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ON PAGE 14U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
26 July 1982

Washington Whispers.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's ability to keep tabs on foreign intelligence agents in the U.S. has been hit hard by budget cuts and a surge of suspects. A decade ago, the FBI aimed to have 1 agent for each suspected spy—but now the ratio is 1 FBI hand for every 4 foreign agents.

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Advice from Adm. Bobby Inman, recently retired deputy chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, on dealing with Congress: "If you've raised teenagers, you've got a head start."

CIA's 'genius' recalls life near the top



The Dallas Morning News: Juan Garcia

Bobby Ray Inman ... the "guiding genius" of the CIA.

By Bill Deener
 Staff Writer of The News

Bobby Ray Inman, gangly and bespectacled, looks like one of those high school science teachers that students love to harass.

Then he speaks, and the thin, almost frail man has cast his riveting spell. The man, who once taught history at a Longview junior high school, has lived most of his life in the shadowy world of the Central Intelligence Agency, spy satellites and Capitol Hill intrigue. Until his retirement in April, Inman, a native Texan who hasn't decided where he will relocate, was considered the guiding genius of the CIA.

"At my retirement ceremony, I was reflecting on how far I had

come and I almost expected someone to come up to me and say, 'I'm sorry, none of this ever happened to you. You were only dreaming.'" Inman said in a recent interview while visiting Dallas.

Inman, 51, became deputy director of the CIA in 1981, at which time the U.S. Senate approved his promotion from vice admiral to admiral. He had been director of the National Security Agency four years before that.

As deputy director, Inman ran the day-to-day operations of the CIA. With his toothy smile and restrained, military manner, Inman was a welcome contrast to Director William Casey — the gruff Republican appointee who angered easily.

Inman became the peacemaker to anxious congressmen irked by past discrepancies of the CIA. His mandate from President Reagan, he said, was to rebuild U.S. intelligence gathering agencies — a task he believes he accomplished.

Because of his popularity with Congress and President Reagan, many believed Inman would become the next CIA director. When Casey was being pressured to resign earlier this year because of a controversy over some of his financial dealings, Inman was touted by some congressmen as his replacement.

"That was one of the most difficult times I've ever gone through in my life," Inman said. "There were all kinds of innuendos that somehow I was orchestrating the

publicity and the congressional attacks in order to get him (Casey) out and take his job. No one who knew me ever harbored any thought of that for any length of time at all.

"Back in 1980, I said there was not likely to be another military DCI (director of the CIA) for 20 years. So even though there was a fair amount of press speculation that I would likely have been the successor if Casey would have left, it was my firm conviction that just flat would not be the case."

Inman was born in the small East Texas town of Rhonesboro in Upshur County. He graduated from Mineola High School and received a degree in history and government from the University of Texas. But he grew tired of teaching history to Longview teen-agers and joined the Navy in 1951.

During the Korean War, Inman served aboard the aircraft carrier Valley Forge. His incisive mind, near-photographic memory and absolute dedication to his work obviously served him well. His rise to admiral at age 50 has been described as meteoric.

Robert Anson, an author and an expert on U.S. intelligence agencies, wrote of Inman recently: "He is . . . one of the very rare non-Annapolis, non-blue water, full four-star admirals in U.S. naval history, and undoubtedly the only one anywhere who can discuss the rhythms of Thackeray and Swinburne as knowledgeably as he can the exact disposition of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. His brain is an intimidating storehouse, crammed with every imaginable fact."

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 7NEW YORK TIMES
24 JULY 1982

Analysis / Leslie H. Gelb


Political Shift Illustrated by Moderates' Departure

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 23 — In recent weeks, the three officials generally regarded as the most moderate voices in the National Security Council have left Government, each a man with impressive military credentials.

Their departure is a stark example of just how far the political center of gravity has shifted since the Carter Administration. It is also a reminder of just how steady and deep institutional roots run in Washington, beneath shifting political fashions.

The three officials, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., Gen. David C. Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, were classified as conservatives in the Carter Administration. In the Reagan Administration they were classified as moderates, a shift that eventually became an element in the departures of Mr. Haig and Admiral Inman.



United Press International

Alexander M. Haig Jr.

It was not unusual in the last year and a half to hear White House officials or political appointees in the Defense Department express a certain mistrust of them. They were often viewed as having divided loyalties, to their institutions rather than to the President. The political men of the Administration were never quite comfortable with them despite their military backgrounds, traditionally a good conservative credential.

There was trouble from the outset.

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger wanted to cut short General Jones's second two-year term as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because the general had recommended Senate approval of the second strategic arms limitation treaty. The general had also supported the Panama Canal treaty, much to the dismay of the Republican right wing.

Mr. Weinberger, however, was persuaded to keep General Jones on the job because of the uproar caused by rumors of his impending dismissal; the Secretary and White House officials reportedly did not want to put themselves in a position of being accused of politicizing the military.

In any event, General Jones stayed on for a full second term and for regular retirement, and he became an advocate of beginning talks with the Soviet Union on medium-range missiles in Europe at a time when the political appointees in the Pentagon were against such negotiations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been an intimate party to past discussions with the United States's European allies on that subject. Like the officials in the State Department who participated in the discussions, the chiefs knew that the Europeans would not agree to the deployment of new American medium-range missiles in Europe unless arms control talks with Moscow were under way. It was a matter of European politics that the American military understood, even though the point had not quite sunk in with the new Reagan officials.

General Jones and the other chiefs also joined forces with Mr. Haig and the State Department in arguing that the terms of the arms limitation treaty should be observed, even though Mr. Reagan and those close to him had pronounced the treaty sorely deficient.

In all of these cases, General Jones and Secretary Haig had greater command of the facts and the diplomatic histories. They carried the day each time with President Reagan.

They were less successful in other matters. For example, while both men and their institutions worried about the growth of Soviet military power, neither was prepared to argue that the United States was in a position of military inferiority. Soviet military superiority was an article of faith with the Reagan team.

General Jones and Mr. Haig essentially restricted themselves to arguing that in some respects the Soviets had the advantage but that in other respects the United States and the Western powers were still better off. They emphasized "adverse trends" in the military balance rather than current inferiority. They were often joined in this view by Admiral Inman and the professionals of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Admiral Inman also proved a thorn in the side of the Reagan Administration with his repeated opposition to efforts by Reagan political appointees to expand the role of the C.I.A. to include certain kinds of domestic spying. Like most senior C.I.A. officials over the years, he had respect for covert operations only under carefully controlled conditions, and he had



Associated Press

Adm. Bobby Ray Inman.

What actually changed was not the three men's views, but the political climate in Washington.

In the inner councils of the Reagan Administration, the three men were the main advocates of arms control talks with the Soviet Union, of a less devilish theory of Soviet behavior, of more tolerance in dealing with the world as it is. As a result, they and the institutions they represented were often out of step with the hard-line approach of the White House.

THE SAN DIEGO UNION
19 JULY 1982

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ON PAGE A-1

Even His Critics Acknowledge Casey Has Strengthened CIA

By L. EDGAR PRINA

Copley News Service

WASHINGTON — A year has passed since the Senate Intelligence Committee reported it could find no basis for concluding that William Joseph Casey Jr. was unfit to serve as director of Central Intelligence.

If that wasn't damning with faint praise it indicated that the committee had, as the Capitol Hill expression goes, only "a minimum of high regard" for him.

But if the committee were to make a judgment on Casey's job performance today, it almost certainly would be phrased in positive, favorable terms.

Even some of his severest critics, who personally don't like the gruff, sometimes abrasive New Yorker, acknowledge he has strengthened the CIA in his first 18 months as Lord of Langley.

"Despite the distrust of Casey, he is generally credited with doing a good job in beefing up the agency," an aide to one of the most critical senators said.

A strapping six-footer, the 69-year-old veteran of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II, is on a roll. He is exhibiting the calm assurance of a man who loves his job



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and feels he's on top of it.

Such was not the case when he was haled before the Senate committee to explain why he appointed the controversial and inexperienced Max C. Hugel as his deputy for clandestine operations and failed to provide all the information required of him on committee questionnaires.

Casey eventually conceded it was "a mistake" for which "I take full responsibility" to have appointed Hugel, who had by then resigned. And the director wound up telling the senators more about his own past business and government activities than they probably wanted to know.

Casey seems to be able to admit a mistake and learn from it. He agrees that he failed to devote sufficient attention to congressional relations after his confirmation sailed through the Senate 95 to 0 in January 1981.

He came across as a rather reluctant sharer of intelligence information with the oversight committees. Members of the Senate panel were particularly irked. Eventually, after

Hugel business erupted, several committee members, including then Chairman Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., suggested Casey should resign.

In recent months, however, Casey has made an effort to keep in closer touch. He now invites small groups of Senate and House committee members to discuss matters of mutual interest over breakfast.

Adm. Bobby R. Inman, who retired as CIA deputy director last month, called Casey a "good director," adding:

"The only critical note that I would make, and I've made it to Bill, is that he needs to work harder on his congressional relations. That process also could be helped if some members of Congress went a little easier in their public rhetoric toward him."

Casey gave himself a handicap with the news media when he decided that the CIA once again would be "not a low-profile, but a no-profile agency."

No longer can a reporter simply call the agency's public affairs office and arrange a briefing by one of the hundreds of specialists at the CIA complex in nearby Langley, Va., as was the case during the Carter administration.

Such briefings are now relatively rare and are offered on a quid pro quo basis: If the reporter is going to travel abroad and agrees to share his insights and information upon his return, he will probably find that a specialist is available.

Unclassified CIA research reports on such things as Soviet oil production or U.S.S.R. arms transfers to Third World countries no longer are brought to the attention of interested reporters, nor mailed to them upon request.

In an address to agency employees, Casey said he believes the CIA will be more effective and more respected "if we cut down on hawking our wares" and concentrate of excellence in

intelligence work

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THE NEWSDAY MAGAZINE (N.Y.)
11 July 1982

Bill Casey at Helm: Quietly in Co

By David Wise
Photo by Ken Spencer

Some weeks ago, an interesting piece of information began circulating in the intelligence community — the closed, spooky world of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the other spy agencies in and around Washington.

The word went out that William J. Casey, the director of central intelligence, had bought an expensive house in the exclusive Foxhall Road section of Washington.

To men and women accustomed to working with fragments, piecing together minute bits of intelligence to form a larger mosaic, the report was immediately seen for its true significance. Better than any official announcement, it meant that Bill Casey, a Long Islander who has a home in Roslyn Harbor, was planning to stick around as CIA director.

There have been times in the past stormy year and a half when it was not at all clear that Casey would survive as the DCI, as the spies refer to their chief. There was a series of disasters. First, Casey named his former political aide, Max C. Hugel, as head of the CIA's cloak-and-dagger directorate. Hugel was soon forced to resign as the result of disclosures in the Washington Post about his questionable business dealings. Then the Senate Intelligence Committee, responding to a barrage of publicity, began probing Casey's own financial past. And Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), chairman of the intelligence committee, once a Republican presiden-

point-blank for Casey to resign.

All of that took place last year, Casey's first year on the job. The storm subsided. The Senate panel, in a backhanded way, found Casey not "unfit" to serve. And through it all, the CIA director — Ronald Reagan's campaign manager in 1980 — managed to preserve his close personal relationship with the President. ("I still call him Ronnie," Casey has said.)

Among those who must surely have heard the report about the house off Foxhall Road was Casey's deputy, Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, who Sen. Goldwater and a lot of other members of Congress had openly hoped would be Reagan's original choice for CIA director. Blocked from the top job, wooed by private industry with job offers in six figures, Inman in April announced that he was quitting.

In Moscow, the KGB has no doubt already heard about Casey's new house. Very likely, Vitali V. Fedorchuk, the recently appointed chairman of the Committee for State Security, better known as the KGB, has already informed President Leonid Brezhnev in the Kremlin.

And the report is true. J. William Doswell, director of the CIA's Office of External Affairs, a smooth, Richmond, Va., lobbyist and former newsman whom Casey brought in as his top public relations man, confirms it. Doswell said that Casey and his wife, Sophia, moved last month from their apartment somewhere in Washington to their new home off Foxhall Road.

career who has managed to stay one jump ahead of trouble, barely avoiding entanglement with the likes of Robert Vesco during Watergate. For example, Sen. Joe Biden of Delaware, a Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee and Casey's most vocal critic, refused to endorse the panel's findings on the CIA director, declaring: "Mr. Casey has displayed a consistent pattern of omissions, misstatements, and contradictions." And Casey's critics also charge he is not really qualified to run the CIA, since his intelligence experience dates from World War II, when he worked for the Office of Strategic Services (the OSS was the

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
11 July 1982

A Few Closing Remarks

In April, when Adm. Bobby R. Inman announced that he was going to step down as the number two man in the Central Intelligence Agency, both liberals and conservatives mourned his retirement as a loss of a brilliant intelligence officer.

In a retirement interview with *The New York Times*, Adm. Inman, in his traditionally reserved manner, raised several important points about intelligence operations. One was a clear warning. "I believe historians would agree that every administration ultimately turns to the use of covert operations when (it) becomes frustrated" in its diplomatic efforts, Adm. Inman said. He also warned that these covert operations can "impact adversely on the more important job of foreign intelligence collection and analysis."

On the issue of the politicalization or bending of intelligence data to justify an

administration's policies, Adm. Inman was tactful but clear in his response. While it was "very rare" for an administration to "deliberately twist the intelligence to support policy," Adm. Inman noted, "there have been efforts over the years to say more than the intelligence professionals believe safe in terms of protecting sources and methods."

However, Adm. Inman also went on to say that "the backbiting and bureaucratic maneuvering by ideologically committed" congressional and executive branch staffers was his greatest frustration.

It is impossible for the U.S. to function on the international stage without a first-rate intelligence service. But as Adm. Inman carefully warns, keeping its analysis free of selfish policy interests and the poisoning effects of covert operations is difficult and, apparently, a full-time job.

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THE WASHINGTON TIMES
6 July 1982

BRIEFLY / Capital

U.S. intelligence weakness cited

The U.S. intelligence community is only "marginally" able to do its job during the rest of this century and was slow in seeing the size of Cuban involvement in Central America, the former CIA deputy director said yesterday.

"The United States intelligence community, as currently structured and manned, is marginally capable to deal with the world of the late 1980s and 90s," said retired Adm. Bobby R. Inman in an interview in The New York Times.

"That judgment is shaped by my view that this country's primary problems in that period will be found in the competition for raw materials, natural resources, and markets in an unstable world with the potential for minor conflicts that could escalate in areas where we have little or no intelligence effort."

"Our major weaknesses include a minimal effort both in collection and analysis about many of the non-communist countries. We lack the encyclopedic effort that will let us understand trends before we get to the level of a crisis," he said.

Ex-CIA aide says agency 'marginally' able to do job

United Press International

WASHINGTON - The US intelligence community is only "marginally" able to do its job during the rest of this century and was slow in seeing the size of Cuban involvement in Central America, the former CIA deputy director said yesterday.

"The United States intelligence community, as currently structured and manned, is marginally capable to deal with the world of the late 1980s and '90s," said retired Adm. Bobby R. Inman in an interview with the New York Times.

"That judgment is shaped by my view that this country's primary problems in that period will be found in the competition for raw materials, natural resources, and markets in an unstable world with the potential for minor conflicts that could escalate in areas where we have little or no intelligence effort."

Inman said there were areas, "specifically intelligence on economic and political developments in the Soviet Union" where "the effort isn't as good as it should be."

"Our major weaknesses include a minimal

effort both in collection and analysis about many of the noncommunist countries. We lack the encyclopedic effort that will let us understand trends before we get to the level of a crisis," he said.

Inman said although the CIA is working to improve, "there are many areas of the world where we have the potential to be surprised by events."

One area, where that occurred, he said was Central America where the CIA for years "had a minimal effort" and "did not detect in a timely way the commencement of the training of prospective guerrillas in Cuba."

"We were slow to recognize the breadth of insurgencies we were going to face," he said.

Inman, the former head of the National Security Agency, said CIA director William Casey, his boss at the CIA, is a "good director."

Inman gave Casey good grades for working to improve the national security estimates and rebuilding the infrastructure of the intelligence agencies. He said Casey could do more in the way of congressional relations.

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NEW YORK TIMES
5 JULY 1982

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Q&A | Bobby R. Inman

Assessing Government's Approach to Intelligence

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 4 — Adm. Bobby R. Inman startled Washington in April when he announced his intention to resign as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. He said he wanted to go into private business, but associates asserted that the real reasons for his departure were policy differences with the Reagan Administration and mounting frustration over dealing with the White House National Security Council staff. His retirement from the Government and the Navy complete, Mr. Inman sat down last week to discuss intelligence issues.

Q. Is the Reagan Administration using intelligence information as a neutral basis for foreign policy formulation, or, as some critics have charged, is it twisting intelligence data to justify policies?

A. It's been very rare in my experience when an Administration makes an effort to deliberately twist the intelligence to support policy, but there have been efforts over the years to force us to say more than the intelligence professionals believe is safe in terms of protecting sources and methods. I believed we found the proper balance earlier this year on the issue of Cuban and Soviet involvement in Central America. The debate was not with the intelligence but with the policy. I don't believe that the Cuban and Soviet threats were being exaggerated. For years we had a minimal effort dedicated to Central America and did not detect in a timely way the commencement of the training of prospective guerrillas in Cuba. We were slow to recognize the breadth of insurgencies that we were going to face. When we finally accumulated a large body of raw data, and understood the scope of Cuban activity clearly undertaken with full Soviet support, there was a tendency to react with shock. That may well have come across as overreaction. The language used to describe Cuban activity may have been a little more shrill than it would have been had we detected the activity from the outset.

Q. How has the Reagan Administration changed priorities in intelligence collection and analysis?

A. Early in the Reagan Administration, increased emphasis was placed on gaining a knowledge of events in Central America and the Caribbean, the causes of terrorism and the problem of the transfer of American technology to the Soviets and Communist bloc. Over a longer period of time, there's been a focus on improving knowledge across the third world.

Q. Has the Reagan Administration placed a greater reliance on the use of covert operations than recent administrations?

A. I know of no way that I can talk sensibly in public about specific covert operations. By their nature, there is nothing unclassified about them. I believe historians would agree that every administration ultimately turns to the use of covert operations when they become frustrated about the lack of success with diplomatic initiatives and are unwilling to use military force. Some may begin by being more eager than others. I wouldn't care to characterize any of the administrations I've watched. In the long years of drawing down intelligence capabilities, we almost completely dismantled the nation's capacity to conduct covert operations. The impression that we're running around the world conducting covert operations is plain false. I would add that concern about the extent of covert operations is not just found in Congress. It's also found in substantial depth among intelligence professionals. They are overwhelmingly concerned about the quality of this country's foreign intelligence, and they worry that covert operations, especially when they are exposed and criticized, impact adversely on the more important job of foreign intelligence collection and analysis.

Q. When the Carter Administration negotiated the second strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, opponents said the United States lacked the ability to verify such agreements. Is that true?

A. We have tried over the last decade to improve the nation's ability to verify arms control treaties. There was valid criticism in Congress that the resulting capability was thin. The requirements for verification with regard to SALT and SALT II treaties were substantial but not overwhelming. A more complex treaty will place substantial additional bur-

dens on verification. There are several ways to deal with that. There are, for instance, forms of on-site inspection that would increase verification capabilities, but if you insist on absolute certainty, if you insist on the capacity to detect every violation, you'll never have an arms control process. You have to take some risks. The key is being confident that you will detect any serious cheating.

Q. What is the state of United States intelligence capabilities?

A. The United States intelligence community, as currently structured and manned, is marginally capable to deal with the world of the late 1980's and 90's. That judgment is shaped by my view that this country's primary problems in that period will be found in the competition for raw materials, natural resources, and markets in an unstable world with the potential for minor conflicts that could escalate in areas where we now have little or no intelligence effort. I do not believe we can do less than we are doing against our principal adversaries, and there are areas where that effort isn't as good as it should be, specifically intelligence on economic and political developments in the Soviet Union. The major strengths of our system involve military matters. Our major weaknesses include a minimal effort both in collection and analysis about many of the non-Communist countries. We lack the encyclopedic effort that will let us understand trends before we get to the level of a crisis.

Q. Over recent decades, there has been an increasing reliance on electronic and other technical means of collecting intelligence. Has the resulting neglect of human sources damaged overall collection capabilities and quality?

A. A myth has grown up from statements of some officials that we are too dependent on technical collection. There was a period of time when decision makers believed that satellite photography was going to answer all our needs. We're all a little wiser now. No analyst should be left dependent on a single means of acquiring intelligence. Human collection runs the risk of relying on someone who wants to may leave you without access to cer-

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WASHINGTON TALK

Briefing

Getting a Line to Inman

As Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Bobby R. Inman had instant access to almost every kind of communication and information in the country, as well as a corps of dedicated couriers to speed sensitive items to his desk.

But as a civilian who recently changed home addresses, he had to make two personal visits to the local post office this week — one visit beginning at 6 A.M. and lasting one and a half hours — to retrieve his own accumulation of letters.

Lynn Rosellini
Warren Weaver Jr.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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JULY 1982

Disinformation: Or, Why the C Verify an Arms-Control Ag

Edward Jay Epstein

WHEN Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger revealed last April that the Soviet Union had achieved superiority over the United States in intercontinental missiles, he provoked a furor in Congress over the status of the nuclear balance. Weinberger's revelation also pointed to an intelligence failure of unprecedented proportions that extended back over two decades, and that cast a great shadow of doubt over the capacity of the United States to keep accurate track of the Soviet military arsenal and therefore to verify any arms-control agreement with the Soviet Union in the future.

In 1961, the Soviet Union, despite all its bluff and bluster, had deployed only four cumbersome and unreliable intercontinental missiles. U.S. intelligence had confidently asserted that there was no way the Soviet Union could ever deploy the number of missiles necessary to threaten the rapidly expanding American missile force without providing years of advance warning.

Such confidence then seemed fully warranted, as U.S. intelligence had through its technical wizardry found means of intercepting virtually all the Soviet missile-testing data, or telemetry, and of determining the accuracy of the missiles. It was on the basis of this powerful array of intelligence about Soviet activity that American leaders made crucial decisions throughout the 1960's concerning the number, location, and defense of America's missiles.

Yet in the event, these intelligence assumptions proved to be seriously flawed. Even though its missile testing was being relentlessly monitored by America's electronic sentinels in space and on land, the Soviet Union, *without* alerting U.S. intelligence, managed to develop—and deploy—missiles with multiple warheads accurate enough to attack the most hardened missile silos in the United States.

How could such
been detected?

At first, explanations for this incredible intelligence failure tended to focus on the errors of the American analysts. The inability to see improved Soviet missile accuracy was attributed either to the prevailing disposition grossly to underestimate Soviet technical competence, or to incorrect assumptions about the method by which Soviet scientists tested missile accuracy. The fault, in other words, lay in self-deception.

However, when the data taken from the Soviet missiles were studied in retrospect, with the help of new and better methods of analysis, it appeared that considerably more was involved in the intelligence failure than American mistakes and self-deception. This reanalysis suggested that the Soviet Union had deliberately and systematically misled American intelligence by manipulating and "biasing," as it is called, the missile transmissions that were being intercepted. In other words, by channeling doctored data into our most sophisticated scientific spying devices, Soviet intelligence had duped the satellites and antennas on which American intelligence had come to depend. The Soviets had thereby effected a decisive change in the delicate balance of strategic missiles.

After nearly a decade of bitter debate within the secret world of intelligence, the deception issue still remains unresolved. Recently a plan was drawn up by the National Security Council staff to place technical as well as human spies under the scrutiny of a centralized counterintelligence authority. The proponents of this reorganization argue that without such an "all-source" unit, able to piece together information from secret agents, surveillance cameras, and the interception of coded messages and telemetry, the various intelligence-gathering services could again be easily deceived. The opponents of this plan in the American intelligence agencies doubt that the Soviets ever in fact orchestrated a major deception. They favor more intensive monitoring devices, and reject the proposed centralization as unnecessary and destructive of morale. The deep and intense divisions within the intelligence community have not been resolved.

EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN writes often on issues of intelligence. Among his books in this field are *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald and Inquest: The Warren Commission's Hidden Role in 1963*. He has also contributed articles to the *New Yorker*, the *New York Times Magazine*, and COMMENTARY (including "The War Within the CIA," August 1978). Mr. Epstein's latest book