

WILLIAM E. COLBY

## Calibrating Intelligence

In the midst of the uproar surrounding increased protection of leading government officials against possible Libyan terrorist attacks, President Reagan issued his long-awaited executive order with respect to intelligence. The most important aspect of the new order is the slight difference between it and the earlier orders of President Carter and President Ford.

Three fundamental changes have occurred in American intelligence in the past few years. First, the very thought of a public Presidential order establishing guidelines for intelligence is a contradiction of the spy traditions of total secrecy. Second, the careful arrangements in the order for accountability for decision making contrast sharply with the polite myth of the spy world that the spy caught was disowned by his king or patron. Lastly, the role of Congress has fundamentally changed, by statute as well as executive order. The earlier belief that Congress did not want to know the secrets of intelligence is replaced by Senate and House Committees on Intelligence, who must know the secrets (and have shown they can keep the secrets) to insure that intelligence does what it is supposed to do and not what it should not do.

The new order changes none of these fundamentals. Rather, it calibrates the guidance for American intelligence between the extremes of oversecrecy of earlier years and overexposure during the past few years. The title change of one section of the order from "restrictions on intelligence activities" to "conduct of intelligence activities" bespeaks recognition of the need for intelligence activities as well as the need to restrain them. The absolute prohibition against the Central Intelligence Agency's being involved in domestic activities is replaced by recognition that a small terrorist group here might properly be penetrated in order to determine the extent of its support and manipulation by Libya's Qaddafi. But the penetration will be subject to the basic

so that the purpose of the penetration must be foreign intelligence. There will also be a clear chain of accountability for the decisions made and the Congressional committees must weigh and consider the justification for such domestic activities, to approve those that make sense and disapprove those which they feel to be wrong.

Some the calibrations may be debatable, but the Administration generally accepted recommendations for change of earlier drafts to be more rather than less restrictive, to the satisfaction of the committees that were invited to comment. Of greatest importance is the fact that this order has been issued, so that the intelligence agencies can put their minds to the more important challenges of intelligence work rather than legalistic debates about the wording of a charter.

The morale and real effects of the violent attacks on American intelligence for its misdeeds of the past have not yet been repaired, however. This depends upon passage by the Congress of a statute to punish employees who reveal the secrets they learn during their service. It will also protect the intelligence services against those who would willfully expose them to danger by revealing their identities so as to destroy the intelligence system that Congress has decided is necessary for the nation's safety. This bill lost out in the pre-adjournalment rush by threat of long debate by some opposed to certain wording in the bill. There are legitimate differences over how such a law should be phrased, but a clear signal is needed for our agencies and our friends abroad that the United States will protect its necessary secrets while it conducts a new and responsible intelligence system.

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STATINTL

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SUBJECT Terrorism

PETER KROUGH: The dramatic rescue of General James Dozier from the Italian Red Brigade provided a brief respite from a growing sense of helplessness in the face of international terrorism. But Dozier's release was also accompanied by predictions of violent retaliation and warnings that global terrorism is still on the rise.

Terrorism has been labeled international public enemy number one by the Reagan Administration, which is alarmed by increasing evidence of Russian, Cuban and Libyan sponsorship. But for Americans, terrorism has not been a local problem. During the last decade, 3600 people died in terrorist attacks around the world, but only 80 were killed in the United States. Nevertheless, Americans, especially diplomats and businessmen, are becoming the prime targets of terrorists abroad. About one-third of all terrorist incidents are now directed at American personnel or property. And concern about terrorism is reflected increasingly in our foreign policy. It has taken at least rhetorical precedence over concern for human rights. Abhorrence for terrorism is one factor that has restrained three Presidents from dealing directly with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. And the debate over who is responsible for the most terror in El Salvador, the government or the insurgents, may ultimately determine the direction of our policy there.

Tonight we'll look at the challenge of global terrorism to American interests at home and abroad with William Colby, former Director of the CIA and Scott Thompson, a leading authority on terrorism and professor at the Fletcher School of Law and diplomacy.

Gentlemen, is the alarm sounded by this Administration

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over international terrorism, labeling it, in effect, as international public enemy number one, exaggerated or is it warranted by the facts?

Mr. Colby?

WILLIAM COLBY: Well, it's warranted by the facts, clearly. There are a lot of terrorists in the world. There are a lot of groups that conduct terror. Now, some of them try to use euphemisms about "your terrorist is my freedom fighter," and all that sort of thing. But there are an awful lot of very bitter, very violent groups in the world, for ethnic, religious, racial, political reasons.

KROUGH: Do you agree, Dr. Thompson, that this is a leading problem?

SCOTT THOMPSON: It's a leading problem. And one of the additional reasons it's a leading problem is there's a lot of enmity between states in the world. And this finds its outlet not in the form of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union or major war between large states in most places in time, but by harboring terrorists from the other side, by giving aid and comfort to a terrorist from a third party, so forth and so on. And as long as there are as many weapons flowing and as many people with an interest in keeping the terrorist well-oiled and well-financed, there's going to be a great international problem.

KROUGH: But by dealing with the problem so loudly, don't we run the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy? That is, the terrorists will feel that they have to now be strong to demonstrate that they really are this serious a problem.

COLBY: No, you don't. One of the main things you have to do about terrorism, aside from intelligence work, aside from security work, is to convince the people that it's important to them, so that they will support the government and the programs against terrorism. Public support is a vital element of efforts against terrorism. And therefore the people must be convinced that these people are operating as outlaws, what we used to call outlaws when we had our terrorists in this country, and they should assist the forces of order in suppressing them.

KROUGH: But what really explains the timing of this? Because terrorism has been around for a long time and there have been incidents of terrorism right along. We've been seeing them throughout the last decade.

Are incidents on the rise? Is this a more serious problem, and why?

THOMPSON: Yes. In fact, you know, we used to say that the guerrilla, the terrorist was a forlorn and hopeless person who was really fighting a romantic battle against great odds and he would die out, as all those before him did. This is no longer the case because it's no longer a weapon simply of the weak. It's also a weapon of the strong.

Look, let's call a spade a spade. We know that the Soviet Union is one of those powers that is intimately involved in this whole process. And they have...

KROUGH: What is the evidence for that, Dr. Thompson? This is something that is asserted, but is it provable?

THOMPSON: It's provable in all the ways that it can ever be provable. I'm not looking to the KGB to come out, the way the CIA has, with mea culpas and say, "Gosh, we did it," you know. Since that's not in the cards, we've got to use the evidentiary rules that we use, for example, in identifying counter-intelligence -- in counterintelligence to identify spies in our midst. We don't expect a Philby to get up and confess. We have to prove by circumstantial evidence that he, in fact, is guilty, or someone like him.

KROUGH: What is the circumstantial evidence? Where do you follow it?

THOMPSON: The circumstantial proof is that these fellows go in and out of Czechoslovakia, out of the Soviet Union, they're using their weapons; that these things happen in sequences. I mean you have to believe that somebody has an interest in this when you've got Dozier being kidnapped in Italy, an American military official being killed on the streets of Paris at a time when America is talking about withdrawal from Europe. This just can't be wholly accidental.

KROUGH: This sounds like a conspiracy operation that you are developing here supported by this country's principal adversary.

Do you see it the same way?

COLBY: I think there are three things. First, there's a clear involvement of the Soviet Union in training, in supporting, in logistics, through Libya, through Cuba, through the Palestinians, for various terrorist groups.

Now, the Soviets make no secret of their belief that they are supporting wars of national liberation, in their words. But, in fact, what that amounts to is a bomb in a marketplace someplace that kills a lot of people.

Now, the second level is the effort by independent groups which are fed a little by the atmosphere, the Red Brigades, who are not directly supported by the Soviets, but who certainly feed of the assistance that happens.

And then the third is the counter-terror that you may hear of that does exist in certain countries. When the situation got so bad in Argentina, in Uruguay, that the forces to overturn the government were totally out of control, and the government reacted in a terrorist way.

KROUGH: But doesn't this bring us into the problem of defining terrorism? Now, you dismiss the notion, I think quite appropriately, of the terrorist-patriot dichotomy. But there are other gray lines here that we cross on the way to discovering what is really terrorism. I mean there is a kind of a blur between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. And what definition objectively holds and can we defend as being essentially an apolitical definition of this phenomenon?

COLBY: Well, I think you have to do two things. First, there's a terrorist tactic. And I think that can be defined as killing or injuring innocent people, innocent bystanders. In other words, an attack against the forces, the police, the government would not be included. An attack at a bus stop randomly killing the people there, that is terrorism. I don't care who's doing it for what reason, it's terrorism.

The other is the protest group which has no logical basis for existence because the political channels are open for change. Now, when that exists, as the Weathermen in this country, they are terrorists, because the political channels are open if they can rally the political support. And, therefore, if they decline to do it and instead begin to kill people, they're terrorists.

KROUGH: Do I sense that you would go further, Dr. Thompson, in equating terrorism, really, with wars of national liberation themselves or the tactics by which they are pursued?

THOMPSON: No, but I'd rather say it this way: The contest between the United States and the Soviet Union right now is a contest over different forms of order. And the Soviet Union has, in its definition of what the correlation of forces is, more than just a military balance in mind. If they can break down the sense of order in the West by encouraging, indirectly, as Bill Colby has suggested -- and I would wholly agree with him that this is an indirect thing -- if they can break down the confidence in democratic institutions, if the liberal institutions of the West can crumble, as in a novel just published today by a very distinguished German novelist, where Germany is shown ten years from now or a while down the road after the society has

been atomized, there would be nothing to fight for. There would be nothing to believe in if the terrorists ultimately have their way.

And so, I'm saying that -- I'm agreeing with Bill's definitions, but saying that the problem probably is even broader. You see, you've got to -- I think we need to come right out and be very blunt about the problem today. Take, for example, the assassination attempt on the Pope. I believe there is overwhelming circumstantial evidence of the kind that would convict in our courts of law, that would convict a traitor without his confession, that would convict Agca of having been a Soviet agent doing the Soviet will to kill the Pope.

Now, I consider -- I'm taking this very, very seriously. It's a very serious accusation. I think the evidence is there. I think the people that have found it are in the process of presenting it. And I think we've got to come out and say, "Look, there are some people that have an interest in the present international order and there are some people that are trying to upset it."

KROUGH: This is a very substantial interpretation or revelation of what happened to the Pope.

THOMPSON: Yes, it is.

KROUGH: Is there evidence for this?

COLBY: I'm not familiar with the evidence.

THOMPSON: The evidence...

KROUGH: Just to move on here. Isn't this basically a no-win situation for the Soviets, in the sense -- or the Cubans or whoever else is engaged in it with them -- because doesn't terrorism eventually come full circle, really, and strike the perpetrators of it? I mean everyone gets involved in this. As a matter of fact, the 1980 report of the CIA pointed out that next to the Americans, Soviet individuals and institutions were the principal objects of terrorism.

THOMPSON: And they were the original ones that were afraid of it. After all, they advocated the anti-hijacking laws in the 1940s because they were the ones who were getting...

COLBY: Having their planes taken away.

THOMPSON: So they're always very careful on things like hijacking, on protecting diplomats. They're punctillious about the legalities on terrorism. But then, as Lenin said over and over again, you know, when you can use the legalities against

the bourgeois order, by all means do so. And, you know, so they want to have their cake and eat it too.

And I agree with you, it's a double-edged sword and it might come back. But I think the evidence is overwhelming that they are in there turning the sword in one direction right now.

COLBY: And I'm not so sure of that premise, that it comes back on them. I've seen the use of terror to destroy the organs of government and totally confuse the people as to where their best interest is until they finally yield. This is what wars of national liberation, the rural attack on the urban centers, and so forth, in Latin America. That's why the Cubans have been training people in this kind of activity. It's why the Vietnamese were doing it throughout Indochina.

This is not a new kind of a tactic, but a very conscious use. The FLN in Algeria used terror against the people to demonstrate the weakness of the French colonial rule. Now, they may have had a legitimate basis for objecting to French colonial rule. But in my mind, they used terror -- i.e., the slaughter of innocents -- in order to demonstrate the French inability to protect them.

KROUGH: What is it in the contemporary environment that is feeding terrorism today and exaggerating it, exacerbating it, driving it into new and different forms? What is our environment that is so fertile for international terrorism?

COLBY: Well, one thing is the delicate nature of the international system today. We have all these very fine choke points in the system that can be stopped and hurt.

And secondly, the guerrilla theater, which we saw a lot of a few years ago, the dramatic effect of a terrorist attack far exceeding its effect on the individual.

KROUGH: With the media as...

COLBY: ...a great media thing. The capture of Prime Minister Moro and his eventual murder was a total slam at the Italian state, the contempt with which these terrorists said that they thought they could destroy the Italian state by taking one of its figures in that fashion, which is largely a media hype of the actual fact being done.

KROUGH: And contributed to by the communications revolution and satellite communication.

COLBY: Well, and the instant attention throughout the world.

THOMPSON: The other side of that coin is that terrorists learn from each other in Japan and the Middle East, you know, overnight by satellite communication. And the very transnational character of the world right now, by which we usually take comfort and we say the world is knitting itself together; but in fact, you know, the terrorists are getting together and cooperating.

COLBY: When you can move across national borders with the ease with which you can move in Europe -- and that's throughout the European Community -- then you have all sorts of abilities to hide.

KROUGH: Isn't there just a whole lot more money and arms sloshing around the world, too, to support this kind of activity?

THOMPSON: That's right.

COLBY: Well, and there are particular weapons that are particularly dangerous, you know. There's a heat-seeking shoulder-held rocket that can knock an aircraft out of the sky that they picked up in the outskirts of Rome at the end of the Fumicino (?) airport, sent over there, conveniently, through the Libyan pouch. I mean this sort of thing can be a disastrous problem.

KROUGH: Nevertheless, the general impression is that while incidents of terrorism, which I think dipped in the last couple of years and have gone up during this year, have increased recently, the number of groups involved in terrorist activities has declined. That is, we no longer see the Japanese Red Army. We're not dealing with the Symbionese Liberation. We're not dealing with the Weathermen. We seem to be dealing with the Red Brigades and Basques, some Armenians.

Isn't the number of actors here really diminished?

COLBY: But I don't think they just went away and decided not to. I think they were pretty well suppressed by some very good and some very legal police work in various countries and cooperation among the countries on this subject. That's what made it very difficult for them to operate.

THOMPSON: But there could be more of that.

COLBY: Yeah.

THOMPSON: You know. I think we've got a long ways to go before we have really effective police cooperation between the Europeans.

COLBY: It's a very difficult subject, finding terrorists.



KROUGH: Meanwhile, what American interests, what American investments, security requirements are really threatened by terrorism? Because what we are talking about here is mostly Americans abroad. We do not have this phenomenon at home.

THOMPSON: Yet.

KROUGH: Do you think it's...

COLBY: To a degree, we do. I mean let's face it, all of our Presidents have been shot at recently. I mean that's rather a terrorist situation to live in.

KROUGH: What would you say is the potential for having a rise of terrorism domestically in the United States, and what would underpin it were it to develop?

THOMPSON: If our national will to maintain a coherent state diminishes, there's going to be terrorism. In other words, if these jokers that are trying to get our people abroad -- and you said, correctly, that one-third of all the incidents are directed at Americans. Now, it's convenient to get them abroad. If it's more convenient to get them here, they'll try to get them here. I mean I think there are people that are out to get Americans. I don't think one is being a conspiracist by saying that that's true. You know, when you look at the data it's perfectly obvious what's going on. A lot of radical groups really have it in their mind to prove that the United States can be had, and very often they're proved right, you know. And so we have to be on our guard.

KROUGH: Where are we most vulnerable, would you say, domestically? Is it on race issues? Is it on the Puerto Rican problem?

COLBY: No. I think the main thing we have is if we polarize our politics very sharply, through the economic situation, through political demagoguery that comes up in various ways, it could happen. Then you get the frustration and then you get the feeling that the political system is not responding to legitimate needs, and then you get the group turning off and going into terrorism.

That was the phenomenon during the Vietnam War. That's why you got bombings throughout this country during the Vietnam War. Several hundred bombings a year took place in this country. And that was a terrorist action. There's no question about it. Whatever you think about the motives for or against the Vietnam War, these people were going outside the political system in order to enforce their will.

THOMPSON: There's another factor here. We have been

very lucky in having secure borders, hitherto. I don't think that is going to be forever the case. I think there's overwhelming evidence that Mexican politics are going dramatically to the left, that there's increasing penetration of Mexican politics by people who are not friendly to the United States. And I think, given the porosity of this border, we could anticipate in 10-15 years, if the present trend continues, a very deleterious decrease in national security within our own borders.

KROUGH: What kinds of terrorists really pose the greatest threat to us? Somebody has said that there are crazies, criminals, and crusaders. Which -- terrorists of which category are most likely to present the most serious problems to us? Are we talking just about nihilists and anarchists?

THOMPSON: No.

KROUGH: Or are we talking about crusaders?

COLBY: Well, I think you're talking about some crazies. And that's just a given. That's going to exist come hell or high water over the years. There's no question about it. They have to be just controlled by the Secret Service and all the rest to keep them from shooting our Presidents.

You'll get some crusaders. But if you have an open political system, the crusaders really can't get very much support. And they need support in order to hide, in order to operate, in order to recruit.

So your real problem, then, is the criminals who then use the techniques of terrorism and wrap themselves in political garb in order to carry out what some people used to call free enterprise terrorism, ransom and things like this. One ransom of \$12 million was paid in a South American case a few years ago. Well, that kept that group happy and prosperous for a long time. And...

KROUGH: This was the Monteneros in Argentina.

COLBY: Yes, that's right. And you've had the same thing exist in Italy and other places, pure private enterprise terrorism.

KROUGH: Speaking of Latin America, as you did in relation to Mexico and with the Monteneros, why is it that we seem to be most vulnerable there? This is where the highest incidence is for us of businessmen and institutions coming under attack, both embassies and businessmen.

COLBY: Well, because of the symbolism of the American business in Latin American, the history of our business operations

and our national operations with respect to Latin America. It's a very symbolic target, even more so than someplace else. You go into Latin America and it's the Yankee that's the problem. You go into Africa and, yes, the Americans, but also the British and the French and all the rest of it. And in Asia it gets all confused as to who the real enemy for the terrorist is.

KROUGH: Dr. Thompson, do you see the contemporary terrorist as very much in the mode of the historical terrorist, or different in kind, different in mode of operation, different in activity and outlook?

THOMPSON: You can find parallels to every contemporary terrorist in, oh, the People's Will group in Russia a hundred years ago. You can find parallels to everything. But I think that it is a qualitative new order -- qualitatively new order, given the factors that Bill Colby suggested earlier.

I would stress that most of the terrorists, I think, that we have to fear are quite rational people. You know, there are some crazies...

KROUGH: Well, isn't this hopeful, then? Because if...

THOMPSON: No.

KROUGH: ...you're dealing with them, they will -- I mean you can get deterrence...

THOMPSON: No, no. It's much less hopeful. These are people that are rational. They're very determined. They're doing their thing. Their thing is to, you know, create chaos. They've figured out. They know how to bomb. They know how to kidnap American businessmen. They know how to do all sorts of things. They get training in camps outside of Prague, outside of Moscow, in Syria, in Libya, in Iraq. They -- these are people that, for whatever reason, have been radicalized and are sort of a transnational floating element in the world.

But you can't call them crazies. I agree with Bill Colby that there is an element of the crazies. Those we can control for reasonably.

KROUGH: Looking ahead and building on your description of the modern terrorist, are we likely to see a really major escalation of the kind of terrorism that is employed, a difference in kind of terrorism -- that is, moving from hostage-taking, kidnapping, bombing, threatening to threats of mass destruction, holding whole populations hostage, and so forth?

THOMPSON: Yes.

COLBY: Yes. You will have attacks on aircraft, for instance. Not just hijacking, but from the ground. You will have some uses of modern technology to hit at, oh, cable lines, satellite stations, things of this nature, symbolic kind of targets. And you will have, eventually, down the road somewhere, somebody threatening the use of nuclear weapons or some of the other high technologies.

THOMPSON: It's already happened several dozen times, but we proved they were frauds. But I think it's going to happen, I assume you're saying, for real one of these days. It's pretty frightening.

COLBY: Yes. It's a very frightening thing.

THOMPSON: But, see, I think it's already happening in a pretty serious way. You know, the -- Paul Henza (?) has done a wonderful piece on how Turkey was practically fractured by, as he put it in the Wall Street Journal, sustained and long-term Soviet aid to terrorists in that state. It's not only the Soviet Union. In this particular case of Turkey, I think you can give them a really substantial share of the credit.

KROUGH: When we face something like that -- hopefully, we do not. But if we do, will our policy of no negotiation and no ransom payments hold up in the face of something of that consequence?

COLBY: No.

KROUGH: So is it really -- is it really viable for us to be announcing that we...

COLBY: Well, you can be announcing it, but you better be ready to negotiate about something. There may be some negotiations possible in these things.

THOMPSON: You're going to use the no-negotiation policy when you think it's going to be advantageous to do it, and the terrorist isn't going to know when you're going to pull this on him.

KROUGH: But, in fact, we have negotiated in the past.

THOMPSON: Of course.

KROUGH: I mean for the Iranians and...

THOMPSON: Of course.

KROUGH: I don't know whether we were involved in the negotiations for the release of Dozier or who put up the \$1,500,000.

But this is not an ironclad kind of...

COLBY: Of course not.

KROUGH: ...kind of thing.

What is the best defense against what we have just been talking about, the frightening prospect of nuclear or biological blackmail?

COLBY: Well, I think, first, good intelligence, which really gets into exchanging information with other friendly services around the world; a good development of files of people involved in these movements. Why they're involved in them, what kind of motives, what kind of people they are, what the strategy is. It's very unlikely that you're going to get to the actual operation in many cases. But you can learn enough about it so that you can do it.

KROUGH: Infiltration is required, penetration?

COLBY: If you can possibly do so, surely.

THOMPSON: In Italy, you know, we really have done a tremendous job. Rather, the Italians have...

COLBY: ...careful interrogation and the putting some people into the movement to tell you more about it.

KROUGH: Are we equipped to do that?

THOMPSON: We're not.

COLBY: Well, we're not very well fixed.

THOMPSON: We did -- we've made some tragic -- we've lost some tragic opportunities because of the atmosphere in this country, where the CIA was running operations that would have successfully shown the ultimate paymasters of these operations, it was believed. And these operations had to be suspended because it just looked too risky in view of the American political environment.

KROUGH: Well, here we're putting billions and billions into defense. This would seem to be almost right at the first line of our defense, to have a capability to protect against...

COLBY: Well, this -- obviously, we've gone through the worst of our binge during the mid-seventies on the subject of intelligence. And I believe that the nation is now sobering up on the subject. And I think that you will see a growth. But as Scott mentions, I think we've lost several years.

KROUGH: And if it happens, we haven't prevented it through intelligence, do we have a strong anti-terrorist attack force?

COLBY: Well, I think then you do need security services, security forces, things of that...

KROUGH: Aren't other governments pretty far ahead of us on this one?

THOMPSON: We're playing a very effective game of catch-up, as best I can gather.

COLBY: I wouldn't knock it too much. And I wouldn't judge the Iranian debacle...

THOMPSON: The desert classic really didn't...

COLBY: Well, that was hardly a move against terrorists. That was a rather major operation.

THOMPSON: And it wasn't organized by the unit tasked for this purpose.

KROUGH: Dr. Thompson, I think the dramatic underlining of the Soviet complicity, purported complicity in the assassination attempt of the Pope is really quite a major -- a major bit of evidence. Is the veil going to be lifted on this, do you think, in the next few weeks? Do we have something to look forward to?

THOMPSON: I hope so. All the evidence has been accumulated by some diligent people and it's awaiting publication. The basic points are that all the statements made about this fellow turned out to be false. He was not a fanatic Muslim. He was -- he, rather, had his associations on the left. There was a great deal of knowledge about his associations in Europe. He was running around with lots of money for 18 months. He was able to escape. He was able to get from one place to the other. He was not operating alone. There is overwhelming evidence, I gather, of this.

KROUGH: And a report is about to be released on this?

THOMPSON: By private individuals who have done some very -- who have long experience in the intelligence field and people I have tremendous confidence in.

And then you finally -- they finally asked the final question: Who could benefit from the assassination of a Pope who was Polish, who had said he would greet Soviet tanks in Warsaw himself if they so moved? You know, it wasn't the right-wing

Muslim fundamentalists that had an interest in getting rid of this Pope. And so that you ask the questions in the same way you would draw a line around a Soviet agent operating, say, as a mole within the CIA, the way your associates working for you would have done. And you can come up with just as much evidence as they would have ever done to prove the point.

KROUGH: And you're sure this is an objective report and not a novel that we are about to...

THOMPSON: Oh, no, no. This is very serious stuff by some of our most competent intelligence people

KROUGH: Thank you very much, Dr. Thompson.

And thank you very much, Bill Colby.