

Prosecutors Take New Look At CIA's Watergate Role

By DAN THOMASSON
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Special Watergate prosecutors have questioned Richard M. Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), about alleged discrepancies in previous testimony on the CIA's role in the Watergate affair and on charges the agency was using a "double agent" to keep tabs on the Watergate burglars.

Helms, now U.S. ambassador to Iran, was quizzed at length Monday by attorneys

working under special prosecutor Leon Jaworski.

Meanwhile, informed sources said the Senate Watergate committee has developed evidence it believes shows the CIA had advance knowledge of the planning for the June 17, 1972, break-in of the Democratic national headquarters here.

The sources said Eugenio R. Martinez, one of the five-man Watergate break-in team, was in contact with a CIA official during the time he and several other Americans of Cuban ancestry were working under

E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former CIA agent, on activities financed by the Nixon re-election committee.

Martinez was on the CIA payroll at the time of the break-in, but the CIA has denied categorically the agency knew he had been recruited by Hunt for the political espionage operation.

Martinez was reportedly being paid to keep the agency informed about anti-Castro activities in the Cuban refugee community in Miami.

A member of the Senate Armed Services committee, which oversees CIA operations, said today, however, Martinez has conceded he made periodic reports to his CIA control agent in Miami.

The source said Martinez twice reported he had talked with Hunt, but he was told by the agent not to be concerned about Hunt because he was on a White House assignment.

This would verify at least part of a charge made in a magazine article by Andrew St. George, a New York writer, who recently appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee CIA subcommittee.

Chairman Stuart Symington, D-Mo., of the subcommittee has discredited St. George's report.

But the source close to the Watergate committee and another close to Jaworski's office said there are indications the CIA was using Martinez in an effort not only to watch the activities of Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, another convicted Watergate figure, but in an

attempt to stay close to activities of a White House intelligence operation known as "the plumbers."

The special prosecutor's office, according to sources, questioned Helms closely about a memorandum in which he ordered his deputy, Gen. Vernon A. Walters, to ask the FBI to "desist from expanding this (the Watergate investigation) . . . into other areas which may eventually run afoul of our operations."

The memo to Walters appeared to contradict Helms' earlier testimony to five con-

gressional committees and to the prosecutor's office, then headed by Archibald Cox.

The thrust of that testimony, including a public appearance before the Senate Watergate committee, was that he and Walters both resisted White House pressure to warn the FBI not to look into certain areas of the Watergate because it would damage CIA operations.

Both Helms and Walters testified they reportedly denied to the FBI that their Water-

gate inquiries would disturb CIA activities.

The June 28, 1972, memo from Helms to Walters also supports a disclosure last summer that the CIA had requested that two of its agents not be interviewed in connection with the Watergate matter.

The request was revealed in an internal FBI memorandum which noted that the CIA had asked too late to keep one of the men from being interviewed but that the bureau honored the request and never interviewed the other.

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Helms faces quiz on memo

By Patrick J. Sloyan
 Washington Bureau

to deputy

WASHINGTON — Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski has decided to cross-examine former CIA Director Richard Helms about a memo that contradicts Helms' sworn testimony that he opposed White House efforts to use the CIA to cover up the Watergate burglary.

It has been learned that Jaworski has decided to dispatch two staff investigators to Teheran to question Helms, who is now U.S. ambassador to Iran.

Involved is a Helms memo to Gen. Vernon Walters, deputy CIA director, that was uncovered by Special Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox. Cox said the memo was at odds with Helms' testimony before Congress and to the federal Watergate grand jury.

Cox had decided to send staffers to cross-examine Helms in Iran for a sworn deposition shortly before he was fired by President Nixon.

In an interview, Helms has denied he committed perjury or lied to the grand jury. He said he could not

recall the memo now in the hands of federal Watergate investigators.

In both public and private testimony, Helms said the CIA was no way involved in the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972. And Helms said he did nothing to limit the FBI investigation of the burglary of Democratic national headquarters.

However, L. Patrick Gray,

then acting director of the FBI, said he limited his agency probe of the break-in after Walters warned that the FBI investigation would jeopardize CIA operations in Mexico.

It was later learned that the Watergate break-in was financed in part with money from Nixon's re-election campaign that had been "laundered" in Mexico City

to hide the source of the funds.

The controversial Helms to Walters memo uncovered by Cox and now being pursued by Jaworski is dated 11 days after the break-in — on June 28, 1972. William Colby, who produced the memo, said it was based on a Helms staff meeting at the CIA on June 19 — two days after the break-in.

28 NOV 1973

Watergate Jury Hears

Helms Again

By Oswald Johnston

Star-News Staff Writer

Former CIA director Richard M. Helms has testified for a second time before the Watergate grand jury about possible CIA involvement in the break-in at Democratic National Headquarters and the subsequent coverup.

Helms, now ambassador to Iran, was recalled from his diplomatic post for testimony and appeared for about an hour yesterday before the grand jury, according to sources close to the investigation.

Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski's office refused any comment on the Helms interrogation. But it understood staff investigators, following the lead of Archibald Cox, wanted to examine further a memorandum written by Helms 11 days after the June 17, 1972, Watergate break-in in which he asked that FBI agents "confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or directly under investigation."

THE JUNE 28, 1972, memo surfaced earlier this month and stirred reports of renewed interest at the prosecutor's office in Helms' original testimony.

In some eyes, the memo ran directly counter to sworn testimony by Helms and other CIA officials that the agency had no connection whatsoever with E. Howard Hunt and the other onetime intelligence opera-

tives who carried out the June 17 break-in.


This apparent discrepancy was further underlined earlier this month by an article in Harper's Magazine. It contended that Eugenio Martinez, one of the five conspirators apprehended inside the Democratic headquarters and admittedly a paid CIA informant at the time of the break-in, had kept CIA higher-ups fully informed of the doings of Hunt and his colleagues.

THE THESIS has been sharply disputed by all congressional investigators who have looked into the matter. The Senate Armed Services Committee held two hearings earlier in the month in an unsuccessful effort to press the author to authenticate his claims.

Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., whose CIA oversight subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, has probably carried out the most painstaking study of the relationship of CIA to Watergate, has firmly concluded that the agency was not involved and that the potentially damaging memo is really innocent.

William E. Colby, the present CIA director, earlier this month prepared at the invitation of Senate Armed Services Committee acting chairman Stuart Symington, D-Mo., a second memo to explain what Helms had in mind.

In it, Colby explained that the original Helms memo,



RICHARD HELMS

addressed to deputy CIA director Gen. Vernon A. Walters, was aimed at protecting two undercover agents in Mexico from exposure by an FBI investigation of what later turned out to be a Republican Finance Committee money chain through a Mexico City bank.

"HE WANTED to discourage a fishing expedition into CIA operations," Colby said.

Nedzi has fully accepted this interpretation, both in a special subcommittee report on the CIA-Watergate connection prepared last month and in private conversation thereafter. He repeated his conviction in an interview yesterday.

State Department offi-

cials confirmed yesterday that Helms returned from Tehran over the weekend. Informed sources reported that he conferred with Colby Monday, and he was reported to have met with Nedzi yesterday afternoon.

When questioned, Nedzi reiterated that the controversial memo could hurt Helms only through misinterpretation. "Our record is complete," he said, adding that he and his subcommittee had gone through "piles of memoranda" from classified CIA files relating to the Watergate crew, including Martinez, without finding a shred of evidence of any involvement.

Helms Summoned to Testify About Memo

BY RICHARD RESTON
 Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Richard M. Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, will return to the United States soon to answer questions before Watergate prosecutors about apparent conflicts between his testimony and a CIA memorandum.

Helms, now U.S. ambassador to Iran, will be asked about discrepancies between the memorandum he wrote and his congressional testimony, informed sources said Friday. What is in dispute is whether the CIA moved to shut off an FBI inquiry into Nixon reelection funds drawn on a Mexican bank and linked to the Watergate case.

The memorandum in question, from Helms to his deputy, Gen. Vernon Walters, was dated June 28, 1972. It was turned over early this month by CIA Director William E. Colby to Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), acting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Colby was attempting to clarify the controversy surrounding the document and Helms' testimony before congressional committees.

The key sentence in the memorandum is: "In addition, we (the CIA) still adhere to the request that they (the FBI) confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or

directly under suspicion and that they desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

White House officials expressed concern in the early stages of the Watergate scandal that an FBI investigation in Mexico might endanger CIA operations in that country.

Both Helms and Walters testified publicly of their repeated assurances to the White House that no CIA operations in Mexico would be threatened by an FBI inquiry.

Early this month Archibald Cox, the special Watergate prosecutor fired by President Nixon Oct. 20, said he had evidence that a key witness in the Watergate investigation had contradicted his testimony in an internal government memorandum. Cox did not name the person in an appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee.

It was learned, however, that his reference was to Helms and the memorandum now in question.

4

22 NOV 1973

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Helms Faces New Quiz By Watergate Probers

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Former Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms is returning to Washington soon from his post in Iran for another round of testimony on the agency's role in the Watergate scandal.

Helms' return visit has "no connection" with State Department business, according to State Department officials. But the Watergate special prosecutor's office is understood to want to interview the former CIA director about seeming discrepancies in various appearances when he gave testimony.

The interest of the special prosecutor's office is understood to focus on a June 28, 1972, memorandum from Helms to his deputy, Geh. Yernon Walters, asking that the FBI be requested to confine its Watergate inquiries in Mexico to "personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion."

The Helms memorandum also requested that the FBI "desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

Previous testimony by Helms, Walters and other CIA officials was that the agency never sought to limit FBI inquiries into the Watergate scandal's Mexican connection. This facet of the case established a link between the Watergate bur-

glary team and the Nixon re-election committee within a week after the break-in.

Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, said yesterday he has no intention of interviewing Helms at this time. Baker did acknowledge, however, that he is looking into published allegations that the CIA infiltrated the White House "plumbers" team and the Watergate conspirators.

Such allegations have been recently made by former CIA official Miles Copeland in the National Review and free-lance writer Andrew St. George in Harper's magazine.

St. George was questioned in executive session by the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday for the second time in a week. Afterward, acting chairman Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said that the writer refused to divulge the source for allegations in his Harper's article that the CIA had infiltrated the Watergate burglary team.

"The authenticity of quotes in the article relating to the former Central Intelligence Agency director, Mr. Richard M. Helms, now ambassador to Iran, is still uncertain, unproven and unsupported, except perhaps by sources which Mr. St. George will not identify," Symington said.

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22 NOV 1973

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Watergate Opened Pandora-Like Box Of Myriad Crimes

By John Hanrahan
Washington Post Staff Writer

The new special Watergate prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, has taken over an investigation in which there have been public allegations of more than three dozen types of crimes that were either committed or proposed in connection with the Watergate scandal.

Thus far, there have been few indictments or guilty pleas in connection with the Watergate affair, but Jaworski has inherited from his predecessor, Archibald Cox, a full load to investigate in a scandal that seems to produce new allegations of wrongdoing almost daily.

The allegations cover present and former White House and Nixon re-election committee employees, as well as some other citizens, and range from allegations against President Nixon himself to those against Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy's former secretary.

In public testimony before the Senate Watergate select committee and in depositions given in connection with civil suits that arose from the Watergate arrests, there have been allegations concerning a large number of crimes that were actually committed — breaking and entering, illegal wiretapping, perjury, obstruction of justice, for example.

There also has been testimony concerning crimes that were proposed, but never carried out for one reason or another, plus testimony of proposed crimes that were perhaps of a more fanciful nature — Liddy's suggestion after the Watergate arrests that he be assassinated for bungling the job, for example.

In some instances, there is the possibility that more than one crime could be charged in relation to the same incident. In other instances, there might not be enough evidence to sustain an indictment or conviction

for some of the crimes alleged during testimony.

A federal prosecutor, with no connection to the Watergate investigation, was asked to review most of the alleged crimes that appear on the list that follows to see if they were properly categorized. In no instance was he passing on the guilt or innocence of those allegedly involved.

What follows is by no means a complete list of the allegations of crimes that were committed or proposed in connection with the Watergate affair, but rather is a large sampling to show that the episode has come a long way since its days as a "third-rate burglary," as President Nixon's press secretary once described it.

Conspiracy

Although a skilled prosecutor could probably find allegations of a number of conspiracies, three of the major conspiracies alleged to date involve the two break-ins and the bugging of Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate, the subsequent cover-up of those events and the break-in at the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

• Five persons pleaded guilty to the original conspiracy charges involving the June 17, 1972, Watergate arrests, and two others were convicted at a trial in January. Since then, there has been Watergate committee testimony alleging that several other persons had advance knowledge of the break-in and bugging effort, which would, if proved, involve those persons in conspiracy charges.

Testimony has placed the following persons at one or more of the meetings at which plans for break-ins and bugging at the Democratic National Committee offices to obtain political intelligence were discussed:

John N. Mitchell, former U.S. Attorney General and former Nixon re-election campaign director; John W. Dean III, former counsel to the President; Jeb Stuart Magruder, former White House aide and former Nixon deputy campaign manager; Frederick C. LaRue, campaign aide to Mitchell, and Liddy.

Also, there has been testimony by Magruder that Gordon Strachan, aide to former White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman, received in advance documents discussing the proposed Watergate break-in and bugging. Magruder also said he assumed Strachan passed the documents along to Haldeman. Both Strachan and Haldeman have denied advance knowledge of the Watergate bugging and break-ins.

Also, Charles W. Colson, former special counsel to the President, has acknowledged in a sworn deposition that he once prodded Magruder in early 1972 to come to a decision on Liddy's political intelligence plan. Colson said he had no idea when he telephoned Magruder that Liddy's plan involved breaking and entering and bugging, and that he had made the call as a favor to E. Howard Hunt Jr. Hunt later pleaded guilty in the Watergate conspiracy trial.

Hunt told Senate Watergate investigators that "he believes" Colson knew of plans for some kind of surreptitious intelligence operation against the Democrats.

• In the cover-up aspect of the Watergate affair — that is, conspiracy to obstruct justice — there has been testimony from Dean that President Nixon himself was aware of efforts to hide the truth of the matter as early as last Sept. 15.

Also named in testimony as playing roles in obstructing justice, either knowingly or unknowingly, were John D. Ehrlichman, former top White House domestic aide; Herbert W. Kalmbach, the President's former personal attorney; former acting F.B.I. Director L. Patrick Gray III, Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen; former Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian, plus Dean, Mitchell, Colson, Haldeman, LaRue and a dozen or more

other attorneys, federal officials and former White House and re-election committee aides.

Dean, Magruder and LaRue have pleaded guilty to one count each of conspiracy to obstruct justice. Magruder also pleaded guilty to conspiring in the unlawful interception of oral and wire communications.

Aspects of the cover-up included allegations that money was paid to the original seven Watergate defendants to buy their silence; that promises of executive clemency were made in return for the defendants' silence; that evidence was destroyed; that witnesses perjured themselves; that witnesses were intimidated or told to commit perjury; that witnesses lied to the FBI; that the White House attempted to thwart the investigation of the affair. All these would be part of a conspiracy to obstruct justice, as well as separate crimes in themselves.

• The break-in at the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist took place Sept. 3, 1971, after Ellsberg had been indicted in connection with the leaking of the Pentagon Papers to The New York Times, The Washington Post and other newspapers. This involves a possible third conspiracy.

Watergate conspirator Hunt, in a sworn statement, said that he and Watergate conspirator Liddy, aided by Bernard Barker, Eugenio R. Martinez and Felipe De Diego, had planned and carried out the break-in at the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist. (Martinez and Barker later were arrested in the June 17, 1972, Watergate break-in.)

Former White House aide Egil Krogh, who headed the "plumbers" unit that Mr. Nixon said was set up in the summer of 1971 to plug security leaks, publicly stated that he had ordered the break-in and assumed full responsibility. (Hunt and Liddy were both members of the "plumbers" unit.)

More recently, Krogh's lawyer has indicated in court that President Nixon told Krogh to lie under oath, if necessary, to protect any of the plumbers' operations.

In later testimony, Dean said Krogh had told him

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FBI Leaks Feared By Helms

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Fears that sensitive CIA operations might be compromised by "leakage in the FBI" led Richard M. Helms, the agency's former director, to propose sharply defined limits on the Watergate investigation in Mexico.

Helms was also concerned about an FBI "fishing expedition into CIA operations" when he laid down guidelines 11 days after the Watergate break-in designed to confine the FBI's inquiries to "personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion."

This was the gist of four-page memorandum submitted yesterday by CIA Director William E. Colby to Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), acting chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee.

Colby's memo was intended to clear up what he described as "recent speculation in the press and elsewhere" over an apparent conflict between a June 23, 1972, memo from Helms to his deputy, Gen. Vernon Walters, and testimony by Helms to five congressional committees and federal Watergate prosecutors.

This conflict was first mentioned—although without any specific reference to Helms—by former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox in an appearance last week before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Cox said he had evidence that a major witness in the Watergate inquiry had sharply contradicted his testimony in a memorandum that had come to the attention of the prosecuting staff.

The newly surfaced 1972 memo instructed Walters that "we (the CIA) still adhere to the request that they (the FBI) confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion and that they desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

But Helms and Walters have repeatedly testified that they told White House officials and former FBI Acting Director J. Patrick Gray III that the Watergate investigation in Mexico would not jeopardize any CIA activities.

Colby's memo to Symington alluded to a strong sense of suspicion within the CIA over the prospective FBI investigation of the Watergate scandal's Mexican connection.

He cited as one ingredient of the CIA's concern Gray's persistence—despite repeated denials by Helms—"in querying the Agency about possible CIA involvement in the Watergate incident."

He also recalled that the FBI refused to inform the CIA on June 22, 1972, of the status of its investigation into the activities of James McCord, a former CIA employee, who was one of the convicted Watergate conspirators.

"In light of these developments, and particularly because of the additional fact that there had been recent leaks of sensitive information provided by CIA to the FBI, Mr. Helms felt it necessary to give specific guidance for Agency officials acting during his forthcoming absence to discourage FBI investigation into Agency operations unless specific reason or justification therefor was offered," said Colby.

However, the FBI investigation that White House officials sought to shut off was not directed as the CIA but at the establishment of a link between Watergate funds and the Nixon re-election committee.

White House officials, acting on instructions from the President, first raised the prospect that the FBI pursuit of the Watergate funds through a Mexico City bank account could jeopardize covert CIA operations in Mexico. Helms and Walters had testified that they repeat-

edly assured White House officials that no agency operations would be so imperiled.

The Helms memo to Walters, however, tended to give legitimacy to the concern originally expressed by the White House and which President Nixon, in his Aug. 22 statement, said proved to be unfounded.

Colby's memo yesterday to Symington failed to clear up what is still a central contradiction in the record of the CIA's involvement in the Watergate cover-up.

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Bigger CIA Role In Obstructing Inquiry Emerges

By THOMAS W. OTTENAD
 A Washington Correspondent
 Of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 7—Newly disclosed documents show that the Central Intelligence Agency went much further than was known previously in attempting to limit, as the White House had requested, an embarrassing Federal Bureau of Investigation inquiry into the Watergate break-in and other suspicious activities of the Nixon Administration.

The documents show for the first time that Richard J. Helms, then CIA director, directed subordinates shortly after the famous burglary "to discourage FBI investigation into agency operations," and ordered steps to head off "a fishing expedition" into CIA activities.

The White House order came from H. R. Haldeman, then President Richard M. Nixon's chief of staff, in a meeting on June 23, 1972, with Helms, Walters and John D. Erlichman, then Mr. Nixon's chief domestic adviser.

Previously the only known attempt by the CIA to limit the FBI inquiry was a request made at White House orders by Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the CIA, six days after the arrests on June 17, 1972, in the Watergate break-in.

New light on the CIA's role in the period when an apparent conspiracy to cover up the Watergate affair was taking shape emerges from a report by the Central Intelligence Agency itself made public today from a memorandum written by Helms that was reported yesterday by the Post-Dispatch.

The documents show a pattern of steps by the CIA aimed at limiting the FBI investigation. The actions are explained, however, as the result of a concern about leaks of sensitive information and about possible disclosure of CIA actions, rather than as the result of the White House order.

The new information shows also that Helms obtained FBI agreement not to interview two CIA officials whose names were found in a notebook of E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the

conspirators convicted in the Watergate break-in.

This action appeared aimed at concealing the CIA's involvement with Hunt, particularly in connection with his action in planning a break-in at the offices of a psychiatrist consulted by Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, the principal defendant in the Pentagon Papers case.

The CIA report made public today, which was requested by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, showed that the secret agency's actions to limit the FBI inquiry were taken despite the CIA's own admission that it would not be damaged by the investigation.

Today's report, signed by W. E. Colby, recently named successor to Helms as CIA director, referred to information provided to the FBI by the CIA in 1972, noting that none of the material "indicated CIA involvement in the Watergate incident nor did it indicate that investigation by the FBI would compromise CIA activities."

Colby's report was intended to answer questions concerning a memorandum written on June 23, 1972, in which, as the Post-Dispatch has reported previously, Helms noted that he had obtained agreement that the FBI would not interrogate two CIA agents linked to Hunt and in which he also reiterated that the CIA wanted the FBI to limit its inquiry to "personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion "in the Watergate break-in and that it avoid probing areas that might "run afoul of" CIA operations.

Referring to the agreement by L. Patrick Gray III, then acting director of the FBI, not to interview CIA officers Karl Wagner and John Caswell, Colby wrote in his report "to Symington:

"The FBI's interest in talking to these officers arose from the fact that their names had been found in a notebook belonging to Howard Hunt."

He said the two men were to be interviewed by a field officer of the FBI, which was conducting initial inquiries relating to the Watergate incident and complained that "recent information

provided by CIA to the FBI" apparently had originated from this office.

"For this reason," Colby wrote, "the agency did not want Messrs. Wagner and Caswell interviewed by this office, but it was always understood that anyone from Mr. Gray's own office would have access to them if their testimony was needed."

As a matter of fact, the report said, Caswell was interviewed by the FBI office before Gray's order not to conduct the interviews was passed down the line of command.

The Post-Dispatch reported yesterday that Wagner was involved in supplying CIA disguises and other materials to Hunt in connection with a planned burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. CIA officials have said that they did not know Hunt's purpose in requesting the materials beyond his statement that he was on a "sensitive mission" for the White House.

Hunt got in touch with Caswell in seeking information concerning a 1954 incident in which information about French activities in Indochina had leaked out publicly in an incident similar to the later Pentagon Papers incident in this country, the Post-Dispatch was informed.

Colby's report to Symington does not give any compelling explanation of Helms's directive that the FBI confine its investigation to those arrested or under suspicion in the Watergate break-in and avoid any inquiry into CIA operations.

Colby's version is that Helms, about to leave on a trip overseas on June 28, 1972, was concerned about actions that might be taken by the CIA in his absence.

"He wanted Gen. Walters to co-operate with the FBI," Colby wrote, "so that its investigation of the Watergate break-in could go forward, but he wanted to discourage a fishing expedition into CIA operations."

"Mr. Helms was concerned about leakage in the FBI which could compromise sensitive agency operations."

Colby said that Helms wanted to be sure that in his absence his subordinates would "discourage FBI investigation into agency operations unless specific reason or justification

Helms' own memo of June 29, 1972, however, makes no mention of allowing FBI investigations to proceed if convincing justification is provided to the CIA.

Colby's report contended that both Helms's memo and his actions "establish a consistent record of co-operation with FBI investigations."

Symington requested the report from the CIA after parts of the memo by Helms, which was in the possession of the Senate Armed Services Committee, became public. Symington is acting chairman of the committee, and was a key figure in congressional hearings last summer at which Helms received great praise for resisting White House pressure to involve the CIA in the Watergate operation.

The memo appeared to be in sharp conflict with testimony given by Helms in a number of congressional hearings last summer. Both he and Walters testified that they stood firmly against White House efforts to implicate the CIA in the Watergate affair.

Walters's previously disclosed request to the FBI to limit its investigation into the handling of suspicious Republican campaign contributions in Mexico was retracted two weeks after it was made.

At that time Walters informed Gray that no CIA activities would be affected by the FBI investigation.

There was no indication in Colby's report that Helms ever withdrew his directives that the FBI limit its investigation to direct suspects in the Watergate burglary and not investigate the two CIA officials linked to Hunt.

CIA Asked To Clarify Helms Note

The CIA has been asked to clarify a June 28, 1972, memorandum from its former director, Richard M. Helms, suggesting that the FBI "confine" its Watergate inquiries in Mexico.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), ranking Democratic member of the Senate Armed Service Committee, made the request because of apparent discrepancies between the Helms memo and public testimony by Helms and other CIA witnesses.

It was understood that Helms was being contacted in Tehran, where he is serving as U.S. ambassador, for a clarifying explanation. Helms has been recalled twice from his post in Iran to testify on CIA involvement in the Watergate affair.

In the June 28 memo to his deputy, Gen. Vernon Walters, Helms left instructions for a prospective meeting with then acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III.

Helms advised Walters that he had instructed two key subordinates in the agency, who were unnamed, that the CIA is "attempting to 'distance itself' from this investigation and that . . . I wanted no free-wheeling exposition of hypotheses or any effort made to conjecture about responsibility or likely objectives of the Watergate intrusion.

"In short," the memo continued, "it is up to the FBI to lay some cards on the table. Otherwise we are unable to be of help.

"In addition, we still adhere to the request that they confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion and that they desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

It was the last sentence of the Helms memo that appeared, particularly, to conflict with previously public testimony by Helms and Walters staunchly denying that FBI inquiries into Watergate issues in Mexico would expose or jeopardize CIA operations.

White House officials, within a week of the Watergate break-in, succeeded in obtaining a delay of more than two weeks in the FBI's investigation of Watergate break-in funds "laundered" through a Mexican bank—and traced ultimately to the Nixon re-election committee.

The delay was occasioned by President Nixon's concern, which he later acknowledged to be unfounded, that the FBI inquiries in Mexico could jeopardize covert CIA operations there.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OLC 73-1285

6 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Stuart Symington
Acting Chairman, Senate Armed
Services Committee

SUBJECT: Memorandum for Deputy Director Walters
from Director Richard Helms, Dated
28 June 1972, Watergate Affair

Recent speculation in the press and elsewhere contends that Mr. Helms' 28 June 1972 memorandum is in conflict with his testimony before congressional committees and Federal prosecutors on the Watergate affair. This speculation centers around the second paragraph of that memorandum which states in part:

"We still adhere to the request that they [the FBI] confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion and that they desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

The circumstances surrounding the memorandum and the actions of Mr. Helms, both before and after it was written, establish a consistent record of cooperation with FBI investigations. In this connection it will be recalled that:

a. On 22 June 1972 in response to Mr. Gray's concern that he may be poking into a CIA operation, Mr. Helms told Mr. Gray that there was no CIA involvement in Watergate.

b. On 27 June 1972 in response to the FBI's earlier request, Mr. Helms advised Mr. Gray that the FBI's investigation of Mr. Ogarrio would not compromise any Agency activities.

Helms Asked FBI Curb On Watergate Inquiry

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By THOMAS W. OTTENAD
A Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 6.—The full text of a secret Central Intelligence Agency memorandum shows that former CIA director Richard J. Helms made two requests shortly after the Watergate burglary for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to limit its investigation of that and other suspicious activities.

In the memorandum, Helms said that he personally asked the FBI to call off its interviews with a CIA agent who was involved in supplying CIA disguises to E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the convicted Watergate burglars.

The other limitation requested by Helms was that the FBI confine its investigation of the Watergate affair only to those arrested in the famous break-in "or directly under suspicion" and "desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may well eventually run afoul of our operations."

The full text of the memorandum, parts of which came to light last week, appears to be in sharp conflict with testimony given previously by the former CIA director to five congressional committees and federal prosecutors investigating the Watergate bugging and burglary and a subsequent cover-up.

The thrust of his testimony and that of Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the CIA, and others was that despite heavy White House pressure the CIA stood firmly against suggestions that the FBI investigations might uncover secret CIA operations. It has been disclosed that former White House aids H. R. Halderman and John D. Ehrlichman directed Walters to ask the FBI to limit its inquiry on this account.

Helms' full memorandum was made public today by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, acting chairman of the Senate Armed Services

Committee, which held hearings earlier this year on the White House pressure on the CIA.

In the memorandum dated June 28, just 11 days after the Watergate burglary, Helms related a phone conversation he had earlier that day with I. Patrick Gray III, then acting director of the FBI. Helms wrote that he had told Gray:

"I would appreciate his calling off interviews with Karl Wagner and John Caswell (this he agreed to do.)"

There was no identification of either man.

However, testimony before the Senate Watergate committee last Aug. 2 by Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, showed that Wagner was a CIA agent.

Cushman said that Wagner was his executive assistant in July 1971, when Hunt, then a White House consultant, asked the CIA to supply him with disguise material and other supplies for "a highly sensitive mission."

"I asked my executive assistant, Mr. Wagner, to arrange with the technical services people in the agency to meet with Mr. Hunt and to provide him with what was necessary," Cushman told the Watergate committee.

A wig, glasses, other disguise material and false identification papers, a camera and tape recorder were among the materials furnished to Hunt by the CIA.

There is a dispute over what the materials were used for. There has been testimony that it was used in connection with a White House-directed break-in later in 1971 at the offices of a psychiatrist consulted by Daniel Ellsberg, principal defendant in the Pentagon papers case. The CIA has denied that the break-in was in any way a CIA operation.

The CIA later cut off its assistance to Hunt after it felt that his demands for assistance were becoming excessive.

There was no explanation in the memorandum made public today as to why Helms asked Gray to call off FBI interviews of Wagner and Caswell. Caswell, also listed as a CIA agent, could not be further identified immediately.

An informed source said later that Caswell also was contacted by Hunt. Hunt sought information concerning the leakage of information in a French case in 1954 that was said to be similar to Ellsberg's disclosure of the Pentagon papers in 1971, the Post-Dispatch was told.

Unless Wagner had some other role in CIA activities in Mexico, where the Nixon Administration was trying to halt FBI inquiries into covert campaign contributions it had received, it would appear that Helms was attempting to stave off FBI questions dealing with Hunt's secret missions for the White House.

The Post-Dispatch was told by a source speaking on behalf of the CIA that Helms had requested that the interviews of Wagner and Caswell be called off because information about FBI inquiries was leaking out from the Department of Justice.

The source said that Helms did not act "to frustrate the investigation." He said that of the FBI interviews had been conducted by high level officials of the agency, Helms probably would have had no objection.

There is, however, no such suggestion contained in Helms' memo.

The second basis for Helms' apparent effort to limit the FBI investigation appeared to deal more directly with the Watergate break-in itself.

In his memo, which was addressed to Gen. Walters, he told his subordinate that "we will advise the FBI that the FBI limit its inter-

views to those arrested or under suspicion in the Watergate break-in itself and that it not expand its inquiry into other areas that might well "run afoul" of CIA operations.

Helms did not specify the areas he had in mind.

President Richard M. Nixon, and some of his top former aids, however, suggested that this FBI investigation might uncover secret CIA operations in Mexico.

The FBI investigation in Mexico was particularly sensitive in the Watergate affair because the agency was looking into the channeling of funds through Mexico which later established a link between the Watergate break-in squad and the Nixon re-election committee.

The full text of the Helms memorandum was declassified by the CIA at the request of Senator Symington. Symington and members of the Armed Services Committee were meeting privately with CIA Director William Casey and other CIA representatives today to discuss the matter further.

Symington said that despite the apparent conflict between Helms' memorandum and his testimony before congressional committees he did not think any further inquiry into the matter was necessary.

He told the Post-Dispatch that on the basis of a private memorandum he had received from Helms, who is now in Tehran as United States Ambassador to Iran, "I am satisfied he was not lying."

"I am satisfied on the basis of his memo that it is not necessary to call him back."

Earlier parts of the Helms memorandum emerged in a re-

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5 November 1973

Duping The CIA

The first congressional committee to issue an official report on the Watergate scandal is the House Armed Services intelligence subcommittee. The burden of its report is that the White House made "unwitting dupes" of the Central Intelligence Agency, and while much of what the committee reports is not new, it makes some strong points.

One is that President Nixon's assistants actually succeeded, to a degree, in using non-existent CIA operations as an excuse to call off an FBI investigation of Nixon campaign funds routed through Mexico. Former CIA Director Richard Helms and his deputy, Marine Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, had indicated earlier that they resisted efforts to misuse their agency.

However, the committee concludes that the two men gave in initially to White House demands to tell the FBI of conflicting CIA operations, though they knew this to be untrue, and that when Mr. Helms confirmed that there was no risk to CIA work in Mexico he neglected to tell the FBI as much. Later, though, the White House aids avoided Mr. Helms and turned to career military men in the CIA for unquestioned obedience, the committee says.

It should, of course, be impossible for presidential assistants, or even the President himself, to abuse the Central Intelligence Agency for reasons of domestic politics. But the four Democrats and three Republicans on the House subcommittee agree unanimously that this happened. The group promises to introduce preventive legislation. Still, the surest prevention is an Administration's willingness to abide by the CIA charter, which was meant to keep the agency out of domestic affairs.

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NOV 1973

Helms Memo on Watergate Disclosed

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2 —

Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence, wrote a memorandum 11 days after the Watergate burglary that could be construed as showing that he tried to limit the Federal Bureau of Investigation's inquiry into the burglary.

However, one Representative familiar with the matter said that such an interpretation would not be accurate.

In his public testimony before the Senate Watergate committee and in closed testimony to four other Congressional panels, Mr. Helms said that he had resisted heavy White House pressure to restrict the F.B.I.'s investigation.

The full memorandum that Mr. Helms wrote to his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, on June 28, 1972, has not been made public. But a passage from it appears in an edited transcript of Senate hearings last July on the confirmation of the present C.I.A. director, William E. Colby.

That passage contains instructions from Mr. Helms to General Walters to request that the F.B.I. "confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or under suspicion."

Mr. Helms further asked Mr. Walters to see that the bureau "desist from expanding this other areas which may well eventually run afoul of our operations."

The memorandum is in the possession of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a House Armed Services subcommittee that investigated the role of the C.I.A. in the Watergate affair and the Senate Watergate committee.

All three panels refused today to release the full memorandum. But Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, chairman of the House subcommittee, said that to interpret the passage to mean that Mr. Helms had tried to put strings on the Watergate investigation would be "not accurate."

Asked if he felt that Mr. Helms had lied when he told Mr. Nedzi's subcommittee that

he had resisted pressure to stop the investigation, the Michigan Democrat replied, "Not so far as I'm concerned."

Mr. Nedzi's subcommittee released a report Tuesday that concluded that the C.I.A. and its top officials had been the "unwitting dupes" of White House aides involved in the Watergate burglary, but that the agency withstood pressure to become involved in the cover-up of the burglary.

Mr. Nedzi interpreted the passage from the Helms memorandum to mean that the former director was concerned over a possible "free-wheeling kind of operation" in which F.B.I. agents would be set loose to investigate C.I.A. personnel. Mr. Helms was not trying to curb the bureau's inquiry, only to insure that it went through proper channels, Mr. Nedzi said.

Mr. Helms, who is now Ambassador to Iran, could not be reached today, and both the C.I.A. and General Walters refused to comment on the matter.

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Helms memo contradicts testimony

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WASHINGTON — Former CIA Director Richard Helms ordered his deputy, 11 days after the Watergate break-in, to request that the FBI confine its investigation "to personalities already arrested or under suspicion."

The June 23, 1972, memo to Gen. Vernon Walters also urged that the FBI be requested to "desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

The Helms memorandum appears to be in sharp conflict with testimony by the former CIA director to five congressional committees and federal prosecutors investigating the June 17, 1972 break-in and subsequent cover-up conspiracy.

It emerged, in part, in the recently released transcript of a Senate Armed Service Committee executive session dealing with the confirmation of William Colby as CIA director.

The thrust of testimony both by Helms and Walters, as well as other principals in the case, has been that despite heavy White House pressure the CIA steadfastly denied that FBI inquiries into Watergate matters would expose CIA activities.

President Nixon, by his own admission and the testimony of top White House aides, initially raised this concern when the FBI was on the verge of investigating the channelling of funds through Mexico which established a link between the break-in team and the Nixon re-election committee.

Colby, in a series of written responses to Sen. Sam Nunn D-Ga., said that Helms' memo to Walters was "consistent with our concern that investigations might reveal CIA activities and our belief that they were unnecessary since CIA had no involvement with the Watergate incident."

This was precisely the concern voiced by top White House officials in their efforts, during the early days of the Watergate investigation, in urging that FBI investigation of the Watergate "Mexican connection" be suspended.

The White House pressures directed at Helms, Walters and acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III had the effect of delaying the Mexican investigation from June 22 to July 10, when the first FBI interviews were conducted in Mexico City.

CIA officials declined to divulge the full memo or comment on the apparent contradiction between the earlier public testimony by CIA officials and the assertions in the Helms memo to Walters.

Colby, in his written responses to Nunn's questions, said that the gist of the memo on CIA relationships with the FBI in Watergate matters was first stated by Helms at a morning staff meeting of the CIA on

June 19—two days after the break-in.

The memo was first alluded to, although without specific identification, by former Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox in his appearance Monday before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Cox said he had received a memorandum by a "major witness" in the Watergate scandal that was at odds with other testimony by that witness. Hearst News Service reporter Patrick J. Sloyan revealed the witness to be Helms in a dispatch Tuesday.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of a House Armed Service Intelligence subcommittee, acknowledged that he obtained a copy of the full Helms-Walters memo in connection with his 12-week investigation of CIA involvement in Watergate. Nedzi insisted, however, that the requested curtailment of FBI activities by limited to a few CIA operatives whose covers Helms feared might be blown by FBI inquiries in Mexico.

Nedzi declined, however, to divulge the full contents of the memo.

2 NOV 1973

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Ex-CIA Director Tried to Limit FBI on Watergate

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms ordered his deputy, 11 days after the Watergate break-in, to request that the FBI confine its investigation "to personalities already arrested or under suspicion."

The June 28, 1972, memo to Gen. Vernon A. Walters also urged that the FBI be requested to "desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

The Helms memorandum appears to be in sharp conflict with testimony by the former CIA director to five congressional committees and federal prosecutors investigating the June 17, 1972, break-in and subsequent cover-up conspiracy.

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Nedzi declined, however, to divulge the full contents of the memo. So did staff officials of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Nedzi's subcommittee issued a report Tuesday charging that the CIA had been duped by top White House aides into becoming implicated in the Watergate case.

The Senate Watergate committee had the Helms memo in its files, but did not publicly question the former CIA director or any other witness about its contents.

Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) asked Helms on Aug. 2 at a session of the Watergate committee whether he had ever told Gray that there might be some form of CIA involvement in Watergate.

"I don't recall ever discussing with Gray," Helms testified, "his question of us (the FBI's) uncovering other CIA operations."

Nevertheless Helms did phone Gray on June 28, according to Nedzi's report, and asked that the FBI "not interview" two CIA active agents, Carl Wagner and John Coswell.

Colby told Nunn that a check of the FBI's Watergate leads in Mexico "did not involve any current CIA assets or activities. We were satisfied ourselves that there was no CIA involvement in the Watergate incident, we were concerned that a possible broadening of the investigation which would reveal CIA foreign activities having no bearing on the Watergate incident would take place."

The FBI leads were focused specifically on Nixon re-election funds which were "laundered" through a Mexico City bank from Texas contributors to the safe of the President's 1972 re-election fund raiser, Maurice H. Stans. The money was ultimately traced to the account of convicted Watergate conspirator Bernard Barker.

In the course of the executive

hearings Colby also acknowledged that he sought unsuccessfully to conceal from former Watergate prosecutor Earl Silbert at an interview on Nov. 27, 1972, that it was White House domestic affairs adviser John D. Ehrlichman who requested CIA assistance for Howard Hunt Jr. in July, 1971, in connection with the break-in of the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

In a "memorandum for the record" on the interview with Silbert, Colby said he "danced around the room several times for 10 minutes to try to avoid becoming specific on this, finally naming the White House, and was then pinned by Silbert with a demand for the name, at which point the name of the individual was given."

The name was Ehrlichman. Colby recited his efforts to withhold Ehrlichman's name in a White House meeting on Dec. 15, 1972, with Ehrlichman and then White House counsel John W. Dean III in the presence of Helms.

This was some six months after Helms and Walters realized, according to their subsequent testimony, that Ehrlichman and Dean were trying to implicate the CIA in the Watergate case.

Colby said he had hoped to withhold Ehrlichman's name from federal prosecutor Silbert because "there was a reluctance to drop somewhat inflammatory names into the kind of atmosphere that was around us at that time."

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ITT and Watergate: The Colson Connection

by Timothy H. Ingram

Timothy Ingram is a contributing editor of The Washington Monthly.

The Colson memorandum was introduced to the Watergate Committee on August 1, 1973, without fanfare, almost as a throwaway. Sam Dash, the Committee's chief counsel, had obtained it the night before from a secretary who worked at the White House, and he wanted to slip it in somehow during the third day of H. R. Haldeman's testimony.

Dash was asking Haldeman whether he always informed the President of potentially embarrassing developments—and he offhandedly cited the Colson memo as an example. It was a truly astonishing document. Dated March 30, 1972, the same day Jeb Magruder said that final plans for the Watergate break-in were approved, it warned of the existence of other internal memoranda that would "directly involve" President Nixon in arranging the favorable settlement of the government's antitrust suit against

the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT). The evidence "would lay this case on the President's doorstep," warned White House Special Counsel Charles Colson.

Thanks to Senator Edward Gurney, the Committee's attention was deflected from the Colson memorandum before anyone had a chance to gauge its importance. Overshadowed by the Haldeman testimony, it was soon forgotten by both the Committee and the press.

Failing to pursue the logic of the Colson memo, both the Watergate Committee and the press lost a golden opportunity to try to answer that often-forgotten, but fundamental, question: Why, on June 17, 1972, did seven men burglarize and bug the offices of the Democratic National Committee? What was it that was worth the high risk, the \$250,000 cost, and the amount of energy that went into the Watergate operation? What, in God's name, were

Howard Hunt and his faithful Cubans looking for?

Like so many other elements of the hearings, the Colson memo was introduced without a framework and without any real effort by the Committee to fit it into the larger picture. The task of sorting out the importance of the Colson memo—as with other items introduced and then forgotten during the hearings—was left to the press, already overextended by the sheer bulk of the Watergate hearings.

One reason for the neglect of the Colson memo was that it dealt with ITT and therefore appeared non-germane in the midst of the Watergate hearings. Scandals, like metaphors, do not mix. ITT also raised the complicated jurisdictional questions involved in defining congressional turf. The Senate Judiciary Committee had already spent two months looking into the ITT affair, and as a result the Ervin Committee tended to shy away from the issue.

Amid the Committee's preoccupation with "who-knew-what-when" and "is-he-repentent," the hearings lost their focus. At the end of the first phase, television viewers knew about the discrepancies between the Dean and Mitchell testimony, but had little more understanding of the rationale for the break-in than they did a year earlier.

The problem is one that would seem obvious to any fictional detective. Neither the Watergate Committee nor the press has ever developed a coherent theory of the case. At no point during the entire proceedings has any hypothesis been advanced that could be tested against the statements of various witnesses. Instead, most of those involved in the Watergate hearings have proceeded with a detachment worthy of the most pedantic of scholars. "We won't form any opinions until all the facts are in"

MacGregor Scheduled To Testify

By John Hanrahan

Washington Post Staff Writer
Former Nixon campaign manager Clark MacGregor, whose testimony could help determine whether President Nixon was aware of the Watergate cover-up at an early date, is scheduled to appear today before the Senate select Watergate committee.

MacGregor has in no way been implicated in the Watergate cover-up, but, in his deposition in a Watergate civil suit and in comments to The Washington Post in August, his version of certain key events is at odds with statements by Mr. Nixon, former top presidential aide John D. Ehrlichman and former acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III. For example:

- MacGregor disputes sworn testimony by Gray and Ehrlichman that he urged President Nixon to call Gray after Gray called him on July 6, 1972, with a warning that the Watergate affair could hurt the President.

- MacGregor, now a vice president of the United Aircraft Corp., also disputes Mr. Nixon's press conference statement of Aug. 29, 1972, that MacGregor "has continued that investigation (of Watergate) and is continuing it now" within the re-election committee. Mr. Nixon also said at a press conference last Aug. 22 that MacGregor "told me that he would conduct a very thorough investigation as far as his entire committee staff was concerned."

MacGregor in his civil suit deposition, said that he conducted no investigation, but rather merely asked officials at the Committee for the Re-election of the President if he could rely on their public statements that they and others at the re-election committee had "no involvement in or foreknowledge of" the Watergate break-in.

Of more importance perhaps are the differing versions of events of July 6, 1972, for it was in the conversation on that date between Mr. Nixon and Gray in which Gray testified he warned Mr. Nixon that some of his top aides were trying to "mortally wound" him by trying to involve the CIA in the Watergate probe.

Gray said Mr. Nixon's call to him came just 37 minutes after he (Gray) had called MacGregor and warned him that the activities of certain White House aides "could be wounding" to the President.

Mr. Nixon, in his May 23 public statement on Watergate, said he called Gray from San Clemente on July 6, 1972 "to congratulate him on the successful handling of" a hijacking the previous day.

Mr. Nixon added, "During the conversation Mr. Gray discussed with me the progress of the Watergate investigation, and I asked him whether he had talked to Gen. (Vernon) Walters (for the CIA). Mr. Gray said that he had, and that Gen. Walters had assured him that the CIA was not involved. In the discussion, Mr. Gray suggested that the matter of Watergate might lead higher. I told him to press ahead with the investigation."

Mr. Nixon elaborated on this at his Aug. 22 press conference, saying he wanted to get assurances from Gray that the CIA was not somehow involved in the Watergate affair. Mr. Nixon made no mention of who, if anyone, prompted him to call Gray.

Mr. Nixon also said he does not recall Gray saying Presidential aides were trying to "mortally wound" him but concedes "he could have said that."

MacGregor denied to The Post in August that he asked Mr. Nixon to call Gray. He said he did not even mention his conversation with Gray to Mr. Nixon.

Also, MacGregor contended he talked to Gray late on the night of July 5, and not in the morning of July 6, as Gray contends.

FBI logs show Gray spoke to MacGregor on July 6 at 10:31 a.m. Washington time (7:51 California time). The logs also show the call from Mr. Nixon to Gray came 37 minutes after a conversation between Gray and MacGregor.

Ehrlichman, in testimony just released by the Special Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, said last May that Mr. Nixon had called Gray as a result of "MacGregor's conveying a request from Gray to the President." Ehrlichman also characterized MacGregor as providing "strong urging" to Mr. Nixon to call Gray.

Attempts by The Post to reach MacGregor yesterday and Tuesday for comment on Ehrlichman's just-released testimony were unsuccessful.

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The Retreat of the Joint Chiefs

"The irony is that as the organization has grown more and more elaborate, the influence of the Joint Chiefs within the national security bureaucracy has grown steadily weaker. Today, the top military leaders in the land are reduced to presiding over hundreds of top-flight officers who perform little but make-work."

By Stuart Loory

The meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff convene as regularly as a West Point course in political science—and they are about as important to the overall operation of the Defense Establishment. Every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday afternoon, the top ranking generals and admirals in each of the four armed services plus their chairman—five in all—take their places around an oval walnut table in a room called "The Tank" just inside the mall entrance to the Pentagon.

The deputies to the Joint Chiefs have carefully prepared the scene. The thick gold carpeting has been swept clean and fluffed high. The necessary papers have been laid out on the table in front of each chair. Someone has thought to fill a couple of glass bowls with an assortment of penny candy on which the Joint Chiefs have traditionally sucked as they deliberate the affairs of the world and the needs of their services. "We like to keep the chiefs happy," an aide said in commenting on the penny candy touch. "They pretty much get what they want."

Five generals and admirals: Five regulation neckties carefully knotted. Five shirts freshly starched. Five jackets securely brass-buttoned. Five breasts emblazoned with row upon row of campaign and awards ribbons representing the achievements of a lifetime. Five pairs of trousers pressed to a fine crease by enlisted aides—service-provided valets, actually—each morning. Five pairs of shoes brought to a mirror-bright shine. These are the outward signs of professionalism. A military professional is known by the attention he pays to detail. Lack of attention to detail could someday mean the loss—needlessly—of lives under one's command and so all five of these men, since their earliest days at the service academies, have been taught to abhor the speck of dust, the scuff mark, or the wrinkle that betrays lack of attention to detail.

They are professionals all: Firm of jaw, trim of figure, possessed of the social graces, articulate, precise of movement. They epitomize what thousands of other officers someday hope to become. They take their seats around that table.

Their chairman was Admiral Thomas Hinman Moorer, 60, a jocular Alabamian who was a veteran of the Annapolis gridiron wars and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor where, on December 7, 1941, he was stationed as a young flying boat pilot. Shot down by the Japanese while flying another patrol in the Dutch East Indies in 1942, he was rescued and decorated for "courage and leadership" during a subsequent enemy attack that sank the rescue ship. He was a member of the post-World War II team that conducted the famous Strategic Bombing Survey to determine how much damage air raids had done to the Japanese home islands. Promoted to rear admiral at the age of 45, he commanded the Atlantic Fleet in the mid 1960s, served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1967 to 1969, and was named chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by President Nixon in 1970.

Representing the Army was General William Childs Westmoreland, 58, a South Carolinian who graduated from West Point in 1936 as first captain of the Corps of Cadets, announcing soon after to his fellow second lieutenants of field artillery that he expected one day to become Army Chief of Staff. By the age of 28 he was commanding a battalion. He commanded a full division before he turned 31. He was a veteran of combat in North Africa, Sicily, France, Belgium, and Germany. He forsook the field artillery in 1946 to earn his paratrooper's wings and transfer to the airborne infantry. During the Korean War he commanded an airborne regimental combat team. In 1953 he attended the Harvard Business School for a short course. Then he served successively as secretary of the Army General Staff; commander of the elite 101st Airborne Division; superintendent of West Point; commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg; then deputy commander and later commander of the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. The prototypical ticket puncher, the man against whom thousands of other officers subsequently measured their careers—going through jump school to become "airborne," applying for graduate school, seeking battalion

General John Dale Ryan, 57, of Cherokee, Iowa, the Air Force Chief of Staff, graduated from West Point in 1938 where, like Moorer at Annapolis, he was a distinguished football player. In 1962, *Sports Illustrated* named him to a Silver Anniversary All-American Team composed of former college stars who had done well in their chosen professions. Ryan never saw combat at a level lower than lieutenant colonel, a grade he achieved at age 27 after progressing from first lieutenant to lieutenant colonel in two years. A bomber pilot, he became commander of the Strategic Air Command in 1964, commander of the Pacific Air Forces in 1967, and chief of staff of the Air Force in 1969.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, was the Navy's member. When "The Z," as he came to be known, was named Chief of Naval Operations by President Nixon in 1970, he was heralded as an iconoclast. There is little, however, in his background to suggest iconoclasm. After graduation from the Naval Academy in 1942, he served as a lieutenant junior grade on a destroyer, seeing action in the Battle of the Leyte Gulf. When the war ended, he took command of a Japanese River gunboat and sailed it up the Whangpoo River to Shanghai, an adventure on which he met, and married, the former Mouza Coutelais-du-Roche, a White Russian reared in Manchuria. In the Korean War, he served as a

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