

Embassy Security: Problems Exist for U.S. Around the World

STATINTL

J By ELAINE SCIOLINO
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 21 — Some of the security problems that have arisen at the American Embassy in Moscow are present in a number of other American missions around the world, according to Administration officials, intelligence experts and current and former American ambassadors.

Missions in China, Eastern Europe and other areas with a large Soviet presence have been particularly vulnerable, American security officials said. But they said there were also problems in certain Middle Eastern and African countries.

Americans serving in friendly countries where internal security regulations are more relaxed are also susceptible to Soviet and other subversion, they said.

Security lapses elsewhere have not drawn the same attention as those in Moscow, the specialists acknowledged, although many of the problems have existed for decades and are considered as serious. Nor has the attention directed at the problem in Moscow been duplicated elsewhere.

'Problems Are Widespread'

A "What the incident in Moscow should awaken us to is that the problems and vulnerabilities are widespread," said Adm. Bobby R. Inman, retired, a former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, who headed a special State Department advisory panel that investigated embassy security in 1985.

"While the Soviets most skillfully exploit them, they are not the only ones trying," he added, "and vulnerabilities are at least as large if not larger in other places where the guard is not so high."

An Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, Robert E. Lamb, acknowledged that hostile espionage is a global problem confronting United States diplomatic facilities.

"Moscow has a threat level unmatched in the world, but there are other places that are just as vulnerable," he said. "Espionage is a worldwide problem and not confined to just hostile countries."

In discussing security problems in Eastern Europe, the officials said that embassy buildings in Prague, Budapest, East Berlin and Sofia, Bulgaria, are next to buildings that in some cases are owned by the host government. American investigators have turned up evidence of break-ins in buildings in Eastern Europe and electronic bugging.

Outside the Eastern bloc, the least acknowledged but the most serious se-

curity problems are at American facilities in China, according to intelligence officials.

When Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigators visited the three Beijing embassy buildings last year, they discovered a maze of tunnels from the basements to other buildings. Doors to the tunnels were locked but did not have alarms. One tunnel led into the basement of the Czechoslovak Embassy, said one committee staff member who went on the trip.

The consulate in Canton, meanwhile, is considered impossible to protect, since it is situated on several floors of a high-rise hotel and even "secure areas" where only Americans are allowed are guarded by the Chinese police, not American marines.

American installations are also made vulnerable by the extensive use of local employees. While West Germany, France and Britain hire an average of one local employee for every three of its own officials, the average number of local employees at American posts far exceeds the number of Americans.

Last December there were 10,766 Americans and 15,327 local employees working full-time at American posts around the world. In some countries, the difference was dramatic. In Japan, for example, local employees numbered 407, compared with 269 Americans. In France there were 583 local employees and 291 Americans, and in Morocco 268 locals and 96 Americans.

Local employees outnumbered Americans even in some posts in Eastern Europe. In Czechoslovakia, for example, 46 locals worked for 27 Americans, while in Poland there were 119 locals and 52 Americans.

In Moscow, 210 Russians worked at the American Embassy, but all have been withdrawn.

Because of language and cultural barriers, American posts in China employed 336 locals and 155 Americans.

The United States can hire its own local employees in countries with large numbers of Soviet officials, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Iraq and Syria, but it is assumed that some of them are intelligence agents and that all must report to their governments.

In November 1985, for example, the State Department issued a strong protest when Nicaragua subjected local employees of the American Embassy in Managua to several hours of intense interrogation. American diplomats in both Baghdad, Iraq, and Damascus, Syria, have reported problems with electronic surveillance.

Government investigators assert that the problem of socializing between American embassy staff members and local employees and residents is more widespread than is generally acknowl-

edged by many officials.

"The basic rule, especially in the Eastern bloc, is 'Sleep NATO,' but that's not always followed," a former Foreign Service officer said.

American officials working at the United States Interests Section in Havana and the embassy in Managua have been sent home in recent years after they were caught dating local women. In Havana, investigators believe there was a serious intelligence loss because of an incident three years ago.

It is common practice for the Soviet intelligence services and their surrogates to use their nationals to seduce Americans in countries outside the Eastern bloc, where there is a tendency to be less suspicious and where socializing may not be forbidden.

Bill Would Ban Locals

In many emerging nations, where salaries are low, local employees have been particularly susceptible to offers to spy for Soviet-bloc governments and, to a lesser extent, ostensibly friendly countries.

This month, Representative Jim Courter, Republican of New Jersey, submitted a bill that would ban all local workers from American posts in Eastern Europe.

Although the State Department opposes the bill, it is working on a plan that would eliminate local employees from sensitive areas of American offices in Eastern Europe. It is also investigating regulations that would further prohibit socializing.

Reducing the number of local employees would require budgeting enormous resources to substitute Americans in many jobs. It would also shrink significantly the services offered to Americans abroad.

Locals Called Vital

Extensive renovation or replacement of more than 100 embassies to deter terrorism and espionage, as recommended by the Inman panel, would be even more expensive.

But despite the concern about the widespread use of locals, many diplomats argue that on the whole they benefit the Foreign Service.

They provide valuable services that in some cases could not be duplicated by American contract employees, according to State Department officials. And without local employees, they say, American embassies could turn into closed fortresses with little connection to the populace.

The officials say that native employees know how to resolve problems with local bureaucracies, know the language and dialects and often provide insight into culture and politics.

'Tremendous Benefits'
"There are tremendous benefits to being surrounded by foreign nationals, and if one is careful the benefits outweigh the liabilities," one Foreign Service officer said.

"There's a lot of sentiment in Congress for building new embassies when you're saving lives, but not for espionage," Mr. Lamb said, referring to the readiness of Congress to make embassies more secure against terrorism. "If this Government is going to make embassy security a priority, this Congress can help."

Mr. Lamb is expected to raise this and other issues in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Operations on Wednesday.

2.

The Workaday World Of Listening Devices

U.S. Diplomats Are Used to East-Bloc 'Bugs'

By Bill McAllister
Washington Post Staff Writer

When two members of Congress returned from Moscow this week and suggested that Soviet listening devices had made the U.S. Embassy inoperable, Soviet KGB agents were not the only ones laughing. A number of career Foreign Service officers, intelligence officers and former ambassadors were, too.

To them, living with "bugs" has for decades been a well-established and accepted way of life for diplomats sent into the Soviet bloc and many other countries.

"You assume a high degree of microphones" is the way former Central Intelligence Agency director William E. Colby put it.

Suggestions that the United States close its Soviet operations are "damn foolish," said former Supreme Court justice Arthur Goldberg, who served as an ambassador-at-large during the Carter administration. "You can operate, provided you take safeguards."

"The idea that you can't operate there is just nonsense," said Robert R. (Bobby) Inman, former head of the National Security Agency, deputy director of central intelligence and chairman of a panel that studied problems at the Moscow embassy in 1984.

Diplomats assigned to posts abroad, including some in countries assumed to be friendly to the United States, say that they long have operated under the assumption that many of their offices were bugged and that the foreign nationals working in U.S. missions—FSNs as they are called—are reporting to their local governments.

But this, say the diplomats, is hardly cause to abandon State Department operations in Soviet-bloc countries.

"What you have to understand is that a whole range of operations go on at our embassy that have nothing

of a classified nature to them," said Greg Guroff, a United States Information Agency specialist who has been assigned to the Soviet Union "off and on for 20 years."

Rep. Daniel A. Mica (D-Fla.), who said the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow may have to be demolished because of the number of listening devices it contains, acknowledged in an interview that it may be unrealistic to hope to maintain an office building in the Soviet Union that is free of bugging devices.

"Most buildings could be penetrated," said Mica, head of the House Foreign Affairs' subcommittee on international operations. He said the United States needs a building in Moscow with "a minimum number of floors" free of bugs.

Bugging devices are hardly new in Soviet-bloc countries. During the Eisenhower administration, U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge displayed a large hand-carved U.S. Seal—a gift of the Soviet Union—that had hung in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from 1945 to 1952 and was found to contain listening devices.

A U.S. diplomat assigned to Romania in the 1960s once sent his shoes to be repaired. They came back with a radio transmitter in the heel, recalled Colby, who added of the inventor of the miniature device: "I'd like to give that man a medal."

When the United States first recognized the Soviet Union in 1934, the first American diplomats posted in Moscow assumed that the first Soviets who applied for jobs there "had come to us with the blessing of the Soviet authorities," according to the memoirs of the late Loy W. Henderson, a career diplomat.

Little has changed, according to Gerald Lamberty, a State Department economics officer and president of the American Foreign Service Association.

Lamberty, who recently served in Poland, said diplomats there assumed their drivers had contacts with the secret police "because they had access to goods not available to the general public" and that their maids were reporting as well.

"Sometimes they would come to us and ask for papers, just so they could give something to the secret police," he said. "So you'd give them something from The New York Times."

"There were jokes about so-and-so is the colonel" of the KGB secret police, recalled Thompson R. Buchanan, a retired Foreign Service officer who spent two tours in Moscow and one as the consul general in Leningrad.

It was not difficult to spot the senior KGB officer in the embassy, Buchanan said. "He was the one, perhaps cleaning the toilets, who everyone snapped to attention when he passed by."

Inman said it was well known in Moscow that "the woman who gave out the theater tickets and the woman who made airline tickets" worked for the KGB.

But for reasons of "efficiency" the embassy decided to keep them on, he said.

Learning what to say—and not to say—in bugged premises requires discipline, all of the diplomats said. "I operated under the assumption that everything is overheard—unless I am told otherwise," Guroff said.

"If you want to talk about something sensitive, you talk in the streets," Colby said. The reason is that traffic noises render most listening devices useless, he said.

Mica said his experience in Moscow suggests that the Soviets may have surpassed the Americans in bugging technology—an idea that James Bamford disputes.

"Both sides make essentially the same types of listening devices," said Bamford, author of the "Puzzle Palace," a book about the National Security Agency.

None of the diplomats interviewed sought to minimize the potential damage allegedly caused by the Moscow Marine contingent, but one former intelligence expert, who asked not to be named, was philosophical about the Moscow incident and the outcries for new security rules.

"Really what we're dealing with is peaks and valleys," he said.

After every major security breach in the United States, the government will attempt to crack down on security violations, he said.

Over time the controls will grow lax and finally become sloppy. Then another breach and another crack-down. Why?

"That's the American way, peaks and valleys," the intelligence expert said.

STATINTL

KAREN On Friday

First lady Nancy Reagan and her old pal, Time Editor in Chief Henry Grunwald, slipped into the Jockey Club Wednesday for a quick chicken-salad lunch.

Ollie North, dressed comfortably in plaid shirt and jeans, smiled and exchanged niceties with neighbors as he pulled up in his pickup truck to dump the family garbage Saturday morning at the Great Falls Elementary School parking lot in Virginia.

Absolutely no one could tell if those sacks were filled with shredded paper and undistributed copies of the Weekly Reader, carrying the cover story on the colonel. Great Falls sits on the other side of the river where plain folk who don't pay extra for home pickup, do their own Saturday morning garbage run.

Adm. Bobby Inman speaking to fellow Texans as part of the Smithsonian Resident Associates program the other evening, reflected on his Texas heritage and the "can-do spirit" of Texans in politics. "When I ended up in the intelligence community where they wanted absolute fact, I lost the flavor for humor, just as Washington has," observed the former deputy CIA director, who now as chief executive officer of the Austin-based company, Wesmark, can once again revel in Texas folklore.

George Mahon of Texas, the longtime chairman of the Defense Appropriations subcommittee, left a strong impression on the admiral. In 1975, the chairman introduced oversight of the intelligence committee into an ongoing function of Congress.

Adm. Inman was one of the early witnesses detailing submarine reconnaissance at those closed hearings. "We got our budget, and there were no leaks out of those hearings," he recalled. When asked if he has considered running for political office, Bobby said the fund-raising process today has discouraged him.

Adm. Inman chaired a panel in 1984 to look at security of overseas missions, specifically terrorism, but also the potential loss of clas-

sified information. Secretary of State George Shultz accepted 91 of the 93 recommendations of that panel, said Mr. Inman, or snooping would be an even worse problem than it is today.

The situation in the Soviet Embassy, he said, has been going on for decades. "Espionage cases in the '30s and '40s involved blackmail for lifestyle or ideology," said Bobby, "whereas in the 1980s it's hard to blackmail anybody, [except maybe the Pollard case]. Now, it's cash, drugs, or women, things to make one's lifestyle more pleasant." He added: "The sad thing is the Americans volunteer it."

The former deputy CIA director said Bill Casey didn't work with Congress to make oversight effective, hence his failure as CIA director. On the arms-to-Iran hullabaloo: "It was terribly short-sighted. The government doesn't ask what if it doesn't work? Or what is the cost of failure?"

Another Texan, playwright Larry King, is thinking ahead. He says his 58th birthday, just a few months ago, inspired his latest play, "The Golden Shadows Old West Museum," about an 88-year-old, crippled former rodeo cowboy trying to recapture his youth. He wrote the play, which takes place in an old folks' home in Texas, in just 17 days. It opens at Memphis State University April 30. He hopes to have his novel "War Movies," about the World War II homefront, completed by that date, and off to Viking press.

Attorney Adam Yarmolinsky, provost of the University of Maryland in Baltimore, sold the book completed by his late wife, Jane, just before her death last December. "Angels Without Wings: A Tragedy Created A Remarkable Family," will be published by Houghton Mifflin in the fall. It's the story of how she and her then husband, writer Kurt Vonnegut, brought up their four nephews whose parents died within a day of one other, along with their own three children. One of them, Mark Vonnegut, wrote "Eden Express."

Steve Trott, the assistant attorney general, joins his old gang, The Highwaymen, for a 25th-reunion concert in June at his alma mater, Wesleyan University in Middletown, Conn. He was a member of the group that received a gold record for their 1961 recording of "Michael Row Your Boat Ashore."

Ted Ken watchers are amazed that the senator has stuck to his diet and shed about 50 pounds. In the ol' days one would have swore he was running.

— Karen Feld

NORFOLK, VA

A former director of the National Security Agency who chaired a panel studying embassy security in 1984 said Wednesday he believes the breach of security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is not an isolated incident.

A "You can be reasonably sure that (U.S.) embassies in the Eastern bloc ... will have been subject to similar compromises," said retired Navy Adm. B.R. "Bobby" Inman.

Inman said, however, he was unaware of other embassies with security problems involving Marine guards, but said he was confident the same espionage traps could be laid for civilians.

Inman, who retired from the Navy in 1982, also served as director of Naval Intelligence and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

He now serves as chairman and chief executive officer of Westmark Systems Inc., an Austin, Texas-based defense industry holding company.

Inman said he was briefed in Washington on Tuesday about problems with the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which is said to be riddled with eavesdropping devices, and the breach of security at the old embassy involving two Marine guards who have been charged with espionage.

Another Marine was arrested Tuesday on suspicion of spying and having contacts with Soviet women while at the American consulate, the Pentagon said. He has not yet been charged with a crime.

Pickup7thgraf: "

"I am not surprised at any of the stories about the new building ... but I was surprised about the evidence of the suborning of the Marines," Inman said.

"This failure goes right at the heart of their primary mission for being on station," the retired admiral said. "I still have some concerns that we are not yet at the bottom this."

Inman was in Norfolk to address a seminar at Virginia Wesleyan College. Afterward, reporters queried him about security problems at the U.S. Embassy.

Inman expressed support for President Reagan's position that the new embassy in Moscow will be torn down if it cannot be protected from eavesdropping. Until security questions about the building are resolved, Reagan has indicated that Soviet diplomats will not be allowed to occupy their new embassy in Washington.

In 1984, Inman chaired a panel that studied the terrorism threat and the security of U.S. embassies.

The panel made 93 recommendations to the State Department, including one to withdraw all Soviet employees from the U.S. Embassy. The proposal, Inman said, met with resistance.

The two former Marine guards are accused of allowing KGB agents to enter top-secret areas of the mission.

The Marines allegedly had sexual affairs with Soviet women working at the embassy, and one such affair led to the security breach. The entire 28-man contingent was called back to the United States for interrogation.

The United States may have to consider using older or possibly married Marines as embassy guards so they will not be as easily swayed by the inducements of female companionship, Inman said.

Security breaches spook U.S.

✓ By Nicholas M. Horrock
Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—In the last five years, foreign intelligence agents have penetrated every major U.S. national security department, but congressional aides and security officials say Reagan administration efforts to guard secrets have been halting, disorganized and ineffectual.

In the annals of Cold War espionage, the record of recent years is amazing. Spies have

been discovered in the FBI, the CIA, the armed forces, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, a range of private defense contractors and in U.S. embassies abroad.

The recently uncovered extensive Soviet penetration of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow through the Marine guards assigned there, according to these sources, is only the latest in a series of cases where counter-

intelligence officials and the Reagan administration ignored danger signals and recommendations to tighten security.

One congressional expert, who asked not to be quoted by name, said that in many cases there is clear evidence that counter-intelligence officials did not properly heed strong warning signs of espionage activity.

In the Marine case, for instance, Robert Lamb, the State Department security chief, ac-

knowledged that agents did not follow up properly when Cpl. Arnold Bracy told them he had fraternized with a Soviet woman employee of the agency.

But the Moscow embassy, key sources said, may be only a small part of the problem in U.S. facilities behind the Iron Curtain. An expert who has made a major study of this problem said that a whole range of young Americans—secretaries, Marine guards and younger

foreign service officers—may have been entrapped into espionage by communist intelligence services.

He cited one instance in the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, where security officials discovered that the barred window to the Marine quarters in the embassy had been modified to permit people to enter the building.

The only guards were on the

Continued

first floor, and this secret entrance on the top floor permitted Hungarian intelligence operatives a free run of the upper floors. It suggested that this had been done with the assistance of marines who wanted to bring in visitors.

These sources said there has been wrangling in several instances over how to improve security abroad.

For instance, former CIA Director Stansfield Turner had ordered that marines who supervised security at the construction of the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow be given polygraph tests upon their return to the United States. Turner hoped to discover whether they had been compromised and the new embassy penetrated.

But when the Reagan administration came into office, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz countermanded the order on the grounds that marines shouldn't face such an indignity.


The breakdowns in procedure have not been overseas alone.

Well-placed intelligence sources said that Jonathan Pollard, the naval intelligence analyst convicted of passing thousands of documents to Israeli agents, lost his security clearance because of emotional instability more than a year before his spying was discovered.

"He was bananas," said one expert, "but he managed to persuade the Navy to restore his clearance because he was going to accuse them of discrimination, anti-Semitism, if they withheld it. They took the easy route and returned it."

Edward Lee Howard, a CIA intelligence officer who defected to the Soviet Union after being dismissed by the CIA, had "an incredible record" of drug abuse and alcoholism while at the CIA, according to these sources. Nevertheless, he was given highly sensitive training and indoctrination to work at the CIA station in the embassy in Moscow. He is now believed to have assisted the KGB, the Soviet security service, in planning ways to penetrate the embassy through the Marine guard force.

Howard's vulnerability to exploitation by the Soviets was ignored by the CIA because of what an expert calls "arrogance [that] demonstrates a false sense of invulnerability on the part of the agency. It is an attitude that once you're in, you're in, and betrayal



Cpl. Arnold Bracy

is out of the question."

In the Walker spy ring case, Jerry Whitworth, a naval petty officer who sold codes and ciphers to the Soviets through retired Navy Chief WO John A. Walker for hundreds of thousands of dollars, lived a luxurious life but never attracted the attention of security agents. In 1983, when many enlisted service people were living just above the poverty line, Whitworth's wife hired a Rolls-Royce and a chauffeur to pick him up when the USS Enterprise docked in San Diego.

In the 1970s, senior naval submarine experts became convinced that there was a leak in naval communications because the Soviet forces were much more adept at tracking American ships than they had ever been. But counterintelligence officers dismissed the danger. At that time, John Walker, the record now shows, was supplying the Soviets with valuable data from Atlantic fleet headquarters in Newport News, Va.

As the espionage cases mounted over the last few years, there has been one internal investigation after another. When President Reagan ordered a massive new re-assessment of damage last week, one cynical security expert suggested it was "simply to appear to be doing something."

Retired Army Gen. Richard Stilwell, an intelligence expert in three wars, headed one commission that wrote a scathing analysis of the defense counterintelligence efforts. It found duplication, thousands of unnecessary security clearances and confused and poorly directed regulations.

Though many improvements have been made, there are still

vast inconsistencies in the standards used for the various security clearances and over who should receive them.

After violent attacks on U.S. facilities in Lebanon, retired Navy Adm. Bobby Inman headed an extensive investigation of embassy security worldwide that found vast gaps both in physical security and in protection of communications and codes.

A secret portion of his report contained severe warnings about security in the Moscow embassy where the Soviets had been discovered bugging typewriters with a device that could record the messages they were typing. The recommendations contained in this report have not been fully implemented.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence wrote a detailed report on security gaps and what should be done about them that was published last year. It was not until January that the Reagan administration submitted a counterintelligence plan sought by the committee, and experts in Congress and within the administration privately admit that little has been done.

One law-enforcement expert, who asked not be identified by name, agency or title, said the central problem seems to be that no one person in government is responsible for catching spies.

"Counterintelligence people in the agencies are dial twirlers; they check to see if safes are locked," the expert said. "They see their job as racking up security clearances; you know, how many people can they clear in a year."

The FBI, he claims, is an investigative agency that sees its role as investigating espionage cases. "They keep track of the Soviet bloc agents, and considering the time and money they have they probably do a good job," he said. "But they don't actively look for Americans who have turned coat."

One key element, according to congressional experts, has been the absence of follow-up on what is happening to men and women who have had access to top secret material but have left their government posts or other jobs.

Ronald Pelton, a communications specialist for the National Security Agency, sold key programs to the Soviets after he left the agency because he was down on his luck. Pelton also had severe drug and alcohol problems.

This issue has been raised in several major reports, but never settled by the Reagan administration. *Tribune* correspondent Terry Atlas contributed to this story.

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REAGAN WAS TOLD IN '85 OF PROBLEM IN MOSCOW EMBASSY

Advisory Panel Told Him That Soviet Employees Posed Serious Security Risk

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 2 — A secret report sent to President Reagan by his advisory panel on intelligence two years ago warned that the United States Embassy in Moscow was vulnerable to Soviet espionage, Government officials said today.

The officials, some of whom have been critical of the State Department, said that the report helped persuade Mr. Reagan to approve a plan to reduce the number of Soviet employees in the embassy, but that it prompted few appreciable changes in security procedures.

The report was prepared by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a group of private citizens who conduct independent reviews of intelligence issues.

Ross Perot Reportedly Resigned

A person familiar with the board's work said today that H. Ross Perot, the Texas billionaire, resigned from the panel in disgust in the spring of 1985 because the Government had failed to heed the recommendations about the embassy in Moscow.

The source said that at one of the board's hearings, a State Department official said it would be too expensive to replace the Soviet employees of the embassy with Americans. Mr. Perot replied that he would be willing to pay for it out of his own pocket, the source said. Mr. Perot declined to comment today.

The report by the advisory board said the 200 Soviet nationals then employed at the embassy were a security threat. It said they could pick up information by contacts with Americans or by entering sensitive areas, according to people familiar with its content. The document did not single out the Marine

guards as a security risk, these people said.

Last year, the entire issue of Soviet employees became moot when the Soviet Government ordered all of them out of the embassy in retaliation for a United States order to reduce Soviet diplomatic personnel in the United States.

In the continuing inquiry into possible security breaches by two Marine embassy guards in Moscow, the State Department announced today that all embassy employees would be questioned. Charles E. Redman, the State Department spokesman, said the security officer at the embassy, Frederick Merke, was being recalled to assist in the inquiry.

After the intelligence advisory board completed its report, another advisory commission, on embassy security, headed by Adm. Bobby R. Inman, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, reached the same conclusions. Its report prompted Secretary of State George P. Shultz to order changes in the Moscow embassy.

Department Called Resistant

But officials outside the State Department contend that it was still resistant, particularly when it came to reducing the number of Soviet employees. The two Marine guards have acknowledged to investigators that their espionage activities began after they were seduced by Soviet women working in the embassy.

A spate of espionage cases in the United States also led to demands by members of Congress to eliminate the practice of having Soviet citizens working in the embassy and to cut back on the size of the Soviet diplomatic presence in the United States.

Congressional testimony and in private conversations, State Department officials argued that the Soviet employees helped the diplomats cope with the Soviet bureaucracy on such issues as arranging travel and expediting imports through customs.

They said Americans who would have to be recruited to replace them would be susceptible to enticement by Soviet agents. Members of Congress and Administration officials said that Arthur A. Hartman, the departing Ambassador, was one of the strongest opponents of the plans to reduce or eliminate the Soviet employees.

"They were nonchalant about security," said Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat and former vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "They let the Soviets have free run of the embassy. They don't seem to realize that the Moscow embassy was the candy store for the K.G.B."

Senator Leahy said a secret version of the committee's 1986 report on counterintelligence had called the State Department lax in the embassy.

Robert E. Lamb, the head of the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, acknowledged in a recent interview that the various reports had essentially called on the Foreign Service to change long-held views about security.

"It is a question of time," he said.

a major cultural change in the last two years, and it has been a painful change as a result of the Inman report."

Government officials critical of the State Department today provided new details about the planting of Soviet monitoring devices in embassy typewriters.

According to these officials, questions were first raised in the 1970's. "The Foreign Service has gone through when other embassies in Moscow reported having discovered such devices. In 1978, an antenna was found in the chimney of the embassy, and officials now believe that it was probably moved up and down to pick up signals from the devices in typewriters on various floors.

A team of investigators sent to Moscow in 1979 found nothing, according to the officials, who theorize that the Russians had been alerted.

The devices were finally uncovered in 1984, but later, Soviet agents were able to introduce a new technology, in which the signals from the electric typewriters were carried out of the embassy building through the typewriter power cords.

STATINTL

Efforts to topple governments often backfire, Inman says

By Overton McGehee
Times-Dispatch state staff

HAMPDEN-SYDNEY — Covert efforts to overthrow foreign governments often backfire in the long run, a former director of the National Security Agency told an audience at Hampden-Sydney College on Tuesday night.

"I think, by and large, when you set out to try to bring about a change of government, you run into trouble," according to retired Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, who served as director of naval intelligence and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as NSA director.

"The shah came back with our help and reigned a few years but are we better off now in Iran as a result?" he asked.

Inman tied together the U.S. experience in intelligence activities for more than a century and commented on situations around the globe and in the White House.

Covert operations have a place, he said, but attempts to overthrow governments have often been counterproductive.

"I am not nearly as much an enthusiast of covert operations as some of my confreres down at the intelligence agencies.

"I don't have any difficulty at all with the basic concept of countering Soviet propaganda efforts. ... [but] I'm not all that enthusiastic about meddling in elections.

"I never saw an instance where the idea of covert operations originated at the CIA."

Usually, he said, interference in foreign governments began with a request from State Department officials frustrated by an inability to create change through political and diplomatic channels.

Supporting unpopular governments has also caused problems for foreign policy, Inman said. He used Anastasio Somoza, former dictator of Nicaragua, and ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines as examples.



1982 file photo

Adm. Bobby Ray Inman

'We never seem to learn'

"Nicaragua is a classic case ... of the difficulty this democracy has in detaching itself from a leadership that is clearly about to lose power.

"We were luckier in the Phillipines than we had any right to have ever expected.

"The lesson I would learn out of Vietnam ... is that it is very difficult to get along with an unfriendly government but it's even harder to prop up people ... who can't govern and who don't have any support to govern.

Inman, 55, is a native of Rhonessboro, Texas, where his father ran a gas station. His military career was a rapid climb from Navy decoder in the early 1950s to head of NSA in the late 1970s. He reached the rank of full admiral at 49.

Inman moved from director of naval intelligence to director of the NSA in 1977 and became deputy director of the CIA in 1981. He retired in 1982 after 18 months in the CIA.

This year, Inman left the consortium to become president of Westmark Systems, a holding company that seeks to acquire defense electronics contracting companies and to

develop products more quickly than is normal at large corporations.

Although Inman advocated limitations on the covert side of foreign intelligence, he argued for the need for more knowledge of "what's going on around the world."

The strongest building period for intelligence gathering was from 1947 to 1958, he said, and there were constant reductions from 1967 to 1981.

Inman said he approached the ambassador in Iran in 1978 about putting additional intelligence officers there and was rebuffed. The ambassador said he had all the information he needed, Inman said.

"All it would have taken was some good, bright people with language ability to sit in the coffee houses and mosques, to understand how quickly the attitudes were shifting away from the shah," Inman said.

"At the time of the hostage rescue operation, within the U.S. government, available to the intelligence community, there were 26 people in total who spoke Farsi, and only three well enough to understand two excited Irnians 'alking to each other."

Inman called the Iran-contra controversy "a classic case of the disruption of government when you put people in jobs to be ideological watchdogs, not for their degree of competence as staff persons to develop sound and sensible ideas and options."

He said he doubts that Reagan knew about the entire plan.

"Was he told? Probably, in the course of a morning briefing, along with 18 other items.

"Will people go to jail? I think probably so.

"Not because their early actions turn out to be in violation of law but for obstruction of justice, for destroying files. We never seem to learn.

"True confessions are not only good for the soul but they're also good for making sure you don't end up with much larger problems later on."