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Vol. 3

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services
and

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences

INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS

(NAVY)

February 8, 1960

Washington, D. C.

WARD & PAUL

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8 February 1960
Preparedness Investigating Sub. and
Aeronautical & Space Sciences
United States Senate
Testimony of Admiral Burke & General
Shoup

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Senate
Armed
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TESTIMONY OF:

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Admiral Arleigh Burke,
Chief of Naval Operations and a
Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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General David M. Shoup,
Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS

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Monday, February 8, 1960

United States Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services, and
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee and Subcommittee met, pursuant to recess,
at 2:05 p. m., in Room 235, Old Senate Office Building,
Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (Chairman of the Committee and
Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:

Senators Johnson (Presiding), Stennis and
Symington.

Present: Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences:

Senators Johnson (Presiding, Stennis, Symington,
Young, Cannon, Saltonstall, Wiley, Martin, and Case (N.J.)).

Also present: Senators Jackson, Engle and Bush, and Dirksen.

Edwin L. Weisl, Special Counsel; Cyrus R. Vance,
Associate Counsel; Kenneth E. Belieu, Staff Director of Space
Committee and Preparedness Subcommittee.

Staff Members, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:

Stuart French, Associate Counsel and Robert M. Neal,

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Attorney.

Staff members, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences: Max Lehrer, Assistant Staff Director; Everard H. Smith, Jr., Counsel; William J. Deachman, Assistant Counsel; Dr. Glen P. Wilson, Chief Clerk; and Dr. Earl W. Lindveit, Assistant Chief Clerk.

George E. Reed, Assistant to Senator Johnson; and Dr. Edward C. Welsh, Assistant to Senator Symington.

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Senator Johnson. The Committee will come to order.

This afternoon the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of Armed Services, in conjunction with the Space Committee, continues its review of the adequacy of America's defenses.

The question remains in many important areas as to whether or not tomorrow's programs -- which must be decided today -- will provide the adequate protection our country will need.

The principal witness this afternoon will be Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations and a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Burke, it is my opinion -- and I know it is shared by other of the Committee Members -- that the American people, if properly informed, will make the proper decisions. We on the Committee represent the people who by their votes have placed us here. We must depend on career experts, such as you, for much of our information.

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The Committee has been told that today we are strong -- but that the trend is against us. We ask you to appear this afternoon to give us the benefit of your views -- not only as America's senior Naval expert, but also as a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, most important, a great and distinguished American.

Admiral Burke, it is our custom to swear in witnesses. Will you please stand while I administer the oath.

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in the testimony you are about to give, so help you God?

Admiral Burke. I do, sir.

Senator Johnson. You may be seated.

If there are no comments by Committee members, we will ask counsel to proceed with the questioning.

Mr. Weisl. Admiral Burke, your predecessor, Admiral Robert B. Carney, wrote an article entitled "Our Public Trust To Speak Out," and in this article he stated, and I quote:

"The existing organizational structure for national defense is such that it is quite possible for the considered service views to be disapproved or pigeon-holed at the military department level or at the Department of Defense level. Thus, important service philosophies can, in effect, be withheld from public consideration unless the people are willing unquestionably to abide by administrative decision in

vital military matters. They will want to hear all the arguments and have a say in the final shape of things."

Do you agree with the views of your predecessor, Admiral Carney, in that respect?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL ARLEIGH BURKE,
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND A
MEMBER OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral Burke. I don't think that any military man has had his opinion suppressed. Whether or not it is possible, which is what I think Admiral Carney stated there, that it might be possible, I don't think it is possible. At least it hasn't been done.

Mr. Weisl. At least you are willing to give your personal recommendations to this Committee as to what is necessary to guard the future safety of this Nation, are you not?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Will you please tell us about Russian sea-power as you see it today?

Admiral Burke. At the end of World War II Russia had a very small and a very insignificant Navy. It took them about 5 or 6 years of study of all the battles and all of the navies of World War II to determine what they should do.

In about 1950 they started the submarine building program, because they realized that the United States is dependent upon allies, it is dependent upon our own forces overseas. If

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wars are to be fought, they will be fought in the Eurasian Continents, and so they built a lot of submarines.

At one time, about 1956, they got up to a building rate of over 80 submarines per year. In 1957 or thereabouts, they stopped building the submarines that they were then building and shifted to some new types. They now have coming off the line a couple of new types of submarines.

We note too they were very much interested in nuclear power in submarines because of the tremendous advantage of nuclear power for submarines, and we know that they have been trying to build nuclear powered submarines. We do not believe that they have any nuclear powered submarines in operation now.

Now in addition to that, Russia built a large number of cruisers, destroyers and a particularly large number of small patrol craft and mine laying craft. About four or five years ago about the same time that we started putting missiles on our cruisers, Russia was reported to have stopped construction on some of the cruisers that were there on the way. She, however, by that time had built about 25 cruisers I believe, so that she now has in commission more cruisers than we have, about twice the number of cruisers than we have.

In the last two or three years Russia has been extremely interested in missiles and surface ships. She has some missile surface ships. She has developed since World War II

dm6

nearly from scratch a navy which has more ships than our Navy, but most of them small ships, but over-all, in her over-all effectiveness, she is the second navy in the world.

Mr. Weisl. How does her submarine fleet compare to ours?

Admiral Burke. She has over 400 submarines in commission. We have less than 120 in commission.

Mr. Weisl. Are her submarines of the modern type?

Admiral Burke. Her submarines are good conventional boats, but they are not nuclear power yet. That is the 450 --

Mr. Weisl. But the average snorkel type are post World War II type submarines, are they not?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir, and they used a German design in their production.

Mr. Weisl. Do you know what percentage of our industry is vulnerable to missile carrying submarines?

Admiral Burke. It depends upon the range of the missile, but of course the entire United States is vulnerable, if they have a missile of sufficient range.

Mr. Weisl. Isn't it a fact that the bulk of our facilities producing aircraft, missiles, electronics, ships and other key military items are located on the East and West Coasts?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisl. May I call your attention, Admiral Burke,

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to a statement made in a magazine called "Navy." You are familiar with that magazine.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Then I quote:

"Of course, sooner or later the Pentagon and Congress must face up to what is probably the most serious and fundamental national security problem, the growing obsolescence of our fleet. With the exception of the few ships built or modernized since the end of World War II, our Navy is operating with World War II shipping.

"Our Navy materiel is not being replaced as fast as it is wearing out or being technologically outmoded. The day of reckoning must inevitably arrive. There is a growing awareness in Congress of this crisis which is already confronting us in its initial form. However, positive proposals for the maintenance of the U. S. sea power must originate with the Executive Branch of the Government.

"In this period of budgetary squeeze on the military, the cost of maintaining a modern fleet is a strong incentive for sweeping the problem under the corner of the Pentagon's administrative rug. Unfortunately, the rapid growth of Soviet sea power indicates that no such problem exists with respect to the Soviet Navy."

Do you agree with that statement?

Admiral Burke. I don't agree with the way it is worded,

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sir, but essentially our fleet is old. Most of our fleet is of World War II vintage.

About 78 per cent of our fleet now was built during World War II. Sooner or later those ships are going to wear out and fall apart. At that time they will need replacement.

Mr. Weisl. Each year you have come before this Committee since I have been counsel with the same story, that we may get along this year, but if we don't do something next year, we are in grave danger. And then the next year you came along and said, "Well, we may get along this year, but if we don't do something next year."

Now we are up to FY 1961. Are you now proceeding with all the ships and aircraft that were approved by the Congress in the fiscal year budget 1960?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. We had to cancel or defer the building of five ships in our 1960 program because the total ship building program, not only '60 but the years before, the cost has increased due to two things: Due to an increase in the cost of labor and cost of material, and also due to increased cost in equipment due to advances in equipment.

Now we cannot start a ship unless we have the money available to pay for it. Due to the fact that we were short of money to pay for all of the ships in the previous program, we deferred five ships, three DLG's, the conversion of one cruiser and a research ship.

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Mr. Weisl. Now those ships that you deferred that were appropriated for in the fiscal year 1960 budget, have they been reinstated in the 1961 budget?

Admiral Burke. One of them has, sir. The research ship has, but we have three DLG's in the '61 budget, and perhaps that could be considered as being replaced. But we would have had them in there whether or not we had the built the ships last year, sir.

Mr. Weisl. But the four destroyers, the three destroyers and the cruiser have not been reinstated.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisl. And yet you have testified very properly, and so have the rest of your staff, of the critical need for anti-submarine warfare development. Aren't the destroyers particularly used in anti-submarine warfare?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. These are excellent ships for that. But because of this necessity each year to either cancel ships or ask Congress for an increase in funds to pay for previous programs is the main reason why we have asked this year, after consulting with the Department of Defense, for a change in the pricing concept, so that we can price the ship to completion, and this will help us out in the future.

Mr. Weisl. Why wasn't Congress asked for the necessary funds?

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Admiral Burke. We discussed this with the Department of Defense, and in the discussion it was decided that we would do two things: that in the re-pricing we would ask for, we would defer these five ships, which I think came to about \$317 million, and also ask Congress for the money to complete the program to completion.

Mr. Weisl. In other words, what you are telling us is that you had reservations about the 1960 program, and you didn't even get all that was provided for in that program, and that the cutbacks in that program have not been reinstated in the FY 1961 budget, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Essentially, yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Now in the fiscal 1961 budget, it appears that your bureau heads, the heads of the various departments, asked the Navy Comptroller for certain equipment, and this is the list, and you can correct me if I don't state it correctly, that was denied, the list that was recommended and denied:

1. The Navy personnel strength was reduced by 11,000, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisl. The number of active fleet ships reduced from 864 to 817.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. The number of average operating aircraft

dm 11 reduced approximately 300 and number of flying hours reduced by 500,000, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. That is essentially correct, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Aircraft procurement reduced by 681 from 1,339 to 658.

Admiral Burke. I don't believe that was in the budget, sir.

Mr. Weisl. That was the difference between what was recommended.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir. That is what was recommended by the Bu/Air at that time, and what we finally came up with.

Mr. Weisl. And this I consider the important one.

5. Eliminated 35 new construction ships including three fleet ballistic missile submarines and long lead time procurement for six additional fleet ballistic missile submarines, and seven conversions, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. But if I may interject here, the lists, the requests, of the Bureau Chiefs did not go to the Department of Defense. I kept a good many of those down, because we were given a directive in July on how to build our budget, and we followed that directive.

Mr. Weisl. In other words, you were given guidelines as to what plateau you mustn't cross regardless of how much you needed?

dm 12

Admiral Burke. We were given two planning guidelines, sir.

One was a guideline based upon our NOA last year less 10 per cent of the procurement, military construction, and research and development. That was to be the basic budget.

The other one was to be the basic budget plus that 10 per cent plus half a billion dollars, and we submitted that budget to the Department of Defense based on those guidelines, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Those guidelines were money limitations, isn't that right?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Not requirement limitations?

Admiral Burke. They were money limitations, yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. But the fact is that three fleet ballistic missile submarines recommended were thrown out, long lead-time requirement for six additional fleet ballistic missile submarines were denied, and seven conversions were denied, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, but I did that in order to --

Mr. Weisl. You did that?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

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Mr. Weisl. But it wasn't because you thought it should be done, but because of the guideline and the money limitations, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. No. 6. Expendible Ordnance and Other Weapons and Support Equipment Reduced.

What does that mean?

Admiral Burke. Ammunition, primarily, such things as torpedoes, mines, and that type of equipment, sir.

Mr. Weisl. What is the condition of the ammunition and mines and torpedoes? Can you run the Navy without a full supply of those?

Admiral Burke. We have now some very good new torpedoes that are coming off the line, and we would like of course to get them in great supply.

We have also just developed a couple of very good mines. We would like to have more of those, of course, sir, but in submitting these budgets to the Department of Defense, we have an opportunity to speak to our budget, to lay out our requirements, and then the decision is made as to what the final budget will be, and we support that budget after it is made, sir.

Mr. Weisl. I know that, but I am talking about what you were allowed as compared to the people who have the responsibility of doing the fighting said their requirements were.

Admiral Burke. They asked for that all right, sir.

Mr. Weisl. No. 8. You reduced research and development effort to approximately fiscal year 1960 level, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisl. In other words, despite the critical needs for research and development of anti-submarine warfare and the like, you have no greater funds for that than you had in FY 1960, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. That is essentially correct, sir.

Mr. Weisl. In your opinion as the head, as the Chief Naval Officer, are you satisfied?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, I don't think that any Military Chief will ever be satisfied --

Mr. Weisl. We know that.

Admiral Burke. -- but I did have an opportunity to state my case, and I support this.

Senator Johnson. What you are saying is that you are following the budget judgment instead of the military judgment. The military judgment is one thing. You made the recommendations based on military judgment. Then you got guidelines and you compromised by following the guidelines.

Admiral Burke. We put our most important items in our budget, in the basic budget, and the next most important items in the add-on, sir.

Senator Johnson. And the budget does not contain items that your military judgment feels you should have.

Admiral Burke. It doesn't contain as many items as we originally asked for, no.

Senator Johnson. It eliminated three Polaris submarines, also long lead time procurement for six additional Polaris submarines. Does that mean that you believe that the budget provides all the funds that should be provided for the Polaris submarine?

Admiral Burke. I might explain that a little bit, sir. I think that the Department of Defense, people in the Department of Defense, and of course they should speak for themselves on this --

Senator Johnson. They will. I want you to speak for yourself. Do you think the budget has got all the money it ought to have for the Polaris submarines?

Admiral Burke. Not now, sir, because we have completed our tests on that, and that is a wonderful machine, sir.

Senator Johnson. The answer is no?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Johnson. And you think it ought to have more money in it for the Polaris submarines?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Johnson. Your military judgment leaves no doubt about that, so far as you are concerned?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, but --

Senator Johnson. But because of the budget guidelines, it is not in there, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, not altogether. Partly it was because at the time that this budget was put bed, by the time it was prepared, we had not completed all the tests on the Polaris submarines.

Senator Johnson. Are you going to ask for a deficiency?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Johnson. Have you?

Admiral Burke. Not yet.

Senator Johnson. When are we going to get around to doing it?

Admiral Burke. We are getting around to doing it right now, sir, because we have got the papers in the mill, but we haven't finally gotten -- it takes quite a while to get all the papers.

Senator Johnson. Where is the mill?

Admiral Burke. In my mill, sir.

Senator Jackson. Will the Chairman yield at that point, or counsel?

Mr. Weisl. Certainly.

Senator Jackson. I think the record should be made clear that of the 12 Polaris firing submarines authorized and under way at various stages, 7 of them were put in over

and above the budget, of the 12, 7 out of the 12. I mean the Department of Defense only asked for 5.

Mr. Weisl. In fiscal years 1958 and '59 the Congress provided funds and authority to proceed with 9 Polaris submarines, isn't that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Despite this, is it not true that the Executive branch refused to release the funds for submarines 7, 8 and 9 during fiscal year 1959?

Admiral Burke. They were held over until fiscal year '60.

Mr. Weisl. I know, but the Congress provided for the use of those funds in '59, and they were deferred, were they not?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Is it not also true that the 1960 budget contained no funds for construction of additional Polaris submarines except for advanced components for submarines numbered 10, 11 and 12?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Isn't the withholding of the funds appropriated in 1959 and the failure to request additional funds in 1960 resulting in a sharp decrease or a gap in the deployment of Polaris submarines after the first 9?

Admiral Burke. Not a sharp decrease, sir. What we can do will of course be to deploy about 3 submarines per year,

because that is what we built per year.

Mr. Weisl. I understand that, but if you had used the money that you asked Congress to give you and that you pleaded so eloquently for, you wouldn't have had that gap, isn't that true?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Weisl. Obviously you cannot make up for that lead time now. Once lead time is lost, it is lost forever, isn't it?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Are you fully satisfied with the funds in the 1961 budget for the Polaris?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, and we will ask for a supplemental on that, I believe, sir. I believe that the Department of Defense will look favorably on it, sir, although I am not sure.

Mr. Weisl. You had the experience. The Congress allowed more funds than the Department asked for, and when they provided for those funds, they weren't used. That happened in two years.

What assurance has the Congress now that if they give you more funds, they will be used?

Admiral Burke. Of course I can't give you that assurance.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. All right, Senator Saltonstall.

Senator Saltonstall. Would you state, Admiral Burke,

what the amount of the funds are that you intend to ask for for additional Polaris subs?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. We haven't completely got our figures in line, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. How many subs --

Admiral Burke. I can tell you what we can do, sir. We can build 6 additional submarines with the money in '61, and then after that year, in '62, we could build a submarine, a Polaris submarine per month.

Now in addition to that, there is the question of Polaris on surface ships. We have cruisers which can take the same suit of Polaris submarines as are in it, the same suit of Polaris missiles as are in the submarines, in other words, 16, and it might be, we think it would be desirable to put Polaris in cruisers, too, so that they would be available.

Senator Saltonstall. Counsel, I haven't yet got the answer to my question. I don't understand it. Is the present program up to 12 Polaris submarines and long lead time for 3 more?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. How many more do you intend to ask for, or how many more do you intend to complete in the '61 program, if you get it?

Admiral Burke. We probably will ask for 6 more, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Six more?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. Now, that is the Navy will ask for 6 more, we probably will.

Senator Saltonstall. That is including those with the long lead time items on 3, so you need money to complete 6 submarines including the 3 long lead time items which you have here.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Thank you.

Senator Stennis. All right, Counsel.

Mr. Weisl. Did you say the 1961 program, or fiscal budget provided for how many submarines?

Admiral Burke. Three Polaris submarines.

Mr. Weisl. That would not add up to 12, would it?

Admiral Burke. Senator Saltonstall was talking about the total of 12, up to the '61 budget, up to and including the '61 budget.

Mr. Weisl. A total of 12?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Jackson. Would the counsel yield? Just to clarify that point, Mr. Chairman, the 3 that were added last year, that adds up to 12 actually call for long lead items, and in the present budget I believe you have the funds to complete those submarines.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Stennis. All right, Counsel, proceed, please.

Mr. Weisl. You spoke of Polaris missiles on cruisers.

Did you request funds to put Polaris missiles on cruisers?

Admiral Burke. Not this year, sir. We did last year.

Mr. Weisl. What happened to that request?

Admiral Burke. It was turned down on the basis that Polaris hadn't yet been proven, and it was too early to make a decision.

Mr. Weisl. Is it your testimony that there will or will not be a sharp decrease in Polaris subs deployed after the first 9?

Admiral Burke. There will be a delay of several months, but it won't be a sharp decrease. They will average out, of course, 3 per year.

Mr. Weisl. Admiral Burke, the Secretary of the Navy appointed a special board to deal with this question of modernizing the fleet. You are familiar with that board?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. May I read to you some of the conclusions reached by that board, and then get your comment:

"General Conclusion: Our observations and an evaluation of the information before us lead to one inescapable conclusion. The United States Fleet is not in an acceptable state of readiness."

Then the rest is deleted.

"The present condition is bad." Deleted.

"Unless drastic steps are taken to reverse the mounting deterioration now in progress, this applies to the ships of the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets, to warships and auxiliaries alike."

Are you familiar with that conclusion reached by the Special Board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, and it was on the basis of the recommendations of that Board that we last year submitted a recommendation that we go to what we call the FRAM program, which is the modernization of certain older ships to extend their life and make them more useful ships.

Mr. Weisl. What happened to that program?

Admiral Burke. The program is divided into two parts: the FRAM 1 part, which is a complete and thorough modernization putting new equipment in the old, in the best ones of the old ships, and the FRAM 2 program, which means a lesser modernization, which puts some new equipment in, but does not modernize them to quite the same extent as the FRAM 1.

In the FRAM 2 program, our original plan we are still on. That is we have in this budget of '61 a request for the modernization of 14 destroyer types, and that is what our original plan was.

On the FRAM 2 program, which was a lesser modernization, our original plan was for 52 ships, and we have in this budget 27 ships, sir, which I might add we are very grateful to have.

Mr. Weisl. Are you through, Admiral?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Was the Navy permitted to ask for all the funds for FRAM 1 and FRAM 2 that were recommended by these consultants of yours?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. Again we submitted our budget this year, based upon the guidelines, and we got the most important things in, and we cut down on some of the FRAM 2 ships, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Now this Special Board that was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy reported further as follows, and I quote:

"Funds not matched to responsibility. The group believes that the primary cause of this situation is an every-widening gap between the responsibilities assigned to the Navy and the financial resources allocated to it for carrying out these responsibilities."

Do you agree with that conclusion?

Admiral Burke. That Board had a very difficult problem, but it had just one part of the whole problem of the Navy. Because of the recommendations of that Board, we did ask last year and again this year for more money in our maintenance and operations appropriations.

But the biggest difficulty in the Navy is trying to make the proper balance between funds to keep up our present

capability in funds for new procurement so that we will have the capability in the future. In other words, it is present capability versus a future Navy.

Mr. Weisl. I believe you testified at the last hearing that in your personal opinion it is more expensive in the long run to try to keep an obsolescent fleet in condition than to build a new one.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. A fleet is just like a car. There comes a time when it costs you more to repair a car than it does to buy a new car.

Mr. Weisl. Now this Special Navy Board made the following statement in addition to those which I read:

"A cold-blooded appraisal of the situation leads us to the conclusion that the deterioration in the material condition of the fleet may well set in motion a series of events so familiar to all through the story of the consequences of the loss of the horse shoe nail. In the circumstances two alternatives face the Department of Defense.

"The first alternative requires a substantial increase in the Navy budget, which permits increased expenditures for maintenance and modernization of present vessels and the orderly replacement of obsolete ships by new ones.

"2. The second alternative is to" -- and that is deleted -- frankly admits we cannot afford a Navy of that size and capability that we now have. By rapid retirement of obsolete

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ships without replacement, the total strength of the Navy could be reduced to a point where we could afford properly to modernize and maintain the remaining ships in good condition. This would result in a substantial reduction of the responsibilities that the Navy could carry. Whether the United States could remain a first-class power under such a reduction is questionable."

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Do you agree with that?

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Admiral Burke. Yes, that is true. At the same time we did get an increase in M and O last year, and we have an increase in M and O this year.

Now it is also true that because of the increased cost, that in balancing this budget this year we cut the number of ships, we cut the number of aircraft, we cut the number of people, in order to cut the costs of present operation to buy new equipment for the future.

Mr. Weisl. In other words the guide lines in the Budget determined what you got, not what you felt as Chief Naval Operations Officer your requirements were?

Admiral Burke. I had an opportunity to express my convictions and to lay my case before the Secretary of Defense over and over again, sir, and I did, and these were the decisions that were made.

Mr. Weisl. I understand. My time is up.

Senator Stennis. Gentlemen of the Committee, we will follow the pattern, unless the Committee wishes otherwise, of allowing 10 minutes for each Senator. In that way we will give all a chance to get in some of their major questions, and then we will come back to counsel.

Admiral, I want to ask you one question about this mobility now. As I see the problem about pitching these missiles around from Polaris, one of your great assets is the mobility of your submarines. If something can be

km2

testified about in open court mere, what about the accuracy of hitting your target when you are out there in the ocean somewhere?

Do you know exactly where you are and exactly where your target is that you are shooting at?

Admiral Burke. Three or four years ago that was a very serious question for us. We didn't know whether or not we could develop navigational systems of sufficient accuracy to warrant trying to hit a pinpoint target a long ways off.

We have conducted the research. We now have systems, not just one but several different methods, which will permit us some phenomenally good accuracy in navigation. We have no doubt on that score any more.

Now as far as knowing where the enemy target is, that is true with all missiles of everything. I mean you have got to know exactly where the enemy is, and that is dependent upon a geodesy of wherever your targets are. We all have the same data on that, so there is no difference between the naval missile and a missile fired from any place else as far as that is concerned.

Now as far as mobility is concerned in general, sir, a ballistic missile is good against a fixed target in a known location. You have got to put an address in the thing. You put the address in and then you fire the missile and it hits that address.

Now that is the advantage of ships at sea, all kinds of ships at sea, carriers, surface ships as well as submarines. But they are not a good target for ballistic missiles, because ballistic missiles must have a fixed address, and ships at sea do not have a fixed address.

So they are not subject to attack by ballistic missiles, and that is why ships at sea are commending to be of even more importance than they were a few years ago, sir.

Senator Stennis. So you feel that you have conquered that problem of firing from your position of mobility and all. You have solved that.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, the navigational problem we think we have solved.

Senator Stennis. What would be your opinion, then, about placing missiles on railway cars? We hear that mentioned occasionally.

Admiral Burke. I think certainly anything that makes a missile move -- the big difference between ourselves and Russia, for example, is that Russia has an iron curtain. We don't know where her missile sites are. We don't know if she has any missile sites. We haven't the least idea of where the missile sites are.

Now, some day we will find out by one means or another where some of these missile sites are. But there will be a large portion of them I am sure that we will never find

out exactly where they are. They can be camouflaged. There can be a lot of dummy sites.

There will be a lot of other reasons, so that we will not know where all of her missile sites are.

Now on the other hand, we in the United States publish before the missile sites are ever built exactly where they are. So they know where our targets are. So missiles on railroad trains are valuable, because they can be moved from one site, from one firing site to another.

Senator Stennis. All right. You think it is practical then to put them on moving railway cars or on moving submarines and moving surface ships, is that right?

Admiral Burke. I don't think it is planned to fire the missiles on a moving railroad car. I think what they propose to do is to move it from one place to another.

Senator Stennis. I know, I mean move them around on railway cars. Now would you want to go further into this, putting the missile on the surface ships? Have you adequately covered that? You mentioned it a while ago.

Admiral Burke. Surface ships are on normal routine duties anyway. There will be a considerable proportion of them deployed. They are there.

Under normal circumstances, you could put Polaris missiles on those ships and they would be very valuable if you needed them.

Senator Stennis. I want to get a figure here as to the cost of a Polaris submarine with the full complement for the missiles. I am sure you have the figure on that. Could you give it to us?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, the cost of a Polaris submarine is about \$100,000,000, a little less.

Senator Stennis. That is all equipped and ready to go?

Admiral Burke. The missiles cost about a million and a half each.

Senator Stennis. Yes, but the costs you give for the submarine includes all the complements, the firing apparatus and all, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. The cost of six submarines in addition to -- that is with missiles, tenders, all the ancillary equipment, every part of the cost, research and development and everything else is around \$975,000,000. That is with six additional submarines outfitted completely.

Senator Stennis. \$975,000,000 for six?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. That is over 150,000,000 apiece.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. That includes the tenders and everything else, sir. That is everything that goes, the total business.

Senator Stennis. Admiral, you used the term "sound military requirements". Just what do you mean when you say

sound military requirements? That is not a trap question.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. I just noticed it is used from time to time. Is that a minimum program?

Admiral Burke.

Senator Stennis. A medium program?

Admiral Burke. Well, I suspect the definition varies a little bit with the people who use it. My definition of a sound military requirement is one which is based upon factors which you are very certain of.

That is, for example, take in a limited war where we might want to assist a country say in Southeast Asia. A sound military requirement would be that we would have to have a certain amount of sea lift to lift a certain number of troops, and that is a sound military requirement.

Depending upon the situation, and each one is a little different, suppose we had to lift a division and a half. We ought to have the sound military requirement for a division and a half lift, the types of ships that go with it, that would go into that lift and those things.

Senator Stennis. It has to do then with requirements for carrying your mission out in a military way.

Admiral Burke. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. In general?

Admiral Burke. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator Saltonstall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Burke, how long have you been Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Burke. Four and a half years, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. And you have another three and a half, God being willing, ahead of you?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, God being willing, a year and a half, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. I hope he is willing on what I say as well as what you said.

Admiral Burke. Thank you, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Now during that time you have been a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral Burke. Yes.

Senator Saltonstall. And while you have had your differences of opinion as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you have as a whole, the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a whole, have collaborated together and worked out a defensive scheme?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. And the plans that we have today for the defense of our country and for a retaliatory effort have the unanimous approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral Burke. That is a pretty broad question, sir.

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Senator Saltonstall. I deliberately made it broad.

Admiral Burke. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider literally thousands of problems in a year, and when we start considering any individual problem, there are usually as many differences of opinion as there are people present.

But in the process of exchanging opinions, we arrive at unanimous conclusion on a surprisingly large number of them. There are only a very few on which we do not have unanimous opinion, perhaps less than 40 I should imagine over a year.

Those are important problems true enough, but those problems deal with futures nearly always. What does the future hold in a particular area? The chiefs arrive at a common understanding, a common belief in what should be done in most of the cases, in a tremendous number of them, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. And there is one over-all plan. There aren't three different service plans as to what to do if there was a retaliatory effort demanded.

Admiral Burke. No, sir. There is one plan that we fight with. That is a plan that is approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, generated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Saltonstall. That plan is based on the availability and the over-all strength of our combined armed

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services today?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, that is the total capabilities plan of all the services.

Senator Saltonstall. And the plan is based on the present Budget requests and what it will produce?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. That particular plan, the fighting plan, is based upon -- and I don't want to get too deeply involved in our planning processes, but that plan is based upon -- our capabilities we either have in hand or very shortly will have in hand, that is mostly on previous budgets, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Last year I recall a conversation with you that what the Navy would like to do or wants to do would be to put in for an aircraft carrier one year and then anti-submarine warfare provisions in a substantial amount next year. Do I remember you correctly?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir. That was our original idea.

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Senator Saltonstall. Now last year we gave you \$130 million more, if my memory is right, for ASW than was in the original budget.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. And that money has been obligated.

Admiral Burke. The money has all been committed, sir, in the program.

Senator Saltonstall. That is what I meant.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Now we gave you \$35 million for a new aircraft carrier, a long lead time item. That was not obligated.

Admiral Burke. That is correct.

Senator Saltonstall. But this year there is in the budget an amount for a new aircraft carrier, conventional type, not nuclear-powered.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. And that \$35 million will go into that?

Admiral Burke. Yes. We are asking Congress to permit us to spend that.

Senator Saltonstall. Now, in this year's budget also how much money have you got for ASW?

Admiral Burke. A total of about, subject to correction, sir, I think it is \$1.9 billion.

Senator Saltonstall. I have heard you testify before, the men, the ships and the aircraft in operation have been cut down, and you are supporting the present budget of the President, are you?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, I do support the budget.

Senator Saltonstall. And if he would recommend more money in the budget for the Polaris subs, you will of course support that?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Your answer was not a surprise.

You believe that the Polaris tests are now sufficiently successful so that the Polaris subs and the Polaris on cruisers will be put into development and operational status?

Admiral Burke. We think that in a very few months that they will be fully operational, sir. We have overcome -- we have passed all big milestones that we have set for ourselves, and the last few tests of Polaris have been so successful that we believe that it will soon be completely operational. We don't see any difficulty whatever.

Senator Saltonstall. And that is a weapon that, as a Navy man, you have great confidence in?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, we have absolute confidence in that, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Now, General Power testified that 300 missiles in the hands of the Soviets could wipe us out,

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wipe out all our retaliatory force in a comparatively few minutes. Do you agree with that statement?

Admiral Burke. I have a very, very high regard for General Power. I think that he probably was talking about his own force, although I am not sure. And I am not sure either whether he meant 300 ballistic missiles on launcher or 300 ballistic missiles hitting the target.

Now I do agree, I think he is right in that a ballistic missile that hits the target with the accuracy of the Russian ballistic missiles which will eventually increase, I mean the accuracy will get better, that is I think what General Power is saying is that the fixed bases will be vulnerable, and it doesn't take very many of them to knock out a fixed base, the number depending upon primarily the accuracy of the missile, but secondarily upon the size of the warhead, but mostly on the accuracy of the missile.

Senator Saltonstall. Where will the Navy be?

Admiral Burke. We will be at sea, I hope.

Senator Saltonstall. Can you be put out at that time?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. Ballistic missiles are of no value against targets which are not in a fixed location.

Senator Saltonstall. So that your retaliatory effort, for what it is worth in the Navy, would still be available?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, and we have a significant retaliatory effort, sir. It is considerable.

We have on our aircraft carriers now, which are in the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, we have over 200 attack aircraft. That is significant.

When we get these Polaris submarines, that is going to be a very significant one, because those submarines, as a system, as a weapons system, are invulnerable, because they are not vulnerable at all to ballistic missiles, and you can't hit all the submarines simultaneously. So those submarines will get off their missiles.

Senator Saltonstall. And can you say in an open session how many missiles each submarine carries?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, 16.

Senator Saltonstall. So there will be 16 on each submarine in this coming year. How many of those Polaris subs will be in operation?

Admiral Burke. There will be two of them deployable, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Two of them deployable in calendar year '60?

Admiral Burke. This calendar year, yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. And then they are going to come along at the rate that you have already testified to?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, about 3 per year.

Senator Saltonstall. What is the retaliatory effort of the carrier? You state the airplanes. What is their

maximum distance? In other words, how far could they travel?

Admiral Burke. It depends upon the type of aircraft, sir. We have three types of aircraft, the A3D and the A4D. The A3D has a range of about, a radius of about a thousand miles. The A4D has a much lesser range, has a lesser range, and these are approximate.

I don't want to give the exact figures here, but it is a significant range, 600 miles about, more or less, and the A3J, which is our new aircraft that is just coming off the line, is a high-speed aircraft which is capable of either high or low level delivery, has a range of about the same as the A3D, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. I have time for just one more question, Admiral.

Are you satisfied that our total retaliatory effort today in the Army, the Air Force and the Navy is sufficient so that no nation will dare attack us because of our ability to retaliate?

Admiral Burke. Of course, deterrence is a state of mind in the enemy, in the other man. Nobody can tell exactly what that is going to be.

But I think that there is no doubt if we were attacked now, that our attackers would be destroyed. There would be nothing that an enemy can do to knock out our retaliatory capability to such an extent that he would not be destroyed.

Senator Saltonstall. Then the problem comes with what will happen in '61, '62 and '63, and as Chief of Naval Operations you are going to do everything in your power to see that that situation remains as it is?

Admiral Burke. I think it will remain, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Senator Symington, you have ten minutes.

Senator Symington. Admiral, I have been reading some of your testimony in the House Appropriations Committee hearing for 1961. Congressman Flood asked you about the question of capability as against intention. He said at one point:

"I am not taking about maximum capability. I agree with you, that would be fantastic. You would surrender.

"Admiral Burke. That is what the old system was."

Now that is your answer categorically. That is all you say. Is your statement correct that we only figured maximum capability in the past?

Admiral Burke. What he was talking about there, I believe -- I don't remember it all -- but I think he was talking about the missile, the ICBM.

Senator Symington. That is right.

Admiral Burke. And when you first get a system like that, you haven't very much data to go on.

Senator Symington. Are you saying that before this year we figured on the maximum capability of the Soviets? Is

that your statement?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. I think when you first get an ICBM or any other system, and you have only one factor, you have got to use that factor, and we used that before.

Senator Symington. The maximum capability?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. And then this year we changed for the first time to intentions?

Admiral Burke. Well, we changed because we have more data and we have got programs. We have got more programs. It is obvious she wasn't exercising her maximum capability.

Senator Symington. That is the reason we reduced our estimate of ICBM production in the Soviet Union, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, because our programs indicated -- her programs indicated that she was not going on a crash program.

Senator Symington. Then why is it that the number of submarines, that is, the number of ICBM's available to attack this country as of mid-1960 was given to us as more this year than it was last year by the Director of Central Intelligence?

Admiral Burke. I don't have those. Yes, I do.

Senator Symington. Well, I do.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, I have them.

Senator Symington. What I am asking, the implication of your testimony as well as statements made in the Department of Defense is that inasmuch as we have changed from capability to intentions, we have reduced the estimate of what the Russians are doing in ICBM's.

My question is why then does the national intelligence give us the fact that they are doing more, that they have more potential instead of less as of, we will say, today, or let's be exactly accurate, as of we will say mid-year this year?

Admiral Burke. It is very difficult to discuss this here with these figures in open session.

Senator Symington. I am not discussing any figures. I am asking about the implication that has been given to the people of the United States that because we were shifting from capability to intentions, that national intelligence was stating that the Russians would have less ICBM capacity than was estimated before.

The truth is, unless Mr. Dulles is perjuring himself before this Committee, which I am certain is not true because he is one of our finest Americans, that we now estimate they will have more in the mill in 1960 instead of less. Therefore, why all this talk incident to intentions as against capability? That is my question.

Admiral Burke. Each year we get more and more data on

every program.

Senator Symington. I understand that, but I thought you felt that based on your testimony this morning, and based on your testimony before the Appropriations Committee, that as a result of changing from maximum capability to intentions, the Russians were doing less in the ICBM field.

Admiral Burke. What I say, and what I intended to imply, was that when you make your first estimates on an enemy program, you base it upon the only data you have, which is her capability to produce that program.

Then thereafter as you get more intelligence, more data, more information, then you realize what programs they are doing, and that may increase, it may decrease.

Senator Symington. I know, but how could intentions exceed maximum capability?

Admiral Burke. I don't think it is intentions, sir. It is based upon the programs. These are all estimates. These are all estimates.

Senator Symington. I think we have finally gotten the important point to me in all this discussion out. Why if we did figure maximum capability, and you say that is what the old system was, and if in figuring maximum capability we imply that the estimate was that they were doing more, would have greater potential in the last intelligence decisions as to what they are doing, why is it that as of mid-1961 Mr.

Dulles now tells us that they will have considerably more capability in mid-1961 than he told us they would have last year?

I mean, what is the point of raising intentions as against capability, if it isn't to imply that they are doing less? Yet national intelligence tells us that they are doing more. National intelligence tells us that they are doing more by 1962.

So here for over a period of years the new intelligence estimates state that they are doing more. Yet when this great change in our capabilities -- and I might point out that the Central Intelligence Agency states they have always combined intention with capability. The implication was that we had a right to do what we are doing because we had lowered our estimates of what they were doing.

Admiral Burke. Actually these figures are bracketed, and on the '61, mid-1961, last year's figure is not far out from this year's figure.

Senator Symington. Just a minute, Admiral. I have got the figures in front of me.

Admiral Burke. We must have different figures.

Senator Symington. You bring yours up and let's take a look because this is pretty important.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. These are the figures that were given

this Committee.

Senator Stennis. Gentlemen, this is an open session.

Senator Symington. I understand that. We are not talking any figures. We are just talking whether or not they are lower or higher. My statement stands, Mr. Chairman, and if there is any disagreement as regards capability, why, I think we ought to seriously consider whether or not we open that up, because I am certain that Mr. Dulles -- I copied exactly here what he told this Committee.

Admiral, in the remainder of my time, I would like to ask a couple more questions.

Are you worried about the offensive danger of Russian submarines?

Admiral Burke. You mean their Polaris? Yes, sir, we are very worried about it.

Senator Symington. Any form of air-breather or ballistic missile that can be fired from a submarine?

Admiral Burke. We believe -- of course, quite a few years ago the Russians were very much interested in air-breathers -- we believe that now they are interested primarily in ballistic missiles in their submarines, and we are very much concerned about it.

Senator Symington. So you are concerned now about both, in other words.

Admiral Burke. Yes.

Senator Symington. Their ballistic missile capacity?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. What was the total budget of the Navy last year? What was the total money allowed you?

Admiral Burke. I have forgotten the figure, sir, but it was about \$11.5 billion.

Senator Symington. \$11.5 billion. How much of that was utilized for anti-submarine warfare?

Admiral Burke. I will have to supply that for the record, sir, because I don't have the details.

Senator Symington. All right.

Admiral Burke. Nearly all the ships that we buy, and a good many of the aircraft, a lot of our research is on anti-submarine warfare, sir.

Senator Symington. As I think you remember, I was pretty hot on that seaplane.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. And after reading this most able book by Dr. Morganstern, he has re-heated me about it. He thinks a great deal of it.

Why did you cancel that?

Admiral Burke. For two reasons, sir. The costs spiralled on us. It went way, way up very fast.

Then technically there were technical defects in that aircraft which were going to be most difficult to overcome,

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and it would have been putting a tremendous amount of money
to overcome those difficulties. So we cancelled the
project.

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Senator Symington. Do you think if you put somebody in charge of a supersonic seaplane like Admiral Rayborn, that it would be a more difficult task than to make a ballistic missile firing nuclear submarine?

Admiral Burke. I have a great deal of confidence in Admiral Rayborn, sir, but --

Senator Symington. Do you think this would be a little bit beyond his ability?

Admiral Burke. I think it might, yes, sir, we had a little difficulty with that.

Senator Symington. By golly, Admiral, that is the first time I have disagreed with you in some time.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. How fast roughly can a submarine go?

Admiral Burke. Submerged?

Senator Symington. Very roughly, under the water or over the water.

Admiral Burke. I don't want to get into any classified figures. Roughly it can be just about as fast as an ordinary ship, sir.

Senator Symington. Is that a figure that is known?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, it is not. That is why I am dodging the question.

Senator Symington. I see. Fine. But we don't know of any ships that go over 50 miles an hour, do we, 75 miles an

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hour?

Admiral Burke. No sir, but it keeps going.

Senator Symington. General White -- Mr. Chairman, my time is coming to a close, and I will ask a couple more questions here to finish this out -- General White is very strong for the B-70. Did you agree that that program should be cut down to these two ships?

Admiral Burke. That is in the Air Force program, sir.

Senator Symington. You would rather not comment on it?

Admiral Burke. I have to get into what happened to that program.

Senator Symington. Fair enough. Are you for an air alert?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. I am for the capability to fly an air alert, sir. I jumped at that question because I inferred that you meant right now, and I don't think that is what you meant.

Senator Symington. I want to bring this point out with you. My time is up. That is that it is going to get increasingly difficult for me to continue to vote for a sea alert like the Polaris that goes, we will say, not more than 75 miles an hour, and cancel out all air development in the way of B-70 which will go according to General White, might go as high as 7,000 miles an hour.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, but --

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Senator Symington. We are eliminating all research and development on something that, according to him, might go to mach 10, and putting billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money into something that is only a very small fraction of mach 1. We are going to get into some problems, as I see it.

Now I have been one who has consistently supported the Polaris program, but I just want to point out to you how cockeyed this thing is beginning to look to some of us as we slice off, in effect, all development of planes.

Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I would be glad to hear the Admiral's answer, and I will ask no further questions.

Admiral Burke. The speed, the effectiveness of the weapons system is dependent upon a lot more than the speed of the weapons system.

The effectiveness of Polaris submarines is not dependent upon its high speed. That is not what gives it its power. What gives it its power is that it is hidden. It can't be destroyed.

It is inevitable, if we get Polaris submarines at sea, there is not anything that Russia can do whatever to prevent her destruction. Differing from an airplane, the bases of an airplane can be destroyed.

Senator Symington. I will take the liberty of pursuing this with you when my time comes back.

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Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, for clarification, I think you said, Admiral, to prevent this country. You meant --

Admiral Burke. I meant there is nothing whatever that an enemy can do to prevent their destruction.

Senator Stennis. Senator Wiley, you are recognized for ten minutes.

Senator Wiley. Admiral, you used the phrase "costs went way up very fast." Do you think we ought to have an investigation to find out why the costs went up very fast?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. We have had that investigation.

Senator Wiley. Did you find the answer?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. The answer was that the problem was a lot bigger than the manufacturer thought it was when he started the program. His troubles -- he had a lot more trouble than he anticipated.

Senator Wiley. While this probably isn't exactly relevant, you made the statement I think the taxpayer is mighty interested, after hearing the testimony here of the tremendous costs involved in the three branches of our defense, and I am glad to get your reaction that you made an investigation.

Do you think that the Congress should make an investigation to find out whether the costs are justified?

Admiral Burke. I think Congress can very well investigate anything that it thinks the costs are going too high on. I

dm 5 think that is proper. I think they have. I think they do.

Senator Wiley. I won't pursue that subject further.

Did you say that in your judgment that the Russians had about 400 submarines, and that we had about 1120? Did I get those figures right?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, a little over 100. We have a few over a hundred. The Russians have over 400, sir.

Senator Wiley. That figure should be 100?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Then you used the figure 75 per cent of our Navy was getting a little old or worn out. Does that apply to the submarines too?

Admiral Burke. The percentage is not exactly the same. This is over-all percentage. But it does apply to the submarines too, sir.

Senator Wiley. What would you say, how many of the submarines are capable of being equipped with the Polaris missile?

Admiral Burke. You have to build a Polaris missile submarine from scratch, sir. We had a choice when we first went into this program whether to try to modify current submarines and put big sails on the submarine and make a Polaris missile submarine out of it that way, or whether to build it from scratch, and we decided it was cheaper and better and just as quick to build it from the keel up.

dm6 Senator Wiley. Another statement you made that interested me and brought a little light at least to my beclouded brain, if war should come, the part that the Navy could play.

In other words, if the ships, not matter what they were, were equipped with the Polaris missile, that the ships wouldn't be stationary, and hence would not be subject to the missile capability of the Russians, is that right?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir. They are not subject to an attack by ballistic missiles.

Senator Wiley. Now how many ships have we got that we could equip with the Polaris?

Admiral Burke. We have about, in cruisers we have 18 heavy cruisers that could be so equipped, and about half a dozen light cruisers that could be so equipped, sir.

In addition, if it were an emergency and we wanted to do it, you could equip merchant ship types with the Polaris. You could put more Polaris on them. They would have just that sole function, and would be of no value for anything else, but you could probably put a couple of dozen Polaris missiles on a merchant type ship, and the rest of the equipment, so that they could be used.

Senator Wiley. Then they would have the same capability that the better type ship had, if it had the Polaris. It could get within striking distance of the targets, which would

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be anywhere, how far, 400 or 500 miles?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, they would be good for 1200 miles right now.

Senator Wiley. 1200 miles?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. What have we got, what has the Navy got in the shape of aircraft? What is your aircraft arm?

Admiral Burke. We have, we will have at the end of 1961 7,800 operating craft. No, 6,800, sir, nearly 7,000. We will have deployed at sea about 1,300 attack aircraft. We will have about an equal number of fighters.

Senator Wiley. Fighters?

Admiral Burke. Fighters, yes, sir. Then in addition to that of course the Marines have three wings of aircraft.

Senator Wiley. How many?

Admiral Burke. I have forgotten the number, sir.

Senator Wiley. Approximately.

Admiral Burke. It is about 3,000, sir.

Senator Wiley. 3,000. Now then, how many of them are equipped with the Polaris or the equivalent missile? Are they missile aircraft?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. They carry missiles. They carry air-to-air missiles, but nothing like Polaris, sir.

They carry missiles like Sparrow and Sidewinders, sir, for attacking other aircraft, and Bullpup, which is for attacking

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surface targets.

Senator Wiley. And isn't it a fact that those missiles can be aimed at a target 150 miles away from the aircraft?

Admiral Burke. No, sir.

Senator Wiley. How close do they have to get?

Admiral Burke. Well, it varies with the type of missile, sir, and I would not like to give you the exact characteristics in an open hearing, sir, but it varies from just a few miles to -- well, it is nothing like 150 miles, sir.

Senator Wiley. These missiles are entirely different from the old type bomb that used to sink ships during the last war, aren't they?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. You are thinking about an air-to-surface missile, sir, not air-to-air missile, I believe. Missiles that are used against ships and surface targets.

Senator Wiley. Now what do you mean by your sea lift? How many ships in your sea lift?

Admiral Burke. Sea lift we have about 112 ships in amphibious forces, sir, which can lift a division and a half of Marines.

Senator Wiley. How many of the ships that you use for -- what do you call them -- carriers, how many carriers do you have?

Admiral Burke. 14 attack carriers.

dm 9

Senator Wiley. Are they in tip top shape?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. The new ones are.

Senator Wiley. How many new ones?

Admiral Burke. We have now four new ones in commission, sir, and we have two of the Midway class which are in good shape too, sir.

Senator Wiley. Are any of them equipped with missiles?

Admiral Burke. Surface-to-air missiles, yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Surface-to-air missiles for the aircraft?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. I will take it back. None of them are. None of these ships that are now in commission are equipped with missiles.

Senator Wiley. Could they be equipped with Polaris?

Admiral Burke. They could, sir, but it wouldn't be a very profitable use of Polaris, because other types of surface ships can be fitted with Polaris without interfering with their mission at all.

Senator Wiley. Well, in view of all this sea air power, I will ask this question and then I will go to one other phase of it.

What is our military capability at present? Is it a deterrent that is adequate?

Admiral Burke. Our military power is tremendous now, sir. I think that we can destroy -- if Russia wanted to attack

dm 10

us in a general nuclear war, I think that we would destroy here, and I think there is nothing that she could do to prevent it.

But in a limited war, I think that we have a capability, a demonstrated capability in the last two or three years, to meet situations similar to those that occurred then.

Senator Wiley. Now as a military man, can you think of any other deterrents except military that should cause Khrushchev or the Kremlin to hesitate as they have been hesitating?

Admiral Burke. Well, the greatest deterrent of course is not military. The greatest deterrents -- no man knows exactly why another nation does the things that it does or why it doesn't do things. But Khrushchev has got to think just like this nation has got to think of the psychological effect that it will have, that his actions will have on other nations.

He has got to think of the economic situation of his country as we do. He has got to think of what other countries will do as he makes a move. We have a tremendous support from our allies in many of these situations that arise.

On the other hand, I don't know what deters Khrushchev. Maybe he would not intend to strike this country anyway. Maybe he proposes to take it over, as he says, by peaceful means, take over the world by peaceful means, as he is trying to do in Africa and Asia and perhaps other places.

dm 11

Senator Wiley. There are numerous other deterrents that are not military that you mentioned that have a particular value in our arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not he would make the mistake, is that right?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Thank you.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Jackson, will you proceed now. You have ten minutes.

Senator Jackson. Admiral Burke, the testimony seems to be agreed that the problem starting now and in the next two or three years seems to be, one of the main problems, the protection of our ability to retaliate.

I take it that it is your position that you feel that the Navy, in the strategic missile age, has a contribution to make in providing protection to the retaliatory system.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, I feel that as ballistic missiles come into being, as they get more accurate, as they eventually will do, that any fixed target in a known location becomes more and more vulnerable, and consequently more and more of our retaliatory power, the invulnerable part of it will go to sea.

Senator Jackson. The Navy is more vulnerable to air power than it is to missile power, isn't it?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir, with manned air-

dm 12 craft.

Senator Jackson. That is what I am referring to. I can only express the hope that the Navy will press for the use of Polaris aboard surface ships. Ships are already available subject to modification.

Just to pursue that point a moment, how long do you think it would take to modify a vessel? Maybe you won't want to say this in open session, but it shouldn't take too long to modify ships for the Polaris missile system.

Admiral Burke. We could have the first ships -- I think it is probably generally known -- we could have the first ships coming off the line certainly in approximately '63, if there was a decision made say right now to build them, to modify them.

Senator Jackson. So the lead time is very important, and this is of course based on present information, which still leaves us in a critical situation insofar as retaliatory power is concerned.

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Admiral Burke. Lead time is important on those ships. We could certainly have them I think in '63. Perhaps we could get them in '62, but I think '63 is safe.

Senator Jackson. I would hope that some effort would be made to see if that modification program couldn't be speeded up, because we can put SAC on an airborne alert, but we can't put Titan and Atlas on an airborne alert.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Jackson. Isn't that right.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Jackson. I mean the point is that your ICBM's are fixed suffer from the same problem as does SAC when it is on the ground, isn't that right?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Jackson. So that what we need to do in the next two or three years to preserve and to protect and to defend our ability to retaliate is to protect obviously the launching system, and to protect it from enemy ICBM's that might be either hardened so as to avoid destruction in a point attack, or to give it some mobility. The Navy I take it can do that with the Polaris system.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Jackson. Of the 800-odd ships that are in the fleet, how many are tied up now roughly on the ANSW problem, anti-submarine warfare problem?

Admiral Burke. Most all of our destroyer types.

Senator Jackson. Without getting into that, wouldn't it be fair to say that it is over 300?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, it is over 300.

Senator Jackson. Of the active fleet of 800 ships?

Admiral Burke. Yes.

Senator Jackson. And this stems from the fact that for the first time the Navy has been up against a potential enemy that has some 400-odd submarines as compared with only about 70 the Nazis had at the start or outbreak of World War II in '39.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. They had 58.

Senator Jackson. They had 58. Well, it is less.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Jackson. So that your problem is not just the one of providing support in a small or limited war or support in a global or general war, but to carry the heavy load of keeping the sea lanes open and contending with over 400 enemy submarines.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Jackson. How much did the Navy actually ask for, without the limitations placed on the Navy, for fiscal '61?

Admiral Burke. We were given those guide lines, sir, and we have submitted our Budget request based on those

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guide lines. Our budget that the commandant and I built, the requirements budget, was about 15,000,000,000.

Senator Jackson. About 15,000,000,000. What did you get?

Admiral Burke. We got 12.073, sir.

Senator Jackson. What is your backlog of maintenance and obsolescence cost that you are going to have to meet based on continuing and present requirements?

Admiral Burke. The backlog of ships, the ships alone, is roughly about \$250,000,000 a year. That is FRAM, and the increased maintenance on the other.

Senator Jackson. 250,000,000 a year?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Jackson. And you are not meeting that?

Admiral Burke. No, sir.

Senator Jackson. So that somebody is going to get a retroactive bill one of these days or otherwise we are not going to have much of a fleet.

Admiral Burke. We will just operate slower.

Senator Jackson. What is happening now is that the requirements for maintenance of what you have is taking away from new and modern weapons systems?

Admiral Burke. That was the difficult thing in trying to arrive at this original balance that we had, sir. We had to maintain a present capability to do those things which

we might be called upon within the next year or so to do.

Senator Jackson. That is right, but --

Admiral Burke. We couldn't cut too much.

Senator Jackson. But the survivability of what you have is your first consideration, because you have specific day to day commitments to meet, and this eats into your new construction funds to the point of just providing for replacements and modification of existing ships, you can't ask for enough in the way, for example, of ballistic missile submarines?

Admiral Burke. Well, it is difficult --

Senator Jackson. You are giving guide lines and the ceiling, and you break it down and there is so much in there, what is it, a billion and a half for new construction?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Jackson. This immediately erodes the amount of money that is available for new construction, because of your continuing commitments to maintain what you have, isn't that right?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Jackson. I am concerned, Admiral Burke, on the research and development funds. The only way surely that you can cut down on the number of ships eventually assigned to ASW is to come up with some answers on detection,

isn't it?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Jackson. I mean you have this large fleet committed and tied up because you have not been able to get some tough answers. This involves basic research, oceanography, for example.

Isn't it pretty hard to come up with any answers, if you are going to be stuck with the ceiling that you have in the current budget, which is the same I believe as last year for research and development?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. We have increased our ASW effort this last year, sir, and we have made considerable progress in the last year on ASW.

Senator Jackson. But at the expense of other programs, too.

Admiral Burke. At the expense of other programs, true enough.

Senator Jackson. So your over-all RD requirements are less, I mean funds available are less.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Senator Martin.

Senator Martin. Are those estimates based on surface ships or submarines, those estimates?

Admiral Burke. Is this a cost?

Senator Martin. I am talking about the general plan

you have for coming up with Polaris equipped ships.

Admiral Burke. Either submarines or surface ships or both can be made available in '63, sir, if a decision were made soon to start their manufacture.

Senator Martin. Your estimates were based on both rather than either one?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, that is correct. However, if you cut out one, it will not increase the speed of the other. It just takes that long. We might be able to get some of each in '62, but we certainly could get them in '63, yes.

Senator Martin. Do Russian submarines have long range cruising capability without detection?

Admiral Burke. They are not nuclear powered, sir, that is the ones that are at sea now. They are difficult to detect, but they can be detected just like our own conventional powered submarines can, sir.

Senator Martin. They have nothing on our forces as far as detection is concerned?

Admiral Burke. We don't think so, no, sir.

Senator Martin. Do the Russians have the equivalent of our Polaris missile at this time?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. We estimate that they have a missile which is probably a much shorter range missile than our Polaris, but we think that they do have a ballistic

missile which can be put aboard submarines, sir.

Senator Martin. Are the Russian submarine crews highly trained and highly qualified?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, they are. They are the elite force of Russian services. They are well trained. Of course the degree of training varies a great deal among ships, but they are much better than they used to be, sir. They are emphasizing it a great deal.

Senator Martin. Are the Russian submarine crews expert marksmen with ballistic missiles?

Admiral Burke. We don't know, sir. We know that Russian military people have been trained in ballistic missiles, and they should be able to do all right with them, sir, just like we do.

Senator Martin. You have no report on their proficiency?

Admiral Burke. No, sir.

Senator Martin. I have always stressed the matter of expertness of crews handling these ships as a very real factor in determining our own policy in meeting any threat. I think it is just as much a part of our consideration as is the matching of ship for ship.

Am I wrong in that?

Admiral Burke. Well, it depends upon how many ships you have, sir. You have got to have numbers of ships

sometimes. If you need a destroyer or patrol in the Yellow Sea and another one on patrol in the Taiwan Straits, having one wonderful ship won't do the two jobs.

But certainly training and proficiency of people is one of the most important things in handling the Navy, sir.

Senator Martin. Yes. The place where and the range capability and the detection avoidance and the expertness of the crews all add into this, so that I can not just say that because they have so many ships, 300 submarines, for instance, to our 100, I can't submit to the conclusion that they are necessarily three times as powerful as we are.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir, but --

Senator Martin. I did not want this hearing to go all in one direction. I think there are other factors we have got to bear in mind, and I think you are bearing them in mind.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Martin. If I can size the situation up.

Are you developing now an answer to the capability of the Russian submarines as you have presented their capability here today?

Admiral Burke. That is one of our big problems, sir, and one of our big jobs.

We are doing a great deal of research on ASW, as Senator Jackson pointed out. One of our big problems is getting

detection.

We have increased our range of detection quite a bit since World War II. We do have new equipment which is now coming off the line, new Sonars, which are much better than the Sonars that we developed even since World War II. We are working very hard on several new techniques of trying to detect Russian submarines.

Perhaps one of them will turn out to be satisfactory, but we need to develop long range detection.

Senator Martin. Yes.

Admiral Burke. We have also developed long range kill capability, once they are detected.

Senator Martin. I commend you on your presentation here today. I can't help but make an observation that our Chiefs of Naval Operations in peacetime generally request ships to meet their maximum anticipated needs, and sometimes those needs are affected by other factors that must be given consideration.

When you do find your estimated needs or requests modified by superior authority, then as the Chief of Naval Operations you, and very properly, go ahead and do the best you can with what you have.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Martin. I think you stand for that principle in a very grand way, and I commend you for it.

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Admiral Burke. Thank you, sir.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator Martin.

Senator Young, you are next. You have 10 minutes, sir.

Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, you testified, as I recall it, and correct me if I am wrong, that instead of the Soviet having 300 submarines, that the Soviet has 400 submarines plus, is that not correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, she has over 400.

Senator Young. Over 400.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Young. The figure 450 is frequently used is it not?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. That was the figure used last year, sir.

Senator Young. And we have 100-plus submarines?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Young. How many over 100?

Admiral Burke. 116 I believe the figure is right now, sir.

Senator Young. Now you have also testified, Admiral, that you are pleased over the tests of the Polaris missile, and that you have great confidence in it?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Young. May I ask does the Secretary of Defense share your confidence in the Polaris missile?

Admiral Burke. I am not sure that he does yet, sir.

Senator Young. You hope he does?

Admiral Burke. I hope.

Senator Young. But you are not sure?

Admiral Burke. I am not sure, no, sir.

Senator Young. I will go further than that. Does the President share your confidence in the Polaris?

Admiral Burke. I don't know that at all, sir.

Senator Young. Well anyway apparently as the funds provided by Congress were withheld, that is we provided in 1959 funds for Polaris.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Young. And that was withheld?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Young. So that doesn't appear then that your confidence is shared, does it. Or would you care to comment on that?

Admiral Burke. Well, we have had a lot of tests since then.

Senator Young. And the tests are successful?

Admiral Burke. And the tests are successful, sir.

Senator Young. Well, then, why was Polaris limited to three submarines only in 1961?

Admiral Burke. Well, partly due to the fact that the tests, the firing tests, full guidance tests have just occurred in the last couple of months, the last month or so, and partly due to the budget guide lines, sir.

Senator Young. And in view of the success of the tests, you are now regretful that limit was only three submarines in 1961, is that right?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Young. May I go to another subject momentarily. I don't want to use up all of my 10 minutes.

You testified, Admiral, that the retaliatory capability of the Navy could not be knocked out based on the premise that the Navy ships were at sea.

Admiral Burke. They were not vulnerable to ballistic missiles.

Senator Young. Your language was also, was it not, that significant retaliatory effort would be available by the Navy?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Young. Provided and based on the premise that the naval ships are at sea?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir, and would not be hit by enemy ballistic missiles.

Senator Young. And that fixed targets are becoming more and more vulnerable as time goes on.

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Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Young. Of course ships in a harbor, in any harbor or in drydock, their positions are fixed?

Admiral Burke. That is one of the reasons why, in periods of tension, we send our fleet to sea.

Senator Young. Yes.

Admiral Burke. They are in position and they go to sea.

Senator Young. Yes. That is the practice now, is it?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Young. Now at the present time we are not in a period of tension. Are you able to tell us the percentage of our naval ships that are at sea at the present time?

Admiral Burke. As of this morning? No, sir, I can't because it varies greatly from day to day, and we operate on a random scale so that we don't have any system which the enemy can predict how many ships we have at sea. But I would guess roughly it is probably from one-third to one-half are at sea at the moment.

Senator Young. At the present time?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Young. And if in your judgment a period of danger or tension were to arise such as a renewal perhaps of the Berlin crisis, you would direct that a larger percentage go to sea. That would be your expectation, would it not?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. We have done that many times in the last several years.

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Senator Young. Now, of the fleet, you testified I believe that 78 per cent of the present United States Navy was built during World War II.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Young. Are any of the present ships on active duty in the Navy, are any of them ships that were built before the start of World War II, before we were involved?

Admiral Burke. I would have to look that up and give you a categorical answer, but I think there are, but I am not positive of it.

If so, they were built just before World War II, and those would be probably the support ships.

Senator Young. And that might be how much of a percentage? Can you estimate that?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, I wouldn't like to estimate it, sir.

Senator Young. It would probably be a small percentage, perhaps 5 per cent or less, would it not?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Young. You can't estimate it very accurately. But then that would mean that probably more than 80 per cent of the ships on active duty in the Navy at the present time date from World War II or just before World War II, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. 78 per cent.

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Senator Young. 78 per cent date from World War II.

You know that?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, or before.

Senator Young. Or before. And of those, are you able to tell us what percentage you would consider obsolete?

Admiral Burke. They aren't obsolete, sir.

Senator Young. Not one of them?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. They aren't obsolete. What is going to happen here is that some day those ships are going to reach a stage where they are no longer repairable, they are no longer operable, and at that time they are going to be incapable of going to sea.

Since it takes a long time to build a ship, and since there are such large numbers of ships required, that puts us in a quandary.

Senator Young. Yes. And I assume that it depends on the character of the ship how long it takes before it costs more to keep it in repair than it does to scrap it.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, and sometimes safety reasons. A submarine lasts about 13 or 14 years. A destroyer lasts about 16 or 18 years.

Senator Young. A carrier lasts what?

Admiral Burke. A carrier lasts 22 years.

Senator Young. Admiral, of the 78 per cent built in World War II or before of our ships, you say you feel that

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none of them are obsolete at the present time. What percentage would you consider obsolescent at the present time?

Admiral Burke. It is probably something in the neighborhood of 50 per cent. For example, we have new sonars now that are coming off the line that are capable of being produced which are very excellent sonars, and they will do much better than the older ones.

Those ships, those old ships, can't take these new sonars. Ships have got to be built for them.

Senator Young. So about 50 per cent you say is obsolescent?

Admiral Burke. It will be.

Senator Young. It will be by the end of this year?

Admiral Burke. Their usefulness gets less all the time. There is no chop off point where a ship is of no value. Something is of value up to that point and then is of no value beyond that point.

Senator Young. And the usefulness becomes less and less until the time comes very soon then that it doesn't pay to repair them and bring them up.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Young. Thank you very much.

Senator Stennis. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Case, you have ten minutes.

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Senator Case. No questions.

Senator Stennis. Senator Engle, you have ten minutes.

Senator Engle. Admiral, I regret that I missed some of your testimony. This may have been covered. If it has, will tell me. I want to ask when you sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, do the Joint Chiefs undertake to determine the priorities of the programming of weapons systems inside of the Defense Department as distinguished from the priority in respect of services? Do you see what I mean?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, I see what you mean. Not as a complete whole program, it isn't done, but we have priority lists which the Department of Defense has, and sometimes the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit recommendations as to what goes on that priority list.

Senator Engle. What I would like to know is who decides what comes first. Now the Navy comes in and it has some very good weapons systems. Along comes the Air Force and it has some. The Army has some things that it things are of very great importance.

Now what I would like to know is do the Joint Chiefs ever sit down among themselves and inside of a room say "Now we are just going to put all of this in one ball of wax and decide what the Nation needs most in the form of priority of weapons systems, without respect to which service happens to benefit"? Is that ever done?

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Admiral Burke. The Joint Chiefs of Staff certainly sit down in a room, and try to decide what is best for the Nation, but it is not always possible to say what comes priority one, what comes priority two, what comes priority three, because things don't fit in priorities lots of times.

That is, for example, for a man to live he must do many things, and you can't put a priority on whether it is more important for a man to breathe or a man to eat. What is most urgent for him is what he doesn't have. If he is deprived of food, that is the thing he needs.

Senator Engle. I listened to Congressman Mahon on the television yesterday, and he made the statement that he couldn't see how you could be building a carrier if, in order to build a carrier, you had to give up something in the intercontinental ballistic missile field.

In other words, from the standpoint of priorities for the benefit of the Nation, he thought the carriers were pretty well down the line. I am not asking you to comment specifically on carriers.

But what I am trying to find out is whether or not the chief military advisers to the Secretary of Defense inside the room and as a unit ever undertake to say to the Secretary of Defense, "We believe that in the national interest the priorities for the military program of the United States should be missiles, and this and this and this right down the

Q165 line."

Admiral Burke. It can't be done that way, sir. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sit in there and they do decide on the military programs, but it is impossible to determine the priorities of weapons systems by that kind of a method any more than by illustration of what is important to a man, what is the number one priority. You can't determine it that way. It is not that simple, sir.

Senator Engle. Admiral, somebody has to determine it. Otherwise we are all over the lot.

Admiral Burke. No, sir.

Senator Engle. And who is better qualified to do it than the chief military advisors to the Secretary of Defense, to sit down and come up with a program that they regard as the top priorities?

For instance, I can't remember whether it was General Taylor or who it was on the witness stand here, maybe it was Secretary Gates, and I asked what their priorities were. Was it intercontinental ballistic missile first, and what came second, whether it was limited to the capability of fighting limited war.

It seems to me that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ought not to sit around in a room by themselves and each member, whether he represents the Navy, the Air Force, the Army or the Marine Corps, honing an axe for his particular service, instead of

dm 7

trying to determine what is for the benefit of America in a defense program on the basis of the priority that ought to be established for the best interests of our country.

Now do I understand you to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff not only don't do it but aren't capable of doing it?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, I didn't say anything like that, sir.

Senator Engle. You correct me, Admiral.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, I would like to. What I do say is that the priority system which simplifies the problem and oversimplifies it to such an extent that it doesn't solve the problem.

You cannot devise a priority system which, by itself, will solve the problem. You put it in this slot and then forget it, that is the number one priority. It can't be done that way.

What the Joint Chiefs do, and they do this many times during the year, and this is the problems that we are usually engaged upon, is to try to determine what is essential, what we must have for the various contingencies which this country may face.

We don't know what we are going to have to face exactly in the future. We don't know where a limited war might break out. We can't determine what we will have to use our forces for exactly three years from now.

dm 8

But what we have got to make sure of is that the enemy cannot devise a system and leave us completely uncovered, leave us so that we are helpless. We have got to get those things which will permit this country to continue to be the leader of the world. And those are the things which we do.

Senator Engle. I understand that, but --

Admiral Burke. Now you couldn't possibly establish a priority say for Polaris submarines, and have that number one, and then have limited warfare number two.

And supposing you said that in using that priority system, let's go all out for Polaris submarines, and after we got Polaris submarines, then we will put some money into limited war.

It is no good that way. You have got to have some Polaris submarines and some limited war capability because you might need either one.

Senator Engle. In any case you are setting up an order of requirements of the Nation, and you may end up with a lot of cats and dogs too that you don't need so much.

For instance, you take the Polaris. I put the Polaris in the retaliatory strike force, because that is where it belongs. Maybe you won't agree. But you decide whether you are going to have a retaliatory strike force or not and whether or not that is number one.

If it is, you decide what ought to go in it. Certainly

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the ICBM's ought to go into it, and certainly the Polaris ought to go into it.

Admiral Burke. I disagree.

Senator Engle. I have no doubt that you disagree, but what I am trying to find out is the procedures.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Engle. What I mean to say is that the only fellow who tries to solve these problems from an over-all standpoint is the Secretary of Defense, and he is pulled and hauled by these various service chiefs, whereas you fellows ought to sit down there in a joint meeting and come up with a recommendation. I asked you whether or not you do it, and you say you do not.

Admiral Burke. I say that we do not come up with a priority list, sir. I say we do come up with a lot of recommendations on the various things that need to be done, lots of them.

Senator Engle. I apparently haven't got my point across. It seems to me that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, operating as the chief military advisors to the Secretary of Defense, ought to walk in with a program that is one ball of wax and say "Now this is the way we think this program ought to be handled from a national defense standpoint," and not from a particular service standpoint. What I object to is the procedure, sir.

Admiral Burke. I think our procedure is very good. We

dm 10

do discuss these problems. We do submit to the Secretary of Defense recommendations on that.

Senator Engle. I suppose if I read from General Taylor's book, it won't resound very well in this particular atmosphere.

Admiral Burke. These problems are very complicated, sir.

Senator Engle. But there is a growing body of opinion in this country that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have simply failed to exercise the function that they ought to exercise as the chief organization advising the Secretary of Defense.

And the reason that is true is because the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not operate to look at the over-all problem, but operate primarily as representatives on the Joint Chiefs of Staff of their particular service.

That is why I asked you if they couldn't sit down there and come up with some kind of a program for the whole defense posture rather than what is good for the Navy, what is good for the Air Force and what is good for the Army.

Admiral Burke. We do, sir. We submit jointly approved plans. We consider all of these problems, air defense and other things, and we do submit these recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Engle. I would like to think they were in terms of an established priority that viewed the problem from the top and from the whole defense posture, rather than from that

dm 11 of individual services.

My time has expired. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Thank you very much. Senator Bush, we are glad to recognize you, sir. You have ten minutes.

Senator Bush. Mr. Chairman, may I yield to the Minority leader.

Senator Stennis. You want to yield?

Senator Bush. I would like to yield to the Minority leader.

Senator Stennis. I wasn't overlooking you, but Senator Bush, as you know, is on the Committee. Senator Dirksen, you have ten minutes.

Senator Dirksen. Admiral, how long have you been in the service?

Admiral Burke. Since 1919, sir.

Senator Dirksen. 41 years.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Dirksen. That is a good long time.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Dirksen. I should disqualify myself at the outset by saying that in this hearing I am no expert. I once held the exalted rank of private, private first class, corporal, sergeant, and I got out as a shavetail. I thought I knew a good deal of course, but I still would disqualify myself.

dm 12

I think I think like, oh, 120 million other Americans of the age of discretion who just want to be sure that we do have a good national defense and a good security system.

Now as the radio says, you are going to have nine uninterrupted minutes to tell me why you think we have an adequate defense. I based that on the statement I saw in the press of General Twining that he thought our defenses were good.

Admiral Burke. I agree with General Twining. We have a powerful nation here, sir. We have developed a lot of very fine things first.

We have the ability now, right now, to destroy any enemy that wants to attack us or who does attack us, regardless of what it does or when it does it or how it does it or anything else.

We have the ability to wreak sufficient destruction upon that country so that it will not rise again.

Now something new has been added in the last three or four years that wasn't there before. We have this capability all along. But what is new is that Russia is now developing a capability which she will have some day of being able to destroy significant portions of this country.

She can also wreak destruction on this country, and we can't do anything about it either, because she will be able to develop ICBM's, and their accuracy will increase in the

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future until she will have the capability to wreak heavy
destruction on this country. But we can also do exactly the
same thing to her.

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Now there is nothing that she can do to avoid it. There is probably nothing that we can do if she wants to start such a thing.

Consequently nations that start a general nuclear war under those conditions commit suicide. She wipes out her nation. She can wreck heavy damage on the other country, but she herself is destroyed. And even a mad man I think wouldn't do that.

Now that does give her though a capability which, if we are not careful, that she may be able to blackmail us into saying that, "If you don't do what I would like to have you do, then you are subject to destruction."

And then she puts pressure on in other ways, psychological-ly, economically, politically and perhaps by limited war situations.

Now that is the reason that I think that limited war is much more apt to occur in the next three, four, or five years than general nuclear war, because she has nothing to gain by general nuclear war except her own destruction. She can't gain anything.

She can destroy us perhaps sometime in the future, but she herself will be destroyed. She can't gain anything.

But that doesn't stop her one bit from trying to dominate the world, which I think she will try to do. And in trying to do that, she is going to use every trick in the book, and

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that is why I think that it is possible, I don't know that it is, but I think that it is possible that Russia and China, Red China, may have an agreement that Russia is very nice now while Red China goes off on a rampage and Russia tries to quiet her down on the surface.

I think that there has been no evidence whatever that Russia is trying, intends to slow down her progress in trying to dominate the world. She is going to try. She is going to continue. She is doing it economically now.

She is getting more and more people into more and more new countries, a lot of African countries. She is sending teachers into Ghana. It is reported, and certainly there is evidence of Mikoyan, who is now in Cuba, being received by Cuba. She is exerting greater influence even in countries right next to our own doorstep, and that I think she will continue to do.

Senator Dirksen. Now do you want to tell us the rest of it. I am thinking particular of course about our defenses.

Senator Wiley. A little louder, please.

Senator Dirksen. I am thinking particularly of our defenses, and how you think they stack up in balanced form to do the job that must be done for this country under present and future conditions, as you foresee them.

Admiral Burke. Well, our defensive capability against ICBM's or against ballistic missiles is non-existent. We have

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no defense against ICBM's, and neither does anybody else.
There isn't any defense against them.

Our defense against manned bombers is extremely great. We have spent tremendous sums on defenses against manned bombers, and it is very unlikely that the enemy could get through with significant numbers of them, just those alone.

Senator Dirksen. Well, then the whole problem resolves itself as one of deterring and deterring force?

Admiral Burke. And retaliation, yes, sir.

Senator Dirksen. Yes.

Admiral Burke. The ability to destroy no matter what the enemy does to us.

Senator Dirksen. And you share the conviction of General Twinning that we do have the deterrent and retaliatory force?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Dirksen. Under present conditions?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, I do, sir.

Senator Dirksen. I don't know that there is anything more I need to ascertain from you.

Senator Stennis. All right, Senator Cannon, you are recognized for ten minutes.

Senator Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, as I understand it, there isn't much dispute today as to the condition this country is in right at the present moment. There is not much dispute between our military

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leaders, is that right?

Admiral Burke. No, sir.

Senator Cannon. And the problem is in the future as Russia has more missiles coming into the inventory, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. I don't think there is a dispute among the military people on that, sir.

Senator Cannon. I am sorry I can't quite agree with you on that from the testimony that has been presented by some of our military leaders here before this committee.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. But you at least think the problem is in the future as Russia has more missiles coming into the inventory?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. Because they would be in the position then by blackmail or by making an actual attack to strike at some of our fixed positions which you state would become increasingly more vulnerable as time goes on, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, but at the same time if she does strike us, I believe that we will have the capability to destroy her.

Senator Cannon. Then you believe that we have that capability now?

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Admiral Burke. I believe we have it now, sir.

Senator Cannon. Now getting to General Power's statement, I think you made the comment that you thought perhaps General Power was talking about his own forces.

As I recall, he stated to us that he was considering the over-all forces of our country as of a fixed date, which I believe was January the 19th of this year, and he stated in his talk, and also before the committee, that if Russia launched an attack, assuming 300 missiles, ICBM's, half of those being IRBM's, that they would in effect destroy our retaliatory capability.

I take it that you don't agree with that analysis, is that correct, as of that date?

Admiral Burke. For two reasons. First, Russia couldn't have 150 ICBM's and, second, I don't think if she did have that she could destroy our total retaliatory capability.

I believe that there is a considerable number of SAC aircraft in the air. Of course he knows more about that than I do.

Senator Cannon. General Power would be the one to know that, would he not?

Admiral Burke. He should know, yes, sir. But it is nearly impossible for us to get even one missile fired at a specific time, so getting 150 or 200 missiles fired all simultaneously to arrive at all places simultaneously is a

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tremendous number.

Senator Cannon. However, I think we are sort of begging the question. I am just referring now, assuming that capability on the part of the Russians which they may or may not have, and I think they do not have it, but assuming their capability as of January 19th, is it your impression that they would not be able to knock us out effectively as of that date with the capability of firing simultaneously 300 missiles, half of them being ICBM's and half of them IREM's?

Admiral Burke. What you are really saying there, sir, is that if 150 atomic weapons, nuclear weapons are exploded in this country, we are going to be in a terrible mess, and that is certainly true.

We are going to have terrific destruction in this country with that number of missiles. And that proves two points: That it doesn't take very many missiles to wreck very heavy destruction on a country, and it doesn't take very many to wreck similar destruction on Russia.

And the second point that it proves is that we have to have the power so that if those missiles ever do, if she ever does get into position where she can launch that many missiles, we had better have retaliatory power in such a position where it will not be destroyed.

Senator Cannon. That is one of the reasons that you

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recommend Polaris, because of the mobility, the so-called change of address of the target, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Cannon. And that would also apply as to the requirement for an air alert, would it not, because of the importance of moving the address of the airplanes with the so-called retaliatory capability?

Admiral Burke. Well, the air alert of course -- I agree with the decision that has been made on the air alert, that we ought to have the capability to launch an air alert. But an air alert that is flown on a sustained basis now I think would be a waste of money.

Senator Cannon. I am talking about a future situation now.

Admiral Burke. In the future in periods of great tension, of course we ought to do what we have done in the past. We send fleets to sea. We get our forces ready, and that is true with all forces.

Senator Cannon. Now Admiral, you made the comment that you believe that limited war was more likely to occur within the next three or four years than an all-out war. How would you use Polaris in a limited war, Admiral?

Admiral Burke. You wouldn't use any Polaris or ICBM's or IRBM's in most situations in limited war. It is conceivable that you could use them sometimes, but it is very unlikely that

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they would be used.

Senator Cannon. In other words, you don't anticipate any use for Polaris in a limited war, so that we would have to go to other capability, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Cannon. Now Admiral, you made the statement here I believe, I am sure you did, that you recommend that we put more Polaris into the program that we have under way at the present time, is that correct, in essence, Polaris subs?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. That we acquire more, and more than were recommended in the present budget, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. What I state there, sir, is that we expect to submit a request to the Department of Defense.

Senator Cannon. But you do recommend more than are presently programmed under the present budget?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, because of its invulnerability.

Senator Cannon. But you say that you support the President's budget as it now is?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Cannon. And is that correct even though you might be denied additional Polaris on your recommendation?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, because the President has much greater responsibilities than I have, and he has to judge

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he has to make judgments and he has to make decisions.

Senator Cannon. So if he ruled against you, you would be satisfied with that ruling because of his --

Admiral Burke. I might not be satisfied, sir.

Senator Cannon. You would be willing to accept it?

Admiral Burke. I would accept it.

Senator Cannon. As a matter of fact, if you did not accept it, you probably couldn't remain in your present position?

Admiral Burke. If I did not accept it, sir, I wouldn't remain in my present position.

Senator Cannon. And your feeling is now that you will make a very strong representation that the acquisition of additional Polaris is a necessity for the safety of this country?

Admiral Burke. Yes.

Senator Cannon. Do you think it would be dangerous to this country not to acquire additional Polaris in addition to those presently programmed?

Admiral Burke. It depends entirely upon the assumptions that you make on that, sir. If Russia does have in a couple of years from now a great number of missiles, if those missiles become accurate, then the only solution is to get invulnerable retaliatory forces which those missiles cannot knock out.

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Senator Cannon. Well, both of those if's that you prefaced are things that you recognize as being probabilities in the future, are they not?

Admiral Burke. Sometime, yes, sir. Now we are getting Polaris submarines at the rate of three a year now, sir.

Senator Cannon. Do you think that that rate is presently enough to insure the elimination of the danger to this country from attack?

Admiral Burke. You will never be able to insure the elimination of danger to this country from attack, sir, no matter what we do.

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We live in a world of competition, and there will be no way that we can guarantee the security of this country. All we can do is to make it very tough for an enemy to decide to attack us.

Senator Cannon. Your recommendation is that we do make it tougher than we are presently making it, is that correct? You say the only thing we can do is make it very tough for an enemy?

Admiral Burke. That is correct.

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Senator Cannon. I am asking you is it your recommendation that we make it tougher for the enemy, prospective enemy, than we are now making it at the present time?

Admiral Burke. We are because as these future things come along, it gets tougher for them.

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Senator Cannon. I think you are sort of begging the question, Admiral. I am just asking you if it is your recommendation that we make it tougher than we are now programming, than we are now doing?

Admiral Burke. I don't --

Senator Cannon. In other words, are we doing enough in your opinion right at the moment?

Admiral Burke. In my opinion, I think that so far as general war is concerned, that what we need is the retaliatory forces which are less vulnerable.

Now whether or not the security of the country is jeopardized if we don't get an increase is dependent entirely upon what Russia does in the future.

Now I think that the intelligence estimates that have been presented are fairly accurate, and I believe as estimates show, nobody knows for sure, but I think that the day will come when missiles get more and more accurate and then at that time we have got to have some retaliatory forces at sea, and we will have two ships at sea this year.

Senator Cannon. Do you think two ships at sea is enough to take care of the threat at the moment?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, and they will be increased.

Senator Cannon. Let me restate my one question again, Admiral, and I will preface it by saying you say you are coming in now to recommend that we get additional Polaris's,

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that we put them into the program in a supplemental buy.

Now I am asking you if you feel at the present time we are doing enough to provide for the safety and security of this country, at this time, and you have not yet presented any supplemental request.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Cannon. At this time do you feel that we are doing enough in your opinion to provide for the safety and security of this country? I think that can be answered yes or no.

Admiral Burke. Yes, it could, and give the wrong impression. I can't answer it yes or no.

Senator Cannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Excuse me just a minute. Did you answer or did you say you couldn't?

Admiral Burke. No, sir.

Senator Stennis. All right. Senator Bush, you are recognized for ten minutes.

Senator Bush. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go on with the subject of Polaris for a few moments, Admiral.

I think I feel very much as you do about the importance of this weapon. I think most of us do. But as I understand it, we have two Polaris submarines coming into being this year.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

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Senator Bush. And next year it is planned to add three more, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Bush. In '61?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Bush. And do I understand that in '62 an additional three Polaris submarines should be completed?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Bush. So that at the end of the year we would have eight completed, ready for action?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Bush. Now it is true that each one of these carries sixteen missiles, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Bush. So that two of them would carry 32, five of them which we would have at the end of '61 would carry an additional 48, and the additional three we would have in '62 would carry an additional 48, so that at the end of the three-year period we would have eight subs capable of carrying and firing 128 missiles, if my arithmetic is correct, and I think it is. Do you follow me?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

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Senator Bush. Now it is true that each of these missiles has many times the destructive power of, let's say, the bomb that shattered Hiroshima in Japan, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Bush. That is correct. Is it not possible, then, that even at that time and our Polaris program would be going ahead at that time, but with 128 of such missiles in the mobile and concealed launching pads, so to speak, that the Polaris will supply, and the great range of locations which it will supply, that the Polaris system alone might provide a sufficient strategic deterrent that would make the Russians hesitate, even fail to think of making, an all out attack upon the United States.

Admiral Burke. I think it is wrong to rely upon any single --

Senator Bush. I didn't say we should rely on it.

Admiral Burke. Upon any single system.

Senator Bush. I didn't say we should rely on it.

Admiral Burke. It could have a significant effect, sir, but I still think that we should have ICBM's ashore and that we should have IRBM's and manned aircraft.

Senator Bush. I do too; and I was not suggesting that because of this powerful system of weapons that we should abandon the others. But I was trying to get your estimate of the value of this weapon in a rather dramatic way.

I asked if, with eight submarines roving the seas with 128 missiles, with the destructive power, or with the destructive power that each one of them has got, wouldn't that seem to be a deterrent, a sufficient deterrent, to make the Russians think twice about attacking us?

Admiral Burke. That is a significant destructive capability, that in cranking in such things as reliability of the missile, that is about 100 targets that would be in danger.

Senator Bush. Yes.

Now, going on from there to this question that has been raised about why we are not building still more Polaris missiles, I ask you if this isn't true, that we actually have not fired a Polaris missile from an atomic submarine yet?

Admiral Burke. We haven't, sir, but we have fired missiles from submerged launching platforms, not the regular missiles, but the dummy missiles and we anticipate no difficulty whatever.

It is just a question of putting the systems together now which will take a couple more months. But our tests have been excellent so far, sir.

Senator Bush. It would seem to me, before we went too far with it, it might be a precaution to make sure that it did go from a submarine submerged. Do you consider that the tests that you are making and have made are sufficient to substitute an actual test from a submarine?

Admiral Burke. They are not sufficient to substitute an actual test from a submarine, but we don't anticipate any difficulty whatever from that.

The tests that we have made already are tougher ones. We have got it behind us. We are confident that this missile will work, sir; that this missile system will work.

Senator Bush. I hope that is right. I think a great deal depends on that being right, as a matter of fact.

You mentioned a little while ago, earlier this afternoon, that you have on the aircraft carriers now some 200 attack aircraft.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, on the deployed in the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, sir.

Senator Bush. Are these all capable of carrying atomic weapons?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Bush. They are. Admiral, one thing that concerns me very much about these hearings that have been going on this year is the fact that we are inclined to make public all of our problems, all of the locations that we have for strategic weapons, almost the exact size of our forces and striking power.

We seem to have no secrets whatever from the world. And then, also, we seem to have a tendency to disclose most of the information that we get through Intelligence sources very

freely. Frankly, that has disturbed me very much indeed.

Now, I don't think there is any doubt about it that the Congress should know all the information available on the subject of our armed forces. I think that every year we should find out, as we do, but I believe that the situation being as tense as it is in the world today, and you and other members of the Joint Chiefs have not hesitated to say how serious it is, just as General Power and others, General Taylor did last week, I just wonder whether it is wise for us to disclose very much information, practically everything about our military posture and our intentions and our plans.

Is this something that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have ever considered or not?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. This is one of the most serious problems confronting us in this country and there is apparently no way that we can keep the information from going out.

We have to put out contracts for things. They are all published. We can't keep anything, any of our own equipment, secret for very long. Everybody knows the location of what we plan on doing, let alone what we have done. It is a very serious problem, sir, and I do agree with General Twining in his very strong feelings on this, sir.

Senator Bush. I am glad to hear that. I think it is a very serious problem and I think that the Congress should

be more cooperative with that point of view, frankly.

I don't think that we should fail to get the information, but I do think that too much of it is given out publicly for our own good.

We have to work very hard to get the information we get about the Soviets and their capabilities, and it seems to me that we should make it just as hard for them to find out about what the situation is in our own armed forces and preparedness situations.

Admiral, would you discuss for a moment your own estimate of the Navy's defenses against air attack while their ships are at sea, our aircraft carriers and so forth which are armed, as you say, with these 200 attack planes? How do you estimate the ability of the modern aircraft carriers that we have at sea now to defend themselves against air attack or submarine attack?

Admiral Burke. Against air attack? First, sir, our capability is increasing and has increased quite a bit in the last few years. We have better radars, we have better communications systems, better computing mechanisms and better surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles.

In the tests that we have run, we have run some of them with our allies, our defense capability has increased a great deal and it is very difficult for a manned aircraft to get into a carrier.

Our formations are entirely different from what they were in World War II. An aircraft that sees on its radar scopes a series of blips, a series of points, all of which might be a carrier or our ships, can tell whether they are the kind of ship that is there because we have counter measures which will confuse him.

So he has got to investigate, and on coming in to investigate, he has got to go through our own airborne CAP combat air patrol; he has got to go through a radar screen of surface ships, surface ships equipped with surface-to-air missiles which are very accurate. And I think he would find it a most difficult job to actually attack a carrier. He has got to do it in great force.

Senator Bush. I think that is very reassuring. Thank you, Admiral.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator.

Gentlemen, just taking a little inventory now of our time, and we also have General Shoup here, without any intention whatever of limiting anyone, we could be pointing our questions or observations to the Admiral to be as brief as we reasonably can, consistent with completeness. Maybe we can finish up and have time for everyone to ask questions too.

Mr. Weisel estimates he will need something like twenty minutes so I recognize him now.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, would the counsel yield to me for just one observation?

Senator Stennis. All right, Senator.

Senator Symington. Admiral, I agree with you that we ought to keep all information, as much of it as will not help the possible enemy, to ourselves. But in a democracy the people have the right to know.

Last January a statement was made in high position that we were rapidly closing the missile gap. I stated that that was not true and stated if it wasn't correct that I would give the percentages of how we planned to have the missile gap widened. And that was done by the Secretary of Defense shortly thereafter. He said we planned to allow the Russians to get a lead of three to one in ICBM's.

I thought that the lead was considerably more than that, but we made the point and so I dropped it. Later on, after the testimony before the committee, that our IRBM situation in England was "sitting there ready to go," I found out on a trip that that wasn't true, and the British chiefs were stating it wasn't true publicly in the British papers.

Now we get a lot of information here in the Congress and to the best of my knowledge since I have been on this Committee, there has never been a leak out of this Committee. But, on the other hand, if the implication of the statement about intentions, as against capabilities, implies that the

Russians are doing less in ICBM's according to national intelligence given to the Congress this year, as against what was given to the Congress by national intelligence last year, that is not correct.

Therefore, as long as my friend, the distinguished senior Senator from Connecticut, has raised the point, I will state that the national intelligence missile estimate on missiles available for launching against the United States has increased considerably this year as against last year, as given to the Congress.

Now, if this is disputed, I am going to release the percentage of increase given to us by Mr. Dulles because the most important thing in the world to me, as this discussion continues, is that if any information is given to the Congress, or given to the people rather, it be the right information.

The people's right to know, the strength of a nation, depends upon the will of the people and in the democracy form of Government that will can only function if the people are informed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Proceed, Mr. Weisel.

Mr. Weisel. Admiral, what I read to you was read from documents that were made public by Navy officers, not by me, isn't that correct, those quotes that I gave?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, all hands, everybody knows

b-9 the numbers of ships that we have, and there is no way of
keeping it secret.

Mr. Weisel. And in all my conversations with you prior
to your testimony, I told you not to answer any question that
would be classified; isn't that true?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisel. Now, we have had a lot -- sir? I don't know
what you were driving at, Senator Bush.

Senator Bush. I wasn't driving at counsel.

I am surprised that he thought I was.

I am making a general observation, and I still hold that
I think we give out entirely too much information about our
military posture. I agree with the Senator's general obser-
vation about this right to know.

But we have a representative government here and one of
the advantages of it is that the representatives of the people
can tend to the business of the people, and we don't have to
tell all of our military secrets and all of our plans for the
future to the whole world, especially at a time when we are
faced with the grave dangers that we are faced with in this
country.

Now, I do not have in mind anything. I think Mr. Weisel
has conducted these investigations in as fine a fashion as
could be done. He has been very particular to try to avoid
bringing out secret information.

So I want him to understand that I did not have him in mind. I do believe -- I object to the fact that I think too much political influence has gotten into this whole situation, and I don't think that we are any better off for it.

Senator Stennis. All right, Mr. Weisel.

Mr. Weisel. Admiral, we have talked about Polaris missiles on cruisers and on merchant ships and so forth. You agree with Admiral Cooper's statement, do you not, that if you want to get things done next year or the year after, you have got to do them now or you won't get them done then?

Admiral Burke. That is correct.

Mr. Weisel. Isn't that right?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisel. You can't get missiles on cruisers and on merchant ships even in 1963 unless you make certain plans now; is that correct?

Admiral Burke. That is correct.

Mr. Weisel. And those plans have not been made now, is that correct?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisel. And as far as you know, there has been no indication that those requirements will be made.

Admiral Burke. Well, we will have an opportunity to submit them.

Mr. Weisel. We talked about a deterrent force in a nuclear

war. I don't know of a single person who testified that we were in any danger now.

The only testimony related to the danger that we might be in two or three years from now if we didn't take certain steps now to create the kind of a deterrent that the Russians would consider unacceptable; isn't that true?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisel. And it is true that the Russians lost fifteen million men in the last war and had sixty per cent of their industries destroyed, and still survived.

Admiral Burke. Not in a couple of days though, sir. That was during years.

Mr. Weisel. They lost it during the year; but there is a certain amount of retaliation that the Russians might consider acceptable to them if they could knock us out.

I am not saying they can or they will.

Admiral Burke. Of course, there is some amount and we are trying to read somebody else's mind here now, and it is very difficult to do.

But I think that we will be able to wreck severe damage on Russia this year, next year, and the year afterwards. Now, it will be very severe.

Mr. Weisel. I am merely bringing that up because you make the statement that she hasn't got 150 ICBM's. I don't know whether you know that she hasn't or not, or whether you

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know when she will get them or not.

Admiral Burke. I do not know, sir, and neither does anybody else know absolutely.

Mr. Weisel. That is right, and, therefore, we must be careful about making those "guesstimates", don't you think?

Admiral Burke. Of course. But also it is equally true that we can over emphasize one aspect of war, one danger, one danger to our nation, and lose by some other danger, some other activity of the enemy.

Mr. Weisel. Agreed. Therefore, it may be that we will reach a state where both of us will have sufficient deterrent to deter the other from a nuclear war.

But it was pointed out here that we have 48 military commitments around the world and that we haven't the requirements to meet those commitments in any reasonable fashion in a limited war, should the enemy choose to go by limited war rather than by nuclear war.

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I would like your comment about the part that the Navy will have to play if we are called upon to meet these military commitments around the world with limited war capacity. Tell the committee whether you are satisfied that you can do it under the present plans, not under the plans you would like or the plans that you ask for, but the plans that are now in being. Are you satisfied that we can meet, that the Navy can meet its limited war commitments around the world?

Admiral Burke. In this situation there is no specific limited war that you can conceive of limited wars where we do not have the capability, or several limited wars occurring at the same time where we cannot do all the things that we would have to do. But the probability of several of them happening at the same time is not great. There is a possibility of it.

Now right now we have the capability of lifting and protecting a division and a half of Marines. We have the capability of defending Taiwan. We have the capability of defending our allies overseas, but not all at once.

Mr. Weisel. Are you satisfied, can you tell us under oath that you are satisfied as the chief naval operational officer of the United States Navy ---

Admiral Burke. No ---

Mr. Weisel. Wait a minute now, with the present plans,

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with the present programs, you can discharge your duty to meet the commitments that you might be called upon for limited war?

Admiral Burke. Nobody is ever satisfied with his capability.

Mr. Weisel. I am not asking you --

Admiral Burke. I am not satisfied either. I am not satisfied, and I am concerned about our ability to conduct limited war in the future. Mostly due to the age of ships.

Mr. Weisel. The question is can you meet your commitments? Are you satisfied that you can meet the commitments that you may be called upon to meet?

Admiral Burke. Not if they all occur all at once, sir, you can't do it?

Mr. Weisel. I am not talking about them occurring all at once. Let me get down to specifics.

Last year you testified that you were spread pretty thin when you had Taiwan and Lebanon, isn't that true?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisel. Suppose you had more than Taiwan and Lebanon?

Admiral Burke. Well, we couldn't do any more than that.

Mr. Weisel. Do you think the Russians and the Chinese and their satellites are just going to create limited wars in two places where you can meet them, or don't you think

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they might create more than two limited wars at one time?

Admiral Burke. They might, sir.

Mr. Weisel. Are you satisfied?

Admiral Burke. I am not satisfied that we can meet all of the commitments if they all occur at once.

You can't do it.

Mr. Weisel. I am not talking about meeting 48 commitments all at once. I am talking about meeting those commitments that could reasonably, that you could reasonably be called upon to meet.

Admiral Burke. We have difficulty, we will have great difficulty in doing more than we did during the Taiwan and the Lebanon crises, but ---

Mr. Weisel. Do you think the greatest country in the world should be only able to meet the Taiwan and Lebanon crises at once in a limited war?

Admiral Burke. If I felt that the security of our country was jeopardized, sir, by our not having greater capability, I would not be here. I don't think the security of the country is.

Mr. Weisel. I know that.

Admiral Burke. I think we do not have the capability of course to meet some limited war situations which can be envisaged.

Mr. Weisel. Could we have that ability if we made the

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plans now?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, you could.

Mr. Weisel. Don't you think we should.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, I most respectfully -- I have the utmost respect for the counsel, but as I interpret that question you are asking, Mr. Counsel, Mr. Weisel, an impossible question for the Admiral to answer in detail.

You first put on an indefinite number, a reasonable number of possible wars. Then you ask him have we got enough defense for that.

We don't know what a reasonable number of wars is. We hope and pray there will be none. I most respectfully say that I would interpret that question so it would be impossible to answer.

Mr. Weisel. That may be. I would ask Admiral Burke whether he thinks it is impossible to answer.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would say that whether a question is impossible to answer or whether it isn't impossible to answer is a subject for the counsel and the witness and not a member of the committee.

Senator Stennis. The Chair rules that the witness is an expert. All right, let's proceed.

Admiral Burke. We can handle about two situations at the same time of about the size of Lebanon and the support that

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has to go to something like that, and that is about all.

Mr. Weisel. Then I ask you whether in your study of this situation and our commitments around the world, whether you don't think it is reasonable that the Chinese and Russians might choose to have more than Lebanon and Taiwan at one time?

Admiral Burke. They might.

Mr. Weisel. And if they do, we are not prepared to meet it?

Admiral Burke. That is right, sir, if they have two or more, we can't do it, more than two.

Mr. Weisel. Now we have talked about the Polaris submarines as missile carrying submarines, and you testified that you believed the tests would all come out well and properly, but we have never had a full scale test of the Polaris missile as yet, have we, Admiral?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, we have not, but we have had tests. All the big milestones we have passed, and there is no reason to expect that we will not be able to pass the rest of them easily. We don't anticipate any difficulty.

Mr. Weisel. Then you talked about having full operational capability. When does a submarine think that a new submarine with a Polaris missile is fully operational?

Admiral Burke. When he is ready to go to war.

Mr. Weisel. Would you say these two submarines you

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will deploy this year you will be ready to go to war?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisel. And the next two or the next three in '61 will be ready to go to war?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisel. and the other three in '62?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisel. What happens after '62?

Admiral Burke. You mean about the overhaul though?

Mr. Weisel. Yes.

Admiral Burke. Well, after we get about these nine submarines on station, they will of course have to come back for overhaul, and thereafter about 55 per cent of the total submarines, Polaris submarines, will be on station. There will be about ten or fifteen per cent that will be under overhaul.

In times of tension you can put all of those except those under overhaul on station, which is what of course we would do.

Mr. Weisel. Yes, and all of the missiles onboard will not be reliable, will they?

Admiral Burke. Oh, yes, sir. Of course there may be some of them that won't be reliable, but we anticipate that they will be. Those missiles will be capable of being replaced when they come back to the tender, so it would be

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very unusual if we have unreliable missiles in any significant number.

Mr. Weisel. It has been estimated by General Power when he made his statement that it would take 150 ICBM's and 150 IRBM's to knock us all out, that it would take three missiles on one target to knock a target out.

Admiral Burke. There are many different kinds of reliability, and there are additional factors in that statement, sir.

The reliability to launch, the reliability of a missile to be fired would probably be very high with a solid propellant type of missile. We have held our missiles for great, long times, and they have been launched very well.

The number of missiles that it takes to knock out a specific target is dependent upon the hardness of the target, the yield of the warhead, but mostly upon the accuracy of the missile.

Mr. Weisel. But you don't contend that 16 missiles would knock out 16 targets, do you?

Admiral Burke. It depends upon what the targets are, sir.

Mr. Weisel. That is right.

Admiral Burke. If the targets are great, a great area, like a city, like Hiroshima, probably --

Mr. Weisel. That is true of Russian missiles too. If

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they want to knock out a city, they don't care where they hit.

Admiral Burke. They could hit within several miles, that is correct.

Mr. Weisel. Russian industry is not on the seacoast as our industry, is it?

Senator Symington. Will the counsel yield? Did you say that the Russians could hit within a couple of miles?

Admiral Burke. No. I said -- he said that you don't have to have a pinpoint target.

Senator Symington. Didn't you say the Russians could hit within a couple of miles?

Admiral Burke. Can hit a city.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Mr. Weisel. We were talking about Russian industry not being on the seacoast. You don't contend that the Polaris missile could hit all parts of Russia, do you?

Admiral Burke. Nearly all of them, yes, sir.

Mr. Weisel. What percentage, what parts of Russia on the map could you hit with the Polaris submarine?

Admiral Burke. With the missile you will hit anything within -- you can figure it out on a 1,200 mile radius.

Mr. Weisel. Can you hit behind their Ural Mountains?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

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Mr. Weisel. You could?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisel. When you say you can put all the submarines on station except those under overhaul, are you assuming you will have strategic warning?

Admiral Burke. Periods of tension.

Mr. Weisel. How do you know that it won't be a surprise attack?

Admiral Burke. You don't, for sure, but it is awfully difficult to launch a surprise attack. You don't know for sure, but 55 per cent of those submarines are on station day in, day out, year in, year out, and as soon as there is a period of tension the others can be ordered out. Some of them can be launched perhaps from the tenders.

Mr. Weisel. What happened at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Burke. That is right. We got caught. Pearl Harbor is possible.

Mr. Weisel. Couldn't we get caught again without warning?

Admiral Burke. I doubt it, not now. If we didn't learn that time, we never will learn.

Mr. Weisel. Do we have any warning at all against ballistic missiles?

Admiral Burke. Against ballistic missiles in flight?

Mr. Weisel. Yes.

Admiral Burke. No, sir, very little.

Mr. Weisel. Have we any?

Admiral Burke. Well, BMEWS system, and the Midas system.

Mr. Weisel. Is BMEWS operational now?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, not operational yet, but when it comes in it will be.

Mr. Weisel. You have given us several examples in which the Navy did not ask for the funds it required because of budgetary guidelines. Did you ever submit to the Secretary of Defense your military requirement for 1961?

Admiral Burke. As I explained before, we had a directive to submit our budgetary request for '61 in two amounts. One was for basic budget and one was for the basic and add on, and we followed our directive.

Mr. Weisel. Then you did not submit your requirements?

Admiral Burke. Not as it has been conceived heretofore, no, sir.

Senator Stennis. Admiral Burke, we are trying to arrange so you will not have to come back tomorrow. We also have General Shoup here.

I understand you were on the stand over in the House all morning. You certainly have been here since 2 o'clock. Do you wish to take a little recess and let us ask General Shoup some questions, or do you wish to proceed?

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Admiral Burke. Just as you like, sir. I am available.

Senator Stennis. In other words, you are not asking for a long count?

Admiral Burke. No, sir.

Senator Stennis. I have a very few questions that I will ask, gentlemen.

Admiral, when you say operational, to my mind it carries the idea that everything is complete and it is ready to operate fully. Do you use the term that way when you said Polaris would be operational this year? Does that mean you are ready to shoot at a target?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, it is fully ready.

Senator Stennis. In anger, if necessary?

Admiral Burke. In anger, if necessary.

Senator Stennis. Is that correct?

Admiral Burke. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. As I understood it, you said in a very few months you would have the Polaris submarines operational, is that what you said?

Admiral Burke. We will have one operational in the fall, sir, and we will have a total of two this year.

Senator Stennis. Is it proper to ask you if you have fired this missile now with the warhead on it as you would be firing it if you were in anger?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, we can't fire a warhead. We have

had tests of the warhead by itself, but we are not now permitted to fire any more warheads. We have got dummy warheads.

Senator Stennis. I asked you the question in open session. If it is not proper, I am not trying to crowd you.

But when you say in a very few months you will have the Polaris submarine operational, to my mind that carries the idea, and I believe it does to the average American, that is saying we will be ready to hit them?

Admiral Burke. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. In war?

Admiral Burke. That is exactly what I mean.

Senator Stennis. With a nuclear warhead?

Admiral Burke. That is exactly what I mean, yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. I don't see how you can say that, Admiral, when you haven't fired one yet, a complete firing, as I understood you to say you haven't.

Admiral Burke. We have fired the warhead. I mean the warhead has been tested.

But there has been no nuclear test for about a year and a half, and there is no warhead, I don't think we have fired any warhead in the missile itself.

Senator Stennis. That is what disturbs me. This has not yet been fired from a submarine, and neither has the

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missile with the warhead been fired.

Admiral Burke. That is true with Atlas, Titan. All the services, all the missiles.

Senator Stennis. I am not trying to discredit Polaris. I am for it.

But my point is if it hasn't been fired from a submarine yet, and there has been no firing of this warhead as tied on to this particular missile, I don't see how you can just say with confidence that in a very few months we will have it ready to go and can knock out the enemy, if it need be to fire in anger?

Admiral Burke. We have tested this missile. We have fired this missile from various types of launchers. We have fired the missile body from under waters so that we know what it will do. We have tested the tubes. We have tested the warhead. We have tested all the components.

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Three years ago, four years ago we laid down a plan, a schedule, and we were to fire this first missile in 1963. We were to be operational, ready with the first boat in 1963.

Then Sputnik came along and we pushed it up, and we pushed it up just as much as we possibly could. At that time we laid out a schedule.

We have met everyone of those important points on that schedule, and now we have fired, we have conducted so many tests under so many different conditions that I am confident that this missile will work, and that the system will work. The warhead, the guidance system, the control of the mechanism, everything I am confident will work.

Senator Stennis. I don't want to prolong this examination on this point, but it seems to me that it is so vital when you get this to the operational stage, do you propose then to fire it, to see that it will work, all put together?

Admiral Burke. Not the warhead, sir, not the warhead, not unless we get a lift on the ban on testing warheads. We are not permitted to fire any nuclear device now, nobody.

Senator Stennis. It has been pictured to us that we are going to have these weapons ranging the seas capable of firing on any target anywhere at any time if the demand comes.

Admiral Burke. And that will be true, sir, that will be true.

dm 2

Senator Stennis. I certainly hope it will. But I still am a little lost, at a great loss to know how you can be so confident that in a few months you are going to have this wrapped up.

Admiral Burke. Because we have done all the significant tests. We have completed them all, sir.

Senator Stennis. You are going to have one. Will you have more than one in this year that will be operational?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, we will have two operational.

Senator Stennis. Two?

Admiral Burke. Ready for deployment, yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. That is the Polaris.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. I think you have done a might good job on this. I commend you for hastening it. But I was disturbed there.

One more question now. The gentleman here told me that all your submarines that are going to be Polaris equipped are nuclear powered.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. Is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, they are all nuclear powered, and they all have sonars and other equipment.

Senator Stennis. Frequently we call this, we say something about the Polaris missile as being a small one or having

dm3 a small or a little warhead. I don't know just what that means.

But we have a memorandum here that last year the Secretary of Defense made the statement that one Polaris submarine carries as much destructive power as all the bombs dropped by both sides during World War II.

Admiral Burke. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. Is that correct?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. This missile, warhead, will be many times the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It is not a small one.

Senator Stennis. Yes. I want to check and see.

Admiral, there was a witness here last week -- I am not going into this at great length now, as there are others here to ask questions, but -- Admiral Rickover impressed me very very much by many things he said.

He said one thing about education. I had closely followed him, and I have some austerity in me I suppose, and I think he is right about a lot of his points on education.

But that is not what I am referring to here. Mr. Weisl asked him last week:

"Getting back to your particular field of atomic propulsion, what have you been doing in the last two or three months?"

Admiral Rickover replied:

dm 4

"During the last two or three months I have been writing reports. I have been defending my program, not only myself but all my leading people have become involved in this.

"Mr. Weisl: Why is it necessary for a man who has accomplished what you have accomplished to spend so much time away from your technological duties writing reports and defending your program? Let's get to the nub of that.

"Admiral Rickover: Well, I don't want to be parochial or personal in this matter. I would prefer to talk about it in a general way. I can be more helpful that way.

"We have too many administrators and staff people in the Executive Branch of our Government. I am not saying this in a manner let's clean house or anything such as that. But it is a fact that when there are too many people, work stops. The Parkinson Law takes over."

I want to say I don't think that he was trying to throw rocks at anyone or trying to be clever. I was very much impressed with his sincerity.

Resuming his testimony:

"These people are smart. They have administrative jobs to do, and in so doing they take up the time of the very few people who do the real productive work. Over the last ten years there has been a constant increase in difficulty in getting a job done. In fact, it has gotten to the point now where it is almost impossible to do a good job.

dm 5

"It isn't money. You don't get jobs done with money.

In fact, you can slow jobs with too much money, because it takes time to spend money. The situation is comparable to a fire department with one fire station and many fire alarms. We have only one fire station, but we keep on having more fire alarms and more people are ringing alarms."

I will skip over:

"Similarly a few people doing the actual technical work are being overburdened by constant requests for information, justification, rejustification, and so on."

Now as his commanding officer and chief naval officer, what is your impression of that testimony? I am not referring to him personally but that situation. And what have you found along that line, and what can you do about it?

Admiral Burke. I have great sympathy for Admiral Rickover, sir, because I am in exactly the same position, and that is serious.

We are answering questions all the time. We are justifying a lot of things. That comes about because people are curious and they have a right to know, and they ought to know. And the man that has got to justify a program is the man who knows the most about it, and that is the way up and down the line.

Senator Stennis. But that is a very serious complaint here. I think it is true with many others too, of your men

dm6

in the other services. That is why the few military places I go I send word ahead no honors, I don't want to tie up the machinery of the place and have staff members coming to brief me, great numbers of them, and so forth. I think they are suppose to have more important things to do.

But I know it is a constant drain on them in time.

Is there something that you gentlemen that are Chiefs, Chiefs of Staff I mean, that you can do? Couldn't you formulate some kind of a plan together with the Executive Branch of the Government, the more direct Executive Branch, civilian side, to protect this situation?

Admiral Burke. Perhaps we haven't been able to devise it yet. This comes about partly because of the tremendous technological advances made in the last few years. There are many changes.

Senator Stennis. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator Saltonstall. Let me ask you this. Our deterrent ability is dependent upon a mix of weapons, submarines, carriers, SAC Air Force, missiles, the Army and all that goes with all our component services, does it not?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. And we are not dependent on any one.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. And your statements here today as

dm 7

to our deterrent ability to stop any war from starting is based on that whole general mix of weapons as well as the Navy.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. And you have great confidence in the Navy and its ability to do its part.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. And if, as Mr. Weisl has said, a reasonable number of wars are started, difficulties or problems are started like Taiwan and Lebanon, you certainly will advise the authorities to give you the immediate opportunity to increase your personnel or to increase what you believe is necessary for the Navy to continue to take its part.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. However, in fairness you can supplement your capability then, but you can't add very much to it in the time when the danger is upon you.

Senator Saltonstall. I understand that. But our whole national security, if our national security is involved, begins to become involved with the situations around the world, you certainly would do your utmost to see that the Navy takes its part in our defense.

Admiral Burke. Of course.

Senator Saltonstall. Now Senator Bridges was not able to be here today, but I know he is interested in this question,

dm 8

and I am too, and I am sure we all are. Do you believe in a single Chief of Staff?

Admiral Burke. No, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Are you satisfied with the present system of Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral Burke. I am getting so I react to that not satisfied question, sir, automatically.

Senator Saltonstall. I leave out the word "satisfied." Do you believe that that is the best system?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. The present system has some tremendous virtues which the single Chief of Staff system does not have. I don't think that any one man will have the knowledge to make the decisions which will be necessary in a single Chief of Staff system.

Now true he will have a staff which should advise him. But in advising him, there is always the tendency to get a single group around him, and sooner or later it would be very bad.

The advantage of this system that we have now is that if something is wrong, or we think that something is wrong, we are heard as individuals. I have the utmost respect for General Twining. He is one of the most wonderful people I have ever met. But we don't always agree. And sometimes we disagree pretty strongly.

But I can now disagree, and he can listen and he will.

dm 9 And then if necessary we can take it up before the Secretary
of Defense. We can lay our problems out before him.

Senator Saltonstall. Do you believe from the recent
order of the Secretary of Defense that he comes in on it
early?

Admiral Burke. He comes in on it earlier and I believe
that is going to be a great help.

But I believe a single Chief of Staff or anything similar
thereto will ruin the effectiveness of some fundamental element
of our military services, and it could be anyone of them, and
I think that when that happens, it will generate a weakness,
and I think our country will be in serious danger.

A single Chief of Staff, one of the advantages of it
is supposed to be economy, the elimination of duplication.
We have very little duplication now left in the services,
but what could happen is to eliminate one whole element, so
you don't have that element at all, and thereby leave yourself
wide open, betting that just one thing is going to happen.

Senator Saltonstall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Senator Symington.

Senator Symington. Admiral, just one question on what
you have just said. Are you saying if there is a Chief of
Staff, you wouldn't have the right to disagree with him?

Admiral Burke. I don't think I would have to. It
depends of course on who is the single Chief of Staff.

dm 10

Senator Symington. If you were the Chief of Staff, would you let a subordinate come to you and present a disagreement, or would you tell him not to tell you what he thought?

Admiral Burke. I would do that --

Senator Symington. Just answer the question.

Admiral Burke. Certainly I would.

Senator Symington. You implied if there was a Chief of Staff, that you wouldn't dare disagree with him. I think you are underrating yourself based on your record.

Admiral Burke. No, that is not quite what I said.

Senator Symington. What did you say? You said if there was a Chief of Staff that the other people couldn't disagree with him.

Admiral Burke. What I said was, sir, if there was a single Chief of Staff, sooner or later you get that single Chief of Staff when there is only one element around him, and that is a group of people who support him and his ideas, and that is just as natural as the day is long.

Senator Symington. I think you underrate yourself, and I think you underrate the people who serve under the Chiefs, and I think you underrate the whole concept of how to manage a business in the country and the biggest business in the world is the Pentagon.

But so much for that. I want to ask you the question

dm 11

again that was asked you by the Chairman. Are you saying that we will have two Polaris submarines fully operational this year at full range with the missiles on board?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, it will be two Polaris submarines operational this year with the missiles on board.

Senator Symington. Do you know why the figure was changed in the last few weeks from one to two?

Admiral Burke. It has been two so far as I know all along, sir.

Senator Symington. Now regardless of what General Power said about ICBM's, whether he was right or he was wrong, if you add the Russian missile capability on the submarines, which you have discussed at length, and as usually intelligently at some length, wouldn't that increase whatever capability they had for attack?

Admiral Burke. Certainly, yes, sir.

Senator Symington. You also said you thought limited war was more likely than general war, didn't you?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. But the manned airplane is a better unit for a limited war than either the ICBM or the IRBM or the Polaris, is it not?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator Symington. You at one time gave us the theory of over-kill, that we didn't need to have to do the job over

dm 12

and over again, is that right?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. Do you still stick to the theory of over-kill, and the theory of a lot more Polaris submarines?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. Because you have got more targets than there were last time?

Admiral Burke. No, sir, because missiles are going to take the place of manned aircraft against large fixed targets in known locations, and it is a question of changing weapons systems.

Senator Symington. I don't want there to be any secret about what worries me, and I know you want me to give my frank opinion.

I have supported, every time anything has every come up before the Congress about the Polaris, and one of the chief reasons that I have done it is because of my respect for you. You recommended it.

(12)

But you apparently didn't approve of the B-70, based on the testimony of General White. The implication was that he was the one that voted for it and possibly one other, and that was the testimony we had. It worries me that we are going to stop the development of manned aircraft for the Air Force which can be used in both all-out war and nuclear war, and at the same time put many billions of dollars into a unit which

dm 13

you can have an argument as to whether at certain altitudes and speeds and so forth it would be the hardest to detect.

But what worries me is if you carry this out, you are going to see the end of the manned aircraft and the Congress is being asked, apparently with the approval of the Joint Chiefs, to end research and development on additional manned aircraft in the Air Force at the same time we are being asked to put a great many billion dollars into the Polaris.

You yourself testified that whereas the Polaris is only good for nuclear war or all-out war, that the B-70, especially with the Hound Dog and this new weapon that General White spoke about in his speech, certainly that could be used for either all-out war or for limited war. So I can't see the logic of the split.

I am not trying to be contentious. I am just trying to be sincere in what worries me. If we are going to give up the Air Force, we ought to face it and give it up. We are certainly going to give it up ultimately, and all naval air with it, unless there is a continued development of manned aircraft.

Anything that came out of the B-70 from the standpoint of progress that you would make beyond the heat barrier of course would be promptly applied to all airplanes and all services and the commercial airplanes too.

Admiral Burke. I agreed with the decision that was made

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on that, sir, and the reason is this: that the B-70 will not be available until 1966 or thereabouts. It is a mach 3 airplane.

Senator Symington. Excuse me, General White said it would go to mach 6 or 10 very possibly. That was his testimony.

Admiral Burke. I don't know that, sir. I guess he is right, I don't know.

I always understood it to be a mach 3 airplane, sir, and that is what we were discussing was a mach 3 airplane.

But in competition of that manned aircraft which must have the same control mechanism as a missile, that means a computer in it just like a missile, that that manned aircraft is doing exactly the same thing as a ballistic missile, and does it not so well and more expensively.

In other words, the B-70 as a mach 3 airplane carrying nuclear weapons can't do the job in that time period as well as ballistic missiles should be able to do.

Senator Symington. Can you recall a missile once you have fired it and it has gone out say 50 miles?

Admiral Burke. No sir, and so you have got to have missiles which you don't fire in a hair trigger response. That is another reason for Polaris.

Senator Symington. But you could send out a B-70 for 5,000 miles, and then decide you didn't want to fire anything or fire a missile for another thousand miles, and it would be

dm 15

a ballistic missile.

Admiral Burke. Sure.

Senator Symington. And you haven't yet gotten into the relative ICBM and B-70 and Polaris missile capability from the standpoint of blast, which I don't think we should get into.

Admiral Burke. That is quite right. You could do that, but why do it that way? Why not fire the ballistic missile right from the area underneath?

Senator Symington. Because it is stationary and a B-70 is not stationary. I am speaking not for the Air Force. I am speaking for all airmen.

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. This business of putting billions of dollars into something that goes along at the speed of a ship at sea and no faster than the fastest ships at sea go today and cutting out completely all manned aircraft that can go at speeds of many thousands of miles an hour, maybe much more than mach 3, I don't understand the split.

Admiral Burke. I am not talking against manned aircraft because I am all in favor of manned aircraft.

Senator Symington. Why stop the development of them?

Admiral Burke. I don't want to stop the development of it. I am in favor of the development of the thing, but not as a weapons system. I think as a weapons system it is true that the development of the engines will have offshoots.

dm 16

Senator Symington. You have stopped the development of the engine.

Admiral Burke. No, there is money in this as I understood it. There is money in the Air Force budget for the development.

Senator Symington. But for no reconnaissance, no electronics, just the engine and the frame.

Admiral Burke. This B-70 as a weapons system I don't think can do the job any better than a ballistic missile, and it is going to cost a lot more. That is not a cheap airplane. That costs a couple of billion dollars before you get the first one. It is a tremendous number.

Senator Symington. How much have you got in Polaris today?

Admiral Burke. Sir?

Senator Symington. How much have you got in Polaris and planned to have in Polaris?

Admiral Burke. But that is for more than one. We have got a couple of billion dollars in it.

Senator Symington. But the B-70 can be used for either conventional or nuclear war.

Admiral Burke. A mach 3 airplane, sir? It is a very expensive way.

Senator Symington. All I am telling you is what has been the testimony before this Committee.

dm 17

Admiral Burke. I am sure that airplanes will be used, but I doubt if a mach airplane will be used.

Senator Symington. This is going to come up, this business of buying billions of dollars worth of something going well under a hundred miles an hour, and we can shade that considerably, in canceling out all future for manned aircraft.

We canceled the fighters on the ground the B-70 would do the job, and now in effect we are canceling the B-70.

Admiral Burke. This speed of the submarine, sir, which you referred to, it doesn't have to have speed. It is on station.

Senator Symington. That is a matter of opinion, Admiral. My opinion is that you can detect anything in the world if you try hard enough, and one of the things that makes it more difficult to detect is speed.

Now again I am for the Polaris, but I am amazed that that here all of a sudden out of a clear sky the United States Air Force, which frankly has meant a lot to me as to a lot of other Americans --

Admiral Burke. Certainly.

Senator Symington. And from the standpoint of a bomber as a naval air arm, they are not going to have any larger airplanes in developmental research, and this is going to wash it out. I think the sky is going to be terribly important, manned as well as unmanned.

dm 18

Admiral Burke. That is true, sir, I agree to that.

Senator Symington. Let me ask you one more question. Did you say that we haven't the least idea whether Russia has any missile sites? Did you testify to that?

Admiral Burke. No, sir. I think what I testified to, if I said that, it can be misinterpreted. What I mean is we do not know of where any missile sites are other than their test missile sites. I know we know where the test sites are.

Senator Symington. I thought you said we haven't the least idea where Russia has any missile sites, not whether.

Admiral Burke. I didn't intend to.

Senator Symington. I thought you wanted that clear for the record.

Admiral Burke. Thank you.

Senator Symington. Because it would be in opposition to other testimony that has been given in this field.

Admiral Burke. Thank you, sir. I would.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the Admiral again. He is always a fine witness. Ever since I have known him he has fought for his own service and fought for the country, and it is always a privilege and a pleasure to listen to him testify.

Admiral Burke. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Stennis. Senator Martin, you are recognized for ten minutes.

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Senator Martin. Admiral, a moment ago in your discussion with Mr. Weisl about brush-fire wars, I more or less came to the conclusion that the location of those brush-fire wars had something to do with the number we could expect to fight simultaneously, is that true?

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir. If they are in widely separated parts --

Senator Martin. We can't count on just so many brush-fire wars and wrap them up in one package. It depends a little on who they are.

Admiral Burke. Where they are, who they are, what is involved, how big it is and a lot of other things, sir.

Senator Martin. Our Nation has been described as incapable of fighting more than two brush-fire wars of a certain size and location simultaneously. How many brush-fire wars of similar size and location is Russia capable of conducting simultaneously?

Admiral Burke. Not very much, sir, except on her own borders. Russia hasn't fought recently very much small wars. She gets her satellites or Communist China to launch these attacks.

Senator Martin. I am not talking about launching. I am talking about fighting them to a conclusion.

Admiral Burke. It depends upon the size of the brush-fire war.

dm 20

Senator Martin. I dislike very much to have to go out of this hearing any impression that Russia has unlimited capability of carrying on innumerable brush-fire wars regardless of location, whereas we are limited in brush-fires to possibly two of the size and type that were then named.

Admiral Burke. You are quite right, sir, that she must fight her wars on her periphery, I mean on the Communist periphery, whereas we can exert force in those locations too. We have a great capability, and it is true that Russia is also limited in her capability.

Senator Martin. Yes. The impression first struck me that we might get out of this hearing, that whereas the testimony here has indicated that we can hold our own as of now against Russia, yet Russia has an unlimited capability of waging brush-fire wars, and we have a very limited capability of fighting those same brush-fire wars.

I wanted to clarify that point a little bit. That is all I have in mind.

Admiral Burke. Thank you, sir.

Senator Stennis. Thank you very much. Senator Cannon, you are recognized for ten minutes.

Senator Cannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, you would not want to leave the impression that Russia and her satellites do not have the capability of conducting more than two brush-fire wars at one time, do you,

dm 21

talking about Communist-dominated countries?

Admiral Burke. That depends entirely upon the size and where she wants them to break out.

She can create a lot of trouble without actually conducting a limited war. That is she can create a lot of trouble by local Communists in an area, in which her own troops are not involved at all.

Senator Cannon. In other words, she might project a number of brush-fire type wars and not be actively engaged herself at all.

Admiral Burke. She might sponsor them.

Senator Cannon. Yes. Now you made the statement earlier that you were not sure that the Secretary of Defense shares your confidence in the Polaris. I wonder if you could state whether or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff share your confidence in the Polaris.

Admiral Burke. I think there is a difference of opinion of course on the degree of confidence in the Polaris, but I think they all do, yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. When you say there is a difference of opinion, is that as to the --

Admiral Burke. What you are asking me, sir, is what another man thinks, and that is awfully difficult to answer unequivocally.

Senator Cannon. I am prompted by the fact that you have

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already said you weren't sure whether the Secretary of Defense shared your confidence, and also by the fact that you indicated or you testified that on numerous occasions in the past there have been splits in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As I understand it, on some occasions you come out with actually a split decision, do you not?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, submitted to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Cannon. And that has happened on many occasions during the 4-1/2 years you have been on the Joint Chiefs, has it not?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. I don't want to give the impression that most of our papers are split, because they are not. Most of them agree.

Senator Cannon. Well, give us some example. Would you say 40 or 50 times in the 4-1/2 years you have been on the Joint Chiefs?

Admiral Burke. Probably. 30 or 40 papers a year.

Senator Cannon. And those have been matters that have been important enough to submit to the Secretary for decision, is that right?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, although sometimes they are comparatively small matters.

Senator Cannon. But on this occasion you don't know

Qm 23

whether there would be a split decision on this. It hasn't gone that far.

Admiral Burke. The supplemental has not been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Cannon. I don't believe I have any further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Mr. Weisl, do you have further questions?

Mr. Weisl. Just one question, in order to clarify the record. How many divisions do the East Germans have for limited war?

Admiral Burke. I think the East Germans have a total of eight divisions, but I am not sure of that.

Mr. Weisl. I think the testimony was that they had 21 divisions.

Admiral Burke. Operational? I think it is the Russian divisions in East Germany may be 21, sir. Maybe it is a total of 21.

Mr. Weisl. How many divisions do we have?

Admiral Burke. We have five in Germany, sir.

Mr. Weisl. How many divisions do the Chinese have? Anyway, they have a great many divisions.

Admiral Burke. They have a great many. I think it is about -- I don't know the number. It is about 100 divisions.

Mr. Weisl. I think you have testified this morning that

dm 24

they were very capable soldiers and learned quickly as fliers, and learned to use new weapons quickly, did you not?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. And how many divisions does the United Arab Republic people have? They have a substantial number.

Admiral Burke. They have a substantial number, yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. And haven't the Russians supplied all of the satellites with modern arms?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, they have supplied a lot of modern arms.

Mr. Weisl. Haven't they supplied some of the Chinese naval forces with submarines?

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, they supplied the first ones, and the Red Chinese are now building Russian-designed submarines.

Mr. Weisl. So that when we talk about limited wars, we don't talk about Russia's capability alone, but Russia plus China plus other satellites.

Admiral Burke. That is correct, sir, and similarly, sir, we count our allies in too.

Senator Stennis. Admiral Burke, is there anything you wish to say now before we proceed?

Admiral Burke. No, sir.

Senator Stennis. Anything further you wish to say?

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Admiral Burke. I think I am said out, sir. Thank you
very much.

Senator Stennis. I will thank you later for attending
our session today.

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General Shoup, will you stand, please. We are certainly glad to have you here. You are a man of great patience as well as other virtues, I have found out.

It is customary, as you know, for our witnesses to be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that your testimony here will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god?

General Shoup. I do, sir.

Senator Stennis. Mr. Weisel, will you proceed, please?

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TESTIMONY OF GENERAL DAVID M. SHOUP,
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Mr. Weisel. General Shoup, I believe in your remarks to your staff when you took command, you stated as follows, and you correct me if I don't quote you correctly:

"Our budget estimate for 1961 is for funds to support a 175,000 man Marine Corps. The percentage of our three division wing teams that may simultaneously be committed to combat and the location, intensity and duration of the conflict could be such as to properly require a ready Marine Corps of 200,000, 215,000, 235,000 or even more. Nevertheless, our most important job is always to think and work hard, to get as much fight from our plight as we possibly can."

Is that your statement?

General Shoup. Exactly.

Mr. Weisel. Would you like to enlarge on it or comment on it further, General?

General Shoup. If there are any parts of it that are not clear, I would be glad to.

Mr. Weisel. The only thing that wasn't quite clear to me as an amateur was to get as much flight from your plight. Did you consider the 175,000 Marine army a plight?

General Shoup. If I may just leave out the word "army".

Mr. Weisel. Leave that out. I apologize.

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General Shoup. I referred specifically to a situation that is very easy to explain without going into too much detail.

We have a number of missions set forth by Congress, and then such as the President may direct, and then essentially that is three combat divisions, three wings, the development of amphibious techniques in operations and such other things as the President may direct and supportive forces to produce these divisions.

Now in addition to that, we have a requirement for general war. We have a function to perform in mobilization plan, and when my predecessor and everyone talks about 200,000 Marines, they are talking about being able to do our entire mission, and that includes this business, if you can imagine the limited war situation in which all of our divisions and wings were committed, and we were fighting and we have to continue to fight, and during that period of time, because of our shortage of people, we have had to send people from our posts and stations to keep them fighting, which we can do, and we have 45,000 of the finest trained Marine Reserves that we have ever had, we can use them too, because the President can call them.

Well, then if at that moment general should start, then we are in the predicament of having taken people from our posts and stations which people are required to help us

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mobilize and perform this mission that we are required to do during mobilization.

Now that is exactly the risk we take, and that is the plight we are in. The mission of mobilization and expansion related thereto and deployments related thereto is written with the same color ink on the same color paper as to have three combat divisions and three wings. So with that absolute of 25,000 people, the risk you take is that if under the conditions I enumerated you should then have general war, we would not be in a position to expand and participate in our general war plan.

At the same time I would like to make the observation that annual budgets do not fund for general war or other actual combat operations, nor do they provide funds for deployment anticipating combat operations like the Taiwan/Lebanon situation. Our budgets do not provide for that.

Mr. Weisel. Your budget does not provide for that?

General Shoup. No, sir.

Mr. Weisel. What does the limitation to 175,000 men do to your staying power in case of war?

General Shoup. I would like to point out that our staying power would be just as good as it would with 200,000 men, except we would have to empty our posts and stations to do it.

Senator Stennis. General, it may be that those in the

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rear of the room cannot hear you. Suppose you put your microphone a little closer to you and I think it will carry better.

Mr. Weisel. May I ask this question, General. In the event of a conventional war, do we have sufficient conventional weapons such as bombs in your opinion?

General Shoup. In my opinion, as far as the Marine Corps is concerned, and I conferred with the staff officers of mine and should know, I am satisfied with the number of conventional bombs that we will have available in Fiscal '61 to carry on a conventional war that we could participate in with the force we have.

Mr. Weisel. Is sufficient provision being made now for the development of conventional bombs and other weapons in your opinion?

General Shoup. I believe that that problem is brought so forcefully to the attention of the people responsible during the Taiwan situation, that I can answer unequivocally yes.

Mr. Weisel. General Shoup, Senator Saltonstall asked me to ask you this question.

You testified before the Appropriations Committee that you could get along under the budget with 175,000 men, but if a general war should start, which you don't foresee this year, you would need 200,000 men to fill the

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responsibility of the Marines as laid out, is that correct?
General Shoup. Is that a question?

Mr. Weisel. That is the question that Senator
Saltonstall wished me to ask.

General Shoup. I did state that.

Mr. Weisel. Do you care to expand on that?

General Shoup. I just did.

Mr. Weisel. You did, that is right. I think, General
Shoup, those are all the questions that counsel can think
of asking you. If there is anything that you would like to
tell the committee, I would appreciate it if you would do
so.

General Shoup. As I can observe here, it is well known
to many that our part of the Defense Department budget only
amounts to a little over two per cent, but with that two
per cent I believe that the American public is going to get
a pretty good package.

Mr. Weisel. You certainly do more than two per cent
of the fighting.

General Shoup. Well, I never made any representation
predicting when and where the fight will start, but I
predict the Marines will be there.

Senator Stennis. General, as I understand now, you
have an airlift that is capable of taking one and one-half
divisions?

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General Shoup. No, sir.

Senator Stennis. Yes, sir, I believe --

General Shoup. That is ship-lift, amphibious combatant, amphibious forces.

Senator Stennis. We have been talking about the airlift the other day with reference to the Army, and I did not think you had an airlift to take care of a division and a half.

General Shoup. No.

Senator Stennis. Of your own men. Now what do you have in a way of an airlift, General?

General Shoup. The air unit that we have for our specific use within the theaters amounts to enough airplanes, and that is intratheater, not trans-oceanic, and we can carry about 2,088 troops for a thousand mile leg, I mean about 2,000 mile leg, and about 3,000 troops for a thousand mile leg.

Now we do have in previous budgets 16 GV-1's, or CV-19's, and we have in this budget under naval appropriations of course for the Marine Corps 20 of this type aircraft, which will give us the capability, dual capability insofar as carrying fuel, refuelers for aircraft as well as carrying troops and equipment.

Senator Stennis. Do you have a full complement of your aircraft, other aircraft like your fighters, your tactical air as I believe you call it?

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General Shoup. I think that we have on hand those that are scheduled, yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. Is that enough to go with this 175,000 strength that you have?

General Shoup. I think that it is, under the plan that we are operating. And of course you realize that this is just not just the Marines, because all of the naval air outfit is backing us up also.

All the planes that are on their carriers and that they have.

Senator Stennis. You have your own wing, and then the Navy wing too is supplemental for your purposes, that is it is available for your purpose?

General Shoup. In an assault operation, yes, sir, and to protect the landing force.

Senator Stennis. All right, Senator Martin, do you have questions?

Senator Martin. I have no questions.

Senator Stennis. Senator Cannon?

Senator Cannon. General Shoup, you do have enough personnel and enough equipment and material under the present programming to, in your opinion, carry out the roles and missions assigned to your organization for this year?

General Shoup. With that one exception, Senator Cannon, the mission to be ready to mobilize and expand and

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continuing to fight in a general war, if we did all the other missions that we have, and we were engaged in them and had no additional people except our Reserves and what we have budgeted for here, we would have to push the people out of our posts and stations, and they are ready to fight too.

They are Marines, and we can send them from our posts and stations. But then if at that time general war should come, then of course the very people that we need there to mobilize and get prepared for expansion would be considerably reduced, and that is the only area that I foresee that we can't do everything that we could be expected to do with 200,000 Marines.

Senator Cannon. And if Admiral Burke is correct in his analysis that the prime danger for the next few years is that of limited war, then in accordance with your assigned roles and missions in that connection, you consider your organization to be adequately provided for?

General Shoup. Yes, sir, and I must conclude that we are not budgeted for general war. If we were, I would say 42 billion would expand to 542 billion.

Senator Cannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. You are not even budgeted as I understand it for trouble spots or limited encounters.

General Shoup. We are budgeted to be ready for them.

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Senator Stennis. Yes.

General Shoup. Like Lebanon. If we have to go, then we chew up more material, we use more stuff, we lose more of it, and so then we have to find out how much it costs to do that, because we have never been permitted to budget for a contingency.

Senator Stennis. I just want to commend you again, General Shoup, for what I thought was a very fine statement that you made soon after you assumed your responsibilities and duties, in your statement to your officers and men.

I think that our country as a whole is certainly not going down hill, the very opposite, but I think in some ways we are growing soft, in some ways.

I think your statement and your attitude is the very opposite. I like the austerity and steel, the austerity in your approach and the steel that you have in your own backbone, and that which you expect to keep instilled into your Corps. I think it is a very encouraging statement.

General Shoup. Thank you.

Senator Stennis. Admiral Burke and General Shoup, we certainly do thank you and your staff members too, from whom we have heard so little.

You have had a very fine session here, and you have made a splendid impression and a strong presentation of a wonderful service. On my first trip to Asia last fall, I didn't know

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what satisfaction I would get out of seeing your men out there in force, seeing your naval forces. I went to Subic Bay, and then I had the chance, the privilege, of seeing part of your fleet way out in the ocean. I just happened to fly over them by pure chance, and I came in contact with many of your fine officers and men too. I commend each of you.

Now because of a certain disparity here with respect to Polaris figures, it will be necessary for us to hold a brief executive session. With that understanding, I am going to ask those of you to retire from the room that are not cleared.

(Whereupon, at 5:45 o'clock p. m., the committee went into executive session.)