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The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee

of the Committee on Armed Services

and

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences

INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS

(DEFENSE)

Wednesday, March 16, 1960

Washington, D. C.

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16 March 1960
Preparedness Investigating Sub. &
Aeronautical and Space Sciences
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Gates Testimony

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

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Hon. Thomas S. Gates, Jr.
Secretary of Defense

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INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS

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Wednesday, March 16, 1960

United States Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services, and
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee and Subcommittee met, pursuant to call,
at 9:35 a.m., in Room 235, Old Senate Office Building,
Senator Lyndon Johnson (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:

Senators Johnson (Presiding), Symington, Bartlett,
Saltonstall and Smith.

Present: Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences:

Senators Johnson (Presiding), Symington, Bartlett,
Magnuson, Anderson, Young, Cannon, Saltonstall, Smith, Wiley,
Martin and Case (N.J.).

Also present: Senators Jackson, Engle, Case (S.D.)
and Bush.

Edwin L. Weisl, Special Counsel; Kenneth E. Belieu, Staff
Director of Space Committee and Preparedness Subcommittee.

Staff Members, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:

Stuart French, Associate Counsel.

Staff Members, Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences: Max Lehrer, Assistant Staff Director; Everard H.
Smith, Jr., Counsel; William J. Deachman, Assistant
Counsel; Dr. Glen P. Wilson, Chief Clerk; and Dr. Earl W.
Lindveit, Assistant Chief Clerk.

Dr. Edward Welsh, Assistant to Senator Symington.

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Senator Johnson. The Committee will come to order.

Today in continuation of our review of missiles, space and other major defense matters, our committees are meeting to hear from the Secretary of Defense, Thomas S. Gates, Jr.

This year, as in the past, we in Congress must make decisions on the annual defense programs submitted by the Executive Branch. On these decisions may well rest America's future.

In order to advise and assist us we have called in the nation's top military experts.

First, in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the threat, we met with Allen Dulles, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. While the testimony, of necessity, remains classified Mr. Dulles left no doubt about the deadly seriousness of the threat -- a threat that ever since the termination of World War II has become increasingly apparent from the obvious intent of the Kremlin to control the world through all possible means.

Our particular attention has been directed to the underlying principles and facts upon which the decisions governing America's defense and space programs are based, for these programs must be designed to actually meet the threat.

To date we have heard from each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the Chairman as well as other key military witnesses responsible for America's

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defense programs. These senior military officials have made it clear that while our defense posture today is adequate, our programs for the future involve a degree of risk which could affect the very survival of our nation.

Some of our outstanding military experts warn us that we must act now to step up such key programs as B-52 continuous airborne alert. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps modernization, airlift, Polaris submarines, dispersed, hardened and mobile ICBM's and anti-submarine warfare.

We must take decisive steps to shorten, rather than lengthen, the lead time for developing an operational aircraft to replace the B-52.

We must also accelerate the development of space satellites and the high thrust engines vitally needed for our space programs.

General Power, Commanding General of America's principal deterrent force testified he was not satisfied that we were doing all we should to ensure our future survival.

General Schriever said that the missile gap we now face results from failure to make the necessary decisions in the past. He also advised that we could increase our operational missile strength during the critical year of 1962 if necessary decisions were made now.

General White testified that there was immediate and continued need for more manned aircraft. He personally

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recommended more B-58's to replace our obsolescent B-47's and the rapid development of the B-70 hypersonic bomber as an operational weapons system.

Admiral Rickover testified about the Soviets that:

"Their program is world domination, and no Russian Communist leader has ever deviated from that principle. Our main enemy is wishful thinking. Only those who learn nothing and forget everything, refuse to look at the record."

Admiral Burke testified that the Navy was approaching the breaking point with regard to obsolescence, but that restrictive budgetary guidelines had prevented the Navy from presenting its military requirements. He urged immediate expansion of the Polaris program.

General Lemnitzer testified that the Army was not modernizing as rapidly as it should and that only a small portion of the funds added by the Congress in 1960 for Army modernization had been released for this purpose. He voiced the need for more airlift and warned that the country has as yet no adequate defense against ICBM's.

General Taylor testified that unless heroic measures are taken now, this nation faces a threat to its survival.

There has, of course, been a difference of opinion among individuals both as Committee members and as witnesses.

I cannot help believe, however, that we are all agreed that

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preparedness and security are the necessary watchwords of this age of advanced and destructive weapons.

America must maintain a position of unquestioned strength to assure that world peace will not be broken by any aggressor tempted to gamble for world domination.

The path to a lasting peace lies through the strength of free nations, and America is the key strength in the free world.

As I have said before, there may be some disagreement on some points discussed before our Committee, but one simple proposition remains absolutely clear.

If we speed up our defenses and they are not needed all we lose is money. If we fail to step up our defenses and they are needed, we could lose our country.

The very able and distinguished Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gates is here with us this morning and the committee, Mr. Gates, wants to thank you for being with us and for rearranging your very busy schedule on relatively short notice.

We understand that you need to be back at the Pentagon this afternoon in order to prepare for your pending NATO trip. Therefore our session this morning will be limited to the hours remaining and will be held in open session.

If executive matters are to be discussed, they will probably have to be taken up at a later date. In accordance with the

d6 established committee procedures, all witnesses have been informed that the committee does not desire to have lengthy prepared statements, especially because of the limited time available for this hearing.

 I believe you have been informed by our staff that we do not care to have any statements read. However, I understand that you have a statement available and we will be very glad to insert it in the record at this point, to distribute it to the members and to have you if you choose to highlight it in any manner that you may care.

 We will start with questions by the counsel followed by each committee member in turn in accordance with our practice.

 Mr. Secretary, it is also the Committee's procedure to swear the witness, and if you will please stand I shall administer the oath.

 Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in the testimony you are about to give so help you God?

 Secretary Gates. I do, sir.

 Senator Johnson. You may be seated and without objection the statement will be included in the record.

 Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman.

 Senator Johnson. Mrs. Smith?

 Senator Smith. I have just received a copy of this statement. It is a little over 5 pages long double spaced.

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It would seem to me that such an important statement should be read before the committee asks the questions. Some of the questions could be answered by the statement.

Senator Johnson. I had understood from the ranking Republican Mr. Saltonstall that he had talked to Secretary Gates about this and that it would be agreeable to him if in the interest of time we could include it in the record, since no members had had a chance to examine it. That while he was testifying, that they could examine it. The Secretary agreed that that procedure would be agreeable to him just before the hearing.

I do not care to make a point of it. I think we can take more time discussing it than it will take to read it except we would be making an exception, in view of the fact we have two committees joining each other in these hearings, in view of the fact that the tendency in the past has been for witnesses to come with lengthy prepared statements, that by the time you get down to many members, you don't hear it.

Senator Smith. But this is a very short statement, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Johnson. And they don't have a chance to ask their questions if most of the time is taken with prepared statements. Now if we do this, and I will be glad to do it if the Committee desires it, we will be making an exception

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for the Secretary of Defense alone, if he wants to make a point of that or the Committee wants to make a point of it, I would have no objection.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I agree completely on lengthy statements. This is a very brief statement and a very important statement. While I am not a ranking member of this committee, I do feel that it is important for me at least to look it over, and I want to listen to the questions. I would ask the Chairman and the ranking member of this committee to reconsider and permit the Secretary to read it if he can do it quite quickly.

Senator Johnson. If the Secretary desires to have that done, the Chair will certainly have no objection because we think we can take more time discussing it than it will take to read it except it does do this: Next time the statement may be 20 pages and the principle of having witnesses come in with statements and permitting them to deliver them at length will --

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, you will recall I am sure that Mr. Dulles did not read his statement, but some members of the committee had read the statement and had prepared questions from that statement, while some of the rest of us did not, and I did not appreciate it nor did I get the information I needed that I would have gotten had I had a highlight of Mr. Dulles' statement and that is why I am taking

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this position at this time.

Senator Johnson. I think that's right and I have no desire to make a point of it except this. The practice has been in the Committee not to have prepared statements. This is the last witness. No person has been allowed to come in with a prepared statement whether it is five pages or five hours. Now if we desire to make an exception and the Secretary of Defense desires to make an exception, we can do that and I have no objection to it if the Committee wishes.

I think the better course of wisdom would be for him to distribute his statement, let the members examine it, let him highlight it in his own way and then let each member ask questions after counsel has concluded. But if you care to have it formally read at this time, and that is your request, I will put the question.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, as usual you are very fair in this and I would leave it to the Secretary. I would like it read.

Senator Johnson. Without objection then the Secretary will read his statement.

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TESTIMONY OF HONORABLE THOMAS S. GATES, JR.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, I have a short statement.

The major threat confronting us today is the persistent and relentless drive of communism toward an unchanged goal -- a communist controlled world. This threat is real and formidable. It encompasses all fields of human endeavor. It is military, political, economic and psychological.

It is important that we keep this complex threat in perspective. To do so we must examine each part in relationship to the whole.

By the same token we must examine our own capabilities in the same manner. In the military field we must consider the entire picture and not an isolated part, regardless of how dramatic that part may be.

Our military requirements must be based on our needs and consistent with national objectives. The communist military requirements are vastly different. That is one reason we do not need to match the communists bomber for bomber, missile for missile, division for division or submarine for submarine.

We need military strength which will convince the communist leadership that no matter how hard it strikes it will be hit back so hard that its structure will collapse.

An aggressor's destruction must be so inevitable that initiating war is tantamount to suicide. That strength I

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believe we have now, and our defense programs are designed to maintain this strength. This conviction is shared by my principal military and scientific advisers.

1. Some of the facts which support this judgment are:

a. Our total strength, widely deployed within the United States and around the periphery of a single strategic target area, is so great that any surprise attack upon us would result in unacceptable destruction to the attacker.

Contributing to this deterrent are tactical fighter bombers and light bombers plus tactical missiles and carrier attack aircraft in addition to the weapons of the Strategic Air Command.

b. The establishment of early warning systems, the capability for an airborne alert at the time and on the scale needed, and the deployment of mobile, hardened, and concealed missiles are progressing as planned. Our defense programs are under continuous review to insure that we maintain a long-range program of military strength. For example, we are accelerating the second BMEWS station to bring it into operation four months ahead of schedule.

c. Funds are included in the 1960 and 1961 budgets to provide an airborne alert capability for our heavy bombers. The extent of this effort is substantial. \$142 million will be obligated this year and \$85 million next year.

This entails the procurement of extra engines and spare

bd12 parts and the training of crews so that an airborne alert can be mounted if and when the need should arise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I agree that we do not need to fly airborne alert now but we do need the capability to do so during periods of tension which may lie ahead.

The Congress has assisted this program by enacting Section 612(b) in the 1960 Defense Appropriations Act which authorizes the incurring of deficiencies for this purpose. We are requesting re-enacting of this provision in the 1961 Act.

d. The intercontinental missile is a new and vitally important weapon that will profoundly affect the character of our problem. However, the threat it poses is not best countered by matching missile for missile.

In fact, we must not allow ourselves to over-concentrate on any instrument of war. Rather the solution to our maintaining a valid and effective defense posture is by having in being a variety of types of weapons systems capable of successfully countering all types of threats facing us and our allies.

2. We have nuclear weapons that exceed those of the USSR by several times in total destructive power. We have long-range means of delivery that exceed theirs by several times in total carrying capacity. We have, in combination, "enough" to bring destruction to anyone who attacks us. We are designing our programs to maintain this strength.

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Last year we had available to us the National Intelligence Estimate which gave us the numbers of operational ICBMs which the USSR could achieve or might achieve in various time periods. These were calculated to cover either of two possibilities: One, that the Soviets would pursue a vigorous but orderly ICBM program, and the other, that they would pursue a highly accelerated or "crash" program.

A year has now passed. Additional information has been acquired and further refinement has been accomplished. Considering all the available evidence, we believe it is now well established that the USSR is not engaged in a crash program for ICBM development.

Whether we take the estimate of a year ago or the current estimate, it is my firm judgment and that of my military and scientific advisers that our deterrent and retaliatory position remains adequate to meet the threat today and in the years ahead. We do not foresee a time when the Soviets could launch an attack on us without inviting unacceptable damage to themselves in return.

I should also like to make it clear that neither General Twining nor I have been deprived of essential elements of intelligence, nor do I believe that our testimony indicates that we have been deprived of such essential elements.

The flow of intelligence information and its assessment by the Intelligence experts is a continuous process. General

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Twining and I are kept constantly informed on important developments in this area.

Because they started much earlier and stayed persistently with the same program, the USSR has booster engines, making possible exploration in deep space.

Meanwhile, our nation has had to telescope time in this effort. The lost years cannot be regained overnight, even though our scientists and engineers have worked wonders. For the years immediately ahead it is important that we clearly differentiate space exploration from military weapons systems. At present the Department of Defense has no specific military requirements for so-called super-boosters.

We are vitally interested in the development of larger boosters because the future may well bring specific military requirements for them.

Our military satellite program is progressing as a matter of priority and is well supported by the propulsion systems of our ballistic missiles.

Mr. Chairman, we are continuously reviewing our programs. We will not hesitate to come back to the Congress for additional funds at any time we feel such funds are required. We will not hesitate to take emergency measures.

As of this time, I am convinced that we are on a sound basis and have presented a properly balanced concept. We will continue to plan and to change as necessary. We must

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always remain superior in total power. Along with the President, I am convinced that we will.

Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

We will first ask the counsel to proceed with his questioning. Then we will take committee members in order.

I want to ask you one question though, Mr. Secretary, in view of your statement that neither you nor General Twining had been deprived of any intelligence information.

I want to call your attention to page 411 of the hearings of this committee.

"Senator Saltonstall. General Twining, you are telling us that until the time you saw this chart, either in this room or after it had been given to this committee, that you have never seen these calculations that CIA had made?

"General Twining. I have seen some of them but not all of them."

How do you reconcile that with the statement that you made that would imply that all the information had been seen?

Secretary Gates. That was not an essential element of intelligence, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Johnson. So the description of intelligence elements would not include these charts in their description.

Secretary Gates. No, sir, it would include those charts, but it would not include certain figures that did

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not affect the national intelligence estimates for the two years that were under comparison.

Senator Johnson. Counsel?

Mr. Weisl. Mr. Secretary, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, namely the Comptroller, has provided a summary which shows that the Department of Defense has underestimated the funds required for IRBMs and ICBM programs each and every year since 1955, and I read:

For Fiscal Year 1955 the budget request for these weapons was 40 and nine-tenths million. The amount finally programmed was 158 and nine-tenths million. FY 1956 the budget request was 159 and three-tenths million. The program finally approved was 526 and three-tenths million. FY 1957 the budget request was 858 and nine-tenths million. The amount finally programmed was one billion four hundred million and nine-tenths. FY 1958 the budget request of the Department of Defense was one billion nine hundred thirty-seven and three-tenths million.

The amount finally programmed was two billion one hundred forty-nine and eight-tenths million. For Fiscal Year 1959 the budget request was two billion three hundred ninety-one million. The amount finally programmed was two billion nine hundred forty-five and six-tenths million. For Fiscal Year 1960 the budget request was two billion five hundred twenty-two and eight-tenths billion, and the amount finally

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programmed was three billion three hundred three million and three-tenths. Can you explain to this committee why the Department of Defense has been so consistently wrong in underestimating the amounts required for ballistic missile programs?

Secretary Gates. I can only explain it, Mr. Weisl, to the effect that this is a new program, a new art in terms of years. It is changing extremely rapidly, and is under continuous review. It relies on tests, and there are continuous changes in it. It is not unusual for the Department of Defense to reprogram in all of its programs, procurement programs.

But it is true that decision are made throughout the years and on a month by month basis that change the figures. This is still going on as of today.

Mr. Weisl. Why have the budget requests so largely underestimated the requirements not for one year but for six years, consistently?

Secretary Gates. I think my answer is just as I gave it. You must remember that it used to take 10 years to develop an airplane weapons system. We are dealing with the first six years of expenditures of substantial amounts for these missile programs. This is a new business, and subject to comparative analyses, scientific review and test success or failures repeatedly, and we do the best we can to estimate

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when we make up a budget which is in the fall for an 18 month period ahead, and it is not unusual to have this kind of an overrun in a new program, or an underestimate in a new program.

Mr. Weisl. My question is why have you always erred by underestimating and never over-estimating for six straight years?

Secretary Gates. I think I have answered the question as best I can, sir.

Mr. Weisl. May I ask this question: If we can't estimate our own requirements on a year by year basis, how can we estimate the Russians' requirements three years ahead?

Secretary Gates. We can only estimate the Russian requirements on the basis of the best intelligence that we can acquire in a field that is obviously an inexact science, so that we do the best we can.

Mr. Weisl. I am sure you do, Mr. Secretary. But my question is that having more intelligence about our own requirements, and if we underestimate them year by year for six straight years, how can we estimate the Russian requirements or intentions, for three years ahead, with any degree of reliability?

Secretary Gates. Well, this is another thing similar to the changes in our own programs. We are reviewing the information we have on their programs on a monthly and

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regular basis, and our estimates change on their program as we go down the line.

Mr. Weisl. But we could be just as wrong in underestimating their intentions or capabilities or programs, certainly can be just as wrong as we have been underestimating our own, can't we?

Secretary Gates. I don't know how wrong we have been in underestimating our missiles in terms of numbers. We may have been wrong in underestimating our dollars. As far as I know, we don't have any estimate of their dollars.

Mr. Weisl. Don't numbers translate themselves into dollars?

Secretary Gates. No, sir. They translate themselves into a whole variety of factors, training, construction, research and operational instruments.

Mr. Weisl. But the more dollars we have, the more training and research and other elements are available, isn't that true?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. And the less dollars we request, the less training and research and other elements are available.

Secretary Gates. Yes, but these things are very difficult to estimate, as I said before, in a new field, and I think we have done remarkably well frankly in a new field to do as well as we could compared to our historical experience with

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other types of weapons systems.

Mr. Weisl. Since there is about a two year lead time in missile programs, won't we be in trouble if we change our estimates a year from now?

Secretary Gates. If we change our estimates on either side we have to adjust for these changes. We may not be in trouble but we must be flexible and alert to such changes as a possibility.

Mr. Weisl. Can we ever make up for lost lead time?

Secretary Gates. Lead time is very difficult, depending on the type of installation you are talking about. Lead time of hardened missiles is about 30 months, and you can make up for lost lead time in other ways of countering the threat, but in certain specific weapons systems, you cannot make up for lost lead time.

Mr. Weisl. General Schriever testified that because we did not make the right decisions two years ago, we have fewer ICBMs today than we could have had, had we made the right decisions then. Do you agree with that testimony?

Secretary Gates. If we decided to put more effort several years ago into a particular type of system, we could have done so and we would have had more of that system, but we decided it would be wiser from the standpoint of national defense to diversify our systems and to move into newer types of missiles that were better, in the fact that they

bd21 could be more mobile and more widely dispersed and more invulnerable.

Mr. Weisl. General Schriever further testified that we could increase the number of operational ICBMs that we could have by 1962 if we made the necessary decisions now. Have you reconsidered the current ICBM programs?

Secretary Gates. Yes. I have not completed the reconsideration of them, but we have been studying certain factors that have been introduced, and I have personally been briefed on certain possibilities, largely alternate possibilities that might make it possible for us to, after review particularly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to make recommendations to change the recommendations that we have heretofore made.

We have these under consideration.

Mr. Weisl. But no decision has been made.

Secretary Gates. No. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Do you have any doubt as to the need for more ICBMs?

Secretary Gates. I have no doubt that we must have an invulnerable and a strong deterrent posture based on a total mix of weapons systems. I cannot look at an isolated system without looking at the total, and the whole. So I would balance the need for ICBMs with the other systems we have under development and the various types of ICBMs we have under development. I would also take a long look at the

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Polaris system which I have always considered in my own mind to be an intercontinental ballistic missile, and have always referred to it as such, perhaps because I was involved with it from its inception.

Mr. Weisl. Mr. Secretary, may I refer you to an address that you made when you were retiring as Secretary of the Navy? This address was made to the Navy League in May of 1959, and in that address you made the following statement, and I quote:

"In a limited war situation the Navy must maintain a capability to use either nuclear or conventional weapons to the controlled degree necessary to achieve the objective. More funds are required for this purpose. More accent on its importance is needed. This support will have to come from the elimination of certain of the very expensive mass destruction single purpose weapons systems which have a priority of claims against our national resources."

Now first of all you did say that more funds would be required for that purpose. Have more funds been asked for for that purpose?

Secretary Gates. Yes. I think we have been putting more money into our limited war capability each year. This is the total money that goes toward --

Mr. Weisl. You mean more money from year to year, Mr. Secretary.

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Secretary Gates. I think we have been trying to balance the three missions that we have in the Department of Defense, which that speech refers to, between our strategic general war weapons systems and our limited war systems. I think that we are still trying to make this correct balance.

Mr. Weisl. Will you supply for the record the figures to indicate what you state, that you have put more money into conventional warfare capabilities from year to year?

Secretary Gates. I will try, Mr. Weisl. This is very difficult because this involves the effort that practically represents the Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps, and their modernization, which is not all that they would like to have. But we think we are making progress on. You must remember there I spoke as a Service Secretary, and I believe at that time I tried to be non-Parochial. I believed at that time in proper balance. I believe in it even more today.

Senator Jackson. Will the counsel separate that question so that you can ask for the amount requested by the Bureau of Budget and the amount actually put in by Congress, especially as it relates to modernization of weapons?

Secretary Gates. The amount requested, Senator Jackson, by the Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. Weisl. The amount requested by the Department of Defense and cleared by the Bureau of the Budget, and the amount appropriated for this purpose by Congress.

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Secretary Gates. Yes. I am not trying to avoid doing any homework, Mr. Weisl. It is going to be very difficult to separate out forces as pertaining to limited war. Many people have tried to put our budget on a functional basis, and we have found it absolutely impossible to do so.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield for a technical question, Mr. Weisl?

Mr. Weisl, I wonder if that question can be answered. For instance, is an aircraft carrier a conventional weapon or a strategic weapon? Is a tank that will fire a gun, that will fire a cannon 500 miles a strategic weapon or a conventional weapon?

I just point out that I think it is a very difficult question to answer in the form that you have asked it.

I say that most respectfully.

Secretary Gates. If I may say the Senator has outlined some of the very real reasons that it is almost impossible to put a functional budget out for the Department of Defense.

Senator Jackson. I think right at that point the Secretaries, Mr. Secretary, for the individual services have been up and made their point that they need additional funds, for example, for modernization. This is the area that is indeed limited primarily to limited war.

Secretary Gates. That's right.

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Senator Jackson. And certainly you can split it from that. Otherwise, of course, you could never get an answer.

Secretary Gates. We can give you an answer on such things as Army modernization which is the Army Procurement account and on the Navy shipbuilding account in some categories. We will try, Mr. Weisl.

Mr. Weisl. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Now last year General Taylor stated that two of his principal reservations concerning the 1960 budget were inadequate provision for Army modernization and for early production of Nike-Zeus. The Congress was convinced apparently of these requirements, and appropriated 382 million over the budget request for Army procurement. The Army head has testified that only 43 million of this has been made available for the Army modernization during 1960. Why has the Congressional intent been completely disregarded?

Secretary Gates. My recollection, Mr. Weisl, is that all of that money has been made available to the Army with the exception of 137 million dollars which was supposed to be applied to the production of the Nike-Zeus system, and since we made a decision to have fullscale tests on a research basis of the Nike-Zeus system and to not put the system in production, we have not released that \$137 million. But my understanding is the rest of the money has been released to the Army. Now there may be a few, a small portion of it that we have not

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yet gotten together on exactly the type of equipment they are going to buy.

But in essence it is or will be released.

Mr. Weisl. Have you read the testimony of General Traub on this subject before the Appropriations Committee of the House?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Would you be kind enough to read it and supplement your testimony if you think it is necessary?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I am aware --

Mr. Weisl. In that respect.

Secretary Gates. I read the Secretary's testimony. I did not read General Traub's.

Mr. Weisl. In your statement that I just read, you make this observatio, and I quote: Referring to support of the program that you then advocated:

"This support will have to come from the elimination of certain of the very expensive mass destruction single purpose systems which have a priority of claims against our national resources."

Now what did you mean by that? What will have to be eliminated in the expensive mass destruction single-purpose weapons systems?

Secretary Gates. I meant by that I am sure that at that time we had to make choices between the variety of different

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ways we had of carrying out our strategic mission, and this is true.

We have made choices, such as Navajo and other weapons that have been changed. I meant that in the long run you should not develop too many competing weapons systems for a single purpose.

Mr. Weisl. The Navajo, Mr. Secretary, was canceled many years before you made this talk.

What expensive mass destruction single-purpose weapons systems did you think ought to be eliminated?

Secretary Gates. I wouldn't have been able at that time to have had a judgment on it. I just was talking about how much is enough for the strategic purpose.

Mr. Weisl. Has any decision ever been made as to how much is enough?

Secretary Gates. No. We do the best we can with it. We make studies and evaluations of it.

Mr. Weisl. But you must have had in mind, Mr. Secretary, ---

Secretary Gates. I didn't have in mind -- I had in mind a broad category of systems. I wasn't competent as Secretary of the Navy to determine which system versus which other system.

Mr. Weisl. But you did say that this support will have to come from the elimination of certain of the very expensive

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mass destruction single-purpose weapons systems.

Secretary Gates. That's right.

Mr. Weisl. Now, which ones did you have in mind? Did you have in mind the Atlas?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Is that a single-purpose weapon?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Did you have in mind the Titan?

Secretary Gates. I had in mind the whole category of systems that were under contemplation or under research or in development, that when they came into certain stages they all compete with each other. This is one of the arguments I am having in my present capacity about the B-70 airplane, for example, which we have talked about in other committees. I had in mind that you have to make decisions between these weapons systems, as you see was involved in them, and you see what dates they are going to come into operational capacity and take a look at these in regard to the total balance of your military power.

Mr. Weisl. Let us try to be a little more specific. The single-purpose mass destruction weapons are the Atlas, the Titan, the Minuteman and the Polaris, is that true?

Secretary Gates. Yes, plus the B-52.

Mr. Weisl. Plus the B-52, the B-58, the B-70. That is true. Now which one of these did you have in mind eliminating

bd29

when you made this positive statement?

Secretary Gates. I didn't have anyone in mind. I didn't have the competence to name one of them. I had in mind the category had to be reviewed.

Mr. Weisl. You talked about elimination.

Secretary Gates. And some would have to be eliminated.

Mr. Weisl. Now how do you feel about that today? Do you feel that some of them have to be eliminated?

Secretary Gates. I feel that we always have to review these programs and keep a well-balanced defense posture, and not rely on a single type of systems for our effort, yes, so in the long run some of them will be eliminated.

Mr. Weisl. Which ones do you have in mind eliminating?

Secretary Gates. None, sir, right now.

Mr. Weisl. In your opinion do Soviet manned bombers pose a current threat to the United States?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. In view of this threat, will you be kind enough to explain the abrupt removal of 15 ships from the seaward extension of the DEW line over the objections of the Commander in Chief of the North American Air Defense Command?

Was this done for military reasons or budgetary reasons?

Secretary Gates. While the Soviet manned bomber remains

bd30

a threat, again it is a matter of balance and degree.

When this extension of the DEW line was contemplated, I believe it was 1955, and I believe it was put into being in 1957. After a review of the Continental Defense picture again, and after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was considered that we could reduce somewhat the effort in connection with both Air Force tactical fighter squadrons and Navy ships in supporting this concept that was, as I say, devised five years ago. Those ships are not going out of existence in total.

Some of them are going to still go on part of the same mission by being used in what is called the continuous warning line, and others will replace older Navy ships that will be put into mothballs.

Mr. Weisl. May I read you from a memorandum submitted to us by the Department of the Navy on this subject on March 8, 1960, and I read from paragraph 3:

"General Kuter notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he recommended against this action in that removal of the picket ships would degrade the warning capability of the seaward extension of the DEW lines, and that the WV-2 aircraft which would remain flying these extension lines would not have as good detection capability as would the ships."

Secretary Gates. That is correct. General Kuter

bd31

recommended that in a Commanders Conference, unified Commanders Conference we held in Norfolk in the first early days of January. We did not agree with General Kuter.

Mr. Weisl. Who are the "we" that did not agree?

Secretary Gates. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself.

Mr. Weisl. Was that unanimous?

Secretary Gates. As far as I know it was, Mr. Weisl.

Mr. Weisl. General White concurred in that?

Secretary Gates. I would want to check and see whether we made a record of this, but I never recall any objection from General White.

Mr. Weisl. Did Admiral Burke concur in it?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. And General Lemnitzer?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. And General Shoup of the Marine Corps?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. I would like to place in the record if there is no objection the memorandum, the entire memorandum of the Department of Defense on this subject.

In January of this year, Mr. Secretary, you submitted the following unclassified --

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, on the question of procedure I assume that that is going in, that memorandum.

Senator Symington. Does anybody object to the memorandum

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being put in the record? Without objection, the memorandum
will be put in the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

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Mr. Weisl. In January of this year Mr. Secretary, you submitted the following unclassified official statement, and I quote:

"It has been stated on previous occasions that the Soviet superiority in ICBMs could be in the order of 3 to 1 in the period 1960 to 1963. This statement was based upon estimates of what the USSR could produce in numbers of missiles, and was not an affirmative statement of fact that the USSR would produce the number of missiles required to attain this superiority. On the basis of our current intelligence estimate, which has been presented to the Committee by the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, we do not now believe that the Soviets' superiority in ICBMs will be as great as that previously estimated."

While we do not want to discuss in any sense the number of missiles in this session, it seems to me that it is appropriate to discuss the ratios that you raised. On the basis of the revised national intelligence estimates to which you referred, and on our currently approved programs, will the Soviet have a superiority of more or less than 3 to 1 in mid-1961?

Secretary Gates. This testimony I believe you are referring to was before the House Appropriations Committee.

Mr. Weisl. Yes, sir.

Secretary Gates. I tried very hard not to discuss the

bd34

numbers of missiles, the relative number of missiles in my testimony before that committee. I made it as clear as I could that these numbers in themselves were misleading, that we had to rely upon a variety of factors when we were talking about such numbers, such as accuracy, reliability, the condition of our own defense posture, relative hardening and the time that we were discussing. I think these numbers and ratios pertaining to them are extremely difficult to not have confusing. We must look at this constantly, and it depends on the way you start off, how you start to compare what the so-called ground rules might be, and it depends on the time that you are discussing. I tried my best in that testimony to bring out these factors, with the hope that we would not get into a discussion which has later of course developed concerning these numbers, because they are misleading unless you consider the total problem that is involved.

Mr. Weisl. I did not bring up the numbers. You are the one that in your statement stated --

Secretary Gates. You are bringing up testimony which led to this, which is part of the identical page of discussion or the identical two or three pages of the discussion leading up to the statement you quoted.

Mr. Weisl. But you made that statement to the committee and in your prepared statement you stated as follows, and I read:

bd35

"If we compare the estimated Soviet ICBM and the sea-launched missile programs with plans for deployment of U. S. ICBMs and Polaris missiles, we know that the Soviets may enjoy at times a moderate numerical superiority during the next three years.

"This difference in numbers appears to peak during the 1962 period."

That was in your prepared statement. It was not the result of any questioning.

Secretary Gates. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisl. And the committee tried to find out what you meant by moderate superiority, and that is what I am trying to find out, and in that regard, since Secretary McElroy, your predecessor, over television publicly stated that there will be a 3 to 1 superiority, and you stated that new intelligence estimates indicate some change in that, I am simply asking you whether the change in mid-1961 will be less than 3 to 1?

Secretary Gates. I can't answer that, Mr. Weisl.

Senator Case of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, may I inject for just a second, this is a matter on which there has been I think more discussion than on anything I know of in this whole area.

I wonder if in order to get the exact facts, without any reservation as to concern for the country's security we

bd36

might not have an understanding that this will be discussed
in detail in executive session.

Senator Symington. I don't think there has been any information that has been given to anybody yet that has not already been given out by the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Case of New Jersey. That isn't the point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. I haven't seen any intention or implication of the counsel to give out any classified information.

Senator Case of New Jersey. There is no suggestion of that.

Senator Symington. The counsel has pointed out that the subject has been raised voluntarily by the Secretary of Defense. We have also had testimony that the gap has not narrowed. It has increased. I think the counsel, inasmuch as the American people want to know what the facts are, should be allowed to pursue the matter the way he thinks best, because he has the interest of classified material at heart just as much as any member of the committee.

Senator Case of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I haven't made myself clear.

Senator Symington. I am sozzy.

Senator Case of New Jersey. There is no suggestion that counsel should be deterred from any questioning along

bd37

this line.

Senator Symington. Would the counsel listen to the comments of the distinguished Senator from New Jersey.

Senator Case of New Jersey. There is no desire on my part to stop counsel from pursuing this line so far as he thinks it is desirable of course at this time. I only wanted to make the point that for my own sake and I think many people would agree, it is very desirable that we ask the Secretary to appear before us in executive session on this point so that we may go into exact detail as to the meaning of his statement, and make it clear to me at least as a member of the committee -- perhaps I haven't gotten all the nuances of the testimony so far, something that is not yet clear and I doubt can be made clear without our being in executive session.

Senator Symington. I must say with great respect I disagree with the distinguished Senator from New Jersey.

Senator Case of New Jersey. This indicates an inadequacy on my part but I still pursue my suggestion.

Senator Symington. May I continue? Statements have been made publicly by the Secretary of Defense and by the Secretary of the Air Force that the gap has either been reduced or eliminated. That was in public session. Statements have been made in private session by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency that the launching capability gap has

bd38

increased. I believe that we have to leave it up to the counsel of the committee, who is mindful of the importance of classified material, to question the witness as to who was right.

Was he right? Was the Secretary of the Air Force right in a television broadcast, or was the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency right with respect to what has happened to this gap in the last 12 months?

Senator Case of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I would like to respectfully suggest that what counsel is doing --

Senator Symington. May I continue?

I am sure that the Senator from New Jersey wants to see the facts given out to the people to the best of the counsel and the witness' ability without getting into classified material.

Senator Case of New Jersey. Of course, the Senator from New Jersey wants this and that has always been his position. It is his position now. It is his position however further that we can more quickly come to an understanding of this either that someone has been wrong or that there has been a misunderstanding by completely open frank testimony in executive session and then make the explanation in our reports and otherwise as the facts may determine.

But I for one do feel that this is a matter we should go into in detail in executive session where there is no

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question of our skirting the line of secrecy. It is a very delicate issue and I believe we ought to have the facts but we ought to have them first in executive session.

I don't suggest for a second that counsel is not entirely right in raising the question or pursuing it as far as he thinks he can in open session.

I merely want to have an assurance if we may that an executive session with the Secretary will be available to us to go into the matter as far as some of us at least think it should be pursued.

Senator Symington. Senator Jackson?

Senator Jackson. Will the Chair yield? Would it not be in order in a lawyerlike way for the counsel to have the right to cross-examine the Secretary in the area that he placed in the public domain, that is namely the statement that counsel read, which has been or was made public in the Appropriations Committee, and to propound the necessary questions as to whether or not there has been any change?

Senator Case of New Jersey. May I just make one comment on this, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Jackson. It seems to me how anyone can argue against that as far as security, it is beyond my understanding. I agree with the Senator from New Jersey that it would be helpful and it should be in executive session to get back of all of this, which the Secretary wants to point out, that

bvd 40 is the matter of other weapons systems. But it would seem completely in order and entirely in keeping with the right to cross-examine that area of the statement already made public, unless there is some clear-cut reason why security is involved.

Senator Case, of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, may I just comment on that?

I think what has happened is this: The Secretary made a statement. Testimony taken before us in executive session from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency appears to some to be in conflict at some point. The questioning of the witness is now being based upon both his open statement and the Director of Intelligence Agency's testimony before us in secret session, and I think we are not going to get a complete final answer on the basis of that without going into executive session. I do not in any way protest counsel's pursuing this as far as he thinks proper at this time.

I merely want before this matter is closed to have an assurance if we may that we may pursue this in a way that I think is necessary in executive session before the matter is closed or considered closed by the Committee.

Senator Jackson. Isn't it entirely in order to simply ask whether that statement still stands? The statement has been made public.

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Aren't the American people entitled to know whether the statement is still correct?

Senator Case of New Jersey. The American people are entitled to have every possible bit of information consistent with security. As a member of this committee, I feel I would like to have it explained to me in executive session in which we can pursue it in detail so that my own understanding is as good as I think my duties as a Senator are required to be.

Senator Jackson. I understand that, but I just for the life of me don't understand why you can't ask whether a previous public statement still stands.

Senator Case of New Jersey. I am not suggesting that that question should not be asked as I said I think several times.

Senator Symington. Senator Case of South Dakota?

Senator Case of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the problem arises from the fact that the Secretary is being asked to comment upon yardsticks used by other persons. There is nothing that I have heard this morning that would indicate that former Secretary McElroy and Secretary Gates used the same definition of terms in their comparisons. Further than that, with respect to asking the Secretary to comment upon a suggested statement or position indicated by the Director of Intelligence, Mr. Dulles, relating

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to comparative strengths overlooks the fact that Mr. Dulles in the executive session which I heard at least talked about an entirely different thing. And further than that, Mr. Dulles has repeatedly refused to make a comparative statement.

He has said that he could give such intelligence as he might have in the foreign field, but that it was beyond the competence of the CIA to go into domestic figures, so that he has refrained from comparative figures. And any attempt to suggest that Mr. Dulles has made a comparative statement I think would be unfair to Mr. Dulles, and to ask Mr. Gates to comment upon an alleged comparative position taken by Mr. Dulles would be without foundation.

Senator Symington. Is the Senator finished?

Senator Case of South Dakota. Yes.

Senator Symington. I would like to make a couple of observations on my own. First, I do not agree with the Senator from South Dakota. I believe the information that was furnished in committee by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency when compared with the information that was furnished in committee by the Secretary of Defense shows that there is a direct disagreement as to what the strength of the Soviets in this field is --

Senator Case of South Dakota. But that is the Senator's comparison, not Mr. Dulles.

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Senator Symington. Let me finish, please.

That is the first point. The second point is that I think there is a great deal more danger of insecurity and lack of security in attempting to have information given out in open hearings which in effect is contradicted in closed hearings than there would be in releasing this testimony as to what we think the Soviet is doing. First they know what they are doing, and secondly based on our system it is a comparatively simple matter for them to find out what we are doing.

Therefore, as I understand it, the Senator from New Jersey, what he is suggesting is that we have a classified hearing later on. Now I have been on this committee for a great many years and testified before it for a great many years in addition.

I know of no case where we haven't had classified hearings either before or after public hearings in order to get the truth out to the people so long as I have been connected with this committee either as a witness or as a member, and I would hope at this time that this able counsel who is giving up his time and effort to do this job is not in any way hindered by comments as to whether or not he is pursuing a proper line of questioning of the witness.

I yield to the Senator from Washington.

Senator Jackson. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, the

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Secretary placed the statement, the now public statement, in the record after the hearing. Is that not correct?

Secretary Gates. Two statements have been read by counsel. One was my public statement, prepared statement. Another statement was the one I guess you are referring to Senator Jackson.

Senator Jackson. Yes. But you had plenty of time to think through the security angle, right?

Secretary Gates. That was placed at the request of the committee after the hearing.

Senator Jackson. And is this not the statement, the one that counsel read to you? Wasn't that the one that you placed in the record after deliberation?

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Jackson. And did you not state in that statement, "On the basis of our current intelligence estimate which has been presented to the committee by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency we do not now believe the Soviet superiority in ICBMs will be as great as previously estimated."

I merely make this point to our colleagues who have referred to a reference to the CIA, that the Secretary of Defense, after thoughtful consideration, based his statement by referring to estimates supplied by the CIA. So I hardly understand the relevance, Mr. Chairman, to the exclusion of counsel from asking questions that refer to information

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supplied by the CIA, if the Secretary of Defense, after thoughtful consideration, referred to the CIA as a source of reference.

Senator Case of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Senator Case.

Senator Case of New Jersey. In the first place I think I am probably the last person who would be in any way suggesting that what counsel, particularly this particular counsel, what he is doing is improper. This is not so. And any suggestion that that is my purpose ought to be immediately eliminated. What I am suggesting is that in order for me, and I am talking about me, I am not talking about anybody else, to have the kind of understanding that I think as a member of the Senate of the United States I ought to have of this matter, it will be necessary for us to go into executive session for this reason.

The Secretary made a statement. Some people have suggested that that is contradicted by testimony given before us in secret session. For us to determine this requires us in my judgment to go into secret session. The quicker we do it, the better. I think we should have done it before we had an open session on this point. I hope at least we will have a secret session hereafter.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Senator Saltonstall?

bd46

Senator Saltonstall. My remark is this: The Chairman stated this hearing was going to be over at 12 o'clock. I have checked and the counsel has about 7 more minutes. With the number of people here, there is 75 minutes of questioning. If we are going to give an opportunity to each one to question, I hope we will let the counsel proceed.

Senator Symington. May I respectfully say to my friend from Massachusetts that the matter was not raised on this side of the aisle, that being raised there ought to be a fair and open discussion of the matter so that the people understand what we are talking about.

Is there anybody here who objects on the committee to having a classified session after this open session? If there is not, without objection we will have an executive session, Mr. Secretary, in accordance with the suggestion of the Senator from New Jersey at some time mutually convenient after this open session.

Senator Case of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I think you have been very fair and I thank you.

Senator Symington. I thank the Senator and I have great respect for his opinion.

Senator Wiley. Peace prevails at least.

Senator Symington. Mr. Counsel, will you proceed?

Mr. Weisl. Mr. Secretary and Members of the Committee, in no way directly or indirectly did counsel refer

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to any testimony given by Mr. Dulles to us in executive session.

I was merely referring to the statement made by the Secretary, that on the basis of our current intelligence estimates that he had, not that we had, we now believe that the Soviet superiority in ICBMs will not be as great as that previously estimated. And since the previously estimated to which he referred, not I, was 3 to 1, I asked the question based upon the 3 to 1 that you yourself suggested, if that superiority has been decreased when you take into account missiles on launcher for mid-1960, 1961 and '62.

Secretary Gates. I have no way of knowing what combination of circumstances were used in the 3 to 1 that has been widely quoted.

I just don't know that. I believe that I stand on the statement that I submitted. I have no other way of commenting on it, Mr. Weisl.

Mr. Weisl. But Mr. Secretary, you were the one that referred to the 3 to 1 superiority and you stated that this was based upon estimates of what the USSR could produce in numbers of missiles and was not an affirmative statement of fact that the USSR would produce the number of missiles required to attain this superiority. I am simply asking you whether on the basis of the current intelligence estimate that you referred to, not that I referred to, that 3 to 1 ratio when you take into account missiles on launchers has

bd48 been changed in '60, '61 and '62.

Secretary Gates. I do not really believe it is possible, I certainly do not want to add to the confusion, I don't believe it's possible to talk about ratios. I don't believe it is possible. I think the difference has narrowed. The difference this year between last year has narrowed when you consider the fact, as I said in my statement here today, that we had an estimate that they might indulge in a crash program. I believe that the situation has narrowed. I think it is terribly misleading to get into ratios and to, into specific numbers, and I wish there was a way so that none of us would be confused.

I wish we could stay in open session and try and resolve the confusion. But to me numbers are misleading because you have to reconcile the other factors that go into numbers, and we are talking about only one weapons system, not other weapons systems.

Personally, as I testified earlier here today, I consider the Polaris an ICBM, the Polaris system, not the missile. And if you count the Polaris in, you get a different set of numbers and a different set of ratios. If you take mid-calendar year versus end calendar year you get another set of numbers.

To me it is unwise and misleading and difficult for any of us to understand without confusion if we deal in

bd50

Mr. Weisl. Military deterrent.

Senator Wiley. Get that in too. There are a lot of other deterrents.

Senator Symington. Let the counsel proceed because a question has been raised by the ranking member.

Senator Wiley. That is all I interrupted. You ought to give me a little concession once in a while.

Senator Symington. You will be given all concessions. I am just trying to cooperate with the other side.

Mr. Weisl. General Power testified we have no warning today against ballistic missiles and will not have a dependable warning system for several years. He therefore recommended that immediate provision be made to place a certain percentage of the SAC heavy bomber force on continuous airborne alert.

As a matter of fact, General Power told this committee that this is number one priority. Do you agree with General Power?

Secretary Gates. No, sir, this has been extremely carefully reviewed. It was reviewed last summer. I personally reviewed it last summer as Deputy Secretary of Defense. My predecessor reviewed it. We reviewed it again in this meeting I referred to in Norfolk of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified Commanders. We heard directly General Power's argument.

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We all agree that we should have a capability to fly an airborne alert if and when it is needed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself are agreed that such an airborne alert in the air as of now is not needed. The only real argument about this is the degree of the airborne alert capability that we purchase. This again is an extremely complicated subject. It depends on how long you fly the airplanes and so forth.

I think that we are making the right move in buying a capability to fly an airborne alert if we need it. I do not believe it should be flown as of now.

Mr. Weisl. How do we know when we will need it?

Secretary Gates. We will need it if international tensions perhaps get worse. We will know when we will need it, I hope we will know when we will need it.

Mr. Weisl. What assurance have you that the Russians won't make a surprise attack similar to the attack by the Japs on Pearl Harbor?

Secretary Gates. We do not believe that the Soviet Union is interested in committing suicide.

Mr. Weisl. You are trying to read his mind.

Secretary Gates. No, sir, I am not trying to read his mind. I am saying he is perfectly capable of seeing what we have in being that will destroy him if he initiates that surprise attack.

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Mr. Weisl. You heard the testimony of General Power, that if, when and as he had a certain number of ICBMs, he might be able to destroy completely our retaliatory striking force.

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. If we had no warning system.

Secretary Gates. This was a hypothetical.

Mr. Weisl. And no airborne alert of adequate proportions.

Secretary Gates. A hypothetical mathematical analysis made with no time table, no estimate of our condition of readiness, and I referred to it I believe as being somewhat unrealistic.

Mr. Weisl. And you disagree with General Power?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Now may I call your attention to a statement made by Professor Kissinger, who was the Military Adviser to the Rockefeller Brothers Committee and is a Professor I think of Military Science at Harvard University, and I quote:

He states: "If the proposals of Generals Power and White are accepted and prove to be wrong, we will have spent \$500 million too much for a number of years. If the program of the President is adopted and he proves to be mistaken, we will have forfeited our national existence."

Do you agree with that analysis of the Power Testimony

bd53

on an airborne alert?

That is what Professor Kissinger was discussing.

Secretary Gates. As I understand what you read, Kissinger recommended we spend \$500 more million dollars a year or our survival was threatened.

Mr. Weisl. No.

Secretary Gates. We were finished.

Mr. Weisl. What he said was if we were wrong in spending that amount of money we would have lost the money. But if the Department of Defense was wrong in not spending it, we could lose our country.

Secretary Gates. I don't think there is anyone wise enough to determine that \$500 million of the defense budget is the difference between survival and security.

Mr. Weisl. He was referring to the airborne alert recommended by General Power.

Secretary Gates. The airborne alert as I said, we agree we should have the capability to fly it. From a military point of view we do not believe it need be flown today. Actually it is again a matter of degree, Mr. Weisl. The airborne alert is in the air today in a certain sense.

Mr. Weisl. But General Power --

Secretary Gates. We have airplanes in the air today on a fulltime basis.

Mr. Weisl. In reply to my question as to whether the

bd54 present program --

Secretary Gates. We believe the present program is correct.

Mr. Weisl. Yes, I understand that but in reply to my question to General Power as to whether he believed the present program was adequate, he answered definitely no. You are familiar with that testimony I take it.

Secretary Gates. I am sorry, sir, he answered no? Who? General Power?

Mr. Weisl. General Power.

Secretary Gates. Yes, that is correct. I understand General Power made a recommendation for a larger effort toward an airborne alert.

Mr. Weisl. Now in connection with warning against ICBMs General Power and General Schriever testified that it was urgent to assure the earliest possible development of the Midas satellite system. General Schriever stated that he was hopeful a decision would be made very soon to authorize proceeding with Midas as a weapons system. Has that decision been made?

Secretary Gates. I agree that it is important to move ahead as rapidly as we can with the Midas system. I am advised that we are doing this as of the present time.

Mr. Weisl. Are doing what?

Secretary Gates. Moving ahead as rapidly as we can toward

bd55 having it in operation.

Mr. Weisl. Has it been approved as a weapons system?

Secretary Gates. It is probably a misnomer to call a ---

Mr. Weisl. Whatever it is called.

Secretary Gates. A satellite ---

Mr. Weisl. It is a warning.

Secretary Gates. Correct.

Mr. Weisl. Has it been approved?

Secretary Gates. Oh, yes. This is one of the four space projects of the Department of Defense at high priority.

Mr. Weisl. General Schriever testified too on that subject as follows:

Referring to the Midas, "Well, I mean by that that you decide at this point in time the system is technically feasible within a short period. If you make that decision, then you also have to plan on the ground bases that will support this system, the personnel who have to operate it and maintain it have to be trained, organizations have to be set up. The lead time involved in doing this is often considerably greater than the production of the hardware itself.

"So it is a matter of doing many things simultaneously rather than waiting until you have proved out through development and tests that it works. If you wait until you have done that, then you have to take all these steps later."

Do you agree with that statement by General Schriever,

bd56 referring to the Midas?

Secretary Gates. I agree that we should move at highest priority on it and have so approved. I don't want to be misleading. We are not going into the production on all these aspects of the Midas program as of this time because our research and scientific people tell us we should not. I believe that within these next 6 months we will make such a decision. But it has highest priority and I agree with its importance.

Mr. Weisl. At the request of this committee the Navy has prepared a summary of budgetary action on the Polaris system since FY 1958. Are you familiar with this summary which was cleared by your office for release to this committee?

Secretary Gates. I read it last night, Mr. Weisl, but it is in such detailed Navy language I can probably not answer. I am familiar with it from my own experience in general terms.

Mr. Weisl. Yes. So that we can be fair, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to place this summary in the record.

Secretary Gates. This is the summary that starts in '57 and goes through to the present, is that correct?

Mr. Weisl. That is correct.

Senator Symington. Is there objection? Without objection that will be included as part of the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

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Mr. Weisl. This summary states, and I quote:

"The program recommended by the Navy to the Department of Defense included 9 Polaris submarines in 1961 and provision for 12 in 1962 at an estimated cost of \$1,654,000 in this amount would be made available. Yet later it is stated that under the budget guidelines prescribed for FY 1961 the Navy could ask for only \$1,089,000 covering four Polaris submarines in 1961 plus long lead time components for four more in 1962. The budget reduced this to \$952,000,000 covering only three Polaris submarines in 1961 plus advance procurement for only 3 in 1962."

Could you kindly explain exactly what happened to the Navy's original Polaris recommendations and why they could not be included in the official budget submissions?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. Over the past years we have made a great many recommendations from the Navy to the Department of Defense, all kinds of combinations of ships, missiles, tenders, supporting facilities and research money. We have gone on the principle that about three nuclear submarine systems per year was right, and we have gone to the extent of 3.7 billion dollars so far through the 1961 period, until we had more confirmation and increasing confidence in this system and its being as good as we all hope it will be. I have testified this year that if we receive more confidence on this system, and it was

bd58

possible to reappraise it, which we are doing right now again as a matter of fact -- I have another letter from the Navy as of this week or last week on some recommendations.

We are going to watch this very closely, and with more confidence we will not hesitate to give it further support.

Mr. Weisl. My question is why wasn't the recommendation included in the official budget submission ?

Secretary Gates. Because we just felt that up until the time we had further tests and verifications, that we should not go any faster than 3 per year.

Mr. Weisl. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Gates. Thank you, sir.

Senator Symington. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator Saltonstall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, just a few questions in the time allowed me. You state upon page 4 of your prepared statement:

"Rather than the solution to our maintaining a valid and effective defense posture by having in being a variety of weapons systems capable of countering all types and threats faced by us and our allies", and on page 5, the second sentence you stated, "We do not foresee a time when the Soviets could launch an attack on us without inviting unacceptable damage to themselves in return."

We hear a lot about gaps of one kind and another.

bd59

You are relying on your judgment that our overall deterrent strength is sufficient today and on the plans that you are making in the Defense Department approved by the President are sufficient for the future years as far as you can see ahead, 1961, 2 and 3, we will say.

Secretary Gates. That is correct, Senator Saltonstall, with the continuous proviso that this is a fast-moving business, and we must look at that at all times.

Senator Saltonstall. And that you are looking at it at all times from all different types of weapons that compose the overall deterrent strength.

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Saltonstall. Now we hear a lot about intelligence estimates, estimates based on hard evidence, estimates based on soft evidence, estimates based we will say on inferences and information picked up that can't be too relied on. Those we learn are put together and recommended or given to the various officers of the government including yourself by Mr. Dulles. Now who makes the decisions to carry out that overall deterrent based on the intelligence estimates that are given you?

Secretary Gates. The decisions are made ultimately by the President. The decisions are made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by myself and recommended to the President.

Senator Saltonstall. So that the decisions that you

bd60

make on this overall deterrent strength are based on the best intelligence or the best decisions that you can make on the intelligence that is given to you at the present time.

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Saltonstall. And that applies today and it applies to the future.

Secretary Gates. As of this time, yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Now we hear a lot about research and development of weapons. Dr. York stated in a conversation or in a hearing that there were several hundreds of research efforts going along from time to time at all times. And the great responsibility was to select from those research efforts and cut them down and when you got them cut down, then to cut down some more so that the final development went into just 2 or 3 weapons.

May I ask you if your decisions to go forward we will say with certain efforts like this line, this Midas enterprise, the Polaris, the Minuteman and weapons of that character, those are the results cut down from a great number of research efforts, am I not correct?

Secretary Gates. Yes. Dr. York often says it is a question of choosing between good ideas, and one of the best things that has happened in recent years has been the authority that came with his office under the reorganization

bd61

plan of 1958. We have now transferred to this office authority for research test and evaluation, a great portion of which funds used to be carried in our procurement accounts.

So a great bulk of our effort is in the research categories which he is responsible for. And the Midas program which you mentioned is one of those.

Senator Saltonstall. In other words, this overall deterrent effort for the future is based on the judgments that comes from the various research and development efforts.

Secretary Gates. That's right, sir, and also not only our in-house research capabilities, but advisory committees of great competence formed from national sources, both to advise us and the President has in addition his own scientific adviser and a scientific advisory committee, and these are all consulted in connection with these research systems.

Senator Saltonstall. So that even if several millions or hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent, the slowing down for or the stopping of any single research effort is based on the decision that another research effort is more valuable at the present time?

Secretary Gates. Yes, in which we all play a role in the decision process, the scientist, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the civilian management.

bd62

Senator Saltonstall. And that also is a concern as to whether that weapon will be an offensive weapon or a defensive weapon.

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Saltonstall. And you are leaning more towards the offensive rather than a defensive weapon, is that correct, or both, or would you express an opinion on that?

Secretary Gates. This is difficult to answer. I would say that we were leaning more toward the offensive weapon. This is a matter of opinion.

Senator Saltonstall. Now I was very much encouraged, Mr. Secretary, by your decision that you made several months ago to get right in with the Joint Chiefs of Staff whenever there was a difference of opinion expressed by them. How has that worked out?

Secretary Gates. From my point of view it has worked out even better than I dreamed. We have been meeting on a weekly basis trying to meet every Monday afternoon. We have met four or five times. We have made decisions which have freed up a back log of papers. It has been accepted with remarkable goodwill by the Chiefs and I think if you ask them they would testify it has been a very successful way of doing business.

Senator Saltonstall. And that in your opinion makes the Joint Chiefs of Staff more effective and keeps the

bd63 civilian authority over them in closer touch.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I think it is a very fine way of working. I think they agree.

Senator Saltonstall. You testified I think that section 612(b) in the budget, that is in the present budget and in the budget that you have submitted to the Congress, gives you all the authority that you need to put an airborne alert into the air at any one time, that you believe it is wise to do.

Secretary Gates. That allows us to spend funds for that purpose in an unlimited manner.

Senator Saltonstall. I think you have testified to this. I would just like to emphasize it. You are going forward with the research and development of conventional weapons so-called as well as these so-called nuclear weapons?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Saltonstall. So that you are improving the conventional weapon with the development of nuclear power, with the development of science such as the M-14 rifle and the cannons and that sort of thing.

Secretary Gates. That is right, Senator.

Senator Saltonstall. And those are overall weapons that you are building up as your deterrent effort for 1961, 2 and 3.

Secretary Gates. That is right.

bd64

Senator Saltonstall. Now we have not heard any discussion of mutual security and the NATO. You are going over to NATO very shortly.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. What in your opinion as Secretary of Defense is the value of NATO in the Mutual Security Program in our overall deterrent effort?

Secretary Gates. Our whole security arrangements are based on collective security of the free world. We have treaties as the Senator well knows with some 40 nations. The most successful perhaps of all of our collective security relationships has been NATO, which has, which can, I believe, claim considerable credit for not having a war in Europe in the years it has been in existence.

The mutual security, the Mutual Military Assistance Program we consider absolutely vital to the preservation of these collective security arrangements, both from the point of view of building allied forces that supplement our own forces at a far less expensive and more effective way than if we tried to do this ourselves.

Also for building the Internal Security and responsibility of these countries themselves. And we are saying with confidence and with support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we would not want to see any funds subtracted from military security programs to add to the defense budget.

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We think it is so important.

Senator Saltonstall. I have time for just one more brief question. You have spoken about your decisions in the offing or in the making on more Polaris submarines as you watch them develop and successfully. What about the Atlas? Is there any decision in the making or being made to speed up the Atlas program?

Secretary Gates. In all of these things they are under continuous review and there are under considerations possibilities of a variety of different combinations concerning the Atlas which in one case, for example, would add more Atlas missiles to already authorized sites. This is under consideration.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, I have the breakdown given by General Traub on that 382 million about which there has been so much discussion. I will be glad to show it to the counsel and if he approves he can put it in because the Secretary stated that it was not fresh in his memory.

Senator Symington. Yes, I think there has been a mistake there.

I have the testimony on page 451 of the House Appropriations Committee. We can clear that up.

I believe my turn comes next. Mr. Secretary, first I don't think we will have a chance to ask a lot of questions we would like to ask, but I want to get into the

bd66
details of this Polaris situation and the B-70 with you later on as soon as it is mutually convenient.

I supported every Polaris program that has come before the Congress. I am worried about the fact that in effect we are stopping the development of airplanes, in my opinion, in research on manned aircraft in the United States.

I have been a believer in air power and I have never made a secret about it, Army Air Force, Air Force, Naval airpower, the power and prestige of commercial air power. This is becoming an increasing mystery to me why we are going to put billions and billions of dollars into something that moves a good deal slower than 50 miles an hour and yet we are cancelling out entirely something that moves at many thousands of miles an hour.

So I just wanted to tell you that my questioning, I would like to get into that and find out why that decision was made, the way the world is today.

Secretary Gates. Is this a comparison, Senator, of the B-70 and the Polaris?

Senator Symington. That is correct, isn't that sort of apples and oranges?

Symington
Senator ~~Saltzman~~. You can call it anything you want. I say that we are putting billions and billions of dollars into something that goes less than 50 miles an hour and that we are cancelling out future development of all military and

bd67

therefore commercial aircraft that could go many thousands of miles an hour. And in the doing of that incidentally we are cancelling it out despite the fact it would cost less than one-third of one day's annual income of the United States.

I thought inasmuch as we won't have time to pursue that in detail, that I would like to tell you that it is something that I think we ought to discuss at your convenience, and the convenience of the Chairman and the counsel of the Committee.

Secretary Gates. I will be glad to.

Senator Symington. Now we have had considerable discussion this morning about this question of the gap. It is my understanding based on what I have heard this morning and before that you said the new intelligence analysis had narrowed the gap.

It is also my impression in listening to Director Dulles that the reverse was true. The testimony of Secretary Sharp on a national telecast implied that the gap had either been narrowed or eliminated. It is my impression from the testimony of Director Dulles that the reverse is true. At this point, Mr. Counsel, and members of the committee, I would ask unanimous consent that testimony from a telecast of Secretary Sharp be included at this point in the record, as long as I have referred to it. If there is

bd68 no objection it will be done.

Senator Saltonstall. I have no objection, Mr. Chairman.
When was that telecast held, please?

Senator Symington. I will read it. May I ask that it
not be taken out of my time?

Senator Saltonstall. If you identify it, it isn't
necessary to read it.

Senator Symington. January 24, 1960, 8:30 to 9:00 p.m.
Face the Nation CBS Television Network, guest Dudley C.
Sharp, Secretary of the Air Force, questions from Mr. Von
Fremd.

(The document referred to follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

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Senator Symington. Is there any reason why this year in order to clarify this matter you don't announce publicly the ratios based on our best estimates of the number of ready to launch ICBMs the Soviets have as compared with the number we plan to have?

Secretary Gates. I think that the ratios are misleading, Senator, and I don't know how to announce them in a way that wouldn't cause more confusion.

Senator Symington. Secretary McElroy announced them last year. Are you implying that he misled the American people when he did so?

Secretary Gates. No, sir. I am not familiar with where Mr. McElroy made this statement, nor am I familiar with how he arrived at the ratios.

Senator Symington. But you referred to it in your statement that Senator Jackson put it?

Secretary Gates. I didn't refer to it in this statement I don't think. I referred to it as it had been stated.

Senator Symington. Who stated it if he didn't?

Secretary Gates. I don't know, sir, I just know that I read it repeatedly over a period of time.

Senator Symington. To whom were you referring when you referred to the 3 to 1?

Secretary Gates. I was referring to the common newspaper and other publicity that has been given over quite a long period

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of time of the 3 to 1 ratio attributed to a variety of people I think.

Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that Secretary McElroy did not say that?

Secretary Gates. I don't know, Senator.

Senator Symington. You don't know whether he did or not.

Secretary Gates. No, I really do not.

Senator Symington. You have never taken the trouble to find out?

Secretary Gates. To be completely frank with you, Senator, we have had a research group on this and we have not found out where he said it.

Senator Symington. Have you ever asked him whether he said it or not?

Secretary Gates. No, I have not.

Senator Symington. Has anybody else in your office ever asked him whether he said it or not?

Secretary Gates. I don't know, sir.

Senator Symington. Is it your impression that he did not say it?

Secretary Gates. No. It is my personal impression that he must have said it.

Senator Symington. Then if that is true and it was said last year, inasmuch as we are in the same confusion this

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year that we were in last year, which he clarified by his statement, wouldn't it be logical for you to attempt to clarify this confusion by simply issuing those ratios which he automatically declassified when he made his statement?

Secretary Gates. No, sir, I don't think it would.

Senator Symington. O.k., Mr. Secretary.

What is the overall expenditure ceiling in dollars for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year 1960 and for the Fiscal Year 1961?

Secretary Gates. I can supply that accurately for the record. My impression is that the target for expenditures is \$41,025,000,000 for 1960.

Senator Symington. How much is that?

Secretary Gates. This must be supplied accurately for the record, but my memory tells me that it is \$41,025,000,000.

Senator Symington. Thank you. Going back, you are not sure whether Secretary McElroy made that statement, is that correct, about the 3 to 1 ratio?

Secretary Gates. I am not sure, no, sir. I told you it was my impression he had.

Senator Symington. Let me read to you your testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, the subcommittee.

Secretary Gates. I told you, Senator.

Senator Symington. The subcommittee on Appropriations.

Secretary Gates. I told you, Senator, it was my

bd72

impression he had made it.

Senator Symington. Here is what you said:

"Mr. McElroy made such a statement in his testimony last year. He also made that testimony on a television program in December, but he was always very careful to say that this would be true only if they do what it is estimated they are capable of doing, and that is the very point that I was talking about earlier. Secretary McElroy was operating on the basis of capability figures that produced only theoretical capability basis something that was like 3 to 1. This new intelligence estimate has narrowed the differences."

Do you want to change that testimony?

Secretary Gates. No, sir, because that was my impression and still is. I tried to find out a little more about it to verify it so I would be better informed on how it was arrived at, but I haven't been able to do this.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

You also have an expenditure ceiling for each service? And if so, what is it?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, we do.

Senator Symington. How much is it?

Secretary Gates. We have expenditure targets would be a better word. For 1960 Senator, the Department of the Army, our estimate at this time, and these have to be inexact

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because you are never sure until later in the year, \$9,349,000,000, for the Department of the Navy \$11,571,000,000, for the Department of the Air Force \$18,823,000,000, and for the Office of the Secretary of Defense \$1,202,000,000.

Senator Symington. That is enough. That gives us what we are after.

Secretary Gates. I guess without military system which plays quite an important part of this, because it reflects one way or the other, this totals 49.45 for military functions excluding military assistance.

Senator Symington. If the Congress appropriates more money than is requested in the budget for specific purposes in which we are particularly deficient, will expenditure ceilings or other policies prevent the Department of Defense from spending that additional money?

Secretary Gates. We always take very seriously the money that is appropriated by Congress.

Senator Symington. I understand that. That is not my question.

Secretary Gates. If the expenditure -- is your question related to 1960?

Senator Symington. In 1955 the plan was to eliminate 20,000 Marines who were volunteers at the same time we were drafting 10,000 men a month off the farms and out of the cities to go into uniform in peacetime who did not

bd74 want to go. The Congress put up about 48 million dollars as I remember it to prevent those volunteers from being relieved of duty and discharged, because they wanted to stay in.

They were trained men. Nevertheless the money was not used and they were discharged. Now I am asking if we put up more money this time, to the best of your knowledge as Secretary of Defense before this committee, do these expenditure ceilings prevent you from using that money?

Secretary Gates. No, the expenditure ceilings would not prevent us from using it. We would have a decision of the President on things like force levels, which is the illustration you just gave.

Senator Symington. Is there a particular number of dollars over and above present expenditure plans which you would be able to spend if the Congress made the money available?

Secretary Gates. I am sure that either the Congress or ourselves would not hesitate to spend more money if national security required it over and above any plans.

Senator Symington. My time is coming to a close. I will skip a lot of questions that I wanted to ask you which I will when you have another chance. °

I will ask one more. In your press conference of March 10,

bd75 you said that decisions were pending on the Polaris,
the Atlas, the Bomarc B, the long-range cargo aircraft
where there has been some most interesting testimony recently,
and the Midas.

 You also said "The program is all right the way it is".
Does that mean the decisions have already been made on
these 5 items?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

Senator Symington. Senator Smith?

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have stressed that numbers are mis-
leading. I like what you have said in your statement and I
wish it could be repeated over and over again, especially
the first page of your statement.

On page 4, however, you say "We have in combination
enough to bring destruction to any one who attacks us."

First, what do you mean "we"?

Secretary Gates. We, the United States.

Senator Smith. By whose interpretation?

Secretary Gates. By the interpretation of those
responsible for the defense program.

Senator Smith. And would that be the Defense Department
or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council
and the President?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

bd76

Senator Smith. And would that be by unanimous agreement.

Secretary Gates. There might be differences. Yes, that would be by unanimous agreement.

Senator Johnson. Will the Senator yield? Does that include General Tower, General Lemnitzer?

Secretary Gates. General Lemnitzer -- I will qualify my answer, Senator Smith.

There would be varying differences of opinion within the framework of how we do any given -- how we could pose any given budget. I would like to look at the statement.

I think you are talking about a statement of policy decision here which is agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Security Council and the President.

Senator Smith. Would that be by unanimous agreement or would there be dissension in that group?

Secretary Gates. Could I see the statement you are referring to?

Senator Smith. Your statement on page 4, point 2:

"We have in combination enough to bring destruction to anyone who attacks us."

My question is this: I don't like the word "enough". I would like it better if you said "More than enough" and I would like to ask you if you would not agree with me on that?

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Secretary Gates. Yes, I would.

Senator Smith. Then I asked about the "we". I wanted to be sure that that was the administration of the President.

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Smith. And next I was asking, and I think that was the question you had in mind, is it by unanimous agreement of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the other services, or is there dissension in that group and what percentage would that be?

Secretary Gates. I don't think the question as phrased here has probably ever been posed for a vote. But I believe, I mean I am satisfied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President would agree with the statement that we have in combination enough to bring destruction to any one who attacks us, and would agree to this unanimously.

Senator Smith. Mr. Secretary, I would like to read paragraph 2 on page 17 of the March 14, 1960 issue of Newsweek, and ask you to comment on the statement or what you would have to say about it. If you prefer to delay to executive session, I would leave that to you. It is under the heading, "Taipai. In one recent dogfight against the Chinese Nationalist group which included members of the elite Air Force acrobatic team the red fliers eluded heat seeking U. S. made sidewinder rockets. Some military sources here believe that the Communists

vd78

have now found a way to jam the infrared guidance system of the side winder, a weapon which in one 1958 air battle knocked down 4 MIGs."

Secretary Gates. I have not had any information given to me that has indicated that they have this capability.

Senator Smith. Would you want to check?

Secretary Gates. So far as I understand it, the side winder is a most effective weapon for its purpose and is still being purchased and installed.

Senator Smith. You would not be in a position to state whether that is an accurate statement or inaccurate or whether our military sources were making such statements.

Secretary Gates. We can check it, Senator Smith. I find it difficult to believe that it is an accurate statement if we are still procuring side winder missiles, and I am sure we are. Therefore, I will check and let you know.

Senator Smith. You will check on the jamming.

Secretary Gates. That is what you are asking.

Senator Smith. That is what I am asking, yes, sir.

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Johnson. Senator Bartlett.

Senator Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in response to a question put to you by

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Senator Saltonstall, I believe you said that advisory groups contributed in some measure or other to decisions reached in the Department. It is my recollection that a man quite well informed as to the operations of the Department told a Committee of the Congress not long ago that there were too many committees in the Pentagon and that the operations were bogged down as a consequence.

Would you care to comment on that?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. The response I made to Senator Saltonstall dealt with scientific advisory committees in connection with research where we have one top flight committee. We do have panels of committees perhaps on separate research problems.

I believe that Mr. Lovett was referring to a time probably prior to this where we have done a great deal in the last 2 years to eliminate committees in the Department of Defense.

I am sure that there are probably still too many committees. But we have made progress. We have reviewed these committees, and particularly the committees in the decision-making process. And we have eliminated a considerable number of them. This was the result of the Hoover Commission and other types of studies that were made on the Department of Defense.

Senator Bartlett. How many committees do you have now?

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Secretary Gates. I could not answer that question.

Senator Bartlett. Do you know how many have been eliminated?

Secretary Gates. There were some 200 I think eliminated under the clean-up committee program that was instigated about 2 years ago.

Senator Bartlett. Roughly what percentage of the total has been eliminated?

Secretary Gates. I would say a very high percentage of official committees. How many ad hoc and other kinds of committees there are I really could not say. But I would say that the percentage of the official committees has been greatly reduced.

Senator Bartlett. Do you know of any new committees that have been organized during this period?

Secretary Gates. Yes, but only the ones that I have any association with have been on an ad hoc basis for a special study of some character or other.

Senator Bartlett. I couple this with your response to Senator Symington.

Secretary Gates. This was pertaining to research, Senator Symington's question.

Senator Bartlett. I believe you told Senator Symington that a research group had been set to work if Mr. McElroy had actually said what Mr. McElroy had been said to have said. What I can't understand is why someone did not pick up the

bd81 phone and ask Mr. McElroy instead of putting a research group to work on this.

Secretary Gates. I tried to find a little more information on this subject, than we had. We tried to examine in our office the statements Mr. McElroy made. That is all.

Senator Bartlett. I still believe that Mr. McElroy might have been the best witness on that.

You said as I recall, Mr. Secretary, in reference to missiles, that we have done very well in comparison with our historical experience with other types of weapons, and I don't quite understand exactly what you meant here. I wonder if you would explain.

Secretary Gates. What I meant, Senator, was that it was not uncommon to spend as long as 10 years for the development of a fighter aircraft system. In fact approximately 10 years was more or less normal in the production of aircraft I believe, although we have done better at times and longer at other times, from its inception until the time it joined the combat forces as an operating system. I think we should take great pride in our scientific, industrial and technical capabilities that have brought these missile systems along to the extent that they have been brought along during a short period, a relatively short period.

Senator Bartlett. You would say then in general that we are doing better than we were, but would you say that we

bd82

are doing well enough?

Secretary Gates. We never do well enough. We do the best we can to expedite all of these things.

Senator Bartlett. Why then, Mr. Secretary, in connection with what you have just said, is it, the B-70 program is being stretched out?

Secretary Gates. The B-70 program, as Senator Symington already referred to, it is a very difficult decision. The B-70 was envisioned to be a very expensive weapons system that would come into being some time in 1965 as an operational system.

There were a good many people that reviewed it that felt it might come in at a later period in 1965, maybe as late as '67 or something of that nature. At this time we will have in being, if we stay on schedule, the 4 missile systems, the Titan, Atlas, Minuteman and Polaris in being, in operational quantities on station in considerable numbers. The B-70 therefore is a competing system to these missile systems in that sense, although it is wise always to have variety in your attack. I agree with this as a military principle.

We felt we ought to take a year's look at the B-70, build two prototype aircraft, and a year's look at the development of our missile programs, and see where we would be at the end of that time.

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This is a compromise decision.

Senator Bartlett. Isn't it the case, Mr. Secretary, that when this prototype is completed, you will have the bones with no flesh on it?

Secretary Gates. That's right. This is not the development of a prototype weapons system.

Senator Bartlett. And that will of course occasion further delay.

Secretary Gates. It will delay the 12 months we have delayed. Yes, it will.

Senator Bartlett. Now, Mr. Secretary, on page 2 of your opening statement you said this:

"For example, we are accelerating the second BMEWS station to bring it into operation four months ahead of schedule".

Can you tell us where that station is located?

Secretary Gates. It is in Alaska, Senator.

Senator Case of South Dakota. That is the right answer.

Senator Bartlett. I honestly did not know that.

Secretary Gates. I was delaying to see whether this was classified information or not.

Senator Bartlett. Yes. I thought it might be. But your answer astounds me a little bit because my information about that station, and it is not classified in Alaska, is that it is months behind schedule, that the entire winter was lost, that the principal buildings were to be under cover last

bd84 fall and that this was not accomplished and the whole winter
virtually was lost.

Secretary Gates. I have no personal knowledge of that, Senator, I have seen a schedule from the time I have looked at the program of a certain date for this installation, and we have now found from experience with the first one that we can accelerate that date by some period of time, and this is what we are doing.

Senator Bartlett. I was a little astounded, and I would be very grateful if you would inquire into this further and inform the committee.

Now you regard these BMEWS stations as being quite essential, I infer.

Secretary Gates. They are a very important part of warning.

Senator Bartlett. Why then, if you know, did it require two years or thereabouts, Mr. Secretary, to reach a decision on the site of the third BMEWS station?

Secretary Gates. I didn't know how long, I do not know how long it took. I was not in my present position, and I have not looked at it. I didn't know it took that long.

Senator Bartlett. You do know, however, that it took a long time to reach a decision as to where --

Secretary Gates. I know that this station is involved in arrangements with another country, which takes negotiations

bd85

and discussions with that country.

Senator Bartlett. Do you know whether those arrangements have now been completed?

Secretary Gates. Yes, it is my understanding that they have been.

Senator Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Johnson. Mr. Secretary, I as Chairman have not asked any questions or made any statements, and I need to open the Senate at a quarter of 12:00. There have been two Democrats and two Republicans have asked questions. If it is agreeable with the Committee and Senator Wiley has no objection, I would like to take a very brief time now to make a statement and ask a few questions and then to be followed by Senator Wiley, because you will be here until noon at least.

Is that agreeable with you, Senator Wiley?

Senator Wiley. I am always agreeable with you, sir, but I have got people waiting for me.

Senator Johnson. Then I will yield to the Senator. Go ahead.

Senator Wiley. No, you have got to go to the Senate, go ahead.

Senator Johnson. Mr. Gates, I am going to leave very shortly, and before doing so I want to again thank you for being with us this morning and I want to take this

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opportunity of emphasizing what I believe you already know, and that is that these committees before whom you are appearing today recognize you as a very sincere, dedicated, devoted, patriotic public servant.

We know your responsibilities are heavy and farflung, and so are ours in the Congress. Because of the unquestionability of our nation's ability to defend itself against threat rests on not only our American heritage but the peace of the world is dependent upon it.

It is in that spirit that I have tried to conduct these hearings. You are one of the concluding witnesses and I have a few questions that I want to submit that I think you can answer briefly, and I would like to have them in the record.

First, are you contemplating adding hardware and operational facilities to the Polaris and ICBM programs over that contained in the originally submitted fiscal year 61 budget?

Secretary Gates. I am using the word "contemplating", Mr. Chairman. I am. We are reviewing other possibilities, and will continue to review them in the case of Polaris contingent on some further tests.

Senator Johnson. Then you do propose an increase in the Polaris strike capability.

Secretary Gates. I am not in a position to propose it. I have it under study and have it referred to the Joint Chiefs

bd87 of Staff and the technical people involved.

Senator Johnson. Was this under consideration when the FY 61 budget was submitted?

Secretary Gates. It would be incorrect to say that more Polaris were not under consideration.

Senator Johnson. The answer is yes, then?

Secretary Gates. I think, yes.

Senator Johnson. Didn't you say at that time that the budget was adequate?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Johnson. And you did have some question about it then?

Secretary Gates. No, sir. I felt that if we could properly gain more confidence in the systems that we would not hesitate to augment them.

Senator Johnson. Then what you meant is adequate excluding increases to be decided on later?

Secretary Gates. I meant that it was a properly balanced defense program, and I still believe it is, Senator Johnson. I believe, however, that when we gain more confidence in a system that is as good as the Polaris system appears to be, that we should not hesitate to augment it.

Senator Johnson. And you do not think we will hesitate to augment it?

Secretary Gates. I will not hesitate to recommend it.

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Senator Johnson. Do you concur with Mr. Allen Dulles that the Communist threat is most serious?

Secretary Gates. I most certainly do.

Senator Johnson. Do you agree with me that America must maintain a position of unquestioned strength in order to meet that threat?

Secretary Gates. Absolutely.

Senator Johnson. Mr. Secretary, if Congress after detailed hearings and after expressing all points of view and after hearing witnesses that cover the entire lot express individual opinions, if we after careful and prudent consideration, fully aware of our constitutional responsibilities as a separate branch of the government, if we conclude that we should raise and support the Armed Services, and in order to do that we must increase the appropriations made by the House or the request made by the Budget Director, if we should do that, would you use the funds?

Secretary Gates. This is always a question for the President to decide, Mr. Chairman. I believe that we would certainly be in agreement in what programs should be increased.

Senator Johnson. You think it is a most serious thing though if Congress, acting under its constitutional responsibilities and after hearing all the witnesses over numerous committees for many weeks finally concludes that in exercising its constitutional responsibility and protecting the

bd89

security of this nation we should do something, do you think it is a pretty serious responsibility to have one man veto that?

Don't you?

Secretary Gates. I am not competent to testify on the legal relationships between the executive and the Congress, but I think it is a very serious business and I certainly recognize your responsibilities in this connection.

Senator Johnson. Now if we come along and grant some departments' request for we will say the Air Force asking for 17 Atlas squadrons rather than the 14 approved, and after we have heard the Central Intelligence and we have heard the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and all the experts we can get and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the ex-Joint Chiefs and so on and so forth, we conclude that it is necessary in exercising our responsibility to appropriate funds for X squadrons, you are called upon to make a recommendation to impound those funds, you realize that that is a pretty serious responsibility you are taking when you veto the action of both branches of the Congress.

Secretary Gates. I certainly do, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Johnson. Have you ever made such a recommendation?

Secretary Gates. No, I never have.

Senator Johnson. You would stop, look and listen before

bd90

you did, wouldn't you?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Johnson. Thank you. I am very grateful to you, Senator Wiley, for permitting me to go ahead.

Senator Wiley is recognized.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, before the Senator starts could I ask do we automatically stop at 12 o'clock?

Senator Johnson. I think that depends on the committee. We are not going to cite anyone. We are not going to issue any contempt citations and we are not going to report any bills.

We are just meeting here for informational purposes. I will be glad to ask the Senate to permit us if you want to, to continue during part of the afternoon that the Secretary can be here.

What time do you need to leave, Mr. Secretary, to keep your other engagements? I understood you had afternoon engagements.

Secretary Gates. I would prefer to leave not later than 1:00 o'clock.

Senator Johnson. I think you could go ahead and run until 1:00 o'clock if the committee is disposed to do so. If not, I will ask permission and if that is granted, I will notify you. What is the pleasure of the committee?

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, I might just say this:

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I understood that Mr. Gates had some very important engagements this afternoon in connection with Paris, and his original statement was half past 12:00. I am afraid he will lose all his lunch and everything else and perhaps not get the full benefit of Paris if we sit until 1:00.

Secretary Gates. I was trying to be as helpful as I can, Senator Johnson. I would prefer to leave earlier. From my personal point of view I would prefer to leave any time after 12:00 o'clock but I would want to be as cooperative as I can and I appreciate it.

Senator Johnson. I don't want anyone to lose any lunch he hasn't had. I think then if there is no objection that we will attempt to find an area of agreement here between the two parties and say if the Secretary says he can stay until 1:00, the Senator from Massachusetts thinks 12:30 is a proper time, I would suggest 12:45. How is that?

Secretary Gates. That is all right, Senator.

Senator Johnson. Senator Symington, will you preside and we will run until 12:45.

Senator Symington. Senator Wiley?

Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, I first want to agree with the very fine words that were just extended to the Secretary by the Senator from Texas in relation to you, Mr. Secretary. I want to compliment you also on this statement which in my opinion if the public can get ahold of will calm a lot of fears

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that have been engendered by this talk of gaps.

When you talk about a gap, as I understand it, if I have one pistol and you have 3, that is a gap of 2, isn't it? Is that what you mean by a gap?

Secretary Gates. That is the way it is generally referred to, yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. But if I happen to also have a gun and some other weapon, then the gap isn't as big as it was before, is that right?

Secretary Gates. That is right, sir.

Senator Wiley. Now that is what you mean when you say that there is no reason why we need match the Communist bomber for bomber, missile for missile, division for division, or submarine for submarine, is that right?

Secretary Gates. That is right, sir.

Senator Wiley. Now you mentioned in your statement the Communist military requirements are vastly different from ours. What are those requirements? Set them out briefly so we will understand.

Secretary Gates. I would say that the requirement would be based I believe on the sincere conviction that they would know that we would not strike them first. I believe it would also be set up on the basis of their geography, which is quite different from ours, they being a large land mass. And I believe that their total military posture is greatly

bd93
different from ours with our collective security arrangements and our deployed forces worldwide. Therefore, their requirements are different from the standpoint of geography and different from the standpoint of the fact that they are still engaged in an objective of world domination.

Senator Wiley. Now among other things you have said, and I want to hurry through this so that we can get it synchronized, the strength, speaking about our strength, "The strength I believe we have now and our defense programs are designed to maintain the strength".

By that you mean the adequate strength to meet the challenge if it comes.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Now you say: "Our total strength widely deployed within the United States and around the periphery of a single strategic target area is so great that any surprise attack upon us would result in unacceptable destruction to the attacker."

Secretary Gates. That is right, sir.

Senator Wiley. The thing particularly that I am interested in is that we have been talking about the gap in ICBMs. But you also say, which I think is very, very significant, and Senator Smith quoted part of the sentence: "We have nuclear weapons that exceed those of the USSR by several times in their total destructive power."

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Secretary Gates. That's right, sir.

Senator Wiley. That is correct, isn't it?

Secretary Gates. That is the basis of our estimates, that is correct.

Senator Wiley. And we have long range means of delivery that exceed theirs by several times in the total carrying capacity.

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Wiley. Now we have been talking about deterrence. The terrible destructiveness that would follow from a war under conditions as they are now, do you think that is a deterrent?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. In other words, there are 200 million Russian people that don't want war and there is 175 million of us that don't want war, is that right?

Secretary Gates. I would hope the Russian people did not want war any more than the American people.

Senator Wiley. I am talking about now some of these deterrents, because I think it is very important that we understand what we mean. You already mentioned the fact of NATO. That is a military deterrent, and it is agreed now according to the General in charge that they are going to create a unified missile defense of some kind. Do you know something about that?

Secretary Gates. I have not seen the proposal that has been

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referred to, but we have a unified defense in a sense in the whole NATO alliance.

Senator Wiley. Now there are a lot of captive nations right around Russia. Take for instance Poland. Do you think that if Khrushchev should think about letting the balloon go up he would probably have to give consideration to the Baltic nations, to Poland, to East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Roumania?

Do you think those captive nations -- do they create a deterrent in your mind?

Secretary Gates. On the same general analysis that people do not want to be destroyed and their will and determination to prevent war and to be strong and in our case our will and determination to remain strong is a deterrent.

Senator Wiley. If you were sitting in Khrushchev's shoes, and he is a practical fellow, he would have to count the costs, and that is part of the cost, what the slave nations would be doing in case he let the balloon go up, is that right?

Secretary Gates. He would certainly evaluate it.

Senator Wiley. Recently we have been hearing a lot about the attitude of Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese. Khrushchev went down and visited in India, and we understand that conditions are doing so well between the Chinese and Khrushchev. But be that as it may, there are 650 million Chinese and there

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will soon be a billion. Is there any place they have got to go except North?

Secretary Gates. No, sir. I think that that would be the logical direction that they would move.

Senator Wiley. That is the logical direction, yes. In other words, with the increased population pressure, the pressure would be such -- I am talking about deterrence now. That is the thing I am getting at, because in my humble opinion it is a very important matter when we consider this question of how much we are going overboard with probably the result of carrying out the very thing that Lenin said, that he would cause us to bust our own economy.

We have got to give consideration to that.

Senator Jackson. Would the Senator yield at that point?

Senator Wiley. Just a minute. I have got a meeting.

Senator Jackson. Would you supply for the record the statement by Lenin? That came up in our hearing when Mr. Lovett was present and you will find that the Library of Congress will tell you that he never made that statement.

Senator Martin. Does the gentlemen know what he said? Keynes reported that he, Stalin, said the surest way to do away with free nations is to debaucher their currency.

Senator Jackson. You are quoting Stalin.

Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, you might protect me a

bd97

little bit now. I like that gentleman from Washington.

Senator Symington. Senator Wiley, will you proceed.

Senator Wiley. He is so taken up with his concept in this matter and I am trying to be judicious. I am not an Army man, a Navy man or a flyer. I am still thinking in terms of the United States of America.

Senator Symington. You are a very fine man, Senator. Will you proceed?

Senator Wiley. What is that?

Senator Symington. Will you proceed, sir?

Senator Wiley. Are you butting in now too?

What I am getting at, sir, can you think of any other deterrence?

Secretary Gates. I think we must have a strong military deterrent to prevent the outbreak of war. I think we must have the will and determination to maintain this deterrent, and the will to use it if necessary in terms of interferences of small nations, of probings of our will and determination worldwide, in terms of things other than military as well as things that are military. I feel that if you want to talk in the broad sense, I believe Senator, you are talking our spirit and our general intellectual and spiritual approach to life is involved in a deterrent.

Senator Wiley. I read from the conclusion of your statement: "We will not hesitate to take emergency measures.

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"As of this time I am convinced we are on a sound basis and have presented a properly balanced concept. We will continue to plan and to change as necessary."

We are living in a changing world, aren't we?

Secretary Gates. We certainly are, sir.

Senator Wiley. We don't know what is going to happen tomorrow in any field of human endeavor, isn't that correct?

Secretary Gates. Well, we have some very fast-moving and tremendous progress that has been made in a period of time that is almost unprecedented in history.

Senator Wiley. Your concluding statement "We must always remain superior in total power".

Secretary Gates. That is my absolute conviction.

Senator Wiley. When you talk total power, you talk not only the military power, the power that results from our allies combination, the power that results from this new world condition, and so forth.

Secretary Gates. That's right, sir.

Senator Wiley. All right. Well under those circumstances the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the President are giving it their attention. That is their job, is it not, sir?

Secretary Gates. Certainly, sir.

Senator Wiley. And men may differ as to what is a gap?

Secretary Gates. That's right.

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Senator Wiley. And men may differ as to what is necessary. But if you have the discretion to use this money as it comes in, for one thing, and we think it should be used for something else, you will not give up your discretion, will you?

Secretary Gates. We will try and consider the responsibilities of the Congress in good judgment.

Senator Wiley. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Senator Magnuson?

Senator Magnuson. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to resolve some of these controversies here regarding gaps, what we should do or what we are not doing and what we are doing at present, but I think that when the American people look at this thing, they will want to look for some place of responsibility as to what decisions are made. Let me ask you this question. There are 2 or 3 members of us here on the Appropriations Committee, because this gets down to money when you break it all down. Has Congress ever denied the Defense Department in appropriations any major program that they have come to Congress and suggested that we do in the security of our country?

Secretary Gates. I think in the context of your question, Senator, my answer would be as far as I know they have not. I know of times when they have not granted all the money that has been requested, but you used the words "major program".

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Senator Magnuson. Well, there have been some slight disagreements, but what I am saying is --

Secretary Gates. So far as I know the Congress has always been mindful of --

Senator Magnuson. Would you agree with me that the American people should know?

Secretary Gates. Absolutely.

Senator Magnuson. That the Defense Department and those that are responsible when they made up their minds and come to Congress, Congress has always given them the money. Is that a correct statement?

Secretary Gates. I want to be as truthful as I absolutely can.

Yes, I think it is a correct statement. I think that there have been occasions where there have been differences of opinion and Congress has not always given all the money for a specific program, but in terms of total defense I don't know any occasion myself where Congress has not granted the money.

Senator Magnuson . Do you know of any occasion when the total amount asked by the Administration for the security of this country, the overall total, leaving out maybe some differences of opinion about certain phases of the program, has ever been denied the Administration?

Secretary Gates. I am not sure that I can answer that.

bd1

I believe that the Congress has on occasions cut the defense budget, yes.

Senator Magnuson. Would you say that the cut in any way affected the major security effort?

Secretary Gates. It was not done during my time, sir.

Senator Magnuson. If I showed you the figures that Congress has never varied in granting the request of the Defense Department in any case within 2% one way or another, would you agree with me on that?

Secretary Gates. I would assume, Senator, that you had studied the figures and would give me the right answer.

Senator Case of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for clarification?

Senator Magnuson. Let me finish and then I will yield to the Senator.

Senator case of New Jersey. I just wanted to clarify what you meant by a question you asked, Senator. I assume you are excluding USIA from the Defense Department.

Senator Magnuson. I am talking about the Department of Defense.

Senator Case of New Jersey. I just wanted that clarified.

Senator Magnuson. YSIA and parts of Mutual Security and even there.

Now let me ask another question. That being the case, and it is the case, there has been some discussion here as

bd2

to making choices between relative programs.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Magnuson. Senator Symington suggested that there should be more on the air and not less on the Polaris but he suggested that one should not be neglected for the other, isn't that correct?

Senator Symington. That is correct.

Senator Magnuson. Now if that is the case and Congress has had that attitude toward the Defense Department at all times, why can't you have both instead of all this discussion whether we should do this or do that when you make a decision that they are important.

Why can't you have both? Why can't you come to Congress and say "We need the Polaris and we need the air thing too"?

Secretary Gates. We have to review. We have to stop somewhere. I mean we review total programs and we review total balance, total balance that we have for specific purposes and we come up with as good priorities as we know how to do and as good judgments as we know how to do and present it.

Senator Magnuson. I understand that, but my next question then is, isn't a great deal of the meat of the problem we are discussing here a problem of budget ceilings on this whole situation?

Secretary Gates. Senator, money affects everything that we

bd3

do.

Senator Magnuson. I asked you isn't that the real problem, budget ceilings?

Secretary Gates. It is not the real problem in connection with the B-70.

Senator Magnuson. The budget gives you a ceiling do they not, before you start out?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

Senator Magnuson. They don't?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

Senator Magnuson. You make your decision. Then the budget gives you a ceiling?

Secretary Gates. No, sir. The Secretary of Defense gives guidelines to the services and they come up with their programs to him.

Senator Magnuson. Would you say that there has not been circulated in the Defense Department on many occasions to the various departments that you can spend so much and no more?

Secretary Gates. I would say that once we establish a financial plan within the Department of Defense, we circulate to the Services where they stand in relation to that plan, yes.

Senator Magnuson. The point I am making here is that a lot of this gets down to that sole question, why we should not have, if Polaxis is good and SAC is good and the things

bd4

Senator Symington talked about is good, which I believe they are, Senator Jackson talks about Polaris for the security of the country, we are sitting here arguing about whether we are going to downgrade one or upgrade the other.

Why don't we have both?

Secretary Gates. If we took, Senator, all of everybody's good ideas and tried to finance them, we would more than double the defense budget.

Senator Magnuson. Maybe the situation might call for that.

Secretary Gates. This is a question of choosing between good ideas.

Senator Magnuson. I don't think you wanted the statement to stand when you said we never make well enough.

Secretary Gates. I have no objection to saying we are never perfect.

Senator Magnuson. Well enough is not perfect.

Secretary Gates. We always can improve.

Senator Magnuson. It is a little bit beyond having enough. Don't you think that is a desirable philosophy?

Secretary Gates. Senator Smith is the one that raised this question and I agreed with her.

Senator Magnuson. Now I just have one more question. I think the American public should know this because it is important and it surely would not be classified.

bd5

Are you going to the Summit conference as an adviser?

Secretary Gates. I have not -- I do not know, Senator.

Senator Magnuson. You do not know. Disarmament will be of course a major part of the agenda there, will it not?

Is that not correct?

Secretary Gates. I would assume so. The disarmament meetings have already commenced in Geneva.

Senator Magnuson. Now if we are negotiating or discussing the question of disarmament, what weapons system would you suggest would have priority in disarmament? You are going to be called upon for that advice like we call upon you?

Secretary Gates. No, sir. The disarmament conversations will all be conducted on the basis of certain agreed on phased proposals that have been presented by our negotiator, Mr. Eton, at Geneva, and they will all be based on the hypothesis that there is agreed upon and valid control systems that will monitor the results.

Senator Magnuson. I understand that.

Secretary Gates. I am not going to be asked about any weapons system in connection with disarmament.

Senator Magnuson. If you are going to disarm you are going to have to cut out something, isn't that correct?

Secretary Gates. Conversations hopeful in the world that will develop will come to the Senate in terms of a treaty.

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Senator Magnuson. I understand that but if you are going to disarm you have got to throw down certain weapons and I would wonder what priority of weapons or of our defense you would suggest would come within the negotiations or the phasing of disarmament?

Secretary Gates. I would not know until the time for the disarmament.

Senator Magnuson. You would not know.

Secretary Gates. I would not have any idea until I knew what we were talking about.

Senator Magnuson. Supposing I should ask you right now which one would you give priority to?

Secretary Gates. I wouldn't know, sir, because I wouldn't know what the terms were.

Senator Magnuson. Supposing the terms were predicated upon inspection, full inspection as I understand it the West is going to propose. Supposing that was agreed to? What broad section or segment of our defense would be the disarmament part of it?

I think the American people want to know what we are going to disarm.

Secretary Gates. We are not going to disarm anything until we have an approved treaty.

Senator Magnuson. I understand that.

Secretary Gates. I think it would be terribly misleading

bd7

to prejudge this, and I would not know how to answer your question.

Senator Magnuson. You wouldn't know. That is an answer to the question.

Now I want to ask you just one question that is somewhat unrelated, but because the Secretary is here and he is going to Europe, a very important meeting as you know in the Defense Department is taking place now in Geneva.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Magnuson. Has the Defense Department taken any official stand on the territorial limits on the law of the sea that you know of?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Magnuson. What is that stand?

Secretary Gates. I am only hesitating to know whether this is part of negotiating procedures that I might not be permitted to disclose, Senator. I believe it is and I believe I would like to tell you in private what that stand is if that is satisfactory.

Senator Magnuson. All right. I would like the Secretary when he has time on another matter that might seem unrelated here but it won't be unrelated if something happens. The Defense Department has said many, many times that they consider the Merchant Marine literally the fourth arm of our defense, our security, is that correct?

bd8

Secretary Gates. I have heard a lot of things suggested as fourth arms, Senator. I never heard that expression to tell you the truth.

But I don't dispute it.

Senator Magnuson. Would the Defense Department, the head of logistics having said so, send to the Committee, because I think when we discuss security this is just as important if something happens with missiles, airplanes or whatever we may have, hardware or anything else, a simple answer as to whether or not you think the American Merchant Marine is adequate enough to fit into this broad concept of defense that you say is adequate in your statement. Could you do that at a later time?

Secretary Gates. I would like to take a look at it, because I really don't feel that we have taken a recent enough look for me to practically answer the question.

Senator Magnuson. I would appreciate that, and several Senators would.

Senator Saltonstall. Would the Senator yield?

Senator Magnuson. Yes.

Senator Saltonstall. I think it might be helpful to the Secretary if you referred him to the speech President Eisenhower made in Los Angeles in 1952 on that subject.

I think the Senator correctly quoted him.

Senator Magnuson. I don't want to talk about '52 because

bd9

we have gone way down the hill.

Senator Symington. We have been cut a little by the other side on this time angle. Senator Martin.

Senator Martin. Mr. Secretary, we have had considerable discussion in these hearings about the views of several Generals regarding the amount of funds needed for certain equipment and weapons.

I want them to come and tell us what they think they need. But is it not expected that a Chief of Staff of any service or the Chief of any special branch of the service will portray the indispensability of that branch and argue for its expansion?

Secretary Gates. It has been historically true that the requirements of the services as they see them have been greater than have been finally approved.

Senator Martin. That is their job to bring us the picture as they see it in their special branch of the service.

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Martin. That does not mean that they are at loggerheads with you on your overall judgment. They are arguing for their particular branch of the service. I think they would be a very odd Chief of Staff or Chief of Branch if they ceased to portray the best qualities and best needs of their particular branch.

Secretary Gates. They are all highly responsible, reliable

bd10

and greatly respected people, and I would hope they would always tell the Congress precisely what they believe.

Senator Martin. I went through this very realistically in 1941 to '45 with the substitution of the armored force for the horse cavalry. We had an awfully hard time getting horse cavalry men out of the picture. They even wore their spurs quite a while after their horses went off the playgrounds.

Secretary Gates. I was in the Horse Cavalry for nine years myself once.

Senator Martin. And I admired them for their spunk but I don't want to take their judgment as final for what I should do in surrendering in their particular arm of the service. That is the position I see you are in.

You have to pass on overall judgment. Is not the present organization of the Department of Defense functioning satisfactorily notwithstanding divergent views of responsible leaders within the department?

Secretary Gates. Yes. I think that over the months ahead we can probably improve administratively some of the procedures within the organization. But I think my personal opinion is the organization which has been changed twice in recent years should be left to shake down, and I believe its framework is correct, and I believe it will shake down and operate effectively.

Senator Martin. It strikes me that there is no particular

bd11 difficulty in the Armed Services with the recognition of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Services in the administration of the total matter of our Armed Services.

They must recognize him as the Commander in Chief.

Secretary Gates. Certainly.

Senator Martin. And we do not tolerate the crossing over into other branches of the service or government to supplant the President in that role. I remember the struggle we had in creating the Court of Military Appeals. Some people wanted to put that under the Supreme Court. But that would cut into the functioning of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. We had to bear that in mind in our committee back there in 1964. Yes, I think we need here in Congress to play the role of Congress in doing all we can to create and maintain Armed Forces, but not to supplant our opinion for the opinion of those responsible for carrying out the Armed Forces program in the field.

Notwithstanding that, is it not true that even though the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the power to impound funds appropriated by Congress, President Eisenhower will not exercise that power arbitrarily?

Secretary Gates. I am sure of that.

Senator Martin. I am as certain of it as I can be, and

bd12

I wouldn't stand aghast if he should overrule my decision as a member of the Senate in what we should spend if he wants to impound those funds.

I know they have been impounded in the past. I went through very much the reorganization of the Air Force in 1946. I know we had 90 air groups then, and the Defense Department came over and asked for authorization of 70 air groups and we gave it to them because they asked for it, and that was actually built up to 48 air groups by following that action by Congress.

That has been an experience we have had many times. I never thought at that time we should overrule them. We should air it out, now, knowing we have different opinions. That is a part of the function of Congress. But I still hope that no one in this Congress will attempt to take over the power of overruling the President in his function as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

Now getting back to this quote that I jumped in with a moment ago, I happen to be a student of Russia over the past 40 years or so, and I have looked far and long for the quote of Stalin.

Senator Jackson. No, no, Lenin.

Senator Martin. Lenin, I should say, and I had to look up Stalin, but Lenin was the one that you had reference to?

Senator Jackson. I didn't raise the question.

bd13

Senator Martin. I thought you made some reference to the Library of Congress.

Senator Jackson. Let me just state it very simply. Senator Wiley referred to Lenin having said in substance that their objective would be to bankrupt us. This question again popped up in our hearings I believe when Mr. Lovett or Mr. Sprague or maybe it was Mr. Watson was present. Senator Robertson pointed out then at the time of the hearings that he had had that question researched by the Library and the answer was that he had not said it. We again had the statement brought up to date as of 2 or 3 weeks ago, and the statement by the Library and by Soviet and Russian scholars is to the effect that they have not been able to find where Lenin ever made such a statement or a comparable one.

Senator Martin. Yes. The Library also wrote me on the subject several years ago, and at that time they made the statement that the nearest approach to it they could get was from a statement made by Lord Keynes of Britain who is reported to have said that Lenin said the surest way to wreck free nations was through debaucher of their currency, and I agree with you that he never said anything stronger than that so far as I can find out.

Senator Jackson. You are quoting Keynes now, the great monetary expert, which is more than hearsay.

Senator Martin. He is the author of the Canadian theory

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and he is the one who made the statement.

I just wanted to agree with you, Senator.

Senator Jackson. All I know is what we were advised on that.

Senator Martin. Of course, debaucher of the currency if he said that is one way of destruction and we are trying to hold this budget within workable bounds.

Senator Jackson. Would you yield at this point?

Senator Martin. That is on my time.

Senator Symington. Senator Martin, this comes out of your time.

Senator Martin. I am all through.

Senator Symington. Senator Anderson?

Senator Anderson. I hope, Mr Secretary, you don't mind my staying in a field that I spend more time on than any other.

Therefore page 4, item 2, "We have nuclear weapons that exceed the USSR by several times in total destructive power". Do you refer to the individual bank of the individual weapon or do you refer to the total stockpile?

Secretary Gates. Total.

Senator Anderson. Did you have a chance to examine Russian stockpile figures to satisfy yourself on that point?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

Senator Anderson. How do you make it then?

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Secretary Gates: Only make it from the estimates that we have on the subject.

Senator Anderson. Then in the third line you say "We have in combination enough to bring destruction to any one who attacks us."

If you rely on those estimates in the first statement would you then say the Russians have enough to do the same thing?

Is their stockpile sufficient?

Secretary Gates. I am going on the principle in my second statement that we are attacked first and we have enough to destroy him after this attack, which is the validity of our deterrent posture.

Senator Anderson. I am only trying to find out if you think they have a substantial stockpile also.

Secretary Gates. I think they have, yes, I think they have.

Senator Anderson. You say near the bottom of that page that "The USSR is not engaged in a crash program for ICBM development."

Does that come from the national estimates of some kind?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Anderson. That is interesting because if you saw scientists who showed up at Geneva in 1955 at the conference who were at that time experts in thermonuclear power and biology and medicine and all of them have been quoted in the

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missile field, that might indicate to you that Russia does have some interest in missiles.

Did the Russians recently test out a missile that went some 7760 miles plus with a CEP of less than 2 miles?

Secretary Gates. I only know there what they said about this CEP, but they went the distance.

Senator Anderson. When they put their -- just what is classified and what isn't -- when they put their devices for measuring how accurately it fell it fell right where they thought it was going to fall, didn't it?

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Secretary Gates. I can't testify to that personally, Senator Anderson, but it was a good shot. I don't mean to minimize it.

Senator Anderson. That is all I wanted you to say, that it was a good shot and I think it was a very good shot. Now if it was a very good shot, would that indicate that they might have improved something on their old missiles that traveled less than 6,000 miles?

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Secretary Gates. It would mean that they carried a different weight warhead or they made some changes in the missile. Yes, it would mean it was an extended range missile compared to the others I presume, although they might have fired the others at closer range before they tried the longer range. I don't know.

Senator Anderson. Do you think we will be able to get an

bd17

8,000 mile missile without nuclear propulsion?

Secretary Gates. Yes, I believe we can do this as of the present time.

Senator Anderson. And having reliable guidance in it.

Secretary Gates. I believe so, and I also believe and think it should be said in that connection that this is longer than it need fly for the mission that it is assigned.

Senator Anderson. They did not think so. I don't say that they were wrong but they thought it was worthwhile to go a long distance and so forth. You say also on page 5, and I hope not to take too much time, that "At the present the Department of Defense has no specific military requirements for so-called super-boosters."

Secretary Gates. That is correct, sir.

Senator Anderson. Do you feel it would be an advantage in the Department taking a more aggressive position on the development of nuclear propulsion or various types of missiles.

Secretary Gates. Senator, I have participated with you and your committee on that subject as of about a year ago, and I have not looked at it since. The status of the program to which you refer I guess is the nuclear powered aircraft, is that correct?

Senator Anderson. No, not nearly as much as project Rover.

Secretary Gates. Oh, yes.

bd18

Senator Anderson. I have greater hopes with Project Rover and we have had a little bit of a delay, I don't say too deliberate a delay, and some budget troubles that stem not only from the Space Agency but from the Air Force on the delay part of it.

There are many people who believe that if we hope to attain ability to put large objects in space we have to search for it in the specific impulse that we can get from nuclear fuels instead of the specific impulse from even the most exotic chemical fuel that has not yet been developed.

Therefore, I hope that when you say you have no program for superboosters, that you might think at least of the nuclear propulsion devices as superboosters that are possible to use.

Secretary Gates. I know the Senator is a great student and expert on this subject. What I meant when I made my statement was that our present military satellite requirements can be met by the propulsion systems that we have or will have related to our intercontinental ballistic missile program. And at the moment there is no specific military vehicle or satellite that is a requirement of the Department of Defense that would require a large booster of the superbooster type.

However, this does not mean that the Department of Defense should not maintain a very serious interest in the

bdl9

development of these boosters, because it is highly likely that a military requirement of the future will develop in space.

Senator Anderson. Project Orion has been mentioned. I don't know whether the nature of it is classified. We don't need to get into that, but the project Orion is of some interest in this field because at one of the laboratories, one of the men whose name is on the patent for the hydrogen bomb had an idea, and he tried to get some money through the Atomic Energy Commission to develop it. They did a little miscellaneous work but could not get the money. Yet the man who was his assistant was picked up by one of the companies, came in and sold the Defense Department a \$40 million contract without any trouble. We wish that we could get the Department of Defense, I do at least, somewhat more interested in some of these very promising things where their costs would be extremely low. The Rover budget was cut only a very few millions of dollars while Orion I read a news item in I think Nucleonics recently which said it now had no fixed place of abode. The Space Agency had dropped it. Somebody else had dropped it. It was now back on the doorstep of the Air Force. Isn't it back there now?

Secretary Gates. I believe it is assigned to the Air Force, Senator.

bd20

Senator Anderson. Yes, but it has had a little route here, there and back and forth. Nobody seems to want to work on it and yet you have got a very large budget for it and yet the budget to the Atomic Energy Commission was completely denied. That is not your responsibility I recognize.

Secretary Gates. It may have been. I am not certain of this, but it may have been one of these projects that was with the Advanced Research Projects Agency that we have been transferring out with the changed organization of that agency, and assigning to the services as it seemed appropriate to do so.

If that is so, why then the assignment of the Air Force will make good sense.

Senator Anderson. Now just to come back to that first sentence again "We have nuclear weapons that exceed those of the USSR by several times in total destructive power", isn't this one of the things that gets us into these rows again, because we can't go back and use classified information to discuss your statement?

Secretary Gates. I would certainly not want to get into a row and I certainly don't want to be confusing. I believe that this is a correct statement that between us we would agree to.

Senator Anderson. I believe we would but if we had the full figures it might show rather surprising Russian strength. General Walsh was asked some question about the

bd21 ability to build up their missile production, and the language is all full of the word "delete, delete, delete", and "deleted".

 The question was "In other words, they could even 'deleted' your estimates if they went to full capability is that right?"

 General Walsh says "Without question."

 I understand from the previous questioning that it must mean that they could produce more missiles than they are now doing if they wanted to. And yet the statement is left that the USSR is not engaged in any crash program for ICBM development.

 I only hope the fact that they have pulled top scientists away from their pet projects and put them on missiles that they have started developing a very long range missile might be persuading that they are doing some work in that field.

 Secretary Gates. The crash program refers of course to production, and there might be people working on research in missiles.

 Senator Anderson. That is all.

 Senator Symington. Senator Case?

 Senator Case of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Reserving for the executive session which the Acting Chairman and the Members of the Committee were gracious enough to

bd22

accede to at my request, the matter of testimony, the statement of the Secretary and the figures in the intelligence estimates, I would like to ask just a couple of clarifying questions on other matters.

Counsel early in his questioning referred to a statement by General Schriever that if we had made different decisions two years ago, we could have more ICBMs now. You stated in that connection that you were reviewing the program on ICBMs at the present time.

Does this review or consideration involve the possibility of doing now what General Schriever said we could have done then, or are your considerations dealing with different systems than those as to which different decisions two years ago could not have been accelerated?

Secretary Gates. Senator, if I understand what you mean, and I am trying to understand what General Schriever meant, you mean that General Schriever said that if we had started two years ago, we would have had the lead time behind us and we would have had in construction, lead time, being quite long in case of hardened missile sites, we would have had opportunity to put into being additional intercontinental ballistic missiles.

This is true, but we made a decision to go more rapidly toward the second generation missiles which we believed were better, namely the Minuteman and Polaris

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as opposed to going completely in the others.

Now the variety of alternatives that I now have under review, which is part of the normal process of review, deals with putting in additional missiles and reviewing the times and costs pertaining to what these missiles would do, at what time period and for how much and how effective they would be in relation to all of the other programs. So they deal with the same missiles. They deal in some cases with an augmentation of those missiles that General Schriever was referring to.

Senator Case of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The other question that I thought might be clarified I think has at least in part been clarified by subsequent questions. Senator Symington made a statement in which I understood him to say in effect that we now had decided to cancel out all development of the B-70.

This is not my understanding as to the present decision.

Secretary Gates. No.

Senator Case of New Jersey. Or the present activity, and I wonder to the extent you think it is desirable if you might just review what we are doing about the B-70 program very briefly in your own way?

Secretary Gates. I think Senator Symington said that we were not going to develop a weapons system in the prototypes that we were producing, and he is correct. What we are

bd27 24

going to do is develop 2 prototype aircraft that will be flyable hopefully at the speed of 3 times the speed of sound, and we will learn more about the program. We have is it 75 million dollars I believe in the budget for this year for this purpose toward the initial cost of these two prototypes?

The Senator is correct. Senator Symington is correct in saying that this is not a development of weapons system components.

Senator Symington. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Case of New Jersey. That is exactly my understanding. Yes.

Senator Symington. Just so long as my name has come into it, what I say is the reason you are postponing the delay of the B-70 is a fiscal reason, and that the reason is, the reason it is a fiscal reason is because, it can be proved to my satisfaction that you are building it and you are saying the reason that you are building only half of that is because you are not sure of it.

If you were sure of it, you would go ahead and build it, if you did not think it was necessary, you would not build it. What you will have may go a great deal faster according to the testimony of General White than the MACH 3 that you talk about. All I say is again we are in effect abandoning the research and development of any true supersonic aircraft for

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the future in the Air Force, in the Navy and commercially.

I thank the Senator.

Senator Case of New Jersey. I am very happy to yield to the Acting Chairman. I am still a little bit concerned that his very last statement is not quite an accurate summary of what is going on. I don't think we are abandoning this development as I understand it, but rather we are taking it at a somewhat slower pace pending a decision which is under review now as to whether it should be gone on in fullscale as a weapons system.

Secretary Gates. That is right. I would like to say that it is not a fiscal reason, the B-70. Everything of course has money assigned to it, but the decision on the B-70 was not a fiscal decision. It was made because we are taking a whole new step in the state of the art involving certain components and metals I believe that are non-existent that have to be developed. We are also running, as I previously testified, into competition with other systems for the mission, and there are other doubts on paper pertaining to this system that have to be thought through.

These were the doubts that really led to this decision which was terribly carefully reviewed by the President and by the Advisory people of the Government throughout all fields of responsibility, military, scientific and judgment persons who could contribute to this decision. Now any compromise is

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not a good decision. It would be better to cut it off clean or to proceed with it. But we thought we would learn from these two prototypes. We would also have more time to review our other programs in relation to the system.

Senator Case of New Jersey. I thank the Secretary and I reserve for the executive hearing the matter discussed earlier.

Senator Symington. Senator Jackson?

Senator Jackson. Mr. Secretary, just a couple of questions.

I think you made a fine statement and I agree with a lot of the statements. For instance you said on page 1 "The Communist military requirements are vastly different". You also stated on page 4 "We have nuclear weapons that exceed those of the USSR by several times in total destructive power."

Now isn't it a fact that inasmuch as we are dealing with an enemy that will have the advantage of the first strike capability, that this places a greater burden on us to have a survivable retaliatory system, or as you have used it and I have used it for several years, the invulnerable deterrent capability.

Secretary Gates. Yes, this is true.

Senator Jackson. So that I mean the statement --

Secretary Gates. Does put a serious responsibility.

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Senator Jackson. When you say we don't want to match just missile for missile, it is a matter of having a missile that is survivable.

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Jackson. When you talk about SAC's striking power being awesome, I agree, standing by itself, but it is less awesome if you give the enemy the capability that we must in our planning, the fact that they will strike first. Is this not true?

Secretary Gates. Yes. We have to appraise the effect of permitting him the first strike against the United States.

Senator Jackson. And I agree with you as I said a moment ago that we have more weapons, nuclear and thermonuclear, than the Soviets in total destructive power and in numbers. But thermonuclear capability and nuclear capability are inseparable from deliverability, are they not?

Secretary Gates. As a deterrent, certainly.

Senator Jackson. I mean to draw --

Secretary Gates. You must have a system.

Senator Jackson. To draw on Senator Wiley's analogy, which involves with the next question sort of a fallacy, that is if you have 3 pistols and I have one, but if I fire first, why those extra two don't do much good, or any of the three, do they?

Secretary Gates. Oh, yes, they do good depending on the

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circumstances, depending on the time of warning, depending on the reliability of the attack against you and so forth. All these factors come into play.

Senator Jackson. I was just taking his analogy. If you are sitting there with 3 pistols and I fire first, you don't have time to get your first one, do you?

Secretary Gates. On that hypothesis I assume that you would outdraw me, Senator.

Senator Jackson. The real problem, and I think you tried to make this statement, just missiles, just putting in more missiles in itself, if they can be destroyed before you can use them don't add to this invulnerable deterrent that you referred to, is that not correct?

Secretary Gates. That is correct. More missiles add to his problem of more missiles to take them out. They add to his requirements. But more missiles per se are not the total answer.

Senator Jackson. Of course, then in that connection we are placing, it is a matter of public record, Mr. Chairman, that our ICBMs are being placed for reasons of economy adjacent to our SAC bases, are they not?

Secretary Gates. I don't know that the reasons were economy. I believe it was a sensible way to cooperate. I believe the Air Force determined that was the right way to do the business.

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Senator Jackson. You are using the housekeeping facilities, and for reasons of economy we were so told in the Armed Services.

Secretary Gates. Let's say economy of efficiency.

Senator Jackson. I thought though in developing a deterrent capability you want to make sure that it is survivable.

Is it always wise to, (a) place them in an area where you already have manned bombers, where you are adjacent to cities, and to make them completely fixed?

Secretary Gates. They have been very carefully evaluated in connection with bomb damage assessment and analyses, and I believe that the distance between them is related to their survivability in a way that is just as effective as if they were widely separated from the home base.

Senator Jackson. What do you have in mind for this to provide more survivable retaliatory deterrence? I am referring of course to completely hardened facilities which would be fixed.

I'm referring to mobility onland which involves I presume ahead the Minuteman, and mobility on and under the sea.

I just wonder what your thinking is on this. It seems to me that just talking about more missiles that are on fixed locations that can be destroyed in a surprise attack does not really add to the enemy's problem in the way it should.

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Secretary Gates. It adds in an extraordinary way on putting a requirement on his production demands. However, I agree with you, Senator, that the more mobile missiles, the more concealed missiles, the more invulnerable our deterrent, the more effective that it is. And we are constantly working on the programs we have in being and thinking up other ideas which I am sure will develop. Just recently, for example, we are talking again, although we rejected it last year, again about looking at Polaris on surface ships.

Senator Jackson. I completely agree with you. That was turned down. Of course, Admiral Burke's request for 6 additional Polaris subs was turned down. What about the use of Polaris overseas in connection with the program, with our bilateral and NATO agreements with our allies?

There you have a mobile system of shorter range it is true than Minuteman.

Secretary Gates. This is also under review.

Senator Jackson. I am pleased to hear that. Now what about the Minuteman program? Do you feel that additional funds would speed the time when we would achieve what I think is one of the finest deterrent systems that has a survivable capability?

Secretary Gates. Up until now, with constant urging too, I have been advised that there is no way we can usefully spend any additional money on the Minuteman to accelerate its

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procurement in operational status. I have asked this question and I received that answer repeatedly.

We have as you know established or agreed to go ahead and build a production facility for the Minuteman.

Senator Jackson. I would hope that the supporting launching systems would move as rapidly on a concurrent basis as the production system.

This is one of the real problems is it not?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Jackson. In connection with a fully operational or an on-launcher capability when you talk about ballistic missiles.

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Jackson. I hope you will recheck that just to make sure that we are leaving no stones unturned for reasons of finance.

Secretary Gates. The whole thing could change you know at any time. But this is presently correct testimony.

Senator Jackson. In connection with the B-70 I think here again is a classic example where budgets cause a lot of difficulty, Mr. Secretary. I have the feeling that the B-70 is more than just another manned bomber. If I recall my history correctly, that we have had to rely on manned bombers to put us ahead in commercial aviation. It does seem to me that we are going to find ourselves in a situation where once

bd32

again the Russians may well come out with a commercial aircraft of supersonic speed and we will be behind.

I would hope that within the Administration some consideration would be given to this weapons system on the basis of it meeting more than just a manned bomber requirement. I do feel that it has an impact on our prestige in connection with commercial aviation.

I think that there are certain additional military uses that are applicable, and certainly it has a great ability to provide rapid support in case of limited war, airlift.

Secretary Gates. I can only repeat that I can personally assure you that it was not a fiscal decision. I can personally assure you in this case that it was not, because I personally participated in the conversations at all levels on this program. But I agree with you that --

Senator Jackson. May I ask this question though, I had the impression that each of the services were given guidelines which gives them a ceiling.

Secretary Gates. No, but the B-70 and other programs were separated out and reviewed as programs and we never got to the service budgets until we were through with the programs.

Frankly outside of the fact you would obviously know the B-70 was an Air Force program we didn't know the Air Force total was when we were reviewing the budget. We

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reviewed the entire budget this year by programs.

Senator Jackson. All I can say is that we must be a little more daring, Mr. Secretary, in some of these things. There are times when we do have to move concurrently knowing that there are hazards that may not prove out.

I felt that from the beginning on Polaris. I was recommending Polaris when no one was much interested in it.

Secretary Gates. You were very helpful to me at that time.

Senator Jackson. Thank you very much, but I was just hopeful, and I have so much faith in this, in our engineers, our designers and the talent that we have, as I am sure you have, that we should be willing once in a while to take a chance on these things.

If we don't, we are going to come out second, coming out second is not coming out when you are dealing with I think some crucial systems. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Senator Case of South Dakota?

Senator Case of South Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I too was attracted by your testimony with respect to the B-70. I hope the Senator from Washington can wait just a minute because I want to follow up on the questions he was asking.

I was struck by your reference to the B-70 as a competing

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system with Atlas, Titan and Minuteman and Polaris as a missile system.

I had been under the impression that the B-70 had potentials both in the commercial or civilian field and the military field. For example, I thought that the B-70 if developed satisfactorily offered abilities in conventional war as well as in a nuclear war. And Atlas, Titan, Minuteman and Polaris are primarily nuclear war weapons are they not?

Secretary Gates. Yes, Senator. This might be debatable opinion, and I am not the expert other people are in this. I would rather hear expert testimony on it. My judgment is the B-70 is a strategic bomber for a strategic bombing mission, and that it would be of very little or no use in limited war, however, I would not argue at all with Senator Jackson that it had implications for the future of commercial aviation, if someone wants a commercial airplane for some reason that goes over MACH 3. But it has the implications in the advancement of the state of art of manned aircraft.

There is no question about that.

Senator Jackson. Will the Senator yield at that point for clarification?

What concerned me budgetwise Mr. Secretary, is that some other branch, the CAB, will want money for assisting in our commercial aviation industry to provide this kind of

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commercial carrier, so that sooner or later we are going to be paying for it maybe out of a different pocket.

Senator Case of South Dakota. Mr. Secretary, would you say that the B-70 program has been abandoned or merely that you are continuing the research and development before you commit yourself to a volume production program.

Secretary Gates. I would say the latter.

Senator Case of South Dakota. Now there was another area of testimony earlier, I thought one of the most significant points coming up in the hearing was the presentation of counsel concerning the budget estimates for ballistic missiles from '55 through '60 as compared with the program.

Did you note the figures?

Do you substantially agree that there was a substantial difference between what was actually spent in the program execution?

Secretary Gates. I have the money that was spent, and as I look at the last three or four, this was correct. But you must recall until 1956 or '55 there was very little money spent.

Senator Case of South Dakota. Yes, I recognize that.

Secretary Gates. We are now up to 3 and a half. I have the money. I don't have the initial request that counsel was referring to.

Senator Case of South Dakota. I would like to ask, Mr.

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Chairman, that the table that Mr. Gates has may be inserted
in the record.

Senator Symington. Objections? Without objection.

(The table referred to follows:)

bd37

Senator Case of South Dakota. The point I want to make about this is what lapse of time or what lead time is there between the time that you finalized the budget figures to present to Congress and the time of program execution.

Secretary Gates. Well, Senator, it would depend on the program. We start working on the budget about this time of year, the fiscal 1962 budget in the services, and a great many people devote a lot of time to it from now until it is finalized. It gets into serious discussions in the fall, usually depending upon other pressing problems, but normally it would get into serious discussions around October and November it would be very serious discussions, and the budget is usually furnished for printing if my memory is right before the 15th of December.

So it is around the first week in December it is pretty well established.

Senator Case of South Dakota. Finalized in December. Your program of execution would be roughly perhaps 18 months later.

Secretary Gates. Yes, I think that would be a fair statement.

Senator Case of South Dakota. Do you stand still during those 18 months?

Secretary Gates. No, we don't. And of course we have been given and Congress has recognized this, no year funds

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for procurement and this is often sufficient or is normally sufficient to carry over during the period of the summertime between sessions of Congress.

Senator Case of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I think that the time limitation will prevent me from pursuing the question, but I wanted to make this observation. The Secretary and others testifying for the Defense Department used the phrase repeatedly that their program is under continuous review, which is as it should be in my judgment.

I would hate to think that if they finalized their budget picture in December, that between that and a year from the following June they did not change their program if during that 18 month period they found that there were some things that ought to be dropped and some things that ought to be augmented.

So that I am glad there is some difference between the budget figures and the program figures. It seems to me that without that we would be chained to estimates and pictures that were anywhere from 6 months to a year and a half old.

That there ought to be changes. There ought to be augmentations of some programs, and probably decreases in other programs. Some programs ought to be dropped depending upon what you learn during this interim between the time you have submitted your budget and the time you spend your last dollar in a given fiscal year.

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Thank you.

Secretary Gates. The authorizing committees and the Appropriations Committees of Congress have been very aware of what is called reprogramming, and this has been very helpful because of this time period, and there always has been this kind of reprogramming in the process.

However, it is all the more urgent in these days of fast moving technical advances to have decisions, not just programs continuously reviewed.

Senator Symington. I would like to ask the Committee for unanimous agreement, having seen this statement that Secretary Gates had, that the Committee be allowed to put a comment on this at the place it is put in the record.

Senator Case of South Dakota. I have no objection. I thought it ought to be in along with the figures on the budget.

Senator Symington. I thank the Senator.

Senator Cannon?

Senator Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, on page 1 of your statement you say:

"Our military requirements must be based on our needs and consistent with national objectives."

What are our national objectives to which you refer there?

Secretary Gates. First the unquestioned responsibility to

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deter and retaliate in connection with general war. Secondly, to maintain a posture that will permit deployed forces to handle limited wars of all sizes and character.

Third, to make a contribution to whatever cold war posture would be helpful to our foreign policy.

Senator Cannon. Have those been our national objectives in that respect for some period of time?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Cannon. And would that apply as to long range objectives as well as to immediate objectives?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. The reason I ask those questions is because in a speech you made on May 8, 1959 you say:

"We should ask scientists and industry to help us with fresh thinking on our long-range objectives and on our weapons systems".

Secretary Gates. Maybe I ought to clarify. I thought we were talking about military objectives. Of course, there are other national objectives.

Senator Cannon. In other words, in your speech you were not relating there specifically to long-range objectives of the military type?

Secretary Gates. Total U. S. objectives.

Senator Cannon. I see. I thought there was some conflict and I just simply wanted to resolve it in my own mind.

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Now, since you appeared before this committee last, have you revised any of the specific programs in the Department? For example, I am referring now to the Atlas, the Polaris, the Air Alert, Bomarc, Midas and so on?

Have any of those programs been revised since you appeared before the Committee here this year?

Secretary Gates. I haven't appeared before the committee before this year, Senator. I appeared before the Armed Services Committee. I have not appeared before this committee.

Senator Cannon. I am sorry, I was attending that one also as a member of the Armed Services Committee. I will say since the time you had appeared before the Armed Services Committee?

Secretary Gates. Yes, the decision to augment, I mean accelerate the BMEWS system has been made since I appeared before the Armed Services Committee.

Senator Cannon. And that is to give us an earlier warning capability?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. Now with reference to the BMEWS system you indicate that agreement has been reached on the third location. I don't suppose any construction has started there?

Secretary Gates. I believe it is just about to start and we now have under study the same thing that we did in connection with the second one, to see whether this can be

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accelerated.

Senator Cannon. And if it isn't classified, would you state when the BMEWS system would be completely operational for the purpose for which it was intended.

Secretary Gates. It is classified, Senator. It will be completely operational is difficult also. It will be in very good shape as we go along with the increments.

Senator Cannon. If this is not classified, I wonder if you would state whether or not the BMEWS system is designed to protect only in a certain direction, and that the additional range indicated by the firing of the ICBM into the Pacific would indicate that the Russians have a capability of firing from an entirely different direction for which our BMEWS would not give us any warning? I don't want to get into that if that is classified information.

Secretary Gates. No, I understand, Senator. My understanding is, and I think it is right technically, that the BMEWS system when installed will be completely effective.

Senator Cannon. Will give us complete coverage?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Cannon. You made the statement that our defense, our present plans are adequate for deterrent in the years ahead, and again you said our defense programs are designed to maintain this deterrent strength.

How far ahead in your opinion is our deterrent posture

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adequately protected now under present plans?

Secretary Gates. As far ahead as the present estimates and understanding of our relative positions are valid, and subject to changes in actions on the part of the Soviet Union. So far as we can see ahead with present information, as I say, this information sometimes changes very quickly.

But our planning is based on the plans as we see them ahead. You certainly have to plan ahead a couple of years because this is the lead time on some of the things we are doing.

Senator Cannon. Then in your opinion the things that we are doing now are adequate to give us a deterrent posture in the foreseeable future?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. And that includes the present plans that we have insofar as the ICBMs are concerned, the Atlas?

Secretary Gates. Total mix of missiles, yes.

Senator Cannon. Total mix of missiles.

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Cannon. Including ICBMs and Polaris which you say you refer to as an ICBM.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. Now if that is your position, then why do you state that you are now reconsidering whether you would change the ICBM program, that is to bring more

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of them in and put them in hardened sites sooner, and why are you reconsidering the plans to speed up the Polaris program if we already now have what you say is an adequate deterrent plan?

Secretary Gates. If we can be more effective, we want to be so, and in the case of Polaris, as I have testified earlier, before other committees, we have held it back to a two or three year possibility even though the investment and the effort has been very, very large. We have held it back on the basis that we wanted more technical information.

Now we have 2 very significant tests pertaining to Polaris this month, if they are on schedule, we believe that when this is evaluated, we may have additional confidence to do something different. We have just got that under review.

In the case of the Atlas which we have under review, it looks like a more efficient way of doing the business. I am not sure it will turn out to be but it looks so. This I have asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review. I think we should continue to improve, and particularly improve in the more advanced things every time we get an opportunity to do so.

Senator Cannon. And then would you say that if you do augment both of these programs, that we would have a stronger deterrent in the future than we have under plans right at the

bd45

moment.

Secretary Gates. Naturally if we can include more missiles at sea in submarines, we are going to have a bigger deterrence.

Senator Cannon. Then you do feel --

Secretary Gates. It doesn't mean the present one is inadequate. It means the second one will be better.

Senator Cannon. And that it would be a wise idea to have more.

Secretary Gates. More particularly of the advanced systems that we are so terribly interested in, yes.

Senator Cannon. In other words, you are saying in your opinion now we are planning for an adequate deterrent, but you would like to have a better than adequate deterrent if these plans work out?

Secretary Gates. I would like to move as rapidly as we can on the improved second generation items that we have in research.

Senator Cannon. You made the statement in the questioning a little earlier that we have an air alert now of sorts.

Do you actually mean that we have an air alert with airplanes flying with nuclear weapons on board now, flying in an alert status or would you have the public believe that, or are you just referring to the fact that we have some of SAC in the air on a training status all of the time?

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Secretary Gates. It is a training program, and I would not want to infer that it was a sizeable program, but they are on alert status all of the time the same as an airborne alert would be.

Senator Cannon. I am not talking about the ground alert, the 15 minute alert.

Secretary Gates. I understand. I am answering the question as I understand it, in the air.

Senator Cannon. In other words, we have a limited air alert in the air at the moment now with weapons.

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Cannon. And the weapon is armed so that it could be dropped in anger if need be.

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Cannon. I asked that information because that is not the information that has been given me and I believe that has been given members of this committee on other occasions by other people in a position to know.

Secretary Gates. I will certainly correct the record, Mr. Chairman, if this is wrong, but this is completely my understanding and the order of magnitude of this is nothing like the order of magnitude that General Power has recommended. I want to be clear on that.

Senator Cannon. Yes, I understand that.

Secretary Gates. But we have strategic bombers in the

bd47

air on a ready status at the present time.

Senator Cannon. And those bombers have assigned targets.

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Cannon. You referred to the present plans for the on the shelf airborne alert. Let me ask you if the present planning for this so-called on the shelf alert would permit General Power to fly at any time in the future an airborne alert to the extent he says is necessary to insure the survivability of SAC in the event of a surprise attack.

Secretary Gates. I don't want to get complicated, but it is a complicated subject. First I will answer specifically. It is not what General Power requested. It is less, less of a capability than General Power requested.

However, you have to deal in terms of an airborne alert with the length of time the planes fly. Obviously a great many aircraft in SAC could be put on an airborne alert for a few days and there would be no problem at all of degrading the force.

If you keep them longer than a certain number of times you certainly downgrade the force. What we are doing is buying a capability for a continuous 365 days a year 24 hours a day airborne alert as an insurance policy you might say.

This capability is not as large as General Power requested or testified to. However, it gets again into the

bd48

question of time of aircraft in the air, and so forth and it is a complicated subject.

Frankly I think it is largely a matter of degree of capability that the argument is about, and we are satisfied that this degree of capability that we are providing at the present time is a pretty healthy one.

Senator Cannon. Is it the degree of capability or is it because of the difference of opinion as to what you would have to have airborne to avoid destruction of our SAC forces in the event of a surprise attack?

Secretary Gates. It all gets into all the other combinations of whether a salvo attack is possible. How much warning time you have and how much reliability they have and how hard you are, how dispersed you are and so forth. So that it is a difficult thing to analyze.

I believe that we have a capability to fly a certain very substantial airlift for a short period of time any time we want to, and I believe we are building in a capability to fly a very substantial number for a longer period of time any time we want to, and it is a matter of degree of how much reserve, spare engines and spare parts and how much additional training is required to do this.

The Joint Chiefs have reviewed this, and I believe they are agreed that we are doing the thing about correctly.

Senator Cannon. And it is based in part on your analysis

bd49

that the Russians would not be in a position to launch an all out surprise attack in the foreseeable future.

Secretary Gates. It is based on an analysis of various types of attack over various periods of time.

Senator Cannon. Mr. Secretary, in answer to a question from Senator Martin --

Senator Symington. I think the Senator --

Senator Cannon. I have only one more question if I may, Mr. Chairman.

In answer to a question from Senator Martin you said the Department of Defense is now functioning satisfactorily.

Does that hold true as to the Joint Chiefs of Staff also?

Secretary Gates. I believe so, Senator Cannon.

I am very pleased with the arrangements.

Senator Cannon. I raise that question because on May 8, 1959 you said "The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to struggle with divided opinions as to the emphasis to be placed on various systems, and the Secretary of Defense continues to struggle handicapped by traditionally divided service opinions."

Secretary Gates. That is right.

Senator Cannon. Is that true today?

Secretary Gates. I think we have made a big step.

I don't want to be boastful about what we have put into being and I don't want to be premature in judging its results. But

bd50 I think we have made a good step and I think it will work.

Senator Cannon. I thank the Chairman.

Senator Symington. The committee will now unfortunately because of the time, Senator Johnson just said we could go to 1 o'clock, and not beyond.

I want to say, Mr. Secretary, may I thank you for your invariably considerate and kind effort before the committee.

I am not at all satisfied yet as to where we stand in this matter. I think there are many more questions that I would like to ask and I hope that you can adjust your time and the committee can adjust its time and we can proceed in an effort to clarify this situation so that we understand where we are.

I would hope that you would consider, in order to eliminate much if not most of this confusion, doing this year what Secretary McElroy did last year and release these ratios as given to us by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator Saltonstall. Would the Senator yield?

Senator Symington. I would be glad to.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, may I express for this side of the table our appreciation of your frank clear testimony this morning, Mr. Secretary, and we wish you well on your very difficult mission to Paris next week.

Senator Symington. I would like to join in that too if I may.

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Secretary Gates. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Symington. The Committee recesses subject to the call of the chair.

(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m. the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.)

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