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## The Problems with Retaliation

Four ex-CIA chiefs weigh the options for countering terrorism

 Frustration and anger over the TWA hijacking have fed the desire to find some way to do to terrorists what they are doing to American citizens. Why not, in future crises, threaten and perhaps take the lives of hijackers? Might swift retribution deter terrorists, or at least punish them? What about covert counterterror, the capacity to identify and eliminate terrorists, pre-emp-

singer (DCI from January through June 1973) was Secretary of Defense from 1973 to 1975. William Colby (DCI, 1973 to 1976) ran the highly controversial Phoenix counterinsurgency program in Viet Nam from 1968 to 1971. And at the request of Annapolis Classmate Jimmy Carter, Stansfield Turner (DCI, 1977 to 1981) came to the CIA from a career in the Navy. Their interviews with Talbott follow.

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### RICHARD HELMS

It is very important to keep these incidents in perspective and not get so incredibly worked up over them. Terrorism, of course, is a serious challenge, and we must do our best to deal with it. But to declare a "war on terrorism" is just to hype the problem, not solve it. The quiet, steady approach is better than bombast.

As for assassination, it's just not on. The people of the U.S. won't stand for it. In fact, there are problems with all levels of violent action. Let's say the Delta Force puts on masks and goes in and blows up an installation around Beirut. We've violated the sovereignty of Lebanon and killed a lot of people in cold blood. Are they terrorists? You'll have a lot of argument about that, just on our side alone.

What if you send in a coup-de-main group of civilians [a hit team]? If it comes out that they were Americans—and it takes no time at all for that kind of thing to unravel in public—you're facing all sorts of allegations.

If, instead, the blow-and-burn stuff is done by surrogates whom you've trained in the black arts and given a suitable cover, there is a whole other set of problems. If you've recruited them from dissidents who have an ideological motivation, they may be very hard to control. You may think you've called the operation off and wake up one morning and find out they've gone and done it anyway.

Let's say we have reason to believe that Khomeini or Gaddafi is behind some terrorist act, so you decide to strike by attacking the Iranian oil fields or a Libyan air force base. In the latter case, you've now got all the Arabs against you. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the moderates will feel immense pressure to line up with their Arab brethren. We've got to get used to the disagreeable fact that there really is no quick fix for terrorism. What we do need is improved intelligence work against terrorist groups. Penetration can help derail the nasty stuff. When I was in the agency, the CIA penetrated the P.L.O., and we helped head off several terrorist acts, including an assassination attempt against Golda Meir.

We also need improved cooperation among free-world intelligence services. As long as we have a leaky Congress and a leaky oversight process, friendly services



Navy strike team trains in California

"If there are casualties, so be it."

tively or in retaliation? TIME Washington Bureau Chief Strobe Talbott put these questions to four former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency. All agreed that the U.S. should move vigorously and effectively to oppose terrorism but not adopt assassination as an instrument of policy.

Each of the former CIA chiefs has had other experiences that bear on the current challenge. Richard Helms (Director of Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1973) spent many years in the CIA's clandestine services and was Ambassador to Iran from 1973 to 1976, so he knows about Shi'ite fundamentalism firsthand. James Schle-

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
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# Spying on Terrorists—It's A Tall Order

**To punish hijackers, U.S. must know who and where they are. The CIA is hard pressed to provide the information.**

In the war on Middle East terrorism, America's intelligence services are up against one of their toughest challenges ever.

Their task: Cracking the shadowy bands of Moslem zealots to obtain the information needed to pre-empt anti-U.S. acts of violence or to punish those terrorists who succeed.

In attempting to match overseas the success of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in penetrating and neutralizing terrorist organizations at home, the Central Intelligence Agency faces enormous obstacles.

Particularly difficult to infiltrate are the Shiite terror cells in Lebanon responsible for the current hijacking episode as well as most of the major attacks on American installations in the Middle East in recent years.

These cells of killers are small, clan-ish and fanatic. Sometimes they consist solely of brothers and cousins who are distrustful of all outsiders. "Almost everyone is suspicious of every-

**Attack on Shiite gunmen by carrier-based planes is one Reagan option. But it requires information on their identity and whereabouts.**

body" else, maintains former State Department terrorism analyst Terrell Arnold. "Their paranoia is a big problem for us."

Compounding that problem is the fact that today's hard-core terrorists are true professionals, trained and equipped by experts from Eastern Europe or radical Mideast states.

Some operations, according to American intelligence sources, are planned and staged by teams whose members may come together only for a single spectacular attack. The group then dissolves and disappears, making attempts at pre-emption or retaliation virtually impossible.

**Entrance test.** Prospective Western informers or agents often are deterred from trying to penetrate the terrorist gangs by demands that they demonstrate their bona fides in advance—by committing murder or other violent crimes.

"Some of the groups are so fanatic," warns former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, "they they will put your agent to a test that he can't possibly accept."

Ironically, the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon in 1982 by the Israeli Army dealt a serious blow to the operations of the CIA and those of Mossad, its Israeli counterpart, in combatting Mideast terrorism. The two intelligence agencies relied heavily on operatives within the PLO to provide information on activities of Palestinian and other Arab underground groups.

Despite the difficulties, officials assert, the CIA has managed, directly or indirectly, to penetrate some clandestine groups in the Mideast and elsewhere overseas. On June 24, Secretary of State George

Shultz said in a press interview that the U.S., in cooperation with intelligence organizations of other nations, had been able to obtain advance warning of some 60 planned terrorist operations over the past nine months.

One example, say officials, was when a CIA informant disclosed that a Shiite gang was preparing for an attack on the American ambassador's residence in Beirut last fall. Since they knew the identity of the group and the general location of its hideout, the authorities were able to forestall the assault.

Saudi Arabia's royal family has been able to take precautions against terror attacks on the basis of information that U.S. intelligence officials passed on from Israeli agents who had infiltrated Middle Eastern guerrilla groups.

There are other instances of successful international cooperation in the campaign against terrorism. One came last November when Italian police rounded up seven Shiite Lebanese who reportedly were plotting to blow up the American Embassy in Rome. The Italians, acting on a tip from Swiss authorities, alerted Washington in time for protective measures to be taken. An eighth man was arrested in Zurich.

Collaboration with friendly intelligence agencies also paid off for the U.S. recently when Egyptian agents uncovered a Libyan plot to attack the American Embassy in Cairo with a truck loaded with explosives.

**Beyond the grave.** Dogged police work resulted in the arrest of Shiite terrorists from Iraq who carried out a suicide truck-bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait in 1983. Kuwaiti authorities recovered two fingers of the driver. Identification of his fingerprints led to capture of the others involved in the attack.

Experts on American intelligence matters say that the CIA and other Western services have managed to thwart terrorist attacks by recruiting people in support organizations—for example, those who produce false passports, supply weapons, make bombs or provide vehicles. With the cooperation of these operatives, terrorists' guns and bombs, according to one authority, have been "spiked"—secretly doctored so that they failed in an attack.

Given the magnitude of the challenge they face, American intelligence officials concede that their successes have been modest and partial. They warn that President Reagan has scant hope of implementing a policy of swift retaliation unless spying on terrorists is far more effective. □

By ROBERT S. DUDNEY with JEFF TRIMBLE in Jerusalem



CHRIS STEELE SPENCER—AP/WIDEWORLD



GARY L. HOFFER—USNAVY

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WASHINGTON TIMES  
1 July 1985

# Reagan signals rebirth of counterspying

STAT

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Reagan has called for a renewed effort to counter the activities of foreign spy services after what he called "mistakes of past restrictions" on U.S. intelligence officials during the 1970s.

Of the more than 2,500 Soviet-bloc officials stationed in the United States, the president said 30 percent to 40 percent were known or suspected intelligence officers.

Besides espionage directed against U.S. secrets and high technology, the Soviets recently have stepped up "active measures" — disinformation, propaganda, subversion, forgeries and covert action — directed against the West, President Reagan said in his weekly radio broadcast Saturday.

The president said the United States needs to "deal severely with those who betray our country."

Congress recently passed a measure calling for the death penalty in cases of espionage. The move follows revelations of a major espionage operation involving

the loss of U.S. Navy nuclear submarine secrets to the Soviet Union.

"We're in a long twilight struggle with an implacable foe of freedom. ... We need to reduce the size of the hostile intelligence threat we're up against in this country," the president said.

He called for reducing the number of Soviet bloc spies working in the United States to "more manageable" levels and singled out the United Nations as a "spy nest."

The administration, he said, is intent on strengthening the U.S. intelligence community's capability to curb spying by foreign powers, known as counterintelligence.

"During the '70s we began cutting back our manpower and resources, and imposed unnecessary restrictions on our security and counterintelligence officials," Mr. Reagan said.

The president was referring to the period in the mid-1970s when congressional committees uncovered evidence of abuses by U.S. intelligence agencies. As a result of the committee findings, activities of the FBI, CIA and other agencies — primarily the counterintelligence and

surveillance programs — were restricted.

W. Ray Wannall, former head of FBI counterintelligence, believes both the CIA and FBI have not fully recovered from these counterintelligence cutbacks.

He said some 400 counterintelligence personnel were cut from the CIA, and a similar number were dropped from the FBI.

"When you take a man who spent 25 to 30 years in counterintelligence work and he drops out the picture, you don't find his knowledge in files," Mr. Wannall said in a recent interview, "he's carrying it around in his head."

Morale among U.S. intelligence officers suffered as a result of cutbacks, particularly within the CIA, which handles foreign counterintelligence outside the United States. Under former CIA chief Stansfield Turner, in office under President Carter, more than 2,200 CIA veterans resigned, according to a report by the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

The association estimates the loss of experienced personnel cost the agency 30,000 man-years of experience. In what

critics describe as a "purge" of experienced CIA officials, Adm. Turner fired 850 officials in October 1977. The mass dismissal was called the "Halloween massacre" and led to the voluntary retirement of some of the most experienced intelligence officials.

"Totally competent people trained for years in certain jobs were just dismissed with pink slips or transferred to the sidelines," one former intelligence official said.

Adm. Turner defended the dismissals by claiming he was only carrying out a program of cutbacks agreed to under the previous administration. He could not be reached for comment on the president's radio address.

President Reagan said "we've begun to rebuild" counterintelligence efforts, but called for more coordination among U.S. agencies and improved analysis of threats posed by hostile spies.

He said the United States should "learn from the mistakes of past restrictions which unduly hampered us."

Without elaborating, the president said U.S. officials have developed a "list" of proposed security reforms.

# Soviet Defector Accused Of Fabrications in Book

By EDWIN McDOWELL

A magazine article charging that a former Soviet diplomat made up important parts of his best-selling book, with the apparent complicity of the Central Intelligence Agency, has evoked heated denials from the American intelligence community. Moreover, defenders say that even if some dates in the book are incorrect and some passages embellished, the overall thrust — that the author spied for the United States while serving as the senior Soviet official at the United Nations, until his defection in 1978 — is essentially correct.

The story by Edward Jay Epstein, titled "The Spy Who Came in to Be Sold," appears in the issue of the *New Republic* on sale today. It sets out a lengthy bill of particulars against the book "Breaking With Moscow" by Arkady N. Shevchenko, the highest-ranking Soviet official ever to defect.

Mr. Epstein's article seeks to cast doubt on Mr. Shevchenko's claim that he spied for the United States beginning in 1975, while he was the senior Soviet diplomat at the United Nations, until his defection.

It attempts to debunk Mr. Shevchenko's claim that he furnished the C.I.A. with details of Soviet strategy on arms-control negotiations, including the strategic arms limitation talks.

And it asserts that the "car chases, meetings, conversations, reports, dates, motives and espionage activities" in the book, which has been on the best-seller list for 18 weeks, were concocted to create "a spy that never was."

## C.I.A. Issues Response

Mr. Shevchenko, who did not return a message left on his answering machine, is said by his publisher and friends to be out of the country on vacation and unreachable. But last week, while galleys of the Epstein article were circulating in Washington and New York, the C.I.A. took the unusual step of responding publicly to Mr. Epstein's article, saying that Mr. Shevchenko "provided invaluable intelligence information" to Washington and that the C.I.A. "had nothing to do with writing his book."

Nevertheless, the Epstein charge that the book is a fraud caused both the book's publisher and *Time* magazine, which ran two lengthy excerpts from the book earlier this year, to re-examine its accuracy. Both pronounced themselves satisfied that it is accurate.

But Mr. Epstein, who has written books challenging the Warren Commission conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in killing President Kennedy, said he sticks by his account. In the magazine article and in telephone interviews, he said the spy fraud was perpetrated in order to produce a "success story" at a time when "the C.I.A. was in disarray" following Congressional revelations of past abuses, and the agency was concerned about K.G.B. espionage successes.

Mr. Epstein's article makes numerous allegations, and cites a number of seeming inconsistencies in Mr. Shevchenko's account. Mr. Shevchenko's inaccessibility and the refusal of some present and former officials to discuss the various matters have greatly complicated the task of independent observers in rechecking the accuracy of many points raised in the article. Nevertheless some of Mr. Shevchenko's assertions that have been questioned by Mr. Epstein can be supported and certain inconsistencies of Mr. Epstein's account have come to light.

## Kissinger Cited in Article

For example, a major Epstein claim is that "one former national security adviser to the President" — whom he subsequently identified as former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger — told him "there could have been no such spy as Shevchenko purported to be" without his knowing about it. But Mr. Kissinger did not return a number of telephone calls to his New York office, seeking to verify that claim.

However, Stansfield Turner, who headed the C.I.A. from 1977 to 1981, said in a brief telephone conversation that, "Shevchenko gave good intelligence." And Ray Cline, former deputy C.I.A. director, said that the C.I.A. denial is correct "and the Shevchenko story substantially truthful."

Mr. Epstein, reconstructing a timetable based on incidents reported in the book, says Mr. Shevchenko's spy career could not have begun before 1976. "Yet the book details a wealth of espionage coups Shevchenko accomplished on behalf of the C.I.A. before 'the end of 1975,'" Mr. Epstein writes.

The Shevchenko book is vague on dates — as indeed it should be, in the opinion of current and past intelligence officials. And Mr. Epstein is correct that Senator Daniel Patrick Moynahan, when he was later vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence

Committee, wrote that he learned on Dec. 5, 1975, that Mr. Shevchenko told an American intelligence official that he wished to discuss details of his defection. But Senator Moynihan said that he learned the Shevchenko story from a source as "invaluable," said he wanted to discuss details of the article, except to reiterate that Mr. Shevchenko "was working for us for a period until that rather dramatic moment" of his defection.

## Information on Arms Talks

Mr. Epstein writes that one of those espionage coups claimed by Mr. Shevchenko in 1975 was that of providing information about the strategic arms limitation talks. Yet Mr. Epstein said in conversation that Mr. Kissinger told him he had never heard of Mr. Shevchenko passing along information on those talks. "And if that claim is wrong than the book's a lie even if none of the other details are wrong," he added.

But Strobe Talbott, the *Time* magazine correspondent who recommended that *Time* publish the Shevchenko excerpts, and the author of several books on arms negotiations, said he is convinced that the Shevchenko story stands up. "A former intelligence community official with direct knowledge told me one reason he remembered the Shevchenko episode, although he did not know Shevchenko by name, was because this Soviet source at the U.N. was providing information that was useful on arms control," he said.

Mr. Epstein's article describes Mr. Shevchenko's three-page account of a 1976 dinner party at the two-room apartment of Boris Solomatin, the head of the K.G.B. in New York, at which they and Georgi A. Arbatov, the Soviet authority on the United States, discussed President Ford's chances of winning re-election — discussions that he said he relayed to the American case officers.

But "there could not have been such a meeting," Mr. Epstein writes, because Mr. Solomatin returned to the Soviet Union in July 1975, six months before Mr. Shevchenko began his alleged spying for the United States and more than a year before Mr. Arbatov would have come to the United States to appraise the presidential elections.

## Discrepancies Not Explained

William Geimer, a former State Department official and close friend of Mr. Shevchenko, concedes that he has no ready explanation for the apparent discrepancy. He said he has not been in contact with Mr. Shevchenko since he left the country early last week. "But my suspicion is that Solomatin came back into the country and Epstein missed it," he said.

Even if that were true, Mr. Epstein said, the apartment that is described in such detail as having been Mr. Solomatin's would then have belonged to his replacement.

STAT

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# IN PRAISE OF SPYING

## Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition

by Stansfield Turner

(Houghton Mifflin, 304 pp., \$16.95)

"Arrogant, insensitive, absurd ideas . . . [he] has ruined the place. . . ." That was the common run of rightward Washington comment on Stansfield Turner as director of Central Intelligence by the end of 1977, his first year in office. By then Jimmy Carter no longer maintained his deceptive pretension to bi-Pauline balance. Of his two supposedly coequal chief advisers, Paul Nitze was moving toward conspicuous opposition, while Paul Warnke was running arms control policy, the only strategy that aroused the president's enthusiasm. For the rightward thinking, the stories coming out of the CIA—about the 2,000 covert-branch officers abruptly fired on Halloween day to "emasculate" the country's espionage abilities, about the placement of narrow-minded Navy officers in key positions, about the new director's disruptive managerial changes—seemed quite consistent with the revealed character of the Carter administration. The Annapolis graduate who seemed set on ruining the nation's defenses had found a classmate to ruin the CIA for him.

But this reviewer, as rightward-thinking as any, was nevertheless denied the clarity of that analysis, for he had heard it all several years before. At that time it came in regard to Stansfield Turner's term as president of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, the place where the Navy's future admirals are supposed to be educated. It was on a working visit, some months after Turner's appointment in 1972, that I heard the complaints from officer-students, and from some of the faculty too. In fact, the place was then being greatly transformed by Turner, in ways most uncomfortable.

With its Mahanian vitality long since spent, the college had been in the business of offering an extended vacation in Newport's pleasant surroundings to Navy mid-level officers between command tours and career-enhancing headquarters assignments. Its staff was just as comfortable, teaching an antiquated curriculum replete with self-congratulatory Navy banalities, punctuated by more of the same from visiting lecturers, who were often retired admiral-

als. By tacit arrangement, Turner's predecessors had indulgently overlooked the somnolence of the teaching staff, while the staff in turn was just as indulgent with the officer-students.

To break this pattern, Turner brought in a cadre of civilians and selected Navy officers of unusual intellectual quality to formulate a drastically revised curriculum; the new studies were to be strong on both the truly modern and the ancient classics, in lieu of the merely outdated. He created a center for advanced studies under James E. King to set scholarly standards for the entire college, showed a remarkable instinct for picking out the talented in his inherited teaching staff while he forced out the rest, and made it clear to the students that they were in Newport to read broadly, think freely, and study hard—and not to indulge in suburban repose with some fishing thrown in.

The "arrogance" that his critics complained of referred to Turner's dismal opinion of the college as it had been. He was "insensitive" because he refused to tolerate private indulgence at public expense. His "absurd ideas" were such things as the compulsory reading of Thucydides, instead of the memoirs of retired admirals or of nothing at all. The ruination Turner was inflicting was the hard work imposed on both officer-students and the staff, as well as his insistence that bright academics and serious men of affairs be invited to give the frequent outside lectures. Thus he displaced the previous cycle of visitors, the retired admirals who so greatly relished the Navy's VIP privileges in the luxurious college "cabin" before and after their "When I was in command of . . ." lectures of complacency. Trivial in itself, this last outrage was important in its consequences: the retired cohorts spread the word that Turner was trying to educate a new kind of naval officer, who might question the sacred pieties—including the sanctum sanctorum of the aircraft carrier, and the huger-is-better school of thought in ship design in general.

IN THE Central Intelligence Agency, too, Turner imposed, or tried to impose, painful transformations, and to eliminate staff. In that case, again, it was the retired cohorts above all—surprisingly well-connected in the media—who blackened his reputation outside the institution's walls. Among the other managerial efforts recorded in his

STAT

book, Turner wanted to place the CIA's traditionally independent three major branches under a joint administration. At the same time, he sought to elevate two of them, the analytic and technical, toward equality with the traditionally dominant "operations" branch, which gathers information by espionage and carries out covert action. Moreover, Turner reduced that latter branch by 820 posts. Most of those operations officers were eliminated by transfers and scheduled retirement. (According to Turner, only 17 people were dismissed and 147 others forced into early retirement—far from the 820, let alone the 2,000, of media gossip.) It seems, in fact, that a 1,350-post reduction had been called for by the branch itself during the previous administration, although over a five-year period instead of Turner's two.

In his other role—as director of Central Intelligence, as opposed to head of the CIA as such—Turner had less success in coordinating the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (the military's own analysis shop), the amply funded National Security Agency (which gathers electronic intelligence in order to do its own analysis), and the State Department's intelligence and research bureau. He was even less successful in obtaining cooperation from the intelligence organizations of each military service; his own Navy's organization was the most defiant of all. The president, it turns out, wanted his own "raw data" to play with, and without his backing Turner's attempts could only fail. By sheer obstructionism, the NSA and the rest even defeated Turner's utterly modest ambition of imposing a unified system on the chaos of 50-odd overlapping and obscure "code-word" classifications, which are supposed to regulate secrecy above the common run of "top secret."

I have no notion of the wisdom or weaknesses of Turner's managerial changes, nor can I judge whether reforms, however wise in theory, were

Continued

10 July 1985

## Point of View.

By Stansfield Turner

# Secrecy and Democracy: the CIA and Academe

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Should colleges and their professors remain aloof from government's intelligence activities? Can they?

**N**OT LONG AFTER MY APPOINTMENT as Director of Central Intelligence in 1977, the chief of a foreign intelligence service gave me a bit of friendly advice: "You know, of course, you want to collect all the intelligence you can on home territory."

What he was alluding to was that journalists, professors, and businessmen, among others, are often in contact with their counterparts in other countries. Some professors have taught foreign students who now are in important positions in their native countries. International journalists keep in touch with key thinkers and politicians in countries where they've served. Many businessmen have frequent dealings with foreign businessmen. Although contacts of this kind aren't likely to have access to the inner secrets of the local Politburo or Cabinet, they will have an excellent feel for the state of the economy, the degree of societal unrest, or the prospects for incipient political movements.

My foreign colleague's logic, while irrefutable, ran exactly contrary to prevailing attitudes in the United States, particularly following the report in 1976 of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Sen. Frank Church and known popularly as the Church Committee.

Without a doubt, the Church Committee investigations damaged the longstanding relationship the C.I.A. had with the academic community. The committee revealed that some professors had worked for the C.I.A. without informing their universities. We received letters from university presidents who wanted to know which professors had worked or were working for the C.I.A. But the C.I.A. had agreed with these professors that their relationship would be kept secret. If the professors chose to reveal their ties to the C.I.A., they were free to do so, but we could not and would not breach those agreements.

Next, a number of universities began drafting their own regulations to control future faculty relationships with the C.I.A. On March 25, 1977, I received word that Harvard was about to issue a set of guidelines that would greatly inhibit its faculty in associating with the C.I.A. I had already taken a number of steps to encourage better relations with the academic community and didn't want this prestigious university to set an example that would hamper my efforts. I called the president of Harvard, Derek Bok, and told him I would like to send someone to Cambridge to discuss this new regulation and explain how it would affect us. President Bok was very cordial and accepted my offer. An hour later he phoned back; the people who were writing the Har-

vard regulation had told him they had already contacted the C.I.A. and asked for the Agency's views. Much to my embarrassment, they had been told we would not comment. My enthusiasm for repairing relations with the academic world had obviously not permeated the C.I.A.'s bureaucracy. We did, however, finally have thorough discussions with Harvard. The regulation was modified, but Harvard still required its faculty to report all relationships with the C.I.A. Fortunately, very few other universities followed Harvard's example, and this did not become a continuing problem. Harvard also requested a complementing C.I.A. regulation forbidding any relationships with Harvard that were not disclosed; I refused to issue such a rule.

The reason I did not comply with Harvard's request was that I felt it was not reasonable to ask an academic to disclose only his relationships with the C.I.A. and ignore the relationships, formal and informal, he might have with corporations, foundations, or other government agencies. Any relationship can compromise a professor's objectivity and affect his teaching responsibilities, one with the C.I.A. no more or less than one with a business that pays him as a consultant. In the business world some of those relationships involve secret, proprietary matters; some require a division of loyalty, as with screening students to recommend whom a company should hire.

I could fully understand a university's insisting that its faculty members report all external, paid relationships. After all, a university has a right to know how much time its faculty members are spending on outside employment. I issued an instruction that before we engaged a professor whose university required disclosure of relationships with the C.I.A., we would remind him of his responsibilities to his university. If he insisted on not disclosing our relationship, that was between him and his university, not between the C.I.A. and the university. We could not and would not be the university's policeman. However, I did require that my approval be sought before we engaged an academic who refused to act in accordance with his university's rules. It was my practice to make a distinction between universities whose regulations required their people to report all outside relations and those which required the reporting only of a C.I.A. association. If the C.I.A. was singled out and an academic did not want to report his relationship, I would approve it. If all relationships had to be reported, I would not.

We did find professors who were insistent that they would work with us only if they did not have to disclose that they were doing so. Sometimes this was a matter of

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obstinate independence; other times it was a concern over the possibility of recrimination by colleagues. A professor at Brooklyn College contacted the C.I.A. in 1977 to ask for some unclassified information about an Iron Curtain country he was going to visit. On his return he called us again to share his thoughts. It was as simple and aboveboard as that. He had been given no assignment or remuneration by the C.I.A. and expected none. But when word of his contact with us leaked, his colleagues almost blocked his obtaining tenure. In another case, I twice contacted a professor at an Ivy League university whom I regarded highly and asked him to accept a year's assignment in the C.I.A.'s analytic branch. My friend thought about it seriously on both occasions, but concluded that associating with the C.I.A. could jeopardize his academic position.

What did we want these academics to do? The primary need for contact between the C.I.A. and academe is to share ideas on all manner of world affairs, ranging from the psychology of foreign leaders to the state of world oil production to the strength of Islamic fundamentalism. The C.I.A., like every research and analytic institution, must be able to test its views and conclusions against the thinking of other experts. Through one-year fellowships, through committees of academics who periodically reviewed the C.I.A.'s work, and through individual consulting arrangements, we sought to tap the wisdom of academe. But the benefits did not flow in one direction. Professors who consulted with the C.I.A. benefited from seeing how governments actually work, rather than how they theoretically work, and from gaining valuable insights into world events based on classified sources that they otherwise did not have access to. Although they could not discuss the classified data with their students when they returned to the campus, they were more richly informed and more discerning in their interpretation of security issues.

**T**HE MORE CONTROVERSIAL AREA OF CONTACT between the C.I.A. and the academic community concerns a much smaller group of university people, who help the C.I.A. scout foreign students. Finding people from abroad who are favorably disposed to support American interests in their countries is a necessary part of maintaining a strong human intelligence capability. It is difficult to do this in countries with tight internal security and a disregard for human rights, which is exactly where we often most need good intelligence. It would be foolish not to attempt to identify sympathetic people when they are in our country. University personnel can sometimes help the C.I.A. in this identification, though there clearly can be a conflict between a university official's doing that and fulfilling his responsibility to look after the student's best interests in and out of the classroom. It is largely a matter of how the situation is handled and is not different from singling out students for scholarships or jobs with business. Many of us are evaluated as

having or not having the potential for all sorts of things. In the end, it is up to us, as it is with the student in this situation, to accept or reject whatever offers are made.

The argument is also raised that we are unfairly taking advantage of impressionable youngsters whom our country has a duty to protect when they are here. I respect that sense of duty, but the young, impressionable undergraduate is not usually the person the C.I.A. seeks to win over to supporting us in his home country. He is not likely to have the maturity, the depth, or the clear career direction we are seeking. The more suitable candidates are graduate students, who are often foreign government employees studying on government grants and whose eyes are wide open.

**M**Y SPYMASTER FRIEND was certainly right in theory. There is a wealth of information no farther away than the media, academe, and commercial enterprises right at home. But in our free society any association of such institutions with secret intelligence activities may impinge on the freedoms of speech, academic inquiry, and capitalistic endeavor. The more I grappled with the question of whether associating these particular communities with intelligence was worth the risk, the more I believed that attempts to isolate them from intelligence would endanger, not protect, those freedoms.

Accommodating secrecy in a democracy requires compromises with the theory of full freedom of speech, inquiry, and endeavor. The media, academe, and business need to think through the problems and participate in drawing the lines of compromise themselves, not wait to have them imposed by government, if we are to avoid tilting too far toward either secrecy or freedom.

*Stansfield Turner was Director of Central Intelligence from 1977 to 1981. This article is adapted from his new book, "Secrecy and Democracy: The C.I.A. in Transition," published by Houghton Mifflin Company. Copyright © 1985 by Stansfield Turner.*

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29 June 1985

# Former director gives an inside look at CIA

By Leonard W. Boasberg  
*Inquirer Staff Writer*

Philadelphia is the 11th stop on a book-promotion tour that will take Stansfield Turner and his wife to 12 cities in 24 days.

"Is this Cleveland?" Turner says with a smile.

"No, this is Monday," someone says.

"Have we done that much?" Turner's wife, Karen, asks in disbelief.

"Yes."

"Wow."

They're at the Marriott on City Avenue for a quick lunch between two TV interviews in the morning and two radio interviews in the afternoon. The book Turner is promoting is called *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*. Turner was director of the Central Intelligence Agency under his Annapolis classmate Jimmy Carter. (Turner ranked 25th among 820 in the class of 1946; Carter was 59th.)

In February 1977 Carter summoned Adm. Turner, on an hour's notice, to return from Naples, where he was serving as commander in chief of the southern flank of NATO. A career Navy man and former Rhodes scholar who had served in a variety of

commands, Turner hoped he was about to be named chief of naval operations.

Instead, Carter made him director of central intelligence, putting him in charge of an agency reeling under recent revelations that during its 30-year history it had committed a multitude of abuses, including plots to assassinate foreign leaders, drug experiments on unwitting subjects and illegal spying on U.S. citizens.

What he found at the CIA, and what he did about it, are discussed at length in his book, and Turner adopts no air of false modesty in appraising the result. "I think it's the best view of the CIA ever written, because it was written by somebody on the inside who really understood it because he was there making the decisions at the top, but yet some-

body who was an outsider and who could look at it more objectively than those insiders who have previously written books on the CIA. It's unique in that regard."

A major theme of the book is the conflict that inevitably arises when an open, democratic society conducts secret intelligence operations. When Carter was in the White House and Turner was at the CIA, a reasonable

balance was struck between openness and secrecy, in Turner's view; he feels that is not the case under President Reagan and William Casey.

In the introduction to his book, Turner complains that Casey's CIA made more than 400 deletions, ranging "from borderline issues to the ridiculous," when he submitted his book for security clearance.

"One of the things that I could not put in my book — and which I took all the way to the ultimate level in the CIA and they took to the White House — was a quotation from a speech I gave in the CIA auditorium to the alumni of Vassar College of Washington, D.C. What I said was, in my opinion, totally unclassified. And if I told you what it was, you would laugh. You would rip your sides apart when I told you the subject that they wouldn't let me talk about that I'd already talked about in public."

## No quotes

He says the CIA also would not let him quote from Carter's memoirs of his presidency, *Keeping Faith*, and refused to tell him why. When he protested, he says he was told "you have to do what you feel you have to do" but was threatened with a lawsuit if he did. "If they really were worried about the secret," he wonders, why did they leave it up to him whether "this secret of great importance to our country was suddenly [going to be] spewed out into the public domain in an irretrievable way. So they clearly weren't interested in the secret."

What, then, is their interest?

"Their interest is in preserving their right to protect themselves."

Ironically, it was CIA chief Turner who, as he acknowledges in *Secrecy and Democracy*, urged then-Attorney General Griffin Bell to prosecute an ex-CIA employee, Frank Snepp, for publishing the book *Decent Interval*. In it, Snepp discussed the fall of Saigon and what he contended were the United States' shoddy role and inept behavior during that event.

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Snepp had signed the usual CIA contract agreeing to submit anything he wrote about the agency to security review. The prosecution was successful: In a case that went to the Supreme Court, Snepp was compelled to forfeit all his profits from the book and forbidden to write or say anything about the CIA without the agency's permission.

## A different case

The Snepp case, Turner insists, is entirely different from his own: "We didn't prosecute Snepp for secrecy, we prosecuted him for violating a contract, and if we had not prosecuted him, how could we prosecute the next person?"

When he ran the CIA, he says, the agency carried out its clearances "much less arbitrarily and with no arrogance. The process is a good process. It's a necessary one I still support. I do not resent having to submit my book for clearance. I resent the arbitrariness and the arrogance of the Reagan administration's handling of that. They have changed the policy since I left."

Turning to current events that have great resonance for him — he headed the CIA during the Iranian hostage situation — Turner takes issue with those who hold that the United States should make no deal to free the hostages currently held by Shiite terrorists. He dismisses the argument that yielding to blackmail would set a dangerous precedent:

"The President keeps saying we'll make no concessions to terrorists. Why aren't we at the Beirut airport? We're not there because the terrorists drove us out.

"I want to support the President, because I remember what pain it

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Continued



gave President Carter when he was being criticized from his political opposition for his handling of the hostage crisis, and I think President Reagan is doing a fine job. What worries me is the criticism he's getting from his own political spectrum, the demands that we make absolutely no concessions, that we be totally ready to retaliate, maybe even retaliate now."

### ***His own advice***

Suppose he were still director of central intelligence? How would he advise the President?

"I'd do just what he's doing."

But what he's doing is insisting that there will be no concessions, no linkage.

"That's right. I'd do that — and then make a linkage, and make a deal, and get our people out. You don't think Ronald Reagan does what he says, do you? He said he was not going to pull out of Beirut on Friday before the Monday that he pulled the Marines out of Beirut. You of the media don't bother to remember that."

Recalling that in April 1980 Reagan had said the Tehran hostage situation never should have been tolerated for even six days, he says: "Well, we're on Day 11 right now." But he adds that at least now Reagan is saying the "absolutely right" thing — "that for us to take out innocent people in order to try to get at some terrorists would be an act of terrorism in itself, and that's not what the United States stands for. . . . I'm glad that he finally, after about five years, has come to where his rhetoric has confronted reality."

Turner believes that the Reagan administration has little to boast about in its handling of foreign affairs. To one reviewer of his book — Charles Lichenstein, former U.N. delegate under Reagan, who ticked off a series of alleged foreign policy failures "on Stansfield Turner's watch" — Turner responds:

"Would he look on the 241 Marines [killed in Beirut in 1983] as a major success in the Middle East? Would he look on the fact that they weren't smart enough to ward off three bombings, continued killing of Americans there, as a tremendous success? Would he look on the situation in Central America as a great success today? Are the American people really pleased that [in Nicaragua] we mined the harbors and that we wrote a manual of assassination? Is he pleased that the CIA is implicated in the truck bombing of 80 innocent women and children in

Beirut in the last few weeks?

"I guess he's very proud that the Reagan administration has one, and, I think, only one, success in foreign

policy in 4½ years, that I know of, and that's that we managed to beat up on 600 Cubans in Grenada, and we only sent in *fourteen thousand* troops to do it."

In *Secrecy and Democracy*, Turner devotes a great deal of space to counterespionage and the problem of tracking down—"moles" and traitors while protecting the rights and liberties of citizens. The book was printed before the Walker spy-ring case broke, implicating John A. Walker, a former Navy radioman with top-secret clearance at Atlantic Fleet Headquarters in Norfolk, Va.; his older brother, Arthur; his son, Michael, a Navy communications specialist, and a friend, Jerry A. Whitworth.

During his CIA tenure, Turner says, he froze clearances for special intelligence — things rated above "top secret" — and cut by 30 percent the security clearances of civilian firms doing business with the CIA. But he had no control over the Pentagon. "I tried to do it with the Defense Department," he says, "and ran into a stone wall."

The Pentagon, he holds, is at long last on the right track in planning to cut the number of security clearances by half — "we just have too many people with security clearances, so it's difficult to screen them as thoroughly as you should" — but that, he adds, is only part of the

answer.

The Carter administration, he says, sought to take as much information as possible out of the "classified" category; its successor has gone in exactly the opposite direction in its "blind belief that more classification keeps more secrets." The result, he says, has been to "let loose the natural instincts of the CIA, which are to classify everything. And that's what they're doing."

Turner defends his controversial action, a few months after he took charge of the agency, of firing 17 old CIA hands and forcing 147 others into retirement — the "Halloween Massacre" — although he concedes that the abrupt way the agents were notified was "unconscionable."

To critics who have accused him of decimating the CIA's clandestine capabilities, he responds that the recommendation to cut staffing had been made under his predecessor, George Bush, who "just couldn't face up to doing anything about it." Moreover, he says, the ousted individuals

had all been rated in the bottom 5 to 10 percent, and not one of the 820 positions eliminated was overseas.

"This was bureaucratic overhead," he says, "and anyone who has ever served in a big bureaucracy would not question my assertion that bigger bureaucracy is not necessarily better bureaucracy."

**Continued**



The Philadelphia Inquirer / KENDALL WILKINSON

**Stansfield Turner and wife, Karen, during Philadelphia visit**

CHICAGO SUN TIMES (IL)  
26 June 1985**Books in the news**

STAT

# How ex-chief views the CIA

## Secrecy and Democracy

The CIA in Transition. By Stansfield Turner. Houghton Mifflin. \$16.95.

By Robert S. Smith

In 1977 President Carter tapped Adm. Stansfield Turner, one of the Navy's best and brightest, to head the Central Intelligence Agency in the troubled period after a Senate committee exposed CIA misdeeds. Four years later, after reorganizing its massive bureaucracy and integrating high technology into an espionage world dominated by human spies, Turner was replaced by the Reagan administration's William Casey. This book is a record of his watch at the CIA.

Turner's tenure was no easy task, but in a turbulent time his was a fairly steady hand on the helm. He lost as many battles as he won, but he brought a level of courage and honesty to the post few other CIA chiefs have.

His main problems were reining in his covert operators and melding the efforts of the CIA with other intelligence agencies—National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Research.

But Turner was never able to control the covert side and errs in writing that the 1947 CIA charter says nothing about covert action. The smogball phrase authorizing such actions as the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile and the restoration of the shah of Iran to his throne reads that the CIA shall perform "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Boiled into plain English, this means that the CIA can do whatever the president wants, whatever it thinks he wants, or whatever it believes he would want if he thought about it. Covert activities were what caused Harry Truman to say that creating the CIA was his biggest mistake.

Although Turner admits losing some skirmishes, he avoids blame the way Dracula did garlic. To reduce a swollen espionage staff, he fired 820 people in the so-called "Halloween Massacre" in 1977. The act was long overdue, but he handled it poorly, sending a brusque note to those afflicted. He now claims that his chiefs advised him against a more gracious note.

On his two biggest flaps—the downfall of the shah of Iran and the "discovery" of a so-called "combat brigade" of Russians in Cuba in 1979—he gives flaccid rationalizations. No one could have foreseen the fragility of the shah, Turner says in effect, and it was NSA that goofed on the Cuban affair. The brigade was a training unit that had been in Cuba for years. The CIA knew about it, but Turner was unable

or unwilling to keep conservatives from using it to stymie ratification of the SALT II arms control treaty.

Self-criticism is alien to a man who sprinkles his prose with statements like, "I weathered the NSC meeting because I had done more extensive homework than anyone else in the room."

As a military man, however, Turner easily sees through the tendency of the military to present worst-case assessments of Soviet power, writing, "The budgetary process virtually forces the military to use intelligence to overstate the threats they must be ready to counter."

Turner has harsh words for the way President Reagan has "unleashed" the CIA under William Casey. An apolitical CIA has disappeared, as has effective congressional oversight. Casey is now immersed in policy formation and is running the illegal contras and mining harbors in Nicaragua in violation of both international law and the 1962 Boland Amendment forbidding funds for the purpose of destabilizing Nicaragua.

"The Reagan transition team that descended on CIA in 1980 was as unbalanced and uninformed a group on this subject as I can imagine," Turner comments, a conclusion possibly triggered by the fact that CIA censors took 18 months to read his manuscript, but made only three concessions on more than 100 deletions.

Turner ends his book urging more congressional oversight of the CIA, expansion of intelligence analysis beyond current events and Soviet military strength; increased attention to terrorism, narcotics and nuclear proliferation; new and nonpolitical chiefs for the intelligence agencies, and less covert action.

The way things are going a major CIA overhaul will be necessary. It does not appear likely that it can happen until the president and Congress forgo their macho views and restore the CIA to its proper place in national and world affairs.

*Robert S. Smith was a member of the U.S. intelligence community for nearly 25 years.*

FT. LAUDERDALE NEWS (FL)  
20 June 1985

## Editorials

# CIA must not be allowed to abuse censorship rules

STAT

**AMERICA'S** Central Intelligence Agency has the legal right, and the need, to prevent former employees from publishing books disclosing secrets that compromise national security.

But the CIA has no need, and should not have the legal right, to engage in unjustified censorship of harmless material.

Unfortunately, according to Admiral Stansfield Turner, a former CIA director, the CIA is abusing its rules and engaging in Big Brother-style censorship not needed to protect government secrets.

Turner charges that high-level Reagan Administration CIA officials forced him to remove more than 100 passages, including a lot of non-secret material, from his new book, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, before they would let him publish it.

Among the censored items, he says, were quotes from his own public speeches and passages taken from former President Jimmy Carter's memoirs.

If true, that kind of abuse of power is stupid, senseless and far in excess of the CIA's proper authority to review publication of books by former employees.

The case is loaded with irony. Turner was caught in a trap that he helped make. In 1978, when Turner was serving as Carter's CIA director, he was instrumental in pressing then Attorney General Griffin

Bell to prosecute former CIA employee Frank Snapp Jr. for publishing a book about the CIA, *Decent Interval*, without getting the required CIA clearance.

The U.S. Supreme Court allowed the government to seize \$60,000 in Snapp's profits.

CIA officials have not commented on Turner's charges, but if they did harass Turner, the motivation to do so is there. Many people on the Reagan team have never forgiven Turner for what they consider gutting the CIA in his "Halloween Massacre" of Oct. 31, 1977, at which he reduced staff in the espionage section by 822 positions, some by early retirement and some by firing.

Also, his book is candidly critical of the CIA under Reagan-appointed director William Casey, especially its resistance to congressional scrutiny. He also documents a series of foulups that he says could lead to a severe loss of public credibility and resultant harm to the U.S. intelligence-gathering ability.

The Turner case should not be swept under the rug. Congressional hearings should be held to determine the validity of Turner's charges. If warranted, changes in the law should be made to ensure that CIA censorship power is severely restricted to halting disclosure of real secrets, not to harassing critics to prevent the public from knowing the truth.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 6-ABALTIMORE SUN  
20 June 1985

# Stansfield Turner's Advice

STAT

The dilemma of how an open, democratic society should carry out and control secret intelligence operations has been a recurring issue in American public life. At one time many Americans probably agreed with the senator who declared he "would rather not" know about Central Intelligence Agency secrets. That mood, however, made possible the abuses that began to be revealed in the 1970s, including illegal spying on U.S. citizens, drug experiments on unwitting subjects and assassination plots. Following those disclosures, Congress and the public agreed on the need for stronger congressional oversight of intelligence matters.

To President Reagan, his intelligence chiefs and other conservatives, that represented the "leashing" of the CIA by timid or overscrupulous liberals. Mr. Reagan and Central Intelligence Director William Casey may not heed the views of Stansfield Turner, who headed the CIA in the Carter administration. But they should, because Mr. Turner's new book, "Secrecy and Democracy," has some sensible and worthwhile things to say about covert action and the oversight principle.

Mr. Turner isn't against covert operations. But he is afraid the CIA will lose its capability for such operations if it squanders its skills (and congress-

sional and public support) on "insignificant projects." Covert means should be used only when their objectives are truly significant — something congressional oversight can help assure. That is an argument worth considering. So is Mr. Turner's point that the country is not well served if its intelligence chief is more committed to covert operations than to objective intelligence-gathering.

The Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Turner writes, "is the only one of the president's advisers who has even a chance of presenting unbiased intelligence to him. All the other advisers are direct participants in the policy-making process who are bound to favor intelligence that supports their policies. For that reason alone the president should keep his DCI from advocating one policy or another, as is bound to happen if he becomes deeply enmeshed in covert action."

Under Mr. Casey, that seems to be what has happened. Covert action has its place, but Mr. Turner is correct that gathering accurate and objective information should be the intelligence community's primary goal. The administration and the country might profit by putting aside partisan prejudice and giving an open-minded reading to Mr. Turner's thoughtful advice.

DETROIT FREE PRESS (MI)  
19 June 1985

# Ex-CIA chief seeks airport inspection system

STAT

By REMER TYSON  
Free Press Politics Writer

Former CIA director Stansfield Turner said Tuesday that the creation of an international airport inspection system would accomplish more than U.S. military retaliation against Middle East hijackers.

Turner proposed that the United Nations establish and supervise the worldwide airport inspection system. If a country's airport failed periodic surprise tests, Turner said, airlines should refuse to land in that country until the inspection system was brought up to standards.

Turner, CIA director during the Jimmy Carter administration from 1977 to 1981, was in Detroit to promote his recently published book, "Secrecy and Democracy, The CIA in Transition."

**TURNER SAID** the first priority for the United States is to get back the Americans who are being held by Arab hijackers in Lebanon. Then the United

States should decide what follow-up actions to take, he said.

Expressing support for actions taken by the Reagan administration, Turner said a military operation would "cause the loss of most or all of the hostages . . . There is no chance of a surgical strike."

Turner said he is optimistic that the administration can free the hostages because the hijackers' demands are "not only obtainable, but ought to be done." The hijackers, who say they are Shiite Muslims, are demanding the release of more than 700 Shiites being held in Israel.

"IT IS ALL a question of saving face," Turner said.

If the hostages are released, Turner said, "What we have to decide is whether retaliation — killing people is what we are talking about — will deter terrorism. I think not . . . I think killing some of their people — except for the hijackers themselves — will simply keep the cycle of violence going."

At least, Turner said, the United States should have a national debate on the retaliation issue before taking action. "We shouldn't let our frustrations get the best of us and do something indiscriminate."

**IN AN INTERVIEW**, Turner also said:

- Recent spy cases demonstrate the need to tighten U.S. security, to reduce access to classified materials, and to submit government employees with secrecy clearances to more frequent lie detector tests.

- The increasing criticism of the CIA is endangering its ability to carry out covert intelligence operations because the criticism reduces congressional support for the agency.

- He has learned that "old boys" from the CIA network who opposed his reforms have been asking newspapers for the opportunity to review his book so they can criticize it.

STAR-TRIBUNE (MN)  
18 June 1985

STAT

# Ex-CIA chief recalls Reagan's criticism of Carter's actions

By Jim Dawson  
Staff Writer

Former CIA director Stansfield Turner said he is sure President Reagan is doing everything possible to free the hostages from TWA Flight 847 in Beirut, but he was quick to remember Reagan's harsh criticism of the Carter administration's handling of the Iranian hostage situation.

"He stood up and boasted, 'Terrorists beware, here I am,' " Turner said of Reagan. "Well, here he is and we're no better off today than we were then."

Turner, in Minneapolis Monday to promote his book, "Secrecy and Democracy, the CIA in Transition," served as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1977 through 1980 under President Jimmy Carter.

He said the "military option" to rescue

the hostages in Beirut would be something to try only when "you come to your wits' end."

"If you undertake a military operation, you're putting the hostages' lives at risk," he said. "I don't think in the environment such as we've got, we can put a rescue force in because the people who control the airport are sympathetic to the hijackers."

The U.S. government is probably negotiating with the terrorists despite its proclaimed policy not to do so, Turner said. In order to try to limit kidnappings and other terrorist acts, he said, the United States, like Israel, has to take the position that it won't negotiate. However, when push comes to shove and lives are at stake, he said, "we will negotiate. And we ought to."

Turner called for the establishment of an international force of inspec-

tors to monitor security systems at major airports throughout the world to prevent would-be hijackers from boarding aircraft.


The United States nearly managed to eliminate domestic hijackings through heavy use of sky marshals and security equipment, he said, and the same thing must be done internationally. The inspectors, he said, would try to get weapons through airport security and could go as far as to try to bribe airport workers to help them.

If airlines of the major western nations refused to land at airports determined to be "dangerous," it would provide tremendous incentive to improve security and eventually reduce hijackings, Turner added.

He said the CIA remains the best intelligence-gathering force in the world, but he said he is worried that Reagan is damaging it.

"Reagan looks at congressional oversight (of the CIA) with disdain and as an adversarial relationship," he said. "He (Reagan) has emphasized covert activities that have blown into the public."

On that point, Turner described the CIA efforts in Nicaragua as the "most overt covert action" he'd seen.



Stansfield Turner