


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NEW YORK TIMES
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29 March, 1985



STAT

EXECUTIVE CHANGES

- Mitre Corp., Bedford, Mass., a system engineering organization, has elected to its board James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of both the Departments of Defense and Energy, and Director of Central Intelligence.

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7 February 1985

STAT

Schlesinger Says Distrust Hinders Foreign Policy

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 6 — Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger asserted today that President Reagan's main difficulty in winning support for his Pentagon budget, Nicaragua policy and missile defense proposal was Congressional distrust of Administration objectives and credibility.

"A national consensus cannot simply be wished into being," he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "It can be restored only gradually over time, if at all. It will come about only through the development of mutual trust, reasonable success and the sustained credibility of the executive branch."

In a review of American foreign policy, Mr. Schlesinger called President Reagan's hope for a total strategic defense to protect American cities an illusory plan that would cost "well over half a trillion dollars and probably will exceed a trillion." Moreover, he said, the "Star Wars" proposal shatters political consensus by breaking with nation's past strategic doctrine.

The Budget's Influence

Mr. Schlesinger, who has served in both Republican and Democratic Administrations, asserted that "there is no way" the Administration can sustain its military buildup in the face of enormous deficits without a tax increase. So long as there are sharp divisions on the budget, he added, it is virtually impossible to obtain a consensus on foreign policy.

On Central America, he said the debate over whether to resume aid to

Nicaraguan rebels was less influenced now by policy considerations than by the breakdown of trust between the executive and legislative branches of government because, he said, the Administration had not openly spelled out clear and consistent objectives.

"Nicaragua has moved beyond a substantive issue to an issue of trust between the two branches," he said in response to questioning by Senator Richard G. Lugar, the committee chairman, who has organized hearings on

the broad scope of foreign policy.

"That issue of distrust has to be resolved," Mr. Schlesinger added. "This is an issue that transcends the oversight function of the intelligence committees because they are not charged with judging policy."

The central theme of his broad-gauged assessment of American power and commitments abroad was that no administration could sustain a policy unless it maintained credibility with Congress. He drew on his experience as Secretary of Defense under Presidents Nixon and Ford, Director of Central Intelligence under President Nixon and Energy Secretary under President Carter.

Under questioning by Senator Larry Pressler, a South Dakota Republican, Mr. Schlesinger quickly took issue with President Reagan's hope that his "Star Wars" proposal would render nuclear weapons obsolete.

"The notion of a defense that will protect American cities is one that will not be achieved, but it is that goal that supplies the political magic, as it were, in the President's vision," he said. But he found a more limited defense, shielding American land-based missiles "well worth examining."

Mr. Schlesinger took sharp issue with estimates that a limited defense would cost only about \$60 billion. That, he said, was an unconvincing estimate and a come-on price to gain support. The actual costs, he said, would be much higher but could not be known until more research was done.

In a broadly analytical opening statement, Mr. Schlesinger asserted that since the early postwar period Amer-

ican foreign policy had suffered from two major problems: first, a decline in American power without a matching decline in overseas commitments, and second, a breakdown in the political consensus behind foreign policy since the Vietnam War, which brought increasing Congressional assertiveness.

Despite Congressional cries for reducing American commitments abroad, Mr. Schlesinger argued against moves to "reduce or jettison" such commitments, saying these might embolden "predatory powers" to challenge American interests.

He sided with Secretary of State George P. Shultz in his policy debate with Secretary of Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, who has argued against American involvement in wars abroad without public approval in advance.

"I cannot concur with the emerging belief that the United States must only fight popular, winnable wars," he said. "The role of the United States in the world is such that it must be prepared for, be prepared to threaten and even be prepared to fight those intermediate conflicts that are likely to fare poorly on television."

He said he meant conflicts between such "glorious little wars" as the quick seizure of Grenada and a longer, full-scale conventional war in Europe.

But under questioning by Senator Christopher J. Dodd, a Connecticut Democrat, he warned repeatedly that the Administration would have to make greater efforts to restore its credibility with Congress by setting out its objectives clearly.

Schlesinger Says Nation 'Has Lost Preeminence'

Associated Press

Former defense secretary James R. Schlesinger said yesterday the United States "has lost its preeminence" among the superpowers and will face a long period of risk and likely inability to meet its commitments around the world.

"While [the United States] remains the leading nation on the international scene," he said, "its power, which earlier was scarcely disputable, is now very much disputable."

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Schlesinger said there is no longer a national consensus on foreign policy, especially in providing military aid to allies in such countries as Nicaragua and Lebanon.

"The upshot is that our commitments will remain large and that our military power will remain more modest in relation to those commitments than it has been in the past," said Schlesinger, who also has been energy secretary and CIA director.

Schlesinger, who served in the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations, was one of a series of former top officials called to testify before the committee, which is undertaking a broad review of foreign policy under President Reagan.

He said there is almost always public support for "glorious little wars" like the U.S. invasion of Grenada as long as they are quick and successful.

Schlesinger noted the deaths of more than 300 Americans in Lebanon and the subsequent withdrawal of Marines from that country and said, "It is useful to have a Grenada to trump a loser like Beirut."

"But from the national perspective such easy victories resolve remarkably little," he said. "If a conflict is sufficiently easy to be a 'glorious war,' it is certain to be marginal to our interests."

Meanwhile, conflicts such as those in Korea and South Vietnam that require staying power and are

"not a clearcut winner will not long enjoy public enthusiasm," he said.

Besides painting a generally pessimistic view of U.S. ability to project diplomatic and military power around the world, Schlesinger jumped into a running disagreement between Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and Secretary of State George P. Shultz about the use of American military power overseas.

Weinberger has said there should be no U.S. military involvement without broad popular support, and Shultz has advocated preemptive attacks against would-be terrorists.

Schlesinger said both are wrong. "I cannot concur with the emerging belief that the United States must only fight popular, winnable wars," he said, adding: "I for one do not believe that there is a political base in this country for American preemption against terrorist groups."

Nonetheless, he said the United States must be prepared to retaliate selectively "in the face of repeated provocations."

Reagan's goal of creating a "Star Wars" strategic defense system in space that will forever neutralize Soviet nuclear offensive weapons will never happen, said Schlesinger.

Estimating the cost of "Star Wars" at between \$500 million and \$1 trillion, he said the Soviets would develop new, sophisticated cruise missiles and submarine-based weapons that would offset the satellite system.

Moreover, he said, creating a kind of "Astrodome" defense over the United States would also create serious divisions among European allies fearful that the United States would defend only itself and not the alliance against Soviet attack.

As a former Pentagon chief, Schlesinger said he was sympathetic to Weinberger's fear of deep budget cuts. But with \$200 billion deficits forecast, he said, the administration cannot defend the size of its military buildup.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 February 1985

STAT

Excerpts From Schlesinger's Senate Testimony

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 6 — Following are excerpts from the testimony of former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today on American commitments abroad:

The United States has lost its pre-eminence. While it remains the leading nation on the international scene, its power, which earlier was scarcely disputable, is now very much disputable. Simultaneously — and not simply by coincidence — national unity has been fractured — both in terms of the national consensus and in terms of the agreement between the executive and the legislative branches.

In short, these changes imply that the costs and risks of sustaining our international position have risen. Despite the relative decline of American power, not only in relation to the Soviet Union but even in relation to some third world countries, the degree of American commitment worldwide has generally not altered.

The unchanged state of U.S. commitments accompanied by the relative decline of American power and the evaporation of national unity have led to two distinct gaps. These are the commitments-power and the consensus-policy gaps.

The Central Commitment

The central foreign policy commitment of the United States since World War II has been to sustain a free Europe — and it is to this commitment that the overall cost and structure of the American military establishment has primarily been addressed.

From time to time attempts have been made to curb our involvement in other parts of the world, which appear less central to American foreign policy.

For any great power — and most notably the protecting superpower of the West — to back away from commitments is more easily said than done.

In practice, the loss in prestige may actually reduce our power more than the reduced claims on our military resources enhances that power. In that may lie the supreme irony. Closing the power-commitments gap may not be possible through reduction of commitments. The United States, as a great power, has essentially taken on the task of sustaining the international order. And any abandonment of major commitments is difficult to reconcile with that imposing task.

The upshot is that our commitments will remain large and that our

military power will remain more modest in relation to those commitments than it has been in the past. That implies a degree of risk that we must acknowledge and accept. Try as we will there is no acceptable way that we can escape from either these responsibilities or these risks.

Vietnam Brought Change

It is, of course, the recognition of these costs and risks that has led to the so called consensus-policy gap. Fulfilling our commitments was relatively simple in the past. When we had the visible power simply to smash our potential foes — as in the 50's and 60's — there was little difficulty in sustaining domestic agreement. Vietnam brought a sea change in domestic attitudes. The human and financial costs of conflict were brought home to the American public.

Since then there has been a notable reluctance to see American forces become engaged notably in third areas of the world.

In such places as Lebanon or Central America there is little question regarding the raw physical power of the United States to impose its will. There is no power-commitment gap but rather a consensus-policy gap. Other nations have come to doubt not the abstract power of the United States to achieve its goals but rather its staying power in sustaining them.

Consensus and Power

Thus, ultimately we are faced with a paradox. In dealing with what is the central strategic problem of the United States, the formidable capa-

bilities of the Soviet Union in relation to finite American power, there is at base a domestic consensus — with respect to both protection of the North American continent and our obligations in Europe. Yet paradoxically, it is here in this arena in which the consensus is not seriously challenged that we may face a real gap between power and commitments.

By contrast, in much of the third world, in which our power is certainly commensurate with our commitments, there is simply no domestic consensus regarding the prospective use of force. Thus, overall, in all parts of the world we are likely to have to contend with at least one of the two gaps. Such is the penalty for the loss of our postwar pre-eminence.

These perplexities lie behind the disputes between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. In effect, the Secretary of Defense has insisted upon domestic consensus be-

fore U.S. forces become employed. Given the circumstances, that is indeed a demanding requirement. Were it to be rigorously implemented, it would virtually assure other powers that they can count on not facing American forces.

The Likeliest Challenges

Much as I personally sympathize with the concerns of the Department of Defense in the post-Vietnam era, I cannot concur with the emerging belief that the United States must only fight popular, winnable wars.

The likeliest physical challenges to the United States come in the third world — not in Europe or North America. If the more predatory states in the third world are given assurance that they can employ, directly or indirectly, physical force against American interests with impunity, they will feel far less restraint in acting against our interests.

Americans historically have embraced crusades — such as World War II — as well as glorious little wars. The difficulty is that the most likely conflicts of the future fall between crusades and such brief encounters as Grenada or Mayaguez.

Yet these in-between conflicts have weak public support. Even the best of times — with national unity and at the height of our power — public enthusiasm for Korea and Vietnam evaporated in just a year or two.

The problem is that virtually no opportunity exists for future crusades — and those glorious wars are likely to occur infrequently. The role of the United States in the world is such that it must be prepared for, be prepared to threaten, and even be prepared to fight those intermediate conflicts — that are likely to fare poorly on television.

No Way Out

Is there a path out of these perplexities? I wish I could suggest one to you. However, there is none. We shall have to bear continuously a degree of risk that is unwelcome.

In the aggregate, our international commitments exceed our capabilities to fulfill all of them simultaneously. Prudent planners will argue that we are running a bluff. Worriers will simply worry. But in fact it will represent the conscious acceptance of risk — and a conviction that not everything will go wrong simultaneously.

WASHINGTON TIMES

1 February 1985

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ON PAGE 1C

CORD MEYER

Scenario for a Bay of Pigs?

Even before he has had a chance to savor his massive electoral victory, President Ronald Reagan finds himself on a collision course with the Democratic majority in the House over the covert aid the United States has been giving the Contras fighting in Nicaragua.

In the Senate, the new chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Dave Durenberger, R-Minn., is telling the administration that the only way to save the arms aid to the guerrillas is to go public.

To deepen Mr. Reagan's dilemma, the influential voices of former CIA directors Richard Helms and James Schlesinger are being raised to warn that the heavy involvement of the intelligence agency in this controversial and no-longer-secret project is eroding the agency's support in Congress over the long term.

Rolling with these punches, Mr. Reagan has made it clear that he has no intention of abandoning the Contras by permanently cutting their supply lines. But he has agreed that all possible ways of assisting the guerrillas be explored to see if there are practical options other than CIA funding. Since the vote on whether to renew the CIA arms aid cannot be held until March, the administration has a month to decide on its strategy.

It is likely that few decisions in the next four years will more profoundly affect the American position in the world and Mr. Reagan's place in the history books than how he manages this enormously difficult dilemma involving the future of Central America. In their initial review of the available options, Reagan officials are finding no easy alternative solutions, and the renewal of quasi-secret CIA funding may turn out to be the only realistic way of helping the Contras.

At first glance, Mr. Durenberger's proposal to make the arms assistance available by open vote as part of the foreign aid package has the appeal of forthrightness and simplicity. But under the law, the United States can only give such military aid to duly recognized governments or international entities and the president would have to report openly to Congress within 60 days and obtain the support of both Houses.

In effect, "going public" with military aid to the Contras would require breaking relations with the Nicaraguan government and giving some kind of formal recognition to the main guerrilla group. A U.S. Congress that balks at quiet support to the Contras is not ready for a virtual declaration of war against the Sandinista regime that would eliminate the remaining possibility of negotiation, persuasion, and pressure.

Until the conclusion is reached that there is no hope of getting the Sandinistas to agree to an open society and free elections, a complete diplomatic break is premature. At present, it would not have the support of most Latin countries nor of our European allies.

If publicly voted U.S. arms aid to the Contras is a mirage, there remains the possibility that friendly third countries might be persuaded to provide the arms the U.S. Congress is reluctant to supply. In fact, one or two governments have stepped in to assist the Contras since the U.S. aid was suspended last May.

But this assistance was a stop-gap measure designed to see the Contras through to the promised renewal of U.S. aid this year. If it becomes clear that the United States is permanently terminating its aid, there is little hope that others will help when they see the United States is unwilling to protect its own vital interests.

If it turns out that CIA funding, with all its drawbacks, is the only feasible way of supplying the Contras, Reagan officials believe that the predictably disastrous conse-

quences of American withdrawal can change enough votes to save the aid. A decision to cut off the Contras would amount to a congressionally mandated Bay of Pigs and would send out the signal that the United States has again proved to be an unreliable ally.

The Sandinistas would take the U.S. pullout as a green light for a major offensive with their helicopter gunships to crush the Contras and to impose a militarized state on the Cuban pattern. The democratic opposition groups that still exist openly inside Nicaragua have consistently warned that the Contra threat is their only protection against a Sandinista crackdown.

Released from the necessity of defending its own territory from the Contra attacks, the large Sandinista army would be freed to step up the flow of arms and trained guerrillas into El Salvador and Guatemala. A very major increase in the American assistance programs to Honduras and Costa Rica would be necessary over many years to have a chance of preventing their retreat into a frightened neutrality. Aid to the Contras is cheap at the price, when the cost of its withdrawal is soberly calculated.

Finally, the Reagan administration can make a strong case that a renewal of aid to the guerrillas at this critical moment could have a dramatic impact on the Nicaraguan civil war. Symbolizing American determination to stay the course, this decision would present the Sandinistas a choice between the eventual risk of defeat or the holding of the genuinely free elections they once promised.

Cord Meyer is a nationally syndicated columnist.

STAT

22 December 1984

Debate on Security: Educated Views

STAT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21 — The debate on national security versus freedom of information, long a staple in Washington, dominated discussion in the capital this week. It was prompted by The Washington Post's publication of details of the secret payload of the space shuttle mission scheduled for next month, and the condemnation of the newspaper's article by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger.

The New York Times sought comments on the controversy from several Washingtonians prominent in the fields of national security and the press. Excerpts follow.

Gen. David C. Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Unfortunately, we have arrived at a point of great confrontation between the press and the Government on national security issues and I hope that we can come to an understanding on the needs of a free press and the needs of national security.

At this point, I think that we have gone too far in revealing information with an impact on national security. The combination of leaks, a reporter putting together bits and pieces of information, creates lots of problems between the Government and the media.

I may be prejudiced, but I feel that when in doubt, you should lean toward the national security side.

Eric Sevareid, television commentator:

A great illusion exists about national security. Our true security lies in peace itself. Our weaponry and soldiery provide the first line of defense of our territory and our vital interests abroad. But our first line of defense of peace lies in the preservation of America's free institutions and civil liberties, including the First Amendment liberties.

If we gradually become like the Soviets — secretive, paranoid, politically neurotic — then world tensions would ultimately become unbearable. Hitler said that the strength of the totalitarian states is that they force their enemies to imitate them. I have an unhappy feeling that this Administration, however unintentionally, is edging us down that path.

Stansfield M. Turner, Director of Central Intelligence under President Carter:

I think the press is being very hypocritical. Most agreed with Weinberger on the need for secrecy and then when The Post published their story, which

was unconscionable, all the others used it as excuse to go ahead and print. One day the mission deserves secrecy and then the next they jump on the bandwagon.

I think the press ought to apply the following rule: Is what they are going to print really going to educate the American people? The details of the satellite The Washington Post printed were not issues of particular importance to the American public.

I. F. Stone, the journalist:

One thing puzzles me. This is the first time in my 44 years in Washington that I have ever heard of calling a press conference to announce that you were going to do something secret. If you want to keep a hold on it and secret, why scurry around town asking people please not to print it? That's the surest way of getting it in print.

Now, the second thing that bothers me is that this test on Jan. 23 is going to be a shuttle that is going to carry some commercial testing and some military testing. If you really want to keep it secret, why not carry off military testing under the cover of a commercial test?

Of course, I am not arguing that there is never an occasion when a government has no right to withhold information. Every law, including homicide, has its exceptions, but its irrelevant to an incident in which the Pentagon flaunts a secret operation as if to deliberately invite maximum visibility.

William E. Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence:

Government has a legitimate call for secrecy for some of its activities and there is a tension between that and the desire of public and the press especially to know everything. I think that this tension is healthy. It's part of our constitutional system.

There is however, some information that should not be revealed. It remains a judgment call that we wrestle with every day.

On occasion the press has revealed

things when they shouldn't have and on occasion I'm sure the Government has withheld information when it wasn't entirely necessary.

I think that this Administration is trying to get better discipline than perhaps there was in the past.

James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence:

Balancing the claims of press freedom and security must ultimately rest on a rule of reason. This society, quite rightly, is unprepared to sacrifice either. For this reason one grows uneasy in times that the press and government are hurling absolutes at one another. It is regrettable and risky that the Government cannot maintain security for its essential though fragile intelligence activities.

But security has been breaking down for a generation. That breakdown reflects a loss of national consensus policy. Not only is the press less inhibited. Not only has the Congress been brought into such matters (members and staff are not invariably reticent!). Above all, there has been a breakdown of discipline within the executive branch.

To preserve secrecy, especially in a democracy, security must be part of an accepted pattern of behavior, outside of government and inside. Regrettably, we no longer have such a pattern.

Restoring effective security arrangements, short of a sense of shared and immediate danger, can only come from within the executive branch and by example. Unless the nation's leaders demonstrate that they respect the security rules and will not violate those rules to score political points against rivals or make their speeches more colorful, those further down the hierarchy will continue gushing (euphemistically called "leaking"). Rather than being prepared to suspend curiosity in selected areas, the press will find it too tempting to refrain from publishing the wealth of information all too readily available.

STAT

20 December 1984

A Public Call for Secrecy

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 — The Reagan Administration's effort to impose tight secrecy on the next mission of the space shuttle reflects both an urge to protect national security interests and what some intelligence specialists see as a broader, long-term drive to curb the flow of information on such issues to the press and public.

Former Government officials support the Administration's assertions that this country has a legitimate need to keep Moscow in the dark about its satellite technology. But they quickly add that by making such a highly publicized shift to secrecy in the civilian space program, the Administration has evoked a foreseeable reaction and may have undermined its stated goal of denying Moscow information about a new generation of American intelligence satellites.

The Administration has drawn attention to the shuttle flight for Jan. 23, they say, thus alerting the Soviet Union to its importance, and in effect inviting closer scrutiny from the press and public.

Beyond that, the episode has touched off a political controversy over how far

the Government needs to go in putting pressure on the press to protect security information without crimping policy debate on arms in space. This echoes earlier controversies over the Reagan Administration efforts to tighten up on policies and practices it inherited.

In early 1982, Caspar W. Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense, subjected more than a score of top Pentagon officials to polygraph, or lie-detector, tests to try to trace the source of one dispatch about the country's future military needs. After that, William P. Clark, then national security adviser, drafted a Presidential order requiring high officials to accept lifetime censorship of their public writings and disclosures, a move eventually blocked by Congress.

In the satellite case, Secretary Weinberger asserted that a Washington Post article today on the next shuttle mission represented the kind of disclosure that "can only give aid and comfort to the enemy." However, Congressional

specialists replied that from previously published technical literature and from Congressional testimony, anyone else could have foreseen that the United States was preparing to launch new electronic intelligence satellites to monitor Soviet radio traffic.

"The Congressional intelligence committees have made not the least secret of the fact that we've provided funds for verification methods in space," said Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, former vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "The details are confidential and should be kept confidential. But I saw nothing in that article that you wouldn't just naturally know if you knew anything at all about this subject."

But Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, the new committee vice chairman, called The Post's article "damaging" to American interests and said that if its details were accurate the information would definitely be of value to the Soviet Union. Mr. Leahy said he was most concerned about who in the Administration gave away the information in the first place and that he would ask the Justice Department and the Defense Department to determine who was responsible.

Schlesinger Cites Precedent

What apparently produced a severe jolt in political Washington, several former high officials suggested, was the Government's abrupt effort to impose secrecy on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, founded two decades ago as a civilian agency dedicated to open, peaceful missions in space.

James R. Schlesinger, a former Defense Secretary and Director of Central Intelligence, said that the Air Force and Central Intelligence Agency had managed to launch military and intelligence satellites through the years in relative secrecy by establishing a pattern of operation that won public and press acceptance. But in this case, he observed, the Administration dramatically changed both the routine and the nature of the civilian space agency.

"If the Defense Department wanted to keep this particular mission classified, it chose the worst possible approach," Mr. Schlesinger said. "By throwing the spotlight on this mission, it produced an enticement for people to go after what the mission was about and then to publish what they found out.

"If the objective was re-establishing the capability of the Air Force in the long run to have a classified satellite launch, that's understandable. But if the objective was to keep this particular mission classified, it was almost inevitable that something would leak. Breaking the routine of the shuttle flights and the NASA tradition of 20 years was bound to call attention to this mission."

Another intelligence specialist, speaking on condition of not being identified, said that by holding a news conference on Monday to announce the new policy and then publicizing Mr.

Weinberger's efforts to prod the press into cooperating, the Administration had also put the Soviet Union on notice that it had important missions coming up.

Defending the legitimacy of tight security on the military functions and detailed operation of satellites, intelligence specialists point to history. One specialist said that the American KH-11 photo reconnaissance satellite operated in the mid-1970's for a year without Soviet detection until a Pentagon clerk sold Soviet agents a manual.

Until that security breach, this specialist said, the Soviet Union was unable to develop countermeasures to balk the intelligence-gathering capacity of the KH-11. He added that for six months more, Moscow was unaware that the United States had a second satellite like it in orbit, meaning that for at least six months more, it operated without being disrupted.

But this same specialist saw little justification in the Administration's announced intention to keep the time of launching secret for the Jan. 23 mission, because the preparations for such space shuttle launches at Cape Canaveral are visible to anyone on the highways and beaches in the region.

Defense Department officials today

indicated that the anger in the Pentagon toward The Washington Post was more over its defiance of Mr. Weinberger's appeals not to publish information on the mission than over any specific security breach.

"My impression is that it has to do more with procedures," said Fred C. Iklé, Under Secretary of Defense for policy. "The Secretary of Defense talked to a number of the networks, not to go with some stories, and they complied. Then The Washington Post has a story. It undermines a process which was accepted by editors and publishers that abstain from printing."

Speculation on Invoking Fight

Mr. Iklé has been one of the Administration's most vigorous advocates of tighter legal restrictions. At a conference at Princeton University on Dec. 1, he told reporters, Government officials and academics that the Administration was likely to seek legislation to in-

crease penalties against officials who disclosed security information to the press.

"The laws are not adequate," he asserted. "We have decided to fight it on all fronts."

Some knowledgeable intelligence specialists said that the Pentagon might have anticipated and welcomed

a political clash with the press on the shuttle issue, confident of public support because of President Reagan's overwhelming re-election and polls indicating public displeasure with the press.

One suggested that after many internal battles over the Pentagon budget, Mr. Weinberger might have calculated that a clash with some press institutions might make him a rallying point in the Administration and for the President personally. If controversy leads to Congressional efforts to make the Air Force less dependent on the space shut-

tle program for launching its satellites, some suggested this would strengthen the Air Force hand in the battle for money and authority for its own satellite launching program.

But a more common reaction was that Mr. Weinberger's vehemence reflected both the Administration's general conviction that more controls are needed and its reversal of the policy of greater openness established under the Carter Administration. Mr. Carter had issued orders to try to reduce the amount of secret material and to make more of it public, but Mr. Reagan has issued orders seeking to tighten controls and insure that more, not less information, is kept secret.