

EHRlichman SAYS PRESIDENT KNEW OF FUNDS INQUIRY

Asserts Nixon Was Fearful 6 Days After Watergate of Action by the F.B.I.

THREAT TO C.I.A. IS SEEN

Former Top Aide Is First to Testify in Congress on Democratic Break-In

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 30 — John D. Ehrlichman told a Senate subcommittee today that President Nixon knew six days after the Watergate break-in that Federal agents were investigating "Mexican aspects" of the case.

Mr. Ehrlichman was Mr. Nixon's chief domestic adviser until he resigned April 30. He was one of the few men in the White House to see the President regularly.

Mr. Ehrlichman was the first of the President's present or former top aides to testify before a Congressional committee on the Watergate affair.

The "Mexican aspects" of which Mr. Ehrlichman spoke involved the transfer of \$89,000 from the President's re-election committee through a bank in Mexico City into the hands of the Watergate burglars.

National Security Cited

Mr. Ehrlichman said that he did not know whether Mr. Nixon knew shortly after the burglary at the Democratic headquarters that the break-in had been financed by money from his re-election campaign.

In a statement to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations and in comments to newsmen afterward, Mr. Ehrlichman affirmed the President's statement that any interference by the White House in the Watergate investigation was a result of the President's concern about endangering national security.

ators that the President had been worried that the investigation of the Watergate break-in might expose covert intelligence operations in Mexico.

A Meeting With Helms

Because of that concern, Mr. Ehrlichman said, the President ordered him and H. R. Haldeman, the White House chief of staff, to meet with the top officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and to have them tell the Federal Bureau of Investigation to call off the investigation in Mexico if C.I.A. operations would be endangered.

In his statement last week, Mr. Nixon acknowledged having ordered Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman "to insure that the investigation of the break-in not expose . . . an unrelated covert operation of the C.I.A."

Mr. Ehrlichman said today that on June 23, 1972, six days after the burglary, he and Mr. Haldeman met with Richard Helms, then director of Central Intelligence, and Lieut. Gen. Vernon Walters, Mr. Helm's deputy, in Mr. Ehrlichman's office.

General Walters was directed to meet with L. Patrick Gray 3d, then acting director of the F.B.I., to tell Mr. Gray of the President's concern, according to Mr. Ehrlichman's statement.

About 10 days later, Mr. Ehrlichman said, General Walters reported that there was no C.I.A. operation in Mexico that would be imperiled by the F.B.I. investigation. But Mr. Ehrlichman said that the President did not believe General Walters.

"The President told me then that he still personally believed and feared that the F.B.I. investigation might harm the agency," Mr. Ehrlichman told the committee. Mr. Ehrlichman continued:

"He said he believed the C.I.A. would be making a mistake if it pretended an investigation would not disclose some of its current operations. He said he hoped the general and other C.I.A. management were not covering up for their subordinates.

"The President said substantially: A man makes a grave mistake in covering up for subordinates. That was President Truman's error in the [Alger] Hiss case when he instructed the F.B.I. not to cooperate."

Mr. Nixon ordered Mr. Gray to conduct a "full investigation," Mr. Ehrlichman said.

Mr. Ehrlichman met with the subcommittee for nearly three hours.

sas Democrat who is the panel's chairman, said that the former Presidential aide would be called back for more questioning. Tomorrow, Mr. Haldeman is to appear before the subcommittee.

Mr. McClellan said that further testimony from Mr. Ehrlichman was necessary because "serious and conflicting allegations have been received regarding attempts to involve the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Pentagon papers cases."

Mr. McClellan was referring to Mr. Ehrlichman's contention that he did not ask the agency to provide E. Howard Hunt Jr. with paraphernalia that Hunt allegedly used to break into the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist in the summer of 1971. Hunt was subsequently one of those who pleaded guilty to the Watergate conspiracy.

Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., deputy director of the C.I.A. in 1971 and now commandant of the Marine Corps, submitted an affidavit to a House subcommittee May 11 in which he stated:

"About 7 July 1971 Mr. John Ehrlichman of the White House called me and stated that Howard Hunt was a bona fide employe, a consultant on security matters and that Hunt would come to see me and request assistance which Mr. Ehrlichman requested that I give."

General Cushman swore to a similar statement before Senator McClellan's subcommittee.

But Mr. Ehrlichman said today that he did not have the "faintest recollection" of having made such a telephone call and that it was "extremely improbable" that he had done so.

Mr. Ehrlichman gave the Senate subcommittee memorandums from General Cushman written last January in which the generals said that he did not know who made the call to him.

Mr. Ehrlichman said that he first found out about the burglary of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding of

Hills, Calif., "probably a week or more after the occurrence."

But Mr. Ehrlichman said that he did not tell President Nixon about the matter and that the President had learned of it "relatively recently."

The break-in "was at that time oppressed with a very sensitive national security characteristic as far as were concerned and as well as the investigating authorities were concerned and continued to be oppressed with that characteristic until very recently," Mr. Ehrlichman said in response to a question from newsmen.

Mr. Ehrlichman appeared before the Senators in a closed session, but his 19-page opening statement to the committee was released.

The McClellan subcommittee is investigating whether any pressure was exerted on the C.I.A. to cover up the Watergate case.

In addition to Mr. Haldeman, the McClellan panel plans to call Charles W. Colson and Egil Krogh Jr., both former White House assistants.

Other ranking aides, such as John N. Mitchell, former Attorney General, Maurice H. Stans, former Commerce Secretary, and John W. Dean 3d, former Presidential counsel, are expected to testify in the next several weeks before the special Senate committee investigating the entire Watergate case.

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Ehrlichman, CIA Clash

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

John D. Ehrlichman's Senate testimony disclosing President Nixon's role in ordering CIA officials last June to curb an FBI investigation relating to Watergate appears to conflict with earlier testimony, raising a series of new questions.

Some of these questions are due for exploration today when H. R. Halderman, the former Nixon chief of staff who conducted the June 23 meeting Ehrlichman described, presents his version before the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on intelligence operations.

Ehrlichman's testimony before that committee yesterday left its chairman, John L. McClellan, D-Ark., indicating he was half persuaded that the meeting was not only "at the instance of the President" but that Nixon knew CIA officials would be ordered to block an on-going probe of Mexican funds that eventually linked the Watergate burglars directly to the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

THE MEXICAN transaction involved the shifting of \$89,000 in Nixon campaign donations through Mexico, in an apparent effort to conceal their source. Ultimately, the funds wound up in the campaign treasury after moving through the bank account of one of the Watergate conspirators.

Ehrlichman, speaking to reporters yesterday, followed Nixon's lead of last week in seeking to justify the meeting with CIA officials in the name of "national security" operations that might be hindered if the FBI were allowed to conduct a vigorous probe of Watergate.

He also tried to shift to John W. Dean III, the ousted White House counsel,

any blame for "improper suggestions" which according to earlier accounts had been made to CIA officials. These included a proposal that the agency use "covert action funds" to pay bail for the Watergate burglars and also to put them on the CIA payroll while they were in jail.

Following another dominant theme in Nixon's statement of last week, Ehrlichman also cited a strong fear of leaks to the press as a reason for limiting the FBI investigation. "We were suffering from extensive hemorrhaging by the FBI," the former White House domestic chief said, referring to press accounts of on-going FBI investigations.

Ehrlichman specifically declined either to deny or assert that it was the President himself who specified that the FBI's potentially embarrassing probe of the Mexican finances be interrupted for the sake of CIA operations.

"I honestly can't recall," Ehrlichman told reporters. "I can't say whether that subject came from the President or came from those of us who were at the meeting."

IN ADDITION to this comment and the question it raises, Ehrlichman's version of the CIA transaction posed specific conflicts with earlier accounts by former CIA director Richard M. Helms and CIA deputy director Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters.

Ehrlichman said Walters was ordered to warn the FBI off the Mexico probe only after Helms and Walters were unable to "make us a flat assurance" there was no danger that the FBI investigation would jeopardize CIA operations. Walters even "left a very clear impression" there might be such a danger, Ehrlichman said.

But Walters and Helms have substantially agreed,

account that Walters gave in a sworn and notarized affidavit: "It had been decided at the White House that I would go to acting FBI director Gray and tell him that now that the five (Watergate) suspects were arrested, further enquiries into the Mexican aspects of this matter might jeopardize some of the CIA's covert activities in that area."

In a confidential in-house memorandum of that meeting which has been turned over to congressional committees examining the CIA-Watergate link, Walters remembered being told "it is the President's wish" that he go to Gray with this plea.

Helms has told both the McClellan committee and Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi's House intelligence subcommittee that he conferred with Gray on the CIA-Watergate link June 22 — one day before the meeting Nixon ordered in Ehrlichman's office.

McCLELLAN indicated he is confident Gray was told that day that "there was no problem" relating to CIA operations. Nedzi, D-Mich., likewise is convinced that Helms told Gray "there was no way an FBI investigation of Watergate could affect their (that is, CIA) covert projects."

It is not clear whether Helms was speaking directly of the Mexican investigation, which is known to have been in progress by the June 23 meeting.

In testimony a week ago before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Helms recalled being asked either "before that day or after that day" by the FBI to check out Manuel Ogarrio Daguerre, a Mexican lawyer involved in the Mexico City fund transfer. Helms did so, he testified, and learned that Ogarrio "had no relationship with the agency of any kind."

In testimony a week ago, however, Walters

was described as so unsure about the effect of FBI activities on CIA operations that, with Helms present in the room during the June 23 meeting, he

was ordered to go to Gray to warn him.

Walters "left a very clear impression with us of the strong possibility of a vigorous investigation uncovering some secret of a national security character such as the President was concerned about," Ehrlichman said yesterday, adding: "If he hadn't, we wouldn't have sent him over there."

As to the Mexican connection, Ehrlichman hinted it may have been Gray himself who brought that up. "My understanding . . . has been that the FBI was aware of the Mexican connection, so to speak," Ehrlichman said, "and they had raised the question of whether or not there might be a CIA connection."

ON THE SAME day of the White House meeting with Helms and Walters, the first public knowledge of the Mexican connection surfaced in federal court during a routine bond hearing for the men caught inside the Watergate on June 17, only six days before. At the hearing it was revealed that a Miami bank draft linked to Bernard L. Barker, one of the burglars, had been traced to a bank in Mexico City.

Despite the key role the Mexico connection was to play in Walters' and Helms' recollection of the episode, Ehrlichman's version appeared to be vague on that point.

"Walters," he recalled, "was never asked to limit anything. He was asked to impart the information which he had or could get to the FBI in order that

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Ehrlichman blames deputy of CIA for agency coverup

Post News Services

WASHINGTON — Former White House adviser John D. Ehrlichman Wednesday blamed the Central Intelligence Agency's deputy director, Vernon Walters, for the CIA's role in the Watergate coverup.

Ehrlichman also said he can't recall asking the CIA to help E. Howard Hunt, challenging testimony by former CIA deputy Robert Cushman. Ehrlichman, who quit as chief White House domestic adviser last April 30, testified behind closed doors to the intelligence subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. He later gave

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newsmen a 17-page transcript of his prepared testimony.

Subcommittee Chairman

John McClellan, D-Md., said later there has been seriously conflicting testimony in his hearings. He scheduled former White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman for an appearance Thursday.

Ehrlichman's statement dealt with two matters. One was the 1971 burglary by

Hunt and others of Dr. Lewis F. Powell, a justice last who read Powell's reports before that Justice Powell. The cover-up was meant to limit the FBI's investigation of last year's notorious wiretapping.

Ehrlichman's account of the

Watergate matter generally supports a statement by President Nixon last week. Nixon said he ordered Ehrlichman and Haldeman to ensure that the FBI's investigations into Watergate didn't uncover secret operations by the CIA or White House agents.

Ehrlichman said Walters and CIA Director Richard Helms met with him and Haldeman in late June, 1972. Helms and Walters said the CIA hadn't been involved in Watergate and that an FBI investigation wouldn't uncover any past CIA operations.

But Ehrlichman said Walters gave an "equivocal response" to a question about whether any ongoing CIA activities in Mexico might be uncovered. Walters was then ordered to contact acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III and "give him all the facts."

Gray has testified that Walters told him to postpone FBI interviews with two men, one of them a Mexican lawyer, whose checks supplied a financial link between the Watergate wiretappers and the Nixon re-election committee. Gray said Ehrlichman interfered with his efforts to straighten the matter out, and that he once warned Nixon that he was being mortally wounded by men around him.

Ehrlichman pointed the matter as a misunderstanding. "In retrospect, had General Walters at the June 1972 meeting said to Mr. Haldeman and me the things he apparently said later, ... Had we been told flatly there was no 'Mexican connection' to the CIA at that time, that would have ended the matter as far as I was concerned," Ehrlichman said.

On the Ellsberg matter, Ehrlichman would not flatly contradict the testimony of former CIA deputy director Cushman, but he said he has no evidence or recollection to support it.

In other developments:

• Chief U.S. District Court Judge John J. Sirica signed a 90-day delay of immunity for Dean and Magruder. The order will keep them from testifying in the Senate Watergate hearings until at least June 18.

• Supreme Court opinions revealed that as recently as 1972 the high tribunal suggested that "in proper circumstances" the President could be subpoenaed to appear in court. The White House said Tuesday that Nixon would not testify before the Watergate federal grand jury because it would be "constitutionally inappropriate."

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Ehrlichman Says President Acted On CIA-FBI Role

Set Meeting On Probe of Contribution

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon personally ordered a White House meeting at which his chief aides instructed the Central Intelligence Agency to intervene in an FBI investigation of the "laundering" of Watergate money through a Mexican bank.

This was the testimony of John D. Ehrlichman, formerly Mr. Nixon's chief adviser on domestic affairs, during a closed hearing yesterday of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations.

At the time the President was specifically aware that the FBI investigation centered on the channeling through Mexico of \$100,000 in Republican political funds which were ultimately used to finance operations of his re-election committee, including the Watergate break-in.

So said Appropriations Committee Chairman John L. McClellan and two fellow senators in recapitulating Ehrlichman's 2½ hours of closed-door testimony.

Ehrlichman, who emerged from a long period of virtual seclusion from newsmen to discuss his testimony, said afterwards, however, that he did not

whether the President was aware of the nature of the \$100,000 fund transaction.

Yesterday's session also produced the disclosure by McClellan that the then-director of the CIA, Richard Helms, had told former Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III on June 22, 1972, that the CIA was not implicated in the Watergate scandal and that the FBI investigation in Mexico would not imperil any of its operations.

This is of major significance since top CIA officials have testified that the President's former chief of staff,

H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, instructed them at a White House meeting the following day to advise the FBI that agency operations in Mexico would be endangered by the inquiry.

The new testimony also produced a series of contradictions between Ehrlichman and top CIA officials on the role of the White House in dealing with the agency on Watergate-related matters.

Ehrlichman said he had no recollection of making the phone call in July, 1971, that resulted in the CIA's giving technical assistance to Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy. That assistance was used in the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in early September, 1971.

Former CIA Deputy Director Gen. Robert E. Cushman had previously sworn that it was Ehrlichman who ordered the assistance to Hunt. And it was Helms' testimony that the assistance was grudgingly provided by the agency because of White House insistence.

to the committee, Ehrlichman said that it was Cushman who called him in August, 1971, to request that the aid to Hunt be ended. Ehrlichman said he readily agreed to the request when he learned that Hunt claimed to be working for the White House.

Cushman, who is now the Marine Corps commandant, made a sworn statement last May 11 that Ehrlichman "called me and stated that Howard Hunt was a bona fide employee, a consultant on security matters, and that Hunt would come to see me and request assistance which Mr. Ehrlichman requested that I give."

Ehrlichman said yesterday: "I can say flatly that I do not have even the faintest recollection of having done so. I can say with assurance that any call to the CIA is the kind of call that I usually have little or no difficulty remembering."

The former White House aide said that in the past the CIA had no hesitation in turning down White House requests that the agency felt would exceed its charter. And he raised the question of "why Hunt would be extended carte blanche at the agency for nearly a month without [the agency's] asking what he was doing."

Helms and Cushman testified that they decided to cut off the aid to Hunt because his requests for CIA services—such as the transfer of a secretary from Paris and a New York mailing address—had become excessive.

The second controversial dealing between the White House and CIA—the June 23, 1972, meeting in Ehrlichman's office—was prompted by the President's concern over the effect of an FBI in-

that country.

Ehrlichman said the White House was apprehensive about the "extensive hemorrhages" of news leaks in the FBI. "Everybody understood that anything that was the subject of FBI investigation at that time was subject to appearing in Time magazine as an automatic proposition."

Even after a series of meetings between Gray and the CIA's new deputy director, Gen. Vernon Walters, resulting in the CIA's assurance that no operations were imperiled, the President was still concerned about security, Ehrlichman said.

"During the first week of July, 1972, the President told me Pat Gray told him on the telephone that Gen. Walters had told Gray there was no CIA objection to a full FBI investigation of the Mexican aspects of the Watergate case. The President said he then instructed Gray to conduct a full investigation," Ehrlichman testified.

"The President told me then that he still personally believed and feared that the FBI investigation might harm the agency."

"He said he believed the CIA would be making a mistake if it pretended an investigation would not disclose some of its current operations. He said he hoped the general and other CIA management were not covering up for their subordinates."

"The President said substantially: a man makes a grave mistake in covering up for subordinates. That was President Truman's error in the Hiss case when he instructed the FBI not to cooperate."

Ehrlichman failed to explain, however, the basis for the President's initial or continuing concern over the impact of the FBI Watergate investigation on the CIA.

Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), who also conducted closed hearings at which the principal witnesses appeared, said Helms told Gray "in categorical fashion" the day before the White House meeting; that

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Excerpts From E Capitol Hill S

Here are key excerpts from statement yesterday by former White House aide John D. Ehrlichman before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations. This portion deals with the CIA and E. Howard Hunt Jr.

I received a phone call from Gen. Robert Cushman, deputy director of the CIA, in late August, 1971 (he says it was Aug. 27), saying that Hunt was receiving aid from the agency, which was becoming potentially awkward. I asked him whether Hunt was acting for the agency or the White House. He said the White House. I asked him what his assignment was from the White House. He said he did not know.

In response to his request I told the general I would take responsibility for the agency terminating its assistance to Hunt and, if there were any squawks or kickbacks from anyone in the White House, to simply refer them to me.

In 1969, in connection with a very different case, I had had occasion to discuss the statutory limitations of CIA activity with Gen. Cushman in some detail. He had clearly spelled out the limits at that time and explained the CIA's continuous concern that it not go beyond statutory bounds.

It is somewhat ironic that Gen. Cushman's testimony makes much of his "long-time relationship" with me and the fact that he took my requests as equivalent to absolute mandate in view of my White House position.

In point of fact, although I think I was introduced to the general once prior to 1968, and saw him to say hello at White House social functions a couple of times, this conversation in 1969 was the first time we had ever seriously spoken to one another.

And, of course, on this occasion he turned down my request for assistance.

The next time I can recall talking to him was in August, 1971, when he called to ask that CIA aid to Hunt be cut off. I was entirely in sympathy with his request to cut off aid to Hunt based on his conclusion, that Hunt's requests had become excessive. I did not even question him for additional details; I simply accepted his conclusion.

I also recall wondering at the time how Hunt had obtained help from the CIA, in the first place. It occurred to me that if anyone later complained to me about this cut-off, I would probably learn how Hunt got started there. No one ever did complain.

At no time during the August, 1971, conversation did the general imply, suggest or state that I had initiated or sponsored Hunt's assistance from the CIA. Rather, the general spoke as though he were turning to me for help out of a situation created by others.

This excerpt deals with the CIA and the Watergate developments in June of 1972.

The President asked Mr. Haldeman to convene a meeting with Director Helms and Deputy Director Walters after the Watergate investigation

began. Mr. Haldeman told me the President wished me to "sit in." As it happened, my office was used for the meeting.

Mr. Haldeman said that the President was concerned about the effect of the FBI investigation upon the agency. The President intended to require a full, vigorous FBI investigation with no strings but believed that the trail might lead to agency people or activities either in this country or abroad. The President was especially concerned about agency activities in Mexico which might be disclosed.

Mr. Helms and Gen. Walters were asked first, if the CIA had a part in the Watergate break-in. They replied that it did not.

They were asked if a very vigorous examination of the past of the burglars or their money sources might jeopardize the secrecy of present or past CIA operations, including those in Mexico. They replied that no past operations would be jeopardized, so far as they could tell them. But Gen. Walters would not say that the CIA had no concern on the question of Mexican operations. I got the impression that Mr. Haldeman's shot had hit some target.

Apparently Director Helms also took Gen. Walters' reply at face value. . . . He testified that he told Gen. Walters after the meeting that if the FBI investigation did run into the CIA Mexican operation, the established procedure should be followed. See also Gen. Walters' memcons [memoranda of conversation], es-

pecially the memorandum of 28 June, 1972.

As a result of this equivocal response by Gen. Walters respecting Mexican operations, he was asked to make contact with Acting FBI Director Gray and give him all the facts. I believe the general called Gray from my outer office to arrange to see him at once.

Helms and Walters were told that John Dean was following the Watergate matter closely for the President and any future White House contact could be with him. I'm not sure whether they were told this on the occasion of the meeting or later, but I do recall having some part in getting Walters to talk to Dean. I believe I also informed Dean of the meeting, of my impression of Walters' response regarding CIA Mexican operations, and I believe I told Dean that Walters would be working with Gray on the problem.

Later Dean told me he had been in touch with Walters and that the CIA did not believe an investigation would harm their operations. I was unaware of Dean's meetings or conversations with Walters regarding use of CIA money for salaries for the defendants until the news reports this month about them.

During the first week of July, 1972, the President told me Pat Gray told him on the telephone that Gen. Walters had told Gray there was no CIA objection to a full FBI investigation of the Mexican aspects of the Wa-

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

CIA Memos Cite White House Role

By Jack Anderson

Declaring "it was the President's wish," H. R. Haldeman asked the CIA last June to intervene with the FBI to limit the Watergate investigation to the five men who were arrested inside Democratic Party headquarters.

He promised that acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III would be receptive as he was looking for guidance on the matter." The once-powerful Haldeman has been deposed as White House chief of staff.

From our CIA sources, we have obtained internal memos which claim the CIA's two bosses at the time, Director Richard Helms and Deputy Director Vernon Walters, were summoned to the White House on June 23, 1972, less than a week after the Waterbuggers were caught.

Haldeman told them the incident "was getting embarrassing" and asked Walters to call on Gray and suggest that the arrest of the five suspects "should be sufficient and that it was not advantageous to have the inquiry pushed. . ."

Obedying orders, Walters saw Gray the same day. "I reported," Walters recorded afterward, "that if the investigations were pushed 'south of the border,' it could trespass on some of our covert pro-

jects, and in view of the fact that the five men involved were under arrest, it would be best to taper the matter further."

Gray was quoted in the CIA memos as suggesting the "problem was how to low key this matter now that it was launched." He said, "this was a most awkward matter to come up during an election year, and he would see what he could do."

The account of the White House attempt to suppress the investigation is contained in a memo which Walters dictated on June 28, 1972. It describes the June 23 meeting with Haldeman and John Ehrlichman in Ehrlichman's White House office.

Declares the Walter's memo: "Haldeman said that the 'bugging' affair at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate apartments had made a lot of noise and the Democrats were trying to maximize it.

"The investigation was leading to a lot of important people, and this could get worse. He asked what the connection with the Agency was, and the Director repeated that there was none.

"Haldeman said the whole affair was getting embarrassing, and it was the President's wish that Walters call on act-

ing FBI Director Patrick Gray and suggest to him that since the five suspects had been arrested, that this should be sufficient and that it was not advantageous to have the enquiry pushed, especially in Mexico, etc.

"Director Helms said that he had talked to Gray on the previous day and had made plain to him that the Agency was not behind this matter, that it was not connected with it and none of the suspects were working for nor had worked for the Agency in the last two years.

"He had told Gray that none of his investigations was touching any covert projects of the Agency, current or ongoing.

"Haldeman then stated that I could tell Gray that I had talked to the White House and suggest that the investigation not be pushed further. Gray would be receptive as he was looking for guidance on the matter.

"The Director repeated that the Agency was unconnected with the matter. I then agreed to talk to Gray as directed. Ehrlichman implied I could do this soon, and I said I would try to do it today. . .

"On returning to the office, I called Gray, indicated that this was a matter of some urgency and he agreed to see me at 1430 (2:30) that day."

In other words, the White House pair directed Walters to intervene with the FBI, despite repeated disclaimers that the CIA was involved in the Waterbugging or could be hurt by the FBI investigation.

Indeed, Helms had already made it plain to Gray that the FBI investigation wouldn't jeopardize any covert CIA operation. Walters, nevertheless, carried out the White House orders and spoke to Gray about tapering the investigation. Subsequently, the CIA resisted White House pressure to participate in the Watergate cover-up.

The CIA memos also entangle President Nixon in the coverup. Haldeman said the intervention with the FBI "was the President's wish." Of course, Haldeman may have misused the President's name. But it took another 10 months for a reluctant Mr. Nixon to fire Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Then he praised them in the process.

For another month, the two aides continued to use White House offices and to ride around in White House limousines. The public was treated to the spectacle, for example, of the accused pair showing up at the courthouse in a gleaming White House limousine to answer charges against them.

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The High Price of 'Security'

The Watergate scandal had long since transcended the mere burglary and bugging of Democratic National Committee headquarters. But as the story continued to unfold last week, that episode emerged as part of the end game in a slow, sad process of the corruption of power—a progression that began in concern for the national security, went on to the bending of ethics and laws and ended in outright police-state tactics as the Nixon Administration lost all sense of the difference between the nation's welfare and its own.

The week's blockbusters, falling with almost cadenced regularity, included the eye-catching allegations that Henry Kissinger, hitherto untouched by the widening scandals, had approved FBI wiretaps

wishes to domestic assistant John D. Ehrlichman (who finally drew his last Federal paycheck last week, along with Dean and Presidential Assistant H.R. Haldeman), and Ehrlichman later indicated to Mr. Nixon that Dean had cleared the White House staff of complicity.

Over at FBI headquarters, meanwhile, interim director William D. Ruckelshaus was facing a battery of newsmen under klieg lights ("You mean he's going to answer questions?" marveled an old FBI hand) to confirm a suspicion that had emerged in the closing hours of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's Pentagon-papers trial two weeks ago—that the whole secret-police apparatus that was to become Watergate had actually been set in motion in the spring of 1969, two years earlier



Wally McNamara—Newsweek

Helms: A presumption of complicity



Kissinger: Tap day at the NSC

on his own National Security Council aides; that White House aides feared a senile J. Edgar Hoover might parlay this involvement into genteel blackmail of higher-ups, and that highly respected former CIA director Richard Helms, now U.S. ambassador to Iran, may well have known more about the Watergate than he had previously let on. But the week's worst news was the emerging picture of an almost routine resort to illegality by top government officials.

That impression was reinforced when Richard Nixon's own distance from the Watergate scandal shortened appreciably. In response to published accusations by fired White House counsel John W. Dean III (NEWSWEEK, May 14), Presidential press secretary Ron Ziegler admitted that the President had never ordered or received an in-house investigation directly from Dean, despite Mr. Nixon's references to such a counsel's report in two television addresses. The President, White House sources

than previously supposed. Thirteen government officials, some of them members of the top-level National Security Council, and four newsmen were tapped by the FBI under direct orders from the President.

Wrestling the Secret Service

The logs from these taps, one of which had recorded Ellsberg, had been reported missing from the FBI since July of 1971 (the straw that finally forced dismissal of the Ellsberg case), but Ruckelshaus disclosed that the FBI recovered them from Ehrlichman's safe a fortnight ago, provoking what he facetiously called an "arm-wrestling" session with Secret Service men assigned to the White House.

It was these early wiretaps that connected Kissinger with the undercover tactics. In the early months of the Administration, NEWSWEEK learned last week, Mr. Nixon became "enraged" over a leak to The New York Times that

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Face The Nation

ST

CBS NETWORK

DATE May 27, 1973 12:30 PM

CITY

Washington, D.C.

FULL TEXT

GEORGE HERMAN: Senator Symington, a week ago you said you found it hard to believe President Nixon was unaware of attempts by senior White House officials to use the Central Intelligence Agency to cover up on the Watergate. There's been a good deal of testimony since. Are you finding it harder now or easier to believe?

SENATOR STUART SYMINGTON: Well it was hard then, and it's still hard.

ANNOUNCER: From CBS Washington, Face the Nation, a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview with Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, Acting Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator Symington will be questioned by CBS News correspondent Marya McLaughlin, Laurence Stern of the Washington Post, and CBS News correspondent George Herman.

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HERMAN: Senator Symington, I'd have to say that your opening answer was more tantalizing than it was informative. There's been more in the way of testimony from CIA officials in the week since you made that original statement. Do they have any bearing on your feeling? Have they moved you one way or the other on the feeling that the President must have known about the CIA cover-up?

SENATOR SYMINGTON: Well, as you know, the man who probably had as much authority in the White House as anybody in the years that I've been in Washington, Mr. Haldeman, has now been relieved of his job, as has Mr. Ehrlichman, who was supposedly the number two man, at least on the domestic side. And in addition to that, the President's Counsel, Mr. Dean, has, in effect, been fired. Under those circumstances, plus the fact that some of the papers say, "copy to the President,"

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Agronsky and Company

STATION WTOP TV

DATE May 26, 1973 7:00 PM

CITY Washington, D.C.

FULL TEXT

MARTIN AGRONSKY: President Nixon on Tuesday made another major statement to vindicate himself in the Watergate scandal. This is the third time in the past five weeks that Mr. Nixon has made public declarations on Watergate. In his Tuesday statement Mr. Nixon for the first time acknowledged that he had ordered some limits on the government's investigation. The President said his aim in doing so had been only to protect the national security. The President's statement left unanswered many questions about the White House role in the Watergate affair.

The latest Gallup Poll taken after the President's April 30th Watergate speech showed Mr. Nixon's popularity has fallen to the lowest point since he's been President.

On Wednesday, however, 22 Republican Senators and Representatives ended a White House meeting with the President by according him a standing ovation after he had cited national security considerations in regard to Watergate.

Mr. Nixon also scored a major political victory in the House of Representatives on Wednesday. A House majority sustained the President's veto of a bill requiring Senate confirmation of the two top officials in the Office of Management and the Budget.

A discussion of these issues in a minute with my colleagues.

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AGRONSKY: Hugh, the President says his concern for national security is what motivated his order to limit government investigation of the Watergate case. How, does that explanation make sense to you?

HUGH SIDEY: Martin, I must say that that statement in its entirety seemed like it came out of another age -- twenty, thirty, forty years ago when we saw these phantoms under the

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26 May 1973

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STAT

Clandestine Corruption

Less than a week after five men were arrested inside Democratic headquarters in the Watergate office building, Assistant US Attorney Earl J. Silbert, then and now chief prosecutor in the case, announced in a court bond hearing that one of the defendants, Bernard Barker, had withdrawn \$89,000 in cash from a Miami bank account. Silbert did not publicly disclose at the time the source of those funds—four checks drawn on the Banco Internacional of Mexico City. As he stood in court that day, June 23, 1972, Silbert was unaware that the checks had originally been sent to the Committee for the Re-election of the President. Thus he did not know he was introducing material that would become the first solid link between the Watergate break-in and bugging and the Nixon campaign organization. The President's closest White House aides, H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, did know it but did not tell prosecutor Silbert. Instead they tried to inveigle the CIA and the FBI into helping them cover up the tracks. At a meeting on June 23 in Ehrlichman's White House office, Haldeman—with CIA Director Richard Helms looking on—ordered the deputy director of CIA, Lt. General Vernon Walters, a former Nixon military aide, to block an FBI inquiry into the Mexican checks. He was to do so by informing then acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III that any such inquiry would disclose secret CIA funding channels. Within an hour Walters met with Gray and did as he had been ordered. Gray thereupon halted further investigation of the checks. Two weeks passed before Walters told Gray that he had lied.

Over at the Committee for the Re-election of the President on that same day, June 23, finance chairman Maurice Stans received a final up-to-date accounting of the almost \$2 million in cash contributions to and expenditures of the committee. There was only one copy. Hugh Sloan, Jr., Stan's treasurer who prepared the report, then destroyed the backup material. That left Stans with the only record disclosing that G. Gordon Liddy, later convicted as a Watergate conspirator, had received some \$200,000 in cash from the Nixon committee. Sloan, the man who had given the money to Liddy, had been rather uneasy even before \$5300 in \$100 bills was found on the Watergate burglars. When Liddy sought \$83,000 two months earlier, Sloan had asked Stans to approve handing over so large a sum in cash. Stans promised to check with Nixon campaign director John Mitchell,

23 MAY 1973

Gray Recalls More Forceful Warning Than Nixon

By OSWALD JOINSTON

Star-News Staff Writer

L. Patrick Gray's own recollection of his direct warning last summer to President Nixon that White House aides were trying to block an FBI probe of Watergate is more explicit than earlier reports of it have been — and far more forceful than Nixon's version.

The former acting FBI director's own account, as restated by a Senate committee and made public with Gray's approval, portrays him bluntly warning the President "that people on your staff are trying to mortally wound you," and making it clear beyond a doubt that the scheme involved "using the CIA and FBI."

In his 4,000-word statement Tuesday, Nixon conceded that investigation of Watergate was limited by his orders for reasons of "national security" that he said in part derived from a belief the CIA was somehow involved in the break-in. He described the Gray warning this way:

"ON JULY 6, 1972, I telephoned the acting director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray . . . During the conversation Mr. Gray discussed with me the progress of the Watergate investigation, and I asked him whether he had talked with General Walters (CIA Deputy Director Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters.)

"Mr. Gray said that he had, and that Gen. Walters had assured him that the CIA was not involved. In the discussion, Mr. Gray suggested that the matter of Watergate might lead higher. I told him to press ahead with his investigation."

Gray yesterday gave the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on intelligence operations a far more dramatic version of the same conversation.

After warning Republican campaign director Clark MacGregor of "confusion" over White House staff "use of both the FBI and CIA," Gray within 40 minutes received a telephone call from Nixon, who was in California.

"MR. PRESIDENT," Gray remembers saying when the chance came, "there is something I want to speak to you about.

"Dick Walters and I feel that people on your staff are trying to mortally wound you by using the CIA and FBI and by confusing the question of CIA interest in, or not in, people the FBI wishes to interview."

In this version, Nixon is quoted as saying after a pause: "Pat, you just continue to conduct your aggressive and thorough investigation."

In the background of both Gray's testimony and Nixon's semi-confessional statement Tuesday has been a steady escalation of testimony by high CIA officials that White House aides H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, seconded by John W. Dean III, tried to involve the CIA in the case within a few days after the Watergate break-in June 17.

BOTH WALTERS and former CIA Director Richard Helms have testified that Haldeman and Ehrlichman, on June 23, ordered Walters to approach Gray with a request that an FBI probe of GOP campaign funds "laundered" through a Mexico City bank be blocked on the pretext that the investigation would jeopardize CIA operations in Mexico.

In Gray's testimony before the committee yesterday, he said that man John L. McClellan, D-

Ark., it was for the first time revealed that the FBI in fact held up its investigation for two weeks as a result of the Walters intercession.

This was apparently the case even though the agency quickly decided against cooperation with the White House request and, according to both Walters and Helms, advised Dean on June 26 that no operations in Mexico would be disturbed by the FBI.

The FBI investigation did not resume until after July 6, the day Gray has testified he tried to take his misgivings directly to the President. July 6 was also the day Walters went to Gray and exposed as false the White House claim that CIA operations would be endangered by an FBI investigation of the Mexican bank account.

NIXON ADMITTED Tuesday that he was so fearful the public would learn about covert programs of domestic espionage undertaken by his administration since 1969 that he ordered Haldeman and Ehrlichman at the outset of the Watergate probe "to ensure that the FBI would not carry its investigation into areas that might compromise these covert national security activities, or those of the CIA."

There are on public record two other accounts of Gray's warning to Nixon about how this order was being carried out:

Widespread reports nearly two weeks ago that Gray on May 10, in a lengthy evening session, told investigators for the special Senate Watergate committee that he warned Nixon in a telephone conversation that "people around you are misusing or abusing the

FBI and the CIA for their purposes."

A memorandum by Walters describing a conversation with Gray on July 12 in which the July 6 admonition to Nixon was discussed. According to the Walters version, Nixon first raised the question of whether Gray "had talked to Walters about the case." In reply, Nixon was warned that a coverup was in progress, that "it would lead quite high" and that "any attempt to involve the FBI or the CIA in this case would prove a mortal wound."

Nixon and the two special White House counsel who helped present the Tuesday statement, Leonard Garment and J. Fred Buzhardt, were aware of both these accounts before the presidential version of the Gray conversation was made public.

THE EARLIER Gray testimony to Senate investigators was widely reported May 12, a full 10 days before the presidential statement was unveiled.

The Walters version was one of 11 memoranda of conversations between the CIA deputy and White House aides during the post-Watergate coverup effort. All 11 of these memos were in the hands of Buzhardt at the White House on Thursday when Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., conducting a separate investigation of the CIA relation to Watergate,

2 C.I.A. Officials Say That Nixon Did Not Ask Them If Agency Had a Watergate Role

WALTERS, HELMS GIVE THEIR VIEWS

President Had Said He Was Advised of Possibility of Involvement by C.I.A.

By MARJORIE HUNTER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 23—Key officials of the Central Intelligence Agency say that President Nixon apparently made no effort to inquire directly if the Watergate break-in involved covert C.I.A. operations.

Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the agency at the time of the break-in, told a Senate subcommittee today that the President had not asked him if the agency was involved in the Watergate.

Richard Helms, director of the agency at the time of the Watergate break-in last June 17 also told a Senate committee earlier this week that he had no conversation with Mr. Nixon during that period.

President Nixon, in his statement issued yesterday, said that within a few days after the break-in, "I was advised that there was a possibility of C.I.A. involvement in some way."

Adviser Not Identified

The President's statement then continued:

"It did seem to me possible that, because of the involvement of former C. I. A. personnel, and because of some of their apparent associations, the investigation could lead to the uncovering of covert C.I.A. operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in."

In his statement, the President did not say who had "advised" him of the possibility of C.I.A. involvement.

General Walters's comments on not having been asked by the President about the agency's involvement came in answer to a question posed during his appearance today.

before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee headed by Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat of Arkansas.

"The general told us that the President did not talk to him about possible C.I.A. involvement," the Senator said later. "He did tell us, however, that the President had called him about another matter shortly after his return from Moscow, but it had nothing to do with Watergate."

Mr. Nixon visited Moscow in May of last year several weeks before the Watergate break-in.

Earlier Testimony Recalled

General Walters, in a number of other appearances before Congressional committees in the last two weeks, detailed alleged efforts by three top White House aides — H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean 3d — to involve the C.I.A. in covering up the Watergate affair.

Both the general and Mr. Helms said that the White House overtures had been rejected.

General Walters was named deputy C.I.A. director by Mr. Nixon late last spring. He had served as official interpreter on foreign trips made by Mr. Nixon as Vice President in the nineteen fifties.

According to the general's earlier testimony, efforts of the three White House aides to involve the C.I.A. in the Watergate cover-up had centered on him, not on his superior, Mr. Helms.

He told of being called to the White House, along with Mr. Helms, six days after the Watergate break-in and told by Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman that the "Watergate incident was causing trouble and was being exploited by the opposition."

General Walters testified that he had been told that "it had been decided at the White House" that he go to L. Patrick Gray 3d, then acting director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to try to persuade him to halt an F.B.I. investigation of Nixon campaign funds "laundered" through a Mexico City bank.

A "memorandum of conversation" written by General Walters following that meeting and disclosed earlier this week by Congressional sources

—said that at one point Mr. Haldeman had turned to the general and said, "It is the President's wish that you go to see Mr. Gray."

Not Sure Now

While not denying that he wrote that memorandum to himself shortly after that meeting on June 23, General Walters indicated in testimony to several Congressional committees this week that he was not sure Mr. Haldeman made any such statement invoking the President's name.

Mr. Helms, questioned earlier this week by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that he did not recall hearing the President's name mentioned during that White House meeting.

However, Mr. Helms said that it did "strike me as odd" that Mr. Haldeman had passed over him by requesting his deputy, General Walters, to confer with Mr. Gray about halting the F.B.I. inquiry.

Mr. Helms further testified that he said at that meeting that he did not believe any C.I.A. interests would be jeopardized by continuation of the F.B.I. investigation.

Mr. Helms was relieved as director of the C.I.A. last November and named Ambassador to Iran.

General Walters, in earlier testimony, also told of being asked by Mr. Dean to provide a "cover" for the Watergate defendants by placing them on the payroll and paying their bail. He said that he had rejected that, too.

Meanwhile, James R. Schlesinger, now director of the C.I.A., said today that President Nixon had never talked to him about any effort to involve the agency in the Watergate case.

Mr. Schlesinger, who was nominated recently by Mr. Nixon to be Secretary of Defense, also denied today that he had ever been asked to testify falsely that James W. McCord Jr., a defendant in the Watergate break-in case, had been returned to the C.I.A. payroll to conduct the burglary.

Mr. Nixon's Explanation

In his long statement on Watergate released yesterday, President Nixon assures us that he had no prior knowledge of the bugging operation, that he took no part in—and indeed was unaware of—any cover up, that he neither authorized nor knew of any offer of executive clemency to the conspirators, that he did not know until his own investigation revealed it of any effort to fund the Watergate defendants or to break into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, that at no time did he attempt—nor did he authorize others to attempt—to implicate the Central Intelligence Agency, and that he neither authorized nor encouraged his subordinates to engage in illegal or improper campaign tactics.

Mr. Nixon would have us believe that, in actions he may have taken as regards Watergate, he was motivated by nothing but concern for the national security.

It may be so. But there are a few matters which still confuse us and upon which we would welcome further presidential elucidation. For example, Mr. Nixon admits that the White House Special Investigations Unit ("The Plumbers") was set up in June, 1971, with his approval. He describes it as "a small group" under John Ehrlichman, consisting of Egil Krogh, David Young, E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, a unit known only to "a very few persons at the White House."

Mr. Nixon says the task of The Plumbers was two-fold: to stop security leaks and to "investigate other sensitive security matters." We can understand the group's first function. But we find it a trifle hard to understand that, with a huge federal intelligence establishment at his beck and call, Mr. Nixon felt compelled to turn to this small group of buccaneers to undertake tasks of grave national security. Was the FBI really that useless? Could no one in the Secret Service be trusted? What about the National Security Agency, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the Treasury, the Defense Department? What qualities had Hunt and Liddy that were lacking in these great departments and agencies?

What were these "sensitive security matters" to which The Plumbers devoted themselves? Well, before their work "tapered off around the end of 1971," they investigated Ellsberg's

"associates and motives." They traced down other national security leaks, including one having to do with the SALT talks. They were engaged in "compiling an accurate record of events related to the Vietnam War," which presumably is why they were rummaging through the State Department's files (no mention of forging telegrams, of course). For all this effort, it is difficult to see how The Plumbers could become privy to many legitimate state secrets.

Comes now the burglary and bugging of Democratic National Committee headquarters, "a complete surprise" to Mr. Nixon. His initial reaction is that the guilty should be brought to justice, but within a few days he is "advised" that there is "a possibility of CIA involvement." He also is stricken with concern "that the Watergate investigation might well lead to an inquiry into the activities of the Special Investigations Unit itself."

When he is worried that the CIA may be involved, does Mr. Nixon ask Richard Helms, then director of the agency, if this is the case? He does not. He instructs Haldeman and Ehrlichman to see that Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray and the Deputy CIA director, General Vernon Walters, "coordinate" their activities so that nobody's covert operations are exposed. Why was Helms by-passed and then shipped off to Iran? We'd like to know. And when Walters told Gray that CIA had no operation which could be compromised by the FBI's investigation (in Mexico in this instance) and Gray told Mr. Nixon that on July 6, did not the President smell at least a small laundered mouse?

And why was Mr. Nixon so concerned about the inquiry leading to The Plumbers? National security matters, so he says. And, that presumably, is why he told Assistant Attorney General Petersen to treat his investigation of Watergate virtually as if it were only a common case of breaking and entering, and "to stay out of national security matters." But could the President not have realized that, no matter how pure his motives, instructions of that nature to Petersen could only result in so severely limiting the investigation as to make it virtually worthless? For by his own definition, anything and everything a White House-based group like The Plumbers did could have a national security construction placed on it.

Mr. Nixon declares in his statement that "it is not my intention to place a national security 'cover' on Watergate." We are relieved to hear that, because a close reading of his statement could lead someone who had not totally suspended his critical faculties to believe that that is precisely what Mr. Nixon is trying to do. We are equally relieved to hear that "executive privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony concerning possible criminal conduct or discussions of possible criminal conduct" when men like Haldeman, Ehrlichman and former attorney general John Mitchell testify under oath, and we trust that this will be the case concerning their conversations with the President.

In concluding his statement, Mr. Nixon declares that "as more information is developed, I have no doubt that more questions will be raised." In our view, Mr. Nixon's statement itself raises so many questions and provides so few credible answers that we are sure that he will soon once again find time from "his larger duties" to inform our doubts and dispel our fears.

CIA Was Warned It Might Be Watergate

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Washington, May 22 (NEWS Bureau)—Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said today that Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr. apparently had warned Central Intelligence Agency officials as early as July that they might be blamed for the Watergate scandal.

Symington said he had given seven sets of notes and letters that "could have a potential impact on the Watergate case" to the Senate Watergate committee and federal prosecutors.

Symington, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he had received the letters, written between July 1972 and January, from high CIA officials.

"The first letter is signed

"Jim," the senator said. "The other notes and letters are anonymous. Nevertheless, we are informed that there is some reason to believe that these letters were sent by Mr. McCord, the former CIA employe who has been convicted in the Watergate case."

Symington said the "subject of the notes and letters is a concern (that) there were attempts, following the Watergate burglary,

to blame the CIA for the Watergate bugging incident."

Also today, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) said he was "very much concerned" about allegations that the White House had tried to involve the CIA in the Watergate scandal. He said he might introduce a bill that would create a congressional intelligence-watchdog committee.

Mansfield said the committee could be "a place where the CIA

could come if it got into difficulties."

Two attempts to create such a joint committee failed in the Senate after the administration objected strongly.

Mansfield's expression of concern followed release yesterday of a CIA memo that had been written by Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the agency's deputy director. According to the memo, former White House chief of staff H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, had said it was "the President's wish" for the CIA to discourage an FBI probe into certain aspects of the Watergate affair.

CIA 1.02 Walters, Vernon

Text of a Statement by the President on Allegations Surrounding Watergate Inquiry

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 22—Following is a statement by President Nixon today on the Watergate case as released by the White House:

Allegations surrounding the Watergate affair have so escalated that I feel a further statement from the President is required at this time.

A climate of sensationalism has developed in which even second- or third-hand hearsay charges are headlined as fact and repeated as fact.

Important national security operations which themselves had no connection with Watergate have become entangled in the case.

As a result, some national security information has already been made public through court orders, through the subpoenaing of documents and through testimony witnesses have given in judicial and Congressional proceedings. Other sensitive documents are now threatened with disclosure; continued silence about those operations would compromise rather than protect them, and would also serve to perpetuate a grossly distorted view—which recent partial disclosures have given—of the nature and purpose of those operations.

Threefold Purpose

The purpose of this statement is threefold:

—First, to set forth the facts about my own relationship to the Watergate matter.

—Second, to place in some perspective some of the more sensational—and inaccurate—of the charges that have filled the headlines in recent days, and also some of the matters that are currently being discussed in Senate testimony and elsewhere.

—Third, to draw the distinction between national security operations and the Watergate case. To put the other matters in perspective, it will be necessary to describe the national security operations first.

In citing these national security matters it is not my intention to place a national security "cover" on Watergate, but rather to separate them out from Watergate and at the same time to ex-

plain the context in which certain actions took place that were later misconstrued or misused.

Long before the Watergate break-in, three important national security operations took place which have subsequently become entangled in the Watergate case.

Three Operations Involved

—The first operation, begun in 1969, was a program of wiretaps. All were legal, under the authorities then existing. They were undertaken to find and stop serious national security leaks.

—The second operation was a reassessment, which I ordered in 1970, of the adequacy of internal security measures. This resulted in a plan and a directive to strengthen our intelligence operations. They were protested by Mr. Hoover, and as a result of his protest they were not put into effect.

—The third operation was the establishment, in 1971, of a special investigations unit in the White House. Its primary mission was to plug leaks of vital security information. I also directed this group to prepare an accurate history of certain crucial national security matters which occurred under prior Administrations, on which the Government's records were incomplete.

Here is the background of these three security operations initiated by my Administration.

By mid-1969, my Administration had begun a number of highly sensitive foreign policy initiatives. They were aimed at ending the war in Vietnam, achieving a settlement in the Middle East, limiting nuclear arms, and establishing new relationships among the great powers. These involved highly secret diplomacy. They were closely interrelated. Leaks of secret information about any one could endanger all.

Exactly that happened. News accounts appeared in 1969, which were obviously based on leaks—some of them extensive and detailed—by people having access to the most highly classified security materials.

There was no way to carry forward these diplomatic initiatives unless further leaks could be prevented. This re-

quired finding the source of the leaks.

In order to do this, a special program of wiretaps was instituted in mid-1969 and terminated in February, 1971. Fewer than 20 taps, of varying duration, were involved. They produced important leads that made it possible to tighten the security of highly sensitive materials.

I authorized this entire program. Each individual tap was undertaken in accordance with procedures legal at the time and in accord with long-standing precedent.

Subjects of Wiretaps

The persons who were subject to these wiretaps were determined through coordination among the director of the F.B.I. my assistant for national security affairs, and the Attorney General. Those wiretapped were selected on the basis of access to the information leaked, material in security files, and evidence that developed as the inquiry proceeded.

Information thus obtained was made available to senior officials responsible for national security matters in order to curtail further leaks.

The 1970 Intelligence Plan

In the spring and summer of 1970, another security problem reached critical proportions. In March a wave of bombings and explosions struck college campuses and cities. There were 400 bomb threats in one 24-hour period in New York City. Rioting and violence on college campuses reached a new peak after the Cambodian operation and the tragedies at Kent State and Jackson State. The 1969-70 school year brought nearly 1,800 campus demonstrations, and nearly 250 cases of arson on campus. Many colleges closed. Gun battles between guerrilla-style groups and police were taking place. Some of the disruptive activities were receiving foreign support.

Complicating the task of maintenance security was the fact that, in 1966, certain types of undercover F.B.I. operating that had been conducted for many years had been suspended. This also had substantially impaired our ability to collect foreign intelligence information. At the same time, the relationships between the F.B.I. and other intelligence agencies had been deteriorating. By

May, 1970, F.B.I. Director Hoover shut off this agency's liaison with the C.I.A. altogether.

Meets With Officials

On June 5, 1970, I met with the director of the F.B.I. (Mr. Hoover), the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Mr. Richard Helms), the director of the Defense Intelligence (Gen. Donald V. Bennett) and the director of the National Security Agency (Adm. Noel Gayler). We discussed the urgent need for better intelligence operations. I appointed Director Hoover as chairman of an inter-agency committee to prepare recommendations.

On June 25, the committee submitted a report which included specific options for expanded intelligence operations, and on July 23 the agencies were notified by memorandum of the options approved. After reconsideration, however, prompted by the opposition of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified five days later, on July 28, that the approval had been rescinded. The options initially approved had included resumption of certain intelligence operations which had been suspended in 1966. These in turn had included authorization for surreptitious entry—breaking and entering, in effect—on specified categories of targets in specified situations related to national security.

Because the approval was withdrawn before it had been implemented, the net result was that the plan for expanded intelligence activities never went into effect.

This 1970 plan are extremely sensitive. They include—and are based upon—assessments of certain foreign intelligence capabilities and procedures, which of course must remain secret. It was this unused plan and related documents that John Dean removed from the White House and placed in a safe deposit box, giving the keys to Judge Sirica. The same plan, still unused, is being headlined today.

Coordination among our intelligence agencies continued

NIXON EXPLANATION

New Questions Raised

By BARRY KALB
Star-News Staff Writer

President Nixon's statement of yesterday raises a number of questions and contains a number of points which seem to conflict with his earlier remarks on the Watergate affair.

One major question grows out of the President's repeated attempt to justify initiating certain spying and surveillance activities by saying he was acting out of legitimate "national security" concerns.

But, in his April 30 speech, the President did not even hint that national security considerations had played a part in the ever-widening scandal.

It was suggested yesterday by White House counsel Leonard Garment, at a briefing following the release of the statement, that the President now knows much more than he did on April 30.

SINCE THAT DATE, Garment said, "a very intensive process of examination, discussion, the kind of process that goes on in the preparation of an investigation or a lawsuit, has been undertaken here. . ."

Yet the statement of yesterday reveals that even before April 30, Nixon knew about most of the incidents to which he alluded yesterday. A partial chronology, derived from yesterday's statement, shows:

1. "WITHIN a few days" after the June 17 arrests, E. Howard Hunt Jr.'s name had been publicly linked to the bugging operation, and Nixon "was alerted to the fact that he (Hunt) had previously been a member of the Special Investigations Unit in the White House."

Nixon revealed yesterday that the Special Investigations Unit had been set up with his approval, and

is the same group which later became known as "the plumbers." He said he directed the group, whose purpose was to plug national security leaks, to "find out all it could about Mr. (Daniel) Ellsberg's associates and his motives," which the President said he considered an item of national security interest after Ellsberg gave the Pentagon Papers to the press. The group eventually led the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.

The President never revealed until yesterday that he had personally approved the unit and had given it instructions regarding Ellsberg.

2. WITHIN the same few days following June 17, he told his top advisers, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, to confer with top CIA officials "to ensure that the investigation of the break-in not expose either an unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the activities of the White House investigations unit."

The President never revealed until yesterday that he had sent the two men on this mission, at which, according to the CIA's deputy director, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, Haldeman and Ehrlichman asked for CIA aid in covering up part of the Watergate case.

Specifically, Walters said in a May 12 affidavit, the two men asked him to warn the FBI off inquiries into the "Mexican aspects" of the Watergate case. This is a reference to the "laundering" of some Nixon campaign funds through Mexico, funds later converted to cash for the Committee for the Re-election of the President by Watergate conspirator Bernard L. Barker.

3. ON JULY 6, Nixon telephoned then acting Attorney General John N. Gray III, who "discussed

with me the progress of the Watergate investigation. . . . In the discussion, Mr. Gray suggested that the matter of the Watergate might lead higher. I told him to press ahead with his investigation."

It was reported earlier this month that Gray had told staff members of the Senate Watergate committee about this conversation. Committee sources have reported that Gray said he expressed to the President concern over interference by White House aides in the FBI's Watergate investigation.

While Nixon acknowledged yesterday Gray's suggestion, in his April 30 speech the President had said:

"As the investigations went forward, I repeatedly asked those conducting the investigation whether there was any reason to believe that members of my administration were in any way involved. I received repeated assurances that there were not. Because of these continuing reassurances — because I believed the reports I was getting, because I had faith in the persons from whom I was getting them — I discounted the stories in the press that appeared to implicate members of my administration or other officials of the campaign committee."

Yesterday was the first time the President spoke of the July 6 conversation with Gray.

4. IN HIS April 17 statement, in which he acknowledged that there were "new developments" in the Watergate case, the President referred to a meeting two days earlier, April 15, with Asst. Atty. Gen. Henry E. Petersen, head of the criminal division, at which the new developments were discussed.

In a memorandum dated April 16, Asst. U.S. Atty. Gen. Henry E. Petersen discovered on April 15,

and had passed the information on to Petersen, that Hunt and his colleague in both the special unit and the Watergate-bugging, G. Gordon Liddy, had been involved in the Ellsberg burglary.

The President, however, gives no indication that he had been told of the burglary by Petersen by April 17.

He says that on April 18, he learned "that Mr. Hunt...was to be questioned by the U.S. Attorney," and that he directed Petersen on that date "to pursue every issue involving Watergate but to confine his investigation to Watergate and related matters and to stay out of national security matters." Again, no mention of the Ellsberg burglary.

On April 25, however, Nixon said, Atty. Gen. Richard G. Kleindienst told him that "the government had clear evidence that Mr. Hunt was involved in the break-in of the office of the psychiatrist who had treated Mr. Ellsberg."

Furthermore, Atty. Gen.-designate Elliot Richardson yesterday told a Senate committee that Nixon knew of the break-in by late March.

THE PRESIDENT, then, knew of all these "national security" matters by the time of the April 30 speech.

The statement of yesterday leaves other questions unanswered. The President repeatedly says that he wanted the Watergate investigation limited to avoid the disclosure of "covert CIA operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in."

What is the nature of these covert CIA operations? The President does not say.

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MARY McGRORY

McCord Creates a Desert

By MARY McGRORY
Star-News Staff Writer

In an anonymous letter sent to his only pal in the White House in December, James McCord wrote prophetically, "Every tree in the forest will fall."

When McCord, the amiable old spook, left the stand of the Ervin committee, he left a ravaged landscape behind him. So gripping, outlandish and unshakeable had been his tales of life in the Nixon campaign committee that the President at the end of the day popped out with a statement warning all investigators to have a care for "national security."

In his accusations about the President's sinister grand design to turn the CIA into a cloak for the Watergate operation, McCord had been corroborated by no less a personage than the agency's deputy director, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters.

And when McCord finally wound down, his buddy — a New York cop named John J. Caulfield, brought into the White House to "provide private investigative support" for God knows what other schemes — advanced to the witness table to corroborate McCord's charges of political pressure from the White House to accept executive clemency in all details save for the mention of the President's name.

McCord dropped his big bombs last week, but he had a few grand grenades in his final hour. He mentioned casually, when discussing the deep-laid plot for the lay-off of Watergate on the CIA that James Schlesinger, the short-lived director, now Defense secretary-designate, "would go along." Nobody took him up on it.

By now everyone is wary. Pull off a splinter on Watergate and a wall falls in.

Fred Thompson, the husky, phlegmatic minority counsel asked about the

Point of View

only question that anyone dared put to McCord after the spate of specifics had flooded a million living rooms across the nation. Why hadn't he sung sooner?

Obviously, burglary had not bothered him. He had made a formal act of contrition, but 19 years in the agency had coarsened his conscience sufficiently to don the blue surgical gloves — and besides he had the blessing of the then attorney general.

AND SURELY although a pleasant man in other respects, he was at one with his leaders about the perilous state of the republic, menaced as it was by enemies from within. He gave the usual litany of bombings and threats, glided over the the chilling information that the McGovern people had a "a pipeline" in CREEP, and as the clincher, cited the report that the Vietnam Veterans Against the War had an office in the Democratic National Committee.

The VVAW, a touching band numbering a thousand at full strength, staged a pathetic demonstration on the Mall in 1970 and gave the Republican National Convention in Miami its only honest moment when they marched in total silence to the Fountainbeau.

It was actually after the break-in that McCord learned of their firebase at the Watergate, which makes the break-in history's first pre-emptive or perhaps retroactive protective reaction raid.

What then, had impelled him finally to raise his voice and blast the forests of Richard Nixon? Well, two things, it seems. One was that it was not done in

the style of the CIA, the agency he loves.

HE TOLD his friend, Jack Caulfield, that in the CIA the rule, if caught, was for everyone to go together. While he was meeting Caulfield on the second overlook of George Washington Parkway Jeb Stuart Magruder who he says knew all about it, was feasting with his family and acting as master of the inaugural revels.

He left the impression that he might have swallowed his sentence as he would have swallowed a death pill on a foreign mission, had the conspiracy taken the group rate to the slammer.

He waited until Judge John H. Sirica, after "a sham trial," had urged them all to come forward and tell all they knew. The Senate committee had provided the only forum where McCord could tell all his secrets.

On the only occasion his light voice rose and his tired face turned dark with emotion, McCord said, "I am fully convinced this was the right decision."

CAULFIELD, a distraught, pop-eyed, bumpy-nosed upwardly mobile Bronx native, came on afterwards and said that 99 and 44/100 percent of what McCord had spilled was true. Caulfield was another interesting case. A man eaten alive by ambition, he was ever on the watch for advancement in administration espionage circles and his ego was wounded by John Mitchell who treated him as "only a bodyguards."

Caulfield slightly lauded McCord's version of what he had told him during one of their rendezvous: McCord said Caulfield arned him, "You know if the administration gets its back to the wall it will

have to take steps to defend itself."

Caulfield scrubbed it up a bit to read: "Jim, I have worked with these people and I know them to be as tough-minded as you and itself."

Caulfield scrubbed it up a bit to read: mmm, I have worked with these people and I know them to be as tough-minded as you and I."

They weren't saints, either of them, but they are believable. And Richard Nixon is in the hands of people like McCord and Caulfield, because that is where he has put himself.

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Nixon Raises Questions, Conflicts

By BARRY KALB
Star-News Staff Writer

President Nixon's statement of yesterday raises a number of questions and contains a number of points which seem to conflict with his earlier remarks on the Watergate affair.

One major question grows out of the President's repeated attempt to justify initiating certain spying and surveillance activities by saying he was acting out of legitimate "national security" concerns.

But, in his April 30 speech, the President did not even hint that national security considerations had played a part in the ever-widening scandal.

It was suggested yesterday by White House counsel Leonard Garment, at a briefing following the release of the statement, that the President now knows much more than he did on April 30.

SINCE THAT DATE, Garment said, "a very intensive process of examination, discussion, the kind of process that goes on in the preparation of an investigation or a lawsuit, has been undertaken here. . ."

Yet the statement of yesterday reveals that even before April 30, Nixon knew about most of the incidents to which he alluded yesterday. A partial chronology, derived from yesterday's statement, shows:

1. "WITHIN a few days" after the June 17 arrests, E. Howard Hunt Jr.'s name had been publicly linked to the bugging operation, and Nixon "was alerted to the fact that he (Hunt) had previously been a member of the Special Investigations Unit in the White House."

Nixon revealed yesterday that the Special Investigation Unit had been set up with his approval, and is the same group which later became known as "the plumbers." He said he directed the group,

whose purpose was to plug national security leaks, to "find out all it could about Mr. (Daniel) Ellsberg's associates and his motives," which the President said he considered an item of national security interest after Ellsberg gave the Pentagon Papers to the press. The group eventually led the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.

The President never revealed until yesterday that he had personally approved the unit and had given it instructions regarding Ellsberg.

2. WITHIN the same few days following June 17, he told his top advisers, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, to confer with top CIA officials "to ensure that the investigation of the break-in not expose either an unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the activities of the White House investigations unit."

The President never revealed until yesterday that he had sent the two men on this mission, at which, according to the CIA's deputy director, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, Haldeman and Ehrlichman asked for CIA aid in covering up part of the Watergate case.

Specifically, Walters said in a May 12 affidavit, the two men asked him to warn the FBI off inquiries into the "Mexican aspects" of the Watergate case. This is a reference to the "laundering" of some Nixon campaign funds through Mexico, funds later converted to cash for the Committee for the Re-election of the President by Watergate conspirator Bernard L. Barker.

3. ON JULY 6, Nixon telephoned then acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray III, who "discussed the Watergate investigation. . . In the discussion, Mr. Gray suggested that

the matter of the Watergate might lead higher. I told him to press ahead with his investigation."

It was reported earlier this month that Gray had told staff members of the Senate Watergate committee about this conversation. Committee sources have reported that Gray said he expressed to the President concern over interference by White House aides in the FBI's Watergate investigation.

While Nixon acknowledged yesterday Gray's suggestion, in his April 30 speech the President had said:

"As the investigations went forward, I repeatedly asked those conducting the investigation whether there was any reason to believe that members of my administration were in any way involved. I received repeated assurances that there were not. Because of these continuing reassurances — because I believed the reports I was getting, because I had faith in the persons from whom I was getting them — I discounted the stories in the press that appeared to implicate members of my administration or other officials of the campaign committee."

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unit and the Watergate bugging, G. Gordon Liddy, had been involved in the Ellsberg burglary.

The President, however, gives no indication that he had been told of the burglary by Petersen by April 17.

He says that on April 18, he learned "that Mr. Hunt...was to be questioned by the U.S. Attorney," and that he directed Petersen on that date "to pursue every issue involving Watergate but to confine his investigation to Watergate and related matters and to stay out of national security matters." Again, no mention of the Ellsberg burglary.

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told him that "the government had clear evidence that Mr. Hunt was involved in the break-in of the office of the psychiatrist who had treated Mr. Ellsberg."

THE PRESIDENT, then, knew of all these "national security" matters by the time of the April 30 speech.

The statement of yesterday leaves other questions unanswered. The President repeatedly says that he wanted the Watergate investigation limited to avoid the disclosure of "covert CIA operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in."

What is the nature of these covert CIA operations? The President does not say.

At the briefing following the release of the statement yesterday, a reporter asked White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler a question arising out of the statement as a whole.

"Doesn't the statement," the reporter asked, "amount to the fact that he (the President) acquiesced in an alleged cover-up of Watergate in order to protect the wire-taps (placed on certain officials and newsmen in 1969), the spe-

continued

Nixon Tells Of Forming Secret Unit

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

In his Watergate statement of disclaimer yesterday, President Nixon acknowledged that he was the author of the secret security operations that were to entangle him deeply and personally in the scandal.

His main caveat was that he neither knew of nor authorized any illegal acts.

But the President admitted that he established—on grounds of national security—the White House-based covert machinery that became heavily implicated in political espionage and illegal fund-raising operations in his 1972 re-election campaign.

His statement alluded to serious disarray within the American intelligence community in 1970 and 1971. It spoke of heretofore-unknown agencies within the intelligence bureaucracy. It provided the first authoritative confirmation of what was in the safe of John W. Dean III, the man he fired as White House counsel.

But most important was the series of admissions that he personally chartered each of what he described as the "national security operations" that were to become entangled in Watergate.

These were the admissions:

• In 1969 the President ordered a special program of wiretaps numbering "fewer than 20" to plug news leaks of major international negotiations, including the nuclear arms talks. He said the taps "produced important leads that made it possible to tighten the security of highly sensitive materials."

National security adviser Henry Kissinger is known to have said that the taps produced no evidence that impugned the loyalty of any

National Security Council member.

The State Department said yesterday that the results of the taps were never made available to Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

• In June, 1970, the President called a meeting of intelligence community leaders that resulted in a plan for expanded domestic intelligence operations. The group working under his authority approved, among other measures, breaking and entering the premises of suspected national security violators. The plan was vetoed on July 23, 1970, a month after it was approved, because of the opposition of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. The plan was never implemented.

Yet this was the intelligence blueprint, the President said, that Dean removed from the White House and placed in a safe deposit box under the control of Judge John J. Sirica. Copies also have been turned over to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Watergate Committee. "The same plan," the President said, "is being headlined today."

• In December, 1970 a new interagency group, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, was created under presidential authority for expanded domestic intelligence evaluation. It was composed of representatives of the White House, CIA, FBI, National Security Agency, Departments of Justice, Treasury and Defense and the Secret Service.

One of the reasons for its establishment, the President suggested, was that by July, 1970, Hoover had "ended the FBI's normal liaison with all other agencies except the White House."

He revealed yesterday that the operations of the committee are now under investigation, a fact that has never before been acknowledged officially. "If it went beyond its charter and did engage in any illegal activities," the President said, "it was totally without my knowledge or authority."

In June, 1971, a week after publication of the

Pentagon Papers, he proved the creation of the White House Special Investigations Unit, the group that became known as "the plumbers," to stop national security leaks. Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy were assigned to the plumbers team.

The President said he personally chartered the investigation of Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg. He said he impressed upon Egil Krogh, the unit's chief, the "vital importance" of the Ellsberg assignment but that he did not authorize the use of illegal means to achieve that goal. Krogh has admitted that he approved the burglary in September 1971 of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.

• The President said he personally assigned "the plumbers" unit the task of compiling "an accurate record" of the Vietnam war. As an outgrowth of this enterprise, Watergate conspirator Hunt acknowledged that he fabricated cables designed to directly implicate the late President Kennedy in the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Members of the "plumbers" unit eventually became instruments for political sabotage operations in the President's 1972 re-election campaign—specifically the Watergate break-in.

• The President acknowledged that he personally directed Haldeman and Ehrlichman to make sure that the Watergate investigation did not infringe on covert operations of the CIA or the White House "plumbers." Deputy CIA Director Gen. Vernon A. Walters recently testified that the two White House aides asked him to

call off an investigation into Watergate funds channeled through Mexico. Haldeman said "it was the President's wish" that Walters tell FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III the Mexican inquiry would foul CIA covert operations. The CIA refused to comply.

• President Nixon admitted that in a conversation with Gray on July 6, 1972 he discussed the acting FBI director's contacts with the CIA. He acknowledged his awareness of Walters' refusal to go along with the plan.

Walters, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee and a federal grand jury, said Gray called him on the same date and told him that the FBI could not call off its investigation in Mexico without a letter from the CIA saying it would endanger covert activities of the agency there.

Retrospectively, the President commented yesterday that "it now seems that later . . . there were apparently wide-ranging efforts to limit the investigation or to conceal the possible involvement of members of the administration and the campaign committee. I was not aware of any such efforts at the time."

At the outset of his 4000-word statement yesterday Mr. Nixon insisted that "it is not my intention to place a national security 'cover' on Watergate . . ." Yet on the basis of his own statement each of the major tributaries of the Watergate scandal stemmed from programs that were begun by presidential order in the interests of national security.

Nixon Name Used, CIA Deputy Says

Walters Memo Quotes Haldeman as Citing 'the President's Wish'

BY JOHN H. AVERILL
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—H. R. Haldeman, President Nixon's former chief of staff, was quoted Monday as saying "it is the President's wish" that the Central Intelligence Agency try to sidetrack FBI efforts to trace funds involved in the Watergate scandal.

The quote attributed to Haldeman was contained in a memorandum written by Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, CIA deputy director, following a White House meeting last June 23, six days after the Watergate break-in.

The memorandum, one of 11 submitted by Walters last week to the Senate Armed Services Committee, was disclosed Monday by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.

Reading from the memo, Symington said that Haldeman turned to Walters at one point and said, "It is the President's wish that you go to see Mr. Gray." This was a reference to L. Patrick Gray III, who resigned recently as acting director of the FBI.

Funds Sent to Mexico

At the time of the White House meeting, the FBI was trying to trace campaign funds which were sent from Texas to Mexico where, it has been alleged, they were converted into Mexican checks and cash in an effort to conceal the identities of the donors. They were later deposited in a Miami bank account of confessed Watergate conspirator Bernard L. Barker.

Symington read from the Walters memo as the committee was questioning former CIA Director Richard Helms, now ambassador to Iran, about CIA involvement with Watergate participants.

Under questioning, Helms said he and Walters were instructed to attend the June 23 White House meeting, where they met with Haldeman

and John D. Ehrlichman, another top presidential aide who resigned along with Haldeman on April 30.

Helms said he believed Mr. Nixon's name was mentioned but could not recall it specifically. He said he took it for granted that Haldeman was not acting without authority.

"When the President's chief of staff speaks to you," Helms said, "you assume it is with the highest authority."

Panel Members Laud Helms

Symington and other committee members praised Helms for what they called his successful efforts to prevent the CIA from being compromised.

Later in the day, Symington emerged from a closed meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which he is acting chairman, to announce that secret documents had disclosed White House proposals that involved burglaries for domestic spying purposes.

Symington said the authenticity of the documents was verified in testimony Monday by Tom Charles Huston, a former White House aide who once worked for ousted presidential counsel John W. Dean III.

Some of the documents, Symington said, included papers Dean had placed in a safety deposit box. They were later turned over to federal Watergate prosecutors and the Senate's select Watergate committee.

Discussing the purported burglary plans, Symington said they did not specifically include political

carried out.

In his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, Helms described the White House meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman as "strange" and "unusual" and said at the time he knew of "no funds 'laundered' in Mexico."

Helms, who was recalled from Iran to testify, said the White House aides wanted Walters to tell Gray that the FBI probe of the funds could jeopardize covert CIA operations in Mexico.

While Helms left unclear his response to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, he told the committee that the FBI probe would inform the other if any overlap developed. He said he told Walters to tell Gray of an arrangement between the two agencies in which one would inform the other if any form of overlap developed. Helms said Walters visited Gray that same afternoon.

Helms acknowledged that the CIA did not actively resist White House pressures until it received "feelers" suggesting that covert CIA funds be used to keep Watergate defendants from confessing.

Order to Walters

At that point, Helms said, "I told Gen. Walters that if there were any efforts to involve the CIA in the Watergate, he was to resist them." Any involvement, he added, "could besmirch the agency."

Confessing that it was not his idea to leave the CIA, Helms told the committee:

"My total preoccupation was to keep the CIA uninvolved and I succeeded. . . . I wanted to stay as head of the agency."

Asked if his departure was related "to your refusal to play along with something you regarded as improper," Helms said: "I do not know."

He said he had a conversation with President Nixon two weeks after the presidential election last

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CIA Memo Cites Nixon On Calling Off the FB

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Washington, May 21 (NEWS Bureau) — President Nixon's former White House chief of staff, H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, was quoted today as having said it was "the President's wish" for the CIA to "discourage" the FBI investigation into the Mexican angle of the Watergate affair.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D.-Mo.) told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Haldeman statement was noted in a memorandum by Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA, on June 23, 1972, just six days after the break-in at Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate.

The memo was made public today as former CIA Director Richard M. Helms, now U.S. ambassador to Iran, appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee. The memo concerned a June 23 meeting involving Walters, Helms, Haldeman and former presidential adviser John D. Ehrlichman.

The Foreign Relations Committee summoned Helms back from Iran for questioning about apparent conflicts in what he told the committee during his confirmation hearing in February and what has subsequently emerged from CIA involvement in the Pentagon Papers and Watergate cases.

At the end of the June 23 meeting, the Walters memo noted, Haldeman turned to the general and said, "It is the President's wish that you go to see Mr. Gray." L. Patrick Gray 3d was then acting director of the FBI.

An Assumption

Asked about the Walters notation, Helms confirmed he was at the meeting but does not recall any comment by Haldeman specifically involving the President's name. But, he said, "when the President's chief of staff speaks, one obviously assumes he's speaking with authority."

At the time, the FBI was investigating "laundered" Republican campaign funds, that is, contributions sent from Texas to Mexico to be converted into checks or cash. Some of the checks eventually wound up in the bank account of convicted Watergate conspirator Bernard L. Barker in Miami.

There had been previous testimony that the FBI was asked to stay out of the Mexican part of the Watergate investigation in order to make it look like a domestic operation.

"Not Explained Why"

Helms testified that Haldeman told him and Walters that the CIA should claim its operations in Mexico might be harmed if the FBI looked into the matter. "It was made very clear that this is the way it had been decided," Helms added. "It was not explained why . . . I couldn't even understand why they were concerned about Mexico."

After the June 23 meeting, Helms said he told Walters that, when he met with Gray, he was to keep the matter "within the bounds of legitimacy." He said he told Walters to say only that, in accordance with long-standing agreement, the FBI should keep the CIA informed if its investigation conflicted with CIA interests.

Helms admitted that the CIA provided a wig, tape recorder and voice alteration to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr., but said he never envisioned the former CIA agent was going to do anything illegal.

"Nobody dreamed the White House was going to be undertaking burglaries," said Helms. Hunt, a onetime White House consultant, has admitted participating in a burglary of Pentagon Papers-defendant Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.

Helms also said that ousted White House counsel John W. Dean 3d put out "feelers" to the CIA to provide covert funds for bailing out some of the Watergate conspirators who were becoming "wobbly." But he said that Walters told Dean the CIA had no covert funds for this purpose, and that any such use of

appropriated funds would have to be reported to Congress.

"This rather cooled Mr. Dean's ardor for that approach," added Helms. After that, he said he never heard anything else about CIA help in the Watergate affair.

Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) asked Helms if he felt that he was removed as CIA director because of his unwillingness to cooperate. Helms did not answer directly, but when Sen. Symington asked him if he left the CIA "on your own volition," he replied: "Well, the President and I had a conversation about it."

Helms said he could not discuss the conversation but added, "Frankly, I wanted to stay as head of the agency to continue to keep it out (of the Watergate scandal). I thought I would be more successful than a newcomer."

Helms received a cordial welcome from the senators on the Foreign Relations Committee except Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.).

Fulbright recalled that during his ambassadorial confirmation hearings last February, Helms said he "knew nothing" of Hunt's involvement with the CIA.

Helms insisted today that he "did not answer those questions dishonestly," and contended that Hunt was not on the CIA payroll at the time.

But Fulbright was plainly not satisfied with Helms explanation. "You left the impression that there was no relationship between Hunt and the CIA," he said. "Now it appears that there was."

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C.I.A. MEMO SAID TO QUOTE HALDEMAN ON NIXON 'WISH TO HALT F.B.I. FUND STUDY'

DENIED BY EX-AIDE

He Says the President Was Not Involved 'in Any Cover-Up'

By MARJORIE HUNTER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 21—H. R. Haldeman, the former White House chief of staff, reportedly told an official of the Central Intelligence Agency that "it is the President's wish" that the C.I.A. attempt to halt an investigation into one aspect of the Watergate case.

This was reported today by Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, who said he was quoting from a document written nearly a year ago by Gen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the C.I.A.

Senator Symington said that Mr. Haldeman's statement regarding the President was contained in a "memorandum of conversations" that General Walters said he prepared after a White House meeting with Mr. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, another Presidential aide, last June, six days after the break-in of Democratic headquarters at the Watergate complex.

Testified Last Week

General Walters testified last week that he had been called to the White House and told he had been chosen to try to persuade L. Patrick Gray 3d, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to halt an inquiry into campaign funds "laundered" through a bank in Mexico City.

At that time, however, he made no mention that anyone had invoked the President's name in demanding his help.

The memorandum, according to Senator Symington, said that at one point during the meeting, Mr. Haldeman turned

to General Walters and said: "It is the President's wish that you go to see Mr. Gray."

Mr. Haldeman denied later today that the President was in any way involved in the Watergate cover-up.

Statement by Haldeman

"I can flatly say that the President was not involved in any cover-up of anything at any time," Mr. Haldeman said.

Still another of General Walters's "memorandums of conversation" — written last year but disclosed today by another Congressional source— quotes Mr. Gray as saying that the President, during a telephone conversation, had inquired about "the case," an apparent reference to the Watergate inquiry.

This memorandum quotes Mr. Gray as telling the President that the Watergate case could not be covered up and that he thought that Mr. Nixon should get rid of those involved.

Meanwhile, there were the following other developments today in the Watergate affair:

Senator Symington disclosed that the Senate Armed Services Committee had acquired two sets of documents purporting to deal with Administration plans in the summer of 1970 to permit burglary and other violations of the law in the collection of intelligence information about United States citizens. He said the plans were never carried out.

Richard Helms, former director of the C.I.A., appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to defend that agency's role in granting White House requests for a personality profile on Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, later a defendant in the Pentagon papers case, and in furnishing materials to a White House aide involved in breaking into the office of Dr. Ellsberg's former psychiatrist.

Nixon's Name Not Used

Mr. Helms said he had presumed that White House aides were speaking for the President when they asked for C.I.A. assistance but he said he never used the name directly.

Asked why he had never in-

formed the President of subsequent, and apparently unsuccessful, White House appeals for help in covering up the Watergate affair, Mr. Helms replied:

"My interest was to keep the C.I.A. out of this. Frankly, I wanted to stay as head of the agency and to keep it out of all this. I felt I'd be more successful than someone who might come afterward."

In effect, the C.I.A. aspects of the Watergate probe have opened up another complete Congressional investigation into potential White House involvement.

General Walters was questioned for nearly two and a half hours today at a closed hearing of the Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee about points raised in the 11 memorandums of conversations he wrote last summer, shortly after the Watergate break-in.

'Heated' Questioning

Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, said that the general's responses to questions "were not totally satisfying" and that the questioning had become "heated at times."

Mr. Nedzi said that his subcommittee planned to question other witnesses, including Mr. Gray, Mr. Haldeman and three former White House aides— John D. Ehrlichman, John W. Dean 3d and David Young.

Neither Senator Symington nor Mr. Nedzi would release a copy of the Walter memorandum purporting to quote Mr. Gray as having told President Nixon that the Watergate case could not be covered up.

However, key excerpts from the memorandum were obtained from other Congressional sources.

The memorandum, prepared by July 13, is said to be General Walter's recollection of a conversation held just a day earlier with Mr. Gray.

The document quotes Mr. Gray as saying that President Nixon had called him a week earlier to congratulate him on F.B.I. action frustrating an airplane hijacking in San Francisco.

"Toward the end of the conversation," according to the

Then I should never is involved, no matter how high up? Gray replied that was his recommendation.

"The President then asked what I thought and Gray said my views were the same as his. The President took it well and thanked him."

The memorandum further states that Mr. Gray told General Walters that he had subsequently telephoned Mr. Dean, then the President's White House counsel, to tell him of the conversation with Mr. Nixon and of his recommendation that all involved be discharged.

Dean's Response Given

General Walters said, according to the memorandum, that Mr. Dean's response to that was "okay."

Senator Symington's disclosure of the existence of documents dealing with intelligence gathering plans came at the end of two hours of questioning of Tom Charles Huston, a former White House aide, by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Senator Symington said that Mr. Huston had been called to verify the authenticity of documents "which bear his purported signature" and to testify about events described by the documents.

The Senator said both sets of documents "purportedly deal with certain studies, recommendations and decisions" in the White House in the summer and fall of 1970 concerning "intelligence collection and evaluation on both foreign and domestic subjects."

Senator Symington said the documents appeared to call for "violations of the law in the domestic collection of intelligence on United States citizens."

The Senator added: "There didn't seem to be any limitation on the amount of burglary involved."

Senator Symington quoted Mr. Huston as saying that copies of the suggested intelligence gathering plans were supposed to go to the President, Haldeman but that all of his relations were with Mr. Haldeman.

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STAT

CIA Deputy Haldeman Told Him Cover-Up Was 'the President's Wish'

Memo by Walters Disclosed on Hill

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

The deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency has made a written allegation that White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman told him "it is the President's wish" that the CIA seek to block an important phase of the Watergate investigation.

Gen. Vernon Walters made this assertion in a memorandum he wrote shortly after a White House meeting on June 23, 1972, between himself and Haldeman, presidential aide John D. Ehrlichman and CIA Director Richard Helms.

This disclosure was made yesterday by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) in the course of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing to question Helms on pressures by White House aides on the CIA to help cover up the Watergate trail.

It was the most direct allegation by a high-ranking government official indicating presidential involvement in efforts to impede the Federal Bureau of Investigation's inquiry into the Watergate case.

Walters in previous statements and Helms yesterday provided details of

other White House aides to have the CIA intercede with the FBI in calling off investigation of the "laundering" of Watergate funds through a Mexican bank account.

It has already been disclosed that some \$100,000 in Nixon re-election funds were passed through a Mexico City bank and ended up in the safe of Maurice H. Stans to finance Watergate and other operations in the 1972 campaign.

Symington interrupted the questioning of Helms yesterday to drop his bombshell, which was based on one of 11 still-secret memos written by Walters in the course of the White House-CIA contacts.

In his memo on the June 23 meeting, Symington related, Walters reported that "Mr. Haldeman turned to General Walters and said, 'It is the President's wish that you go to see Mr.

FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III that any investigation into the Watergate scandal's Mexican connection would jeopardize CIA operations. It was clear from the testimony that Helms' authority as CIA director was bypassed by the White House aides in their demand that Walters convey the proposal to Gray.

Walters had served as a translator to President Nixon on foreign trips both during his vice presidential and presidential terms and the two men were considered friends.

Within an hour after the June 23 meeting the deputy CIA director was given an appointment with Gray. Walters relayed to Gray the concern of "senior White House officials" that the Mexican investigation would jeopardize CIA activities, according to Walters' own testimony.

After consultation with Helms, however, the CIA took the position that the FBI inquiry would in no way jeopardize CIA activities in Mexico. The agency, in effect, turned down the White House request.

Helms testified yesterday that he had no independent recollection of the Haldeman remark but he did not take issue with Walters' memorandum on the June 23 meeting, which was called by Haldeman six days after the Watergate break-in.

Helms did recall a Haldeman statement that "the opposition" was "capitalizing" on the Watergate episode. Haldeman, Helms recalled, stated about the Bay of

Pigs investigation" at the time. The former CIA director said he told the White House aides he had no interest in the Bay of Pigs.

"I did not have any idea of what the Mexican investigation was about," Helms testified. He said he then took the position with Walters that there was no CIA involvement in the case.

Asked why neither he nor Walters went directly to the President about the incident, Helms said:

"My total preoccupation was in keeping the CIA uninvolved in the matter. I was successful in doing that so far as I was concerned. . . I wanted to stay as the head of the agency to keep it out of it (the Watergate scandal). It is always a question of moral judgments and I was doing the best I could do."

Yesterday's hearing also raised publicly, for the first time, the question of whether Helms was replaced as CIA director in reprisal for his refusal to cooperate with the White House staff in the alleged cover-up effort.

Asked directly by Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) whether there was any connection between his departure from the agency and his refusal to cooperate in the cover-up, Helms replied:

"I don't know. I talked to the President and I think our conversation is privileged. At no time in that conversation was Watergate or anything else mentioned."

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The CIA in a Better Light

Enough new information has come out of the Watergate-Pentagon Papers investigation so that accounts can be better squared on the involvement of one key department, the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA looked bad in the wake of disclosures that at White House request it had provided assistance to the burglars of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and that it cooperated in compiling a psychological profile of Ellsberg. We said at the time that this involvement compromised and discredited the CIA.

Since then, there has come some rather remarkable testimony from General Robert E. Cushman, former deputy director of the agency, General Vernon Walters, currently deputy director, and Richard M. Helms, who was director of CIA in the period covering both the Ellsberg and the Watergate episodes. Although CIA does not emerge blame-free, the new disclosures do afford a better perspective, and do place the agency's role in a more favorable light.

To recapitulate: General Cushman used bad judgment in helping burglars E. Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy, though it is fairly clear he did not know their mission, and though CIA assistance to them was halted even before the burglary took place. Helms used similar bad judgment in acquiescing on the Ellsberg profile. So

much for the Ellsberg period in 1971.

In the 1972 period following the arrest of the Watergate burglars, high White House officials evidently attempted on several occasions to unload major responsibility on CIA for what happened, and to get the agency to help scuttle the FBI's investigation. Helms and General Walters deserve great credit for refusing to go along with the White House suggestions, which Senator McClellan described as "beyond impropriety."

Should Helms and Walters have gone to the President, or Congress, with that information? Perhaps so. In retrospect, it is understandable that they did not. Lyman Kirkpatrick, a former CIA official, wrote recently in the New York Times:

"In fairness to CIA and other departments involved, the role of the White House staff should not be underestimated. It is not the custom of the bureaucracy to question a call from the executive offices. It is assumed that the President's people know what they are doing. While they may not inform the President of all details, it is usually believed they are operating under approved policy guidelines."

The point is worth remembering. It is one thing to have been marginally compromised. It is another to have used the power and authority of the White House to plot the compromising.

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CIA MEMO ON HALDEMAN**'Nixon's Wish' City****Coverup**By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

Six days after the Watergate break-in last June, federal prosecutor Earl J. Silbert revealed at a routine bond hearing involving the burglars that a bank draft of \$89,000 linked to Bernard L. Barker, one of the suspects, had been traced to a bank in Mexico City.

That same day, June 23, 1972, according to recent testimony before three congressional committees, White House aides H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman tried to enlist CIA cooperation in blocking an FBI investigation of an ill-defined Mexico City finance operation.

According to a memo by CIA deputy director Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters which was prepared a few days later but revealed only yesterday, heading off the FBI probe was deemed so urgent that Haldeman told CIA officials that day "it is the President's wish" that Walters go to FBI acting director L. Patrick Gray III to call the FBI investigation off.

In the annals of the complex Watergate affair, the details of the tortuous financial trail that led from a Houston mining company, through Mexico City, to Barker and then to GOP fundraiser Maurice Stans' safe did not surface for many weeks.

TO WALTERS and to former CIA director Richard M. Helms, who testified yesterday in an open session of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, the connection was totally obscure last June. At that time, Watergate was still regarded as a mysterious "caper" and the Mexican bank drafts had barely surfaced in Silbert's prosecution of Barker and the burglars.

Helms' testimony yesterday underscored both these points as he recounted the meeting at which Haldeman warned that the Watergate affair might be fraught with political dangers.

As Helms recalls it, he was summoned by telephone to be at the White House at 1 p.m. June 23 to discuss an unidentified subject and to come with Walters, a former aide to President Nixon who barely six weeks before had been sworn in as CIA deputy.

Once in Ehrlichman's office, Helms recalled, Haldeman told the men there was a danger the Watergate incident might be capitalized upon by the "opposition." Apparently some danger to the national security likewise was invoked, as Helms recalls it, because "Haldeman also mentioned the Bay of Pigs, in an incoherent statement I didn't understand."

THEN HALDEMAN gave his order: "It was decided at the White House," Helms testified yesterday, that Walters should go to Gray and tell him that continued investigation of the Mexican finance might jeopardize CIA operations there.

Walters, in a confidential memorandum of the same conversation, which Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) in part revealed at yesterday's hearing, put it more bluntly. "It is the President's wish that you go to Mr. Gray" is the way he heard Haldeman's order.

Helms yesterday insisted that he had no recollection of the phrase "it is the President's wish." But he left no doubt that he re-

garded an order from Haldeman as issuing from the top. "When the President's chief of staff speaks to you," he noted, "you assume he speaks with authority."

Helms revealed yesterday that the CIA immediately checked the only conceivable link between the Mexican money transfer and its own operations in Mexico. This was Manuel Ogarrío Daguerre, an attorney to whom had received a \$100,000 transfer from Gulf Resources and Chemical Corp. of Houston as a bill payment April 3, 1972.

OGARRIO, Helms told the committee, "had no relation to the agency," and by June 26 the CIA director and his deputy were trying to tell White House aides they could not invoke CIA operations to block the FBI probe.

Ogarrío, as the investigation eventually was to reveal, bought \$89,000 in bank drafts from Banco City April 4, 1972.

Richard Helms testifies.

The next day the drafts, plus \$11,000 in cash, were delivered by courier to Nixon fund-raisers in Houston. The money was flown immediately to Washington. The drafts were cashed through Barker's Miami bank account before the money went back into a campaign safe used, in part, to finance Watergate spying.

Some of these connections between Watergate and the GOP campaign might never have been made had Haldeman's order of June 23, been carried out, and the Mexico City bank transaction, Watergate prosecutor Silbert revealed that day, might never have been developed. The full details of the Mexican transaction are still under investigation by a federal grand jury in Houston.

Helms, looking back yesterday on that early stage of the Watergate scandal, stressed the seeming innocence of what Haldeman seemed to be doing at the time. "I don't know after it had been revealed



-Star-News Photographer Joseph Silverman



EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

No. 359

21 May 1973

DDCI STATEMENT ABOUT THE WATERGATE CASE

The following statement was made by Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters during a recent appearance before a Congressional Committee.

On 23 June 1972 I was ordered by a phone message from my office to be at the White House at about 1300 with Director Helms. I had lunch with Mr. Helms and we went to Mr. Ehrlichman's office at the White House. Present were Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Helms and myself. As I recall it, Mr. Haldeman said that the Watergate incident was causing trouble and was being exploited by the opposition. It had been decided at the White House that I would go to Acting FBI Director Gray and tell him that now that the five suspects were arrested, further enquiries into the Mexican aspects of this matter might jeopardize some of the CIA's covert activities in that area. An appointment was made for me to see Mr. Gray at 1430 that same day. I went over and told him that I had been directed by top White House officials to tell him that further investigation into the Mexican aspects of the Watergate episode might jeopardize some of the Agency's covert actions in that area. He said that he understood the agreement between the FBI and the Agency regarding their sources but that this was a complicated case. He would not violate the agreement with CIA regarding sources. On my return to the Agency I checked to see whether there was any danger in the Agency's covert sources if the Mexican part of the investigation continued and ascertained that no one believed that this was the case. No one had any knowledge of the plan to bug the Democratic National Committee.

On June 26 the Counsel to the President John Dean called me and asked me to come and see him about the matter I had discussed with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. He said I could check with Ehrlichman and I did. He said I could talk to Dean so I went to Dean's office at 1145 on June 26.

I informed Dean that I had checked carefully to see whether there was any jeopardy to the Agency's sources by a further investigation of the Mexican sources of this matter and had found there was none. Dean then asked whether the CIA might have taken part in the Watergate episode without my knowing it. I said that this was not

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possible. I knew that the Agency had had no part in the operation against the Democratic National Committee. I therefore could not say that further investigation would jeopardize Agency sources. I felt that someone had bungled badly and that the responsible parties should be fired. He asked whether there was not some way in which the Agency might have been involved. I said that I had checked with Director Helms and was convinced it was not. Any attempt to stifle this investigation would destroy the effectiveness of the Agency and the FBI and would be a grave disservice to the President. I would have no part in it and was quite prepared to resign on the issue. He asked whether I had any ideas on what might be done and I replied that those responsible should be fired. He seemed disappointed and I left.

The following day I saw Dean again in his office at his request. He again reviewed the Watergate Case saying that some witnesses were getting scared and were "wobbling". I said that no matter how scared they got, they could not involve CIA because it was not involved in the bugging of the Watergate. He then asked if the CIA could not furnish bail and pay the suspects' salaries while they were in jail, using covert action funds for this purpose.

I replied that this was out of the question. It would implicate the Agency in something in which it was not implicated. Any such action by the Agency would imply an order from the highest level and I would not be a party to any such action. It would be a grave disservice to the President and the country and would destroy the CIA's credibility with the Congress and the people. I would resign rather than do this and, if ordered to do it, I would ask to see the President to explain the reasons for my refusal. Furthermore, when the Agency expended funds in the U.S., we had to report this to the Oversight Committees of the Agency in Congress. He was much taken aback by this and agreed that risks of implicating the CIA and FBI in this matter would be enormous. I said that what was now a painful wound could become a mortal one. What was now a "conventional explosion could be turned into a multi-megaton explosion". I again advised him to fire the responsible parties.

Again Dean sent for me on the 28th of June and I saw him at his office at 1130 that day. He enquired whether I had learned anything more about CIA involvement. I replied that there was no involvement of the Agency in the bugging of the Watergate. He then asked whether I had any ideas and I said that I had none which could be helpful. Perhaps the Cubans who were anti-Castro might have had a hand in it but the CIA did not.

On July 5 I received a call from Acting Director of the FBI Gray saying that he could not stop further investigation of the Mexican aspects of this matter unless he had a formal letter from the Director of CIA or me asking him to do this. I said that I would come to his office and I saw him at 1000 the following morning.

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I told him that I could not tell him that further investigation would jeopardize the Agency's covert sources. I had checked on this and it was not so. I had ascertained that General Cushman had initially authorized the issuance of some equipment to Howard Hunt without knowing its purpose other than it was, as I understood it, to shut off "leaks". This was long before the Watergate bugging. Since then I had carefully checked and there was no other involvement of any sort by the CIA in the operation against the Watergate. I said that I felt that attempts to cover this up or to implicate the CIA or FBI would be detrimental to their integrity and a disservice to the President and the country. I would have no part in this and was quite prepared to resign on this issue. He said that he shared my views regarding the importance of the integrity of our Agencies and he too was prepared to resign on this issue. I gave Gray a list of the equipment the Agency had given Hunt and the account of our dealings with the former CIA employees up to the termination of their employment with the Agency long before the Watergate episode.

I saw Gray again on the 12th of July and gave him one additional memorandum regarding the contact furnished Hunt. We reviewed the matter reiterating the position we had taken previously. I said that I had told Dean that the best solution would be to fire those responsible. Gray said he had made the same recommendation. Once again we agreed that anything that might damage the integrity of the FBI and CIA would be a grave disservice to the President and the Government.

In February 1973 shortly after Dr. Schlesinger became Director I told him of my conversations with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean. In February Dean called Dr. Schlesinger to see if the Agency could get back from the FBI the material it had sent to the Justice Department concerning our contact with Hunt. Dr. Schlesinger and I agreed that this could not be done. I attempted to contact Dean but he was in Florida. On his return I saw Dean at his office on February 21 and told him that we could not ask the FBI for the material back. That would only serve to implicate the CIA and I could not and would not do it. I had seen Acting FBI Director Gray that morning and told him of Dean's request and our refusal. He agreed saying that he could not do such a thing.

Since that date I have had no further contact with Dean. The above represents my recollection of what occurred and the dates are checked in my appointment book.

'It Is the President's Wish,' CIA Memo Quotes Haldeman

By OSWALD JOHNSTON

Star-News Staff Writer

CIA Deputy Director Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, in a memorandum prepared last June, said he was ordered by White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman to interfere with an FBI investigation of the Watergate case and was told "it is the President's wish" that he carry out the order.

The memo was written a few days after a June 23 White House meeting in which the order was relayed to Walters in the presence of then-CIA director Richard M. Helms and presidential domestic adviser John D. Ehrlichman.

The substance of the memo was revealed today in a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Helms, testifying to the committee, said he had no recollection that the President's name was invoked on the June 23 meeting.

He said he was in the room, but does not recall on his own whether Haldeman used the President's name specifically.

(Informed sources have told The Star-News that Helms testified before the Watergate grand jury on Friday that Haldeman said the request for aid in the cover-up came from "higher up" in the White House. At that time, there was only one person higher than Haldeman, and that was President Nixon.)

DURING MORE than two hours of an open hearing, at the conclusion of which Helms was

roundly praised by committee members for refusing to yield to White House pressure, Helms stressed that he gave orders after Watergate that the agency was under no circumstances to be linked with the widening scandal.


Much of the testimony merely confirmed earlier disclosures of the campaign by White House aides Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III to use the CIA to hinder investigation of Watergate and to provide a cover for the five Watergate burglars.

Helms made it plain, however, that his perplexity was extreme in the face of evidence that top-ranking White House aides, invoking presidential authority, were seeking to involve the agency in illegal activities.

Recalling the June 23 meeting, Helms described Haldeman as making an "incoherent statement that I didn't understand" linking the FBI probe in Mexico to the Bay of Pigs — the CIA-directed 1961 invasion of Cuba that ended in disaster.

Walters also was quizzed by Dean on the possibility of using CIA "covert action funds" to pay salaries to the five Watergate burglars while in jail and bail expenses.

HELMs WAS ALSO questioned at length about an earlier episode when the CIA, at Ehrlichman's request, supplied camera disguises and false documents to convicted Watergate conspirator Howard Hunt. The materials were used in the September 1971 burglary



Wally McNamee—Newsweek

Gray: A message for Mr. Nixon

HOW GRAY TRIED TO 'WARN' NIXON

When L. Patrick Gray III resigned as acting director of the FBI three weeks ago, the chorus of relief around the White House could almost be heard in tourist country. Gray had wounded the Nixon Administration deeply: not only had he admitted handing over

• FBI files on the Watergate bugging and burglary to White House counsel John W. Dean III, he had also confessed to destroying papers from Waterbugger E. Howard Hunt's safe given to him by Dean. But the White House rejoicing was at least premature; last week Gray surfaced again with an even more damaging story. As the details leaked out, Gray told Senate investigators that he had personally warned President Nixon less than three weeks after the Watergate burglary that White House top-siders were using both the FBI and the CIA to cover up the scandal.

As Gray told the story, he first suspected CIA involvement in the Watergate case the week after the burglary, when FBI agents investigating the case told him that the forged passports and fake identification papers found on the Waterbuggers bore the professional earmarks of first-rate CIA work. That embarrassing clue sent Gray to the phone to call Richard Helms, then chief of the CIA. "Is the CIA somehow involved in the Watergate?" Gray asked. Helms said no. But next day, according to Gray, the CIA's No. 2 man, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, informed him that "there was CIA involvement."

With that, Gray arranged a meeting with Helms and Walters to pin down the CIA role—and told White House counsel John Dean about the appointment. On the morning of the meeting, Gray says, he got a call from John Ehrlichman telling him to "cancel" it. "Who decides on these things?" Gray bristled. "You, Pat," Ehrlichman replied blandly. Gray dutifully scrubbed the appointment.

It gradually dawned on Gray that, whatever the fact of the matter, some-

body in the White House wanted him to believe that Watergate was a CIA caper and that he ought to lay off. Dean, he says, phoned him three times on July 3 with precisely that message. But Gray, still suspicious, asked the CIA—and got a denial. Gray may or may not have suspected at that point that the whole idea of a CIA connection had been designed to flimflam the FBI off the case. What he did sense was that the FBI was caught in the contradictions and unwelcome in the investigation. When Mr. Nixon called him on another matter on July 6, he blurted out the bad news: "Mr. President, you are being wounded by men around you . . . by men using the FBI and the CIA."

Agony: The President, Gray recounted, answered mildly: "You keep up the investigation." The "meddling" seemed to stop; Senate investigators were left to decide from Gray's raw unevaluated narrative whether Mr. Nixon really meant to call off his people or whether the Gray message merely forced the White House to replace the CIA cover story with a blanket cover-up. Gray, in any case, agonized for months ("He feels he tried to warn the President," a friend said, "and the President didn't heed the warning")—and as a patriot, he told friends, he once even contemplated suicide.

But in the end, like so many others tarred by Watergate, Gray may have been trying to hedge his bets. Gray also disclosed for the first time that he had not put Hunt's papers straightaway in an FBI "burn bag." Instead, he squirreled them away for six months and burned them at his home in Connecticut—only after the White House assured him he would be permanent director of the FBI.

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Meddling with the CIA

Let us pause and ponder those three meetings on three successive days last June between Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, deputy CIA director, and John W. Dean 3d, then counsel to the President. At the first meeting, on June 26, General Walters refused a White House request to ask the FBI to call off its probe of Watergate-connected money transactions in Mexico on the spurious ground that CIA operations there could be endangered. At the second meeting, on June 27, General Walters refused a White House request that the CIA use covert funds to finance bail and pay the salaries of defendants in the Watergate break-in case. At the third and last meeting, on June 28, General Walters refused to have the CIA take the blame in the Watergate affair when, in fact, it had no cause to take the blame.

These overtures from the White House were so compromising to the CIA that General Walters informed Mr. Dean he would rather resign than carry them out. This tells us the CIA may have learned something from its unseemly involvement a year earlier in the White House-directed burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. But it also tells us that some of the top aides to the President seemed to recognize no bounds in corrupting the operations of their own government.

Whether Mr. Nixon himself knew of these and other misdeeds in the Watergate coverup is a question bearing on his future capacity to govern effectively. Senator Stuart Symington says he finds it hard to "visualize" that the President was unaware of such high-level White House approaches to

the CIA. Yet neither General Walters nor his overly acquiescent former chief, Richard Helms, ever went to Mr. Nixon to discuss or protest this troubling matter. Instead they assumed, perhaps with good reason, that orders issued by such palace guardsman as H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman had to reflect the wishes of the President.

Let us pause again and ponder that assumption. It seems to suggest that the director and deputy director of the CIA could envisage their President's being willing to subvert a vital agency by sanctioning illegal actions. And for what purpose? To defend the national security, as was pretended in the Ellsberg case? Or to meet a national emergency? Hardly. The objective was to guarantee the re-election of a President who was a shoo-in long before the campaign year began.

The American people must ask themselves, as they did in the days when Watergate was still considered a caper, just why—not how, but why—the administration got itself in such a mess. And the answer may be truly disturbing. For we are not dealing here with the public Mr. Richard Nixon—the Chief Executive determined to fulfill high policy objectives regardless of the carping of the press and the anguish of Congress. Rather, we have a private glimpse of a President—or at least a presidency—that seems to have lost all perspective, all sense of proportion and propriety. That is a dangerous development, even in a democracy with strong institutions to check and balance.

Symington, STUART

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How the CIA got tricked

By STEPHEN E. NORDLINGER

Washington.

At a meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April of 1971, Richard Helms with the permission of President Nixon gave his first public address since becoming in 1936 the director of central intelligence. After defending the need and propriety of a democracy having a clandestine intelligence-gathering service to protect its national security, Mr. Helms noted that the statute which created the CIA in 1947 expressly prohibited the agency from having any police, subpoena or law enforcement powers or any domestic security functions.

"I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our personnel, our facilities and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions," Mr. Helms said. "We have never sought any."

"In short, we do not target on American citizens."

Including Ellsberg

That speech was on April 14, 1971. Less than three months later—July 7—John D. Ehrlichman, President Nixon's top domestic adviser, telephoned Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., deputy CIA director, with a request that was to ensnare the CIA directly in a domestic security function, including the targeting on an American citizen—Dr. Daniel Ellsberg.

For the past week or so, three congressional committees have been hearing hours of secret testimony centered on the fallout from that Ehrlichman-Cushman conversation and other dealings over the past two years between the CIA and the White House. From all indications, the agency has been severely shaken by its unprecedented involvement in domestic affairs, normally left to the FBI and state and local police. Agency members are said to be dismayed and aghast. The reputation of Mr. Helms, now ambassador to Iran, has been tarnished and the top agency leaders have been quietly accused on Capitol Hill of suppressing the agency's knowledge of involvement of top White House aides in the Watergate cover-up.

Based on oral and written statements

of General Cushman and other CIA officials and comments of various senators, it appears that high-level advisers to President Nixon—H. R. Haldeman, John W. Dean 3d and Mr. Ehrlichman—made a calculated judgment that the CIA with its history of carrying out "dirty tricks" overseas could be used and counted on to keep its mouth shut. The agency has a long record of saying nothing publicly. The White House's assumption almost turned out to be quite valid.

Apparently with this background of CIA discretion in mind, Mr. Ehrlichman sought the agency's assistance in the summer of 1971 for what turned out to be Phase I of an extraordinary series of CIA entanglements.

Pentagon Papers

The call to General Cushman, now Marine Corps commandant, came at the height of a White House security scare because of the publication a month earlier of the Pentagon Papers. The general, acting as a true-blue military officer and former military aide to Mr. Nixon when he was vice president, asked no questions of Mr. Ehrlichman. As he said last week, he felt Mr. Ehrlichman spoke with the President's authority and he realized that the leaks of intelligence information were of great concern.

Thus, when E. Howard Hunt, a White House aide then, came around soon afterwards, he got with Mr. Helms's assent the camera, false identification and other materials he sought for himself and G. Gordon Liddy, despite absence of the CIA's required procedural steps and approvals normally required by its regulations. Only when Mr. Hunt went beyond reason weeks later and asked for a New York mailing address, a telephone answering service and use of the secretary he had known during his 20-year CIA career did General Cushman call off the arrangement and notify Mr. Ehrlichman.

First American

While this assistance was being offered, Mr. Helms at White House request instructed the CIA's Medical Services Division over the staff's protests to prepare a "personality assessment" of Dr. Ellsberg—the first one ever made on an American. Mr. Helms later read the two different profile versions, the second based on some classified material, before they were sent off to the White

questions and was kept in the dark. It learned only recently about the uses to which the materials were put—the break-in at the office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Even when Hunt and Liddy were implicated last year in the Watergate break-in, Mr. Helms and General Cushman said nothing to President Nixon or congressmen who oversee CIA functions.

James R. Schlesinger, Mr. Helms's successor, and General Cushman told what they knew of this phase of CIA involvement only after Hunt early this month revealed to the Watergate grand jury his role in the break-in at the psychiatrist's office. Hunt and Liddy's names had been in the headlines for almost a year in connection with Watergate.

The CIA also suppressed its information concerning the remarkable attempts of Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean to persuade the CIA to take the blame for the Watergate break-in, Phase 2 of the CIA's involvement. Mr. Helms and General Cushman's successor, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, were asked to halt an FBI investigation of campaign contributions to the Nixon re-election "laundered" in Mexico by suggesting to the FBI that its activity would compromise CIA activities. At the time—six days after the Watergate burglary—Mr. Helms and General Walters might not have related this request to Watergate. But numerous newspaper

and television accounts soon afterwards made the relationship clear. The Mexican agency was traced to the bank account in Florida of Bernard L. Barker, one of the five-member team that broke into Watergate.

The attempt to have the CIA take the blame for Watergate became absolutely obvious a few days later when Mr. Dean asked General Walters whether the CIA could put up bail for the arrested Watergate men and pay their salaries in jail. The CIA resisted all these requests.

None of this was told to the President or congressmen by Mr. Helms or General Walters. Last February and March Mr. Helms was specifically asked several questions at a closed meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee whether the CIA was involved in Watergate. Such questions may have been prompted by a feeling of at least four of those who broke into Watergate that it was a CIA operation. To these questions, Mr. Helms said that the CIA had nothing to do with the bugging and wiretapping of the Democratic headquarters and he said that the CIA had "no

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Coverup request by Nixon, Helms said to believe

By MURIEL DOBEIN

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Richard M. Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, reportedly has told Senate investigators that he believed two top-level White House aides were speaking for President Nixon when they urged the calling off of an FBI investigation into Presidential re-election funds in Mexican banks.


According to reliable sources, Mr. Helms said that both he and Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the CIA deputy director, were convinced that H. R. Haldeman, the former White House chief of staff, and John D. Ehrlichman, the former top domestic aide to Mr. Nixon, were speaking "at the behest of the President.

Not mentioned by name

Mr. Helms was said to have stressed that Mr. Nixon's name was not mentioned by either Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman at the meeting which he and General Walters attended in Mr. Haldeman's office during the presidential election campaign.

Mr. Haldeman did most of the talking at that meeting, according to reports of Mr. Helms's accounts to the investigators. It was proposed that the CIA should persuade the FBI that its investigation of \$100,000 in Nixon re-election campaign funds in a Mexico City bank should be terminated because it might imperil intelligence operations.

What has been called the "Mexican connection" of the



RICHARD M. HELMS

Nixon fund-raising pattern of 1972, involved a \$100,000 contribution, said to have come from a Texas source, which was filtered through a Mexico City bank before coming to rest eventually in the safe of Maurice H. Stans, director of campaign finances for the President last year.

When questioned by the Senate investigators as to why there was no more effort to alert the President to what was going on, Mr. Helms reportedly pointed out that he, General Walters, and Lt. Paul

rick Gray 3d, former acting chief of the FBI, were confronted by a situation in which they were dealing with Mr. Nixon's two top aides.

According to sources, Mr. Helms said he had assumed—as had General Walters and Mr. Gray—that such men had authority to speak for the President.

As he was said to have put it, "Where can you go?"

Mr. Helms reportedly confirmed earlier reports that Mr. Gray's concern reached the stage that in the course of a telephone conversation with the President, the acting FBI director told Mr. Nixon, "You are being wounded by the men around you."

As far as has been ascertained, the President took no action as a result of Mr. Gray's warning.

It was only a few days ago that the Senate Armed Services Committee released testimony showing that Mr. Helms knew six days after the Watergate raid of June 17, 1972, that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman had tried to involve the CIA in interference with the FBI investigation of the case.

As Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) acting chairman of the committee, put it, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean 3d, then legal counsel to the President, were "up to their ears" in trying to link the CIA to covert political activities.

Mr. Helms, now ambassador to Iran, was called back to

Washington last weekend as a result of increasing reports of CIA involvement in the attempted coverup of the Watergate scandal and the related burglary of the office of Daniel R. Ellsberg's psychiatrist in an attempt to discredit the Pentagon papers case defendant. It is expected that Mr. Helms will testify before the Senate's Watergate hearings now under way.

Bail money

General Walters testified last week before the Armed Services Committee that the White House had tried to persuade the CIA to provide bail for the Watergate defendants or pay their salaries while they were in jail.

Later, Senator Symington said he did not think there was "any question in the world" that this had been a deliberate effort by the White House to obstruct justice.

He added that it was "difficult to understand" the proposition that the President had no knowledge of attempts by top White House aides to use the CIA to conceal the facts

behind the Watergate break-in.

Both Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman—who recently resigned from their White House positions as they became increasingly deeply implicated in the Watergate affair—are scheduled to testify at the Watergate hearings, which are due to resume Tuesday.

James W. McCord, the former security chief of the Committee for the Re-election

of the President, and now a convicted Watergate conspirator, will return for further testimony. He already has contributed sensational statements linking President Nixon—by hearsay evidence—not only to knowledge of last year's political espionage, but to orders of executive clemency and money in return for silence on the part of the original seven Watergate defendants.

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A Tapping Is Heard On High

WASHINGTON — A Democrat once high on Lyndon Johnson's White House staff spoke of "leprosy"; a Republican who kept the financial accounts of President Nixon's 1972 campaign concluded that a political career "sooner or later takes the edge off your values"; a former Republican Presidential candidate reluctantly said what he felt he had to say about his President and his country—"Let's get going."

Their reactions to the Watergate scandals were appropriate to the week. In a variety of ways, the main actors seemed caught in the elements of tragedy—men of substance drawn, by their own assumptions, into an official life of intrigue and deception. There was major news: The chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission resigned, Attorney General-Designate Elliot Richardson finally named the man he wants as special prosecutor of the Watergate scandal, and the White House rejected any notion that President Nixon might resign. But what held attention was what became known about the atmosphere in which events have occurred in the Government.

The most startling development transferred Henry Kissinger's name from the diplomatic stories to the Watergate stories. The intellectual, disciplined Harvard don seemed the Nixon man least likely to become involved; he is, in many ways, not even in the image of a "Nixon man." He was accessible; he conducted cogent, mutually respectful background talks with the press; he had wit; his power seemed earned by his hard and productive work. His staff worked as hard as he did with great loyalty.

Last week, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and sources in the Justice Department disclosed that in 1969 Mr. Kissinger had asked for—and, with the President's approval, he had gotten—wiretaps on his associates, White House aides and newsmen. The phones of 17 persons were wiretapped. Two weeks ago, Mr. Kissinger had conceded having read logs of some conversations, but he had denied authorizing taps.

The explanation now given for the taps is "national security," which the Administration says it

felt was endangered after the publication of a New York Times story reporting, for the first time, American bombing in Cambodia, and the military and diplomatic considerations involved in the air strikes. The taps, White House spokesmen said last week, were meant to cut off leaks as well as protect the innocent from suspicion.

But the conduct of Mr. Kissinger raised disturbing questions that could only pain him and his admirers. For one thing, it is not clear that the taps were even legal, let alone proper; the Supreme Court decisions on the subject are murky. It is hard for many to understand why they were necessary as a result of the Cambodia story: Surely the Cambodians knew they were being bombed, though Americans did not know it.

Among those reportedly bugged were key Kissinger associates, including Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Anthony Lake, Winston Lord and Daniel Davidson. Why didn't Mr. Kissinger talk to them instead of bug them—then either accept their explanations or fire them? Mr. Lake, in a telephone interview with a Times reporter, said, "It's an invasion of privacy." The taps, placed on home phones, recorded wives and children as well as officials. Mr. Lord had no comment; Mr. Kissinger had called him five minutes earlier to tell his phone had been tapped.

White House spokesmen said that three unidentified "blabbermouths" had been revealed by the wiretapping and eased out of Government. But the taps had other effects. The Government's espionage case against Daniel Ellsberg was thrown out in part because the log of one of the taps could not be produced by the Justice Department. Last week, only hours after the dismissal, the logs were found in the office safe of John D. Ehrlichman, Mr. Nixon's domestic-policy czar until his resignation April 30. Mr. Ehrlichman, a lawyer, had apparently not come forward to help the Justice Department locate the logs.

The atmosphere of intrigue also settled heavily on the relationship between the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency. It had already been disclosed that the C.I.A. supplied equipment used in a burglary at the office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Last week, a much broader story emerged from the public summaries of secret testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee by Richard Helms, the former C.I.A. director, and Lieut. Gen. Vernon

They testified that John W. Dean 3d, the ousted White House counsel, had asked the C.I.A. to pay bail and salaries for those caught in the Watergate burglary, and that Mr. Ehrlichman and H. R. Halderman, the former White House chief of staff, asked for an end to an investigation of "laundered" Presidential campaign funds. The C.I.A. answer was no; General Walters said he would resign first. Mr. Helms did not go to President Nixon at the time with any complaint, nor, apparently, did other C.I.A. officials.

Despite that, Senator Stuart Symington said: "It's hard for me to visualize that the President knew nothing about this." A day later, after seeing detailed summaries of the conversations between General Walters and Administration officials, Senator Symington said it was "even more difficult" for him to believe the President.

The President has said he knew nothing at all about Watergate or the subsequent attempts to cover it up. In his speech to the nation April 30, he said that when he first heard of the break-in he was "appalled"; that he asked Mr. Dean to investigate; and that he had relied on Mr. Dean's report when he mistakenly assured the nation last August that "no one in this Administration, presently employed, was involved in this very bizarre incident." He said he had been misled although he had "repeatedly asked those conducting the investigation" whether his Administration was involved.

Last week, John Dean said he was "flabbergasted" by the President's reference to his report and its import. He had never made a report, he said, and never spoken to the President about it. White House spokesmen then conceded there had never been a formal, written report, only a verbal account transmitted by Mr. Dean through Mr. Ehrlichman. They began speaking of "an investigative process" rather than an "investigation"; if there were deficiencies, they said, they were Mr. Dean's.

Mr. Dean, who has vowed he would not be a scapegoat for the cover-up in which he apparently participated fully, has created one of the remaining major mysteries of the entire scandal. Last week, Federal Judge John J. Sirica accepted custody of secret papers Mr. Dean took with him when he

was fired; their content has not been disclosed.

A new name was added to the Watergate casualty list. G. Bradford Cook, who had been chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission for only 74 days, resigned. His position had been made untenable by the disclosure that he had deleted from an S.E.C. report all mention of a secret cash contribution of \$200,000 by financier Robert L. Vesco to Mr. Nixon's campaign. Mr. Cook's resignation was the 19th from government or Republican party positions.

For most of the week, Mr. Richardson struggled along as the current symbol of Administration half-measures. He was hard-put to convince the Senate that he would give his special Watergate prosecutor full independence.

But finally he prevailed upon Archibald Cox, who had been Solicitor General in the Kennedy Administration, to accept the job. Crew cut, aristocratic, sometimes autocratic, a respected professor at the Harvard Law School, Mr. Cox lacks prosecutorial experience but enjoys a reputation for stubborn independence, which in the present climate is priceless. Mr. Richardson retained the right to fire him, need be, but ceded to Mr. Cox full authority for "all practical day-to-day purposes." Most of those who had doubted that every lead would be exhaustively pursued seem satisfied that under Mr. Cox, even Mr. Nixon would not be sheltered.

For his part, the President—practiced political counter-puncher—seemed curiously passive; the White House response to this crisis struck many politicians as feeble. There were promises of great accessibility to press, Congress, Cabinet and critics. And Mr. Nixon proposed a 17-member, bipartisan commission to study the whole electoral process including such basic questions as a one-term, six-year presidency. (See story on Page 1.) But study commissions, however worthy their purposes, are a traditional temporizing device. Mr. Nixon showed no public sign of deep concern. He did not wait

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Role of Military Men Outside Pentagon Stirs Concern

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon, at least so far, has managed to escape the taint of Watergate that has engulfed much of the government. But the case has touched the lives of three high-ranking generals in various ways.

In so doing, Watergate is causing concern among at least some junior and senior

News Analysis

career officers and is raising fundamental issues about the role of the military man in government.

Perhaps most importantly, it raises the question of whether senior military men should be lifted out of their familiar service surroundings and put into critical jobs outside the Pentagon.

It is in such jobs, as the unfolding Watergate case dramatically demonstrates, that military men can easily face severe political pressures that could compromise them, reflect poorly on their services, and violate the traditional separation of military from political powers in this country.

"These guys have been raised for 20 years on a diet

of dedication to the Commander-in-Chief," says one general speaking about all high-ranking military men.

The point is simply that in any administration there can be created a temptation for a President or for those acting in his behalf, either real or presumed, to take advantage of such dedication and abuse it.

It was two military officers—Marine Corps Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. and Army Maj. Gen. Vernon A. Walters—rather than their civilian boss who were leaned on first by high White House aides at various stages of the Watergate episode.

Both officers at the time were working outside the Pentagon as successive deputy directors of the Central Intelligence Agencies. Both had long personal histories of close associations with Mr. Nixon.

Cushman, in the 1950's, had served for several years as a special assistant for national security affairs for then-Vice President Nixon.

Walters, a skilled linguist and interpreter who had served former Presidents

Truman and Eisenhower, was also the man who accompanied Mr. Nixon as vice-president through a tough Latin American tour in 1958 and had journeyed with him to the Azores in the fall of 1971 to meet with French President Pompidou.

As matters turned out, Gen. Walters was revealed as one of the few heroes of Watergate to congressional investigators, turning aside pressures and threatening to resign rather than compromise the CIA.

Gen. Cushman, believing he was acting on official White House orders, at first

supplied equipment to since-convicted conspirator E. Howard Hunt. But when the demands continued, Cushman, too, shut the door.

Because of their actions, some military men say it proves that the sense of honor of top-ranking officers in fact acts to protect the country, and the presidency when they hold these outside jobs.

But others argue that not every general might have responded as Walters did, that the pressures could be too great, and that the risks of entangling the military in politics are too high.

In the wake of the Watergate disclosures and staff resignations, the President has called on a third military man—four star general and Army vice-chief of staff Alexander Haig—to act as his White House chief of staff to replace H. R. Halderman.

Haig's assignment is supposed to be temporary, but that is not at all certain and his return to the White House is also the cause of ambivalence and concern within the Army.

Haig, too, has a long association of working for the White House, joining the

National Security Council staff as deputy to Henry A. Kissinger in 1969 as a colonel and emerging four years later as the Army's second highest ranking officer.

During the years Haig was working with Kissinger, a number of important decisions involving the Army were made by the White House.

A recommendation by former Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, widely supported throughout the government, to reduce the stature and switch the service responsibility for the Army's so-called South-

Continued

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Helms Cites 'Higher Up' Pressure

CIA HEAD PRODDED BY HALDEMAN

Grand Jury Told of Request

By BARRY KALB
Star-News Staff Writer

Former CIA director Richard M. Helms has reportedly told the Watergate grand jury that when H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III tried to enlist CIA aid in the Watergate cover-up on June 23, Haldeman told Helms the request was coming from "higher up."

At that time, there was only one person at the White House higher than Haldeman, and that was President Nixon.

Helms, now ambassador to Iran, made the statement to the grand jury Friday, according to informal sources.

There was no indication that Haldeman, then White House chief of staff, actually used Nixon's name in his unsuccessful effort to involve the CIA in the bugging and cover-up.

NOR COULD The Star-News' sources say that Helms had been able to ascertain that the requests for CIA help were in fact coming from the President.

But members of Congress who have been reporting on congressional testimony by Helms and Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, CIA deputy director, have stressed that when requests were made by aides with the authority of Haldeman, the authority of the President himself was taken for granted.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., who as acting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee has been questioning current and former CIA officials about CIA links with Watergate, announced yesterday that he had turned over to the grand jury and Senate Watergate Committee 11 in-house CIA memoranda. They deal with conversations between top CIA officials and the three White House aides — Haldeman, former domestic counsel head Ehrlichman and former White House counsel Dean — between June 23, 1972, and February of this year.

Without providing details, informed committee sources have told The Star-News they believe the memoranda contribute "added fact" to the suspicion that Nixon knew of the cover-up attempts.

SYMINGTON said on Thursday, after hearing closed-door testimony from Helms, that "it is hard for me to visualize how Nixon could have been unaware of what was going on."

In a statement released Friday, in which he revealed the existence of the memoranda, Symington went even further:

"I believe these memoranda are highly significant, and my first impression of them is that they appear to verify one of my statements yesterday at a press conference, namely that it is very clear there

was a high-level attempt by the White House to unload major responsibility for the Watergate bugging on the CIA.


"Also," Symington continued, "it is even more difficult for me to visualize that the President knew nothing about it."

One source close to the CIA-Watergate probe described the memos as presenting an important "added fact" about one of the conversations. This is believed to be the June 23 meeting—six days after the Watergate arrests—at which Walters was ordered by Haldeman, with Helms present, to interfere with the FBI's Watergate investigation.

Helms' grand jury testimony Friday, like that of convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord's before the Senate Watergate Committee, was second-hand "hearsay" at best, and both bits of testimony fail to provide conclusive proof that the President knew of the cover-up.

McCord testified on Friday that in January John J. Caulfield, a former White House aide then working at the Treasury Department, had tried to buy McCord's silence at the Watergate trial and that Caulfield had said Nixon was aware of the attempt.

This prompted White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler to once again issue a statement denying that the President



RICHARD M. HELMS

SYMINGTON CITES NEW DATA BY C.I.A.

Says It Is Now Harder for
Him to Believe Nixon Was
Unaware of Cover-Up

By MARJORIE HUNTER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 18 — Senator Stuart Symington said today that new data just given the Senate Armed Services Committee made it "even more difficult for me to visualize the the President" knew nothing about "White House attempts to use the Central Intelligence Agency to cover up the Watergate affair.

The new data consist of 11 memorandums of conversations that Sen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the C.I.A., said that he made following conversations with White House aides last June, shortly after the break-in at the Democratic headquarters at the Watergate complex.

Senator Symington declined to disclose the exact contents of the memorandums but termed them "highly significant."

He said that he had sent copies to the Senate select committee on Presidential campaign activities, which opened a full-scale inquiry into the Watergate case yesterday, and to the United States Attorney who is also investigating that case.

Visited White House

Testifying yesterday before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Walters disclosed that he had recently visited the White House to talk with J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., who was named recently by President Nixon as special counsel for the Watergate investigation.

General Walters told the committee that, at the suggestion of Mr. Buzhardt, he had turned over to the White House some memorandums he had made last June of his recollections of conversations with Presidential aides.

At the direction of the Armed Services Committee, General Walters retrieved the memorandums from the White House late yesterday and delivered them to Senator Symington.

The memorandums are said to recount, in far more extensive detail, a series of meetings that General Walters had told about in an affidavit presented earlier to Congressional committees.

Affidavit Described

In that affidavit, he told of meetings at which three top White House aides — H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean 3d — attempted to persuade the C.I.A. to cover up the Watergate affair.

The general cited meetings, at which he said the C.I.A. had been asked to persuade the Federal Bureau of Investigation to halt an inquiry into Nixon campaign funds that had been "laundered" through a Mexico City bank and later used, at least in part, to finance various undercover activities by the Presidential Re-election committee.

He also told of being asked by Mr. Dean to pay the salaries and bail of the men caught in the Watergate burglary, in an apparent effort to make the crime seem to be a legitimate national security matter.

He said that his agency had rejected both overtures. He also said that he had suggested to Mr. Dean that those responsible for the Watergate affair be dismissed.

Senator Symington said yesterday, before receiving the memorandums of conversation, that it appeared clear to him that there had been a "high-level" attempt by the White House to involve the C.I.A. in covering up the Watergate.

A Hint by Senator

He also said yesterday that General Walters and other present and past C.I.A. officials had testified that they did not know if President Nixon knew of the attempted cover-up of the Watergate affair.

However, Senator Symington added then: "It's hard for me to visualize that the President knew nothing about this."

In his statement today, the Senator hinted—but did not say—that there may have been material in the Walters memorandums indicating that White House aides had specifically said that their requests for C.I.A. help were being made with full knowledge of the

announced plan to inquire further into possible C.I.A. involvement in the Watergate affair.

Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat of Arkansas, announced that an Appropriations subcommittee that he heads had invited four former White House aides—Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Dean and David R. Young Jr.—to testify about their alleged demands for C.I.A. help in both the Watergate and Pentagon papers cases.

C.I.A. officials, in the last week, have told various Congressional committees that it was Mr. Young who had asked the agency to prepare a "personality assessment" on Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, who later was indicted on charges involving his copying and making public the Pentagon papers.

CIA Aided Hunt After Ord

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency opened its unclassified files at least twice to White House aide E. Howard Hunt several months after the agency supposedly discontinued help to him in August, 1971.

Intelligence officials have testified in a closed House subcommittee hearing that Hunt—later convicted in the Watergate case—went to CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., and was allowed to examine files even after then-Director Richard M. Helms had ordered that all aid to the former White House consultant was to end.

Also, the officials have testified, unclassified documents on a 1954 foreign security leak were delivered to Hunt's White House office in October, 1971—two months after he had been declared persona non grata in the CIA.

The CIA accommodations to Hunt apparently were made by lower echelon employees without the knowledge of Helms or former CIA deputy Director Gen. Robert Cushman.

The decision by Helms and Cushman to cut off all assistance to Hunt "was not disseminated throughout the agency," according to Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Armed Forces Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations.

The disclosure that Hunt was involved with the CIA for a longer period of time than previously had been admitted by the agency came as two congressional committees announced they will summon four former White House advisers to explain attempts to involve the agency in covering up the Watergate scandal.

Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations, said he had sent letters inviting John D. Ehrlichman, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, John W. Dean III and David Young to appear "as expeditiously as possible."

Haldeman and Ehrlichman were top Presidential advisers before resigning earlier this month. Dean was President Nixon's counsel before he was fired, and Young was a staff member of the National Security Council before he resigned.

McClellan said the four would be asked to answer charges of "grossly improper, if not criminal" attempts to get the CIA to assist key conspirators in the Watergate case.

Nedzi said he, too, planned to call the same White House aides to testify, although he said he was "not optimistic" about obtaining substantial new information.

Past and present

the CIA have testified that the White House aides exerted severe pressure on the CIA to block an FBI investigation into the funding of the Watergate burglary, and also solicited CIA money to pay bail costs and salaries of the Watergate defendants.

Helms and former CIA Deputy Director Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters testified they refused those requests. But they admitted the CIA did provide disguises and surveillance equipment used in the September, 1971, break-in of the office of Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

They also admitted "reluctant" CIA participation in compiling a psychological profile on Ellsberg.

Nedzi said yesterday that two additional instances of CIA assistance to Hunt occurred after Helms ordered Cushman in August, 1971, to put an end to the agency's involvement with him.

Nevertheless, according to Nedzi, CIA Director James R. Schlesinger has testified that in October, 1971, Hunt arranged with an unidentified CIA officer to obtain unclassified documents relating to a 1954 security breach case in which some sensitive government information was "leaked" in France.

Nedzi said Schlesinger testified that the documents were delivered by the CIA to Hunt's office in the White House. Details of the French case were not discussed in the hearing, although Nedzi said the documents were unimportant.

Schlesinger could not be reached.

Nedzi said that sometime before Hunt reportedly made a December, 1971, trip to Miami to prepare a surveillance network in advance of the 1972 Democratic National Convention, the former CIA agent again gained access to agency files.

Nedzi said CIA director-designate William E. Colby testified that Hunt examined resumes of retired CIA agents, which are maintained in the agency's placement office. The resumes, Colby testified, are kept for reference by CIA personnel officials when prospective employers seek information about specific ex-agents.

Nedzi said Hunt was

"going into the files," apparently in search of information about one or more persons who used to work for the agency.

Hunt, according to the report by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, has told a federal grand jury here that he obtained from the CIA the name of a locksmith whom he planned to recruit for a spying mission against the Democrats in Miami Beach.

Hunt told the grand jury, according to Anderson, that he and convicted Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy went to Miami Beach, but that the locksmith later turned down an offer to participate in the scheme.

Nedzi said the significance of the two CIA accommodations to Hunt lies not in the content of the information obtained, but in their timing.

"My concern was that the agency (officials) had experiences with Hunt that soured them on him, but afterward . . . they were assisting him," Nedzi said.

He said he is convinced that "it was a case of the left hand not knowing what the right was doing," and that Helms and Cushman were unaware of the continuing involvement.

Nedzi said in response to a question that his subcommittee's review of the CIA's budget has been "extremely cursory" to date, but that he

planned to look more closely at the agency's expenditures.

He conceded that a congressional oversight committee might pinpoint CIA expenditure of funds for domestic covert intelligence-gathering operations and put a stop to it. The 1947 National Securities Act, which created the CIA, specifies that the agency shall have no internal security function.

Nedzi said some of the six members of his intelligence subcommittee have been busy with other work and with defense appropriations legislation and have not devoted much time to intelligence appropriations or operations. He said the subcommittee "will very definitely become more active."

Meanwhile, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), acting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that memoranda written by Walters verify his conclusion that the White House tried to blame the CIA for Watergate. The memoranda describe White House meetings involving Helms and Walters in June, 1972.

Symington, who said Thursday he found it hard to believe President Nixon was unaware of the cover-up attempt, said yesterday, "It is even more difficult for me to visualize that the President knew nothing about it."

Nedzi said he, too, found it "difficult to conceive" that Mr. Nixon was ignorant of the approaches to CIA, but he said, "anything's possible."

Symington doubts Nixon was unaware of bids to

BY STEPHEN E. NORDLINGER
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), after hearing three days of testimony by present and past Central Intelligence Agency officials, said yesterday that it is difficult for him to believe that President Nixon had no knowledge of attempts by top White House aides to use the CIA for covering up the Watergate break-in.

Senator Symington told reporters following a closed meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which he is acting chairman, that the CIA officials uniformly said they were ignorant about whether the President knew of the coverup attempt.

"All of the witnesses stated that they did not know whether the President knew about it," the senator said.

"Very difficult to understand"

"It is very difficult to understand that could be correct," he said. "It is hard for me to visualize that the President knew nothing about this."

Mr. Symington spoke after hearing testimony from Richard M. Helms, the former director of central intelligence, and Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the present deputy director of the agency. Earlier, the committee heard Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., former deputy director, and James R. Schlesinger, Mr. Helms's successor.

Earlier this week, in the most explicit disclosure of the purported White House coverup, General Walters said that soon after the Watergate

break-in last June, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, two top Nixon assistants, asked the CIA to stop an FBI investigation of Nixon re-election campaign funds "laundered" in Mexico and traced to a Watergate burglar's bank account, and that John W. Dean 3d, the White House counsel, asked General Walters whether the CIA could post bail for and pay the salaries of the jailed Watergate burglars. Both requests were rejected by the CIA.

Jackson, Nedzi

Senator Symington and Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.), another member of the Senate committee, and later Representative Lucien N. Nedzi (D., Mich.), the chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee at which Mr. Helms testified in the afternoon, said the CIA officials indicated that they felt they were receiving their instructions from the President, to which the CIA reports directly.

Speaking of the testimony of Mr. Helms, who left the CIA early this year to become ambassador to Iran, Mr. Nedzi said that "it was clear that he felt he was getting orders from the highest authority."

For that reason Mr. Nedzi and the two senators defended Mr. Helms's decision not to complain directly to the President.

Presidential sanction

"When Helms was called on by Haldeman and Ehrlichman he had reason to believe their requests had the sanction of the President of the United States," Mr. Jackson said.

Senator J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.), the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said he may summon Mr. Helms next week to explain why he told the committee nothing of the White House requests when he was asked at hearings last February and March whether the CIA was involved in the Watergate affair.

Mr. Helms also may be called before the Watergate grand jury. Three days ago, he met with the federal prosecutors.

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C.I.A. Aide Says Gray Told Him in 1972 He Urged Ousting All in Watergate Case

Threat to Leave F.B.I. Over Cover-Up Related

By MARJORIE HUNTER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 17—The deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency says that L. Patrick Gray 3d, then acting director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, told him almost a year ago he had recommended that all those involved in the Watergate affair be discharged.

Lieut. Gen. Vernon Walters also quoted Mr. Gray as having told him that he was "prepared to resign" over apparent White House efforts to implicate the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. in covering up the Watergate operation.

The previously undisclosed points were made in a sworn affidavit presented to several Congressional committees this week by General Walters but made public only today.

The Senate Armed Services Committee had released a summary of the Walters affidavit earlier this week, but the summary failed to mention either of these matters.

In his affidavit, General Walters did not identify to whom Mr. Gray said he had recommended the dismissals. The break-in at Democratic headquarters occurred last June 17. General Walters said that Mr. Gray told him July 12 he had recommended the dismissal of those responsible.

Mr. Gray testified here today before a Federal grand jury investigating the Watergate affair. However, he was not available for comment on matters raised by General Walters.

Resignation of Gray

Mr. Gray resigned last April 27 as acting director of the F.B.I. following disclosure that he had destroyed documents obtained from a key conspirator in the Watergate scandal after receiving them at a meeting with two former ranking White House officials, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean 3d.

General Walters appeared again today at a closed hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, along with Richard Helms, former director of the C.I.A. and now Ambassador to Iran.

Later, as he left the hearing room, General Walters declined

to elaborate on matters he had touched upon in his earlier affidavit. Mr. Helms, too, declined comment.

Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, acting chairman of the committee, said today that all C.I.A. witnesses who appeared before his panel in the last week had "stated that they did not know whether the President" knew about White House efforts to involve the agency in the apparent cover-up of the Watergate affair.

"But it's hard for me to visualize that the President knew nothing about this," Senator said.

Reports of White House attempts to involve the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. in covering up the Watergate affairs were detailed in General Walters's statement, as well as in the committee summary released earlier this week.

Called to White House

General Walters told of how he and Mr. Helms had been called to the White House on June 23 of last year by Mr. Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman, at that time the President's chief of staff.

"As I recall it," General Walters said, "Mr. Haldeman said that the Watergate incident was causing trouble and was being exploited by the opposition."

The general said that Mr. Haldeman had asked him to go to Mr. Gray and demand that the F.B.I. investigation into certain Nixon re-election campaign funds "laundered" through a Mexico City bank be called off on the ground that "further inquiries into the Mexican aspects of this matter might jeopardize some of the C.I.A.'s covert activities in that area."

The general said that he had done as he was told, but that later he found that the F.B.I. investigation would not jeopardize C.I.A. interests in Mexico and so informed Mr. Dean at the White House.

General Walters indicated that the White House had continued to press both the C.I.A.

The general said that on July 5 he conferred again with Mr. Gray and told him that "I felt that attempts to cover this up or to implicate the C.I.A. or F.B.I. would be detrimental to their integrity and a disservice to the President and the country."

"I would have no part in this and was quite prepared to resign on this issue," the general continued. "He [Mr. Gray] said that he shared my views regarding the importance of the integrity of our agencies and he, too, was prepared to resign on this issue."

General Walters said that when he saw Mr. Gray again on July 12, "I said that I had told Dean that the best solution would be to fire those responsible. Gray said he had made the same recommendation."

Appearing last week before Senate investigators preparing for the full-scale watergate inquiry that opened today, Mr. Gray reportedly said that during a telephone conversation on July 6, he had mentioned to President Nixon that there was some confusion about the role of the White House aides in the Watergate investigation and that their actions could cause trouble for the President.

A source close to the committee said that Mr. Gray had told that panel's investigators that he had said to the President, "Mr. President, you are being wounded by men around you, using the F.B.I. and the C.I.A."

However, Mr. Gray reportedly told the Senate investigators that he had not informed the President of his suspicions of a "cover-up" because he felt it would be improper and might appear as if he were seeking guidance from Mr. Nixon.

Mr. Gray was named acting director of the F.B.I. last summer following the death of J. Edgar Hoover on May 2. President Nixon nominated Mr. Gray to be director on Feb. 17 of this year, but his confirmation bogged down over the Watergate disclosures.

General Walters's affidavit also told of being asked by Mr. Dean last year to help cover up the Watergate case by paying bail and salaries for the men involved in the break-in at Democratic headquarters.

The general said that on June 27 Mr. Dean called him to the White House and said that the Watergate break-in "were getting

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continued

Watergate and the CIA

The rush of events has cast the impression that the Central Intelligence Agency, too, was caught up in the crisis of governance known as Watergate and was somehow despoiled or suborned. But such a comprehensive indictment should not be handed down casually. A closer look at the three main episodes of Watergate-CIA involvement suggests another and more complex view.

In the first episode, in July-September 1971, the CIA was asked by John Ehrlichman to give retired CIA employee Howard Hunt, then identified as a White House security consultant, technical help for an undisclosed mission. The Pentagon Papers had just been published. The CIA's legislative charter gives it "responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures." and in that context the then-deputy director, Gen. Robert Cushman, who had long known Mr. Ehrlichman and who had also served as a personal aide to Vice President Nixon, granted technical aid to Howard Hunt. But he was put off by Hunt's manner; the agency, learning that "domestic clandestine operations" were involved, cut the Hunt link in five weeks; General Cushman quickly informed Mr. Ehrlichman. The burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist took place a month later. At the same time, CIA Director Richard Helms, in the same context of an ostensible White House investigation of security leaks, ordered up a CIA psychiatric profile of Mr. Ellsberg at White House request. His successor, James Schlesinger, later termed these missions "ill advised."

In the second episode, beginning only six days after the Watergate break-in of June 17, 1972, top White House aides reportedly tried on repeated occasions to induce the CIA to halt an FBI probe into the "laundered" Mexican money that financed the break-in (by having the CIA invent a false rationale that the probe would compromise CIA sources); those aides then asked CIA to use secret funds to "go bail or pay the salaries" of Watergate conspirators. By available testimony, the CIA resolutely rejected these entreaties. Gen. Vernon Walters, the then-deputy director and also a former aide to Vice President Nixon, even said he would resign and go to the President before so compromising the agency.

In the third episode, in early 1973—by then, "Watergate" was rapidly unfolding—the White House sought to have the CIA receive back (knowingly) the Ellsberg burglary materials it had blindly given Hunt in 1971. The CIA absolutely refused.

So what do we have? In all three episodes, the White House trampled over the provision of the CIA's charter specifying that the agency function "under the National Security Council" and it sought to turn the CIA to purposes having at best a tenuous connection to the agency's intelligence mandate—even the way the White House presented it—and at worst no connection whatsoever. In the episodes involving the Mexican money and the receiving back of Ellsberg burglary materials, successive CIA directors and their deputies stood off fierce White House pressure aimed at forcing them to violate the spirit and letter of their charter. In the episode involving aid for a mission whose purpose was at first unknown to the CIA, the agency recovered promptly when it got a better sense of what was going on.

The further question arises of whether Mr. Helms should have reported, either to the President or Congress, whatever may have been his suspicion or knowledge at various times that something sour was going on. We submit that no final answer can be offered until there becomes available a fuller record not only of precisely what Mr. Helms told Congress last February and March and again in the last few days, but also of the steps he may have taken to protect the CIA from taint before he was relieved of the agency's directorship.

To establish a kind of base line, we think it appropriate meanwhile to recall a rare public speech Mr. Helms gave in April 1971, before any of the known incidents had occurred, in which he spoke with feeling and sensitivity of the difficult role of a secret intelligence agency in a free society. The CIA operates "under constant supervision and direction of the National Security Council," he said. It assumes only "normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information . . . In short, we do not target on American citizens."

To the extent that the integrity of the professional intelligence community may have been compromised, we think it necessary to look first to the White House. It was the men there who in their cavalier abuse of power and their contempt for the institutions of American government—even an institution as sensitive as the CIA—tried but, it seems, largely failed to compromise and subvert the CIA.

Symington Doubts Nixon Was Unaware of CIA Role

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said yesterday he finds it hard to believe that President Nixon was unaware of attempts by senior White House officials to use the Central Intelligence Agency to cover up the Watergate scandal.

Symington expressed his doubts after listening to three more hours of testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee by present and former CIA officials.

He recalled his own experience on the National Security Council in 1950-51, and observed: "It is hard for me to visualize that he (Mr. Nixon) knew nothing about it." Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) expressed a similar view.

The witnesses before the committee yesterday were former CIA Director Richard Helms and his deputy in the agency, Gen. Robert Cushman, and Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the agency's deputy director.

They gave additional details of efforts to further involve the agency in domestic espionage by three White House officials—H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III. The CIA officials have previously testified to the agency's role—at the behest of the White House—in the Daniel Ellsberg investigation and in additional efforts by the White House to involve the CIA in covering up the break-in at the Democratic Party's Watergate headquarters in June 1972.

Helms, Cushman and Walters have all testified, Symington said, that they were unaware of the extent of President Nixon's knowledge of these interventions. Helms has also testified, however, that approaches to the agency by White House officials were made in the name of the President.

General Walters, in an affidavit released Wednesday, described several meetings with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean beginning within

a week after the Watergate break-in. He was asked in the course of these meetings for CIA help in disguising the nature of the break-in. Furthermore, said Walters, Dean specifically asked the agency to provide bail and salary payments from "covert funds" for the Watergate defendants, some of whom were, in Dean's reported words, "scared" and "wobbling."

Walters said he told Dean that if CIA money were used for covert operations in this country, he would have to report it to a congressional committee that deals with CIA affairs.

Walters refused to comment on his testimony yesterday, but Symington said Haldeman apparently "localized in" on Walters and that Dean followed up with pressure to obtain CIA help.

Senator Jackson, also a committee member, termed the White House effort a "premeditated plan and design to use the CIA as a cover-up in connection with illegal activities undertaken by the administration."

Jackson said Helms and other CIA officials "had reason to believe the requests had the sanction of the President of the United States." But, like Symington, he was unable to offer any evidence to substantiate that claim.

When asked whether Helms had questioned Haldeman and Ehrlichman about the President's support, Jackson said, "You don't ask those questions when you're a professional and in this kind of climate."

Jackson said Helms "had a right to believe that it (the request for cover-up assistance) came from the top."

Symington said that Helms testified that he talked with Mr. Nixon earlier this year when Helms was appointed ambassador to Iran, but said that the subject of Watergate did not come up. Symington said that at no time during the testimony did Helms mention pressures on the CIA did

Helms communicate his concern to the President.

A committee source said that Helms' testimony yesterday was mostly an elaboration on the three White House requests described Monday by Walters, and that no new approaches emerged.

The source said that from the questioning it was obvious that the committee members felt Helms and the

other CIA witnesses "had done a pretty good job of resisting (the White House) under the circumstances."

Helms clearly made some accommodations to the White House staff, the source said, without connecting the requests to a larger program of political espionage that had not yet been publicized at the time.

However, Helms may face more unfriendly questioning Monday when he appears before the Senate foreign Relations Committee to explain why he denied at least three times in January and February that the CIA had been involved in Watergate in any way. Helms made the denials in hearings for his confirmation as ambassador to Iran.

"Several members of the committee are disturbed that some of the stories they have read of CIA involvement are not consistent with what they understood from the confirmation hearings," a committee staff aide said.

The aide said Helms will be asked in the closed session to describe all White House requests to the CIA and the domestic intelligence in which it participated.

While the committee cannot revoke its confirmation of Helms, it could turn over transcripts of testimony to the Justice Department for possible perjury action, or could even recommend impeachment proceedings.

Helms is also scheduled to appear before a federal grand jury here and before the Senate Select Subcommittee investigating Watergate. He may also be called by a Los Angeles County grand jury investigating the break-in of the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

It was also disclosed yesterday that Walters testified that he recently visited the

and that he left some memoranda there at Buzhardt's suggestion. Buzhardt, former Pentagon counsel, joined the White House on May 10.

The memoranda, a committee source said, were Walters' recollections of the White House meetings in June with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Symington said that the Armed Services Committee has requested the documents, and that Buzhardt has said he will deliver them.

Helms appeared later in the day before a House armed forces subcommittee, after which Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.) said the former CIA director "felt he was getting orders from the highest authority."

Referring to White House pressures for assistance in domestic intelligence operations, Nedzi said, "It is difficult with the benefit of hindsight how one should have acted under tremendous pressure."

McClellan says CIA violated charter

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Senator John L. McClellan (D. Ark.) said yesterday that he felt the Central Intelligence Agency had violated its charter in complying with requests from White House aides for materials later used in the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist.

Senator McClellan, who hesitated earlier to make this indictment, spoke after a closed three-hour meeting of his Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations at which Richard M.

Helms, the former director of central intelligence, testified.

Mr. Helms, now ambassador to Iran, refused to comment on his testimony as he walked briskly out of a Senate office building. He will testify again today before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Two days ago, he met with federal prosecutors investigating the Watergate case.

As he emerged from the hearing room, Senator McClellan was asked whether he now felt the CIA had violated its charter contained in the National Security Act of 1947 in providing materials to E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a former White House aide, which he used in the burglary of the psychiatrist's office.

"My belief is that they violated it," the senator replied. "Not that they did it willingly, they were asked to do it."

The law states that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." The Justice Department has jurisdiction over internal security, espionage and sabotage.

To justify their action, some CIA officials cited another provision of the law that authorizes the agency to protect "intelligence sources and methods

from authorized disclosure." The CIA's help was sought at a time of leaks of classified information including the Pentagon papers.

While Senator McClellan said the CIA had "made mistakes," the thrust of his comments was to attack the top White House aides for seeking the services of the CIA.

Such use of the agency was of "great impropriety, if not illegal," Mr. McClellan said.

According to the senator, Mr. Helms felt that he had not withheld any information about the CIA's actions from Congress when he was asked last winter if the CIA had been involved in the Watergate affair.

Mr. McClellan indicated that Mr. Helms lacked knowledge of the psychiatrist burglary case until recently and the other CIA involvements he did not relate to the Watergate affair at the time of the congressional hearings.

Meanwhile, a deposition from Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of central intelligence, made public yesterday, quoted L. Patrick Gray 3d, the former acting FBI director, as having recommended last July that those involved in the Watergate break-in be fired. The deposition did not say to whom Mr. Gray made the recommendation, but it implied that it was made to John W. Dean 3d, the former White House counsel.

General Walters also said that he had told Mr. Dean last June that involving the CIA or FBI in the Watergate affair would turn a "conventional explosion" into a "multi-megaton explosion."

According to General Walters, Mr. Dean, in appealing for CIA help to cover up White House involvement in the Watergate affair, said last June soon after the break-in that "some witnesses were getting scared and were 'wobbling.'"

Ellsberg, Daniel

CIA 1.02 WALTERS, VERNON

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McClellan: CIA employ illegal

By Thomas B. Ross
 Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — The chairman of a Senate subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency accused the White House Wednesday of violating the law in asking the CIA to take part in the Watergate cover-up.

Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) also declared the CIA's actions in going along at first with the cover-up were "possibly illegal and certainly of the greatest impropriety."

McClellan, chairman of the Appropriations Committee and its CIA subcommittee, spoke out after taking 3 hours of closed-door testimony from Richard M. Helms, former CIA director and now ambassador to Iran.

Asked if the 1947 National Security Act, which created the CIA, had been violated, McClellan replied: "My belief is that they (the CIA) did. But it was not that they did it willfully. They were asked to do it."

He said Helms, who refused to answer reporters' questions, had confirmed that former high White House aides asked the CIA to take part in the cover-up.

McClellan indicated Helms had not been asked about the possibility he was fired as head of the CIA for failing to co-operate fully in the cover-up.

Gen. Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA, testified on Monday he had been ordered by H. R. (Bob) Halde- man and

John D. Ehrlichman to tell former acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III the CIA would be hurt if he pushed an investigation of the money used to pay the Watergate conspirators.

Walters said he carried out the order, even though Halde- man had indicated it was politically motivated, without any objection from Helms, who also attended the White House meeting six days after the Watergate break-in last June.

Walters acknowledged he waited two weeks before notifying Gray that the CIA had no involvement and even did so only when Gray demanded a written confirmation of his original message.

Walters insisted, however, the CIA resisted all other efforts to get it to take part in the cover-up. Specifically, he said he rejected a request by White House counsel John W. Dean III that the CIA put up bail and pay the salaries of those arrested in the break-in.


Helms reportedly corroborated Walters' testimony.

McClellan said Helms also confirmed he reluctantly agreed to supply the CIA with equipment used in the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and the psychological profile of Ellsberg requested by the White House.

McClellan said he planned to call for testimony from Halde- man and Ehrlichman.

Helms will appear Thursday before the Armed Services Committee and is expected to meet Friday with the Foreign

Relations Committee the Foreign Relations Committee earlier this morning according to Sen. J. W. Bright (D-Ark.), the committee had absolutely no



Richard M. Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, poses for pictures before speaking to a closed-door Senate subcommittee hearing Wednesday in Washington. (AP)

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Helms Says He Didn't Tell Nixon About Bids to C.I.A.

By MARJORIE HUNTER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 16 — Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence, was quoted today as saying that he felt White House requests for his agency's assistance in the Watergate affair had been improper but that he never told President Nixon of his concern.

Mr. Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, was questioned for more than three hours today by a Senate Appropriations subcommittee that is investigating the Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in the Watergate and Pentagon papers cases.

His testimony was not made public and he refused to answer questions as he emerged from the hearing.

Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat of Arkansas, who is chairman of the investigating panel, said later that Mr. Helms had expressed concern over repeated attempts of White House aides to involve the C.I.A. in the Watergate affair.

Asked if Mr. Helms had conveyed his concern to the President, Senator McClellan replied: "No. He did not feel at that time that he should go to the President about it. He did not want the C.I.A. involved."

Mr. Helms had told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier this spring, at his confirmation hearings on the ambassadorial post, that the intelligence agency had not been involved in the Watergate affair.

Since then, however, other present and former officials of the agency have told Congressional committees that the agency provided assistance to the White House in two incidents involving the Pentagon papers case and was approached other times by White House aides in apparent attempts to cover up events involving the break-in of Democratic headquarters at the Watergate complex last year.

Mr. Helms confirmed the re-

ports of other C.I.A. officials, but under questioning he also defended his earlier denial of the agency's involvement in the Watergate affair.

"He did not relate these events to the Watergate," Senator McClellan said.

"After all, this Watergate is a very broad-based thing," said Senator Milton R. Young of North Dakota, ranking Republican of the subcommittee.

Asked if Mr. Helms had known that White House requests for C.I.A. assistance were part of an attempted cover-up, Senator Roman L. Hruska, Republican of Nebraska, replied: "He didn't and, in fact, they weren't. The so-called Mexican laundering operation did not relate in any way to the bugging of Democratic headquarters."

The Mexican "laundering" incident involved Nixon re-election campaign funds that had been channeled through a Mexico City bank and later used to finance various operations connected with the Watergate affair.

Nixon Aides Involved

Lieut. Gen. Vernon Walters, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, told the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this week that two White House aides, H. R. Halderman and John D. Ehrlichman, had asked the agency to call off an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation into the "laundered" campaign funds in the interest of national security.

General Walters also told

that committee that John W. Dean 3d, recently dismissed as counsel to the President, had asked the C.I.A. to pay the bail and salaries of the men involved in the Watergate break-in. The request was believed to be an attempt to get the agency to provide a "cover" for the operation.


Senator McClellan said that Mr. Helms told the subcommittee today that he felt these White House requests were wrong and had insisted that the C.I.A. not become involved.

'Reluctantly' Granted

But the Senator said that Mr. Helms had admitted that he approved earlier a request of another White House aide for preparation by the agency of a "personality assessment" on Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, who was later indicted on charges involving his copying and making public the Pentagon papers.

Senator McClellan said that Mr. Helms "did not think this quite proper" but that he "reluctantly" granted the request because it had come from the White House.

Senator McClellan said that he felt that the C.I.A. had violated the National Security Act by becoming involved in the Ellsberg case. The law forbids the agency from engaging in internal security operations.



Richard Helms, ex-C.I.A. chief, at a Senate hearing

United Press International

Nixon Name Used To Pressure CIA

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Staff Writer

Several high White House aides invoked the name of President Nixon when they asked the Central Intelligence Agency to help cover up the Watergate scandal and assist key conspirators. Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) disclosed yesterday.

For that reason, McClellan said, Richard M. Helms, who was then CIA director, and other intelligence officials did not inform either Congress or the President about the requests.

McClellan said they "wanted to go as far as they could to accommodate the President" because the requests had come from such high offices of the Executive Branch.

"Some things went too far and they put a stop to it," McClellan said after listening to three hours of testimony by Helms in a closed Senate Appropriations subcommittee hearing.

Helms, who is now ambassador to Iran, emerged from the hearing room with his jaw tightly clenched and bored through a crowd of newsmen to a waiting car without making a comment about the first of at least three scheduled appearances before Watergate-related investigating panels.

But McClellan later reviewed Helms' testimony, and then angrily accused the White House of violating the National Security Act by trying to pressure the CIA into covering up financial manipulations connected with Watergate.

Referring to the 1947 act that prohibits the CIA from domestic intelligence work, McClellan said, "I'm satisfied the CIA made a mistake. I'm satisfied that the CIA was imposed upon."

McClellan also implicitly criticized Helms for his silence over a two-year period, saying that when it became obvious "a cloud was being passed over the agency" the former CIA director had an opportunity to complain about the

sures brought to bear by the White House.

But he reserved his most stinging criticism for former presidential aides H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III, calling their actions "beyond impropriety."

Two major White House requests of the CIA to assist in apparent conspiracies were met, McClellan said, and a third was refused. Only one of the three requests, he said, was personally approved by Helms, and that was done "reluctantly."

"Mr. Helms and his assistants were seriously imposed upon and they undertook to mitigate those impositions by doing as little as they could, and finally they did refuse," McClellan said.

The first CIA involvement with Watergate figures, McClellan quoted Helms as testifying, occurred when the agency provided E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy with disguises, burglary tools and electronic surveillance equipment that were used to break into the offices of Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

McClellan said Helms did not know the equipment had been provided—at Ehrlichman's request—until "some time later, when Hunt began making more requests for CIA assistance.

Helms, according to McClellan, ordered former Deputy CIA Director Gen. Robert E. Cushman to stop providing equipment to Hunt.

McClellan said the next request came when David L. Young, a National Security Council staff member, asked the CIA for a psychological profile on Ellsberg.

Helms "reluctantly went along" with that request, McClellan said, even though he "didn't think it was quite proper by reason of the source."

sworn statements of government information to a special White House security squad called "the plumbers," and for that reason the burglary of the psychiatrist's office was planned by Hunt and Liddy.

The third White House attempt to involve the CIA in the Watergate scandal was made last June 23 by Haldeman to Helms and his deputy, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, McClellan said.

McClellan said Helms testified that Haldeman "suggested to him that Gen. Walters go to see the director of the FBI and ask them to call off the investigation into the Mexican money journey."

He was referring to the \$100,000 check that was "laundered" through a Mexico City bank, proceeds of which ended up in the safe of Nixon fund-raiser Maurice H. Stans. The money figured in bankrolling the Watergate break-in and other political espionage operations of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Walters testified before another Senate subcommittee on Monday that he told

Dean three days later that he would resign if ordered by the White House to compromise the CIA in the Watergate case.

McClellan said yesterday that it was Helms who ordered Walters not to get involved in asking Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray to cover up the probe. McClellan said Helms was convinced that the FBI investigation of the Mexican connection would not interfere with the CIA's operatives in Mexico, which he said had been suggested by Haldeman.

McClellan and Sen. Roman L. Hruska (R-Neb.) repeatedly emphasized Helms' reluctance to become involved in a Watergate cover-up. Another subcommittee member, Sen. John Pastore (D-R.I.), described Helms as "quite hurt that his reputation has been tainted after

However, when asked why Helms did not take his concerns to President Nixon while his agency was allegedly being pressured by Haldeman and Ehrlichman, McClellan said:

"He remained silent ... He didn't feel that he was called on to go to the President. He didn't want the CIA involved."

When reminded that in at least three confirmation appearances before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last January and February Helms flatly denied any CIA involvement in Watergate, McClellan said, "He did not relate this to the Watergate."

Hruska chided reporters for attaching the "Watergate" label to every allegation of White House misfeasance. He claimed that at the time of the con-

firmation hearings Helms did not connect the requests made to the CIA to the break-in at Democratic National Headquarters.

McClellan conceded that he "didn't intend to put (Helms) through the grill" during the hearing. He said that he and other subcommittee members had little time to prepare questions and that Helms was testifying mostly from memory.

However, McClellan said he probably will seek more testimony from Helms at a future date. He said he also planned to seek testimony from Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Young.

Helms, meanwhile, is scheduled to testify at 10 a.m. today before the Senate Armed Services Committee and sometime later before a federal grand jury here and the Senate Select Subcommittee investigating the Watergate scandal.

Dean Sought CIA

Agency Rejected Plea

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

White House aides seeking to enlist CIA aid in covering up the Watergate case last summer tried to get agency officials to pay "scared" and "wobbling" witnesses from top secret funds, apparently to hide their connection with the Nixon re-election campaign, a top CIA official has charged.

According to an affidavit by the CIA deputy director, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, prepared Saturday and made available late yesterday, former White House counsel John W. Dean III specifically asked that "covert action funds" be used to pay bail costs and salaries for the Watergate burglars.

Use of funds earmarked for foreign "covert actions" normally requires a directive from the President himself. Dean was "much taken aback," Walters reported, when he was told CIA funds could not be used for domestic purposes without specific approval by Congress.

ACCORDING TO Walters' affidavit, which in most respects paralleled his closed-door testimony in recent days before a Senate committee, Dean made this request June 27, 1972 — 10 days after a team of five headed by a former CIA agent was discovered inside Democratic party headquarters at the Watergate here.

During the meeting, Walters said, Dean "reviewed the Watergate case, saying that some witnesses were getting scared and were 'wobbling.' I said that no matter how scared they got, they could not involve the CIA because it was not involved in the bugging of the Watergate."

Dean then made his request: "He then asked if the CIA could not furnish bail and pay the suspects'

salaries while they were in jail, using covert action funds for the purpose."

IN MAKING the request, Dean was asking the CIA deputy to draw on a top secret fund which is specifically committed in the CIA's budget, itself highly classified, to clandestine operations overseas.

The covert action fund is under the jurisdiction of the deputy director of plans, the agency's department of "dirty tricks," and is used for such secret operations as bribing candidates or voters in elections and meddling more violently in the domestic affairs of other nations. The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the 1953 coup that restored the Shah to control of Iran, or the more recent clandestine war in Laos were all eligible for funding from the covert action fund.

Under CIA operating regulations, set forth in a series of highly classified memorandums handed down by the National Security Councils of successive presidents, covert action operations and their funding must be cleared by the top-secret "Forty Committee" in the White House.

THIS COMMITTEE, named after a numbered National Security Council memorandum, is the successor to the similarly named "303 Committee." It is composed of representatives from CIA, the State Department, the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs and is chaired by Henry A. Kissinger. It is responsible for approving all clandestine operations by CIA operatives, and it carries the express authority of President Nixon.

Walters rejected Dean's request out of hand. His affidavit continues:

out of the question. It

would implicate the agency in something in which it was not implicated." He added, in an evident reference to the Forty Committee: "Any such action by the agency would imply an order from the highest level; and I would not be a party to any such action."

He also pointed out that using the covert action fund for a domestic operation would violate another CIA regulation designed to keep the agency, which is governed by the National Security Act of 1947, out of internal security operations. When the CIA spent money for operations inside the United States, Walters explained, "We had to report this to the Oversight Committees of the agency in Congress."

THIS WAS a clear warning to Dean that the White House group he represented, which included H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, could not rely on a CIA cover to hide payments to the Watergate burglars. It evidently dismayed Dean.

"He was much taken aback by this," Walters reports, adding that Dean at length agreed that "the risks of implicating the CIA and FBI in this matter would be enormous."

Walters added: "I said that what was now a painful wound could become a mortal one. What was now a 'conventional explosion could be turned into a multi-megaton explosion.'"

Dean's request for covert funds to pay the Watergate suspects was evidently the second part of a White House effort to enlist the CIA in covering up the source of funds for the Watergate team's finances.

Earlier, according to the Walter's affidavit and to


Senate testimony made public in recent days. Haldeman and Ehrlichman had tried to order CIA interference in an FBI probe of campaign funds which had been "laundered" through a Mexico City bank.

Meanwhile, in a continuing probe of CIA responsibility in the case, former CIA Director Richard M. Helms faces two committees today: Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri's Armed Services Committee, where Walters made his disclosures earlier this week, and Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi of Michigan's intelligence subcommittee of House Armed Services.

Helms yesterday reportedly told a special subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee chaired by John L. McClellan, D-Ark., that he had been concerned by what White House aides were ordering the CIA to do in covering up Watergate, but that Helms made no effort to warn President Nixon what was going on.

Helms, currently ambassador to Iran, has been recalled from his post to explain CIA involvement with White House staff operations. He will be on call for further testimony. McClellan said.

The Senator said that three White House aides implicated in administration efforts to involve the CIA in domestic operations would be called on to testify: Haldeman, Ehr-



Bid reported for CIA to pay burglars

By STEPHEN E. NORDLINGER
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the deputy director of central intelligence, has testified that the White House tried to persuade the CIA last year to provide bail for the men arrested in the Watergate break-in or pay their salaries while they were in jail.

General Walters also said that the White House sought to persuade the CIA to use its influence to block an investigation by the FBI of about \$100,000 in bank drafts and cash channeled through Mexico to the Nixon re-election campaign as anonymous contributions.

These funds were believed to have ended up in the safe of Maurice H. Stans, the chief Nixon fund-raiser, for use in political espionage.

Senate testimony

This testimony, which provided the first details of the efforts of H. R. Haldeman and other top members of the White House to enlist the CIA in the Watergate coverup, was disclosed in a summary of statements General Walters made Monday before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The summary was released as a statement by Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), the committee's acting chairman, at a crowded news conference.

Commenting on the disclosures and whether they amounted to a deliberate White House effort to obstruct justice, Senator Symington said:

"I don't think there is any question in the world [about that]."

General Walters also appeared during the day before the Watergate grand jury and presented an affidavit that outlined the White House approaches to the CIA and steps taken to reject the requests, which General Walters

said would have compromised the agency.

His testimony indicated, however, that the top officials of the CIA knew of a possible White House attempt to conceal its involvement in the Watergate case 11 months ago but kept their silence even through the trial in January.

Defending the CIA, Senator Symington said the officials deserved "great credit" for resisting the White House. And he said that as members of a covert organization these officials "are not too anxious to turn in their own agency [when it is] under instructions from the top of the President's staff."

Mr. Haldeman, who resigned as the White House chief of staff; John D. Ehrlichman, who resigned as the President's chief domestic adviser, and John W. Dean 3d, the fired White House counsel, were all implicated in the purported coverup by the Walters testimony.

White House meeting

According to General Walters, he and Richard M. Helms, his superior as director of central intelligence and now Ambassador to Iran, were asked to meet at the White House last June 23, six days after the Watergate break-in, with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman.

General Walters said that Mr. Haldeman told him that the "Watergate incident might be exploited by the opposition and that it had been decided that he, Walters, should go to

Patrick Gray and should tell Mr. Gray that if the FBI pursued an investigation of certain funds in Mexico, connected with the Watergate case, this inquiry would compromise certain CIA activities and resources in Mexico.

"Mr. Haldeman specifically

bypassed General Walters's superior, Mr. Helms, in asking that only General Walters visit Mr. Gray," the summary of the Walters testimony said.

An immediate appointment was made with Mr. Gray, and General Walters conveyed the information from the White House, without naming Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman.

However, on returning to the CIA office in Langley, Va., he discovered that the FBI investigation of the Mexican financial matter would not compromise any CIA clandestine activity, the general said.

According to the testimony, Mr. Dean called General Walters three days later—June 26—and asked him to come to his office to discuss the Haldeman-Ehrlichman request. General Walters said he informed Mr. Dean that the CIA would not be compromised by the FBI investigation.

Called again by Dean

At the same time, General Walters said he informed Mr. Helms of the situation and won his approval for his handling of the matter.

The next day—June 27—Mr. Dean called General Walters again to meet him at the White House. At this meeting, General Walters said Mr. Dean asked "if there was some way the CIA could go bail or pay the salaries of the individuals accused in the Watergate case while they were in jail."

According to the Symington summary, General Walters testified that such expenditures would require approval of the House and Senate committees that oversee CIA activities.

General Walters stated that he told Mr. Dean that to spend funds in this way would implicate the agency and that he, General Walters, was prepared to resign rather than to do this," the statement said.

For a third time, Mr. Dean called General Walters to the

White House—June 28—to ask "if there could have been some CIA involvement [in the Watergate case] that General Walters did not know about," the summary said.

"At one point in the conversation, according to General Walters, Mr. Dean asked if General Walters had any ideas, and General Walters replied, yes, that anyone who was responsible should be fired," the statement said.

General Walters then said he rejected any CIA involvement and, if ordered to do so, he would ask to see President Nixon "and to explain to him how dangerous he thought such an action would be."

July 5, 12 days after the meeting with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, General Walters received a call from Mr. Gray, who reportedly refused to halt the investigation of the Mexican financing operation unless he received a letter from the CIA.

General Walters said he told Mr. Gray the next day that no harm would be done to the CIA and, elaborating, informed him of the details of the Haldeman-Ehrlichman meeting.

Call to Nixon

At this time, Mr. Gray told Senate investigators, he called President Nixon and told him of "confusion" between the CIA and the FBI, blaming the problem on "either carelessness or indifference of White House personnel" and warned

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Gen. Walters talks to panel

CIA boss links Nixon aides, bug

coverup

By Jim Squires

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 15—

The deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency has testified that former White House aides H.R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, and John W. Dean sought CIA assistance in a coverup of the Watergate bugging.

The testimony of Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, given before a Senate committee yesterday, is the first hard evidence from persons other than Watergate participants that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were linked directly to the coverup.

Walters' testimony corroborates Dean's statement that he was acting under orders. It also supports an allegation by convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord that the White House attempted to blame the Watergate break-in and wiretapping on the CIA.

WALTERS' statements also give new credence to a statement by McCord that former CIA Director Richard Helms was ousted because he refused to cooperate.

Helms was in Washington today and was interviewed by the Watergate case prosecutors.

Walters' Senate testimony was released today as he prepared to tell the same story to a federal grand jury. The special Senate Watergate committee went on record in favor of limited immunity for Dean when the Watergate hearings begin Thursday.

The extension of immunity to Dean must be channelled thru the Justice Department to United States District Court, but the court cannot deny the committee's request.

Commenting on Walters' allegations, Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), chairman of a special committee investigating possible CIA involvement in the Watergate affair, said, "There is no question in the world that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean were doing their best to obstruct justice."

ACCORDING TO a summary of Walters' testimony released by Symington, Walters and Helms were called to the White House on June 23, 1972, five days after the Watergate burglary. They reportedly were told by Haldeman and Ehrlichman that "the Watergate incident might be exploited by the opposition . . ."

It has been decided, Walters quoted Haldeman as saying, that Walters should go to L. Patrick Gray, acting Federal Bureau of Investigation director, and tell him that the FBI should not investigate certain Mexican campaign funds used in the Watergate burglary because it would "compromise certain CIA activities and resources in Mexico."

The money in question is two bank drafts which total \$89,000. Investigators have said the money represents donations which were passed thru a Mexican bank as part of an operation to hide the donor's identity.

Walters said he relayed the information to Gray but told him he had been asked to give him that message by White House officials.

Walters said he later discovered that the investigation would not compromise any CIA assets.

THREE DAYS later, on June 26, Walters said, he was telephoned by Dean and was told that Ehrlichman would vouch for Dean's authority to speak to Walters about Watergate. Walters said he then called Ehrlichman who told him he could speak with Dean.

Later in the afternoon, Walters said, he went to see Dean at the White House and told him that the agency was not compromised in any way by the Watergate bugging, despite what Haldeman and Ehrlichman said.

Walters said he returned to the CIA, relayed his conversation with Dean to Helms, and was told by Helms that he had

handled the situation correctly. Walters said he constantly checked with Helms during the next several weeks concerning subsequent contacts with the White House.

ON JUNE 27, Walters testified, Dean summoned him to the White House again and asked "if there was some way the CIA could go bail or pay the salaries of the individuals accused in the Watergate case while they were in jail." Walters said he told Dean this could not be done and that he would resign rather than do it.

IN A THIRD conversation with Dean on June 28, Walters testified, he told Dean that he [Walters] would have no part in compromising the CIA in something in which it was not involved. If ordered to do so, Walters said he would ask to see the President.

However, Walters did not see the President, Symington said, and neither did any other CIA official who has testified. Symington said the CIA officials have a direct responsibility to the White House and did not go to the President because "When the No. 1 man on the President's staff tells you to do something, you do it."

Walters said he finally told Gray that the FBI investigation would not endanger CIA assets and that the CIA was totally unconnected with the Watergate matter. He said Gray had telephoned him on July 5, stating that the FBI could not stop its investigation unless he received a letter from Walters or Helms requesting it.

IT WAS ON the following day, July 6, that Gray has said he personally told the President that White House aides were "confusing" his attempts to investigate the Watergate case.

Gray has said that after the July 6 conversation he encountered no further trouble from Dean and the other White

subsequent meetings with Walters and other CIA executives he received information regarding CIA assistance to two other White House aides, E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, in preparing for a burglary at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Symington said that Helms apparently supported Walters in his efforts to keep the CIA out of the Watergate case until he left the agency for an ambassador's post. In early February of this year, Symington said, Walters told James Schlesinger, the new CIA director, about the White House efforts.

WALTERS SAID Dean had telephoned Schlesinger and asked if the CIA could get back from the FBI the material which it had delivered concerning the CIA's relationship with Hunt and Liddy.

On the same day, a separate set of public hearings by the special Watergate investigating committee will begin.

The Watergate committee also voted today to seek similar immunity for a witness identified as Roy Sheppard, whom sources identified as the man who helped clean out the White House office of Hunt following the Watergate burglary.

Sheppard was identified as the so-called "mystery client" of Washington attorney Peter Wolfe. Wolfe has given an affidavit saying his client took eight cartons of material, including detailed plans for the burglary, from Hunt's office.

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Dean Reportedly Asked CIA to Post Bail for 5

Request Was Made for Those Arrested at the Watergate, Intelligence Official Says

BY RUDY ABRAMSON

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Presidential aide John W. Dean III called the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency to his office 10 days after the Watergate break-in and asked whether the CIA could post bail or pay salaries for the five arrested men, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said Tuesday.

Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, who had been at the CIA only six weeks, was reported to have told Dean that such actions would implicate the CIA and that he would resign rather than approve them.

At a press conference Tuesday Symington detailed a series of contacts between the CIA and Dean, John D. Ehrlichman and H.R. Haldeman after the Watergate arrests.

According to Symington, Walters testified that the first contact came only six days after five men were caught inside the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee and the last was earlier this year after James R. Schlesinger became the new CIA director.

The last request was a plea from Dean for the CIA to recover from the FBI a package of material related to CIA assistance to E. Howard Hunt while Hunt was preparing for the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Walters, testifying earlier this week before Symington's subcommittee, which oversees the CIA, said the agency's top officials agreed that such an action would implicate the CIA, Symington said.

The new details of efforts to use the CIA in the Watergate coverup came after testimony that Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean asked the CIA to use its influence to stop an FBI investigation of \$100,000 in Nixon campaign funds routed through a bank in Mexico.

Symington said Tuesday his investigation had shown that "there was an attempt to unload major responsibility for the Watergate bugging and coverup on the CIA."

In turning aside the effort to use the CIA, Symington said, the top agency officials "behaved very well."

However, it was disclosed last week that the CIA had become involved in the Ellsberg case in 1971 by providing disguises and phony identification for Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy before they broke into the psychiatrist's office. Agency experts also prepared a behavior profile on Ellsberg at the behest of White House aides doing undercover work on security leaks.

Gen. Robert E. Cushman, commandant of the Marine Corps who was then the CIA's deputy director, has confirmed that he approved the assistance to Hunt after receiving a telephone call from Ehrlichman.

Richard Helms, then CIA director, is said by Cushman to have been aware of the CIA's work on the Ellsberg profile.

Helms, named ambassador to Iran earlier this year, has returned to the United States to testify. He met with Watergate prosecutors for about four hours Tuesday. He is scheduled to appear Wednesday before a closed-door hearing chaired by Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), and Thursday before the Symington subcommittee.

Symington was asked repeatedly Tuesday whether he faulted CIA officials for not coming forward with the information that they had been contacted repeatedly by Dean after the Watergate break-in and were asked to help suppress the FBI investigation in Mexico by declaring it injurious to CIA interests.

Symington evaded the question, saying only that his investigation would get all the facts. Rather than finding fault with the CIA for not reporting the pressure over a period of 11 months, Symington said the agency's officials had performed admirably in refusing to be drawn in.

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Dean Tied to Plea to C.I.A. To Help Watergate Group

By MARJORIE HUNTER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 15—The deputy director of Central Intelligence was quoted today as saying that John W. Dean 3d, the ousted White House counsel, asked the agency last year to help cover up the Watergate case by paying bail and salaries for the men involved.

According to Senator Stuart Symington, Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters told the Senate

Text of Symington statement is printed on Page 27.

Armed Services Committee that he had threatened to quit rather than involve the agency in such a scheme.

Mr. Symington, a Missouri Democrat who is acting chairman of the committee, issued a statement summarizing testimony by General Walters to the committee at a closed hearing yesterday.

The statement said that General Walters had told the committee that H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, two other White House aides who have resigned in the Watergate scandal, sought to get the Central Intelligence Agency to call off a Federal Bureau of Investigation inquiry last year into Nixon re-election funds that had been "laundered" in a Mexico City bank.

The general said that the agency had turned down both White House requests, according to the Symington statement.

The two events, the statement said, occurred in late June and early July of last year, following the June 17 break-in at Democratic headquarters in the Watergate complex.

But even as late as January or February of this year, according to the general's testimony, Mr. Dean again sought C.I.A. help in retrieving from the F.B.I. "some materials" that had been sent to the bureau last year regarding C.I.A. help given E. Howard Hunt Jr. for use in a break-in at the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist.

"It is very clear to me," Senator Symington said, in releasing the summary, "that there was an attempt to shift responsibility for the Watergate

bugging and cover-up on the C.I.A."

Further inquiries into possible involvement by the agency in the widening Watergate scandals will be made when Richard M. Helms, director of the agency at the time involved, is questioned tomorrow and Thursday.

Mr. Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, is scheduled to appear tomorrow before a Senate appropriations subcommittee investigating C.I.A. involvement in Watergate and Thursday before the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. Helms was in the United States Attorney's office here for several hours this afternoon. No statement was issued.

Query on Bail or Pay

According to the summary, General Walters said that he had been called to the White House by Mr. Dean last June 27.

There, the summary says, Mr. Dean asked if the C.I.A. could provide bail or pay the salaries of the five individuals accused in the Watergate break-in while they were in jail.

General Walters was quoted as saying that he told Mr. Dean there was no way such a thing could be done and that any internal expenditure of funds by the agency must be reported to House and Senate oversight committees.

General Walters also told Mr. Dean, the summary says, that to spend funds in such a way would implicate the agency and that he would quit rather than do such a thing.

The general reportedly testified that Mr. Dean called him to the White House again the next day and asked if there could not have been some C.I.A. involvement that the general did not know about. The general said he replied that there could not have been.

At one point, the statement continued, Mr. Dean asked General Walters if he had any ideas and the general replied that yes, he had an idea—that anyone who was responsible should be fired.

The alleged activities involve the agency in providing a "cover" for the five men caught, and later convicted, in the break-in apparently prompted by the fact that they, Hunt and James McCord, had once been employed by the C.I.A.

In detailing events in the "laundered" campaign funds, General Walters reportedly told the committee last June 23 he and Mr. Helms met at the White House with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Helms.

He was quoted as saying Mr. Haldeman expressed concern that the Watergate scandal might be exploited in opposition (an apparent allusion to the Democratic Party) and that it had been General Walters' attempt to get the F.B.I. to drop its investigation of campaign funds, in the name of national security.

General Walters said in the summary that he was told by Mr. Haldeman that L. Patrick Gray, at the time acting director of the F.B.I., had further investigated the fund issue with a promise certain C.I.A. funds and resources in Mexico.

While Mr. Helms was present during this meeting, he apparently was bypassed, and it is not yet known if he raised any objection to such a request.

The summary continues with the following:

General Walters testified that an appointment was made with Mr. Gray during that meeting, and that just an hour later he went to see Mr. Gray.

He said that he told Mr. Gray that certain senior persons at the White House—he did not specify who—had told him that pursuit of the bureau's investigation would uncover some of the C.I.A.'s clandestine activities in Mexico. He said Mr. Gray replied he was aware that the agency and F.B.I. did not uncover one another's sources and operations (that is, reveal or interfere with each other.)

General Walters said that, however, upon his return to his agency he checked and discovered that the bureau's investigation of the Mexican financial affair would not compromise any C.I.A. activities.

Senator Symington said today that he believed that it was Mr. Helms who informed General Walters that the C.I.A.'s activities would not be compromised by the F.B.I. inquiry.

The summary says that General Walters testified that on June 26, he again went to the White House, upon the request of Mr. Dean. There, he said, he told Mr. Dean that after looking into the matter, he

Watergate case said today that Mr. Gray told the panel's investigators that he had said, "Mr. President, you are being wounded by men around you, using the F.B.I. and the C.I.A."

There has been no other confirmation of what Mr. Gray told investigators.

The F.B.I. investigation of the campaign funds channeled through Mexico involved \$89,000 of the \$100,000 contribution made last year to the Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President by Robert H. Allen, president of the Gulf Resources and Chemical Corporation of Houston.

The \$89,000 was in the form of four checks, drawn on a Mexico City bank and payable to a lawyer in Mexico City. These checks, plus \$11,000 in cash, were sent to Washington, along with other campaign funds, in a satchel.

The checks were turned over to G. Gordon Liddy, then serving as counsel to the finance arm of the re-election committee, who was to convert the checks into cash.

Liddy sent them to Bernard L. Barker in Miami, who in turn placed them in his own bank in Miami. Most of the cash proceeds, in \$100 bills, were then returned to Washington and placed in the safe of Maurice H. Stans, the chief fund-raiser for the committee.

More than \$200,000, including the funds given by Mr. Allen, were paid to Liddy to finance various Watergate activities. A number of \$100 bills were found on the five men arrested at the Watergate.

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The Day's Development

The White House inquiry: White House sources said President Nixon received last year only an informal oral report through his then chief of staff, John D. Ehrlichman, concerning a White House inquiry into the Watergate break-in. Mr. Nixon ordered an investigation shortly after the incident, and Mr. Ehrlichman delegated the task to the former White House counsel, John W. Dean 3d, the sources said. They asserted that it was after Mr. Ehrlichman's oral report that Mr. Nixon said last August that Mr. Dean had conducted a "complete investigation" showing that no one in his Administration "was involved in this very bizarre incident."

Watergate and the C.I.A.—Lieut. Gen. Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of Intelligence, reportedly told a Senate committee that Mr. Dean had asked the agency to help cover-up the Watergate break-in by paying bail and salaries for those involved. General Walters also was said to have testified that two other White House aides, John D. Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman, had sought to get the C.I.A. to halt an F.B.I. inquiry into Nixon re-election funds. Both requests were rejected, the general said.

Security wiretaps: Washington informants said President Nixon personally authorized telephone taps on more than a dozen subordinates on the National Security Council and in the Pentagon in 1969 after The New York Times reported that B-52 bombers were striking in Cambodia. F.B.I. reports on the overheard conversations went to Mr. Nixon's national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, and to Mr. Kissinger's deputy, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, now interim White House chief of staff.

The Senate investigation: The Watergate investigating committee, set to open hearings tomorrow, moved ahead with plans to obtain immunity from prosecution for Mr. Dean, although Federal prosecutors are said to believe that this would complicate their case. The Senate panel, meeting in closed session, also took similar steps to obtain immunity for a witness said to have moved cartons of documents from the White House shortly after the Watergate break-in.

Special prosecutor: Federal Judge Harold R. Tyler Jr. of New York, Attorney General-designate Elliot L. Richardson's first choice to be special prosecutor in the Watergate case, declined the post because it would have forced him to leave the bench.

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Bail Asked in Bugging

Agency Refused to Block FBI Probe

From Our Wire Services

WASHINGTON.—Sworn testimony by a top CIA official indicates that White House aides sought to have the CIA go bail or pay salaries for the men arrested in the Watergate break-in.

The testimony also indicates the White House tried to get the CIA to block the FBI's investigation of a Mexican money-laundering deal later linked to the Watergate case.

The bizarre story was revealed Tuesday by Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), who released a summary of testimony given to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Army Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Former White House aides H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman tried to pressure the CIA into blocking an investigation of the Watergate scandal, Symington reported.

"It is very clear to me that there was an attempt to unload major responsibility for the Watergate bugging and coverup on the CIA," Symington said.

Symington, acting chairman of the committee, said CIA officials "under these difficult circumstances and heavy pressure . . . behaved very well with respect to this attempt."

According to the summary, White House Counsel John W. Dean 3d, since fired, called Walters on June 27 — 10 days after the break-in at Democratic headquarters — and Walters went to see Dean, one of a series of meetings between the two men.

"Mr. Dean reportedly asked," the summary said, "if there was some way the CIA could go bail or pay the salaries of the individuals accused in the Watergate case while they were in jail.

"Gen. Walters stated that he told Mr. Dean that there was no way this could be done, that any internal expenditure of funds by the CIA must be reported to the House and Senate Oversight committees.

"Gen. Walters stated that he told Mr. Dean that to

spend funds in this way would implicate the agency and that he, Gen. Walters, was prepared to resign rather than to do this."

Symington said that six days after the Watergate break-in, Walters and the CIA director Richard Helms, now ambassador to Iran, were summoned to the White House.

They met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Walters testified he was told by Halde-

man that "the Watergate incident might be exploited by the opposition, and that it had been decided that he (Walters) should go to acting FBI director Patrick Gray and should tell Mr. Gray that if the FBI pursued an investigation into an investigation of funds in Mexico, connected with the Watergate case, this inquiry would compromise certain CIA activities and resources in Mexico."

Campaign contributions, funneled through Mexico, wound up in the hands of the conspirators, it has been charged.

Walters testified, according to Symington, that he made the request of Gray but three days later, after finding out that no CIA operations would be affected, told Dean the agency was not compromised in any way and there was no CIA involvement in the case.

Helms Becomes Latest Victim Of Watergate

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Richard M. Helms, long regarded as Washington's most candid professional intelligence man, is the latest casualty of the Watergate scandal.


Watergate has been a graveyard of public reputations, and Helms today begins a series of congressional appearances in which he hopes, presumably, to salvage his own.

Just recalled from Iran, where he is the American ambassador, Helms spent his first hours here in a most unambassadorial setting—the office of Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert, chief prosecutor in the Watergate case. He was met at the airport by a deputy federal marshal rather than a protocol officer.

Helms' reputation for candor with Congress already has been badly tarnished.

In at least three appearances before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to his departure for Iran earlier this year, Helms unequivocally denied that the CIA under his directorship had ever been involved in Watergate.

Yet as long as two years ago, it was disclosed last week on Capitol Hill, the CIA gave undercover assistance to the star conspirators of the Watergate case, E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.



RICHARD M. HELMS

... going to Hill

The assistance—snooping paraphernalia of a variety that James Bond might have found embarrassing—was delivered to Hunt on the authority of a phone call from White House aide John D. Ehrlichman to former Deputy CIA Director Gen. Robert E. Cushman, a military aide to Mr. Nixon back in the vice-presidential years.

The agency called off its help to Hunt in August, 1971, but not in time to prevent the burglary of the office of Pentagon papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding.

Last February and March—long after Hunt and Liddy had become household words in Washington—Helms was questioned under oath in closed sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about CIA involvement in Watergate or other domestic operations.

The questioning also came months after the President's three principal White House aides, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman,

Dean III, reportedly sought the CIA's collusion in covering the Watergate trail.

So far the record suggests that Helms stood up admirably during the eight months of Haldeman-Ehrlichman-Dean pressures that began a week after the Watergate break-in and continued until last February. His deputy, Gen. Vernon Walters, told the White House he would

resign rather than comply with any plan to implicate the CIA in the cover-up attempt.

Yet Helms said not a word to the Foreign Relations Committee, once his warmest constituency on Capitol Hill, even in response to a series of probing questions on CIA domestic involvements during a lengthy closed hearing last March 5.

Silence in adversity is an underlying discipline of the intelligence craft. But to a number of the senators waiting eagerly for a crack at Helms this week, Watergate was no legitimate intelligence concern of the CIA but rather a grisly domestic political conspiracy centered in the White House.

To the credit of Helms, he did withstand the pressures of the White House to make the CIA an exculpatory tool for a clique of presidential aides. As Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) pointed out yesterday, it takes some powerful withstanding to spurn a directive of the President's chief of staff.

And some congressional investigators are looking into the possibility that the departure of Helms as CIA director last December stemmed in part from his unwillingness to cooperate with the cover-up enterprise. Close friends and colleagues of Helms said at the time that it was a reluctant departure.

Last September, during a leisurely lunch at the Hay-Adams Hotel here, Helms shook his head at the unfolding revelations of the Watergate scandals. Speaking sympathetically of acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray's plight, he remarked:

"Can you imagine the predicament of a new FBI director coming into office and having this thing break over his head?"

But since then the scourge of Watergate has cut a great swath through the ranks of public men in Washington. And it is now Helms who stands under its shadow.

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STAT

CIA Resisted Cover-Up Eff By White House Hill Account

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency resisted an extraordinary series of pressures by top White House aides to assist in a cover-up of the Watergate scandal over an eight-month period beginning in June, 1972, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) revealed yesterday.

These pressures became so intense that the CIA's deputy director, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, warned former White House counsel John W. Dean III that he would resign and demand an audience with President Nixon if he were ordered to "compromise" the agency in the Watergate case.

This new account of White House intercessions in the Watergate investigation was disclosed by Symington based on testimony by Walters on Monday to the Senate Armed Services Committee and a deposition given by the CIA officials to federal prosecutors yesterday.

The White House officials implicated by Walters' testimony are Dean, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman. Former acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III also became involved in the efforts, according to Symington.

"It is very clear to me that there was an attempt to unload major responsibility for the Watergate bugging and cover-up on CIA," Symington said. The three aides, he added, "were doing everything in the world to obstruct justice."

Symington said the narrative began on June 23, 1972, less than a week after the celebrated Watergate break-in, when Walters and former CIA Director Richard M. Helms were summoned to the White House to meet with Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

Haldeman warned that the Watergate incident "might be exploited by the opposition" and he directed Walters to tell Gray that any investigation into channeling of Watergate funds through Mexico would endanger CIA activities and resources in that country.

"Mr. Haldeman specifically bypassed General Walters' superior, Mr. Helms, in asking that only General Walters visit Mr. Gray," Symington noted.

An immediate appointment was made by the White House with Gray and within an hour the acting FBI direc-

tor and Walters were meeting.

Walters, according to Symington, told him that pursuing the investigation would uncover some of the agency's clandestine activities." Gray answered that he was aware the FBI and CIA "do not uncover one another's sources and operations," according to the Symington account.

But when Walters returned to the CIA he was told, Symington believes by Helms, that an FBI investigation of the Mexican fund "laundering" operation would not endanger CIA covert resources.

Three days later Walters was summoned to the White House, this time by Dean, to discuss the scheme for calling off the FBI investigation.

Walters went to see Dean after confirming with Ehrlichman "that it was all right to talk with him," Symington related. He told Dean that "the agency was not compromised in any way in the Watergate bugging, and that there was no CIA involvement in the case."

Helms told Walters on this occasion and in the ensuing developments that "he had handled the situation just right," according to the Symington account.

The following day, June 27, Dean again called Walters in. "Mr. Dean reportedly asked if there was some way the CIA could go bail or pay the salaries of the individuals accused in the Watergate case while they were in jail," Symington said.

"General Walters stated that he told Mr. Dean that to spend funds in this way would implicate the agency, and that he, General Walters, was prepared to resign rather than to do this."

Dean summoned him a third time the next day, Walters related.

"Mr. Dean reportedly asked if there could have been some CIA involvement that General Walters did not know about, General Walters said he stated that there could not be," according to the account.

"Mr. Dean asked if General Walters had any ideas, and General Walters replied, yes, that anyone who was responsible should be fired."

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continued

Statement Issued on Walters Testimony

Statement by Sen. Stuart Symington, Acting Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, in Watergate testimony.

In sworn testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday, Monday, May 14, the deputy director of the CIA, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, testified to a remarkable series of events:

On June 23, 1972, General Walters, who had been at the CIA about six weeks, said he was asked to go to the White House with CIA Director Richard Helms at 1 p.m. that afternoon. There they met with Mr. H. R. Haldeman and Mr. John Ehrlichman in the latter's office. General Walters said he was told by Mr. Haldeman that the Watergate incident might be exploited by the opposition, and that it had been decided that he, Walters, should go to the acting FBI director, Mr. Patrick Gray, and should tell Mr. Gray that if the FBI pursued an investigation of certain funds in Mexico, connected with the Watergate case, this inquiry would compromise certain CIA activities and resources in Mexico. Mr. Haldeman specifically bypassed General Walters' superior, Mr. Helms, in asking that only General Walters visit Mr. Gray.

General Walters further testified that an appointment with Mr. Gray was made for him immediately and that he went to see Mr. Gray an hour later. According to his testimony, he told Mr. Gray that senior people at the White House, whom he did not name, had told him that pursuit of the investigations of Mexican financing would uncover some of the agency's clandestine activities. Mr. Gray reportedly responded that he was aware that the FBI and CIA do not uncover one another's sources and operations.

General Walters stated, however, that on his return to the agency he checked and discovered that investigation of the Mexican financial affair would not compromise any CIA activities.

line assets.

General Walters testified further that Mr. John W. Dean III called him on the following Monday, June 26, and wanted to talk with him about the substance of his conversation with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman the previous Friday. Mr. Dean reportedly said that General Walters could call Mr. Ehrlichman to insure that it was all right to talk with him. General Walters then called Mr. Ehrlichman who told him he could speak with Mr. Dean.

General Walters then testified that at 11:45 a.m. that same day, June 26, he went to see Mr. Dean. Mr. Dean reportedly received him alone. General Walters stated that he told Mr. Dean that after talking with Mr. Gray he had looked into the matter and that the agency was not compromised in any way in the Watergate bugging, and that there was no CIA involvement in the case.

Following this Monday meeting, General Walters stated that he returned to the CIA and told Mr. Helms of his conversation with Mr. Dean, and of his denial of any agency involvement in the Watergate case. According to General Walters, Mr. Helms told him that he had handled the situation just right. General Walters also testified that he constantly checked with Mr. Helms during the following events and that Helms assured General Walters that he was acting correctly.

The next day, June 27, Mr. Dean reportedly called General Walters again, and General Walters again went to see him at his office. Mr. Dean reportedly asked if there was some way the CIA could go bail or pay the salaries of the individuals accused in the Watergate case while they were in jail. General Walters stated that he told Mr. Dean that there was no way this could be done, that any internal expenditure of funds by the CIA must be reported to the House and Senate Oversight Committees. General Walters stated that he told Mr. Dean that to spend funds in this way would implicate the agency, and that he, Walters, was prepared to resign rather than

to do this.

General Walters testified that the next day, June 28, Mr. Dean called him again, and that he went to see Mr. Dean for a third time. Mr. Dean reportedly asked if there could have been some CIA involvement that General Walters did not know about. General Walters said he stated that there could be. At one point in the conversation, according to General Walters, Mr. Dean asked if General Walters had any ideas, and General Walters replied, yes, that anyone who was responsible should be fired.

General Walters further testified that he told Mr. Dean that he would have no part in attempting to compromise the CIA in something in which it was not in fact compromised. He said that, if ordered to do so, he would ask to see the President and to explain to him how dangerous he thought such an action would be.

On July 5, General Walters received a call, according to his testimony, from Mr. Patrick Gray, the acting director of the FBI. Mr. Gray, referring to his previous conversation with General Walters, reportedly said that he could not stop the investigation of the Mexican financing unless he received a letter from the director or General Walters stating that such an investigation would damage the agency's assets in Mexico. General Walters testified that he then went to see Mr. Gray the next day, July 6, and told him that he had checked this matter and discovered that such an investigation would not endanger any CIA assets, that the CIA was totally unconnected with the matter, and that the CIA had no interest in stopping any investigation. He then testified that he told Mr. Gray the story of his meeting with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and that he had been told to convey his previous message to Mr. Gray. General Walters testified that he repeated to Mr. Gray his de-

termination to resign if there was an attempt to compromise the CIA in this issue.

According to General Walters' testimony, he saw Mr. Gray again on July 12 at the FBI office, and gave him some additional information regarding material which had already been made available to Mr. Gray with regard to the CIA's contact the previous year with Mr. Hunt.

Finally, General Walters testified that in late January or early February, 1973, he told Dr. Schlesinger in a general way of the above matters. He testified that, shortly thereafter, Mr. Dean called Dr. Schlesinger and asked if the CIA could have returned from the FBI the package of material that had been sent to the FBI regarding the assistance furnished to Mr. Hunt the previous year. He testified that he, Mr. Colby, and Dr. Schlesinger discussed the matter and agreed that there was no way this could be done—that it would implicate the CIA in something it was not implicated in.

General Walters then testified that he went to see Mr. Gray that morning—he did not have the date available—and told him of the request by Mr. Dean, and of the CIA's decision.

He testified that he thought he later went to Mr. Dean and told him also, that there was no way the CIA could have this material returned.

With respect to this testimony, I would like to say the following, based upon the facts we have uncovered to date:

"As I stated yesterday, it is clear that senior White House officials were deeply involved in attempts to enmesh CIA in the Watergate affair and thus take the pressure off those who were really responsible."

"Because of security clearance and questions with respect to verbatim release of statements which might affect legal proceedings, I do not know when the full transcript of our hearings can be made public. Under those circumstances, I thought this narrative account should be made public.

"It is very clear to me that there was an attempt to unload major responsibility for the Watergate bugging and coverup on CIA. Under these difficult circumstances and heavy pressures, I believe that Director Helms and General Walters, who was at all times operating with the approval of Mr. Helms, behaved very well with respect to this attempt.

"Our inquiry of this and other related matters is continuing and we expect to hear testimony from Mr. Helms this Thursday."

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SECURITY LEAKS PROMPTED MOVE

Nixon OK'd Taps on Aides

CIA Watergate Role Probed

BY OSWALD JOHNSTON

Star-News Staff Writer

Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms becomes the focus of scrutiny in the Watergate case today in the wake of disclosures of persistent White House efforts to use the Central Intelligence Agency to cover up administration responsibility.

Testimony disclosed by the Senate Armed Services Committee has put it on record that Helms knew as early as June 23, 1972 — six days after the Watergate break-in — that White House aides H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III tried to order CIA interference with an FBI investigation related to the case.

The testimony by Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the CIA deputy director under Helms who still is in that post, gave no indication that Helms ever tried to communicate any misgivings to President Nixon, despite his knowledge of what White House aides were doing. However, the testimony did indicate that CIA officials did not give in to the pressure.

It was disclosed in testimony before the special Senate Watergate committee last week that acting FBI director L. Patrick

Gray III, the man the CIA was expressly ordered by Haldeman and Ehrlichman to warn off the scent, tried to inform Nixon last July 6 that something was wrong.

ACCORDING TO the Walters account, it was only that day that Gray learned that the CIA had been dragged by the White House team into an effort to block an FBI investiga-

tion of Republican campaign funds that were "laundered" through a Mexico City bank en route to the bank account of one of the Watergate conspirators.

Helms, who according to the Walters account had been aware of such White House maneuvers for more than a week before Gray found them out, testifies today before two congressional committees probing CIA complicity in White House-directed operations, intelligence subcommittees of the Senate Appropriations and the House Armed Services committees. Helms is scheduled to face the full Senate Armed Services Committee tomorrow.

AS CIA CHIEF, Helms, unlike Gray, was directly responsible to the President. Nevertheless, acting Armed Services Committee Chairman Stuart Symington, D-Mo. sought during a news conference yesterday to exonerate Helms and all other CIA officials of wrongdoing or even official laxity.

Citing the "facts of life in Washington," Symington offered this explanation: "When the President's staff tells you to do something, you naturally feel that you know what you should do — and you do it."

Helms, now ambassador to Iran, was called back to Washington last weekend as reports began to spread of CIA involvement in Watergate, its coverup and the related burglary of Pentagon papers de-

He has been in Washington since Monday and spent more than five hours yesterday at the U.S. Courthouse, where he was interviewed by Watergate prosecutors. Authorities declined to say if he would testify before the Watergate grand jury.

HELMS' HEARING before both subcommittees today was originally planned as testimony limited to the Ellsberg burglary, which involved a CIA supply of false documents, disguises and other materials to Watergate conspirator and former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt during the summer of 1971.

Walters' testimony, however, has brought the agency into the thick of the Watergate scandal itself. Both Sen. John L. McClellan, D-Ark., head of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee, and Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., head of the House Armed Services subcommittee, have been furnished copies of a sworn affidavit in

which Walters yesterday set forth substantially the same account he gave the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The Walters account, besides setting forth in the greatest detail so far available the efforts of high White House aides to cover up the Watergate burglary, also gives the fullest account so far of an effort to pin some of the blame on the CIA.

TAKEN TOGETHER with last week's account of Gray's hesitant efforts to tread his way through the Watergate labyrinth, the Walters account shows a

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Today Show

STATION WRC TV
NBC Network

DATE May 16, 1973

7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

PRESIDENTIAL AIDES TRIED TO USE CIA IN COVER-UP

FRANK BLAIR: For more on Watergate, here is Paul Duke in Washington.

PAUL DUKE: There are also new disclosures about attempts to use the CIA to cover-up the scandal. Senate testimony implicates three of Mr. Nixon's top aides, H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and John Dean. Democratic Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri said the attempt didn't work because CIA officials resisted the pressure. Symington said the White House aides worked to get the CIA to dissuade the FBI from making a full investigation.

The disclosures were based on testimony given the Senate Armed Services Committee in closed session by deputy CIA chief Vernon Walters. Symington was blunt in blaming the presidential aides.

SENATOR STUART SYMINGTON: It is clear to me that there was an attempt to unload major responsibility for the Watergate bugging and cover-up on the CIA. Under these difficult circumstances and heavy pressures, I believe that Director Helms and General Walters, who was at all times operating with the approval of Mr. Helms, behaved very well with respect to this attempt. I don't think there's any question in the world that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean were doing their best to obstruct justice.

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Military Wife

By Jeanette Symth

Big business and the military got together last night—with much talk of champions and motherhood and a little about Watergate—to pick the "Military Wife of the Year" from among five finalists.

Attorney General designate Elliot Richardson, immersed these days in the administration's handling of the Watergate scandal, couldn't attend as scheduled, because "of a number of domestic problems," as someone put it.

Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., commandant of the Marine Corps, and former deputy director of the CIA, who was recently named in public reports as having given CIA aid to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt, was also absent.

His substitute, Deputy Commandant Gen. Earl Anderson, told the Shoreham Hotel crowd that Cushman "had lost his voice" after two days of Senate Armed Services Committee hearings.

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), ranking Republican

on the Armed Services Committee, attended, but left early.

"We had the CIA witnesses yesterday," said Thurmond, "and the Navy was there today." He said Monday's testimony by Gen. Vernon A. Walters, Cushman's successor as CIA deputy director, "pretty badly" implicates White House aides in Watergate.

Most of the evening was spent, however, in eating clams and oysters on the half shell and a seven-course meal laid on by Stokely-Van Camp.

After four hours of eating and listening to speeches by and about the finalists the judges chose Martha Pennington of Sacramento, Calif., the second black woman honored in eight years. Mrs. Pennington, wife of Air Force M. Sgt. John Pennington, established a troubleshooting parents' group to defuse racial tensions at the high school attended by black children from Mather Air Force base near Sacramento.

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS World News Roundup

STATION WTOP Radio
CBS Network

DATE May 15, 1973 8:00 AM

CITY Washington, DC

DEAN DOCUMENTS

DALLAS TOWNSEND: From Washington, Bob Schieffer has something more now on those documents transferred yesterday from Dean's safe deposit box.

BOB SCHIEFFER: The security designator on the documents in Dean's safe is "COMMENT" -- a code word for information gathered through communications intercept, in most cases, electronic eavesdropping.

It's generally used in referring to information gathered by code breakers at the super secret National Security Agency. Persons authorized access to such information must have security clearance higher than top secret, classifications known as "SI" for special intelligence.

Such classifications are compartmentalized into subdesignations for access to such things as satellite reconnaissance photos. In that instance, for example, the clearance is know as "TK" but even the code name to designate that security classification is a closely guarded secret.

Dean gave no hint what secrets his documents contained, but the security code name indicates it was information gathered through some kind of electronic eavesdropping, that it could have been picked up from foreign sources, and that it was known to few people in the U.S. Government.

Bob Schieffer, CBS News, Washington.

TOWNSEND: Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, appeared yesterday at a closed door session of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Afterwards the Committee's acting chairman Stuart Symington, said Walters testified that Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman had been heavily involved in an effort to misuse the CIA.

The Associated Press quotes an unidentified source as

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

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MAY 15 1973

CIA was urged to take rap

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — The deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency testified Monday that the top command of the White House tried to get the CIA to take the blame for the Watergate incident.

Senate sources said Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the pressure came from former-presidential advisers H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III.

Walters, a close associate of President Nixon from the Eisenhower administration, reportedly insisted in his closed-door testimony that the CIA was innocent, even though documents forged by the CIA were found on the burglars arrested in Democratic headquarters at the Watergate complex last June.

(The Washington Post reported that Walters told the senators that the three top Nixon aides sought to persuade the Central Intelligence Agency to try to block — on national security grounds — an FBI investigation into the Watergate scandal's "Mexican connection."

(According to this report, Walters said the proposal was made to him at a White House meeting to which he was summoned by Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean.

(Walters, who is expected to be summoned before a federal grand jury to tell the story, said former CIA director Richard M. Helms refused to go along with the plan, and the White House was so informed, the Post said.

The "Mexican connection" case involved the \$100,000 or more in Nixon re-election funds that were "laundered" through a Mexico City bank and ended up in the safe of Maurice H. Stans, chief presidential fund-raiser in 1972.

Walters, according to the Post's sources, testified that the three White House advisers told him they wanted the agency to tell the

FBI that an investigation of the Mexican money would jeopardize CIA operations. When he relayed the suggestion to Helms, Walters said, the former director decided that there was no basis for the request to the FBI.

(The Mexican money incident was one example of what one authoritative source described as a "continuing pattern" of White House efforts in 1972 to involve the CIA in Watergate cover-up activities, as depicted in Monday's testimony, the Post said.)

Walters' predecessor, Marine Corps commandant Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., another Nixon protege, acknowledged last week that Ehrlichman had prevailed upon him to provide CIA equipment used in the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in the summer of 1971.

The equipment included fake identification papers that evidently were retained by the Watergate conspirators for the Democratic break-in.

Committee members took Walters' testimony as corroboration of the story told to Senate Watergate investigators by former acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray III.

Gray reportedly declared that White House aides sought to convince him that the CIA was behind the Watergate operation, in an effort to induce him to go slow in his investigation.

Gray is quoted as saying that Richard M. Helms, then CIA director and now ambassador to Iran, denied throughout that the CIA was involved.

Helms was dismissed as CIA director shortly after the presidential election in November, and some of his friends have alleged that he was exiled to Iran as part of the Watergate coverup. He is scheduled to testify before the

House and Senate CIA subcommittees this week.

Walters took over the No. 2 job in the CIA last April, nine months after the Ellsberg burglary and two months before the Watergate break-in.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee, declined to make public Walters' testimony. But he called a press conference for Tuesday afternoon and hinted at the role of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean.

"There were other matters besides the Ellsberg case in which the White House staff tried to involve the CIA," Symington told reporters.

"What I learned today was how deeply involved were Haldeman and Ehrlichman as well as Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman were up to their ears in this matter."

Symington, who previously had declared that the CIA "behaved very well," insisted after hearing Walters' testimony that "Whatever the CIA was ordered to do was at the direction of the top staff people at the White House."

Convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr., who broke open the scandal when he started to talk last month, alleged last week that White House pressure had been put on him and the other defendants to blame the CIA.

He claimed that Helms, who reportedly rejected Haldeman's original request for direct CIA help in domestic operations, was fired as part of the coverup.

The current director of the CIA, James R. Schlesinger, testified last week that Helms turned over the agency's records in the Ellsberg case to the Justice Department in October, a few weeks before the election.

9

Bid to blame CIA for break-in alleged

By STEPHEN E. NORDLINGER
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Officials of the Central Intelligence Agency told the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday that top officials of the White House tried—although unsuccessfully—to persuade the agency to accept the blame for financing and directing the Watergate burglary and bugging, Senate sources disclosed.

This testimony emerged at a closed-door meeting of the committee, which is investigating the CIA's role in the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist.

The testimony also disclosed for the first time that H.R. Haldeman, who resigned as White House chief of staff two weeks ago, had played a key role in trying to obtain CIA assistance in connection with covert political activity.

Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), the committee's acting chairman, raised Mr. Haldeman's name at a meeting with reporters following the session of the committee.

He also mentioned that John W. Dean 3d, the ousted White House counsel, had sought CIA assistance. Until this testimony, only John D. Ehrlichman, the resigned domestic adviser to President Nixon, had figured among top White House aides in connection with requests for CIA help in domestic political activity.

"There were other matters besides the Ellsberg case in which the White House staff tried to involve the CIA," Senator Symington said. Mr. Haldeman was involved in this very heavily."

Later Mr. Symington said: "What I learned today was how deeply involved Haldeman was as well as Ehrlichman and Dean. They were up to their ears in this matter."

The CIA had disclosed previously that on orders of Mr. Ehrlichman it had supplied a camera, disguises and false identification to E. Howard Hunt, Jr., one of the convicted Watergate burglars, who used this equipment to break into the office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Senator Symington declined to disclose what other matters were discussed at the closed committee meeting, but Senate sources said it was testified that the White House had tried to shift the responsibility for the Watergate operation to the CIA when the break-in failed.

Last week, James W. McCord, Jr., another Watergate conspirator, said in a memorandum to federal and Senate

Two top Nixon aides suggested candidates for special Watergate prosecutor ... A7

investigators that he was pressured on two occasions before his trial in January to assert that he and his colleagues were working on a covert operation for the CIA at the time of their arrest in the Watergate break-in. McCord said that at one point his lawyer told him that his personnel records at the CIA could be altered, if needed, to show that he had been restored to active

duty by the agency, even though he had retired in 1970.

Apparently, this new evidence of White House attempts to involve the CIA came from Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, who took over as the deputy director of the CIA last December. He was the only top CIA official at the hearing who was with the agency during the 1972 political year.

Others at the committee meetings were James R. Schlesinger, the head of the CIA and defense secretary-designate; Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr. (USMC), the deputy director of the CIA when then Ellsberg psychiatrist burglary occurred, and William E. Colby, who has been named by President Nixon to succeed Mr. Schlesinger.

Richard M. Helms, Mr. Schlesinger's predecessor as director of central intelligence, has returned from Iran, where he is ambassador, to testify this week before the Symington committee and an appropriations subcommittee headed by Senator John McClellan (D., Ark.). Last week, General Cushman said that Mr. Helms had "assented" to providing Hunt with the CIA supplies.

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BID TO C.I.A. CITED

3 Nixon Aides Said to Have Asked Further Help on Espionage

By MARJORIE HUNTER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 14—

Senator Stuart Symington said today that three high-level White House aides had been deeply involved in trying to enlist the help of the Central-Intelligence-Agency in domestic undercover activities other than the burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist.

He identified the three as H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean 3d. Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman have since resigned, and Mr. Dean was dismissed.

Senator Symington said he based his comments on testimony given the Senate Armed Services Committee today by Lieut. Gen. Vernon Walters, the deputy director of the C.I.A.

Declines to Give Details

The Senator, a Missouri Democrat, declined to state the nature of the "undercover activities" for which the help of the C.I.A. had reportedly been sought.

However, he said that the activities had been in addition to the previously disclosed C.I.A. involvement in the break-in at the psychiatrist's office and the C.I.A.'s preparation of a "personality assessment" of Dr. Ellsberg.

"There were other matters besides the Ellsberg case in which the White House tried to get the C.I.A. involved," Senator Symington said the committee had been told.

Asked if one of those undercover projects was the bugging of the Democratic party headquarters at the Watergate complex here last June, Senator Symington replied: "No."

Ehrlichman Named Earlier

While testimony of other C.I.A. officials last week had named Mr. Ehrlichman as hav-

ing enlisted agency help in the summer of 1971 in the Pentagon papers case involving Dr. Ellsberg, today's testimony by General Walters was the first indication that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Dean had sought C.I.A. assistance, too, on behalf of the White House.

"Ehrlichman and Haldeman—particularly Haldeman—were up to their ears in this, along with Dean, in trying to involve the C.I.A. in this whole Watergate mess," Senator Symington said.

General Walters appeared before the committee in closed session. His testimony was not made public, and he made no comments as he departed.

General Walters became deputy director of the C.I.A. in April, 1972, succeeding Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., now Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Richard Helms, former C.I.A. director who is now Ambassador to Iran, has been called to testify Wednesday before a Senate appropriations subcommittee and on Thursday before the Armed Service Committee.

Both committees are inquiring into the question of whether the C.I.A. violated the National Security Act of 1947 by assisting the White House in domestic undercover activities.

The law states that the C.I.A. "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." The Justice Department has jurisdiction of internal security, espionage and sabotage.

Mr. Helms was director of the C.I.A. at the time the agency, on the request of Mr. Ehrlichman, provided disguises and equipment later used in the break-in of the office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

'Personality Assessment'

He was director, too, at the time the C.I.A. provided a "personality assessment" of Dr. Ellsberg in the summer and fall of 1971, also at the request of a White House aide, David R. Young Jr. Agency officials have said it was the first such study made by the C.I.A. on an American citizen.

Testimony last week by General Cushman and James R. Schlesinger, now director of the C.I.A. indicated that Mr. Helms had been aware of both actions.

Mr. Helms continued as head of the C.I.A. until he was named Ambassador to Iran earlier this spring.

Some members of the Armed Forces have said they fled that the C.I.A. was

not at fault in granting White House request for aid in these two cases. The fault, they have said, lies with the White House.

While General Walters's testimony was not made public, there were strong indications that he had told the committee that the C.I.A. had rejected White House efforts to enlist the agency in further activities.

Saxbe Comments

Senator William B. Saxbe, Republican of Ohio, a member of the committee, said later: "I believe that's why Helms was shipped off to Iran. He wouldn't cooperate."

Another Republican member of the committee, Senator Peter H. Dominick of Colorado, said that he had been "surprised at the direct testimony [of General Walters] which indicated that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were apparently interested in getting the C.I.A. involved."

Senator Dominick said that the general's testimony showed "there were incidents other than the Ellsberg case in which White House aides tried to get the C.I.A. involved."

Since General Walters did not join the C.I.A. until the spring of last year, it would appear that whatever White House efforts that may have been made to enlist further C.I.A. help came since that time, either in 1972 or earlier this year.

Senator Symington and other members of the committee declined to say whether C.I.A. help had been sought in trying to cover up White House involvement in the Watergate scandals.

Long-Time Nixon Aides

Both General Walters and General Cushman were long-time associates of President Nixon. General Cushman had served as Mr. Nixon's military aide while he was Vice President in the nineteen-fifties.

General Walters was a staff assistant to former President Eisenhower and served as Vice President Nixon's interpreter on various foreign tours, including a 1958 South American visit in which the party was showered with rocks and empty cans.

Mr. Nixon was not injured but General Walters was sprayed with glass splinters. General Cushman was also a member of the Nixon party on that trip.

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15 MAY 1973

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Mexican Episode Involved

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Three of President Nixon's highest-ranking White House aides sought to persuade the Central Intelligence Agency to call off—on national security grounds—an FBI investigation into the Watergate scandal's "Mexican Connection."

This testimony was given to a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday by the CIA's deputy director, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, it was learned.

Walters said the proposal was made to him at a White House meeting to which he was summoned by presidential aides H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III.

The CIA official, who is expected to be summoned imminently before a federal grand jury to tell the story, said the then CIA Director Richard M. Helms refused to go along with the plan and the White House was so informed.

The case involved the \$100,000 or more in Nixon re-election funds that were "laundered" through a Mexico City bank and ended up ultimately in the safe of Maurice H. Stans, chief presidential fund-raiser in 1972.

Walters, according to qualified sources, testified that the three White House advisers told him they wanted the agency to tell the FBI that an investigation of the Mexican money would jeopardize CIA operations.

When he relayed the suggestion to Helms, said Walters, the former director decided that there was no basis for the request to the FBI.

The Mexican money incident was one example of what one authoritative source described as a "continuing pattern" of

White House efforts in 1972 to involve the CIA in Watergate cover-up activities, as depicted in yesterday's testimony.

Walters was accompanied to the hearing by outgoing CIA Director James R. Schlesinger, Director-designate William E. Colby, the CIA's present director of clandestine operations, and Marine commandant Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., who preceded Walters as CIA deputy director.

Acting Armed Services Chairman Sen. Stuart Sym-

ington, (D-Mo.) said he was surprised to learn of Haldeman's implication in the case.

"The CIA was asked to provide help on other matters beyond the Ellsberg case by the White House staff," Symington said after today's closed session. "We found out that Haldeman was very heavily involved."

Dean had been implicated in secret testimony Friday dealing with White House pressures on the agency, it was learned.

The time sequence of the attempted intercessions was not clear. They occurred, according to one qualified source, "at a time when these guys were frantically trying to get off the hook and get other guys on the hook" — presumably after disclosure of the Watergate break-in last June 17.

Both Symington and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) praised the CIA for standing up to the alleged White House pressures to assist in covering up the Watergate trail.

One of the subjects covered by the committee in its questioning of the CIA witnesses was a memorandum



VERNON A. WALTERS

... tells of CIA role.

to federal prosecutors by convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr., who said he had been urged by his previous counsel to claim that the Watergate break-in was a CIA operation.

The lawyer, Gerald Alch of Boston, denied in an interview last week that he had made any such proposal to McCord. The attorney said he merely asked McCord about possible CIA im-

plication because, on the basis of government-produced evidence, McCord had once intimated that the break-in team consisted of CIA employees.

It was disclosed last week that Ehrlichman in July, 1971 had asked then CIA Deputy Director Cushman to give undercover assistance to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt for an undisclosed mission that even Hunt would not divulge to the CIA. The assistance, spy equipment and secret phone numbers, were provided. The mission, it turned out, was the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding of Beverly Hills, Calif.

The names of Haldeman and Dean had not come up in the course of last week's public revelations.

Senators who attended yesterday's closed session were extremely reluctant to divulge details. "We are dealing with what may well be serious criminal violations by high-ranking officials," commented one committee member. "Whatever we say now could probably jeopardize any future criminal prosecutions."

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White House Pressure on CIA Indicated

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

The White House last summer pressured the Central Intelligence Agency to help high administration officials conceal their part in the Watergate conspiracy, a Senate committee has reportedly been told.

According to several fragmentary accounts of closed-door testimony by CIA officials appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday, the agency was urged by White House aides to extend the "cover" of CIA employment to some of the Watergate break-in team and to help conceal the financing of the operation.

The CIA refused both requests, it was reported.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., acting chairman of the committee for the special investigation, disclosed yesterday that former White House aides H. R. Haldeman and John W. Dean III were involved in efforts to implicate the CIA in domestic activities on behalf of the Nixon administration.

SYMINGTON declined, however, to give any details of what Dean and Haldeman tried to do. Last week it emerged from depositions by CIA officials that John D. Ehrlichman, President Nixon's chief domestic aide, personally intervened to win agency cooperation in the 1971 mission which led to the burglary of the psychiatrist of Symington promised to disclose more at a news conference scheduled for later today.

It emerged from other sources that the White House triumvirate, apparently with Haldeman taking the lead, sought active CIA help in covering up the role of administration higher-ups in Watergate.

Specific details were scanty, but the scheme reportedly had two main facets

FIRST, the CIA was to revise its employment

records to restore to its payroll two former employees involved in the break-in E. Howard Hunt, a retired 20-year CIA veteran who was also involved in the Ellsberg burglary, and James W. McCord Jr., another CIA veteran who was among the arrested in the Watergate complex June 17.

At the same time, the CIA was asked to add to its payroll the so-called "Miami Four" — the Cuban-American operatives whom Hunt and coconspirator G. Gordon Liddy had hired as foot soldiers in the scheme. Two of these men also apparently took part in the Ellsberg burglary.

SECOND, the CIA was asked to help cover the tracks of administration officials in using Republican campaign contributions which apparently had been earmarked for political espionage during the 1972 political season.

In this connection, the CIA was reportedly asked to help cloud traces of about \$89,000 in campaign contributions which were "laundered" through a Mexico City bank account before winding up in the bank account of Bernard Barker, one of the Watergate operatives.

While precise details of the proposals were lacking, the testimony appeared in some respects to support the claim advanced by McCord in a May 7 memo to the special Senate committee investigating Watergate that higher-ups behind the plot tried to put some of the responsibility on the CIA.


THE KEY witness before the committee yesterday was Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, who has been deputy director of the CIA since May 1972 — a month before Watergate.

Speaking to reporters after the morning committee session, Symington revealed for the first time that Haldeman and Dean had been implicated in the cover-up on behalf of the White House. These overtures, he said,

had been made during Walters' tenure as deputy director.

Ehrlichman had been named last week as the administration official who approached Walters' predecessor, Gen. Robert E. Cushman, to request help for Hunt's operations investigating the Penta-

According to affidavits and statements from Cush-



LT. GEN. WALTERS

man, now Marine Corps commandant, and CIA director James R. Schlesinger, the association with Hunt was broken off in late August 1971 — just a week before Hunt, Liddy and the Cuban group carried out the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office in Los Angeles.

DESPITE this rebuff, however, it apparently emerged from Walters' testimony yesterday that Haldeman and Dean returned to the agency with new approaches after the Watergate burglary, nearly a year later.

From Symington's account of the committee session, Walters had most of his dealings with Haldeman, whose name had not before yesterday been linked with covert administration contacts with the CIA.

Dean's role is still unemerged in U.S. District

Court yesterday during a hearing into the disposition of classified documents relating to Watergate which Dean had sequestered in a safe deposit box until turning them over to the court yesterday.

Under questioning from Chief Judge John J. Sirica, Dean disclosed that the papers bore the obscure security classification "Top secret — handle via commint channels." This is an extremely sensitive classification denoting a highly restricted status that is used primarily in the intelligence community.

"COMMINT" refers to "communications intelligence," the highly classified procedure of intercepting foreign diplomatic and intelligence messages that is quietly carried on by both the CIA and the Pentagon's intelligence establishment.

Presumably, Richard M. Helms, who was CIA director during the period of the reported Dan — Ehrlichman — Haldeman overtures, was instrumental in turning down the post-Watergate request for help.

According to Cushman's affidavit in the case last week, Helms at first approved the decision to supply false documents, disguises and other undercover equipment to the hunt group.

That earlier association was broken off because it was feared Hunt's machinations were involving the CIA in domestic opera-

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Haldeman and Dean Pressed CIA for Aid

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
 Star-News Staff Writer

White House aides H.R. Haldeman and John W. Dean III both participated in efforts to involve the Central Intelligence Agency in domestic activities on behalf of the Nixon administration during 1971 and 1972, Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., said today.

Symington continuing a Senate investigation of the CIA's role in helping the September 1971 burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, told reporters today he had learned of new evidence of White House efforts to bring the agency in on its operations.

Symington refused to give any details, but it was clear from what he told reporters during a break in committee hearings that the additional attempts to involve the CIA took place after the burglary.

Symington did stress that the operations did not involve the bugging of Democratic National headquarters at the Watergate in 1972, suggesting more undercover efforts are yet to be disclosed.

"I was surprised to learn that not only (John D.) Ehrlichman and Dean were involved, but that Haldeman was also,"

Symington said. "They were involved up to their ears."

Although Symington indicated he knew of earlier Dean involvement, his reference today to Dean was the first disclosure that the former White House counsel was somehow involved in White House contacts with the CIA as well as the first news of Haldeman's role.

IT WAS revealed last week that Ehrlichman, President Nixon's chief domestic aide, personally

intervened to gain CIA cooperation with Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt in an operation that later turned out to be the burglary of Ellsberg's analyst. Symington declined to give any details of Dean's or Haldeman's actions.

The key informant in today's revelations was the present deputy director of the CIA, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, who held that post from early 1972. Walters testified today before Symington's

armed services sub-committee on intelligence.

What Walters revealed, Symington said concerned attempts by the White House team of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean to involve the CIA in unspecified operations during the time he was deputy director—that is, during 1972.

Also present to testify today was Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., a Marine Corps commandant who was CIA deputy director in 1971, when the Ellsberg burglary occurred. Cushman

has already admitted that the CIA, at Ehrlichman's request, gave Hunt false documents, disguises and other equipment when he was planning the burglary.

WITH CUSHMAN and Walters in the committee room were also James R. Schlesinger the out-going CIA director who has been designated secretary of Defense, and William E. Colby, who has been named to succeed him.

In his testimony last week and in a formal affidavit made public Friday, Cushman said the former CIA director, Richard M. Helms, gave his assent to the support the agency gave Hunt in what was clearly to be a domestic operation.

The national Security Act of 1947, under whose authority the CIA operates, expressly forbids the agency to engage in any internal security or domestic police operations.

Helms, now ambassador to Iran, has been called to testify before Symington's subcommittee and also two other Congressional units probing CIA activities during 1971 and 72 — the Pentagon Papers-Watergate period.

Symington said Helms would testify to his group later this week, but a precise date has not been set. Helms' travel plans are not being formally announced, but he left Tehran over the weekend and is believed to be in Washington now.

12 May 1973

I, VERNON A. WALTERS, a Lieutenant General in the United States Army, hereby duly sworn, depose and say as follows:

I have been Deputy Director of CIA since I was sworn into that office on 2 May 1972.

On 23 June 1972 I was ordered by a phone message from my office to be at the White House at about 1300 with Director Helms. I had lunch with Mr. Helms and we went to Mr. Ehrlichman's office at the White House. Present were Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Helms and myself. As I recall it, Mr. Haldeman said that the Watergate incident was causing trouble and was being exploited by the opposition. It had been decided at the White House that I would go to Acting FBI Director Gray and tell him that now that the five suspects were arrested, further enquiries into the Mexican aspects of this matter might jeopardize some of the CIA's covert activities in that area. An appointment was made for me to see Mr. Gray at 1430 that same day. I went over and told him that I had been directed by top White House officials to tell him that further investigation into the Mexican aspects of the Watergate episode might jeopardize some of the Agency's covert actions in that area. He said that he understood the agreement between the FBI and the Agency regarding their sources but that

this was a complicated case. He would not violate the agreement with CIA regarding sources. On my return to the Agency I checked to see whether there was any danger in the Agency's covert sources if the Mexican part of the investigation continued and ascertained that no one believed that this was the case. No one had any knowledge of the plan to bug the Democratic National Committee.

On June 26 the Counsel to the President John Dean called me and asked me to come and see him about the matter I had discussed with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. He said I could check with Ehrlichman and I did. He said I could talk to Dean so I went to Dean's office at 1145 on June 26.

I informed Dean that I had checked carefully to see whether there was any jeopardy to the Agency's sources by a further investigation of the Mexican sources of this matter and had found there was none. Dean then asked whether the CIA might have taken part in the Watergate episode without my knowing it. I said that this was not possible. I knew that the Agency had had no part in the operation against the Democratic National Committee. I therefore could not say that further investigation would jeopardize Agency sources. I felt that someone had bungled badly and that the responsible parties should be fired. He asked whether there was not some way in which the Agency might have been involved. I said that I had checked with Director

Helms and was convinced it was not. Any attempt to stifle this investigation would destroy the effectiveness of the Agency and the FBI and would be a grave disservice to the President. I would have no part in it and was quite prepared to resign on the issue. He asked whether I had any ideas on what might be done and I replied that those responsible should be fired. He seemed disappointed and I left.

The following day I saw Dean again in his office at his request. He again reviewed the Watergate Case saying that some witnesses were getting scared and were "wobbling". I said that no matter how scared they got, they could not involve CIA because it was not involved in the bugging of the Watergate. He then asked if the CIA could not furnish bail and pay the suspects' salaries while they were in jail, using covert action funds for this purpose.

I replied that this was out of the question. It would implicate the Agency in something in which it was not implicated. Any such action by the Agency would imply an order from the highest level and I would not be a party to any such action. It would be a grave disservice to the President and the country and would destroy the CIA's credibility with the Congress and the people. I would resign rather than do this and, if ordered to do it, I would ask to see

the President to explain the reasons for my refusal. Furthermore, when the Agency expended funds in the U.S., we had to report this to the Oversight Committees of the Agency in Congress. He was much taken aback by this and agreed that risks of implicating the CIA and FBI in this matter would be enormous. I said that what was now a painful wound could become a mortal one. What was now a "conventional explosion could be turned into a multi-megaton explosion". I again advised him to fire the responsible parties.

Again Dean sent for me on the 28th of June and I saw him at his office at 1130 that day. He enquired whether I had learned anything more about CIA involvement. I replied that there was no involvement of the Agency in the bugging of the Watergate. He then asked whether I had any ideas and I said that I had none which could be helpful. Perhaps the Cubans who were anti-Castro might have had a hand in it but the CIA did not.

On July 5 I received a call from Acting Director of the FBI Gray saying that he could not stop further investigation of the Mexican aspects of this matter unless he had a formal letter from the Director of CIA or me asking him to do this. I said that I would come to his office and I saw him at 1000 the following morning.

I told him that I could not tell him that further investigation would jeopardize the Agency's covert sources. I had checked on this and it was not so. I had ascertained that General Cushman had initially authorized the issuance of some equipment to Howard Hunt without knowing its purpose other than it was, as I understood it, to shut off "leaks". This was long before the Watergate bugging. Since then I had carefully checked and there was no other involvement of any sort by the CIA in the operation against the Watergate. I said that I felt that attempts to cover this up or to implicate the CIA or FBI would be detrimental to their integrity and a disservice to the President and the country. I would have no part in this and was quite prepared to resign on this issue. He said that he shared my views regarding the importance of the integrity of our Agencies and he too was prepared to resign on this issue. I gave Gray a list of the equipment the Agency had given Hunt and the account of our dealings with the former CIA employees up to the termination of their employment with the Agency long before the Watergate episode.

I saw Gray again on the 12th of July and gave him one additional memorandum regarding the contact furnished Hunt. We reviewed the matter reiterating the position we had taken previously. I said that I had told Dean that the best solution would be to fire those responsible. Gray said he had made the same recommendation.

Once again we agreed that anything that might damage the integrity of the FBI and CIA would be a grave disservice to the President and the Government.


In February 1973 shortly after Mr. Schlesinger became Director I told him of my conversations with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean. In February Dean called Dr. Schlesinger to see if the Agency could get back from the FBI the material it had sent to the Justice Department concerning our contact with Hunt. Dr. Schlesinger and I agreed that this could not be done. I attempted to contact Dean but he was in Florida. On his return I saw Dean at his office on February 21 and told him that we could not ask the FBI for the material back. That would only serve to implicate the CIA and I could not and would not do it. I had seen Acting FBI Director Gray that morning and told him of Dean's request and our refusal. He agreed saying that he could not do such a thing.

Since that date I have had no further contact with Dean. The above represents my recollection of what occurred and the dates are checked in my appointment book.

State of Virginia
County of Fairfax


VERNON A. WALTERS

Sworn to and subscribed before me
this 21st day of February 1973
Witness my hand and official seal.


Notary Public