

Wife of Soviet Defector Says the C.I.A. May Have Caused His Death

STAT

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 24—The wife of a Soviet defector has asked President Carter and the Senate Intelligence Committee to investigate disclosures that have led her to suspect that her husband's life may have been needlessly sacrificed by the Central Intelligence Agency in a counterintelligence operation.

In letters prepared by her lawyer and sent to Senator Birch Bayh, the Indiana Democrat who heads the intelligence committee, and President Carter, Eva Shadrin, the defector's wife, said that in the two and a half years since her husband disappeared in Vienna she had received information that contradicted official versions of the case given her by the C.I.A., the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the White House.

Mrs. Shadrin says that she has recently received information that indicates the C.I.A. may have used her husband to help solidify the position of a Soviet agent in the Soviet intelligence service despite the fact it strongly suspected the Russian was an agent provocateur.

If this is true, she said in an interview, this would have been a needless and cynical use of her husband's life. Mrs. Shadrin, who has been trying to find out what happened to her husband since his disappearance, told officials of both the C.I.A. and F.B.I. about the information through her lawyer in April. She was advised that the two agencies had told her all they could under national security regulations and that they did not know what had happened to Mr. Shadrin.

In her letter to Mr. Carter, she renewed her appeal for an audience and entreated him to help her find her husband or the truth about his fate.

The request for an investigation has brought renewed attention here to the murky world of defectors and double agents.

Nicholas G. Shadrin is the American name of Nikolai F. Artamanov, commander of a Soviet Navy destroyer who defected to the United States in 1959. Mr. Shadrin disappeared in Vienna on Dec. 20, 1975, ostensibly while on the way to meet with Soviet intelligence agents.

Contradictions Are Noted

Mrs. Shadrin, who accompanied her husband on the Vienna trip, said she was told later by the F.B.I., the C.I.A. and the White House that at the time of his disappearance her husband was serving as a "double agent" for the F.B.I. and the C.I.A.

She said that the agencies had told her that he had become a double agent in 1966 after he reported that members of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service, had tried to recruit him while he was living here and working as a consultant for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

But Mrs. Shadrin and her lawyer, Richard D. Copaken, said that new information, in press reports and from sources they had interviewed, sharply contradicted this version.

Mrs. Shadrin said that she believed that her husband might have been sacrificed to aid the C.I.A. in its dealings with a Soviet official named Igor, who first approached the agency by calling the home of its director in May 1966 and offering his services to penetrate the K.G.B. He held out the promise that he could be the C.I.A.'s man in the higher echelons of the Soviet intelligence service.

Part of the story of Igor was published two weeks ago in Time magazine and independently confirmed by The New York Times.

According to former intelligence officers, one of the tidbits Igor offered to get the relationship under way was the charge that a longtime Soviet operative for the C.I.A., code-named Sasha, was in fact a K.G.B. plant. By this time Sasha had been brought back from foreign assignment and was living in Virginia under the name Alexander Orlov.

Igor told his C.I.A. contacts that to prove his value to his superiors and to obtain a permanent assignment at the Soviet Embassy here, he needed to recruit Mr. Shadrin as a double agent.

Mrs. Shadrin and her lawyer said they believed that this was the real reason that in June 1966 Adm. Rufus W. Taylor, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, urged Mr. Shadrin to take on the risky assignment. They charged that the next nine years, during which Mr. Shadrin kept in contact with Soviet agents at the instruction of the C.I.A. and F.B.I., were a waste because the American authorities had strong suspicions that Igor was a K.G.B. plant.

The Times has confirmed independently that C.I.A. and F.B.I. officials were deeply skeptical of Igor's "bona fides," the information by which they seek to verify the legitimacy of defectors and penetration agents.

If the American intelligence services doubted Igor, Mrs. Shadrin said in an interview, they should never have allowed her husband to come under Soviet control on two trips to Vienna, one in 1972 and the other in 1975 when he disappeared.

Several present and former intelligence officers told The Times that the publication of Igor's name and the details of his case endangered "his life and others," as one source put it, and was detrimental to United States security.

Yet the Russians themselves seem aware of many of the contradictions in the Shadrin story. On Aug. 17, 1977, in response to the first press report here about Mr. Shadrin's flight, a well-known Soviet journalist, Genrikh Borovik, published the Soviet side of the story in an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta, a weekly newspaper.

The article was unusual in that it is rare for Soviet publications to discuss their intelligence operations or refer to K.G.B. files. Mr. Borovik uses as the pseudonym for the K.G.B. agent in the article the name Igor Aleksandrovich Orlov.

This seems to couple the Igor of the telephone call with the named used by the agent called Sasha since Sasha is a short form for Aleksandr.

C.I.A. Complicity Suggested

The article suggests that instead of Soviet agents capturing Mr. Shadrin, the C.I.A. may have had complicity in his disappearance to avoid the embarrassment of his returning to the Soviet Union and publicly denouncing C.I.A. methods.

Mrs. Shadrin said that the Igor matter was not the only contradiction she had found between her own investigations and the official information given her. She said that when she accompanied Mr. Shadrin in his flight from Poland in 1959, she believed that his defection was an impromptu act to permit them to marry and live in the West.

She said she had now received information that her husband was in fact recruited for the C.I.A. by Indonesian Navy officers who were being trained by Mr. Shadrin and others at the Polish port of Gdynia.

In her letter to the Senate committee, she said this factor placed a whole new complexion on her husband's decision in 1966 to work as a double agent and suggested that he had little choice but to take on the assignment.

There is no firm indication of Mr. Shadrin's fate since his disappearance. The C.I.A. has said it believes that he was killed or kidnapped by the K.G.B. The

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ON PAGE 42-48

NEW YORK
8 May 1978

The Shadrin Ai

A Double Agent Doubt

By Tad Szulc

"... Shadrin disappeared after United States senselessly thrust him into the role of double agent

It was through a stunning succession of blunders, carelessness, and inexcusable acts of intelligence greed spanning a sixteen-year period that the United States lost its most valuable Russian military defector. The missing man is believed to be either dead or incarcerated in the Soviet Union.

There are still questions which probably never will be satisfactorily answered, but all indications are that the man known as Nicholas George Shadrin was kidnapped by the Soviets through the fault of American intelligence agencies. There is little reason to believe that he redefected voluntarily, that he was killed by the CIA (as the Russians have insinuated), or that, tired of being a pawn for both sides, he decided to create a new life for himself somewhere in the world.

Shadrin disappeared in Vienna in December 1975, after United States intelligence had senselessly thrust him into the immensely dangerous role of a double agent working with the KGB, the Soviet secret service. He vanished under circumstances that make it clear that he was cruelly used by his superiors as bait for the Russians. Spies, after all, are expendable when they become a problem.

That Shadrin, a gregarious, intelligent, onetime Soviet Baltic-fleet destroyer commander, was recruited by the CIA in 1959, and had not simply fled to the West to marry the woman he loved—as alleged at the time by him and the United States government—was a closely guarded secret, until now, and it sheds a wholly new light on his covert relations with the American intelligence establishment.

It explains why he agreed to serve as a double agent under extremely bizarre and controversial conditions, and it may also help to explain the strange behavior, after his disappearance, of two succeeding administrations, their unwillingness to open secret intelligence files on him to his wife and her lawyer in their search for the truth, and the glaring inconsistencies encountered during a private investigation of the Shadrin case.

Defectors are one of the most sensitive subjects in intelligence operations, after all, and neither the administration on the highest level nor senior intelligence officers are prepared to discuss various theories surrounding the Shadrin case. (This reluctance was further enhanced by the defection last month of Arkady N. Shevchenko, the Soviet diplomat who served as undersecretary general of the United Nations in New York. Shevchenko is the greatest diplomatic intelligence prize ever won by the United States.)

At first, Shadrin was worth his weight in gold to the United States. At the time when the Soviet Union launched a major buildup of its navy, the information brought by Shadrin was crucial to the United States Navy. After he outlived his usefulness, however, he was transformed into a double agent to satisfy the insatiable appetite of American intelligence. If it were not for this greed, Shadrin would be living tranquilly in the United States today, like other Soviet defectors.

His name originally was Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, but on orders after his arrival in the United States, he changed it to Shadrin—after the hero

of a Russian warship (and a brilliant but somewhat-ineffectual and somewhat-ineffectual captain). It was a pointless deception, because he testified as Artamonov in an open session of the House Committee on Un-American Activities in September 1960, and the audience included a Soviet diplomat busily taking notes. Afterward, no effort was made to conceal his real identity, and Shadrin was the nearest thing to a public figure in intelligence circles. This was the first major blunder and led to all the others.

Nobody, it seems, wishes to delve into intelligence secrets that could cause considerable embarrassment to the United States. Full disclosure could, for example, highlight the sixteen years of blunders surrounding Shadrin's activities in this country and abroad, methods employed by American intelligence, and conflicts involving the CIA, the FBI, and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Shadrin was not a run-of-the-mill spy or defector: He had high-level acquaintances and friendships in American intelligence, which made him a vulnerable figure.

One friend was Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, who, as director of naval intelligence, was his boss during the time the Russian ex-officer served as a special consultant to the navy. And Admiral Stansfield Turner, for example, got to know Shadrin sufficiently well to write him "Dear Nick" letters (Shadrin had lectured at the Naval War Col-

Mystery men: CIA files yielded these photographs of three KGB agents Oleg Kozlov (left) and Mikhail Kuryshev (center), possibly the last men to see Shadrin (right) alive.

Records Show CIA, U. of California Relationship

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By Narda Zacchino
and Robert Scheer

Los Angeles Times

LOS ANGELES—A long history of contacts between the Central Intelligence Agency and the University of California—highlighted by a UC vice president's tour of duty with the CIA during the height of student unrest—is revealed in documents released by the CIA.

The documents, about 800 pages dating from the late 1950s through 1977, have been released under the Freedom of Information Act and made available to the Los Angeles Times.

They cover a wide range of cooperative activities conducted between the university, several of its nine campuses and the intelligence agency, including:

- The UC vice president's two-week tour with the CIA during which he advised the agency on such matters as student unrest, recruiting UC students, academic cover for professors doing research for the CIA and improving the agency's public relations image on UC campuses.

- A series of CIA-sponsored seminars in Berkeley and other locations with professors thought to be friendly to the agency, to share information.

- Providing a steady flow of CIA materials on China and the Soviet Union to CIA-approved professors.

- At least one instance in which a CIA staff person asked a Berkeley political science professor to use his influence to get a CIA agent admitted to Berkeley's political science graduate school. Apparently, the agent's only interest was to pursue academic studies.

The Freedom of Information request on the CIA's relations with the University of California was originally filed in May 1976 by Nathan Gardels, a political science student and UCLA research assistant. The request was endorsed by a number of UC's student and staff groups.

But the CIA has released only a portion of the documents, and the private Center for National Security Studies in Washington joined Gardels to file appeals. The center is expected

this week to file a lawsuit to force the CIA to release the rest of the documents.

As is government practice in releasing documents under the Freedom of Information Act, the names of principal parties are blanked out. An investigation by the Times determined that it was former administrative vice president Earl Clinton Bolton who served an active tour of duty with the CIA in the summer of 1968. Interviews also established the names of several professors referred to in the documents.

Vice Adm. Rufus B. Taylor, former deputy director of the CIA, confirmed Bolton's service, saying he was "brought in because of his expertise in administrative matters involving the knowledge of student affairs."

University officials expressed concern over the documents relating to the role of Bolton, who used University of California letterhead stationery to correspond with Taylor.

UC President David Saxon said Bolton violated university policy by using the letterhead, while Saxon's executive assistant, David Wilson, said Bolton used "poor judgment" in his work with the CIA.

As vice president for administration, Bolton's duties included supervising the university's Washington office and maintaining liaison with headquarters of the Atomic Energy Commission, with the AEC's field agencies and major AEC labs and conducting negotiations for renewal of three major AEC contracts with the university.

Bolton retired from the university in 1970 after 10 years and is now a vice president in the Los Angeles office of Booz Allen and Hamilton, an international management consultant firm. He said he would "neither confirm nor deny" that he spent those two weeks with the CIA at its McLean headquarters in the summer of 1968.

But his presence in McLean at that time has been confirmed through other sources.

Ruling on CIA Cancels The First Amendment

By Tom Collins
Newsday Media Writer

Can an American citizen sign away his rights under the First Amendment? Apparently he can, because it happened to author Victor Marchetti.

It all began when Marchetti submitted his resignation to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1969. One of the first calls he received was from Richard Helms, then the CIA's director, who summoned him to his office for a chat.

After Marchetti explained that he had become disenchanted with the CIA and its covert operations, Helms said, "I don't suppose there's anything I can do to make you change your mind. What are your plans?"

"I think I'm going to write a book," Marchetti said.

"Oh, that's interesting," Helms replied. "If you want us to type it for you, we will."

The CIA didn't type the book, but it did review it for secret information under a contract that Marchetti had signed when he joined the CIA granting the agency censorship powers. That book was a novel, "The Rope Dancers," a fictional account of life in the CIA that criticized the agency.

The CIA censors did not like it, but they allowed it to be published. It wasn't until a few years later, when Marchetti had decided to do a nonfiction book on the CIA, that the agency cracked down.

"I had a meeting in a motel in Arlington with Adm. Rufus Taylor [his old boss at the agency]," Marchetti recalled in a recent telephone interview. "He said, 'Look, Victor, they're very much concerned with what you're doing. Let's make a deal. Don't go on the lecture circuit, be careful what you write and what you say on radio and TV. Write your book and then we will review it and you and the agency can negotiate your differences.' So we agreed on that. I went home and started to work on the book. Then one day about a week later the doorbell rang and it was the U.S. marshals and they had subpoenas and injunctions and things."

Thus began a long and historic legal battle over what now is a celebrated book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by Marchetti and his collaborator, John D. Marks—celebrated because it is the only book ever published in America with paragraph-sized blank spaces and the word DELETED printed in boldface type 16S times.

The legal battle reached a climax on May 27 when the U.S. Supreme Court, for the second time, let stand a federal court ruling that said, in effect, that the CIA had the permanent right to censor anything a former employee wrote—"factual, fictional or otherwise"—about the CIA.

At the heart of the case is the contract Marchetti signed committing him to CIA censorship. His attorney, Melvin L. Wolf, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, argued that the contract "was illegal because it deprived him of his First Amendment rights." The refusal of the Supreme Court to review the case, he says, "is an insult to the First Amendment and jeopardized the court's reputation as a responsible judicial body. It was a failure of their constitutional duty."

The CIA, on the other hand, does not see the Marchetti case as involving the First Amendment, despite the huge gaps in the book's text, and the exercising of "prior restraint"—a phrase that gained prominence during the Pentagon papers case when the courts temporarily suspended publication by newspapers of the government's secret documents on the history of the Vietnam war.

The agency's position is that the contract binding its employees stems from a statutory requirement dating to 1947 that demands that the CIA director protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The reasoning is that the employee surrenders his First Amendment rights and is compensated for the surrender by the salary the CIA pays him. Therefore, the Marchetti case is not a First Amendment issue, according to the agency, but a question of contract. "We feel that the Supreme Court satisfied its duty on two occasions that it was not a First Amendment question," a CIA source close to the case said.

What it comes down to is the agency's fear that vital secrets regarding methods and operations may be revealed by ex-employees and thus jeopardize the national security.

Marchetti, on the other hand, argues that some of the cuts the CIA made in the book were not secret but could be found in the public domain. He claims that the CIA's "secrets" were of the kind that the public should know and that no reasonable interest of the United States would be injured by their disclosure.

In fact, the CIA itself, which labeled his original manuscript "Top Secret Sensitive," waffled on the question of secrecy. It initially demanded 339 deletions. After considerable wrangling with Marchetti and his attorneys, it reduced the number to 163. One court further reduced the deletions to 26 but another court reinstated the number of cuts to 168 and the book was published last year—it is now out in Dell paperback—with that number of deletions while the court contest continued.

An important side effect of the case is how publishing firms will react in the future when presented with a similar manuscript. The publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, has lost money on the book, mainly because of \$150,000 in legal fees. "I'm not sure anyone, including us, would publish a thing like this if they knew ahead of time they would be subjected to this kind of treatment," a Knopf editor said.

Another aspect is that other government agencies with classified stamps can begin requiring the same contractual secrecy obligation for their employees and feel reasonably sure that they will be supported by the Supreme Court.

Marchetti, who was with the CIA from 1955 to 1969 and held sensitive posts in the office of the director, said he has mixed feelings about the Supreme Court's failure to take up the case. On the one hand, he is disappointed, he said, but on the other he takes satisfaction that the agency "can't prevent me from criticizing it, and this action [the CIA's censorship] lends credence to my criticism."

Continued

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RALEIGH, N.C.
NEWS & OBSERVER

M - 130,652
S - 148,247
SEP 23, 1974

STAT

The People's Forum

Former CIA

Incomplete as received.

To the Editor: Your paper may be "Old" but I don't find it very "Reliable," at least not in its editorial comment.

Your Sept. 14 editorial on the CIA creates the impression that CIA operations in Chile were a result solely of a CIA initiative only "approved" by the secretary of state.


As you must know from the "leaked" statements of Director Colby in this and other instances the operations were undertaken at the behest of the Department of State and approved by the President as well as by the secretaries of state and defense, in other words by the core of the National Security Council which sets the policy under which the CIA operates — standard procedure, prescribed by law and fiat.

It has been apparent for some years that a popular pastime of the liberal press is a continuing effort to discredit the CIA. What is not so apparent is that the Soviet Ministry of State Security (The KGB) engages in precisely the same effort through its Department of Disinformation, not as a pastime, but as a deadly serious business of discrediting the United States even within its own borders as well as abroad.

If the CIA operations have become so offensive to the American sense of virtue as expressed by some segments of the press, look to the President and to some 25 or more key members of the Congress for a remedy, not to the CIA, which operates under existing laws and presidential directives as one of our most effective, dedicated, loyal and highly disciplined instruments of national policy.

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (ret.)
Former Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence

Whispering Pines



Banned in McLean

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600320003-7

✓ Victor Marchetti was a high-level clerk and analyst at the CIA until 1969, when he quit because he had become "disenchanted" with the spy business. At the peak of his career he was an executive aide to Admiral Rufus Taylor, deputy director of the agency. Marchetti quit after doing 14 years of CIA paper work because he felt his employers had become "too large, too inefficient, too tribal, too dangerously manipulated by the military. One of the things that bothered me," he said, "was the fact that we continued to perpetuate the cold war, we were over-concerned with what they called 'maintaining stability in the third world,' another way of saying supporting our dictators and reactionary friends. Also, to be frank, age was a factor. My boy scouts were coming back with long hair and beards and saying they didn't want to go to Vietnam. It was a time of personal reevaluation. At the time all I thought was, just get out, the hell with it." He thought he would write some spy novels, make some money and "get established in the writing game." Eventually he planned to write "the kind of fiction I wanted to write in high school."

✓ Marchetti was disappointed when the critics panned his first book, a novel called *The Rope Dancer*, about espionage. "They completely misunderstood it," he complains. But he discovered that reporters were interested in him as news copy. He gave interviews, delivered some lectures and began work on a nonfiction analysis of all that he felt was wrong with US intelligence. He drew up an outline, found a co-author (John Marks, a former foreign service officer) and signed a contract with Knopf to write what was tentatively called *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. Then the CIA's lawyers moved in. Since April 1972 Marchetti has been prohibited by court injunction from showing his manuscript to anyone outside the CIA without its prior approval.

With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union Marchetti appealed his case to the Supreme Court, which denied him a hearing. Marchetti now remains bound by the lower court injunction, which he calls "an outrageous document, written by that juridical master, Clement Haynsworth." It applies to fiction and nonfiction, and apparently it binds him for life. Under threat of contempt charges Marchetti and Marks sent their book to the CIA last month for approval. They were told that 100 pages of the 530 they submitted were unacceptable and would have to be cut. The CIA argued that if published in its present form, the book would compromise national security and violate the CIA's right to protect its "sources and methods." Marchetti, on the other hand, said he put nothing in the book that hadn't already been exposed and that the only names he included were those of high officials ("who are in a sense public") and foreign heads of state.

Legally the case is interesting because it is not being argued as a violation of the espionage statutes, but as a civil dispute. The CIA won its injunction against Marchetti on a principle of business law. Many big corporations require new employees to sign a contract promising not to give away or exploit company secrets when they leave the company, a practice that is generously supported by legal precedent. When Marchetti joined the CIA he pledged not to "divulge, publish or reveal either by word, conduct or by any other means any classified information, intelligence or knowledge . . . unless authorized specifically in writing in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence." So when Marchetti signed his book contract the CIA went straight to court citing his oath and business law precedents. It won an injunction against breach of contract; Marchetti and the ACLU describe their case as a constitutional issue, an unprecedented attempt by the government to censor a book before it has been published. They warn that other government workers may find themselves bound by similar injunctions. Marchetti points out that on August 25 the FBI announced that all employees would be bound by a new secrecy code, enforced through contract pledges like the one he signed at the CIA. When a reporter asked for a legal justification of the new policy, the FBI spokesman cited the Marchetti case.

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Marchetti believes the CIA has taken him to court to harass the book out of existence. He says "The CIA doesn't want the book published. And if we go ahead and publish anyway they want to punish the author to set an example for lots of other guys who are sitting around in the Washington suburbs thinking about what has happened and wanting to comment." Marchetti's only legal recourse now is to challenge each CIA objection individually and try to reinstate the 100 censored pages a word at a time.

Since it is not possible to read the Marchetti manuscript we cannot say whether his suspicions about the agency are justified or not. One former CIA official who has seen parts of the book believes that Marchetti simply used bad judgment, that he might have published his book by now if only he had not used the names of current CIA employees and projects. Marchetti says his book doesn't expose current operations; the CIA says it does and as of now the agency has the upper hand.

(NOTE: Presumed AUTHOR is Elliott Marshall)

SoC 4.01.2 *The Rope Dancer*
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600320003-7

28 JAN 1973

LETTERS

Myth and Madness

WHAT IS THERE about the intelligence business that invites the kind of commentary contained in Thomas Ross's review of *CIA, The Myth and the Madness* (Book World, December 31)? A book is written. Enough of it is true to establish an ambivalence of plausibility for the book as a whole. The balance of the book is made up of statements which are either factually inaccurate or convey impressions that are distorted—not to say perverted—and entirely misleading. It is hard to believe that a trained professional reporter would swallow a hodgepodge of tales and gossip about any other sector of activity, inside or outside the government, with such gullible abandon. Why be so free with the intelligence community?

To turn to the case in point, the reviewer remarks in an introductory passage that the book is "flawed" by "bad writing, bad taste and bad logic." On most subjects this would suggest need for caution about the validity of the book as a whole. But not, apparently, where charges against the intelligence community are concerned, and the reviewer goes on to repeat a number of "startling disclosures, allegations and horror stories." These include a number of peculiarly repulsive attacks on Richard Helms alleging Byzantine maneuvering on his part—and worse—to destroy his competitors.

It is easy enough to see how the latrines of the government could spew forth this kind of stuff. It is not easy to see how a responsible publisher should publish it or why a responsible journalist would wish to give it credence.

These charges in fact are all easily refutable. For example, Helms is charged with "destroying" his former deputy, Admiral Rufus Taylor. Even the most casual acquaintance of Admiral Taylor knows that he agreed to remain on active service to become deputy director of central intelligence in 1965 with the greatest reluctance. He had meant to retire at the expiration of his service as director of naval intelligence but was persuaded to remain for another year as director of DIA. What he wanted to do personally was to fix up a place which he had recently ac-

quired in South Carolina and indulge his interests in wildlife preservation and game management. When asked to stay on for still another term and serve as Helms's deputy he, in effect, agreed to postpone felicity a little longer because of what he considered the call of duty.

Far from destroying him Helms made every effort to keep Admiral Taylor in government service and only forwarded his resignation to the President at his insistence and with genuine and deep regret. This suggests the general level of authenticity of the other "disclosures, allegations and horror stories" insofar as they involve circumstances with which I am personally familiar.

This brings us to the question of censorship. Under the Marchetti case, which Ross appears to deplore, the Supreme Court held in effect that a former employee of CIA could be restrained from publishing material that he had promised not to publish. The fact that disclosure of the material which is "suppressed" would, in the opinion of responsible officials, compromise national security hardly makes the Marchetti rule an iniquitous one. However that may be, the McGarvey book, being subject to the same rule of law, was presumably subject to review and "censorship" by CIA.

Assuming that this was in fact the case, one concludes that the censor's hand is not a heavy one. One can presume that only a very few items which clearly compromised the security of on-going operational activity or some other sensitive security interest were deleted. The director of central intelligence is apparently prepared to overlook personal abuse—no matter how preposterous or invidious—and general charges of incompetence and irresponsibility—no matter how ill-founded.

Why? Partly, I suppose, because the record of efforts to refute some of the wilder charges leveled against CIA and the intelligence community has been so discouraging. Ask to see the manuscript, prior to publication, of a book about intelligence operations and official policy by an author who could not possibly have anything better than third hand access to the actual facts about a given incident and a wild cry of "escape tactics" and "censorship" goes up.

Attempt to establish an effective

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about

as DCI, are responsible, and you are immediately accused, as witness this review and book, of "blunting the investigative spirit of the major newspapers and magazines by taking their correspondents to lunch." Try to correct inaccuracies and false impressions by telling the "whole truth" about a particular situation or incident and see what that does to the security of your sources and methods.

Perhaps the best reason why those in charge of American intelligence prefer to let these allegations go unchallenged is their confidence that the American people, on balance, recognize garbage when they see it.

Any reasonable person would agree that incompetence and blunders are fair game for any reporter. What my former colleagues in the intelligence services deplore and find incomprehensible is what appears to be the deliberate tilting, to coin an expression, of the image of their activities in a discreditable balance. It is easy to understand why our adversaries abroad would wish, by inference, misrepresentation or otherwise, to paint a picture of American intelligence which is as dark and delinquent as possible. But why should American citizens contribute to this tilting process? And what creditable purpose does it serve?

JOHN A. BROSS STAT
McLean, Virginia