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These billions for foreign aid are provided reluctantly by the American people out of record taxes, on the theory that every penny thus spent is essential to American security.

This money is spent in the far corners of the world, out of sight of the average citizen. As is the case whenever huge sums are freely available, there is inclination toward waste and extravagance which can be prevented only by constant vigilance.

This is a case where, in our opinion, Congress is right and Ike is wrong.

Congress appropriates this money and Congress certainly should insist on full accounting. We hope the Senate adopts a similar 20-day rule and insists it be enforced.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Finally, Mr. President, in addition to all these accusations of waste, misuse and secrecy, there is a growing feeling in America, I believe, that our farflung foreign aid program actually is not a good investment for the American taxpayers. I think that many Americans are beginning to wonder how long our country can continue to shoulder the economic burdens of more than half a hundred nations, while our own national debt is greater than the total of the national debts of all other countries in the world. I think that many Americans are beginning to ask, Why do we keep buying air conditioners for Vietnam when we cannot afford proper schools for our own children and proper medical care for our own aged?

A very lucid example of this hometown-American view was contained in an editorial which was published in the July 21 edition of the *Sunset News-Observer* of Bluefield and Princeton, W. Va. The editorial was titled, "Pakistan Versus Brush Creek." I ask unanimous consent that it may be printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PAKISTAN VERSUS BRUSH CREEK

It will be hard for Princeton and area residents to understand President Eisenhower's logic if he vetoes the public works appropriations bill which contains the funds for the badly needed Brush Creek flood control project. For here is a situation in which an expenditure of a modest amount of Federal funds could give an economic lift to an area of our own country as badly in need of help as any place you can find. Maybe we'd stand a better chance of getting help if we could fool the President into thinking Princeton is in Pakistan instead of West Virginia.

We are not sure, of course, that the President is going to veto the measure. But yesterday's story from Washington in which he criticized Congress for appropriating money for new domestic public works projects was not encouraging. Privately, our representatives in Washington are saying that Ike may not actually go through with his threat. They point out that the overall amounts in the bill are only slightly more than the President requested. But what apparently irks Ike is that 44 new projects were added by the House and 38, of which Brush Creek is one, were added by the Senate. He sees the thing as a challenge to his determination to balance the budget whatever it may cost in terms of domestic programs.

It's the old familiar story, of course. Cutting government spending is fine so long as it applies to the other fellow. But there's more to it than that. If the U.S. economy,

generally and not just in spots, is going to grow stronger and expand as it should, then Federal projects such as this which can provide new job opportunities, and hence more national income and more tax revenues, should be undertaken. We cannot afford to continue supporting public works projects all over the world (which Ike likes)—we simply will not have the tax revenues to do it—unless we undertake new projects at home which will boost our own economy. The good old goose that lays the golden eggs might quit laying one of these days.

Ike's viewpoint, in our opinion, is the short-sighted one. Balancing the budget is a desirable goal. But why balance it at the expense of the future of Princeton and other U.S. communities? Why not shave a little more off of aid for Pakistan, or wherever the money is going now?

Princeton and Mercer County, we submit, could use some foreign aid. And the returns, we wager, would be considerably more tangible than those realized from some of the aid we have sent all over the globe.

The prospect of reclaiming land that can be used for new business and industrial development, and at a reasonable cost, right here in our own bailiwick fully justifies the Federal appropriation, we think. We hope Ike sees it that way.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. So, Mr. President, in view of the charges of waste, the charges of mismanagement, the charges of official secrecy, and the grassroots feeling that perhaps some of the immense quantities of money which we are scattering overseas might be better spent at home—in view of all these things, I repeat my proposal.

I respectfully submit that the Senate should withhold approval of any more foreign aid appropriation bills until the findings of the investigation being conducted by the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] and his subcommittee have been made known.

Mr. President—
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRUENING in the chair). The Senator from West Virginia.

UNITED STATES MUST STAND UP AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, in Friday's edition of the *Washington Post*, there was a copy-righted article by former President Harry S. Truman, entitled, "Harry Truman Writes: United States Must Stand Up Against Khrushchev."

I feel that there is great wisdom in the contents of the article. I feel that the words of caution voiced by our distinguished former Chief Executive could well serve as guides to each person who helps direct our Nation's course in these tense days.

In order that the Congress may have benefit of our former President's views on this crucial world question, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the article be printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HARRY TRUMAN WRITES: UNITED STATES MUST STAND UP AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV

(By Harry S. Truman)

Our current encounters with Russian diplomacy should serve as added warning

that to falter or to hesitate in dealing with Khrushchev can only lead to more trouble.

The unrelenting pressure on the free world by the Kremlin can only be met by steady and determined resoluteness. For us to appear to be begging the Communists for peace or to try to go over their heads to the Russian people will do us no good. The Russian people have no voice in their dictatorship and are being kept in total ignorance about the United States and the conditions in the world as a whole.

The situation—already bad—could become even more serious if we give Khrushchev reason to think that we of the West are weak, confused, and divided and that he can bluff us into bargaining away our rights and security by threats of total destruction. The visit to Russia by a Vice President of the United States would, under halfway reasonable circumstances, be seized upon by the Soviet Government to help toward a more hopeful understanding. But the Kremlin seems to prefer an atmosphere of crisis and tension, because it best serves its plan for government control and exploitation of all its satellites and for further expansion of the Communist world.

COMMON DECISIONS

We sometimes make the mistake of assuming that dictators underestimate our strength and determination to resist them. I was sorry to see the West give the impression recently of being unable to arrive at common decisions in such matters as a summit meeting, how to cope with an attempted blockade of West Berlin and nuclear weapons in France.

Clearer leadership on our part should have prevented these matters from developing into differences among the allies.

Under present conditions, one of the most important responsibilities of our leadership is to keep our allies together. This is not easy. Our allies are free and, of course, have views of their own. But in recent years there has been a feeling on the part of some of them that we have lacked sympathy and understanding of their problems. For my part, I think that this feeling grew out of our actions during the Suez crisis, and I must add that feeling was in some measure justified.

I have an impression that our friends and neighbors in Cuba and South America are disturbed about our policies toward them today. And I hope we do something about that situation so that we do not blunder into the hands of the Communist fifth column now active in this hemisphere.

For instance, in Cuba, I think that Fidel Castro is a good young man, who has made mistakes but who seems to want to do the right thing for the Cuban people, and we ought to extend our sympathy and help him to do what is right for them.

During Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration and my own, we sought to do what we thought was in the interest of the nations of South America, to do what was best for their people, without regard to special interests. And the people of South America knew we were not out to exploit them.

However, in our relations with the Kremlin, we have but one choice, and that is to meet force with force and to confront bluff and bluster with cool and determined resoluteness. If the Communists should blockade West Berlin, we ought to break through it, and that should be the end of the blockade.

If we permit the Communists to cut us out of Berlin, we will provide them with the means to take over the rest of Germany, and go on from there.

FIRMNESS STRESSED

If Khrushchev is not stopped at Berlin, there will be no stopping him anywhere in

Europe. Unless we keep this in mind in our dealings with the Communist dictatorship, we shall run the risk of hesitating and faltering and thus encourage the Soviet dictators in their mad adventure.

Strong leadership by the United States is the one possible way of arresting the trend toward war through a miscalculation. The only one who dares to engage in warlike behavior is Khrushchev, aided and abetted by his comrades in arms in Red China.

We certainly never did and do not now want war, but it would be the grossest folly of miscalculation if the Kremlin and Red China believed we would stand for peace at any price.

I am disturbed by the continuing spectacle of so many well-intentioned, distinguished Americans traveling to Moscow on their own and intruding into the conduct of our foreign policy.

It is difficult and trying enough for this country to confront Russian propaganda, which has been seeking to divide and confuse us, but seldom have we been so badly served as we are now by a procession of visitors who come back and rush into print to tell us what Khrushchev intends to do. I wonder if these visitors realize that they are being used by Khrushchev to serve his purposes, which are to confuse, intimidate, and frighten free nations into surrendering to the Communists on their terms.

A fellow Missourian, Mark Twain, once talked of "Innocents Abroad," but he was referring to Americans who went abroad for amusement and not to meddle into foreign affairs. The Kremlin has seized upon the willingness of recent visitors to propagandize this country over the heads of our Government.

It makes it more difficult for the President and the Secretary of State to carry out the established policy of the Government.

MEDDLING DEcriED

All Americans should, of course, be free to travel and meet and converse with anyone they choose, but it is quite another matter when these visits and meetings are used by the Russians to meddle in the business of our constitutional policy makers.

If any of these travelers wish to undertake personal missions, they ought to make sure that they have the approval of the Government of the United States. They should bear in mind that the Logan Act prohibits unauthorized negotiations, formal or informal, by Americans with any foreign powers at any time.

With the present explosive situation between the free and the Communist-slave worlds, the dangers of misunderstanding caused by public statements of prominent Americans, in my judgment, calls for someone to put a stop to these activities.

I am not talking about curbing the fullest reporting by competent and professional reporters, just as I am in favor of giving the widest publicity to all matters pertaining to the conduct of our foreign affairs so that we may have a fully informed public; but what I am opposing is the use of visits to Moscow by prominent people—in or out of public life with no official responsibility for conducting our foreign negotiations—making statements and purporting to speak with some authority to the American people when they who speak, themselves, are not fully informed of all the circumstances involved.

If the President is to conduct our foreign affairs with a strong and firm hand, he cannot tolerate intrusions by unauthorized persons or groups of persons, no matter what their aims. The President is in the best position to know all the facts and conditions in the exercise of his leadership. This is no place for amateurs who get themselves exposed to only one facet of a complicated situation.

Any one of these private interviews with Khrushchev—whether for 15 minutes or 8

hours—is a privileged sanctuary for him, from which he can shake his fist, threaten with missiles and make irresponsible statements with diplomatic immunity.

HARRIMAN CRITICIZED

I have the highest regard for Averell Harriman as a keen observer. He has served his country with distinction. As a matter of fact, he was among the first to sense the trend in Russia's course of hostilities toward the West. I wish that he had reported what transpired between him and Khrushchev to the President or the Secretary of State and stopped there.

Mr. Harriman understood Salin with rare insight and communicated it, as he should have done as Ambassador, to Washington. But I think Khrushchev may have overimpressed him.

I am glad that, at long last, the administration is about to avail itself of the special talents and experience of Chip Bohlen in recalling him to the high councils of the State Department. Ambassador Bohlen not only possesses the knowledge of the Russian language—he knows the Russians.

He should be of great help and strengthen the hand of the Secretary of State. Bohlen acted as my Russian interpreter at the Potsdam Conference. I was impressed with his alertness to shadings and evasion in the translation of Stalin's own interpreter, Pavlov. Frequently, Bohlen would correct the interpretation made by Pavlov and clarify obscure meanings. Salin, too, appreciated Bohlen's performance, for he would smile each time Bohlen corrected Pavlov.

When you caught up with Stalin, he was always easy to deal with, perhaps because he had in the back of his mind that he did not intend to keep his word and his commitments.

**STUDY OF GOVERNMENT POLICY-
 MAKING MACHINERY**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, 3 weeks ago the Senate approved Senate Resolution 115, under which a special subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee is undertaking an unprecedented study of our Government's policymaking machinery for dealing with the cold war. This study has been given front-page treatment and extensive favorable editorial comment in the Nation's press.

I share the conviction of the editorial writers that this study is in excellent hands, under the chairmanship of the distinguished junior Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON].

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a number of editorials and news stories attesting to the importance of this study.

There being no objection, the matters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, July 19, 1959]

**PRESIDENT BACKS SENATORS' STUDY OF POLICY-
 MAKING—HE SHIFTS STAND AND AGREES TO
 FACILITATE INQUIRY ON DEVISING STRATEGY—
 NOT AN INVESTIGATION—LEGISLATORS VOW
 THEY WILL NOT INFRINGE ON ADVISING BY
 NATIONAL COUNCIL**

WASHINGTON, July 18.—President Eisenhower, reversing his earlier opposition, has pledged White House cooperation in a forthcoming congressional study of the Government's organization for reaching national policy decisions.

The President's assurance of cooperation in the unusual congressional inquiry was disclosed today by Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, Democrat, of Washington, who will head

the three-man Senate Government Operations Subcommittee conducting the inquiry.

Senator JACKSON said in a statement that the White House cooperation would make possible an unprecedented congressional study of the adequacy and the shortcomings of the present organization for devising national strategy.

SCHOLARLY EVALUATION

"Never before have the Congress and the executive branch worked together in a scholarly and nonpartisan evaluation of our national policy machinery," the Senator declared.

An exchange of letters with the President made public by the Senator disclosed that President Eisenhower early had serious objections to the proposed inquiry and had expressed his concern in a letter to the Senate majority leader, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Democrat of Texas. From the exchange it was evident that the President was concerned that the inquiry might infringe upon executive privileges and go into the sensitive area of National Security Council deliberations.

To meet these Presidential objections, proposed guidelines for the inquiry were worked out in discussions between Senator JACKSON and Bryce N. Harlow, a Deputy Assistant to the President.

STUDY, NOT INVESTIGATION

The proposed guidelines specify that the inquiry, so far as it relates to the National Security Council, "will be a study, not an investigation" and "will not attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to infringe upon the constitutional privilege of the President to obtain advice through such organization and procedures as he deems appropriate."

The guidelines also state that the study of the National Security Council will be directed to its purposes, composition, organization, and procedures and will not go into substantive matters considered by the council.

In a letter to Senator JACKSON on July 10, the President said that the guidelines "relieve the most serious of the concerns" expressed in his earlier letter to Senator JOHNSON. He gave assurances, therefore, that the White House staff would "work cooperatively with your subcommittee in an effort to help make this study of value not only to the legislative branch but to the executive branch as well."

PRESIDENTIAL STUDY CITED

The President's letter indicated that the study might play a role in the reorganization plans he intended to submit to Congress before retiring from office. At his news conference this week, the President observed that the present organization imposed "unsolvable" burdens upon higher Government officials and said that he planned to submit some reorganization recommendations to Congress so his successor will have the benefit of a better organization.

Senator JACKSON, who is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, has criticized the present policymaking machinery on the ground that it does not "produce clearly defined and purposeful strategy for the 'cold war.'"

He has made some proposals for revising the present organization, including establishment of several policy planning staffs in various Government agencies to relieve the National Security Council of some of its planning responsibilities and creation of a national academy to act as a permanent policy study group in all phases of defense strategy.

FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES SEEN

"The fundamental issues," Senator JACKSON said in his statement today, "is whether a free society can so organize its human and material resources so as to out-

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think, outplan and outperform totalitarianism."

In carrying out its study, the subcommittee plans to hear testimony from officials who have held policymaking jobs in both Republican and Democratic administrations. Preliminary hearings are expected to begin next month.

Senator JACKSON announced the appointment of three men to the subcommittee staff:

Kenneth Mansfield former staff member on the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and now assistant to the director of Combustion Engineering, Inc., of Windsor Conn., who will serve as staff director; Robert W. Tufts, former member of the State Department policy planning staff and now Professor of Economics at Oberlin College, and Greenville Garside, a New York lawyer.

[From the New York Times, July 20, 1959]
A LOOK AT NATIONAL POLICY

Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, Democrat from the State of Washington, believes that today's "fundamental issue is whether a free society can so organize its human and material resources as to outthink, outplan and outperform totalitarianism." He has overcome President Eisenhower's original reluctance to cooperate in a scholarly and nonpartisan evaluation of our national policy machinery.

Anyone who delves into that illuminating publication called the U.S. Government Organization Manual is likely to come out with a headache and a realization of the need for some study of this sort.

The trouble is not that we lack policymaking machinery, especially in the obvious fields of foreign programs and defense. We have the National Security Council, whose members include the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.

We have a Planning Board to formulate policy recommendations to be considered by the Council; we have an Assistant Secretary for Planning in the State Department, with the modest task of evaluating current foreign policy in the formulation of long-range policies; the Office of Defense Mobilization coordinates all mobilization activities of the executive branch of the Government; the Central Intelligence Agency advises the Council concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security, and all the Operations Coordinating Board has to do is to provide for the integrated implementation of national security policies.

In this setup there are little wheels and big wheels. Senator JACKSON, who is a member of the Committee on Government Operations and therefore familiar with the work of the Hoover Commissions, will understand the problems and the difficulties.

A layman might suspect that what the Government needs is a simplified structure of responsibility and command. Who does the original thinking when everybody is either being coordinated or is coordinating somebody else? The Government is overweight, perhaps not so much with squandered money as with overlapping agencies.

Senator JACKSON's three-man Government Operations Subcommittee may get somewhere if he sticks to his announced principles and resists the temptation to put on a circus. A scholarly congressional inquiry would be refreshingly new.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 1959]

PRESIDENT, CONGRESS LAUNCH POLICY VENTURE
(By Neal Stanford)

WASHINGTON.—A unique experiment in legislative-executive cooperation is in the

making, now that President Eisenhower has pledged his support of a forthcoming congressional study of the government's machinery for reaching national policy decisions.

Normal procedure would have resulted in a congressional study—with Senators trying to pry into the administration's mechanics of formulating national policies—and the administration adamant against congressional encroachment.

It is only stating facts to report that the White House was more than a little cool to the original proposal as presented by Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, Democrat, of Washington, who will head the three-man committee making the investigation.

INVESTIGATION OUT

The President was concerned lest the investigation infringe upon executive privileges and get into the sensitive area of specific National Security Council decisions.

It is the NSC—with members including the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the director of the Office of Defense Mobilization—which does the final fact finding and correlation on all major national-security problems.

But after some exchanges, a number of guide lines were agreed to by White House and Senate leadership to keep this from becoming either a witch hunt or a whitewash.

It was agreed that the inquiry would be a study, not an investigation—investigation carrying unsavory overtones.

It also was agreed that the Senators would not attempt in any way to infringe the constitutional prerogatives of the President to seek advice and help in any way he deems appropriate.

And thirdly, it was agreed that the study would not get involved in specific substantive matters considered by the National Security Council—which could only result in aid and comfort to unfriendly powers.

PRESIDENT DISSATISFIED

One reason President Eisenhower—assuring himself of adequate safeguards—was ready to cooperate with the Congress in this matter was disclosed at a recent press conference.

The President let it be known that he is himself quite dissatisfied with some governmental machinery in general and certain features specifically. As he told newsmen, the present machinery imposes unsolvable burdens on government officials.

And he announced that he himself would before long present some reorganization plans with the one purpose of leaving his successor a more workable system.

ISSUE PINPOINTED

No one is arguing that there is not enough "machinery" in the Federal Government to handle decisionmaking. But both White House and Congress are increasingly persuaded that the machinery that exists is inadequate, inefficient, overlapping, and archaic.

In sponsoring this study Senator JACKSON asserted: "The fundamental issue today is whether a free society can so organize its human and material resources as to outthink, outplan, and outperform totalitarianism."

It is his position that the United States and its allies can do just that but not with the present machinery, staff structure, responsibilities.

Members of the Senate making the study are to be: Senator JACKSON, Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Democrat, of Minnesota, and Senator KARL E. MUNDT, Republican, of South Dakota.

In the forthcoming hearings both Democrats and Republicans who have held or hold policymaking jobs in the Government will be heard.

Present machinery for reaching national policy decisions includes such a variety of councils, boards, agencies as: the National

Security Council, the Operations, Coordinating Board, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Bureau of the Budget, the National Aeronautics and Space Council.

OBSCOLESCENCE HIT

The trouble, then, as Senator JACKSON publicly charges and the President suggests, is not there is not enough machinery. It is rather that it is obsolescent.

Senator JACKSON hails the President's cooperative effort in this congressional inquiry as "unprecedented."

"Never before have the Congress and the executive branch worked together in a scholarly and nonpartisan evaluation of our national policy machinery," the Senator declared.

And, just as neither branch of Government can be expected to have a monopoly of wisdom, neither can either political party, as the Senator puts it, "have a monopoly of wisdom or a monopoly of error on this vital matter."

If the two parties and the two branches of Government carry through this study as envisaged it can indeed claim to be something unprecedented—as the Senator claims.

[From the Spokane Spokesman Review, July 20, 1959]

A FAIR AGREEMENT FOR POLICY STUDY

President Eisenhower and Washington's Senator HENRY M. JACKSON have pledged mutual cooperation between Congress and the executive branch in the conduct of an unusual evaluation of the purpose and operations of the national security council.

As chairman of a subcommittee on national policy machinery of the Senate Government Operations committee, Mr. JACKSON secured Senate approval last week of a resolution authorizing this study.

According to the Senate-White House agreement, this is not to be an investigation of the national security council. It is planned as a study into the "effectiveness of Government organization and procedure in the contest with world communism."

In pressing for this evaluation, Mr. JACKSON stated that "the fundamental issue is whether a free society can so organize its human and material resources so as to outthink, outplan and outperform totalitarianism."

Following conferences with White House officials, certain guidelines for the study were established and these were deemed satisfactory to the President in his correspondence with the Senator.

This is a vital field for consideration by both the executive and legislative branches of the Government. Mr. JACKSON should be encouraged to keep this study on a nonpartisan basis and to effect searching appraisal of how the United States can best utilize its superior talents and resources to strengthen America—militarily, diplomatically, economically and psychologically—in the contest that confronts this Nation and its people.

[From the Providence Journal, July 21, 1959]
STATESMANSHIP AT ITS BEST IN WASHINGTON

The agreement between President Eisenhower and Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, Democrat, of Washington, concerning a study of the policymaking machinery of the U.S. Government represents statesmanship of the highest order.

It is impossible to tell in advance, of course, how the study will be conducted or what it may disclose. But there is ample evidence of the need to take a long, hard look, as Senator JACKSON puts it, at the question of "whether a free society can so organize its human and material resources as to outthink, out-plan and out-perform totalitarianism." The decision to make the inquiry a joint undertaking of the legisla-

tive and executive branches should assure its scope and depth.

When Senator JACKSON first proposed that a three-man subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee might look into the functioning of the National Security Council, the President properly and understandably was alarmed. As he pointed out in a letter of objection to the majority leader, Senator JOHNSON, Democrat, of Texas, a congressional investigation of the usual sort in that area almost certainly would infringe upon executive privileges and risk the disclosure of sensitive information.

In negotiations between Senator JACKSON and a presidential assistant, however, it was found that guidelines for the inquiry could be established. One specifies that the subcommittee will conduct "a study, not an investigation" of the workings of the National Security Council. Another provides that the congressional group will "not attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to infringe upon the constitutional privilege of the President to obtain advice through such organization and procedures as he deems appropriate." The fact that the study is to be headed by a responsible and informed Senator like Mr. JACKSON is the best guarantee that these necessary limitations will be observed.

A third guideline stipulates that the study will be confined to the purposes, composition, organization, and procedures of the National Security Council but will not touch any substantive matters decided by the Council. This could come close to frustrating the entire undertaking. For example, Senator JACKSON may want to learn whether we have overinvested in nuclear power to fit the doctrine of "massive retaliation," and have underinvested in the kinds of balanced, mobile conventional-nuclear power most necessary to serve our political purposes under the still operative but unpopular doctrine of containment. It is difficult to see how he can get answers to such vital questions if he is obliged to consider the policy-making apparatus entirely in the abstract.

The hope that the study will be permitted to deal with some specific matters rests on President Eisenhower's pledge that the White House staff will work cooperatively with your subcommittee. Having taken the necessary precautions to prevent an irresponsible congressional intrusion into executive functions in the fields of foreign policy and military strategy, the President now says he is anxious to make this study of value not only to the legislative branch but to the executive branch as well.

If it is to have such value, it must have enough freedom to determine by examining the evidence how well the policymaking machinery is working. Senator JACKSON suspects that it has not produced clearly defined and purposeful strategy for the cold war. This is a legitimate subject for a congressional inquiry, provided it is conducted with scrupulous care and receives the cooperation of the executive. Both sides deserve credit for recognizing these requirements.

[From the Washington Post, July 22, 1959]

A LOOK AT POLICY FORMATION

The potential value of the study of governmental machinery for the shaping of national policy has been greatly enhanced by the decision of President Eisenhower to cooperate with the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee in this undertaking. White House participation in the study became feasible when Senator JACKSON, chairman of the subcommittee, agreed with Bryce N. Harlow, Deputy Assistant to the President, on a set of guidelines. The result could well be the most valuable survey of

national policy formation that has ever been undertaken.

Neither the congressional leadership nor the White House is wholly satisfied with the present system for the formulation of major national security policies, although the machinery has been substantially improved in recent years. Mr. Eisenhower indicated at his last news conference that he will send reorganization plans to Congress during his last year in office in the hope that his successor will be given a better organization to work with than he has had. Senator JACKSON and other leaders on Capitol Hill also have some definite ideas of how the country's best talents may be mobilized in the present struggle against the spread of totalitarianism. At least these ideas can now be brought together in a thoughtful and nonpartisan search for agencies and relationships that will best promote the national interest.

The study will not be an investigation. It will not be concerned with the problems before the National Security Council but rather with how that agency operates as an instrument for the shaping of international policies and defense planning. It would be a happy outcome, indeed, if the study should produce a plan satisfactory to both the congressional leaders and the White House, which would give virtual assurance of its enactment.

[From the Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 23, 1959]

WASHINGTON COMMENTARY—REFORMING NATIONAL SECURITY METHODS (By Max Freedman)

WASHINGTON, July 21.—President Eisenhower made the right decision when he agreed to support Senator JACKSON's study of the Government's procedures in establishing national security programs. It did not require weeks of reflection in the executive branch to reach the conclusion that Senator JACKSON would conduct a responsible study of the National Security Council rather than a destructive investigation. His entire record in Congress, together with his special interest in defense problems, confirms his credentials as one of the most reliable and useful Members of the Senate. More than the usual measure of responsibility rests, in a study of this kind, on the staff director. It is therefore a matter for general rejoicing that Senator JACKSON has been able to persuade Mr. Kenneth Mansfield to return to Washington for this duty. During his years of service with the congressional Committee on Atomic Energy he was universally regarded as an official whose rare intellectual gifts were enhanced by his austere and disinterested concepts of public duty. It will be good to have him in Washington again.

Senator JACKSON, like many other responsible students of government, has criticized the National Security Council because it often fails to debate and to decide the crucial issues of policy. All too frequently the problem, when it reaches the Council, is presented in the form of an agreed compromise. This procedure prevents the President and the Council from seeing the question in all its tangled and urgent complexity. Senator JACKSON has suggested more planning staffs for the departments, so that they will be able to make the strongest possible case for the Council's judgment. These departments in turn can often exact a responsible and searching decision by the Council, for it will know that its policy will be subject to friendly but detailed review by independent experts.

More administrative machinery will not solve very much. The project of reform will collapse in failure if the members of the Council do not accept the painful duty of

making the ultimate national decisions which they alone are qualified to make. But at least Senator JACKSON wants to give them a fair chance by improving the methods of consultation with the various departments, by presenting the opposed issues with challenging clarity, and by producing the necessary information for a candid and courageous debate. Senator JACKSON deserved the President's support, if only for this high purpose.

When he discussed this whole question in April before the National War College. Senator JACKSON regretted the lack of planning throughout the executive branch. Officials are inclined to leave this task to the National Security Council or to agencies that are given specific duties. The result can be seen in the absence of ideas for new policies. A great deal of talent in the Government is never used. The National Security Council itself is most active after a crisis has burst upon Washington. It usually shows less wisdom and less zeal in applying the policies which will prevent a dangerous situation from slipping out of control. It requires no morbid precision of memory to recall numerous episodes in recent American policy that confirm the accuracy of Senator JACKSON's analysis. One proof that the indictment has hit the mark is provided by the special commissions and study groups doing the work which should be done by the National Security Council if it were functioning properly.

President Eisenhower's guarded and enigmatic remarks at his recent press conference have been taken to mean that his personal discontent with existing procedures will lead him to propose a detailed reorganization plan to Congress next year. There will be no conflict between the President's proposals and the Senator's study. Both will try to strengthen the Government for the diverse tasks of peace and for the constant challenge of Communist power.

Senator JACKSON has suggested that the staff of the National Security Council be reorganized so that it would consist of the heads of the policy-planning staffs in the departments. These men would have direct access at all times to their departmental chief and would be responsible to them. He believes this kind of staff would be better prepared to define issues in a way that would compel responsible decisions by the council than is the present staff which is responsible to an independent director. This change would be frankly designed "to force the chiefs of departments and the President to make the choices between alternatives that they should make." The Secretary of State would have a central role on the council, as it would be his duty to make the first presentation in which the choices of policy are defined.

Another suggestion calls for the establishment of an Academy of National Policy. This agency would be outside the Government, but it could see secret information. It would conduct special investigations for the confidential use of the Government. Many of its reports could be published, for the academy would have as one of its tasks the preparation of public opinion in understanding the issues which would one day have to be settled by the National Security Council. Being a permanent agency, consisting of nationally respected citizens and having easy access to the thinking of the Government's leading officials, the academy might come to exercise a central influence in the development of policy.

Senator JACKSON has not intended either to anticipate or to limit the results of his forthcoming study. The inquiry may begin next month but it will almost certainly run into next year. Few activities in Washington will better reward thoughtful attention.

1959

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 26, 1959]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL COMES UNDER PUBLIC STUDY BY U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE—GOVERNMENT'S HIGHEST POLICY ADVISORY GROUP CALLED A DANGEROUSLY MISLEADING FACADE BY A SENATORIAL CRITIC—LONG-TERM PLANNING SAID TO BE NEGLECTED—NIXON INCIDENT IS CITED

(By Raymond P. Brandt)

WASHINGTON, July 25.—With limited cooperation promised by President Eisenhower, a Senate subcommittee is preparing for the first public study of the National Security Council, the highest policy advisory group in the Government.

Chairman of the three-man subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee is Democratic Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, of Washington, a severe but constructive critic of the Council's setup, recommendations and operations. He is also a member of the Armed Services and the Joint Atomic Energy Committees. The other members are Democrat HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, of Minnesota, a member also of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Republican KARL E. MUNDT, of South Dakota, also on the Appropriations Committee.

JACKSON is convinced that the Security Council has failed, under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, to live up to its promises and potentialities envisioned when it was established as an integral part of the 1947 National Security Act.

"As it now functions," he told the Post-Dispatch, "the NSC is a dangerously misleading facade. The American people and even the Congress get the impression that when the Council meets, fresh and unambiguous strategies are decided upon. That's not the case though it ought to be. The NSC spends most of its time readying papers that mean all things to all men.

"As a result, national decision making becomes in fact a series of ad hoc, spur of moment, crash actions, when there is action at all. Because the NSC does not produce positively worded strategy and see that it is carried out, the handling of day-to-day problems is necessarily left to the departments concerned. Each goes its own way because purposeful, hard-driving, goal-directed strategy, which alone can give cutting edge to day-to-day tactical operations, is lacking."

A minor but timely example of the lack of executive branch foresight was the coincidence of Vice President Nixon's arrival in Moscow Thursday to open the American fair, with President Eisenhower's proclamation for a Week of Prayer for the nations held captive by Russian communism.

For their own political purpose the Kremlin undoubtedly would have found other ways to downgrade the Nixon goodwill gesture if this Government had not given Khrushchev and Pravda a readymade target for propaganda blasts.

Nixon's trip to Russia was a high-level policy decision. It was not the Security Council's function to try to guess what probable counter actions the Kremlin would take. That would be the job of the lower level Operations Coordinating Board which is expected to see that the approved policy is carried out in the most effective way. The coincidence of the visit and the proclamation probably was an accident.

But the accident could have been avoided if someone in the State Department, the U.S. Information Service, or Central Intelligence, all represented on the Coordinating Board, had been able to delay the issuance of the proclamation until after Nixon's visit.

JACKSON wants the Council to act in accordance with Bernard M. Baruch's personal definition of a speculator as "a person who sees what is going to happen and does something about it." Baruch emphasizes that

the doing something is just as important as seeing what is going to happen.

The Council, which in potentialities ranks higher than the Cabinet, is headed by the President, who presides at weekly meetings when he is in Washington. The other statutory members are Vice President Nixon, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy, and Director Leo A. Hoegh, of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

The Council's papers are only advisory recommendations to the President who constitutionally is responsible for foreign policy. Once he has signed them, however, they become operational directives to the departments and agencies, primarily State, Defense, OCDM, and the U.S. Information Agency.

In practice, about 10 other high ranking officials, backed by their experts, attend the Council meetings. They include Treasury Secretary Anderson, Attorney General William P. Rogers, Budget Director Maurice H. Stans, Chairman Raymond Saulnier of the President's economic advisers, Gordon Gray, Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs, General Nathan Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director George V. Allen, of the USA, and Director Allen W. Dulles, of the Central Intelligence Agency. These officials do not have a vote on policy papers.

The meetings, which last from 2 to 3 hours, are almost invariably opened by Dulles with a briefing on the latest international intelligence. Its agenda is handled by Gray, who is a principal member both of the planning staff, composed of experts from various departments and agencies, and the Operations Coordinating Board, of which an Under Secretary of State is chairman.

The Jackson resolution authorizing the study of the NSC setup was unanimously approved by the Senate July 14 and carried with it an appropriation of \$60,000. Preliminary work has already been started by a three-man expert staff and public hearings may be held within a few months. The first report must be made by January 31. The subcommittee's life probably will be extended.

President Eisenhower agreed to cooperate with the study only if rather severe limitations were accepted by the subcommittee. These were worked out between Jackson and Bryce N. Harlow, the President's deputy assistant.

In summary, these conditions were:

1. The inquiry will be a study, not an investigation.
 2. The testimony of executive branch officials must not deal with substantive considerations before the Council or its subordinate machinery.
 3. The study will be confined to matters involving purposes, composition, organization and procedures, all subject to appropriate safeguards regarding classified projects.
 4. All testimony by present and former officials who have served on the NSC and its subordinate bodies will first be taken in executive session. Decision as to later public hearings and release of testimony will be agreed upon by the committee and a representative of the President.
- On June 25, Mr. Eisenhower wrote to Senate Majority Leader LYNDON B. JOHNSON what, in effect, was a protest against the resolution. This letter has not been made public but it expressed a natural concern that an investigation might get into the sensitive area of President's foreign policy responsibilities and undermine the usefulness of the Council itself.

After the subcommittee guidelines had been agreed upon, the President wrote Jackson that within those bounds his staff, including personnel of the NSC organization would cooperate to help make this study of value not only to the legislative branch but to the executive branch as well.

Commenting on this letter, JACKSON said Mr. Eisenhower had made a "major contribution" to the study which should produce some practical results in the national interest.

JACKSON's concept of the NSC organization and the President's responsibilities for foreign policy and national security is much more comprehensive than Mr. Eisenhower's.

His basic complaint is that we are losing the cold war when we could be winning it. Committee after committee, he points out, has proposed programs to fortify our position in the cold war, for every new crisis we seem to get a new committee.

"It is a formidable list," he observes, "for example the Finletter committee, the Gray committee, the Paley commission, the Sarnoff commission, the President's Committee on Scientists and Engineers, Citizens Advisers on Mutual Security, the Gaither committee, the Draper committee, the Boeschstein committee—not to mention the Committee on Economic Development and the study groups of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

"Over and over again these committees warn that we are losing the cold war. Their reports are not refuted, neither are they acted upon. They are simply referred to some other committee for 'study'."

JACKSON believes that policy planning staffs should be set up in each major department and agency, "with a position, role, and prestige" like that of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department during the Truman Administration. He would also consider establishing an "academy of nation policy" outside the Government, the equivalent of a permanent Gaither committee, which would have access to classified information.

The Washington Senator does not expect immediate radical changes in the NSC organization as a result of the subcommittee study. Much will depend on who is elected President next year because the NSC is an intimate advisory group for the President.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 2, 1959]
NEW APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY—COMMITTEE TO STUDY U.S. PLANNING

(By Russell Baker)

WASHINGTON, August 1. — Without fanfare, the machinery has begun to roll here for a joint White House-Congressional undertaking that could be of immense importance in the decade ahead.

The object is review and possible revision of the fundamental processes through which the United States Government makes and carries out the highest national policy.

The prime mover is Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, Democrat, of Washington, who has been arguing for months that the existing cumbersome and labyrinthine bureaucracy charged with policymaking has proved a dismal failure against the peculiar challenge of cold war.

A few weeks ago Senator JACKSON finally found an influential and not unenthusiastic supporter for his thesis that it was time at least to start reexamining the policymaking machinery.

President Eisenhower, after an initial coolness toward the project promised White House cooperation in a nonpolitical Senate study that will examine and recommend improvements in the present system.

The study will be managed by a three-man panel of the Senate's Government Operations Committee. Senator JACKSON is the chairman. His colleagues will be Senators HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Democrat, of Minnesota, and KARL E. MUNDT, Republican, of South Dakota.

STAFF READY

The President has assigned Charles A. Haskins, senior staff member of the National Security Council, to work closely

with them. A professional staff has already been assembled and is at work. A few hearings may be held later this summer but the bulk of the work that will attract public notice is unlikely to begin until early 1960.

Behind these unstartling facts lie problems and issues of the greatest sensitivity and the most profound importance. National security policy touches in some degree, every activity of public life and lies at the heart of most contemporary political controversy.

Into its formulation go questions great and small: How extensive a military commitment will national resources safely permit? What should be the policy toward the Middle East? Would the psychological value of an expensive technological demonstration justify expenditures that threaten the economy's stability? What are the United States' long-term goals in the cold war? Is it wise to build a grain elevator in Pakistan and deny Idaho's demand for a new dam?

Ideally, the thousands of daily decisions made by the executive branch would conform to a set of policy guidelines charted by the President in consultation with his highest advisers, the whole directed toward moving the Nation along a defined course toward an understood goal.

AGREED GOALS

Obviously this directed course would be impossible and unthinkable in a nontotalitarian state, even if it were blessed with a leader of the omniscience required to chart it.

In an effort to fit democratic government for a prolonged competition with totalitarianism, Congress and the President have gradually created a system of organizations where, in theory, agreed goals are synthesized from the constant clash of ideas and interests within government, and where alternatives are prepared for the President to weigh when he must make an important decision in crisis.

Senator JACKSON's charge is that the organization has fatal flaws for the cold war situation. President Eisenhower, through his recent discussion of the need for well defined national goals, of the lack of time for top Government men to think, and of the need for a White House reorganization after 1960, has indicated his own dissatisfaction with the present system.

"The central issue of our time," Senator JACKSON said in a speech to the National War College in April, "is can a free society so organize its human and material resources as to outperform totalitarianism?"

"Come a crisis, we may arouse ourselves to take emergency action," he said. "We appoint a science adviser to the President, we rush wheat to India, we improvise an airlift to Lebanon, we consent to a summit meeting. But at no time are the vital energies of our people fully engaged. * * * At no time are the tasks of the cold war presented in terms that are meaningful to men at the work bench, to shopkeepers, to children in school, and to housewives."

FLAW NOTED

Directly under the President at present are the Cabinet and the National Security Council with its subsidiary Planning Board and Operations Coordinating Board. In addition, there are the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon, the offices of the Secretaries of State and Defense, various departmental planning staffs, hundreds of advisory boards, steering groups, interdepartmental committees and special Presidential committees.

Under the organization charts, the Planning Board of the NSC plans new policies and programs which are then considered by the appropriate department heads before an agreed paper is presented to the NSC. The NSC functions as a presiden-

tial advisory board. Decision rests with the President.

The agreed policy is then carried out under the supervision of the Operations Coordinating Board.

Senator JACKSON contends that the flaw in this picture is that the NSC simply does not operate as the charts depict. In fact, he argues, NSC papers are inevitably no more than compromises worked out among conflicting departments and, therefore, lacking in the "sharply defined policy issues and choices" that a President should have before him.

CRASH ACTION

"An NSC paper is commonly so ambiguous and so general that the issues must all be renegotiated when the situation to which it was supposed to apply actually arises," he said in his War College speech.

As a result, he contends, high decision-making becomes a series of "crash actions."

The NSC was established by Congress in 1947 but it has not been subject to congressional study since. Senator JACKSON, realizing the sensitive area he will be treading, has agreed with the President that his study is to be apolitical, without attempts to embarrass or sensationalize, and dedicated to strengthening the hand of the President of the future, to whichever party he may belong.

The prospect for headlines is dim. The opportunity for Senator JACKSON to make a significant contribution to the art of Government is enormous.

HUMAN NEEDS IN URBAN SOCIETY

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. President, my interest was recently caught by a statement of Dr. Karl Menninger, the famed chief of staff of the Menninger Foundation at Topeka, Kans., that wilderness and near wilderness areas are essential to the mental health of both children and adults.

Upon inquiry about the statement, Dr. Menninger sent me the text of an article he wrote for the Architectural Record of July 1959, on "Human Needs in Urban Society," where the statement is made.

I ask unanimous consent to have the text of Dr. Menninger's article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PLANNING FOR AN INCREASING LEISURE— HUMAN NEEDS IN URBAN SOCIETY

(By Karl Menninger¹)

If a psychiatrist were to be interviewed by a group of architects and builders, they might ask him some such question as this: "There are many of us engaged in the sciences and arts involved in planning and building houses, schools, factories, subdivisions and cities. Our aim in the long view is the more complete fulfillment of human needs insofar as these depend upon physical structures. For our guidance we must depend upon the experience of previous failures, failures which we can analyze and try to make provision against in the ever-opening future. In this way, we believe, we create more and more stately mansions and more and more comfortable human colonies.

¹ Dr. Menninger is chief of staff of the Menninger Foundation in Topeka, Kans. He is the author of "The Human Mind," "Man Against Himself," "Love Against Hate," and many other books and papers. This paper is based on an address given at the National Construction Industry Conference, December 1, 1958, in Chicago.

"The failures from which we have learned least are the human failures, the individual citizens who, for all our diligent planning and provision, nevertheless fall sick, turn back from their goals and even attack the very community which has given them life. About such failures we expect psychiatrists to have something to say to us, because psychiatrists see these failures. Of course lawyers see them too, and clergymen and general physicians. But psychiatrists see more of them than anyone, especially of those whose behavior suggests a deep frustration of human needs and purposes. Some of the lacks in these damaged lives may reflect an omission or an error in the planning and building of human habitations. What can you, a psychiatrist, tell us that will help us to know how to plan and build better for people?"

This is not the kind of question which psychiatrists ordinarily must answer. In practice, we are usually faced with an immediate problem of damage done. Frustrations have become unbearable; disappointments, temptations, and aggressions have overwhelmed control. Reactions have occurred which necessitate special maneuvers by the doctor, from consolation to hospitalization or even incarceration. This is our daily practice. In theory, a few research projects have been developed which engage the cooperation of sociologists, but psychiatry for the most part concentrates upon the individual's capacity to make the best of his situation, whatever it may be.

We have made some progress away from the ancient notion that behavior programs are inherited along with the family silver and Grandmother Wright's asthma. We are not quite in agreement with the Russian psychiatrists for whom it is an axiom that nothing is inherited, but we no longer use heredity as a whipping boy or an alibi. Nor do we go along with the Russians in dispensing with individual responsibility, picturesquely and improperly labelled "free will." But most psychiatrists throughout the world would probably concur that much human maladjustment—or let us just say crime and illness—is directly related to social structures, social pathology, and social improvidences. I am using the word social here in a sense which includes the work of architects, engineers, and builders.

HUMAN NEEDS: BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

In speaking of human needs generally, I would divide them into biological needs such as the need for air and preferably unpolluted air; for food and preferably fresh and not too expensive food; for water—and need I say unpolluted water and easily available water; for temperature control; for sleep undisturbed by noise, alarms, movement and the like; for bathing; for clothes storing (I am including this as a biological need); for exercise of various kinds; for excretory convenience and privacy. For all of these I know architects try to provide.

To these more classical biological needs I would add the psychological needs. Of these the most important are for maintaining contacts of different degrees of intensity and intermittency with other human beings, i.e., very intimate (as in the family), moderately intimate (as with friends) and less intimate (as with acquaintances of different groupings.) There is also a need to have some privacy and retreat from all of these.

The long childhood in the human species requires special provisions for the proper nurture, protection and training of the baby, little child, older child and teenager. These may be considered psychological needs considering our state of cultural development. They require certain places in the home, places in the neighborhood to play and to go to school and, ideally, a place in the neighborhood to do some kind of work.