



KOPPEL: Good evening. I'm Ted Koppel, and this is Nightline. He sees himself as the ultimate Arab leader. He has supported international terrorism. He's underwritten political assassination. And he's engaged in a frantic effort to buy his own nuclear bomb. Libya's Moammar Khadafy, how much longer will the rest of the world put up with him?

* * * * *

DUNSMORE: However complex Khadafy's personality, analysts are unanimous that he is driven by a single-minded ambition. He wants the mantle of former Egyptian President Nasser. He wants to reunite and lead the Arab world. It has been his greatest frustration that he comes from a tiny country of some 3 million people and therefore has no legitimate power base. ROBERT KUPPERMAN (Center for Strategic and International Studies): He's a one-man source of tyranny, with a comparatively small following that is willing to violate all of the international norms of decency and who somehow has maintained a high degree of personal charisma and zealously upon the part of his followers.

DUNSMORE: Most of his escapades, however egregious, can be seen as attempts to make himself important. He has dispatched hit squads to assassinate President Reagan and former Secretary of State Haig. He has mined the Suez Canal. He has

made war on the Sudan. And he has eliminated untold numbers of his opponents within and outside of Libya. The latest incident in Egypt would be, for him, only a minor setback. If you take a map of the world and then paint red every country where Khadafy has supported terrorist groups, tried to overthrow the government, sent in hit squads to assassinate political leaders or tried to form

a political union, the map will be redder than during the heyday of the British empire. There are rather more important reasons for the British to dislike Khadafy. In April, a man inside the Libyan People's Bureau here in London fired

on a crowd of demonstrators, killing a policewoman. After the shooting and siege here at the People's Bureau, many Britons were asking the old questions, 'Why do we put up with Khadafy? Why not cut off all ties and isolate him?' And back came the same old answer, 'Well, Khadafy may be bad politics, but he is good business.' There's no question that Khadafy's oil money has created a tolerance for his behavior, which would otherwise not exist. Britain broke relations but continues to trade with Libya. France stood up to Khadafy in the civil war in Chad, but President Mitterrand's critics say he was out-manuevered by Khadafy into a premature withdrawal from Chad because the French want to resume arms sales to Libya. Even the United States, despite all the public hand-wringing, still does business with Libya. One thousand Americans continue to work there, and U.S. oil companies continue to make millions. Ironically, parts of the Arab world believe Khadafy survives because he is a creature of the

CIA. In this view, said to be held by senior Saudi Arabian officials, Khadafy is useful because he could give the U.S. access to his Soviet weaponry, and he is a divisive force in the Arab world. Actually, the greatest concern for Washington is the possibility that Khadafy might get his hands on nuclear

Continued

'68 Memo by C.I.A. Aide Read at CBS Libel Trial

By M. A. FARBER

thirteen years before he became a paid consultant to CBS-TV on its 1982 documentary on Vietnam, a C.I.A. analyst told his superiors that Gen. William C. Westmoreland's command had engaged in a "monument of deceit" regarding estimates of enemy strength in the Vietnam War.

The assessment by the analyst, Samuel A. Adams, was contained in an internal Central Intelligence Agency memorandum that was read to the jury yesterday in the libel case brought against CBS by General Westmoreland, who is expected to take the stand today.

In the memo, Mr. Adams accused General Westmoreland's command of "half-truths, distortions and sometimes outright falsehoods" regarding the size and nature of enemy forces in South Vietnam in 1967. It was, basically, these same charges that were leveled on the 1982 "CBS Reports" documentary, "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception."

Mr. Adams is also a defendant in General Westmoreland's \$120 million libel suit, which stems from the broadcast and is being tried in Federal Court in Manhattan.

Memo Introduced in Court

The memo — dated Jan. 31, 1968, the day after the start of the Tet offensive — was written to George A. Carver Jr., then chief of Vietnamese affairs for the C.I.A. and Mr. Adams's immediate superior. It was introduced by David Boies, the lawyer for CBS, during his cross-examination of Mr. Carver.

In September 1967, Mr. Carver led a delegation of intelligence officials to a conference with military leaders in Saigon, where an agreement was struck on size of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces in South Vietnam to be included in a report for President Johnson. Initially, the C.I.A. argued for significantly higher estimates of enemy strength than did General Westmoreland's command.

In the memo of Jan. 31, 1968, Mr. Adams notified Mr. Carver that he was leaving his staff to take a job with the agency's office of economic research, where he said he could pursue his interest in Vietcong organization and manpower.

But the "fundamental" reason for his departure, Mr. Adams said, related to what he called a compromise on enemy strength that been forged in Saigon the previous September.

Criticized C.I.A.

Mr. Adams said the C.I.A., and particularly Mr. Carver's staff, had made a "mistake" in agreeing to lower figures on the estimate of enemy strength in South Vietnam and had thereby "basically misinformed policymakers of the strength of the enemy."

The C.I.A., Mr. Adams said in the two-page memo, had not been "sufficiently diligent in bringing to the attention of the intelligence community the numerical and organizational strength of our adversaries in Vietnam."

Mr. Adams said in the memo that he realized the "pressures" on the C.I.A. — originating, he said, from General Westmoreland's command — "have been enormous.

"We have occasionally protested," he said, "but neither loud enough, nor long enough."

Analyst Present at Meeting

On direct examination at the trial, Mr. Carver testified that Mr. Adams was present in Saigon when the the C.I.A. developed its alternative offer to the military and had not dissented from it. Mr. Carver said, however, that Mr. Adams had expressed his feelings about the final enemy troop estimates before writing the memo. He described Mr. Adams, 51 years old, as someone who is "often in error, seldom in doubt."

Yesterday, Mr. Carver told Mr. Boies that he respected Mr. Adams's ability and had recommended him for the "promotion" to the office of economic research. But he said he had reservations about Mr. Adams's judgment and about his readiness to accept the fact that, in government, "you have many arguments" and while "you win some, you lose some."

The CBS documentary focused on the events surrounding the preparation in 1967 of a revised order of battle and of a new intelligence estimate on enemy strength in Vietnam for President Johnson. An order of battle is the official military listing of enemy forces.

Besides serving as a consultant for the documentary, Mr. Adams also appeared on the 90-minute broadcast. Like Mr. Adams, CBS contended in the documentary that, by minimizing the size of the enemy in 1967, General Westmoreland's command had left the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and American troops unprepared for the magnitude of the Tet offensive in January 1968.

New Order of Battle

The accord reached in Saigon in September 1967 listed a total enemy military force of 223,000 to 248,000, plus a separate category for 80,000 to 90,000 political cadre. The figure of 248,000 represented a decline of 51,000 from the existing order of battle, which, unlike the new listing, included the political cadre. The existing order of battle also included 70,000 Vietcong self-defense forces, which were now dropped from the listing in favor of a "verbal description" of them. C.I.A. and military estimates of the self-defense forces in 1967 put their number at about 120,000.

Yesterday, Mr. Boies introduced another memo to show that, even after these figures were settled on, C.I.A. officials — including Mr. Carver — were uncertain of their validity.

In a Nov. 3, 1967, memo to Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Carver wrote that "evidence has come to light which suggests the VC may be further blurring the distinction" between armed guerrillas and the self-defense forces.

Mr. Carver told Mr. Helms that "we will need to do a lot more concentrated research in this area" if the kind of agreement made in Saigon was not to prove "more misleading than helpful."

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ON PAGE A-8

WASHINGTON TIMES
14 November 1984

CIA ex-official's testimony, deposition differ

NEW YORK (AP) — A former CIA official who testified that communist militia forces were not militarily important in the Vietnam War seemed to express a different view a year ago in a deposition brought out in court yesterday.

George A. Carver, the agency's top specialist on Vietnamese affairs from 1966 to 1973, was on the witness stand for a fourth day in the \$120 million libel suit filed against CBS by retired Gen. William C. Westmoreland, former commander of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.

Gen. Westmoreland, 70, claims he was defamed by the 1982 broadcast, "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception,"

which accused his command of systematically understating enemy strength in the months before the communists' 1968 Tet Offensive. The intent, CBS said, was to convince officials in Washington and the American public that the war was being won.

A key issue in the trial is whether Gen. Westmoreland's staff improperly insisted on excluding "self-defense" and "secret self-defense" units from estimates of enemy strength, known as "order of battle" reports.

Mr. Carver testified that the self-defense forces were made up of old men and boys as young as 10, and that they should not have been counted among the guerrillas who

confronted U.S. troops.

But in his deposition, which came out during cross-examination by CBS attorney David Boies, Mr. Carver had said the so-called "irregular" forces were an insufficiently appreciated factor.

Mr. Carver said in the deposition that he believed as early as 1967 that intelligence experts "ought to take a look . . . at all the components of organized or quasi-organized man- or womanpower to which the communists had some degree of access and assess their total contribution."

Mr. Boies also produced a memo written by Mr. Carver in 1967 to CIA Director Richard Helms:

"We on the American side . . . have always drawn a sharper distinction between the guerrillas and the other paramilitary elements than is drawn by the communists. Evidence has recently come to light which suggests the [communists] may be further blurring this distinction to the point where our rather arbitrary U.S. breakout may be more misleading than helpful."

Mr. Carver testified yesterday that U.S. intelligence analysts, experienced in the methods of regular armies fighting conventional conflicts such as those in Europe, had difficulty adapting their methods to the conditions in Vietnam.

"Order of battle in the classic Western European military sense was essentially irrelevant," he said.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 9BOSTON GLOBE
14 November 1984

Former CIA deputy disputes statement in CBS documentary

By Mark McCain
Special to The Globe

NEW YORK - Seventeen years ago, in Saigon, George A. Carver Jr. fired off a cable alerting Central Intelligence Agency headquarters of the "inescapable conclusion" that Gen. William C. Westmoreland had put an arbitrary ceiling on the estimate of enemy troops.

Now, in a Manhattan courtroom, lawyers for CBS, Inc. are trying to rekindle the accusatory spark of such words. But Carver prefers to shrug them off as "purple prose" uttered in the heat of the moment.

Like a dozen other witnesses so far, Carver has rallied behind Westmoreland in his \$120 million libel suit against CBS. But some of Carver's past remarks are working against the 70-year-old general, who claims the network libeled him by charging he deliberately downplayed enemy troop strength to make the war appear winnable.

A central charge by CBS - in a 1982 broadcast now the focus of the legal attack - is that Westmoreland ordered his officers to keep a ceiling of 300,000 on enemy troop estimates prior to the 1968 Tet offensive.

The year was 1967, and for many months, the CIA had been arguing for an estimate of about 500,000 enemy troops. But the military assistance command in Vietnam (MACV) considered a figure about half that size to be correct.

In September, Carver led a CIA delegation to Saigon to settle the simmering debate, which had delayed a new estimate of enemy strength intended for President Lyndon B. Johnson. Two days after his arrival in Saigon, Carver cabled CIA director Richard Helms:

"So far, our mission frustratingly unproductive since MACV stonewalling, obviously under orders. . . . Variety of circum-

indicators . . . all point to inescapable conclusion that Westmoreland . . . has given instructions tantamount to direct order that [enemy] strength total will not exceed 300,000 ceiling. Rationale seems to be that any higher figure would not be sufficiently optimistic and would generate unacceptable level of criticism from the press."

Under questioning by Westmoreland's lawyer, Dan M. Burt, Carver said the cable reflected anger he felt towards the MACV negotiators "because they weren't doing things my way.

"They were so obtuse and difficult to deal with," he said, "that I drew the inference they were operating under some order."

Carver, under cross-examination by Burt, conceded one of the largest disputes centered on a category known as the self-defense militia. MACV wanted these troops deleted from all future estimates, arguing that they had little offensive military ability and were too elusive to count. But they planted mines and booby traps which killed American soldiers, the CIA argued, and were an intrinsic part of the communist guerrilla war.

Two days later, on Sept. 12, 1967, Carver cabled Helms to say negotiations were "at an impasse." Westmoreland's deputy for pacification, Robert Komer, had "launched into an hour-plus monologue," Carver explained, "reviewing his and Westmoreland's problems with the press . . . and the paramount importance of saying nothing that would detract from the image of progress."

According to the cable, MACV made a "final offer, not subject to discussion" with a range of 219,000 to 249,000 enemy troops and a separate listing of 75,000 to 85,000 for political cadres - the Viet Cong's "shadow" government.

The next day Carver, who was CIA's deputy director for namese affairs from 1966 to 1973,

sat down privately with Westmoreland. Within hours after that meeting an agreement was reached. Carver then cabled Helms: "Circle now squared, chiefly as a result of Westmoreland session. . . . We now have agreed set of figures Westmoreland endorses."

The CBS broadcast, "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," said those figures represented a virtual surrender by the CIA to Westmoreland. It quoted Carver's deputy, George Allen, as saying: "It was strictly a political judgment, a political decision, to drop CIA's opposition and to go along with the modified set of figures."

The agreement called for a range of "at least" 223,000 to 248,000 enemy and 75,000 to 85,000 political cadres. Self-defense forces were dropped from the tally. They continued to be included, however, in the body counts.

The CIA had gone into the Saigon conference favoring a range of 311,000 to 371,000 regular troops and 120,000 self-defense troops.

CBS lawyer David Boies quizzed Carver about why the CIA agreed to an estimate "so similar" to the "take-it-or-leave-it offer" from MACV.

"I heard arguments, analysis and evidence that I hadn't heard before," said the 54-year-old Carver, who was scheduled to begin his fifth day of testimony today in Federal Court.

Sitting halfway across the courtroom from Carver was one of his former CIA analysts, Samuel A. Adams, who has been arguing the numbers-deception theory for a decade.

Most recently Adams served as a paid consultant for the CBS broadcast. He is now a defendant in the libel suit, as are CBS producer Geroge Crile and reporter Mike Wallace.

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Troop pact set, 1967 cables say

Associated Press

NEW YORK — A CIA official complained to agency director Richard Helms in 1967 that Gen. William C. Westmoreland apparently had skewed Vietnam intelligence reports to avoid media criticism, but several days later struck an agreement with the general, according to documents introduced in court yesterday.

A series of internal cables and a memo used as evidence in Westmoreland's libel suit against CBS detailed a battle between military and CIA analysts over estimates of enemy troop strength in the Vietnam War.

The cables — sent by George A. Carver Jr., the top CIA official for Vietnam — detailed his view of a heated conference in Saigon over the politically sensitive intelligence reports.

At the start of the conference, Carver cabled Helms with the complaint that his mission was "frustratingly unproductive" because of "stonewalling" by members of Westmoreland's staff who were "obviously under orders."

Carver wrote that the "juggling of figures" by Westmoreland's staff and "tacit or oblique lunchtime and corridor admissions" by his officers "all point to the inescapable conclusion that Gen. Westmoreland ... has given instruction to direct order" that the estimate of Vietcong strength would not exceed 300,000.

He said the rationale appeared to be that an increased estimate of enemy strength would lead to an "unacceptable level of criticism from the press."

Westmoreland is suing CBS over a 1982 documentary, *The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception*, that said the general imposed an artificial ceiling of 300,000 on enemy strength estimates to give the impression the war was winnable.

He contends CBS libelously accused him of deceiving President Lyndon B. Johnson about the progress of the war.

Carver's five internal CIA cables and a memo show that a marked change took place during the September 1967 conference, in which Westmoreland's officers opposed the CIA's plan to number civilian "self-defense" troops in an official national intelligence report.

The day after complaining of "stonewalling," he said the talks had been "full of action and behind the scenes scurrying" in Westmoreland's command, but so far "little movement."

The following day, Carver met with Westmoreland and had dinner with Robert Komer, a representative of the President with the rank of ambassador.

He was then able to report in a cable to Helms, "Circle now squared, chiefly as result of Westmoreland session (and perhaps Komer dinner). We now have agreed to a set of figures Westmoreland endorses. Mission seems on verge of successful conclusion."

The CBS documentary contended that the CIA gave in to Westmoreland's demand not to count civilian enemy troops.

The general's attorneys have portrayed him as a man who willingly accepted a CIA offer to mention the civilian forces in the narrative of an intelligence report, but not to count them.

Westmoreland attorney Don W. Bert also introduced as evidence a memo Carver wrote to Ellisworth A. Barber, U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, that said an agreement had been reached over troop estimates. The memo praised Westmoreland and his staff for "invaluable contributions."

INTERNAL CIA CABLES AT CBS TRIAL
NEW YORK

Internal cables detailing a rift between the CIA and the military show the top CIA official in Vietnam complained that enemy troop counts were purposely underestimated but then apparently struck an agreement with Gen. William C. Westmoreland.

STAT A series of internal cables and a memo were introduced as evidence Friday in Westmoreland's \$120 million libel suit against CBS over its January 1982 documentary, "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception."

George A. Carver Jr., the top CIA official in Vietnam, sent the cables to CIA Director Richard Helms during a heated conference in Saigon over the politically sensitive intelligence reports.

At the start of the conference, Carver complained Westmoreland's staff was "stonewalling" and "obviously under orders."

He wrote that the "juggling of figures" by the staff and "tacit or oblique lunchtime and corridor admissions" by his officers "all point to the inescapable conclusion that Gen. Westmoreland ... has given instruction to direct order" that the estimate of Viet Cong strength would not exceed a "ceiling" of 300,000.

He said the "rationale" appeared to be that an increased estimate of enemy strength would lead to an "unacceptable level of criticism from the press."

The CBS documentary said the general imposed an artificial ceiling of 300,000 on enemy strength estimates to give the impression the war was winnable. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. troops in Vietnam, contends CBS libelously accused him of deceiving President Lyndon B. Johnson about progress of the war.

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The CBS documentary contends the CIA gave in to Westmoreland's demands not to count civilian troops.

Lawyers for Westmoreland have portrayed him as willingly accepting a CIA offer to mention the civilian forces in the narrative of an intelligence report, but not to count them.

Westmoreland lawyer Dan M. Burt also introduced as evidence a memo Carver wrote to Ellsworth A. Bunker, U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, saying an agreement had been reached over troop estimates. The memo praised Westmoreland and his staff for "invaluable contributions."

Burt said the memo, which was sent on to Johnson, showed there was no attempt to deceive the president.

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ON PAGE A-13

WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1984

Troop-Count Dispute Amplified in Trial

By Eleanor Randolph
Washington Post Staff Writer

STAT

NEW YORK, Nov. 9—The former head of Vietnam intelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency testified today that he wrote a cable in September 1967 accusing retired Army general William C. Westmoreland's command of "stonewalling, obviously under orders" against CIA efforts to increase estimates of enemy troop strength.

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But George A. Carver Jr. also said that, when he met with Westmoreland two days later, the general "immediately, firmly and emphatically" denied imposing any ceiling on his officers negotiating differences between the CIA and the military over an official such estimate.

Carver was then the CIA's special assistant to the director for

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Vietnamese affairs. He was testifying for a third consecutive day in Westmoreland's \$120 million libel action against CBS, Inc., and three co-defendants.

At issue is whether a CBS documentary was correct two years ago in accusing Westmoreland of ordering an arbitrary ceiling of 300,000 on numbers of enemy troops and of coopting officers under him at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and other intelligence officers, including those at the CIA, to stay within that range, which had been cited by the media.

The CBS broadcast said that, because of a conspiracy to underrate the enemy in the autumn of 1967, the media, the public and even Westmoreland's superiors, including President Lyndon B. Johnson, were surprised by the massive communist attacks that began through-

out South Vietnam on the Tet holiday Jan. 31, 1968.

In the program, "The Uncounted

Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," narrator/reporter Mike Wallace said that, after a bitter intelligence debate on troop estimates, "Gen. Westmoreland... won the intelligence war.

"And so, instead of being told of an enemy army of more than a half a million, the president, the Congress and the American public were told there were only 248,000 Viet Cong left, that the enemy was running out of men," Wallace reported.

In cables, parts of which were read to the jury by Westmoreland's attorney, Dan M. Burt, Carver described how he engaged in "heated, testy and at times adversarial" arguments with then-Army brigadier general Phillip Davidson, Westmoreland's second-in-command at MACV and chief of intelligence.

Carver said these occurred at a meeting in Saigon in September 1967 to hash out a CIA-Army dispute about enemy strength.

But, after four days of the negotiations, Carver said, in a cable to CIA Director Richard Helms: "I have made a major concession in not quantifying the irregulars. It seemed to me this was MACV's major sticking point."

Thus, an earlier CIA estimate of 120,000 so-called irregular troops, including the "home militia" of women, old men and teen-agers, was not listed numerically in the enemy Order of Battle but merely included in a written summary of enemy strength.

In another cable to Helms, Carver said the official National Intelligence Estimate hammered out that week would not include a total of Viet Cong military and political troops "since we believe such an

aggregate total is inherently meaningless and misleading."

Carver's cables, some of which

were read here, are colorful and highly descriptive of the confrontation in the summer and fall of 1967 among intelligence officials from all branches of government.

In the series of cables, most labeled "Eyes Only" for Helms, Carver charted the compromise, always suggesting that he would try to see Westmoreland to attempt to "loosen this straitjacket" imposed by MACV on the negotiations.

In a cable dated Sept. 13, 1967, after Carver met with Westmoreland, he told Helms: "Circle now squared... we now have agreed set of figures Westmoreland endorses."

Those aggregates, minus the irregulars, were increased from an earlier MACV figure of 298,000 at the beginning of the session to a range of 299,000 to 334,000 as the compromise.

In the cables, Carver accuses Davidson of interrupting him "frequently and sometimes tendentiously" during sessions.

Carver seems to relish "discomfiture of our [MACV] hosts" when the CIA's case seems bolstered and describes "tacit or oblique lunchtime and corridor admissions by MACV officers, including Davidson—all point[ing] to inescapable conclusion that Gen. Westmoreland... has given instruction tantamount to direct order that [Viet Cong] strength total will not exceed 300,000 ceiling."

Asked today about such language, Carver said: "I had had two extremely frustrating days, very difficult discussions where I felt the people with whom I was talking, discussing, were being singularly unreasonable since they were not doing things my way."

"I was tired, I was irritated and I lapsed into slightly purple prose trying to convey a mood and impression, having no thought I would be discussing this in detail 17 years later in a lawsuit," Carver added.

Carver, whose role was considered crucial in any compromise on enemy troop figures, is expected to face cross-examination by CBS attorney David Boies Tuesday.

Westmoreland is expected to testify next week.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 November 1984

Ex-C.I.A. Aide Cites Westmoreland's Help on Troop Figures

By M. A. FARBER

The former chief of Vietnamese affairs for the Central Intelligence Agency testified yesterday that he believed for a few days in 1967 that Gen. William C. Westmoreland had imposed a ceiling of 300,000 on reports of the size of enemy forces in South Vietnam, perhaps to avoid criticism by the press.

But the witness, George A. Carver Jr., said in Federal Court in Manhattan that when he confronted General Westmoreland with his concern at a private meeting in Saigon on Sept. 13, 1967, the general "immediately, firmly and emphatically denied that he had given any such order."

Moreover, Mr. Carver told the jury in General Westmoreland's \$120 million libel suit against CBS, the general was instrumental in helping to quickly arrange an accord on enemy strength figures between his own intelligence officers and the C.I.A. after months of dispute in which the C.I.A. had favored reporting higher troop figures than General Westmoreland's command.

The 1982 CBS Reports documentary that prompted the suit — "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception" — said that officers at "the highest levels" of military intelligence had conspired to minimize enemy strength by setting an "arbitrary ceiling" of 300,000 for Communist forces.

To achieve that end, the broadcast said, General Westmoreland adopted the "tactic" of deleting the Vietcong's self-defense units from the official listing of enemy strength known as the order of battle.

Mr. Carver's purpose in visiting Saigon in September 1967 was to reach an agreement on new order of battle figures, which would be incorporated in a special estimate of enemy strength for President Johnson. In a cablegram to C.I.A. officials on Aug. 30, 1967, Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, described the issue as "charged with political and public relations overtones."

Yesterday, Mr. Carver cited that cablegram and others that he himself had sent to Mr. Helms from Saigon early in September 1967. Mr. Carver's frustration before he talked to General Westmoreland was captured at the beginning of the first cablegram he addressed to Mr. Helms — on Sept. 10, two days after his arrival in Saigon.

By that time Mr. Carver and aides who had come with him from C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., had met with Maj. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson Jr., General Westmoreland's chief of intelligence, and the general's intelligence analysts. Among Mr. Carver's aides was Samuel A. Adams, who, 14 years later, would become a consultant for CBS on its Vietnam documentary.

But General Westmoreland, on Sept. 10, 1967, was on leave in Manila.

Frustration Is Noted

"So far, our mission frustratingly unproductive since MACV stonewalling, obviously under orders," Mr. Carver wrote Mr. Helms, using the initials for General Westmoreland's command. "Unless or until I can persuade Westmoreland to amend those orders, serious discussion of evidence or substantive issues will be impossible."

Mr. Carver said the "root problems, as we all recognize, lie more in political public relations realm than in substantive difference" and added that the discussions "all point to the inescapable conclusion that General Westmoreland (with Komer's encouragement) has given instruction tantamount to direct order that VC strength total will not exceed 300,000 ceiling."

The parenthetical reference was to Robert W. Komer, General Westmoreland's chief civilian deputy, who was away at that time in Bangkok.

Mr. Carver told Mr. Helms that General Westmoreland's "rationale seems to be that any higher figure would not be sufficiently optimistic and would generate unacceptable level of criticism from the press."

Yesterday, Mr. Carver said that in his "distress" he had used "purple prose" in the cablegram. "The MACV people were so obtuse and difficult," he said, "that I made the inference they were under orders."

Estimates of Strength Differ

When Mr. Carver arrived in Saigon, C.I.A. officials leaned to a total enemy strength figure ranging from 311,000 to 371,000, excluding an estimated 120,000 part-time forces in the self-defense units. The order of battle total at the time was 298,000. General Westmoreland's command proposed a total figure of 213,000 — excluding a newly estimated figure of 85,000 for political cadre that was counted in the C.I.A. total and that had been carried in the existing order of battle at a figure of 40,000.

Military intelligence officials also differed with the C.I.A. over the self-defense forces, which were listed in the existing order of battle at about 70,000. Senior C.I.A. officials said they agreed with General Westmoreland's command that the self-defense forces had little offensive military ability. But the C.I.A. wanted these units counted — if

only in a "nonmilitary" appendix to the order of battle — and General Westmoreland's officers insisted they not be counted in the future.

General Davidson, Mr. Carver said yesterday, took a "take it or leave it" approach to the dispute. And, on Sept. 12, he and Mr. Adams and other C.I.A. representatives in Saigon, he said, took another look at the C.I.A. figures. They now arrived at a total enemy strength of 229,000 to 259,000, with a separate listing of 80,000 to 90,000 for political cadre and no formal counting of the self-defense forces.

Within hours of his meeting with General Westmoreland the next morning, Mr. Carver testified, an agreement was reached on an enemy strength range of 224,000 to 249,000, plus a separate listing of 75,000 to 85,000 for political cadre. The self-defense forces would not be counted in the order of battle but they "would be described verbally" and, in the estimate for President Johnson, note would be taken they had once been as high as 150,000.

"Circle now squared," Mr. Carver cabled Mr. Helms, "chiefly as a result of Westmoreland session."

Mr. Carver's testimony will continue on Tuesday.