

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600090008-8

WASHINGTON QUARTERLY
 CENTER for STRATEGIC and INTER
 GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
 AUTUMN 1982

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 ON PAGE 83

George Anderson, U.S. Navy admiral (retired), was chief of naval operations from 1961 to 1963. He later served as U.S. ambassador to Portugal, and as chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1969 to 1977. This interview was conducted by Brian Dickson of CSIS and Devon Gaffney, associate editor of The Washington Quarterly.

An Interview with Admiral George Anderson

Twenty years after the Cuban blockade, the then chief of naval operations reflects on whether the U.S. benefited from the outcome of the crisis and whether it could be successful today under similar circumstances.

The Cuban Blockade: An Admiral's Memoir

THQ: This autumn marks the twentieth anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union approached the brink of nuclear war. The incident is widely regarded as an American victory, for the Soviet Union withdrew the medium and intermediate ballistic missiles that caused the crisis. Do you concur with that judgment?

ANDERSON: The Cuban missile crisis was one of a series of conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States over Cuba going back to the overthrow of Fulgenio Batista by Fidel Castro in 1958 and the subsequent support of Castro by the Soviet Union and the Communist party, and later by the dramatic incident of the Bay of Pigs in 1961. In 1962, the Soviet Union decided to

move to enhance its strategic position vis-à-vis the United States by introducing offensive nuclear-capable weapons into Cuba, including ballistic missiles and intermediate-range bombers.

The basic and consistent strategy of the Soviet Union in its foreign policy is to create or exploit situations that pose to its adversaries only risky or disadvantageous courses of action, while retaining the option of retreat for itself, if necessary, and thus the alternative of restoring no worse than the *status quo ante*. The Kremlin pursued this strategy in October 1962.

In contrast, the enduring objectives of every government of the United States in any crisis must be to provide for the common defense, to promote the general welfare, and

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
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
Ray S. Cline is a senior associate at CSIS and formerly served as deputy director for intelligence at the CIA and director of the bureau of intelligence and research at the State Department. His latest book, The CIA: Reality Versus Myth (Washington: Acropolis Books, 1982), contains an earlier version of this reminiscence.

Ray S. Cline

National euphoria over successful conclusion of Cuban missile crisis, argues a former key CIA analyst, at the time may have contributed to decreasing U.S. concern for intelligence assessment in subsequent years.



A CIA Reminiscence



The CIA's deputy director for intelligence (DDI) supervises the sorting and study of the flood of information reaching this country from all sources, sifting the wheat from the chaff, the signals from the noise. He is the highest-ranking full-time intelligence analyst in Washington. He is responsible for keeping meaningful intelligence flowing to the whole national security community and for letting his boss, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the DCI's boss, the president, know what is going on in the turbulent world of foreign geopolitics and actual or potential threats of military action.

Among the most crucial are the 1,000 men and women working in the National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC), where in 1962 high-flying U-2 and satellite reconnais-

sance photography received its initial readout after each flight.

In 1962, I served as DDI under John A. McCone, and on a normal day at my desk on the seventh floor in the Langley headquarters building, hundreds of pieces of information were called to my attention in one way or another to make sure I perceived the strategic implications and tried to communicate them to the director, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and President John F. Kennedy.

Late in the afternoon of October 15, 1962, my secure (scrambled) phone rang and a senior officer at NPIC cast all the many other thoughts and preoccupations of the DDI out

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Ex-CIA Boss McCone, Now Retired, Keeps His Eye on the Spy Business

By Kevin Howe
Herald Staff Writer

While 38 nations operate major international intelligence-gathering services, only two — the United States and West Germany — admit to it.

And while the public image of the intelligence agent was formed years ago by the glamorous James Bond novels and movies, the main work of intelligence groups is pretty dull, though vital, stuff.

John A. McCone of Pebble Beach is in a position to know. He served as director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency from 1961 to 1965, under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

Highest Award

Though retired, he still keeps "in constant touch" with the CIA and last Saturday received what may be the highest accolade given anyone in the espionage business, the William J. Donovan Award, named for Gen. "Wild Bill" Donovan, founder of the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II fame.

The Donovan Award has been given 14 times since World War II. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was the prior recipient, and the award is made by a 14-member committee of the OSS Association, by unanimous vote only.

McCone was honored for his contribution to the introduction of technological advances in intelligence gathering, but he said, in an interview Wednesday, that it was probably as much in recognition of his long service to the intelligence community.

He sees the CIA and other government intelligence services as coming out from under a cloud cast over them by public controversy that began in the Nixon administration. The cloud appears to be subsiding, and, according to McCone, that's a good thing.

Political Purposes

"I attribute the great majority of criticism of the CIA and the intelligence community to political purposes," he said, "and I think some elements in Congress felt that in raising the issue of foreign intelligence operations, they could generate a great po-

litical issue, and indeed, they gave the intelligence community a bad time for two or three years, and in doing so very seriously affected the national security.

"It seems to have passed now."

McCone said he feels public, press and Congress have come to realize that the United States' leaders must have the benefit of "the very special knowledge" available through the CIA and other agencies "to make decisions for the national security."

He commented that while the United States and West Germany admit to running spy networks, the rest won't even identify their services by name, and the Soviet Union, which "has the most extensive intelligence service in the world," won't admit that its KGB spies on anybody.

But the people in the business, he said, know all about it, "and that's the facts of life."

Secrecy is necessary to operate intelligence-gathering effectively, he said, and it's used not only at the international level, but down at the local law enforcement level as well.

Guidelines Controversial

Attempts to draft guidelines for operating the CIA have been controversial, he said, though Attorney General William French Smith said at the awards dinner in San Francisco Saturday that the Reagan administration is planning to present guidelines that should work.

While there is not a great deal of curiosity on the part of government officials about CIA operations and procedures, he said, the Freedom of Information Act, "which I think is one of the most unfortunate pieces of legislation ever put on the books," give "the inquisitive, the curious and the enemies of this country" an opportunity to probe into sensitive knowledge that deserves to be carefully guarded.

But the CIA isn't men in trenchcoats "with switchblades in dark alleys, and beautiful women," he said. "What is not understood is the very, very great importance of the analytical side of the intelligence effort; the ability to take a mass of information from a variety of sources . . . putting it together in an analysis, collating, interpreting, and arriving at an estimate of what it means to national security."

Sources of Information

Information from satellite photographs, publications, intercepted messages, agricultural and educational reports, reports of eyewitnesses, all goes into the mill and is processed by a small army of specialists at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., he said.

Involved are "men of the highest intellectual standards of every possible discipline," he said, "historians, linguists in many languages, persons familiar with the intimate geography of countries, mathematicians . . ."

Not only the military capability of nations, but their economic, manufacturing, educational and agricultural potentials are under study he said.

"But that's not very sexy," McCone remarked.

Commenting on recent events in the news, he noted that the United States "had no alternative but to support Britain" in the Falkland Islands crisis, since "failing to do so would mean that we wouldn't support the U.N., who indicted the Argentines as aggressors."

He said heavy ship losses by the British fleet in that action will probably mean a lot of rethinking about the future of surface ships in naval warfare.

Though McCone, who headed the California Shipbuilding Corp. during World War II, added that every nation lost hundreds of ships of all kinds in those days.

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600090008-8

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-4NEW YORK TIMES
22 MARCH 1982

Notes on People

Former Chief of C.I.A. Honored by O.S.S. Veterans

The William J. Donovan Award, named for the late major general who founded the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, is given by O.S.S. veterans each year to those who have rendered singular and distinguished service to the United States, though not necessarily in the intelligence field.

Previous winners, for example, have included the late Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, the Apollo II astronauts and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain.

This year's winner, however, does have a background in intelligence. He

is John A. McCone, the California industrialist whose various government positions included a stint as Director of Central Intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency, which he headed, was an outgrowth of the wartime O.S.S.

The award will be presented May 22 at a dinner in San Francisco, where the 80-year-old Mr. McCone makes his home. To help assure its success, the veterans organization has persuaded two former medal winners, former President Gerald R. Ford and William J. Casey, the current Director of Central Intelligence, to serve as chairmen of the dinner.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
4 February 1982

JFK Secretly Taped White House Talks

By Bob Woodward and Patrick E. Tyler

Washington Post Staff Writers

President John F. Kennedy secretly recorded about 600 of his White House meetings and telephone conversations during the last 16 months of his presidency—apparently without the knowledge of other participants.

It has been known for several years that Kennedy recorded some meetings and phone conversations from his White House days, but the extent of the recordings, the names of the participants and the subject matters have never been disclosed.

A 29-page log obtained by The Washington Post from the Kennedy Library in Boston shows the recordings were made from July, 1962, until November, 1963, the month Kennedy was assassinated. The tapes contain a vast amount of unreleased information, including many highly classified meetings of the National Security Council on such subjects as the Cuban missile crisis, Berlin and Vietnam, and high-level discussions of domestic controversies such as the 1962 integration of the University of Mississippi.

There are recordings of 325 meetings in the Oval Office or the Cabinet room and another 275 personal telephone conversations Kennedy had with family members, his Cabinet, White House staff, former presidents, legislators, world leaders and diplomats.

The disclosure of a secret Oval Office taping system maintained by President Richard M. Nixon became a sensational element in the Watergate scandal. Those tapes eventually provided evidence for the impeachment proceedings that led to Nixon's resignation in 1974. At least two other presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, also taped private conversations in the White House, but the full scope of JFK's taping system has not been widely known.

"It is bound to become approved for release on how John F. Kennedy's mind worked," said Dan H. Fenn Jr., director of the Ken-

and preliminary transcripts, made by archivists over the last several years, are kept. The Washington Post has over the last several years requested access to the tapes but it has been denied because of classification and privacy considerations. Fenn said that some of the tapes and transcripts of the recordings, donated to the library by the Kennedy family in 1976, will be made available in the

near future. Burke Marshall, a former assistant attorney general in the Kennedy administration and head of a three-member committee that controls release of material from the Kennedy Library, said last night: "Our position is going to be that we should open this material in an orderly fashion."

He said he could not set a time frame for this process, but added that transcripts are being made and that many will have to undergo a declassification review by the National Security Council.

Evelyn Lincoln, Kennedy's personal White House secretary, and several Secret Service agents who installed and maintained the system of recordings were the only ones who knew the full details of the secret recording system, according to well-informed officials.

"I was the engineer," Lincoln said in a recent interview. Lincoln said Kennedy had a switch in his office that activated a red light at her desk. That was the signal, she said, to begin the recording system. According to Lincoln, if the red light went on when Kennedy was on the phone, she was to record the conversation on the dictabelt system hooked into his phone. If the light went on when he was in the Oval office or the Cabinet room, she was to start the regular taping

system for those rooms. The log from the Kennedy Library indicates there may also have been some recordings made in a study in the president's residence. But one person knowledgeable about the taping system said he believed there was a system of recordings made of Kennedy's conversations there.

"He was very conscious of history," Lincoln said. "He was always wanting to get exactly what was said to pinpoint precisely what was said. These were for history, and he wanted to have them for that and he never once went back and listened to one."

Theodore C. Sorensen, special counsel to Kennedy and probably his closest aide, was shown a copy of the log last month. "I'm dumbfounded," Sorensen said, adding that he had no idea whatsoever that such recordings were being made.

The log listing each recording reads like a Who's Who of the early 1960s. It includes recordings made between Kennedy and the following: his wife Jacqueline Kennedy; his brothers Robert F. Kennedy and Edward M. Kennedy; former presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman; his vice president, Johnson; Sens. Barry Goldwater, Hubert H. Humphrey, Henry M. Jackson and J. William Fulbright; Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, House Speaker John W. McCormack, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, CIA Director John A. McCone; various military leaders, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor and Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

* * * * *

Like presidents who came after him, Kennedy discussed the "use of polygraphs in tracing defense leaks" with his defense secretary, according to one log entry, and he appeared concerned about "keeping the CIA out of the Peace Corps," according to

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THE WASHINGTON POST
4 February 1982

Logs Are a Tantalizing List of Names of the Era

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By David S. Broder and Haynes Johnson
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Kennedy tapes, an extensive electronic evocation of a crucial era in American life now come to light: a generation later, are certain to become a preeminent historical source—and another political controversy swirling around another president.

Even in their fragmentary form, the logs of John F. Kennedy's secret recordings are riveting both for what they indicate and for what remains unknown.

They list, in stark chronological fashion, the leading personalities and the great issues that were being discussed during Kennedy's fateful last 16 months in office.

What they fail to relate remains even more tantalizing—what was actually being recorded in both phone conversations and personal meetings, many of which dealt with then highly classified subjects.

* * * * *

But some of the most intriguing items, for the curious if not for the scholars, may be personal items. On March 4, 1963, the president and his brother, Robert, discussed "press reports and press gossip," along with "then CIA director John McCone's testimony on the Cuban missile crisis."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
4 August 1981

A Camp for High-Powered Bohemians

MONTE RIO, Calif.

Late in the last century a few San Francisco newspapermen with a love of poetry and good liquor founded the Bohemian Club to swim and shoot and run around naked and live with their buddies in old cabins. A lot of that still goes on, but the need to raise money has brought a new and vastly more powerful clientele into the club. Over the years they have raised summer camp to new levels.

In 1928, for instance, Herbert Hoover was besieged in his tent at "Cave Man" (the cabin group that now includes Richard Nixon) and asked by hundreds of fellow campers to run for president. In the early 1940s a few fellows pushing twigs around the campfire here decided to build an atom bomb, they say. Right here in 1979 Alexander M. Haig Jr. launched his bid for the presidency.

With the current U.S. president (he's a member of "Owl's Nest"), the vice president and two former presidents all club members, this has been a rugged summer for the Bohemian Club. Reporters tried to get in. (Two burly security men in T-shirts escorted me back to my car.) Protesters demonstrated outside the gate. But activities during the two-week 1981 "encampment," as they call it, continued undisturbed deep in the woods on their 2,700-acre tract.

According to the summer camp program kindly provided, by Bohemian Club critics with friends on the staff inside, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger spoke July 17 on "Rearming America." As is customary, no word of his remarks reached the outside. The same held for television producer Don Ingalls' talk on the inside story of his show, "Fantasy Island." Caltech president Marvin L. Goldberger's speech on "Space Wars: Fact vs. Fancy," astronauts Frank Crippen and John M. Young on the space shuttle and Arthur Hailey on "Joys and Perils of the Author."

The various cabin groups into which the members are divided show

Letter From California

an interesting clash of cultures. Consider the membership of "Mandalay," the group with the best quarters, and, the staff says, the most servants:

San Francisco business executives S.D. Bechtel Sr. and Jr., Hillsborough businessman and Shirley Temple husband Charles A. Black, tire magnate Leonard Firestone, former Nixon aide Peter M. Flanagan, former president Gerald R. Ford, former Pan Am chief Najeeb Halaby, metals tycoons Edgar F. Kaiser Sr. and Jr., former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger, former CIA director John A. McCone, former diplomat Herman Phleger and his son Atherton, former labor and treasury secretary George P. Shultz

and Attorney General William French Smith, among others.

Despite a number of rumors to the contrary, Neither President Reagan nor Vice President Bush made it to camp this year, which is too bad. Members make a real effort to put everyone at ease. Autographs are banned and photographs discouraged.

Many senior campers, including former diplomat George W. Ball, dressed up in red-hooded robes and torched a coffin symbolizing "Dull Care" while a member orchestra played funeral dirges, the program said. It took them five tries to light the thing, after pouring kerosene all over it, but it was a spectacular sight.

Some spoilsports at the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing tried to force the club to hire female waitresses. But the members defended their feminist consciousness. After all, they do dress up in drag for the "Low Jinks" and "High Jinks" shows at the camp.

A small group of local people, many of them opponents of nuclear power and supporters of women's rights, also set up a "vigil" outside the camp gates this summer. Mary Moore, 46, an owner of the consignment shop in nearby Occidental, said that the group wished to remind people "that the good old boy network is perpetuated this way." Their coalition of local citizens groups charge that Bohemian Grove is a place "where these men, in anonymity and without public scrutiny, make policy decisions and sustain contacts that often have catastrophic effects on our daily lives and, indeed, on the life of our planet."

The parking lot, which I caught a glimpse of, is impressive, a vast expanse of metal under the trees. A poem in the club newspaper says:

Can't find your BMW?

You shouldn't let it trouble you
Don't worry where your auto is
Forget about it — Drive home
his.

Large and expensive automobiles passed by the little vigil group, with their anti-nuclear banners pinned up by the roadside. Some in the cars yelled, "Get a job!" at the vigil members as they rolled past.

Two, however, physicist Athelstan Spilhaus and pantyhose magnate R. Philip Hanes stopped to chat. Spilhaus assured the vigil members that nuclear waste was no problem. We will soon be rocketing the stuff into the sun, he said.

Laurie Moore, 26, a viola player for the Santa Rosa symphony, said she declined an offer of some free pantyhose. "I don't wear them," she told Hanes. She also deflected protests from one visitor that he could not be blamed for the ecological damage the group blames on the club's power elite. "He was trying to tell me he was all right because he has a membership in the Sierra Club," Moore said.

— Jay Mathews

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FOREIGN POLICY
SPRING 1981

THE LIBYAN MENACE

by John K. Cooley

Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, considered by some to be a great Arab leader and by many others to be an international scourge, is at least in part an American responsibility. U.S. interests had much to do with creating the conditions for Qaddafi's seizure of power in Libya in 1969. Later, those same interests gave him at least the appearance of American protection, allowing the Libyan leader to develop his ability to use and abuse that power. Participating in this extraordinary disservice to long-term U.S. interests were top officials of the Defense and State departments, leaders of the U.S. oil industry, active and retired agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, contractors with close ties to U.S. officials, and relatives of former President Jimmy Carter. Because various segments of U.S. society at different times played the role they did, U.S. policy makers can scarcely shirk the now pressing responsibility of coping with Qaddafi's messianic desire to spread his revolution far beyond Libya's desert frontiers.

When he seized power, Qaddafi's fiercely anticommunist ideology as well as his anti-Soviet words and deeds indicated to U.S. policy makers that he would be a useful asset in North Africa. Qaddafi and his young associates in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) were determined to eradicate Western bases and political influence in the Arab world and were opposed to Israel's existence. Yet they showed no more inclination to grant the Soviets air or naval facilities than had Libya's royal government in the 1950s.

Moscow tried unsuccessfully to soften Qaddafi's anti-Soviet outpourings by praising the ephemeral, paper union of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan as "an anti-imperialist force in the Arab world." Nevertheless, after the death of former

JOHN K. COOLEY, on leave from the Christian Science Monitor, is a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment.

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coup's leaders and handing him over to Nimeiry to be hanged.

The Nixon administration was pleased when Qaddafi denounced the Soviet role in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war as "conforming to Soviet imperialist designs in the area." Qaddafi also criticized the Soviet-Iraqi treaty of April 1972, although he had signed an accord on economic and technical cooperation with the Soviets a month earlier. Qaddafi also appears to have approved Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972.

Qaddafi's Adventures

Along with Qaddafi's anticommunism, however, went a bewildering series of foreign adventures that the Nixon administration, using anticommunism as its only litmus test, seemed to overlook. Some of these foreign adventures involved outright support for terrorism. Many others threatened Western strategic, political, or economic interests. Qaddafi has always maintained that the entire Arab world must finally unite and wipe Israel off the map. At various times he has supported—with promises, cash, or arms—the Moro National Liberation Front in the southern Philippines; the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland; Basque, Corsican, and other separatists throughout Europe; the leftists in the Lebanese civil war; Somalia and the Eritrean nationalists against Ethiopia (later switching his support to the Soviets); liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique; the most radical, black factions in Zimbabwe and South Africa; and the Black Muslims in the United States. Qaddafi also provided shelter for the Palestinian terrorists who attacked the Israeli team at the September 1972 Munich Olympic games, and

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
29 DECEMBER 1980

THE INTELLIGENCE W PUTTING MUSC IN THE CIA BY ROBERT MOSS

COMPARISONS are already being drawn in Washington between the appointment of Mr William J Casey as CIA director under the Reagan Administration and the choice of Mr John McCone for the same role under the Kennedy Administration.

Both men are shrewd non-professionals (although Mr Casey served with distinction in the Office of Strategic Services and is remembered with affection by many wartime colleagues in London) whose instinct may prove a surer guide to policy than the conventional wisdoms of the established bureaucracy.

Mr McCone's instinct told him that Khrushchev had secreted missiles in Cuba when CIA analysts were still unconvinced. Similarly, Mr Casey is unlikely to pay overmuch respect to estimates from the analytical side of the CIA — the National Foreign Assessments Centre (NFAC) — suggesting that the motivation for the Soviet military build-up is essentially defensive; his instinct tells him otherwise.

According to sources inside Mr Reagan's CIA transition team, a major overhaul of NFAC is expected to be one of the first consequences of Mr Casey's appointment. The present head of NFAC, Mr Bruce Clark, is expected to be replaced.

One leading contender to take his place is Mr George Carver, a former CIA station chief in Bonn, now based at the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, who serves on Mr Reagan's transition team and has made himself a subtle and engaging commentator on intelligence matters.

In a parallel development, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the other components of Pentagon Intelligence are likely to be given a larger role in the shaping of national estimates; their predictive record is generally recognised to have been much better than that of NFAC.

Mr Casey and his team are likely to move slowly, avoiding radical staffing changes at Langley; the view in the Reagan camp is that the CIA has already been dangerously demoralised through the loss of veteran officers.

However, the new CIA director is likely to want to re-engage the services of some of the senior people who were fired, or pressured into premature retirement, under Admiral Stansfield Turner or his no-less controversial predecessor, Mr William Colby. In addition to analysis, the other component of CIA activities that is likely to be subjected to most rigorous scrutiny is counter-intelligence.

There is widespread concern that the counter-intelligence (CI) staff was fatally weakened in 1974 when Mr Colby managed to engineer the ouster of Mr James Jesus Angleton, for two decades the agency's CI chief.

The nominal cause of Mr Angleton's removal was the Press leak of his involvement in a programme of domestic mail intercepts. It was not made clear at the time that this programme had been initiated as early as 1953 with full presidential authority, and that it has resulted in the discovery of an important East German "illegal" as well as of contacts between prominent Congressional figures and the Soviet KGB.

Staff cuts

With Mr Angleton's fall, the powers of the centralised CIA staff were radically reduced, and the security of the department's own files — including sensitive studies of allied secret services — was lessened, giving rise to concern that CIA operations, and allied secrets, had become more vulnerable to Soviet detection and penetration.

Counter-intelligence is rarely popular within a secret service, since the CIA role is to play the institutional devil's advocate, questioning, for example, whether a defector or a double agent (whose case-handlers may be intensely genuine, or a KGB-controlled plant.

The breakdown, however, of the entire intelligence penetration and by its antagonist Mr Angleton, who have been the Reagan on the CIA the next administration, his advice.

weighed very seriously, not least because of the close relationship of trust that Mr Angleton established in the past with many friendly secret services, including the Israelis.

The whole question of CI organisation is taken up in a valuable collection of papers, edited by Dr Roy Godson, that will be published early next year by the Washington-based Consortium for the Study of Intelligence as part of a series entitled "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s."

Contributors to the new volume, entitled "Counter-Intelligence," include senior present and former CIA and DIA officials.

Two of the most provocative papers in the book are by Mr Norman L. Smith and Mr Donovan Pratt, who were formerly (respectively) chief of operations and research director on the CIA's counter-intelligence staff.

Mr Smith argues that it is necessary to re-establish a centralised CI staff with a wide purview, not only to ensure the security of the CIA's intelligence-collection and covert action operations, but to undertake its own offensive double-agent and deception activities against the KGB.

He argues the very special qualifications required to make a successful CI specialist — not only in terms of intellectual ability, but in terms of familiarity with hundreds of individual cases, over many years. He rightly observes that the Soviet intelligence services place a kind of historical research for which no computerised data bank can substitute.

the creation of a fully clandestine service, outside the present CIA structure, to conduct intelligence and CI operations.

The present CIA, largely reduced to analysis, covert action and paramilitary operations (none of which are likely to remain secret indefinitely, or perhaps even for very long) would remain to deflect interest and scandal away from the clandestine service.

This is one of the many current proposals for the restructuring of the U.S. intelligence community that will be reaching Mr Casey's desk.

Within the narrower area of CI itself, Mr Casey will be urged by some members of the CIA transition team to re-initiate the review of Soviet deception operations, especially those involving double agents in New York who may have been controlled by the KGB that was aborted by the 1974 purge.

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