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Hearing held before

Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services
and

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences

INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS

(JOINT CHIEFS)

February 9, 1960

Washington, D. C.

WARD & PAUL

1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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9 February 1960

Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub. &
Aeronautical & Space Sciences

General Twining Testimony

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INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Tuesday, February 9, 1960

United States Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services, and
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee and Subcommittee met, pursuant to recess,
at 10:10 a.m., in Room 235, Old Senate Office Building,
Senator John C. Stennis presiding.

Present: Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:

Senators Stennis (Presiding), Symington and
Saltonstall.

Present: Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences:

Senators Stennis (Presiding), Symington, Bartlett,
Young, Cannon, Saltonstall, Smith, Wiley, Martin and Case (N.J.).

Also present: Captain L. P. Gray, Military Assistant to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Bush.

Edwin L. Weisl, Special Counsel; Cyrus R. Vance, Associate
Counsel; Kenneth E. Belieu, Staff Director of Space Committee
and Preparedness Subcommittee.

Staff Members, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:

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Stuart French, Associate Counsel and Robert M. Neal,
Attorney.

Staff Members, Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences: Max Lehrer, Assistant Staff Director; Everard H.
Smith, Jr., Counsel; William J. Deachman, Assistant Counsel;
Dr. Glen P. Wilson, Chief Clerk; and Dr. Earl W. Lindveit,
Assistant Chief Clerk.

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Senator Stennis. The committee will come to order, please. Let's see if we can't have a working arrangement here with our photographers this morning. You know that is one of the things that I have changed my mind on considerably since coming to the Senate.

I realize that the photographers really serve a major part in transmitting the news and operations of our government to the American people. It is a part of the free press, without which I am sure that our form of government could not last very long without a free press and all of its elements. So I am willing to swap time with the photographers but don't want to have it where you are really interfering with the committee, and I am sure you don't want to. But in the enthusiasm sometimes you detract from the witness or from the man who is trying to question the witness.

So after about 5 minutes, if you can settle down below the witness and the Senators, I hope you can do that without being reminded again, and also after the Senate is in session, why these chairs up here are reserved for the Senators.

By working together I believe we can better serve the cause, and that will be the purpose of the chair and I am sure it is yours.

I have a short statement, Members of the Committee and General Twining. Today the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee and the Space Committee will hear General Nathan F. Twining,

bvd 4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following General Twining, we expect to hear from Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates. Because it is the responsibility of Congress to provide the essential enabling legislation for America's security, we have asked the nation's senior military officials to advise us.

The head of each military service and each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already appeared. Today General Twining, we are asking your advice in your capacity as the country's military official, as former chief of staff of the Air Force and as a distinguished citizen.

History proves that nations who do not look to their common defense do not remain long as principal actors on the stage of world affairs.

America today is strong. We must continue to be strong. We must be certain that our defenses are based on sound military requirements, and I think that that is the major question before the world, as General Eisenhower goes to the summit conference. Are we really in actuality strong enough for him to be in a position of strength rather than having a major part of the thoughts of the world thinking, whether we are or not, thinking that we might be secondary.

I believe that that is what the question comes down to.

General Twining, it is the custom of swearing all witnesses. Will you please stand and be sworn?

bd5

Do you solemnly swear that your testimony at this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General Twining. I do.

Senator Stennis. Have a seat. If the members of the committee are ready, we will proceed. Perhaps it will be better if we can to let the General make his statement, which I understand is brief, make it without interruption.

General, proceed.

b36

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL NATHAN F. TWINING

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Twining. Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, I would like to have permission to make a few opening remarks.

I believe I can be of service to the committee in setting forth as clearly as I can my personal views on some of the vital issues that are involved in the current hearing. I realize that there are some honest and sincere men who will not hold the same views that I do. I respect their views, even though I may not agree with them. I have the responsibility as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President of my own view.

These are views formed after careful consideration of all the facts involved in the complex matters which led to the design of our defense posture. In analyzing our posture versus that of an enemy, we utilize the national intelligence of the highest degree of sensitivity. Moreover, to conduct the analysis we undertake war games.

Senator Stennis. Pardon me just a minute. Do you have copies of your statement so we may follow you more closely?

General Twining. No, I'm sorry I don't. This is very short.

In these efforts we established assumptions, crank in

bd7

national intelligence and then engage in the most complex calculations known to professional analysts and strategists. Some of these efforts require months of work on the part of the best brains that this country can muster. I believe in our national intelligence estimates. I am briefed nearly every day of the year regarding the developing intelligence picture worldwide. This daily briefing is standard practice for key officials and officers of the department. We do not wait until the end of the year for one final intelligence briefing and then relate all of our plans and programs to it.

Our planning process is continuous as is our intelligence process. I believe that I know that the military professional is never satisfied with the forces at his command.

Each of us all over the world in all nations would like to have just a little bit more regardless of how much is at hand. I believe that we have enough military strength today to carry out our assigned missions, and I believe that our combined American leadership will see to it that we continue to have enough.

On the basis of all the information available to me, and in view of the mission and locations of our retaliatory weapons systems, I just do not believe that any nation possesses the ability today or in the foreseeable future to attack us or destroy us without receiving unacceptable damage in return.

So long as our armed forces are maintained strong and ready

bd8 and so long as the national will and courage remains vigorous and hardy, we have no reason to fear any human system or threat.

I am not complacent. Yet I am not fearful of the Soviet capability. Thank you.

Senator Stennis. All right, Members of the Committee, we will follow the usual pattern today of calling on counsel and then each Senator for 10 minutes so as to give everyone a chance to ask any questions. On the second time around we will extend the time on the request of any Senator I think.

Mr. Weisl, you may proceed.

Mr. Weisl. General Twining, General Power stated to this committee last week that in March 1959 he sent a request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating his urgent requirements for airborne alert, and I quote his answers to my question briefly:

"Were the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked to approve and fund an airborne alert for SAC?

"General Power. They were.

"Mr. Weisl. When was the request submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

"It was submitted in March of 1959, I believe around the 6th of March.

"Mr. Weisl. That was almost 10 months ago.

"General Power. Yes, sir.

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"Mr. Weisl. Did you receive any reply?"

"General Power. I have not received a reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

How is it possible, General Twining, in these critical times that a request of such urgency has not been replied to for 10 months by the Joint Chiefs who are in command of General Power?

General Twining. His request would naturally go into the normal budget cycle because it requires a considerable amount of money, so it was held until we went through the normal budget cycle and had the discussion with the Chiefs.

That is why the delay. A decision on this whole matter was not made until late this fall.

Mr. Weisl. Wasn't the major --

General Twining. I might say though that of course General Power though he did not get a direct communication from the Joint Chiefs, he knew exactly the status of what was going on all this time through his own Chief of Staff.

Mr. Weisl. Did he learn that through the grapevine or directly from the people who command him ?

General Twining. He probably got it through the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, but he was not informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You are right.

Mr. Weisl. Don't the Joint Chiefs have the responsibility of telling the Commander of SAC who serves under the Joint

bd10

Chiefs?

General Twining. They had not made the decision.

Mr. Weisl. Wasn't the major change in the National Security Act amendment of 1959 removing the secretaries in the Department from the chain of command so there would be direct chain of command between the unified and specified commander and the Joint Chiefs.

General Twining. That is correct, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be the proper people to inform him.

Mr. Weisl. Since this was supposed to streamline the operations, why does it take more than 10 months to answer a letter of such urgency to a Commander of 90% of the free world's retaliatory power.

General Twining. I would like to check the record on it and see what he was told and was not told.

I do not know.

Mr. Weisl. Very well. Will you supply it for the record?

General Twining. I will.

Mr. Weisl. General Taylor says there's no machinery available for the Joint Chiefs to make hard decision, and I quote him briefly: "Nowhere in the machinery of the Government is there a procedure for checking military capability against political commitments or our forces in being against the requirements growing out of the basic national security policy."

Do you agree with that?

bd11

General Twining. No, I do not agree with that entirely, no. That has been taken up before with the Chiefs when General Taylor was here, and there was no real merit to his proposal.

Mr. Weisl. I quote him further: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have failed to agree on the forces needed to support the agreed strategic concept, and hence have not produced the military guidance needed by the military services. The Secretary of Defense has interjected fiscal considerations into midrange strategic planning, and has thus deprived it of much of its potential value."

Do you agree with that?

General Twining. He is right on the forces, and the JSOP, and there has also been a difference of opinion. Otherwise we know what we call the JSOP has always been agreed by the Chief with the exception of the --

Mr. Weisl. Has there ever been a decision made on that subject?

General Twining. No, not on the JSOP. We now have the JSOP for this next go-around in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Weisl. General Twining, could you tell us, do you feel there is a future need for manned bombers?

General Twining. I'm sorry, sir, I missed that.

Mr. Weisl. Do you feel there is a future need for manned

bd12 bombers?

General Twining. Yes, I do.

Mr. Weisl. On the B-70 General White testified that he felt there was an urgent requirement for the development of the B-70 as a weapons system. Can you tell us whether the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body made any decision or recommendations on this?

General Twining. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have discussed this at great length, and the Secretary of Defense knows the opinions the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold in this matter.

Mr. Weisl. Can you tell what those opinions are?

General Twining. No, I don't think I should tell what they are.

Mr. Weisl. Have they made any decision or recommendations?

General Twining. The recommendations were made and they have gone all the way up to the President himself, also through the Defense Department on the way.

Mr. Weisl. Were those decisions unanimous or split?

General Twining. Those decisions were not unanimous.

Mr. Weisl. There has been considerable open testimony, General Twining, about the fact that the development of the B-70 has been downgraded. Do you care to comment on that?

General Twining. Well, yes. I believe that is probably true. It was originally designed as a complete bomber weapons system, and now in this budget, as you know, the B-70 will

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continue as more or less a development project for the airplane and the engines, and not as a bomber system.

Mr. Weisl. Perhaps I might quote some of the testimony taken on the B-70, if you haven't already read it.

General Twining. I have read quite a bit of it, sir, but I will be glad to hear it.

Mr. Weisl. Senator Cannon asked this question: "Now in connection with the B-70 program, was the B-70 scheduled to come into the inventory at the time the B-52 became obsolescent?"

"General Power. Yes, it was timed. Whether this was by design or accident, but it was timed to come in just about the time of the first B-52 becoming obsolescent.

"Senator Cannon. And if the B-70 program is delayed as it is now proposed, will the B-52 in the inventory be comparably as obsolescent as the B-47s are today?"

"General Power. Yes, to the same extent. There is a rule of thumb in bombardment, and I think it still holds, that 7 years you approach obsolescence, 10 years obsolete."

Do you agree with that?

General Twining. I think that is correct, yes. I agree with that.

Mr. Weisl. Then under the present plan will the B-70 possibly be in operation when the B-52 becomes obsolescent?

General Twining. Well, if we proceeded on the B-70

bdl4 program full speed ahead we wouldn't get it I would say until about '67.

Mr. Weisl. Then by that time the B-52 will be obsolete.

General Twining. It will be on the way out, that is right, sir.

Mr. Weisl. What are your personal views as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on the B-70?

General Twining. Well, I think if you go back a little bit on the whole bomber, I think that we aren't quite sure how much the ICBMs will take over the role from the bomber. We certainly know that the bombers will go down in numbers as the ICBMs become perfected. But how much and to what numerical numbers the ICBM will replace the bombers we don't know for sure.

But I am convinced that we will have bombers all the way through this period we are talking, '67, '68 and maybe beyond, and the bomber will still be a useful weapons system in the inventory, regardless of how good the ICBMs may get.

Mr. Weisl. Doesn't that depend on how quickly or at what time a potential enemy will decide to make war on us?

General Twining. That would have some bearing on it, and I certainly believe that at that period, '67 and '68 if the bomber is still a useful weapons system, we would be much better off with a more advanced bomber like the B-70.

Mr. Weisl. What bombers will we have?

bd15

General Twining. None.

Mr. Weisl. If we don't have the B-70.

General Twining. The B-70 is the only one.

Mr. Weisl. What are your personal views on airborne alert, General Twining?

General Twining. My personal views are that the airborne alert capability is what we must go for.

I think that what is in the budget this year will take care of it. I do not advocate an allout airborne alert but I do think we should have this capability and use it when we want it and when we think we need it, and change it from day to day and time to time so the enemy knows we have this capability.

He doesn't know when we are using it, and I think it is just about as much of a threat to him then in his planning, it makes it difficult for him as if we used it 100% in every 24 hours a day, which I do not believe in.

Mr. Weisl. But General Twining, in order to have it when we need it, we have to do certain things now, don't we?

General Twining. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. And are we doing those things now in order to have it in the force that General Power and General White recommend?

General Twining. I think we are doing, pushing for what we need to get the airborne capability, not the airborne

bd16 alert that General Power wants.

Mr. Weisl. Or that General White wants.

General Twining. That is correct.

Mr. Weisl. Did you make your views known to the General, to General White?

General Twining. Yes, on many occasions.

Mr. Weisl. Did you advise General White that you agreed with his views but that the budget didn't provide for the money that he wanted and if he wanted to put his views on airborne alert into effect, he would have to take it out of his Air Force budget?

General Twining. I don't recall that. That might be the way that it would happen though.

Mr. Weisl. May we ask what did you advise General White?

General Twining. I advised General White that I thought that the airborne alert capability was essential and was sufficient, not the whole airborne alert operation as General Power wanted it.

Mr. Weisl. Or that General White wanted.

General Twining. That's right. I am not just sure what General White does want. I didn't see his testimony.

Mr. Weisl. His testimony was that he supported General Power in the --

General Twining. Permanent airborne alert?

Mr. Weisl. In the airborne alert that General Power

bd17

recommended. I don't want to state the percentages, because that was in closed session.

General Twining. I certainly never recommended that to him.

Mr. Weisl. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body make any decisions or recommendations on General Power's urgent request for airborne alert?

General Twining. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. What was their decision?

General Twining. There was a difference of view there again, but none of them I can say went along wholeheartedly with General Power's recommendation.

Mr. Weisl. What were the differences? I mean you understand General Twining, anything you feel you shouldn't answer--

General Twining. I feel that those Generals testifying should say how they feel. I can tell you what I recommended and I have told you, and they didn't agree with General Power, but I don't think I want to say any more on that because they might have said something up here since I have seen them that I don't know about. I don't know, but I think you ought to get it from them, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Then really there was no decision made.

General Twining. There was certainly a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. He knew exactly how the Chiefs felt about it.

bd18

Mr. Weisl. And what were those recommendations?

General Twining. I think you ought to get those from the Chiefs. I gave them mine. I gave you mine, I mean.

Mr. Weisl. Does the budget incorporate your recommendations?

General Twining. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. Does the budget incorporate -- that incorporates your recommendation.

General Twining. I think the budget does. If the figures are correct there they have got enough money for what I feel they should do, the on the shelf capability is what they call it, I think that is a very good plan and very essential and badly needed.

Mr. Weisl. General Twining, if you are concerned that we will need the B-70s to replace the B-52 when it becomes obsolete, why did you advocate delay in the development of the B-70 as a weapons system?

General Twining. I made the recommendations on the B-70 and General White made them and our recommendations were considered at the proper source, and the decision was made to do otherwise as was specified in the budget.

I certainly go along with that. I would like to see possibly a little bit more, but I do go along with this. The project is still alive and we can look at it this year. It is a very, very expensive project as you know. There are

bd19

many unknowns in the project, and maybe as we go down the road this year we can find out more about it and make a more careful analysis and judgment later.

Mr. Weisl. Were your recommendations overruled?

General Twining. They were not all considered, no.

Mr. Weisl. Your recommendations were not all considered?

General Twining. No.

Mr. Weisl. What do you mean by that?

General Twining. They were listened to. I had the chance to make my speech and I made it and the result was what you see in the budget today.

Mr. Weisl. To whom did you make your speech?

General Twining. How is that?

Mr. Weisl. To whom did you make your speech?

General Twining. I made it several places.

Mr. Weisl. Sir?

General Twining. The Secretary of Defense basically and the Chiefs.

Mr. Weisl. And your speech or your requirement--

General Twining. My recommendation.

Mr. Weisl. Your recommendation was not granted?

General Twining. Not 100%, no.

Mr. Weisl. Can you tell this committee what your recommendations were?

General Twining. I don't think I had better do that, no,

bd20

sir, Mr. Weisl.

I would rather not do that.

Mr. Weisl. You would rather do that in closed session?

General Twining. That is right.

Mr. Weisl. May I call your attention to General White's testimony on that question, and I quote:

"At some point in the proceedings as Chief of Staff of the Air Force I entered a paper into the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting that an airborne alert of the magnitude requested by General Power be implemented."

Do you recall that?

General Twining. He never told me he was going to do that but that is fine. That is his recommendation.

Mr. Weisl. He said he entered a paper into the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting that an airborne alert of the magnitude requested by General Power be implemented.

General Twining. I would like to see which one that is, sir, which airborne alert he is talking about. We have had quite a lot of discussion.

Mr. Weisl. He said of the magnitude requested by General Power.

General Twining. I am reminded that was General Power's full airborne alert, one-quarter of the force on 24 hour alert, and General White did back that.

Mr. Weisl. What was the action taken on that paper

bd21

submitted to the Joint Chiefs by General White backing up General Power?

General Twining. It was considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was quite a little discussion about it, and as I said, the Secretary of Defense was informed of the Chief's views on airborne alert. He knew how they all stood on it.

Mr. Weisl. And you don't care to tell us how they stood on any one?

General Twining. No, sir. And this was studied a great deal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was a pretty serious study.

Mr. Weisl. Now may I ask you, General Twining, did the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body make any decisions or recommendations of what should be done about the Nike-Zeus program in the 1961 budget?

General Twining. Yes. We did make a recommendation on Nike-Zeus.

Mr. Weisl. What was that recommendation?

General Twining. The overall recommendation, and there was a difference of opinion again.

Mr. Weisl. What?

General Twining. A difference of opinion, one dissenter, was not to go into production this year with the Nike-Zeus, to carry it on as a high priority, top priority research program, and do as much as they could on it, but not to go into

b22 production, not to authorize any pre-production of it.

I think there was one dissenter of the Chiefs in this vote.

Mr. Weisl. There was one dissenter.

General Twining. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. And that was the dissent I take it of those who had the responsibility of using the Nike-Zeus.

General Twining. That's right.

Mr. Weisl. There was appropriated by the Congress 137 million for the development of pre-production parts for the Nike-Zeus system in the event there was a breakthrough.

That appropriation was never used and has not been used to this day. Has that issue come up before the Joint Chiefs?

General Twining. No, sir. We have not gone into that issue at all. That would be a matter for the Secretary of Defense, and I think for Secretary Brucker to work out how to handle it. I think the Secretary of Defense is prepared to talk about that.

Mr. Weisl. Wasn't that an important matter for the Joint Chiefs to consider?

General Twining. Not necessarily.

Mr. Weisl. Why not?

General Twining. Because they did not go into the production fund and it is up to the Army then to handle that themselves with the Secretary of Defense.

bd23

Mr. Weisl. Where does the Secretary get his military advice as to whether a certain fund appropriated by the Congress should or should not be used to make a military weapons system?

General Twining. We recommended no preproduction from the Chiefs as the majority view, no preproduction, and the money that Congress voted, and that is up to the Secretary of Defense I guess in the budget what to do with that money. We have nothing to do with holding up the money or spending it. It is up to the Secretary of Defense, because he gives it to the services, not to the Chiefs.

Mr. Weisl. In other words, then the majority view was that it should be released if it referred to preproduction use.

General Twining. No. Referring to preproduction funds the majority view was not to go into the preproduction.

Mr. Weisl. What was the majority view? I thought the majority view was to go into research and development.

General Twining. Research and development, that is correct.

Mr. Weisl. Which involves preproduction, doesn't it?

General Twining. No, no, no, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Don't you develop a program before you go into production?

General Twining. Well, the way we looked at it, and it was

bd24

thoroughly understood that we would not set up advance procurement items to prepare for production, but to go ahead purely on an R&D program, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Suppose that a breakthrough took place where the Nike-Zeus team was ready for production, and the \$137 million that the Congress appropriated for components to be ready in the event production was ready, what would happen then?

General Twining. Well, I think they ought to go ahead and use it right away. That is what the Secretary has said. I would like to bring that up right now. I have been here with him for two straight years now before the committees, and he has said that all these programs like Nike-Zeus, Polaris, Minuteman, that the minute that we make any breakthroughs and see a chance to spend more money intelligently we are going to come right over to the Congress regardless of what time of the year it is and ask you for the money, and he has said that repeatedly, and that would apply to this money you are talking about.

Mr. Weisl. But in this respect you did not have to go to Congress to ask for the money. The Congress already appropriated the money, and the purpose of it was to be ready in case there was a breakthrough not to have any year or more delay in the production of the weapon system, and that money was not used.

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General Twining. That's right, because it had not gone far enough to use. They had ~~not~~ made the proper advance to warrant spending the money.

Mr. Weisl. Why do you suppose Congress was requested to appropriate that money if they didn't need it? Didn't the Department of Defense urge Congress to make the \$137 million available last year?

General Twining. I don't think the Department of Defense did. I am not sure about that, sir.

The Army probably asked for it, I don't know.

Mr. Weisl. The Secretary of Defense sent a letter to the Senate requesting that this \$137 million be appropriated, that there was a need for it, and the Congress appropriated it, and the question I am asking you, why that money wasn't used, in view of the recommendation of the Secretary that it was needed, and that was the reason it was appropriated.

General Twining. Sir, I am not prepared to answer that. You will have to ask Secretary Gates about that.

Mr. Weisl. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body make any decision or recommendation on accelerating the Polaris program in the fiscal year 1961?

General Twining. The Chiefs of Staff did not make that recommendation. I think that came from the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Weisl. In your statements you and Secretary Gates laid

bd26 great stress on the importance of the Polaris program as a retaliatory force. Don't you think that a matter of that kind should have some use from the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General Twining. Well, here again, sir, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have gone into the Polaris on many occasions, but this particular recommendation, they agreed with the size of this program, the Chiefs did. But it didn't instigate in the Chiefs of Staff as I recall. That is a program that came from the Navy through the Secretary of Defense. The Chiefs were asked about it and they went along with this program that was given by the Secretary.

Mr. Weisl. What I am asking you is whether the Joint Chiefs made any decision on the acceleration of the Polaris program as recommended and appropriated for by the Congress?

General Twining. Those are Secretary of Defense matters.

Mr. Weisl. Who advises the Secretary since he is a civilian?

General Twining. We advise him.

Mr. Weisl. What did you advise him on the acceleration of the Polaris program?

General Twining. On what is in the budget now?

Mr. Weisl. No, the acceleration provided for by the Congress. The Congress appropriated more money for the acceleration and for the production of more nuclear submarines than the program provides for.

General Twining. We were not consulted on that.

bd27

Mr. Weisl. That was in the 1959 budget?

General Twining. We were not, the Chiefs as a group were not consulted on that. Up there again that is up to the Secretary of Defense what they do with those funds.

Mr. Weisl. Did you make any recommendation on that subject?

General Twining. No.

Mr. Weisl. Isn't that one of our -- at least it was testified to as being one of our chief retaliatory forces, and yet you say the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are the only military advisers that the Secretary of Defense has, made no recommendation on that.

General Twining. The Chiefs of Staff were satisfied with the program as submitted, and went along with it, not the accelerated program that you are talking about.

Mr. Weisl. Then the Joint Chiefs opposed the acceleration of the program, is that correct?

General Twining. Well, they certainly did not recommend to go ahead with it.

Mr. Weisl. Did you make any recommendation?

General Twining. We went along with the program as put in the budget, as presented by the budget.

Mr. Weisl. Did you go along with the program as put in the budget after the budget was made or before the budget was made?

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General Twining. Before the budget was made.

Mr. Weisl. What was your recommendation?

General Twining. I forget now what the recommendation was.

It was a 3 submarine increase I believe.

Mr. Weisl. Did you have any personal view that you gave?

General Twining. Yes, I did. I thought it was about the right program, 3 submarines a year as I recall.

Mr. Weisl. In other words, you disagreed with the recommendation of the Congress and the appropriation of the money for an accelerated Polaris program?

General Twining. I was never asked that question.

Mr. Weisl. Well, what are your personal views on that?

General Twining. My personal views are we should go along just about like we are, until we find out more about Polaris. I think it is a good program.

Mr. Weisl. Won't it be too late when you find out about Polaris? Isn't there a lead time involved? Doesn't it take a year or two years of pre-planning in order to get a submarine?

General Twining. What do you mean? I don't understand what you mean by being too late.

Mr. Weisl. I mean you can't make up the time that you lost by not making preparations for the production of more Polaris submarines by making up your mind tomorrow or the next day.

bd29

General Twining. Certainly the sooner you make up your mind to buy something the sooner you are going to get it.

Mr. Weisl. Then I take it as your opinion that you did not agree with the recommendation of the Chief in charge of Naval Operations, you did not agree with the appropriation for the acceleration of the Polaris program by the Congress. You did not agree with that.

General Twining. I wasn't asked that question, but I still wouldn't agree with it if I was. That is what I mean.

Mr. Weisl. Who was asked that question? How does the Secretary --

General Twining. I guess the Secretary of Defense decided.

Mr. Weisl. I know, but how does the Secretary of Defense a civilian, make a military decision without military advice?

General Twining. Well, I think you had better ask him about that.

Mr. Weisl. Well, we will, but you didn't give him that advice.

General Twining. I was not asked about that particular problem.

Mr. Weisl. Neither as far as you know were the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body.

General Twining. No, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff make any decision on incorporating the Polaris on surface ships?

bd30

General Twining. Not yet.

Mr. Weisl. Have they been asked about that?

General Twining. I don't recall it was Polaris, but we had one project some time ago of putting other weapons systems on surface ships, and I think the Chiefs did not go along with that project at the time.

Mr. Weisl. Then the Joint Chiefs were opposed to the project of incorporating the Polaris on surface ships.

General Twining. Yes, I recall that is correct.

Mr. Weisl. That is the decision?

General Twining. That is right.

Mr. Weisl. Do you agree with that decision?

General Twining. I still do, right as of the moment, very vulnerable.

Mr. Weisl. And Admiral Burke testified that unless that decision is made now, that there will be a considerable delay in bringing that decision into fruition if at a later time the Joint Chiefs change their mind. Do you agree with that?

General Twining. I do, I agree with it, yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Admiral Burke testified yesterday that the Navy never had an opportunity to present its military requirements to the Secretary of Defense because the Navy had to stay within the established budget guidelines. What function do the Joint Chiefs perform if military requirements are not considered when the budget is determined?

bd31

General Twining. Well, I don't see why if Admiral Burke had a set of requirements he could not present them to the Secretary of Defense. He certainly presents them to his own Secretary.

Mr. Weisl. He testified that because the guidelines limited him as to the amount that he could ask for, and since his minimum requirements were more than the guidelines provided, he was in no position to ask for those military requirements.

General Twining. The Secretary of Defense had what he called reclama meetings with the service secretaries and the service chiefs of staff and they could present any problem to him they wanted to present at that time, requirements or anything else, and I think Mr. Weisl there is another thing that you should ask the Secretary.

Mr. Weisl. May I ask this question, General Twining. What good is it to present requirements when the guidelines prevent those requirements from being acted upon?

General Twining. You can still present the requirements. If you have got a strong enough case I think the guidelines would have to give.

Mr. Weisl. May I read to you the testimony given by Admiral Burke briefly:

"Mr. Weisl. You have given us several examples in which the Navy did not ask for the funds it required because of budgetary guidelines. Did you ever submit to the Secretary of Defense

bd32

your military requirements for 1961?

"Admiral Burke. As I explained before, we had a directive to submit our budgetary request for '61 in two amounts.

One was the basic budget and one was the basic and add-on, and we followed our directive.

"Mr. Weisl. Then you did not submit your requirements?

"Admiral Burke. Not as it had been conceived heretofore, no, sir."

General Twining. Well, I think what Admiral Burke said was correct, but still that doesn't mean to say that he was not listened to or his Secretary was not listened to, if they had requirements other than were listed in that program.

Mr. Weisl. I understand that the Secretary and all of you have freedom of speech in this country, but since the guideline or the budget says you cannot ask for more than this amount, it doesn't do any good to present a requirement exceeding that amount no matter how urgently the man in charge of that responsibility needs it, is that correct?

General Twining. That is right. Of course, I do want to make clear that the Secretary of Defense is fully aware of the requirements of all the services, that he is not in ignorance on this. He knows. He is the one that has to judge, and he knows what the service requirements are. There is no mystery about that.

Senator Case. Mr. Chairman?

bd33

Senator Stennis. All right, Senator Case.

Senator Case. If Mr. Weisl might not get from the Chief of Staff the definition of add-on.

Mr. Weisl. Will you give us the definition of add-on?

General Twining. I think this is purely a matter of the Secretary of Defense, and I wouldn't mind defining it, but if I define it, I am getting into his sphere, the way this budget was handled, and I personally was absent during this period when this was going on, and I understand just how it was done and all that, but it was a way of managing this budget.

They were given objectives, and I think it would be much better, Mr. Weisl, if you would let Mr. Gates explain that to you.

It is really in his ballpark.

Mr. Weisl. Were you represented at that time?

General Twining. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. By whom?

General Twining. Probably Admiral Burke. He was the senior.

Mr. Weisl. You were represented by Admiral Burke?

General Twining. Admiral Radford came in. I was absent for several months.

Mr. Weisl. In connection with the formulation -- may I say, Senator Case, we will try to get you that information,

bd34 what add on means -- in connection with the formulation of the 1961 budget, did the Joint Chiefs make any determination of exactly how much and what types of strategic deterrent and retaliatory forces we need now and for the next several years?

General Twining. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not get down to specifics on that. This is a matter that is discussed all the time with the Chiefs, all these force levels intermittently through the year are discussed. It isn't just budget time, like carrier programs, B-52 programs, they come out all the time for discussion. They see the programs, they know exactly what each service has in the way of programs.

They know exactly what SAC consists of, which is the basic retaliatory organization, and they don't want to change, they might think it is a little big but they have not recommended we cut it down.

Mr. Weisl. General Taylor testified and I think you are familiar with his views, that no one determines what the overall need is.

He says that a certain budget is fixed, and then the Army gets a certain part, the Navy gets a certain part, the Air Force gets a certain part, the Marines get a certain part, but there is no determination of how much is enough for the overall defense of the United States.

General Twining. That is one of the very difficult

bd35

problems. People have very strong opinions about forces, how big they should be and what should comprise them, what type they should be.

That is one of the most difficult things we have to contend with in the military.

Mr. Weisl. I know it is.

General Twining. Very difficult.

Mr. Weisl. Don't you believe that someone should make a decision of what overall forces we need before we decide how much the Navy should get, how much the Army should get and how much the Air Force?

Don't weapons systems, in other words, today in modern warfare cross service lines?

General Twining. That is right.

Mr. Weisl. So that someone ought to make a decision what overall requirements there are before deciding?

General Twining. I think the Secretary of Defense will explain to you when he comes up here, and I don't want to be taking words out of his mouth on this, but this year I think really for the first time we concentrated in this budget more on programs without worrying about the ultimate end cost of the budget or the service budget, but worked on programs, what programs were necessary, weapons systems were necessary for the defense of this country, and we stayed with this weapons system discussion for days over there, regardless of

bd36

costs or anything else, to find out which ones we must have, which ones should go on to research and so forth.

Mr. Weisl. But the Joint Chiefs were decided on all of those subjects.

General Twining. No, they aren't divided on all, but they have their strong opinions. They naturally want their own weapons systems in, and that is the thing, that is the great debate of course.

Mr. Weisl. There was no firm recommendation, no unanimity on the Polaris, on the B-70, on airborne alert.

General Twining. Well, when the final thing was decided on what amount of money would be spent on Polaris in this year, how big the program would be, everybody went along with it.

There is no objection by the Chiefs on it. I think Admiral Burke would like to have had a few more but he went along with the three submarines plus the lead time for more out in the distance.

Mr. Weisl. He had to go along, didn't he? He had no choice.

General Twining. He presented his case and I think it was a pretty good decision myself.

Mr. Weisl. Well, now, if he presents his case, and the Joint Chiefs don't make a decision, what good is the presentation of the case?

bd37

General Twining. He presented his case but the Joint Chiefs didn't agree with him. Another one of those split decisions. The Secretary gets this for advice. Sometimes it isn't too formalized, but he calls us in and says "What do you think about this", we are all there and we state our views and he has got them. That is the kind of advice we give the Secretary of Defense. We do that quite frequently and we don't make a formal paper lots of times on these things.

Mr. Weisl. You agree that up to this year there has been no overall planning.

General Twining. I wouldn't say there hasn't been overall planning but I say it can be improved and it is the toughest problem we have, Mr. Weisl.

It can be improved.

Mr. Weisl. Thank you. Did you want to say anything further?

General Twining. He brought up a point about the Chiefs and our split decision. I will explain now what it means. I can tell you that since I have been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we have passed on over 2300 papers, and of those 2300, over 2300 papers we passed on, 34 were split decisions, that that is about a 1.5% roughly and I think that is pretty good business.

Mr. Weisl. Well, yes.

General Twining. Of course those were major decisions, I

bd38

must say.

Mr. Weisl. Yes, but the 2300 things that you passed on didn't concern the vital questions like the B-70, the airborne alert, the Polaris program, the acceleration of the Atlas program and so forth. Those were the important things, weren't they?

General Twining. They were quite basic.

Mr. Weisl. And that is where the splits were.

General Twining. Some of them were basic, that is right. Those are the ones.

Mr. Weisl. The modernization of the Army, the modernization of the Navy. That is where the splits occurred.

General Twining. I don't think it is a split on modernization of the Army. It is just a question of priority of funds, getting the money for it. I think we all realize that the Army should be modernized.

Mr. Weisl. The recommendation as to the speed of the modernization was denied to the Army, the recommendation of the Chief of Staff of both General Taylor and General Lemnitzer as to the requirements for speed of modernization was denied.

General Twining. Well, the speed, the rate may be.

Mr. Weisl. The rate?

General Twining. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Now may we go to another subject, General Twining?

bd39

Secretary Gates testified before the Subcommittee of the committee --

Senator Stennis. Pardon me just a minute, Mr. Counsel, you are running overtime but I think this has been very, very illuminating testimony.

I will yield to you five minutes of my time if you will proceed now and you can round off your questioning in five minutes, please.

Mr. Weisl. Secretary Gates testified, and I quote:

"There was a significant matter brought up by Mr. Dulles, and it was brought out by General Twining. Heretofore we have been giving you intelligence figures that dealt with the theoretical Soviet capability. This is the first time that we have had an intelligence estimate that says "This is what the Soviet Union probably will do".

Therefore the great divergence based on figures that have been testified to in years past narrows because we talked before about a different set of comparisons, ones that were based on Soviet capabilities. The present one is an intelligence estimate on what we believe he probably will do, not what he is capable of doing.

"Mr. Mahon. That is what you are doing this year?

"Secretary Gates. Yes, it is a very significant change."

Now then, on the same subject within a few days you stated

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as follows:

"On the basis of my own personal knowledge of the national intelligence estimate for this year, I can inform this committee that there was nothing new introduced in the principles followed."

How do you reconcile these two statements?

Secretary Gates saying there was a significant change and you are saying that on your personal knowledge of the national intelligence estimate, "I can inform this committee there was nothing new introduced in the principles followed"?

General Twining. I don't want to confuse these problems any more than they, but what I would like to say is that he was referring to a specific item, and what I was saying was intelligence has not been changed, the way we put out intelligence, make it up and distribute it has not been changed.

Now what happened? Every single good intelligence man wants to give the military planner the most accurate information he can about the enemy, so he gives him the best he can, and that degree of help is how much input he has into his intelligence.

Now we had very little information on the ICBM program of the Russians, for example.

I don't want to get into security, but I want to say this:

bd41

The intelligence thing has not been changed at all.

This year we had more evidence, more specific evidence in which we can refine our judgment on what the Russians have.

Last year we didn't have that much information, that is all. We have more specific evidence this year. We formed a deduction on how many missiles he is going to have or express a judgment, a course of action he might take, that is the point.

Mr. Weisl. If that statement is correct, has the intelligence ^{statement} ~~statement~~ narrowed the difference without going into numbers?

Let us be specific; what did you say? I didn't hear your answer.

General Twining. I think that is a question we ought to thrash it out and I don't want to start it here if we can't finish it.

Mr. Weisl. The statement was made in public by the Secretary.

General Twining. I agree with his statement. That is as much as I will say here. I will agree with his statement.

Mr. Weisl. That the number was narrowed.

General Twining. I agree with his statement.

Mr. Weisl. And I quote the statement made by the Secretary:

"This new intelligence estimate has narrowed the differences." Do you agree with that?

bd42

General Twining. Yes, in a particular field.

Mr. Weisl. Let us be specific without going into numbers. Let us compare the current estimates without going into numbers of Soviet ICBMs on launchers with those of last year in mid-60?

General Twining. We had no estimates on launcher last year.

Mr. Weisl. What about mid-60 of this year?

General Twining. I have got to get them.

Mr. Weisl. Would you say under oath that it is narrowed?

General Twining. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. You say that under oath?

General Twining. From the intelligence we have. Now you may have some special intelligence that I don't know about. I am stating this compared to the intelligence we had last year and that I personally gave these committees and the intelligence we have this year that I personally gave the committees, it has been narrowed.

Mr. Weisl. For missiles on launchers.

General Twining. For ICBMs.

Mr. Weisl. ICBMs for missiles on launchers.

General Twining. As I said before, last year we did not list missiles on launchers in my intelligence.

Mr. Weisl. Isn't that the significant thing?

General Twining. It is, but we didn't know it. We didn't

bd43

have it.

Mr. Weisl. We did have them last year and we had them this year, unless you get different briefings from the CIA than this committee got.

General Twining. I have my charts of last year. I have them all, and I gave no figures on launchers last year, and I had one set of figures, and this year we have the same.

Mr. Weisl. You say the same thing about '61, that it is narrowed?

General Twining. As I said, I am getting in a bad spot here because you can't air this out without putting charts out and the whole business.

Mr. Weisl. Yes, I know.

General Twining. And I don't like to discuss it.

Mr. Weisl. The Secretary has testified publicly that it has narrowed. We have heard evidence also from the CIA.

General Twining. All right, and he meant that, and he will show you when he comes up here in executive session, he will have to show it in executive session, what these charts are.

You can show what you have got and let's straighten this thing out. I am very anxious to get it straightened out. I don't think we can do it here.

Mr. Weisl. How are we to learn about it? The public have been told that its narrowed. We have received evidence from the

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CIA in closed session. I am not asking you to give numbers, but I am asking you whether there has been any intelligence estimate that indicates that the relative position of missiles on launchers by the Soviet Union and ourselves has narrowed from last year.

General Twining. We didn't have an estimate on launchers last year, and it is just very difficult to explain it without getting into security problem. I would like to straighten it out I assure you.

Mr. Weisl. You would like to straighten it out?

General Twining. Yes, but not here. The Secretaty is also prepared to do this.

Mr. Weisl. I can tell you that we did get those figures *for* last year and this year.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, will counsel yield for a question?

Mr. Weisl. Certainly.

Senator Symington. Did you see before you came before this committee on the 19th of January that you know of the new Central Intelligence Agency estimates of what the Soviets had on launchers?

General Twining. I think we have the list.

Senator Symington. On the 19th of January. Are you saying that on the 29th of January that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency did not estimate that they had

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more of these missiles on launchers this year than last year for mid-1960, mid-1961 and mid-1962? This could be answered by your assistant because he sat here when Mr. Dulles gave us the testimony.

General Twining. Last year there was no CIA estimate of on-launcher.

Senator Symington. I didn't say that. I said when you came before the Committee on January 19, 1960, did you know the Central Intelligence estimates of what was on launchers last year and now what was on launchers this year?

General Twining. I didn't know what was on launcher last year, no.

Senator Symington. That was the evidence that was presented to us by the Director of Central Intelligence this year, on January 29.

General Twining. We have never had that in the Defense Department.

Senator Symington. You mean the information that the Director of the CIA gave this committee has never been in the Defense Department?

General Twining. I know the chart you refer to, Senator, but we didn't have it until this thing broke. We didn't know about it.

Senator Symington. I just want to be sure in your interest that what you are stating is then that the information that was

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given us on the 29th of January as to what were on launchers estimated for last year that you did not know about in the Department of Defense; is that correct?

General Twining. As to on launcher last year, the answer is no, I did not know.

Senator Symington. Do you have a representative on the national intelligence agency board?

General Twining. Yes.

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. All right, this is a special situation. You have used up the chair's time too, which is all right. There is one more question.

General Twining. I think it is very important that this be straightened out and we can't straighten it out here. That is my point. That is all I have got to say.

Mr. Weisl. I don't want to ask a question. I just want Captain Gray to look at his own handwriting showing his attendance at the session when Mr. Dulles briefed this Committee and then advise General Twining.

Captain Gray. With the Chair's permission I will do this.

Senator Stennis. All right, we will proceed in the regular order, gentlemen. We will come back to that, gentlemen; as I say, counsel was permitted to go over considerably in his time but it was an important matter.

Senator Saltonstall?

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, I have just come in

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and I prefer to hold my questions until later. I simply want to make this observation, that I think that some of this secret information that was given to us in the most secret sections has been leaked to the newspapers and questions have been asked, I have just heard questions asked of General Twining, who said that he did not want to answer them in open session, and then there was persistence. I think that is very wrong. I hope that General Twining in open session will stand on his rights and not give away any military secrets or make any statement that he thinks is derogatory to the security of the United States.

I will support him and I am confident every member of this committee will support him, and in executive session he can make what statements he believes.

But I resent tremendously the security that has been leaked to the newspapers in recent weeks, and which I think is dangerous to our country, and is derogatory to our military officials.

Senator Stennis. The Chair was following those questions very closely indeed, and it is very clear to the Chair that Counsel was not trying to require the witness to disclose figures. In fact, counsel insisted that he was not calling for figures all the time. I think General Twining -- may I have your attention, gentlemen?

I don't know how far this is going. I think the General

bd48

had a good point too, being careful that he not disclose these figures, and he handled himself very well indeed.

At the same time it is of concern to the committee about whether or not the Chiefs of Staff have the full figures before them and whether or not the correct figures have been given here. The acting chairman has no sympathy whatsoever with disclosing figures anywhere near the borderline of security and he thinks we overdo it.

I don't know where those figures come from. I used to think that maybe some members of the committee or the staff might give them out, but I have changed my mind. I don't believe they come from those sources. I mean I never did accuse any individual, but we come in here and have these briefings, and then a few days later what purports to be the figures show up in the paper and I can't understand it. I don't know where it comes from but I think the General has made his points well, and at the same time it is my impression that counsel was certainly within the limits of the examination.

If the committee wants to go into executive session, why I will be certainly glad to.

Senator Saltonstall. I appreciate that.

Senator Stennis. The Chair will not rule that he has to disclose anything that he doesn't want to in open session.

Senator Symington.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I too regret very much

bvd 49 as the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts does that figures have been given to the newspaper, and I would hope -- I am sure that everybody else regrets that very much.

I have seen four lists of figures by four different people. All those lists were wrong, as against what is given this committee. In general they underrate the Soviet capacity, those lists and they overrate our own. I too am very sorry that they have been given.

General Twining, I have here a statement. General Maxwell D. Taylor, retired Chief of Staff of the Army, told the Senate hearing this week that the Chiefs of Staff instead of being able to consider free world needs, have been frozen in their thinking by fixed budget percentages of the defense dollar made available to each of the Services.

Do you agree to that?

General Twining. Not entirely. The budgets have been, as we all know, they have been fairly rigid percentagewise to the various services because of the missions the services had, the expense of equipment and all that. But I don't think it is completely stereotyped. He may have a point, sure, yes.

Senator Symington. Another statement has been made.

In the past two or three years the Service Chiefs have been authorized to include a list of what they consider most essential for their weapons, at a cost not to exceed half a

bd50 billion dollars as a possible addition. This has given them a chance to list projects they consider essential that cannot be undertaken within the present budgetary limitations.

Is that correct?

General Twining. We had one exercise where something like that was done, yes.

Senator Symington. These presentations have been ineffective in the main, is that correct?

General Twining. I wouldn't say that, no, sir.

Senator Symington. Then the statement continues:

"The speed up of the Atlas Intercontinental program during the past two years was denied, although production could have been doubled."

Is that correct?

General Twining. Production could have been greater than it was, there is no question about that, yes.

Senator Symington. "This would have lessened the Soviet advantage in the missile gap during the critical next few years."

General Twining. We could have had more missiles.

Senator Symington. Thank you, General. The statement then is made: "The reasons were budgetary, a desire to wait for the as yet undeveloped and much cheaper solid propellant Minuteman Intercontinental Missile.

"Today it is claimed that since the lead time on the Atlas

bd51 not for missiles but for preparation of sites and training of crews is 2 years and the Minuteman should be available by mid-1963 there is no need now to increase Atlas production.

This evades the fact that the Minuteman is yet to be perfected and that the expected date of readiness is only a hope." Is that correct?

General Twining. I think that is true. I think General Schriever testified to that.

Senator Symington. Now last May 20th, "Asked about his recommendations on the B-70 bomber it was stated 'We questioned the use of a new bomber when we and presumably our enemy would have converted to principally a missile capability. We questioned whether by the time the B-70 could be developed, we would be preparing for the kind of warfare that it would be capable of carrying on.'"

Inasmuch as that statement was made by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget last May 20, doesn't that imply that the decision was a budgetary decision on the B-70?

General Twining. No, sir, I don't think so because we were discussin the B-70 right up to the close of budget time.

Senator Symington. Then the statement is made: "From the Air Force point of view, the United States may never know where all the targets for strategic attack are, and missiles cannot be shot at those targets that are not known. But a bomber capable of evading hostile defenses can find hidden

bd52 targets such as missile launching sites and destroy them.

The Air Force is convinced of the continued need therefore for a small number of bombers, but for bombers of much greater performance than the present subsonic craft that can penetrate the formidable modern air defenses."

Would you agree with that?

General Twining. I think that statement has a lot of merit.

Senator Symington. Then it is stated: "The Air Force tried to keep the B-70 program alive first by reducing the amount spent on the B-58 program and then by eliminating entirely the F-108, the new supersonic long-range fighter, but these savings failed to save the B-70."

Would you agree with that?

General Twining. Well, I agree with the first part, and I still don't think the B-70 is lost.

Senator Symington. You said that it took until 1967 to get it if we went full speed ahead?

General Twining. I think that is pretty close.

Senator Symington. And previous testimony is 1965. Which do you think is the right one?

General Twining. I hope 1965, but my experience has been it generally takes a little longer than you think.

Senator Symington. That is pretty much true for all these weapons, isn't it?

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General Twining. That is right.

Senator Symington. And if we delay now further, why then it will be just that much farther probably based on the cycle just that much more obsolete, will it not?

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Symington. Or obsolescent.

General Twining. I do want you to understand that all these points were presented strongly by the Air Force, and they had a good hearing, and the people had a lot of problems besides purely defense, and the Air Force business felt maybe we should go a little slower, I just want you to understand that.

Senator Symington. Was that the reason that you opposed General White's position?

General Twining. On the B-70?

Senator Symington. Yes, sir.

General Twining. I never opposed his position on the G-70.

Senator Symington. Captain, will you come here please, Captain Gray?

Senator Jackson asked a question.

General Twining. Well, it depends at what stage of the proceedings you are talking here now. Initially of course, I would be for it 100%, but when all things came out --

Senator Symington. Were you for it for military reasons?

General Twining. Yes.

d54

Senator Symington. Then you supported it? It is not going ahead. You couldn't have had any other reason but budgetary reasons, could you?

General Twining. It is a very expensive weapons system. There are a lot of unknowns in it. I hate to see the delay in it certainly, but I think it is probably pretty good to take a look at it this year.

Senator Symington. Can we say then that you did feel because of its cost after it was turned down that you had to differ with General White, and therefore oppose it as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? Isn't that a fair statement?

General Twining. I think that is a fair statement.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I want to put out that on high authority, I am going to present a statement to the committee on very high authority, the statement has been made that the B-70, the cancellation of the B-70 was not on the basis of budgetary considerations. My time is up. I have some more questions. I will wait my turn. I would like to ask just one more.

Senator Stennis. All right, proceed.

Senator Symington. It is true, is it not, that as of today in the United States Air Force there is not a single plane, fighter or bomber, under research and development?

General Twining. I think that is right, sir, except the B-70, this airplane is still going ahead on a

bd55
high-powered research problem.

Senator Symington. My final question adding to it ---

General Twining. Not a weapons system.

Senator Symington. That any advantages in breaking the heat barrier on the B-70 could be immediately interpreted into all other airplanes for the Air Force, for the Naval Air, for commercial air, could they not?

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Symington. Thank you, General.

Senator Stennis. Senator Wiley, you have 10 minutes.

Senator Wiley. General Twining, I am not a military man. I am not a man versed in aircraft or in ships, but I was interested in a statement that you made, and I think we should spend a little time, because you intimated that the military professional, and that means one in each of these classes, is never satisfied with the forces at his command. You repeat that, do you?

General Twining. Yes. I think that is around the world.

Senator Wiley. You also made the statement that you believe that we have enough military strength today, and I stress today, to carry out our assigned missions, and I believe that our combined American leadership will see to it that we continue to have enough. You have faith in that state?

General Twining. Very much faith.

Senator Wiley. Now then, when we talk about a threat of war,

bd56 we are all thinking in terms of the Kremlin, are we not?

We are not talking so much about limited war.

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Wiley. As we are about the overall war?

General Twining. That's right, general war.

Senator Wiley. I think Admiral Burke made a very profound statement. He said that we had in his judgment at present adequate military deterrence, but he said the other deterrents are more significant than the military. Do you agree with that?

General Twining. I do.

Senator Wiley. Can you enumerate these other deterrents, why the Kremlin would not let the balloon go up? Just why wouldn't it and what are the deterrents outside of the so-called military deterrents?

General Twining. Well, I think the Kremlin feels that they are doing a pretty good job without the military operations. They are moving around the world pretty freely doing about what they want in accomplishing programs.

I think that is one area that Admiral Burke was talking about.

Senator Wiley. Well, would a world war mean the destruction of both the contending forces or nations?

General Twining. I certainly think that Russia, the people of Russia have been through wars. They have had their country

bd57

completely ruined, like just recently in the last war.

I think the last thing they want, even less than we do, is to have their beautiful country hit again with bombs and terrible weapons of destruction.

Senator Wiley. You are talking about the 200 million Russian people, aren't you?

General Twining. That is right.

Senator Wiley. The common people of Russia?

General Twining. That is right. They are very proud of their country and they are building it up at a great rate as we all know. I was there in 1956 and I was greatly impressed with what they showed us, and they are so eager to show us what they were building, what they were doing.

For instance, Stalingrad, we thought when we went down there we were going to hear about the battle of Stalingrad, all about what went on there. We heard practically nothing about that, but we certainly heard plenty about the master plan for the rebuilding of the city and they took us all over and showed it to us.

They don't act like they are ready to jump on the United States.

Senator Wiley. Well, what do you say about the captive nations? Do you think that that is a deterrent force? In other words, that the Kremlin or the men in the Kremlin --

General Twining. We are getting into politics, Senator

bd58

Wiley, and that is a little over my head, but I certainly think their captive nations would be a questionable thing in the case of a showdown. Their loyalty might be quite questionable.

Senator Wiley. In other words, we are talking about Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the Baltic States and so forth, is that right?

General Twining. That's correct.

Senator Wiley. Well, do you suppose that our allies constitute a deterrent?

General Twining. Our allies constitute a great deterrent. This collective security is what we base our military posture on, and that is part of the deterrent definitely.

Senator Wiley. Have you been reading lately about the difference between Mao Tse-Tung and Khrushchev over Khrushchev's visit to Inida?

General Twining. I have been reading some of it, yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Well, do you think that 650 million, it will soon be a billion Chinese on the south of Siberia is also a matter that Khrushchev would have to consider?

General Twining. He might some day, yes.

Senator Wiley. What is that?

General Twining. He might, yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Now would you mind briefly in the few minutes that I have left telling us what our military deterrent

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consists of, because we had yesterday an enumeration of a great number of airplanes and also our Navy and so forth. I would like to get that briefed so that today at least we can have a little answer to what we have had so far, because heretofore we have had evidence in cross-examination to the effect that there has been a lack in the men who are supposed to handle the job.

Let's put it this way. What is the percentage that the Navy gets, the Army gets and the Air Force gets of the budget? Have you got that?

General Twining. The Air Force is now getting the highest percentage. I haven't got the exact figures with me, but it is about 18 billion roughly to about 11 to about nine, Air Force, Navy, Army. That is roughly the percentage, the \$41 billion budget.

Senator Wiley. When the general military group like yourself get together, and you take, for instance, the billions that each one of these forces get, then it is up to that particular force to determine how they are going to use those bills, or is it up to the Secretary or what?

General Twining. The money is created during the budget cycle according to the needs of the services, the weapons systems they have to buy and the people they have to provide for and all of that, and the money comes out at the end to provide for, for instance -- for instance the Army's carrying

bd60

out their mission. Then within that once the budget is set of course the Army has to live within that budget for that year.

If it has some new requirements they have to come back in the way of supplemental as you know to get more money.

Senator Wiley. You said "I have the responsibility as Chairman of the Chief of Staff to advise the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President of my own views."

General Twining. That is correct, sir, and I do.

Senator Wiley. So it isn't just a Chief of Staff. It is the Secretary of Defense, the President and the National Security Council, all of which consider the disposition of the funds that Congress votes.

General Twining. That is correct, and I attend the Security Council as adviser to the Secretary of Defense when the Security Council meets, and I am free there to voice an opinion.

Senator Wiley. I think that is all.

Senator Stennis. The Acting Chairman read in the morning papers that the Senator from Massachusetts was going to have to be in conference at the White House advising the President, and the Chair therefore knows for that sole reason the Senator was a little late.

Senator Saltonstall. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. So the Chair takes the liberty with the

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permission of the committee to recognize the Senator from Massachusetts out of order.

Senator Saltonstall. I thank the Acting Chairman. He is as courteous and always polite and always thoughtful.

General Twining, while I missed much of your preliminary statements, I have a general knowledge of your position from other hearings. I would like to ask just one question, and I appreciate the courtesy of the Chair. You stated that the B-70 research was going forward but not as fast as recommended by the Air Force or that the Air Force would like?

General Twining. That is right, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. That is a fair statement, is it not?

General Twining. The Air Force would like to have a whole weapons system developed with all the components, which is quite different from what it has.

Senator Saltonstall. Isn't it true there is research going forward on a number of projects of intense value to our security if they are perfected, and the problem is in the overall Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the Defense Department, is to decide whether to make a selection, and then proceed with that more fully as in the weapons system of the B-70, and if that was done, it would mean the elimination of some of the other research projects, or to decide to go forward with more of the research projects in their preliminary stages, and then make a decision to drop some and concentrate on the ones that they

bd62 may decide on?

General Twining. That is right.

Senator Saltonstall. Like the B-70.

General Twining. That is right, to keep taking a new look at these things as you go along.

Senator Saltonstall. Isn't that the problem and isn't that the fundamental reason why the decision was made to keep the B-70 going forward with these other projects, with the money available, and with the men available and the space and the research facilities, rather than to make a selection at this time of the B-70, and drop some of the other projects, and concentrate on them?

General Twining. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Saltonstall. And that was one of the fundamental bases of the decision, was it not?

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. I thank the Senator. Without going back into the subject unless someone wishes to I think the following quotation from the public record will clear up the situation. A few minutes ago when Mr. Weisl was questioning General Twining, the Chair thought the counsel's questions were proper even in open session, as long as the General did not go into figures based upon the following consideration.

In open hearings or at least in testimony that has been cleared and has been printed in the public record, the

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Subcommittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, Secretary Gates testifying in this year at page 24, referring to these intelligence estimates makes this statement:

"This new intelligence estimate has narrowed the differences."

Then later Secretary Gates sent in the following statement:

"It has been stated on previous occasions that the Soviet superiority in ICBMs could be in the order of 3 to 1 in the period of 1960 to '63. This statement was based upon the estimate of what the USSR could produce in numbers of missiles and was not an affirmative statement of the fact that the USSR would produce the number of missiles required to attain this superiority."

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, what is this?

Senator Stennis. This is from Secretary Gates' testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations of the approximate date of January 1960. The rest of that sentence quoting from the Secretary:

"On the basis of our current intelligence estimate, which has been presented to the committee by the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, we do not now believe that the Soviet superiority in ICBMs will be as great as that previously estimated."

Now that being a public statement was why the Chair thought

bd64 : that the Counsel was within his rights in examining the General as long as this committee did not require the General to give any figures, and that was the matter we had up a while ago and I thought that had a place in the record at this time:

May we proceed now in regular order? Senator Cannon?

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I am interested in this subject. May I make one observation?

Senator Stennis. Certainly.

Senator Symington. I am very glad the Chair read that statement because based on the testimony given us by Mr. Dulles, the Soviet launching capability will be greater than what he said he estimated it was last year.

That is why this situation has got into the condition that it is in now.

Senator Stennis. Unless there is further comment from the members we will return to the regular order. Senator Cannon, you have 10 minutes.

Senator Cannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, yesterday Admiral Burke stated that in his opinion the greatest threat in the next 4 or 5 years was the prospect of limited wars. Do you share that view?

General Twining. I think it is pretty hard to say that: limited wars are certainly a real threat like the thing we are talking about. I think it is hard to say which is more

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likely to happen but in general I think he is right, yes.

Senator Cannon. In general you think the greatest threat would come from limited wars. Now are we making as adequate preparations for limited type wars as we are for a general all out war?

General Twining. I think our preparations for limited war are adequate, yes.

Senator Cannon. You say you think they are adequate?

General Twining. Yes.

Senator Cannon. I wonder then if you would take issue with this statement from General Lemnitzer: "The Defense Department is woefully and hopelessly unprepared for the type of emergency airlift it might require."

General Twining. I think he has exaggerated that a little bit. Certainly we don't have all the airlift that the Army would like to have and all the airlift we would like to have.

We would like to have the airlift more modern too. We do have lots of airlift and I think we can handle the situation.

Senator Cannon. Is it your view that we have adequate airlift for the type of emergency situations in limited wars that we might conceivably foresee within the next 3 or 4 years?

General Twining. We have, as our studies show, we have

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adequate airlift for the general war situation.

In the limited war situation we do have some problem areas, and I recall one not long ago of a limited war in Korea while we were mobilizing at the same time at home. There was an indication that the first 20 days we were going to be short in some of our lift. We can take some administrative action, getting the craft in sooner and relieve it somewhat, but of course it all depends on what the requirement is.

Now we couldn't move all the Army divisions at one time of course. We couldn't move 3 Army divisions at one time but we could move some of the advanced echelons.

Senator Cannon. You did show you would be short in the first 20 days, is that right?

General Twining. That is right.

Senator Cannon. And the first 20 days of course would very likely be the critical period?

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Cannon. I am wondering then if you agree with Mr. Mahon who made the statement that lack of an adequate airlift is one of the weakest links in our defense chain?

General Twining. No, I don't go that far.

Senator Cannon. You don't believe that that is our weakest link. What do you believe is our weakest link then?

General Twining. I don't think we have a real weak link. We have a lot of things we would like to have certainly, and

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this airlift has been one of the problems that has vexed us for years and I think and I hope that we will get some improved airlift, modernize the fleet more than we have done, and we should do it.

Senator Cannon. Do you think that more should be done in that direction than is being done at the present moment?

General Twining. I do, yes.

Senator Cannon. You do agree that more should be done toward modernizing the fleet?

General Twining. That's right.

Senator Cannon. And providing additional airlift.

General Twining. The fleet is getting kind of old now as you know.

Senator Cannon. Now getting back to this all out war proposition and this so-called air alert, General, does the money in the budget for the on the shelf air alert capability provide for a 24 hour continuous air alert capability at some future time?

General Twining. I can't give the number but not for a fourth but for a limited number of aircraft, yes.

Senator Cannon. Be sure you understand my question there. Does it provide for a continuous 24 hour alert capability at some future time for a portion of the SAC forces?

General Twining. For one year, yes, for a very limited portion though, not anything like General Power wants.

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Senator Cannon. I think that General Power stated if I remember correctly in open session, he testified to about one-eighth, but this is simply to get it in a position to go on an air alert and not to actually carry out that capability for any continuous period of time. Do you agree with that?

General Twining. That's right, an air alert I feel should be something that you have a capability of doing and you use it when you want to do it.

Senator Cannon. I think that General Power stated in open session that he estimated it would take about 600 million to get SAC in a condition to carry out a continuous air alert with the requirements that he foresaw.

Now as I understand the budget, there is 20 million this year and 90 million next year for this so-called on the shelf capability, is that correct?

General Twining. I think it is a little bit more than that. I think this year the '61 budget is some 91 million and I believe in '60 they have about the equivalent of pretty close to 100 million. We can get those figures, but it is more than you have stated.

The whole bill is about \$200 million.

Senator Cannon. Over a 2 year period.

General Twining. That is right, '60-61.

Senator Cannon. I see, and that would provide for the on the shelf capability?

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General Twining. The on the shelf capability, yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. General Power also stated that he believed this danger would be the greatest within the next few years. That is the necessity for the air alert while our additional missile capability was coming into being. Do you share that view?

General Twining. That looks like you could take that point, but I still think with our forces and the way they are deployed and set up, that we are not going to have that deterrent gap in there.

There is a time of relative difference in numbers of ICBMs between the two countries I would say, yes.

Senator Cannon. Would you say it is the time of the lowest position insofar as our deterrent capability is concerned, the next 3 or 4 years?

General Twining. Well, it might be.

Senator Cannon. Do you think it would be?

General Twining. It could be, yes.

Senator Cannon. I think that was the testimony of a number of people.

General Twining. Yes.

Senator Cannon. Who have appeared before us. As a matter of fact, General Power said that he foresaw the maximum period of need for an air alert to extend perhaps for

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five years. As I recall, General Taylor said -- General White rather said he thought the maximum need would go through possibly 1963. Now do you agree that General Power's theory of an air alert would cost approximately 600 million this year, and one billion a year thereafter for such time as we needed to keep it in effect?

General Twining. I think that is pretty close.

Senator Cannon. Now if General White was correct in his analysis that we would need it in his opinion through 1963, then we would be talking here about figures of 600 million for the '61 budget and a billion for the '62 and a billion for the '63, is that correct, a total of a little less than \$3 billion?

General, don't you believe that that is a pretty good life insurance policy for this country for that amount of money?

General Twining. Sure it is a good life insurance policy, but I think the other, the on the shelf capability is just about as effective, and if I was in need of the cash I would put that money in some other programs than a full airborne alert, I think something else of high priority.

Senator Cannon. What programs would you put it in?

General Twining. I would put it in an offensive weapons system of some kind.

Senator Cannon. Well, what kind?

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General Twining. More missiles.

Senator Cannon. You would put it in more missiles?

General Twining. Yes. As I say, you don't need it but if I had to spend it that would not be my first priority.

Senator Cannon. You said you would put it in more missiles. I think General Schriever testified if we started doing something now we couldn't bring any more missiles into the inventory until the end of '62 or early '63.

General Twining. That is correct, but my point is if I had to spend the money I think that would be a better investment than going to a full airborne alert, that is all.

I wouldn't advise the missile business.

Senator Cannon. When you say the full airborne alert.

General Twining. That General Power wants.

Senator Cannon. That is General Power's recommendation.

General Twining. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. What other areas would you put that little less than \$3 billion in?

General Twining. I would like to have it go into Polaris or the Minuteman, speed them up. As I say again I don't advise it but if I had to spend the money -- in other words, we end up with this, we have nothing for this \$3 billion you are talking about. By my system I don't think we are going to get like a lot of people do so I say put this in an offensive weapons system so when you end up the period you

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have something for your 3 or 4 or 5 billion dollars. When you end up with the air alert you have nothing but some wornout airplanes.

Senator Cannon. But you have some trained crews and air alert in the meantime?

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Cannon. Prepared to make a strike if a surprise attack is made against us and if a surprise attack is made against us and those airplanes are on the ground, they are no good to us are they, General?

General Twining. That's right. We don't want to get caught on the ground.

Senator Cannon. Now General Taylor made this statement before the committee, and I would like to get your views on it, General. He said: "Meanwhile the trend of relative military strength is against us. Our manned bomber force is a dwindling military asset."

With the present program of the manned bomber force do you consider that to be a dwindling military asset?

General Twining. I certainly don't. It has, it is going up through 1963 in numbers. I disagree heartily on that.

Senator Cannon. General Taylor said "Our long-range missile force is limited in size, uncertain in reliability and immobile upon exposed bases." Do you agree with that?

General Twining. I think part of it is right. We don't

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have the hardening completed, but our plan is to harden these missiles and they will be well protected and as far as reliability goes, I think they are proving out very well, much better than we hoped for.

Senator Cannon. There is no question but what it is limited in size and immobile upon exposed bases at the present time, isn't that true, General?

General Twining. At this moment, yes.

Senator Cannon. General Taylor also stated "We have no antimissile defense in being or in sight. There is no effective fall out protection for our civil population."

Do you agree with that statement?

General Twining. I do at the moment.

Senator Cannon. General Taylor also made some recommendations for immediate measures that we might take, and I will read them to you.

He stated: "We can improve our readiness for limited war by better use of our existing resources. We can at least partially offset the missile gap by using Jupiter as a mobile field weapon as it was intended, by an airborne alert for part of SAC, and by the initiation of a simple fall out protection program for our civil population."

Do you agree with those views, General?

General Twining. No, I don't agree with all of them. I don't think Jupiter by any stretch of the imagination can be

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called a mobile weapon. That is Number one. If you have seen them you can see that they are pretty big. In this day and age we have to have a weapon of less weight, the Pershing is very good. The Army is building Pershing. The other one on shelters, I don't think that is really a military problem. That is something that we have an organization in the Administration to look after that, and they are studying that now and there is a lot of thought being put on the shelter program, but it is just not that simple to say let's build a shelter program and build one. It is going to take a lot of thinking.

Senator Cannon. And you have already answered the one on airborne alert so I take it you don't agree with any part of his views then as to what we might do at present.

Thank you very much, General.

General Twining. I don't want to give the opinion that I don't think highly of General Taylor.

I think he is a wonderful officer. I served with him for four years on the Joint Staff and he is a most outstanding individual.

But he is very dedicated on these things. He has written his book. He thinks highly of them and he had his chance in the JCS to expound on them, also the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States he went to with his problems and some of the committees of Congress, and they

bd75 weren't bought and I think that he is entitled to his ideas, but I just don't buy them and I don't think the others do either.

Senator Stennis. All right, Senator Martin, you have 10 minutes.

Senator Martin. General Taylor, in your prepared statement you made the statement:

"In analyzing our posture versus that of an enemy, we utilized national intelligence of the highest degree of sensitivity."

And again later on down in the statement you made this statement:

"Our planning process is continuous as is our intelligence process."

Now from those statements I gather that you have access to all intelligence reports that are available to other members of the Armed Services?

General Twining. Yes, sir.

Senator Martin. Do you have access to all intelligence reports that are available to Mr Dulles and his organization?

General Twining. I think that we have access to every single thing that is being done in an intelligence way for the security of this country.

I am sure of it.

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Senator Martin. And following those two statements you make this statement, which I think is very important:

"I believe that we have enough military strength today to carry out our assigned missions."

General Twining. Yes, sir.

Senator Martin. I have considerable confidence in your judgment in the matter without trying to pick to pieces the various fragments of your thinking and approach to that conclusion.

I also agree very strongly with this statement, and it has been my own observation through my lifetime that the military professional is never satisfied with the forces at his command. I have tried to bear that in mind during the entire hearings we have had here.

Now these intelligence reports that you rely upon do change frequently and quite extensively, do they not?

General Twining. Yes.

Senator Martin. And a person can be well primed on intelligence reports one month and may be out of date one month or six months later, isn't that true?

General Twining. It could be, and they do change quite frequently, some of them.

Senator Martin. I hope out of these hearings we do not create the impression that Congress is getting away from its role for creating and maintaining our forces.

I hope that we do not undertake to interfere with strategic planning and the making of tactical decisions. That is my own position.

I just want that in the Record at this point. I have tremendous confidence in your ability as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I want to get that on the record right now, and I commend you very highly for your statement.

General Twining. I just want to state I think that is the greatest thing we have, and I think it is fine that the Congress does take the interest to investigate and find out what is going on. It is very important to the security of the country.

Senator Martin. It is absolutely a good program of planning and congressional action, and as long as we do not allow it to disturb us too much in strategic planning and tactical decisions, it is all to the good.

General Twining. That is right.

Senator Martin. I believe that is the spirit in which you are taking this inquiry here today.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Bartlett, the Chair requests that because you are not in your customary place that the Chair did not see you sitting here at that moment. You are recognized for ten minutes, Senator.

Senator Bartlett. It is far from too late, Mr. Chairman.

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General Twining, with the recent publication of hearings on the military budget before the House Appropriations Committee, it was revealed that there is a wide, even complete divergence of opinion between the Air Force and the Army on the advisability or even the necessity of placing missiles in Alaska.

Are you familiar, General, with the testimony given on the subject before the House committee?

General Twining. I am sorry I am not, but I am quite surprised at that, because we have just recently, as you know, gone into this problem, and the chiefs, the Army did not present that problem you just brought up at that time.

Senator Bartlett. In the testimony published that came to my attention only yesterday, maybe it was published only yesterday, the Army, through Secretary Brucker, urged that IRBM's be placed in Alaska, and the Air Force dissented from this conclusion, and suggested that Alaska was defensible by the use of ICBM's placed in the interior of the United States.

Now General Twining, has this been a subject for discussion and decision by the Joint Chiefs?

General Twining. Yes, it has.

Senator Bartlett. And by the Secretary of Defense?

General Twining. Yes.

Senator Bartlett. And you say the Army has not raised

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this issue within the Joint Chiefs?

General Twining. No.

Senator Bartlett. General, I believe that man is or could be more familiar with Alaska than you are, because you served there as Commander In Chief of the Alaskan Command through some critical and constructive years so far as Alaska is concerned.

I should like to ask you if it is not true, General Twining, that the present Commander In Chief of the Alaskan Command is an Air Force officer?

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Bartlett. And a very distinguished, able outstanding officer?

General Twining. Yes, sir.

Senator Bartlett. Lt. Gen. Frank A. Armstrong.

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Bartlett. Is it not true, General Twining, that with General Armstrong, it was General Armstrong himself who urged in a very dramatic, unexpected public speech, that it is imperative not so much for the security of Alaska but for the security of the whole United States that IRBM's be placed in the 49th State without delay?

General Twining. That is correct, and he made that recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Bartlett. And he made it publicly, did he not?

General Twining. Yes.

Senator Bartlett. Now I am not going to say here the number of bases in Siberia at which the Russians are said to have missile sites, although I take it that this no special secret. It has been published even if not widely.

General, in a statement published by the Air Force in the House Appropriations Committee, it was said that the Siberian situation should be taken care of by the ICBM's in the interior of the United States. I am wondering, and I put this to you as a question, if the United States, within the foreseeable future, would have a sufficient number of ICBM's to take out the Siberian bases much less accomplish other military missions, granted the number of bases there?

General Twining. Yes, sir. We will have to take out those bases. Those bases are the closest to the United States, and they would be very high on our target priority system with ICBM's, or it might be with bombers when the time came.

Senator Bartlett. Are there going to be enough ICBM's to do that?

General Twining. Yes, there will have to be, because that is a very, very high priority target up there.

Senator Bartlett. I was somewhat interested, very interested in fact by the statement presented to the House Appropriations Committee by the Air Force on this subject,

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because it did say this is a mission for ICBM's. Only a few months ago the Air Force said, as I recall, this is a mission for SAC bombers, is that correct?

General Twining. Well, it might be. They will change as these missiles come in, the targets will be changed.

Of course up to now it has been all bombers because we haven't had the long-range missiles. But as the missiles come in, some of these targets will be shifted over from the bombers to the missiles as the missiles are ready to take over.

Senator Bartlett. And is it not true, General Twining, that in a public declaration General Armstrong said it will be too late if we have to rely upon bombers coming from Omaha or elsewhere in the interior of the United States, because it is a matter of minutes until these missiles can hit here, and he said this is a subject of concern not so much for Alaska but because if war came, the enemy could then come to Alaska and, using those fields, bomb West Coast cities and, as I recall, he said Chicago, and then went on to declare that at that time the President would have to make the hard decision of whether to bomb our former bases in Alaska then held by the Russians, or subject all the cities in the United States to bomber attack, if the Russians chose to unleash a fleet of bombers against us from these great bases of ours in Alaska.

Now General Twining, it was stated in the testimony before the House Appropriations Committee that General Armstrong was at the recent conference at Norfolk, and the implication was that he made no complaint against the decision reached by the Department of Defense on this matter.

Is it not true that a military judgment had been imposed upon him, and he could go no further with this?

General Twining. I think that is right, and I just want to tell you that this question of placing weapons in Alaska, intermediate range missiles or something else, is not a closed book. I mean this is something we keep looking at all the time.

Senator Bartlett. It is being actively considered?

General Twining. Yes, oh, yes.

Senator Bartlett. Is it true, General -- I have read this, I do not know whether it is or not --

General Twining. But at the moment the decision was made not to, and General Armstrong was notified, that is correct, and he could do nothing more about it.

Senator Bartlett. Is it true, do you know if you can tell us -- I have read this -- that we have sought to station some IFEM's on the land of some of our allies, and some of them are a bit reluctant to accept them?

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Bartlett. And yet here where the Commanding

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General, a distinguished officer, seeks them imperatively, the decision is not to place them for the immediate protection of the whole United States, is that right?

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Bartlett. General Twining, one final question. It is often said in situations like this that the local Commander always wants more, he always asks for more.

Do you think this is comparable to that? Isn't it true that if missiles were placed there, the Commander in Chief of the Alaskan Command, who would not be General Armstrong -- his time there is coming to an end -- would have not more and more to boss but less and less?

You have no doubt, have you, General Twining, that this recommendation on General Armstrong's part was that of a dedicated officer gravely concerned with the situation he confronts across from Siberia. Will you agree with that, General?

General Twining. Yes.

Senator Bartlett. General, we are aware of the fact, are we not, and this has been published, that the Russians have made tremendous developments in Siberia in military bases, construction of airfields and surrounding sites?

General Twining. Yes, they have done a great deal of work in Siberia.

Senator Bartlett. And is it not true that in Alaska

during the last several years our military strength has been steadily reduced?

General Twining. It has been reduced some, yes, not too much though.

Senator Bartlett. And this tremendous Russian build-up has taken place with an accelerated pace right across the Bering Straits from Alaska. That is a matter of common knowledge and not intelligence, is it not, General Twining?

General Twining. That is correct.

Senator Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator.

Gentlemen, I feel sure there will be time for everyone, but the Senate has gone into session, and after we have concluded the open hearing, we will have an executive session.

We have the choice here that Mr. Allen Dulles presented earlier, and General Twining indicated his testimony should not be in open hearing, I think that is correct, and we will go into that in a short session.

Senator Case, you are recognized next.

Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you, counsel and my colleagues and the general will stop me from asking any questions that involve security. I am just anxious to get as much information and opinion from the general based upon the facts.

Senator Stennis. The Chair leaves that largely to the

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general himself. He is a better judge than the Chair is I think on those matters.

Senator Case. This relates to the question largely of matters whether they have or have not been discussed previously in open or closed sessions, and my memory may not be completely accurate about it.

It is my recollection, just in preparation for the question, General, that General Power in open session did state the percentage of his force that he wanted on airborne alert. I think that is correct.

Senator Stennis. No, not in open session.

Senator Case. Not the percentage?

Senator Stennis. That is what I understand. The Chair thought to the contrary. I am advised the only thing he said in open session was that he desired twice as much as he was given.

Senator Case. Yes, that was the very question that I wanted to ask. Then I think I am right that you did give a figure today as to what percentage General Power wanted, General Twining.

General Twining. I don't recall that. I shouldn't have.

Senator Case. I think you did, but I don't want in any way to press you to answer that, because I don't want to get into anything.

General Twining. I don't think that ought to be discussed in open session.

Senator Stennis. That is a closed session matter. I think the Senator from New Jersey is correct.

Senator Case. Is it accurate, can we go this far, and I don't want to press you to say yes if you think not. Is General Power's statement that he got about half what he was after a correct statement?

General Twining. I didn't get that.

Senator Case. Is General Power's statement, which the Chairman just repeated, that he got about half the air alert that he was after a correct statement?

General Twining. I think that is about right.

Senator Case. About right. And it is subject to this qualification, isn't it?

General Twining. Yes, about half.

Senator Case. Then there is a difference, besides the difference in size, there is a difference that what has been authorized would provide an on-the-shelf capability both as to mechanical parts and men, I take it, to be available as I recall it approximately -- was the date given in open session?

Then I won't pursue that. You did make this statement: that your judgment was that the amount of capacity provided for under present funding, that is in the two budgets, '60 and

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'61, was equivalent used on an intermittent basis to as much or more than the amount General Power requested, if used only on a full 24-hour alert basis. That was in general the subject of your testimony.

General Twining. No, it is less. I said somewhere around two hundred million total program in the budget.

Senator Case. No, this is the question of the value of what was provided for in the budget. Used on an intermittent basis, you thought it was almost as great.

General Twining. Yes, I think so.

Senator Case. As the 24-hour alert of the amount General Power wanted or perhaps even a larger one.

General Twining. I don't think if General Power had the authority and money and equipment to run it 24 hours a day around the clock all the time, that he would do it. He just wouldn't choose to do it I am sure.

But I don't think so as a commander. He would kind of play it by ear too. He is a pretty smart fellow, and I think that is what he would do. He wouldn't put it up there and grind it 24 hours a day all year long.

Senator Case. You made quite a point of this, General, and the fact that it would be used on this intermittent basis would make it additionally valuable and useful as a deterrent.

General Twining. That is right.

Senator Case. But isn't this true, and perhaps you have

already taken this into account.

Assuming you have a period of tension, of strategic war, and you decide to put everything you can in the air for an airborne alert, that your capacity to keep this there for any length of time is --

General Twining. Yes, sir, that is the idea of this.

Senator Case. Unless you are able to do this for an extended period, maybe for months, the situation might go against you rather badly. I take it you are taking that into account also?

General Twining. And I think on this on-the-shelf capability you have got enough for those periods when tension exists, and you want to keep the force up for a while. I think we can do that on this concept the budget provides for.

Senator Case. The rest of my questions I think have to wait until executive session.

Senator Stennis. Very well, Senator Case. Thank you.
Senator Bush?

Senator Bush. General Twining, I want to speak of the matter of disclosing so much information that we do in these hearings and otherwise.

Yesterday I raised a point with Admiral Burke, and I am going to read in a moment from the record. But it seems to me that inasmuch as we have been warned by the highest

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military officers that we have that we are in a very grave and dangerous situation today, and likely to remain in one for the next two or three years at least, that a great deal of the information that is given to this committee should come to it in closed session, and the same way over at the House.

In saying this, I do not single out any Senator or Member of the House in a critical way, but I do express very grave concern for our country, because I believe we are disclosing much too much information to potential enemies of this country.

Not only are we disclosing to them what our own plans for the future are respecting development of weapons and so forth year by year, and the course thereof, but we are disclosing to them our own estimate of their own plans day after day. I think this is very dangerous.

Now I believe that the Congress should be fully advised as to what the situation is, but this is a representative form of government, and one of the advantages of it is that the representatives of the people can act as representatives of the people, and they should, in matters where the national security is involved.

I recall in World War II we spent enormous sums of money on a thing called the Manhattan Project, which later resulted in the atomic weapon that brought the war to a sudden end in

the summer of 1945, and that project was going on in various parts of this country, but nobody knew what it was.

The people of this country didn't know what it was. I don't believe the enemy knew much about it. At any rate, it was a very well kept secret for a period of two or three years, and a tremendous project into which hundreds of millions of dollars went. And the Members of the Congress no doubt must have known something about it because they appropriated the money, but it wasn't given out in these open sessions.

So I raised this question yesterday with Admiral Burke, and I am just going to read a part of what I said to him, and because he mentioned your name, I am going to ask you to respond to this question. I said, in view of the statements of General Power and General Taylor and others:

"I just wonder whether it is wise for us to disclose so much information, practically everything about our military posture and our intentions and our plans."

And I might add here our estimates of the Soviet capabilities and intentions and plans.

"Is this something that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have ever considered or not?"

"Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. This is one of the most serious problems confronting us in this country, and there is apparently no way we can keep the information from going out.

"We have to put out contracts for things. They are all

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published. We can't keep anything, any of our own equipment secret for very long. Everyone knows the location of what we plan on doing, let alone what we have done. It is a very serious problem, sir. And I do agree with General Twining in his very strong feelings on this, sir."

Would you tell the committee what your feelings are about this matter?

General Twining. This is a very difficult problem, because I know full well that the Members of the Congress are trying to get the facts up here and do a job, and they feel much of this information the public should have and are entitled to, and I certainly go along with that. The public should have some of this information. But where do you draw the line? There is the difficult thing.

Senator Bush. We have got to rely on you to draw the line, General.

General Twining. We mark these things top secret. We mark them secret and all that, and we have executive sessions.

But things just seem to get out that shouldn't get out, and I don't know how you are going to control it in a democracy like ours.

Senator Bush. Do you think it is a hopeless proposition?

General Twining. It is not hopeless because we do have some secrets that haven't leaked out yet, but they are getting fewer every day I would say.

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Senator Bush. I would suggest that if it is as serious a problem as it is apparently thought to be in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Burke certainly didn't hesitate to say that he thought it was a very serious problem --

General Twining. I do too.

Senator Bush. -- that the representatives of the Defense Department from the Secretary on down would demand that their testimony on these very sensitive points be held in executive session, and I am sure that the Congress would be glad to cooperate.

General Twining. I think you are exactly right, and I would like to see it done that way, because I think this can be very dangerous to our security.

It is the little things, not that anyone person does anything bad, but when these people add it all up, the people on the receiving end add these things all up, they really get the whole business. These newspaper people are pretty smart. I hope that something can be done about this, I really do.

Senator Bush. Don't blame the newspaper people.

General Twining. No.

Senator Bush. For trying to get the information. They are all here as our guests.

General Twining. Not at all.

Senator Bush. My point is that what you have said here

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today will probably be in the papers in Moscow in the morning, and all over the world, in Japan, China and every place else.

General Twining. And this isn't limited to the Congress either. It happens in practically everything we do, every group we have, wherever it is around the world. Things just seem to get out, and they shouldn't get out.

Senator Bush. My suggestion is, General, that you as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs -- and I am going to make the same suggestion to the Secretary when he comes -- should not hesitate to refuse to answer questions on the basis of security, and offer at the same time to answer them in executive session.

I think we should have a lot more executive sessions and a lot less public discussion of these very, very sensitive matters.

General Twining. I certainly go along with you on that.

Senator Bush. Thank you very much.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Are there other matters now in open session? Mr. Weisel, do you have something?

Mr. Weisel. I just want to make this observation,
General Twining.

General, Secretary Gates testified in open session that Secretary McElroy over television discussed these figures by saying that in his opinion, based on these figures, there

would be in the future a three to one superiority. It was not the committee. It was Secretary McElroy who, over television, made that statement.

General Twining. Well, I didn't infer that any of the committee had leaked anything.

Mr. Weisel. Here is the testimony of Secretary Gates:

"Last week he stated: 'Mr. McElroy made such a statement in his testimony last year. He also made that statement on a television program in December.'"

Senator Bush. What is the purpose of counsel's reading this? I don't quite understand it.

Mr. Weisel. To show that these things aren't originated by the committee. They are originated by the officials of the Defense Department.

Senator Bush. I didn't say they were originated by the committee. I didn't point the finger at anybody, but I do say that I would regret that Mr. McElroy did exactly what he did then, if it involved sensitive information.

Mr. Weisel. That is right.

Senator Bush. Counsel seems to be a little sensitive on this, but I can assure him, as I did yesterday, that I know he is only carrying out the wishes of this committee, for which I commend him, because I think he has done it very well for several years.

But that isn't the point that I am talking about at all.

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I am talking about the general policy not only of this committee but over in the House and in the Defense Department too. I think there should be a lot more security observed.

Mr. Weisel. Thank you, Senator. I think also, General Twining, you made the public statement as follows, if I quote you correctly:

"I can also inform this committee that the over-all military capability of the Soviet Union has not been down-graded."

General Twining. That is the over-all military capability, yes.

Mr. Weisel. Thank you.

Senator Stennis. All right, gentlemen of the committee.

Senator Symington. I have a question I would like to ask.

Senator Stennis. It appears here now that we will have an executive session, as the Chair has already indicated.

It is now 12:15, and there is no way to accurately determine how long that session will be. It seems in view of all these conditions, that we can hardly get to the Secretary this afternoon.

So suppose, when we complete with the general in executive session, that we recess subject to the call of the Chair, and we will have the Secretary at some convenient

time.

Now we will have the further questions in open session, and then go into executive session. Senator Symington?

Senator Symington. General Twining, yesterday the Secretary of State, and I think this is important, because I saw it several times on a telecast, was asked this question:

"Mr. Secretary, last November at a news conference you told us that you had thought the Russians had come a very long way on Berlin since November of 1958 when they were threatening to throw us out. Now in the past two or three months Mr. Khrushchev seems to have become a little tougher on it. I am thinking particularly of his statement that if we don't make a peace treaty on his terms, he will sign a treaty with East Germany with all the consequences that entails.

"Do you feel that since you talked to us in November on that, he has become tougher in his position?"

The answer given by Secretary Herter was:

"Yes, I think that is the only way we can interpret the statement if it had been made since that time."

Now later on in the same press conference, and I think this is very important from the standpoint of the American people, I am not one who has been giving out this information, but I think if any information is given out, it should be the correct information, and I know you agree with me on that:

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"Question. Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union apparently is leading the United States, according to some critics, in a military posture vis-a-vis the United States. First of all, sir, do you think this is so? Are the Soviets ahead of us in military strength through missiles, and, secondly, if this is so, does this account for the stiffening Soviet attitude on such questions as Berlin?"

I want to read this all because I want to be sure not to get anything out of context. The answer was:

"Well, in the first place you are asking me to get into the current estimate of relative strength, on which I think a great deal has been said by much better experts than I am in this field. Whoever has done the estimating I think has agreed that the Soviets are gaining in strength in the missile field."

May I point out to you that is the statement of the Secretary of State yesterday, one of the finest public officials, public servants it has ever been my privilege to know. He goes on:

"It is possible that the Soviets feel that their increased strength from a military point of view, not necessarily from the point of view of being able to take on the offensive, without an unacceptable retaliatory strike, but from the point of view of their defensive capacity, has made them, has given them great assurance in what they are

saying in the international field. But there again that is only speculation, and I think that sometimes it is unfruitful to get into speculation of that sort.

"Question. Mr. Secretary, in that same vein, sir, do you think that the United States ought to make a greater effort to close the gap then if this is creating a sense of increased strength on the part of the Soviets in their dealings with us and the rest of the free world?

"Answer" -- and this is what I was getting at -- "Now you are getting into a very technical field, the question of the closing of the gap. This is a matter that has, of course, been given a great deal of very serious consideration by people in the administration, by people up on the Hill, and there are some conflicting views in our military on the subject.

"In so far as I am concerned, I have heard a number of discussions on this matter, and have faith in the President's and the Joint Chiefs and Mr. Gates' evaluation that we are taking steps to close that gap as effectively and as soon as we can, and that there will not be a disparity in strength in the coming years which would, in itself tempt the Russians to make a sudden attack upon us."

Now I have here the figures that were given us. If we are talking about the missile gap, let's not get into the question of what we all know, that their ICBM's are estimated

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to be far more powerful than ours, because of the amount of payload in the third stage of the lunar thrust, and so forth. I am not interested in this bottom part.

But with the premise that a missile in a cave that can't be launched doesn't mean anything, that what is able to be launched against this country is what counts, show me any evidence, if you will, on what was given us by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Captain Gray, will you take this piece of paper please?

Captain Gray. Do you want me to show it to the general, Senator?

Senator Symington. Yes, I would like to see if there is anything there that justifies the American people in believing that any missile gap is being closed -- you have a representative of the Joint Chiefs on the National Intelligence Board, each service has. There are the figures.

General Twining. There is no way to answer this in open session, Senator.

Senator Symington. All right, General. Thank you very much.

General Twining. I have, Senator, this chart, but I didn't have it last year.

Senator Symington. Thank you, General. I have no further questions.

Senator Stennis. All right. It is the pleasure of

the committee now that we finish the open hearing. All right, gentlemen, we will go into executive session at 2 p. m.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p. m., the committee took a recess to resume in executive session at 2:00 p. m., the same day.)