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People

By PHIL ROURA and TOM POSTER

Ford and his old Cabinet to meet, no buts about it

Former President Gerald Ford has called an extraordinary session of his former aides and cabinet members for Tuesday in Grand Rapids, Mich., to consider a weighty problem: more than 15 million sheets of paper about most of the public life of the former congressman and President that are housed in the Ford Memorial Library. It opens tomorrow.

For two meetings, each to last about an hour, the minutes will record those in attendance as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, CIA Director William Colby, Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman, Press Secretary Ron Nessen, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, presidential counsel Anne Armstrong, Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson and Attorney General Ed Levi, to name a few.

For Ford, it's history. No other former President has ever called his cabinet back into session after leaving the White House.

Absent will be James Schlesinger, who was bounced as defense secretary after a feud with Kissinger, and Earl Butz, the former agriculture secretary who suffered from foot-in-mouth disease. They weren't invited.

The Ford Library, said Ford spokesman Bob Barrett, cost \$15 million and was paid for by 14,000 contributors and the University of Michigan. The library is a two-story brick building with red oak walls inside and a high-security vault for special papers and a private office for Ford, should he ever want to do research or writing there.

About 150 former White House aides have been working to put the library in order, a huge job because Ford was the first chief executive to donate his papers while still in office. The collection includes 7,000 hours of video and audio tapes.

A presidential museum also is being built at Ann Arbor by the university.

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WASHINGTON STAR
25 APRIL 1981

Panel Told Soviets Back Terrorism

By Howie Kurtz

Washington Star Staff Writer

In a tightly guarded hearing room at the first session of the Senate's new subcommittee on security and terrorism, witnesses yesterday warned that the Soviet Union is supporting a network of terrorist organizations around the world.

Former CIA Director William E. Colby told the panel that the Soviets "have directly trained and supplied elements around the world engaged in what they euphemistically call wars of national liberation." He said the Soviets have employed "their proxies and surrogates of Cubans, East Germans, Czechs and others" against the United States, its allies and a host of other countries ranging from Mexico to Morocco.

Although these violent groups are not directed from a central "war room" in Moscow, Colby said, the Soviets must be held responsible for them. "They are not directing the orchestra, but they did provide the instruments. There is training in the finer arts of sabotage, demolition and guerrilla ambushes."

Colby's warning was echoed by the subcommittee chairman, Sen. Jeremiah Denton, R-Ala., who said his concern that Soviet-backed terrorists might infiltrate the United States was "urgent realism, not paranoia." Denton, a former prisoner of war in North Vietnam, plans to hold further hearings on this "new and most insidious threat" before his panel, a new version of the Senate internal security subcommittee that probed Communist influences during the 1950s.

"The sand in which we bury our heads will eventually bury our nation," Denton said.

While Denton sounded his clarion call, more than a dozen sign-wielding protesters marched outside the Dirksen Senate Office Building shouting, "No more witch hunts!" Inside, security was tight as plainclothes policemen guarded the witness table and a metal detector was used to screen visitors.

Denton interrupted the testimony several times to talk at length about his experiences as a prisoner in Hanoi, speaking with great emotion as he questioned the role of the media in the growth of opposition to the Vietnam War.

"The press hurt our cause," he said. "It hurt. It hurt for the North Vietnamese to be seeing all the glory of (the war) and for the U.S. to be seeing the hell of it. It is inevitable that the press in this country leans to the left. (But) tens of millions of people are now living in slavery (in Vietnam). We must get our perspective back."

The senator said he didn't think reporters who wrote about the anti-war movement had been "subverted" by the Soviet KGB, but that American journalists need to be more "careful" about challenging the motives of their government.

Denton said the KGB has an entire department devoted to spreading "disinformation," which he said "is to be accomplished by fabricating lies, planting forged documents and spreading issue-obfuscating propaganda in situations where a story-hungry and sometimes gullible press would seize upon them."

Arnaud deBorchgrave, a former foreign correspondent for Newsweek and author of "The Spike," a novel about terrorism, said the KGB is trying "to recruit agents and

sources inside the Reagan administration and to steal industrial and high-technology secrets."

DeBorchgrave said that "at least 1,000 Soviet, Cuban and East European diplomats" in this country are known or suspected intelligence agents, and that the staff of the United Nations "is under increasing KGB control," using U.N. publications to spread Soviet disinformation in the Third World. He added that Soviet agents had been feeding "disinformation" for years to a prominent French journalist, who willingly published it until he was caught and convicted last year.

"The KGB is in the position of never having to get its hands dirty," he said. "The East German secret service has done a lot of subcontracting work for the KGB in such countries as Libya, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen."

Claire Sterling, a foreign correspondent in Rome and author of a book about terrorism, said, "All governments have been extremely reluctant to point a finger at the Soviets for developing what was a cottage industry to the sophisticated, high-technology industry it has become."

"This is an undeclared war. The terrorists themselves have said the ultimate objective is us," Sterling said. She said there is "no mastermind" in Moscow directing these groups, but that the Soviets provide arms and sanctuaries for many terrorists through Cuba and the Palestinian resistance movement.

Michael Ledeen, editor of The Washington Quarterly, said many informants are reluctant to pass secrets to American officials for fear they will be leaked. He said he recently gave some sensitive information to State Department officials in an off-the-record conversation, only to receive a call three hours later from a reporter who questioned him about the details of the conversation.

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Amid Echoes of Past, He on 'New Threat' of Te

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Warning against the notion that "it can't happen here," Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.) opened hearings yesterday on the "new threat" of terrorism that, he said, is endangering freedom in the United States and elsewhere.

A succession of witnesses, led by former CIA director William E. Colby, blamed the Kremlin and a number of its allies for training, supporting and equipping terrorists on a far-flung international scale, but agreed that there was no "mastermind" directing the violence.

"I think there is a feeling that there is a central war room with flashing lights," Colby told Denton's subcommittee. "There is no central war room." The Soviet Union "did provide the instruments," but neither the Russians nor any other government, he said, is "directing the orchestra."

The inquiry, the first in a sporadic round of sessions to be held in coming weeks, produced instant controversy and echoes of the past. Yesterday morning, a small group of protesters showed up as the Ad Hoc Committee Against the SST (Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism) to warn against a return to the red-baiting days of the 1940s and '50s. Disapproving press releases abounded.

Testifying after Colby was journalist Claire Sterling, author of *The Terror Network*, a book that describes Soviet and surrogate support for terrorists of all persuasions, including Irish extremists and Spanish Basques. She said such collaboration began roughly around 1968, but suggested the Soviet contribution could best be described as "a do-it-yourself kit for terrorist warfare" that might destabilize Western societies.

Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) questioned her about the book's charges that Western intelligence agencies have long known but said nothing about the Soviet involvement.

"Have the CIA and the FBI been bought?" he asked after noting that she had written "the fix is in."

"Well, I don't know about the FBI," Sterling replied. She added that she

wasn't talking about just the CIA, but about "all the Western governments" that have been under attack by terrorists. Those governments, she said, have been "extremely reluctant to point a finger at the Soviet Union," perhaps to preserve the spirit of detente perhaps for other political reasons.

"I don't have a plotter's mentality," she said. "The fix is political."

Sterling, who has lived in Italy for 30 years, declined to suggest what should be done in America. It was widely agreed at the hearing that, as another witness, Washington Quarterly editor Michael Ledeen, put it, "at the moment, domestically, there is no problem to cope with."

Security at the hearing was, nonetheless, tight. The public had to enter through a metal detector. Plainclothes security officers dotted the room, although subcommittee chief counsel Joel Lisker, who asked for their presence, told reporters that no threats had been received.

During the afternoon session, Denton announced that he had received a call from a Huntsville, Ala., television station, asking him if he was wearing a bulletproof vest. He then unbuttoned his shirt a bit and announced that "the answer is no."

Another main topic at the hearing was the issue of "disinformation," on which, Denton said, the Soviet KGB expends much effort, especially in "recruitment of Western journalists."

The primary witness on the issue, former Newsweek correspondent Arnaud de Borchgrave, said he became interested in the subject in the late '70s and colleague in France was on the KGB payroll.

He did not elaborate.

Citing a number of leading scientists from Andrei Sakharov to Fred Hoyle, de Borchgrave also suggested that "the Soviet Union today is playing a covert role in the antinuclear lobby."

He charged that "there is a direct link between the World Peace Council, a well-known Soviet front organization, and antinuclear lobbies both in the U.S. and West Europe." De Borchgrave added that the peace council's U.S. branch is "affiliated with MFS — Mobilization for Survival — which is a leading umbrella organization for antinuclear groups."

"Interestingly enough," de Borchgrave continued, "MFS has now linked the antinuclear protest to unilateral disarmament advocates, New Left activists and some ecologists." But he said current FBI guidelines make it difficult for the bureau to monitor "the very groups and individuals that the KGB hopes to manipulate or recruit."

MFS, a Philadelphia-based organization, issued a statement last evening denouncing suggestions of "external domination as 'total fabrication' and protesting that "the kind of guilt by association tactics employed by Mr. de Borchgrave can only be said to be reminiscent of the repression and intimidation of the McCarthy era."

Throughout the hearing, Denton professed his hopes of a " rapprochement" between the U.S. press and government, and repeatedly expressed his chagrin over the news media's performance during the Vietnam war. At one point, Colby alluded to the CIA's finding that the antiwar movement was "an indigenous movement" and not dependent on foreign support.

Terrorist acts down, FBI on eve of hearing

By Vernon A. Guidry, Jr.
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Terrorist acts in the United States are declining, undermining "doomsday rhetoric" about domestic terrorism, says the executive assistant director of the FBI in charge of investigations.

"Right now, the risk is tolerable," said Francis M. Mullen in an interview. "We believe we are effective. . . . We do have the ability to investigate terrorist activity and groups."

The level of terrorist activity—both domestic and international—has become a matter of controversy, and so is the question of the appropriate response. A Senate subcommittee begins hearings today on the current extent of terrorism.

As the FBI measures terrorist incidents, there were 111 in the United States in 1977, 65 in 1978, 52 in 1979, and 29 in 1980. These are incidents; Mr. Mullen said, in which a claim of responsibility is made by a terrorist organization or in which there is "good evidence" of terrorist responsibility.

"I don't like to see all this rhetoric predicting a doomsday because I don't think that's going to happen," Mr. Mullen said.

"Now, the potential is there," he went on. "We've got to agree to that [but] the problem is being addressed."

One disturbing element is what Mr. Mullen describes as "more of a willingness to take human life" on the part of terrorists operating in the United States than had been the case before.

"What we're concerned about, and what we are watching closely, is that the United States doesn't become a battleground" between different foreign political factions, he said. He cites Libyan, Cuban and Iranian activities as examples.

"The only active [terrorists] we have that are really anti-U.S. government are the Puerto Rican groups," he said.

"We do suspect Cuban involvement in [terrorism involving] Puerto Rico, but to say Soviet involvement, no, we can't prove

it," Mr. Mullen said in response to a question about Moscow's possible role.

This is a key element in the controversy over international terrorism. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., largely began the current debate by focusing attention on what he called "rampant international terrorism" and the role of the Soviet Union in sponsoring it.

A number of experts have questioned whether terrorist activity is actually "rampant" at the moment. Pinning down the extent of Soviet involvement also has been difficult.

This issue will be examined today in a hearing before the Senate subcommittee on terrorism, a group whose very creation has stirred some fears that civil liberties may be abused in the search for internal threats.

One of the witnesses at today's hearing will be Claire Sterling, a veteran American journalist who has written a book on the subject, "The Terror Network."

Ms. Sterling maintains that the Soviet Union and its surrogates are supporting modern terrorist movements. "All the

world's emerging terrorist bands in the 1970s were indebted to the Cubans and their Russian patrons . . ." she writes.

She is sharply critical of Western governments and of the CIA in particular for what she regards as a cowardly failure to point to the Soviet Union as the promoter of terrorism.

Former CIA director William Colby, also to testify at today's hearing, says that, overall, Ms. Sterling has "produced a spectacularly effective analysis."

Mr. Colby says that the Soviet Union must shoulder "a high degree of responsibility" for international terrorism, but adds that "this doesn't mean that every example of terrorism stems from a decision of the Politburo."

As to his former employer, Mr. Colby says Ms. Sterling may be too much put off by the fact that "intelligence people try to write very precisely and not generalize too much."

The controversy may have already touched the CIA, however. Its annual report on terrorist activity for 1980 has been held up for no announced reason, and a

spokesman said yesterday it may not be published at all.

Earlier in the year, officials knowledgeable about the issue said the report for 1980 would conclude that there were about the same number of terrorist incidents outside the United States as there were in 1979, which had itself represented a decline from previous years.

An article in *The Washington Post* this week indicated, however, that the CIA's method of defining a terrorist incident had been changed to increase the number contained in the report.

The use and misuse of information are sure to come up before the subcommittee, which is headed by Senator Jeremiah Denton (R, Ala.).

A Talk With Sen.

STATINTL

Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.), head of the Senate subcommittee on security and terrorism, recently discussed the role of his members of the editorial page staff. The subcommittee hearings on terrorism begin today.

Q: What is the mandate of this committee?

A: My concept has undergone some transformation. I've got two nouns: Security and Terrorism. Those are very broad terms, at least security is. It's almost omnivorous. I temporarily had the impression that my jurisdiction was purely domestic terrorism. But as I have proceeded with this thing and have been asked to work with the Select Committee on Intelligence by Sen. Barry Goldwater, asked to talk with CIA Director Bill Casey and having seen that there is sort of turf problem with the CIA and the FBI which we are reading about—and it's natural, it's bureaucratic—I find that they want me to look at the whole circuitry. I'm sure that farther down the pike we may be coming across some American who is being used as an agent, but that is an infinitesimal part of it. I'm not even thinking about that right now.

Q: In six, eight months, a year from now, do you see this committee as having other functions and mandates?

A: No. I don't see it happening. Functions and mandates, but only in the context of what I have already outlined.

Q: Joel Lisker, your subcommittee's staff director, is quoted in The Washington Post as saying that the subcommittee has a secret agenda. That's an exact quote. Organizations that it intends to investigate. Does the subcommittee have a secret agenda?

A: I don't know what he is talking about. I have never heard of it. I mean, he doesn't set the hearings up. I do. I told him what business I wanted to get done. He comes from an FBI background, okay?

Q: They have secret agendas?

A: They have secret agendas. I don't even know what he means. A secret agenda. That's pretty good. I can't imagine Joel being dumb enough to say something like that.

Q: Are you aware of the anxieties expressed by civil libertarians and others about the subcommittee's creation, given the past history of such committees?

A: I

mistakes made in the past, if one works from the conclusion that the government is infiltrated, infested with communists, and undertakes to prove suspicions about individuals, that is about 180 degrees away from where I am starting. I am springing from the assumption that every institution in the United States from academe to the media to the government and to the FBI recognizes that there are unmet, unchallenged, even unidentified threats to U.S. security.

But we are the opposite of proper subjects for disapproval by the civil libertarians. The object of preserving security is to preserve the civil liberties we enjoy. We're not going to transgress those civil liberties in our effort.

Q: How do you reassure those civil libertarians on very specific issues of the handling of hearings?

A: I could reassure them most simply in terms of my personal relationships. Although I had political disagreements with Allard Lowenstein, I had scores of hours of conversations with him. He didn't have any fears that, if I ever got involved in something like this, I would bulldoze around in it.

Q: Let's talk about McCarthyism and McCarthy techniques. You have said you want to avoid all that. Can you tell us what your conception of McCarthyism is?

A: We might have 30 major concepts of what McCarthyism is, and mine is not that firm. I don't say that everything he did was wrong. I just don't know that much. My own perception of him on television was one that turned me off, and I watched the guy. However, I don't know that much in detail about how evil the guy's motives or even techniques were.

Q: But there is something you want to avoid?

A: Well, the objective of his thrust had to be individuals within the United States who were disloyal. That is not what I am doing, nor is it in my sights to focus in on that. Having said that, let me remind you that in looking at the

William E. Colby

El Salvador: Which 'Vietnam'?

Debate over American action in Central America is dominated by the specter of Vietnam. Some call for a bold stance to exorcise the American defeat there. Some fear that sending the first few advisers will start a certain descent toward a pit of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers locked in a fruitless and bloody jungle battle. Some predict the inevitability of revolutionary success against a corrupt and brutal government. And some decry the analogy, saying El Salvador and Vietnam have little in common, so that the earlier experience does not augur the result in a new area.

The common measuring stick of these contending points of view is an image of Vietnam emanating from the Tet Attack of 1968—masses of guerrillas outwitting a corrupt local government and a ponderous and yet deadly American fighting force. With this image, the conclusion is inevitable that we should not repeat the experience.

But there were several "Vietnams." A blind application of only one in our decision-making process today only exacerbates the cost of Vietnam and its wounds upon the American body politic. Identification of these quite different "Vietnams" forces attention to real policy alternatives rather than obliterating the process by emotion and imagery.

John Paul Vann, a leading figure in our effort in Vietnam from 1960 to his death in 1972, once commented that Americans did not have 10 years' war experience in Vietnam (1960-1970) but rather one year repeated many times; due to the short tours most Americans spent there. But those with a longer perspective can clearly identify four distinct periods of the American wartime experience in Vietnam, each with its own characteristics.

The first period, 1960 to 1963, marked the start of Hanoi's effort to overthrow the South, launched by a call by the Lao Dong Party for the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his American allies. This was implemented by the reactivation of dormant Communist nets in South Vietnam and the infiltration of organizers and guerrilla leaders. After an initial period of indecision, the South Vietnamese developed the Strategic Hamlet strategy, to gather the smallest local communities for self-defense, with the military's role being to support these communities and act against regular forces. The American role was one of advice and support.

This program had its failings, but it seized the momentum of the "people's war" to the extent that Wilfred Burchett, an Australian Communist apologist, later commented that "1962 belonged to the Government [of South Vietnam]." At this point, a combination of urban political oppositionists, Buddhist religious frenzy and Mandarin repression led to American encouragement of a junta of generals to revolt against President Diem. Diem might have won or might have lost the people's war on his own, but America's complicity in his overthrow produced instant turmoil and cemented America's responsibility for Vietnam's fate.

The second "Vietnam" is closest to the one commonly perceived, from 1964 to 1968. Most Americans served then as our involvement increased to 550,000 men. Instructed to find, fix and fight the enemy, they reacted with frustration and frequently fury before an enemy that only occasionally could even be found. The side effects of this massive military force in a tiny land dominate most fictional and theatrical representations of Vietnam, making this period the basic reference point of Vietnam for most Americans. Its culmination was the Tet Attack of 1968, whose media drama so overshadowed its military failure as to win for the Vietnamese Communists a psychological victory.

The third "Vietnam" appeared between 1968 and 1972. The rural countryside was rebuilt and pacified by a revival of reliance upon village participation in defense and development. The combat was turned on the secret political enemy, not just his military forces. The contrast with the earlier period became dramatic in the opening of the Delta

to land reform and commerce, the arming of local security and self-defense forces for village protection and the resettlement of millions of refugees in the villages from which they had been driven by the war. And most of America's military force was withdrawn from the country.

Vietnamese Communists are quite frank today in recognizing this period as the lowest point of their effort to defeat South Vietnam. The shift from the earlier period was best illustrated by the large North Vietnamese military attack in the spring of 1972, which took place only at three points along South Vietnam's borders (Quang Tri, Kontum and An Loc), with no countryside guerrilla assault. South Vietnamese, not American forces, fought back and stopped the attacks, helped by reinforcements from the Delta where they were not needed to defend against local forces and guerrillas. The American contribution was limited to advisers, extensive logistics support and

B52 bombardment from the sky, with almost no combat force participation on the ground.

The fourth "Vietnam" appeared between 1973 and 1975. A "peace" treaty was pressed by the United States upon South Vietnam, which left North Vietnamese forces in place in South Vietnam and the border areas of Cambodia and Laos. American logistics support of South Vietnam's forces was cut back so that President Thieu's American-advised forward defense strategy became impractical. When in 1975 North Vietnam made a major assault at almost the same points as in 1972, American logistics were held back by Congress, and B52s did not fly. South Vietnamese tactical errors, not substantially different from some in 1972, led this time to total collapse before the oncoming North Vietnamese armor, artillery and regular forces. But even the North Vietnamese commander acknowledged that guerrillas played no part in his final victory. The boat people have dramatized the human dimension of the outcome; the degree to which it cast doubt on America's will and ability to stand by its allies is more ambiguous.

The question then is: Which "Vietnam"? There is little doubt that no one wishes to see another Vietnam of the turmoil and blood from 1964 to 1968. Neither should we repeat the 1960 to 1963 period of America's turning against a friendly president and government for their imperfections and producing something worse. Nor, one hopes, do we want to see a Vietnam of 1973 to 1975, refusing aid to a nation battling a foe that makes no secret of its hostility to the United States. But the Vietnam of 1968 to 1972 offers a positive model of a leading role for political, economic and social programs to enlist a nation to develop and defend itself, with American advice and assistance in doing both.

The writer, who was formerly director of the Central Intelligence Agency, directed multi-agency advisory teams in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) mission in Vietnam from 1968 to 1971.

3 April 1981

Ex-director speaks at OU

STATINTL

CIA cloak is uncovered

By TROUT POMEROY
Of The Oakland Press

He didn't exactly look like a spy. And he admitted it.

But William Colby, 61, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), told a wealth of spy stories for 200 students and other guests during a one-hour address Wednesday afternoon at Oakland University (OU).

"Already, I think some of the ladies are disappointed," he said. "They're probably asking, 'Where's the cloak? Where's the stilleto? Where's the blonde?'"

Colby said such images of a spy are, for the most part, elements of the past. Intelligence gathering, he said, has taken on a new look since the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December, 1941.

"After our fleet was bombed, we looked around to see why we were so surprised," he said. "We found it wasn't for lack of information. We had that. But it hadn't been brought together or centralized. So we started at this time to get really serious about the business of establishing an intelligence service."

Subsequent to World War II, professionals such as scientists, attorneys, engineers and other scholars were attracted to the CIA, changing its image, Colby said. At the same time, the agency also began using advanced technology.

"We don't have to do things like send a spy slurping up through China to inspect the Manchurian border," he said. "Now we can look

"Now we can look down from satellites and count the enemy's tanks and troop movements."

— William Colby

down from satellites and count the enemy's tanks and troop movements. We have a precision of knowledge now we couldn't have dreamed about 30 years ago. We've become a great technological enterprise."

That enterprise ran into difficulty, Colby said, when the Vietnam War and Watergate turned intense public scrutiny upon the agency.

He described that scrutiny as "an orgy of recrimination" that "grossly exaggerated" the agency's actual record. Colby said the negative points that were discussed during this time had already been cleared up by the agency.

"But that didn't matter," he said. "It still became a great political football."

Control and accountability structures now exist at the CIA to prevent the kind of abuses that caused the agency earlier damage, Colby said.

Looking to the 1980s and beyond, Colby insisted the CIA must monitor global events and



William Colby

described an organization more attuned to the analysis of information.

The purpose of intelligence, he said, is to provide enough warning so that changes can be made to influence world events.

"One of our principle functions needs to be providing information to enable the American intelligence system to solve problems instead of having to fight about them," he said. "Otherwise we would have confusion."

After beginning his intelligence career in World War II parachuting behind German lines, Colby served around the world before becoming CIA director from 1973 to 1976. He is currently an attorney in Washington, D.C.