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(TEXT) WASHINGTON MARCH 5 TASS -- BY TASS CORRESPONDENT
ALEKSANDR LYUTYY:

JOHN MCMAHON, FIRST DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, HAS RESIGNED FROM HIS POST FOR "PERSONAL REASONS".

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN ACCEPTED HIS RESIGNATION AND APPOINTED TO THE POST ROBERT GATES, THE AGENCY'S DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE.

ACCORDING TO UPI NEWS AGENCY, SEVERAL EXTREME RIGHT-WING ORGANIZATIONS LED BY THE REACTIONARY FREE THE EAGLE GROUPING HAVE SOUGHT MCMAHON'S RESIGNATION FOR SEVERAL MONTHS BECAUSE HE, AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS IN CHARGE OF THE CIA'S CLANDESTINE SPY NETWORK FROM 1978 TO 1981. DOUBTED THE ADVISABILITY OF PROVIDING ARMAMENTS TO ANTI-AFGHAN BANDITS THROUGH CIA CHANNELS.

STAT

EVEN IF THE CHARGES AGAINST MCMAHON WERE UNTRUE, THE ADMINISTRATION, AS NEWS ANALYSTS BELIEVE, COULD NOT KEEP IN THE AGENCY'S NO. 2 POST A PERSON WHOSE COMMITMENT TO THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AFGHANISTAN WAS IN DOUBT.

5 MAR 1116Z CML

Soviets lead in laser beam weapons for space shield


First of five parts

By Tom Diaz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Soviet labor battalions have worked for years in the cold clear air of the high mountain near Dushanbe in the Tajik Socialist People's Republic, patiently hacking a giant military facility out of the rock at 7,000 feet.

Just as patiently, U.S. spy satellites orbiting overhead have photographed the progress of the work. Its significance only recently has become clear to intelligence analysts.

There at the top of the world, where the Soviet Union borders Afghanistan, the Soviets are building what U.S. officials now believe will be a powerful laser-beam weapon capable of knocking down U.S. satellites and perhaps ballistic missiles.



A senior administration official, who asked not to be identified, said the Dushanbe site underscores the lead the Kremlin enjoys in key areas of the high technology that is being explored by the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, the missile defense program proposed by President Reagan in March 1983.

"They have some very interesting facilities right now

which we do not fully understand, but which have the potential in a few years of giving them at the very least, strong ground-based, directed-energy [laser] capabilities against satellites, if not a beginning and emerging capability against ballistic missiles," the source said.

The site at Dushanbe, he said, "hasn't yet put out a single photon."

"But it's a big, big construction site that has been under way for a long time," he said. "It appears to be a major directed-energy facility composed of multiple elements, and our best estimate today is that it could well be a ground-based laser."

He and other U.S. officials believe the Soviets will be the first to deploy a working laser weapon, despite the great progress the United States has made in its SDI research program, popularly known as "star wars."

"Things are progressing at a rather incredible rate," Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson, director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office, said in a recent interview.

Many U.S. officials are confident that America can build an effective missile shield before the end of the century. But their official public forecasts are hedged by caution.

"There's a lot of science yet that we have to do, and even more engineering," Gen. Abrahamson said at a November press conference. "But I'm confident that the job can be done. The real question is just how fast and what is the best way."

The enthusiastic reports have done little to quell the debate over SDI.

Powerful political voices oppose the very idea of ballistic missile defense and some scientists remain skeptical of the claimed scientific advances.

Their skepticism contrasts sharply with the optimism of the March 1983 speech in which Mr. Reagan called upon scientists "to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."

Four prominent opponents of SDI ripped into Mr. Reagan's proposal in an article appearing in the winter 1984-85 issue of "Foreign Affairs," that has become holy writ in the anti-SDI ranks.

The authors were former National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Sovietologist and former Ambassador George F. Kennan, former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, chairman of the Arms Control Association and chief negotiator of the 1972 SALT I treaty.

"We believe the president's initiative to be a classic case of good intentions that will have bad results because they do not respect reality," they wrote. "What is centrally and fundamentally wrong with the president's objective is that it cannot be achieved."

The core of their case was that a 100 percent effective missile defense shield is technically impossible. A shield less than perfect is worse than no shield at all, because it will encourage the Soviets to build more missiles to overwhelm it, and deal arms control a fatal blow.

But supporters of SDI say a missile defense need not be perfect to be effective. In any case, they say, the

Soviet missile defense program is roaring ahead. The SDI program has proven its worth in the arms control field by spurring the Soviets to return to stalled talks in Geneva, the supporters argue. Eventually, it will lead to massive reductions in offensive nuclear arms, phased in while both sides are sheltered behind defensive shields.

For now, most opponents concede, the pro-SDI forces are ahead in the debate. Congress has approved an ambitious research program, originally scheduled to spend \$27 billion between 1985 and 1990 but pruned by about one-fifth in each of the last two fiscal years.

SDI critics say the president has the edge only because he hasn't put a specific system for deployment on the table. That won't happen until the early 1990s. Once specific proposals are made, opponents say, the debate will get much hotter. The American people then will have to decide two grand questions: Can it be done? Should it be done?

Americans already have seen a cartoon version of the debate in television ads produced by SDI proponents and opponents. But the arguments that will ultimately determine the fate of SDI involve not cartoons, but the world of nuclear strategy and arms control.

In that dark and mysterious world, two basic camps are powerfully divided by widely different views on two key issues:

- The nature of the Soviet Union, its military force and its intentions for the use of that force.
- The reach and grasp of modern science and technology.

The camps drew battle lines over these two issues long before Mr. Reagan's 1983 speech. Many of the same people slugged their way through a similar debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The opponents of ballistic missile defense won that debate. Their victory is enshrined in the 1972 SALT I Anti-ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty, which forbids either country to develop, test or deploy a national ABM system — the kind SDI envisions — or any of its components.

To understand the ABM treaty, one must refer to the grim logic of nuclear deterrence, and the concept of "mutually assured destruction" (known as "MAD") on which it is based.

For a decade after World War II, the United States held an effective

Continued

17 January 1986

To Check on the CIA, Send In the B Team

By EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN

The ambiguous nature of secret intelligence is often not fully appreciated, especially by top Central Intelligence Agency executives who boast that they are privy to the intentions of the Kremlin through sources that report to them directly from its inner sanctum, the KGB.

The "facts" that proceed from secret intelligence are not discrete objects, like marbles, that can easily be separated by color, lined up and counted. They tend to change their shape, color and meaning depending on how, and by whom, they are arranged.

Consider the case of Vitaly S. Yurchenko. He came to Washington last August as a "defector" from the highest stratum of the KGB. Then, after the deputy director of the CIA, John N. McMahon, had staked his reputation on the quality of Yurchenko's information and CIA Director William J. Casey had proclaimed him "for real," Yurchenko returned to Moscow.

Despite this embarrassment, Casey continued to assert that Yurchenko had provided extraordinarily important information to the CIA during his curious visit. That very same week, on the basis of a briefing about the case by his national-security staff, President Reagan said categorically that "the information he provided was not anything new or sensational." He added that the putative defector had told the CIA nothing more than it "already knew."

Clearly the CIA director and his deputy, and the President and his national-security adviser, had looked at the same set of secret intelligence "facts" from the same defector, but they arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions about their value.

The issue goes far deeper than the credibility of a single defector. It cuts to the

core of the CIA's assumptions about Soviet deception. Does, for example, the KGB systematically attempt to mislead American intelligence by allowing its agents to reveal misleading data? The CIA's current position on this vexing question, as stated in a letter sent to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, is that it can find no evidence of such kinds of deception on strategic issues in the past 20 years. Counterintelligence experts outside the government, such as those at the Rand Corp., reached the opposite conclusion.

The problem can be resolved neither by insiders, who are committed to a denial of deceptions, nor outsiders, who lack access to the highly classified data. Nor does the evidence speak for itself. What is needed to break this conceptual logjam, if only on a temporary basis, is another "B Team."

The B-Team idea stretches back a decade, when George Bush was the CIA director. Data from reconnaissance satellites had raised serious doubts about the CIA's assessment of Soviet bomber and ballistic strategy. The question again was not the raw data but what might be missing from it. In order to settle the matter, Bush appointed two teams to look at the same data. The A Team, headed by Howard Stoertz, the CIA's national intelligence officer on the Soviet Union, consisted entirely of CIA insiders; those on the B Team, headed by Richard Pipes, a professor of Russian history at Harvard, were all outsiders (with proper clearances) who were not committed to any prevailing view of Soviet strategy.

The most dramatic result of this unprecedented competition was a radical reassessment of the Soviet threat, based on the B Team's conclusion that the CIA had seriously underestimated the accuracy of

Soviet missiles. It also shook up much of the complacency at the CIA.

Casey, at his confirmation hearings, suggested that there was definite value in these kinds of competitive analysis. If so, the current crisis in counterintelligence presents a golden opportunity for a new B Team.

The team should be chosen by Casey, not in his capacity as the director of the CIA but in his wider role as the head of the intelligence community. As in the model of the 1976 B Team, these experts should be drawn both from other U.S. intelligence services, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, and from think tanks, such as Rand and R&D Associates, that have been working on these problems for a decade or more. To head the team, Casey might consider a senator who has served on the intelligence committee and is respected for independent thinking on these issues, such as Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) or Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.).

Since this B Team's primary purpose would not be to investigate but rather to test the CIA's imagination, it should have a limited mandate and be confined to two or three specific issues. These might include Soviet use of double agents and Soviet disinformation tactics to confuse anti-ballistic-missile strategy and mislead U.S. submarine deployments. The idea would be to test the proposition that analysis with diverse views might discern different clues from the same raw data. The results, again, might prove both surprising and useful.

Edward Jay Epstein, the author of "Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald," is completing a book about international deception.

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WASHINGTON POST
16 January 1986

Rebels' Backers on Hill Press Aid

Administration Accused of Ambiguity in Military

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Congressional supporters of the resistance movement to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, backed by outside lobbying groups, are pressuring the Reagan administration to improve the effectiveness of its military aid to the guerrillas and end its ban on the delivery of American-made arms, particularly antiaircraft weapons.

These congressmen also are seeking to get the administration to name a high-level White House presidential adviser to coordinate U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and the expanding American aid to the rebels. The Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development and the Pentagon each has its own program.

One of the chief charges being leveled against the administration by U.S. supporters of the Afghan guerrilla struggle is that Washington's policy has no clear objectives. The critics are charging the White House has never made up its mind whether it wants a clear-cut Afghan guerrilla victory or a low-level campaign of harassment of the Soviet Union.

Outside analysts and even some administration officials concede that six years after the start of the U.S. aid, American objectives remain ambiguous—caused by Washington's concern over the Soviet reaction to a more direct U.S. involvement and by caution in Pakistan toward the conflict.

Despite this ambiguity, the U.S. commitment to the guerrilla forces has grown steadily. While the level of funding for the CIA's Afghan operation remains a secret, congressional and other sources say the House and Senate intelligence committees initially approved \$470 million for covert military assistance last spring for the current fiscal year.

Later, there were reports that Congress had ap-

proved a supplemental \$300 million in aid over two years. It is not clear whether the supplement is reflected in the \$470 million figure or is in addition to it.

Congress now has approved \$15 million in annual humanitarian assistance, which AID will administer, and another \$10 million for the Defense Department to cover the cost of transporting such nonlethal items as clothes and blankets to Pakistan for Afghan refugees.

While President Reagan repeatedly has stressed his commitment to the Afghan resistance, the main thrust for steady increases in aid has come from Congress. According to a former Senate Select Intelligence Committee staff member, the committee each year has doubled the administration's initial request.

Unlike divisive debates over the administration's desire to provide covert military aid to rebel groups fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua or Marxist rule in Angola, Congress has achieved consensus on providing more assistance to the Afghan rebels.

This has made the administration nervous about the implications for its relations with Moscow.

Administration spokesmen defend the current program as a major success, citing the ability of Afghan guerrillas to fight the estimated 118,000 Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan to a stalemate and claiming that they have shot down nearly 800 aircraft—a figure met with some skepticism by independent observers.

The spokesmen say the United States is doing all it can, given its dependence on Pakistan to funnel aid to the rebels, and that the administration's general caution only reflects Pakistan's.

"We have a right to be cautious. We're dealing with another sovereign country and it could blow up in our face," said one U.S. official.

The administration's critics also charge a lack of direct U.S. control over the delivery of U.S.-purchased arms, which, U.S. critics and guerrilla leaders alike charge, has resulted in many weapons not getting through to the battlefield.

Some congressmen also are complaining that the CIA, in the absence of a clearly stated White House objective in Afghanistan, is making policy on its own. "It's so damn obscure what the policy is. There is no clear objective," said Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), adding that CIA Deputy Director John McMahon "has told me it [U.S. aid] cannot be too successful."

Wallop and Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey (R-N.H.) have been instrumental in lobbying the administration for a clearer, all-out commitment to an Afghan guerrilla victory.

Other congressional sources said McMahon had argued before the House and Senate intelligence committees last year against provision of American antiaircraft weapons or a much larger covert program, saying the administration was concerned they might provoke the Soviets into retaliating against Pakistan and believed authorities there would not agree to either.

Rep. Charles Wilson (D-Tex.) asserted that the CIA and McMahon are taking "a bum rap" and that the agency is doing "as much as is humanly possible within the parameters of our policy—which is no Americans and no American arms involved in the conflict."

"The president has got to decide on a change," said Wilson.