

WASHINGTON

Nukefreeze-Colby

Because the United States has nuclear superior over the Soviet Union, President Reagan should call for an immediate nuclear freeze, former CIA Director William Colby said Tuesday.

In an article for the opinion page of The Washington Post in which he said President Reagan is trying to appease both the Soviets with arms talks and nuclear freeze proponents with a softer position, Colby said a freeze would benefit the United States by halting the certain buildup of Soviet weaponry and benefit the Soviet Union by halting American buildups now planned.

In criticizing Reagan, Colby, who ran the CIA from 1973 to 1976 under Presidents Nixon and Ford, said, "Appeasement doesn't work. I am sure the president would agree with that statement, but in fact, he is engaged in a program of appeasement."

Cataloging the administration's history of arms moves he said amounted to appeasement by Reagan, said each argument against a freeze collapses under careful scrutiny.

A freeze, he said, would halt both the MX missile and Soviet testing of two new missile types. It would stop work on cruise missile armadas on both sides, halt work on a new Soviet bomber and on the B-1 on the U.S. side. And it would bar work on the D-5 submarine missile by the United States, but not bar replacement of Polaris submarines with Trident units. The Soviets are behind the United States in submarine technology, he said, but they can be expected to catch up.

Appeasement, said Colby, "is not the answer. It does not satisfy the nuclear priesthood, which thinks only of building new and more complex weapons systems. It does not satisfy the Soviets, as every indication of yielding is taken as a weakening of will to achieve a mutual solution to the arms race," said Colby.

"Only a bold, firm call for a mutual stop in the arms race could cut through the present tangled political and diplomatic negotiations and produce a result worthy of an American president," he said.

Colby said the Soviets are not superior to the United States "in any meaningful way today.

"If they were, we would see them using that superiority, rather than indicating concern over the technological superiority of the United States and its ability to leap ahead in technology in the coming years at a pace beyond that possible in the Soviet Union. The present American retaliation potential is absolute, and with a modicum of maintenance, its components will not vanish

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from old age."

Colby said the Soviets are restricting their global moves to "the safer techniques of proxy war, subversion and attempts to encourage weakness of American will and separation from European opinion. This is not the bluster of someone convinced that he has the power to dominate. It is the wiliness of someone operating from a position of weakness, trying to slow the opponent down without confrontation."

He said U.S. intelligence systems can verify Soviet violations of a freeze and those serious enough to affect the United States would be spotted. He said disputes about verification can be handled with third-party investigations or other methods.

"The Soviets have shown themselves in recent treaties to be willing to yield some of their long-held phobias against exposure of their affairs, provided that the result is specifically in their interest" he said.

A freeze, wrote Colby, "would certainly be of advantage to the Soviet Union, halting the major American nuclear buildup now planned. As with any successful treaty, however, the question is whether it would be in the equal interest of the United States, halting a certain further Soviet buildup of nuclear weaponry, which, of course, it would.

"We can better protect the United States by convincing the Soviet Union not to develop new weapons systems than by developing the defensive systems to shoot them down if they are used against us.

"Thus appeasement is not the answer," he said.

STATINTL

'Meeting of minds' on nuclear freeze vote

by PATRICIA KOZA

WASHINGTON

Sponsors of a nuclear freeze resolution reached a 'gentlemen's agreement' with Republican opponents Tuesday to call a vote in the House after two more days of debate, a congressional source said.

Because of the agreement, Rep. Clement Zablocki, D-Wis., head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and chief sponsor of the resolution, abandoned a plan to ask Rules Committee Chairman Claude Pepper, D-Fla., to limit debate.

The source said the House will devote all of Wednesday and Thursday to debate and then vote on the resolution, strongly opposed by President Reagan, that calls for a 'mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in nuclear weapons.'

'There has been what you'd call gentlemen's agreement to finish by late afternoon Thursday,' the source said. 'There was sort of a mutual meeting of the minds ... that it was time to move on to a final vote.'

In debate on the resolution March 16 and April 13, the House acted on only four of 39 amendments. An aide to Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., another sponsor, said since last week at least 15 more amendments have been added.

The sponsors, confident the Democratic-controlled House will approve the resolution by a wide margin, had been tolerant of Republican efforts to stretch out debate. The Rules Committee set no limit on the number of amendments that could be offered on the floor.

But, the aide said, 'We'd like to get a vote on this thing this week. We've always felt if administration wants to get pounded like this every week, it's fine with us. We've got everything ready if they want to go after us again.'

Former CIA Director William Colby took issue Tuesday with Reagan's contention that a freeze would lock in a Soviet advantage. He said Soviet nuclear forces are not superior to the U.S. forces 'in any meaningful way today' and both nations would benefit from an immediate nuclear freeze.

In an article on The Washington Post's opinion page, Colby said Reagan is trying to appease the Soviets with arms talks and nuclear freeze proponents with a softer position.

'Appeasement is not the answer,' he said. 'It does not satisfy the nuclear priesthood, which thinks only of building new and more complex weapons systems. It does not satisfy the Soviets, as every indication of yielding is taken as a weakening of will to achieve a mutual solution to the arms race.'

'Only a bold, firm call for a mutual stop in the arms race could cut through the present tangled political and diplomatic negotiations and produce a result worthy of an American president,' Colby wrote.

William E. Colby

Reagan Should Turn From 'Appeasement' to a Freeze

To use language meaningful to those of President Reagan's generation (and my own), appeasement doesn't work. I am sure the president would agree with that statement, but in fact, he is engaged in a program of appeasement. NATO's first resolute decision to deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 cruise missiles to meet the Soviet SS20 buildup has been followed by the president's proposal of a zero option on both sides, rejected by the Soviets, and then a suggestion for an interim solution, also rejected by the Soviets.

The president's proposal to supplant the SALT II treaty by the START proposal to reduce strategic launchers to 850 on each side and warheads to 5,000, no more than half of which would be land-based, has been rejected by the Soviets. The U.S.S.R. made a minimal move in our direction by suggesting an 1,800-launcher limit. The administration now considers means by which it could move off its original proposal toward the Soviet position.

Another appeasement being attempted is of the anti-nuclear and nuclear freeze movements in the West. The political force of these movements led the administration to soften its previous positions, in hopes of diluting the impatience of millions of Europeans and Americans over their governments' inability to reduce the nuclear terror to which they are exposed. Minor variations of the degree of terror certainly are not going to appease these movements, particularly when these gestures are matched by plans to bring in new weapons systems like the MX, the D5, the B1, and a whole new dimension of space warfare.

The real requirement is for a bold move to halt the arms race, as a clear indication of resolution to reduce the nuclear terror to which all our populations are subjected. This is the basis for the call for a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. A recitation of what this freeze will produce in benefits to the safety of the United States is a compelling argument for Reagan to leapfrog the obstructionists who urge him to oppose it and instead take leadership of it.

A simple projection of current weapons plans that would be obviated by a freeze demonstrates its value to the safety of our country:

1) A freeze on new types of land-based missiles permitted under SALT II would halt the present Soviet testing of two new types. It would also halt the MX. The prime characteristic of these new weapons is an increase in accuracy and consequent targeting of the land-based missile systems of the other side. While the so-called "first-strike" scenario is discussed as a theoretical possibility today, the advent of these new weapons systems will bring it remark-

ably closer. Both sides will be convinced that the other will soon have the potential for a single devastating blow, requiring that it keep itself on hair-trigger alert for an equally devastating response. The decision time in such circumstances will be reduced so that automatic, not human, decisions will have to be programmed, offering the sickening prospect of mutual destruction through machine error.

2) A freeze would bar the development of cruise missile armadas on both sides. While the United States is technologically ahead with this new device to date, it is predictable that the Soviets will develop their own capability within the next decade. They did just that with respect to the MIRV, after it was left out of SALT I in 1972 because the United States had no incentive to bar itself from something the Soviets did not then have. At the end of this decade, we can confidently expect a national debate over the need for a comprehensive air defense system to protect the United States from a Soviet cruise missile armada. This whole development would be eliminated by a freeze today.

3) A freeze would bar the further development and deployment of the Blackjack bomber on the Soviet side and of the B1 on the American side. This would have to be clarified in the discussions leading to the freeze agreement, but it seems clear that the strategic arms negotiating history considers intercontinental aircraft to be launchers rather than platforms. Again, this would prevent the buildup of a large Soviet intercontinental nuclear air force requiring the kind of air defense system the Soviets are now hoping can hold off at least some of our B52s.

4) The freeze would bar the development of the D5 missile by the United States, with its improvements in accuracy leading to the danger of first strike from the sea. Similarly, it would bar a more accurate Soviet submarine-launched missile. It would not bar the replacement of Polaris submarines by Tridents because the negotiating history has considered submarines as platforms rather than as launchers. The Soviets are currently considerably behind the United States in submarine technology, but again it can be confidently expected that they will improve over the next decades through a combination of espionage, allocation of resources and talent, and plain competitive determination. A freeze on launchers would limit the application of those improvements in the nuclear dimension.

Each of the arguments against the freeze collapses under careful examination:

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1) The Soviets are certainly not "superior" to the United States in any meaningful way today. If they were, we would see them using that superiority, rather than indicating concern over the technological superiority of the United States and its ability to leap ahead in technology in the coming years at a pace beyond that possible for the Soviet Union. The present American retaliation potential is absolute, and with a modicum of maintenance, its components will not vanish from old age.

The Soviets restrict their adventurism these days to the safer techniques of proxy war, subversion and attempts to encourage weakness of American will and separation from European opinion. This is not the bluster of someone convinced that he has the power to dominate. It is the wiliness of someone operating from a position of weakness, trying to slow the opponent down without direct confrontation.

2) Could we verify whether the Soviets would abide by such an agreement? The administration's own reports show that we are doing exactly that in our attention to potential violations of SALT II and the steady buildup of Soviet power. The fact is that our intelligence system will cover the Soviet Union's nuclear weaponry whether there is a freeze between us or not; a freeze treaty would merely make it easier to do so because of the numerous elements included in recent treaties to facilitate the process. Even in areas of ambiguity, of which there will certainly be some, such as the current indications of Soviet violation of the chemical and biological treaty, it is plain that our intelligence systems have picked up these activities. They have not occurred without being exposed to outside scrutiny.

The fact that the Soviets might violate a treaty is not the determinant. No one should "trust" them not to do

so. The real point is whether we would catch them at it and be able to act upon that information. The evidence today indicates that this is clearly the case. Any violation that would be extensive enough to have an impact on the strategic balance would certainly be noticed by us.

The real question is what we propose to do about a violation rather than whether we would know of it. In this respect, there are improvements that can be made in procedures, such as third-party investigations and decisions, interim sanctions and greater visibility upon challenge. The Soviets have shown themselves in recent treaties to be willing to yield some of their long-held phobias against exposure of their affairs, provided that the result is specifically in their interest.

3) A freeze would certainly be of advantage to the Soviet Union, halting the major American nuclear buildup now planned. As with any successful treaty, however, the question is whether it would be in the equal interest of the United States, halting a certain further Soviet buildup of nuclear weaponry, which, of course, it would. We can protect the United States better by convincing the Soviet Union not to develop new weapons systems than by developing the defensive systems to shoot them down if they are used against us.

Thus appeasement is not the answer. It does not satisfy the nuclear priesthood, which thinks only of building new and more complex weapons systems. It does not satisfy the Soviets, as every indication of yielding is taken as a weakening of will to achieve a mutual solution to the arms race. It does not satisfy the opponents of nuclear warfare among the broad populations of Europe and the United States, who believe their leadership has failed to protect them against potential annihilation as a result of the inexorable march of technology.

Only a bold, firm call for a mutual stop in the arms race could cut through the present tangled political and diplomatic negotiations and produce a result worthy of an American president.

The writer, former director of the CIA, is a Washington lawyer.

Richard Allen's Ties to Japan Now Formal

By Michael Isikoff
Washington Post Staff Writer

In the course of little more than a year, Richard V. Allen has gone from President Reagan's national security adviser to foreign agent.

Allen was ousted from office last year after disclosures that he accepted \$1,000 from a Japanese magazine and three Seiko watches from a Japanese businessman.

Allen's ties to the Japanese are now more formal and far more lucrative. According to government records, Allen recently signed a \$300,000-a-year contract to serve as chief lobbyist for a consortium of Japanese companies, including Mitsubishi and the Bank of Tokyo, which are seeking U.S. government approval for a new sea-level canal through the Isthmus of Panama.

In that capacity, Allen has tapped his administration connections. When a group of his Japanese clients arrived in town last winter, Allen arranged meetings for them with Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders and other high-level government officials.

The meetings raised questions at the State Department, where some officials wonder about the propriety of a former government official who once had access to classified information being on a foreign payroll.

Allen's reaction is that "this is not a matter that vitally affects the national security. I'm very much aware of seemliness and propriety."

Allen's judgment is shared by dozens of former government officials, including ex-senators, Cabinet secretaries and agency directors who are selling their expertise to foreign governments and corporations.

Justice Department officials say that the foreign "revolving door" is moving so briskly they can no longer police it.

Just last month, for example, former senator Charles Goodell (R-N.Y.) registered as a lobbyist for a French aerospace firm.

Stuart Spencer, a longtime political consultant to Reagan, registered to handle public relations for the government of South Africa.

Other recent filings at Justice show:

- Former defense secretary Clark Clifford's law firm received \$165,000 last year from the Australian Meat and Live Stock Corp. to lobby Congress on farm import legislation and \$32,400 from Atlantic Container Lines Ltd. to lobby the Defense Department to buy the British firm's container ships.

- The consulting firm of William Colby, former director of the CIA, received about \$180,000 last year for political and economic analysis provided to the Government of Singapore Investment Corp.

- The law firm of former transportation secretary Brock Adams received about \$483,000 last year to lobby on behalf of a variety of foreign transportation clients, including the China Ocean Shipping Co., the Japanese Fisheries Association, the Japan Deep Sea Trawlers Association and the Hokuten (Japan) Trawlers Association.

To monitor such activities, the Justice Department has a 17-person unit whose job it is to ensure compliance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act. That law was passed in 1938 because of concern about Nazi propagandists and other subversives.

Critics say the law is weak and enforcement is sporadic. There hasn't been a criminal prosecution under it since 1963. "The act has never been given very much attention by the Justice Department," says Joel Lisker, the former registration chief who is now staff director of the Senate Judiciary security and terrorism subcommittee.

"Many people who occupy senior positions at justice, if they haven't represented foreign principals themselves, associate with law firms that do. There's a tendency for them to look ahead to what they may do" after they leave government.

Although the law requires all foreign agents to file semi-annual reports disclosing their activities and fees, Lisker says that Washington law firms with foreign clients often hide their public relations and lobbying activities behind the shield of "attorney-client" privilege.

"Voluntary compliance is our main form of enforcement," said Joseph E. Clarkson, who now heads the registration unit.

In the past five years, the number of registered agents has grown from 5,200 to 6,700, an increase attributed in part to the perceived success of the Israeli and Greek lobbies in influencing U.S. policy.

But Clarkson says, "There are probably 30 to 60 percent more agents out there that are not registered as are."

The loose enforcement leads to anomalies, particularly in the national security area. Last month, Reagan kicked up a storm when he signed an executive order requiring all federal employees with sensitive security clearances to get approval—even after leaving the government—before publishing anything that might contain classified information.

Justice officials concede there is no way to require a former government official to get prior approval before privately divulging information to foreign governments.

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the secrets can couch his advice to take advantage of that, it goes through that filter . . . He has the benefit of inside thinking on a variety of issues," Lisker said. "This is what makes him so valuable."

But others say the disclosure problem is exaggerated. "The various messages that I send to a foreign principal are here, and anytime the government wants to come take a look at them, they can," says Colby. "I still feel bound not to tell anybody any classified information."

PATRICK BUCHANAN**Who lost Central America?**

Whose side are you on? That rhetorical question posed by Dean Rusk in the decisive years of Vietnam was said to be an insult to the patriotism of the politicians and press at whom it was directed.

Looking back, the question was valid. Not a few "anti-war activists" who bedeviled Johnson and Nixon, all the while whimpering "give peace a chance," privately hungered for an American defeat. Some, to vindicate predictions that "the war could not be won." Others, because they believe Marxist revolution to be the wave of the future, and want to ride with it.

The other evening, former CIA Director William Colby related how, after the massacre of the Viet Cong by American firepower during the Tet offensive of 1968, reform and pacification worked. By 1971, he insisted, he could ride a bicycle alone through Vietnamese provinces that in 1967 had belonged, militarily and politically, to the Communists.

"Who, then, lost Vietnam?, I asked. Congress, he retorted: the Congress of the United States lost the Vietnam War.

And so it did. In a series of decisions shameful and vindictive, the American Congress between 1973 and 1975 reduced South Vietnam's war rations to 1 percent of what the United States expended in 1968 and 1969, leaving our desperate allies at the mercy of the dozen Soviet-supplied divisions from the North that invaded in the spring of 1975. Congress was collaborator in the worst defeat in American history, ushering in the greatest holocaust since Auschwitz.

The victors, whom the peace movement assured us would bring to Southeast Asia a far, far better future than anything dreamed of by American imperialists and their "corrupt and dictatorial" puppets, unmasked themselves as a pack of butchers.

And the Republican Party let them get away with it.

"Yalta!" was the epithet spat out at the obsequious "statesmen" who sold out Eastern Europe to appease Stalin. "Who lost China?" was the bitter question pitched in the face of apologists for bumblers like George Catlett Marshall, who had insisted a "coalition government" was the proper solution for China, and imposed it upon a dependent ally. During the '50s, the Democratic Party was forced, repeatedly and rightly, to answer for the fecklessness and stupidity of initial postwar policy toward China and captive Europe.

But with Ford and Kissinger at the helm, and the politics of conciliation in the ascendancy, the Republican Party acquiesced in 1976 to establishment importunings that we "put Vietnam behind us." The decision was as unfair to the families of the 50,000 dead and third of a million wounded as it was politically foolish. Americans were allowed to forget that the war launched by the liberal Democrats John F. Kennedy brought to Washington had been betrayed by liberal Democrats.

Now, it is happening all over again. In Central America. Again, the petulant whine that we are on the side of corrupt and dictatorial right-wing regimes. Again, the recommendation that we fight armed Castroites with land reform, economic redistribution, human rights commission, anything except military assistance for our desperate friends. Again, the hands of the president are being tied.

Prohibited by the Clark Amendment from moving against the Russian beachhead in Southern Africa, the president now is prohibited, by the Boland Amendment of December last, from disrupting the Russian beachhead in the Americas. Odd, is it not? The two most exposed and vulnerable provinces of the Soviet empire, Angola and Nicaragua, are designated pro-

TECTED sanctuaries by the Congress of the United States.

Let us not mince words. The margin for the United States is narrowing; the conclusive battle for Central America is underway. In Guatemala, Gen. Rios Montt has turned the tide against the communist guerrillas in a conflict reminiscent of the French and Indian wars. In El Salvador, 7,000 communist guerrillas have won a stalemate. In Nicaragua, pro-American "contras" have established one base camp adjacent to Honduras and are about to open a second front on the border with Costa Rica. We will win, the "contras" proclaim proudly, because "the strongest power on earth is behind us."

Is it? What do we hear from Congress? Abandon Rios Montt! He has no respect for human rights! Make aid to El Salvador conditional on negotiations with the guerrillas. Cut aid at once to the contras; they are right-wing "Somocistas" and the Boland Amendment says we are not permitted to attempt the overthrow of a Nicaraguan regime working for the overthrow of its pro-American neighbors.

As the left never mentions free elections, human rights or land reform in "liberated" China or Cuba, Vietnam or Nicaragua, we ought not only to question their proposals, but their motivation and sincerity.

Sooner, rather than later, Reagan must lay his cards on the table. The United States cannot remain a credible superpower if it allows the establishment of half a dozen Cubas in Central America. The president should declare it to be American policy to liquidate every Soviet outpost in Central America; and congressmen who labor relentlessly to impede that national purpose, while cloaking their resistance with the familiar patter of progressive nonsense, should be identified for what they have become: passive — and in some cases active — collaborators of the communist empire.