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REMARKS OF ADMIRAL BOBBY INMAN

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

before

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

A.N.P.A. GENERAL SESSION

Speech by Admiral Bobby Inman

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ADMIRAL BOBBY INMAN: Several months ago, when Mrs. Graham called, with Tom Johnson, the office and twisted my arm in the style you all are familiar with to accept an invitation, I stopped to consult with [unintelligible] Oswald (?), the Agency's Director of External Affairs, who thought that even though we were trying to keep a low profile, that this was a group certainly worth talking to and trying to convey some views.

When the program eventually came and I saw I was doing a breakfast meeting on a Tuesday morning, I had some concern about whether there would be a turnout to show any interest in what I had to say. But there was some sense that one ought to whip up some attention from the crowd. I think we overdid it a little in the activities of the last week.

I'm going to wonder for you for the next 20 minutes or so through what I hope won't come across as a pedantic exercise in talking bout how we got the current intelligence community we have and where I think it ought to go. But there are several sort of basic ground rules you need to understand as we address the U.S. intelligence community and for sorting out what you think we ought to do, what you can support, and where you have some reservations. And the first basic ground rule is that you need to think of three basic functions that are performed by the U.S. intelligence community.

The overwhelmingly large is the foreign -- large one is the foreign intelligence capability. What's going on in other countries, other organizations that may be of direct relevance or interest to this country as it goes about its business.

The second is the counterintelligence question. How does one understand and counter efforts by foreign intelligence organizations to learn this country's secrets.

And the third is covert action. Using less than military force, more than diplomacy to try to affect the actions or outcomes of other nations.

We often confuse those, both in looking at the criticisms leveled in the past and trying to chart out what we ought to do in the future.

What is the state of U.S. intelligence today? In my view, for the problems that we're going to face in the late '80s and the '90s, I would tell you it's marginal. And what I will be discussing this morning is why it got in the condition it's in and where I believe we need to go.

And the first point to underline is that when this great republic was founded, we had little concern about what was

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happening in the outside world. In fact, there's a good isolationist trend that goes right from the outset. And so we established many great institutions of government -- the First Amendment, which Mrs. Graham spoke to eloquently yesterday -- but we didn't have any concern about the need to collect information on foreign countries or to protect that information. In fact, if you look back at the historical record, standardly, we've created intelligence collection, analysis, reporting capabilities in wartime, and then we've dismantled them as rapidly as we could when peace came along.

It was not until 1882 that we created the first permanent peacetime intelligence organization, the Office of Naval Intelligence, 23 March 1882. We hadn't laid down any ships in 17 years, and there were some bright people who persuaded the Secretary of the Navy that unless we could get the country focused on the threat outside, we'd never start rebuilding a fleet.

Through World War I, we again followed the usual pattern of building up capabilities. And we moved into the electronic age for the first time with a substantial communications intelligence effort. That was sustained after the war for a while in the State Department, until 1929, when a new Deputy Secretary of State examined it, said, "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail," and disestablished the capability.

Small residual elements were picked up by the War Department and the Navy, and that was the nucleus of the effort that broke the Japanese code in the days before the war. But we had no organized way to flow the results, to analyze it, to discuss it with policymakers to make sure it was in the hands of those who need it.

Out of the World War II experience came a totally different approach toward this country's needs for intelligence. And the leaders who had experienced too often the shortfalls in the start of the war were persuaded that we ought to create, in peacetime, the institutions that would provide this country the quality of intelligence it needed.

There was another underlying fabric out of that World War II time, collaboration with our allies. And, in fact, many of the approaches to how we would structure intelligence organizations came out of those very close working relationships in World War II.

We also had, through our OSS experience, the first outreach toward what would come to be known as covert action.

When the new organizations were put together in the

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late '40s and when the infusion of money and people began, there was, I believe, one major shortfall. We provided no guidelines to those who were creating the agencies and those who were going to work in them of the standards of conduct to which they would be held accountable in the future. They were simply told there was a mission, and go accomplish the mission, and no clear guidelines of what 25 years later would be the standard to which one would examine their performance.

The '50s were a time of great investment in U.S. intelligence capabilities. The overriding question was what might this country need to know. We moved to create an encyclopedic knowledge about all the countries around the world. But you'll remember, in those days there were far fewer countries. Many colonial entities still existed.

The investment in technology produced U-2 and the first chance to begin collecting intelligence on denied areas in ways that had never been possible before. We also had some experiments with covert action: '53 in Iran, '54 in Guatemala.

We also had an event in the late 1950s that impacted pretty heavily on the organization and structure of the intelligence community for some years thereafter. That was the so-called missile gap;. There have been many allegations about the twisting of intelligence to fit preconceived notions or to sell budgets. That's the one that you can document where the use of footnotes was the instrument through which a public debate was shaped to create the impression of a missile gap.

As we moved into the '60s, the Defense Intelligence Agency was created, largely to deal with that problem. It is also a classic study about how not to go about creating organizations. Sixty percent of the billets from the service intelligence organizations were pulled together in a central organization, and then the services were told to send the 60 percent of the people they would prefer to send to fill those slots. And DIA picked up right at the outset some quality problems that have continued to bedevil them to this point in time. Not ineffective, but rather simply not having the absolute top quality that they needed from the outset to compete effectively with the other organizations.

Instead of asking what might we need to know, suddenly the intelligence community, like the rest of the Defense Department, was caught up with the question, is it cost-effective? And if there was ever a livelihood that was unlikely to be cost-effective, it is this one.

On the covert action side, the Bay of Pigs, Laos, early South Vietnam. When the war in South Vietnam began to spread,

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instead of adding manpower to do the in-depth intelligence job that was required, assets were diverted, diverted away from keeping the encylopedic data base on all parts of the world. And you'll recall that's the time when many countries were becoming independent. So at a time when our interest in doing encylopedic collection, reporting [unintelligible] should have been going up, we diverted away from it.

That got an extra shot in the arm in 1967 with something you'll recall as the balance of payments exercise. And we began asking, how can we draw down American presence abroad? It didn't just hit the formal intelligence community entities; it also hit very hard the State Department. And it was the beginning of drawing down political, economic reporters from many parts of the world.

In the early 1970s that drawdown picked up steam with Vietnamization. And the primary question became, what can you do without? Budgets were predetermined, and then you tried to fit the requirement that you could satisfy within that predetermined ceiling.

The decision was made to take advantage of new technology, satellites; not by adding money, but by giving up manpower and using the manpower dollars to buy the access.

In 1973, as a penalty for failure to predict the October war, there was a further 25 percent slash in manpower across all those entities which come under the Department of Defense.

The primary focus in the '70s was on the capability to verify treaties. And as you well know, we then got into the long period of examination of the mistakes made in the previous 30 years, with revelations and the investigations by the congressional committees.

That's not all bad news, because out of that process came some new institutions and some new approaches. In 1976, for the first time, we were provided guidelines. There will be those who argue they were overrestrictive. That's not unusuall for a first time to apply guidelines. But it was a conscious effort to tell the professionals inside the intelligence organizations the standards to which they would be held accountable 10, 20, 30 years later for the decisions which they would undertake, primarily dealing with protection of the rights of American citizens.

We also got out of that period of the congressional investigations two new institutions, the permanent select committees in the Senate and the House, established in peacetime

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with the mechanisms to fully protect intelligence collection, processing, reporting secrets, but in a way that would permit the most thorough and detailed oversight. They also had another purpose. By becoming knowledgeable in great detail of the country's intelligence capabilities, they became advocates, as they began to recognize the extent to which we had drawn down our total capabilities.

As you will recognize, I'm edging my way around a lot of classified data and a lot of classified figures, because the manpower and budget figures have always been classified; and, by agreement of the Executive and Congressional Branches, they remain so. But from the plateau in 1964, before the small adds in the tactical forces to deal with Vietnam, to the low point in the late '70s, we drew down 40 percent of the manpower that we devoted to this intelligence arena, at a point in time when the world was not turning out to be the peaceful place, with primary concentration on treaty verification and detente that had been hoped a decade earlier.

In 1976, in the wake of the Soviet move into -- with proxy forces and equipment -- into Angola and some fumbling U.S. efforts to respond through covert action, we got the Clark Amendment, which precluded the use of covert action in that operation. One can debate a long time the wisdom of that action, the action on the U.S. to undertake it, the signal sent to the Soviets and the Cubans when we declared by law that we would not use the process. But what is not debatable is that in the wake of that, in the climate of saying what can we do without, the country dismantled the majority of its covert action capabilities.

Finally, when one considers the impact of this long drawdown of intelligence, one also must consider the impact of the psychology of leaks, which began in full cry in the Vietnamese conflict, when it became the heroic thing to do to leak something that would show your opposition, and it continues unabated to this point in time, with recurrent examples, to the dismay of the professionals inside, of leaks that simply don't convey information, but convey how we know it. And the adversaries, who operate against the most open society in the world, find it very easy to plug our access into the most closed society in the world.

By 1980, those two congressional committees that had spent a substantial period of time examining the state of U.S. intelligence began to push on the Administration the need to rebuild. They were offering manpower and dollar adds well before the Executive Branch was prepared to accept them. The climate already existed in the Congress, among the knowledgeable members

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of select committees and the appropriation subcommittees, on the long-term need to rebuild.

Where do we stand in Inman's report card in the early 1980s? Those systems purchased to verify treaties also have great capabilities to provide indications and warning. So I would tell you, in my view, the country's intelligence and warning capabilities against a surprise attack from our principal adversary are better than they have ever been. And I simply reject out of hand the likelihood that we could be surprised with a Pearl Harbor kind of attack of any substantial size. And the same pretty well holds true for the Eastern Front, Central Front of Europe, save for conditions when one has a very, very long period of bad weather.

We do well in following the military developments, the order of battle, the equipping, the state of training and readiness or our principal adversaries. We do substantially less well in the political and economic areas. And that, in my judgment, is a factor -- there are two factors which drive that. One is simply the limited resources which have been applied against those problems for a long period of time; and secondly, the great difficulty in getting access in a closed society to the actual discussions, the developments, the intentions of the senior leadership.

As one moves to the basic encyclopedic data base that ought to serve as the underpinning of all policy development, all force development, the underlying fabric for the country's national security and foreign policies, I would tell you we do very poorly. Again, largely, in my view, for lack of application of resources against many parts of the world. And we increased in that long period of drawdown our reliance on our allies to provide us information on many of the areas that we were no longer going to devote direct attention ourselves.

Where do we need to go? We have spent a great deal of time over the past year in trying to look out at the issues that this country is going to have to face in the 1985-1990 time frame, and then to assess the capability of the U.S. intelligence community now, not only against what it's already been charged to do, but against that range of issues, to assess what was already in the programs and what ought to be done. And the long-range rebuilding program has been approved. It is in the process of being endorsed by the Congress. And while we may have some arguments about relative priorities and whether we take seven years as opposed to five to do the rebuilding, I am persuaded that there is support in the Congress and in the Administration to see through this long-range rebuilding. I am also persuaded that one can do that and can provide this country the quality of intelligence that it needs, through a process of laws and, where

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one does not have laws, by executive order, to insure that one provides for the protection of the rights of American citizens.

It does make the job harder sometimes, just in simple things like background investigations. But usually those are questions where additional manpower will let you do the job that needs to be done, while still abiding by the law.

In the process of collecting information from abroad,we don't need a lot of redundancy. There, you want to manage the collection to it as efficiently as you can. You don't want to be stuck with a single source, and so you want always to aim toward trying to have a human source, an electronic source, or a photograph, at least two of the three; else you're very likely either not to understand the significance of what you see, or simply to be confused or misled.

When it turns to analysis, there you want redundancy. Others may call it duplication. But as a national priority, we ought to insist upon competitive analysis, because intelligence is a very large mosaic made up of bits and pieces of information. It's very rare when you get the actual manual or document that tells you what another country is going to do in great detail. And the assumptions that the analyst brings as he or she examines those bits and pieces of information makes a great deal of difference in their judgment about what's going to actually occur or what they're even seeing. And therefore we should, as a national priority, always look, whether it's -- and we have a great deal of competition in analysis of military intelligence matters. That's probably the healthiest part of our intelligence capabilities. We need to look to build our basic political and economic analytical capabilities and to insure that there is competition of views from at least two different departments.

I hope we've also made some headway in the last year in insuring that what we're focusing on in the order of priority is relevant to the problems that this country's going to face in the decade out ahead. As you know from watching the rest of government, it's not easy to move people from what they've been doing for 20 years as the world changes. Now, the question becomes, what is your view of how the world is changing?

If you believe that the country's primary problem in the decade out ahead of us is going to be dealing with the Soviet Union on the Eurasian continent, looking across the Central Front of Europe, then you can relax about the current capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community and where it needs to go. If you happen to share my view that we're much more likely to find this decade one of great difficulties in competition for raw materials, natural resources, markets, dealing with instability in many areas of the world, trying to cope with fervor of religious movements, then we have a very long way to go, and need

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your strong support in sustaining the rebuilding of the U.S. intelligence community. And we must come to grips witht he very difficult issue of secrecy to protect the investment that we make in our ability to collect, to process, and to report on foreign intelligence.

That will not be easy. There is a start already in something that's called an identities bill. There are proposals on the floor for consideration of amendments to the Freedom of Information Act that would take us back to the stage prior to 1974. Those will help. I can't guaranty to you that they will do the job entirely, because we're still caught with this psychology of leaks.

One can tell a story of what's happening in a foreign event with care without in fact damaging the country's intelligence capabilities. But it's far more difficult when the urge is there to describe how we knew. And in that instance, it's almost impossible to do it without damaging the country's intelligence capabilities.

Now, without belaboring it further and to give you at least some time for questions, may I throw the floor open for questions. You are not limited to the topics that I have covered, and there are no questions that I consider out of bounds. But some of the answers might be, so I may be cautious in how I respond.

DAVID KRASLOW: Admiral, David Kraslow of the Miami News.

I wonder, sir, how you would reconcile your comments about redundancy and competiveness in intelligence analyses with the very difficult problem our government had in the Vietnam War when you had tremendous, tremendous disparities on estimates of enemy strength between CIA and DIA, to the point where CIA was estimating twice the number of enemy forces that DIA was estimating, and really made it very difficult for our leaders, particularly the Secretary of Defense, to make recommendations to the President. And I just wonder if in that kind of system you don't have a built-in motivation for coming up with the kinds of answers which would help an agency protect a policy that it has been advocating.

ADMIRAL INMAN: You always have to be alert to the dangers you have outlined. There are two or three things, though, that I think give a more optimistic prospect for the future. One is substantially improved collection methods and opportunities than were available in the '60s time frame.

You're never going to reconcile all the differences.

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The key factor is to make sure that the disagreements are clearly spelled out to the policymaker. And he's always going to have to make some tough choice. But he needs to know clearly how much is assumption, how much are judgments, how much hard fact is there, and why you end up with different outcomes.

It is not the role of the intelligence community to make the job of the Secretary of Defense easier. It's their job to make sure he clearly understands where there are disagreements and what the options are, from the intelligence point of view, in trying to narrow the gap.

CHARLES ROWE: I'm Charles Rowe from Fredericksburg.

As you know, Admiral, ANPA has opposed the so-called names-of-agents bill, which is now, I guess, in conference committee. If this bill becomes law, it would make it illegal to publish information that indentifies and intelligence agent, even if the information came from a public source.

ADMIRAL INMAN: If the government had the clearance to continue to keep that identity secret.

ROWE: Now, do you feel that the intelligence community gains enough additional protection for covert agents under this bill to justify what I guess is the first time in the nation's history to criminalize the publication of public information?

ADMIRAL INMAN: In the '50s, I believe the date, Mr. Rowe, we enacted 18 U.S. Code 798, which covers communications intelligence. It requires only two elements: that the individual knew that it was communications intelligence and that it was classified, in order to get a prosecution. I think that's only been used once in the intervening years. But, in fact, we have better protection for our communications intelligence than any other element of our intelligence process. Why? In my view, it's because of the general impact that the legislation is there.

I do not believe there is any high likelihood that one will need to use the legislation. I'm in hopes it will have the deterrent effect.

After a long time of looking at the proposals that are before the Congress, I finally came down preferring the Chafee Amendment on the pattern, rather than proving the intent, for a reason that's not necessarily satisfying to all of my colleagues. But as I look at the goal -- that is, deterrence in publishing -- I worry, if you have an intent standard, that indeed you will set in motion the invasion of civil liberties that lies at the heart of our concern, as the government will set off with all kinds of intrusive techniques to try to prove intent; and that

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therefore one is far more likely not to set in motion those intrusive -- use of intrusive technique if one holds to a pattern of activity.

I'm not a lawyer. So whether there could have been yet a better way to address -- to develop a law, I defer to the lawyers. But I do believe the intelligence community gains substantially, not only in protecting its own sources, but also in the view sent to our allies, that information which they provide us which is relevant to their own sources is more likely to remain secure.

ROWE: I respect your views, Admiral. I would still feel that what you call the deterrent effect we would call the chilling effect.

Thank you.

TOM VAIL: Admiral, I'm Tom Vail of the Cleveland Plain Dealer.

Can you tell us something about your views on the use of intelligence in internal domestic matters by our political friends, and how we prevent them from using them for those purposes?

ADMIRAL INMAN: I'm not quite sure I understand the question.

VAIL: Well, you've made some news lately about the use of intelligence in domestic affairs, which can be used by politicians. There's been some fear that that be used by politicians for their own purposes.

ADMIRAL INMAN: There has been some reporting that is a little garbled over the concerns. Let me see if I can lay out two or three quick areas that will be responsive to your question.

First, in drafting Executive Order 12333, the one that governs the conduct of the agencies in doing, largely, the foreign intelligence mission, there were those who had the view that we needed to increase competitive collection and analysis in the counterintelligence arena; and that one, therefore, should authorize and divert CIA to provide competition to the FBI as the way to improve the overall counterintelligence performance.

I did not share that view. I felt very strongly that we have -- and as you will well know from my 20-25-minute dialogue, that we have so much to do abroad that we aren't beginning to addresss satisfactorily now, that to divert those assets and to

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try to create a fabric of competition in counterintelligence was just absolutely the wrong way to go.

The separate question that parallels is, what kind of organizational structures do you need, both for the intelligence community and the foreign intelligence role and on the counterintelligence side? And again, it will not surprise you, from what you've heard in the last 20 to 25 minutes, I do not believe that organizational questions underlie our problems. It's a resource question.

Ten years ago the FBI tried to maintain a standard of at least one agent for every two potential foreign intelligence collectors from our clearly identified adversary countries. In a decade in which we were opening up this country to a far greater presence of the nationals from those countries, we were reducing the size of the FBI to where it's about a four-to-one ratio now. And you simply cannot conduct the kind of surveillance necessary with those odds.

On the question of the use of CIA in the U.S., the coverage is probably understandable, but it was very substantially misleading to the public in both the intent and where we finally ended up.

In the first weeks of the new Administration, there was a focus on the question of terrorism and whether or not terrorism was going to likely have an upsurge in this country, and our capabilities to deal with it. I made my pitch then that resources, dollars and men, were a critical factor in dealing with all of these problems. But there were some views that restrictions might well be the primary problem. And so the question, to at least examine it, was: What restrictions in any way inhibit the ability of any of the intelligence organizations to contribute on this potential threat of terrorism in the U.S.? And there were indeed a lot that impacted on the use of th agencies that are normally engaged in foreign intelligence collection.

But circulating that first set of restriction was picked up as a policy decision. In fact, there had been no policy review to say, "Yes, you could do those. But do you want to do them?"

I tried to get out in front of the truck to slow it down to make sure that policy deliberation took place. I could have done without the publicity that accompanied it.

The end result, once the senior policymakers examined it was, no, they didn't want to do that. But nonetheless there persisted an image that there was a deliberate, conscious effort

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by the senior members of government to involve CIA in domestic collection activity. It was never -- had never been reviewed to that point. And when they did review it, it was rejected out of hand.

So, one does not have to worry that with the departure of a single individual, suddenly the hordes are going to be released.

There is a tougher part, and there was an authorization, and it did cause some unease. But that's dealing with the real world of the 1980s and the ease and speed with which foreigners can transit into this country.

And I'll just very quickly finish off with this one, and then give you back the floor.

In the days when foreigners came to this country by ship, it was a very easy matter to pass the word and turn over to the FBI to pick up surveillance when the ship docked of someone that you knew was coming to make an agent meet in this country. But in the days of modern air transportation, when suddenly the agent -- the suspect heads for Charles de Gaulle and gets on an airplane, unless you're going to lose the contact, the only option you have is to put your CIA people on the plane and send them to the U.S., and then turn over the contact as soon as you reasonably can do it in an orderly manner. And that is the only internal collection activity which was authorized.

MAN: Admiral, just quickly. What's the finest intelligence organization in the world, in your opinion?

ADMIRAL INMAN: Let me duck that one.

[Laughter]

TOM JOHNSON: Admiral, Tom Johnson, Los Angeles Times.

Could you tell us why you resigned, sir?

ADMIRAL INMAN: When I had reached 28 1/2 years of service in 1980, late 1980, it was my sense that that was really a good time to go start a second career.

I made a conscious decision, Tom, 20 years ago to be an intelligence specialist. I don't regret it at all. It's been an enormously exciting life as it's gone along. But the nature of those things is that there's a limit in how far you can go. When you've become an intelligence specialist, normally the highest you can aspire to is perhaps two stars, if you're a military officer. By a great fluke, a little more than that's come along

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my way.

But it's very clear, in a structure where Presidents select their intelligence officers, as they properly should, and they want that chief intelligence officer to be someone they know and understand, and there are not laws or legislations which would send you in a different direction, one has to anticipate that, whichever party is there, the Director of Central Intelligence is going to be someone with the political views of the U.S. -- of the President himself.

I looked at all that and said it's really time that I ought to go start a second career. My arm was twisted severely to provide help. I'd been complaining for the last four years that we weren't getting on with trying to shape a long-range program to rebuild the U.S. intelligence capabilities. And it was a little hard to back away from the offer to at least try to shape that. I've done that. And it seemed to me now was the right time to get off the train and go start a second career.

There were no policy decisions along any major issue that caused me to resign in protest. There were lots of disagreements. A fair number of them were solved to my satisfaction. Not all. But of those that were not, there were none that were matters of principle.

On the working relationships with Mr. Casey, they've actually been very good. He's been an amazingly patient man with a deputy who tends to be very direct and very outspoken in public and in private on a great many issues. And I could not have asked for better support than I've had from him in that process.

But it, frankly, came down that after 30 years, I feel I've done my service to the country in the public sector. And maybe I can give some from the private side. But I had lost any zest that I had for the bureaucratic problems.

I would like all you to assure me that I'm not going to find those bureaucratic problems in the private sector. But nonetheless, I'm eager to try.

I realize that we've really run out of time, and no one really asked the question back. Let me come back to the controversial topic of the Freedom of Information Act.

[Cassette turned]

ADMIRAL INMAN: ...full exclusion. We've had some very useful dialogue already from your working committee, Mr. Rowe and others. And all the professionals I know, and Bill Casey as well, have been grateful for the efforts that this organization

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has put forth to try to understand our views. That's not always been a frequent occurrence.

It would clearly be easier to administer a full exclusion. And that would certainly be much more reassuring to our foreign friends, many of whom are increasingly reluctant to provide us information which they fear will come into the public domain. And there are also problems in the cooperation that we get from friends in this country as well, for fear that their contacts abroad will be damaged unacceptably if it becomes clear that they in fact do provide their government helpful assistance in understanding what's happening abroad.

Once I get out the door on the 1st of July, if you were to ask me, I would tell all of you that I think the Chafee bill might well be a good compromise that one ought to push hard to get enacted, in not giving the total exclusion that worries this organization, but that at least would go a very long way toward meeting the really urgent requirements of the intelligence community for some redress in this area.

And I would urge that you'd continue the efforts that you've already started of the dialogue. It's one of the more promising notes that's come to me out of this great world of the media over these last several years.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to talk with you.

[Applause]

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NATIONAL SECURITY AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION

by

Admiral B. R. Inman

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

American Association for the
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This symposium is an appropriate place, I believe, to lay out some thoughts that all of us--scientists and public servants--should consider. These thoughts, as well as the ensuing dialogue today and later, will help us recall how much we have in common and also help us remember that national security and scientific interests can best be advanced through a joint effort. The fact is that we do have a substantial amount of common ground and experience--both in our separate fields, and in our joint work, to protect this nation and to further science.

Throughout the world today, every nation's progress and security are tied up with science and technology. Some would say that fact is a curse of the modern age; others would say it is our salvation. Technical information has given us the means to destroy civilization or, at least, revert it to the Dark Ages. At the same time, science and technology have made life safer and bountiful, given us tools to understand better the universe in which we live, and provided the weapons and intelligence systems to help us defend our nation.

There is an overlap between technical information and national security which inevitably produces tension. This tension results from the scientist's desire for unconstrained research and publication, on the one hand, and the federal government's need to protect certain information from potential foreign adversaries who might use that information against this nation. Both are powerful forces, thus it should not be a surprise that finding a workable and just balance between them is quite difficult. But finding this balance is essential, for we must simultaneously protect the nation and protect the individual rights of scientists--both as academicians and citizens.

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This tension is accentuated when scientists are employed by the federal government directly, or work for the government indirectly in their own offices with federal research funds. Some of this work is done on subjects which directly affect the nation's security--e.g., its defense, diplomacy, and intelligence efforts. The federal government has always conducted these activities on behalf of our society for several reasons. It is far more convenient for the federal government to provide for the common good. Irreversible and significant harm--to the nation as a whole, and to its citizens--often is threatened and this fact is a stimulus for the federal government to act.

There are cases where interplay has occurred between science and the national security interests. One of the most obvious, of course, is the Manhattan Project of World War II in which the first nuclear weapons were created and tested. Another is the development of "national technical means" to monitor foreign compliance with international arms control accords. Science and national security have a symbiotic relationship--each benefitting from the interests, concerns, and contributions of the other. In light of the long history of that relationship, the suggestion is hollow that science might (or should somehow) be kept apart from national security concerns, or that national security concerns should not have an impact on "scientific freedom."

The need in today's world for protection of some information, for secrecy is clear--I believe--to any fair observer. Protection of the information necessary to safeguard our society, and to conduct our international affairs, must occur. Within the federal government, there is a system established by Executive Order to assess the expected damage, should certain information come into the hands of foreign enemies, and--based on that assessment--to control

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access to that information so as to prevent any such exposure. This exposure potentially could occur through public release of the data, or from the successful clandestine activities of the agents of foreign intelligence services.

And we should make no mistake, foreign intelligence services--among other entities of foreign governments--are collecting all types of information in the U.S. Specific data on technical subjects is high on the wanted list of every major foreign intelligence service and for good reason. The U.S. is a leader in many--if not most--technical areas, and technical data can enhance a nation's international strength. In terms of harm to the national interest, it makes little difference whether the data is copied from technical journals in a library or given away by a member of our society to an agent of a foreign power.

A different source of tension arises when scientists, completely separate from the federal government, conduct research in areas where the federal government has an obvious and preeminent role for society as a whole. One example is the design of advanced weapons, especially nuclear ones. Another is cryptography. While nuclear weapons and cryptography are heavily dependent on theoretical mathematics, there is no public business market for nuclear weapons. Such a market, however, does exist for cryptographic concepts and gear to protect certain types of business communications.

Research into cryptography is an area of special, long-standing concern to me. When I was Director of the National Security Agency, I started a dialogue to find a common ground regarding cryptography between scientific freedom and national security. Considerable effort has gone into that dialogue,

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by both scientists and public servants, and I think the results so far have been reasonable and fair. Cryptologic research in the business and academic arenas, no matter how useful, remains redundant to the necessary efforts of the federal government to protect its own communications. I still am concerned that indiscriminate publication of the results of that research will come to the attention of foreign governments and entities and, thereby, could cause irreversible and unnecessary harm to U.S. national security interests.

There are, in addition, other fields where publication of certain technical information could affect the national security in a harmful way. Examples include computer hardware and software, other electronic gear and techniques, lasers, crop projections, and manufacturing procedures.

I think it should also be pointed out that scientists' blanket claims of scientific freedom are somewhat disingenuous in light of the arrangements that academicians routinely make with private, corporate sources of funding. For example, academicians do not seem to have any serious difficulty with restrictions on publications that arise from a corporate concern for trade secret protection. The strong negative reaction from some scientists, over the issue of protecting certain technical information for national security reasons, seems to be based largely on the fact that the federal government, rather than a corporation, is the source of the restriction. Yet this would presume that the corporate, commercial interests somehow rise to a higher level than do national security concerns. I could not disagree more strongly.

Scientists and engineers have served our society spectacularly in peace and war. Key features of science--unfettered research, and the publication of the results for validation by others and for use by all mankind--are essential

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to the growth and development of science. Both our national security and our economic development rely heavily on these features. Restrictions on science and technology should only be considered for the most serious of reasons.

But nowhere in the scientific ethos is there any requirement that restrictions cannot, or should not--when necessary, be placed on science. Scientists do not immunize themselves from social responsibility simply because they are engaged in a scientific pursuit. Society has recognized over time that certain kinds of scientific enquiry can endanger society as a whole and has applied either directly, or through scientific/ethical constraints, restrictions on the kind and amount of research that can be done in those areas. The fact is that restrictions exist today on science and technology; for example, in conducting medical experiments on human subjects, in safeguards on handling and storing radioactive materials, in controlling some research on gene-splicing, in protecting proprietary manufacturing processes, and in requiring peer review before publication of the results of scientific research. Some of these restrictions are common sense, some are federal requirements, some are simply good business, and some are good science.

Moreover, in 1952 Congress gave an example of its willingness to act when it passed the Patent Secrecy Act. This law directs procedures to ensure that public disclosure of inventions, which would be detrimental to the national security, does not occur. Such inventions are secret and are afforded appropriate protection. Equally important, this law is not totally one-sided in favor of government. The law established appeal procedures and a mandatory review process. Little use of this law has been necessary, except in the last few years and then not for long. The law is obviously not popular with all whom it regulates, but it has for thirty years now provided a precedent for a legislative solution to

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the question of private versus public interest.

One sometimes hears the view that publication should not be restrained because "the government has not made its case," almost always referring to the absence of specific detail for public consumption. This reasoning is circular and unreasonable. It stems from a basic attitude that the government and its public servants cannot be trusted. Specific details about why information must be protected are more often than not even more sensitive than the basic technical information itself. Publishing examples, reasons, and associated details would certainly damage the nation's interests. Public review and discussion, of classified information which supports decisions, is not feasible or workable.

In contrast, it is a fact that in today's world Congressional reviews of sensitive Executive Branch decisions are feasible and workable. The existence, and the processes, of such reviews are intentional. I do not think it is harmful to recognize that the federal government--particularly its intelligence agencies--have in fact made mistakes in the past on occasion, and suspicion of the actions of the federal government in this regard is understandable if not always supportable. The dominant fact of this new decade is that there now exists in the Congress a forum where assertions by the government of secrecy needs can and have been challenged and examined in a properly secure environment.

I recognize that there is concern in some circles that the suspension of publication of some information, for national security reasons, means that such information will never be published. The fact is, however, that national security concerns to protect information will not--and do not--last forever. The federal government's structure and procedures, though conservative and imperfect, do work. Sensitive information does get released in due course.

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The Executive Order I mentioned earlier, which requires protection of information through classification, also requires the eventual declassification of that same information. For example, voluminous classified data from World War II has been declassified and released--including intelligence materials which had extraordinary sensitivity when they were acquired. Much of the stimulating effort for computer science in this country came from government sponsored and controlled classified activity. There is in our society a legitimate need and desire which I accept that history, whether political or scientific, will be served eventually--even if national security requires that public disclosure, and personal recognition, have to be postponed.

Rather than a confrontation between national security and science, I believe that a wiser course is possible and that our joint search for that course ought to be one of our goals. A potential balance between national security and science may lie in an agreement to include in the peer review process (prior to the start of research and prior to publication) the question of potential harm to the nation. The details of such a system would have to be resolved, of course, but cooperation will be better for all of us than confrontation. Included in such a system should be goals to simultaneously preclude harm to U.S. national security and to impose no unreasonable restrictions on scientific research, publication, or the use of the results. And when restrictions are judged necessary, speedy procedures for appeals, review, and appropriate compensation should be included. One example of this type of process is that recommended in the Public Cryptography Study Group. It is not easy to create workable and just solutions that will simultaneously satisfy the wide-ranging needs of national security and science, but I believe it is necessary before significant harm does occur which could well prompt the federal government to overreact.

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