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29 JAN 1985

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STAT

Executive Secretary

28 Jan 85

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ON PAGE 18

The Anchorman Chronicles: Geneva

By DANIEL HENNINGER

Talking with the Russians is good.
Talking about nuclear-arms reduction is good.

I hold these truths to be self-evident, because I have been watching television. I have been watching the Talks between George Shultz and Andrei Gromyko as reported from Geneva by Dan Rather, Tom Brokaw, Peter Jennings, David Hartman, Bryant Gumbel, John Chancellor and Bill Moyers. The original Gospel had four Evangelists, but arms control has seven. George Will, an unbeliever whom one expected to see stoned off the air by his colleagues, told Peter Jennings on Tuesday night that he doubted there would be another significant arms agreement "in our lifetime or our children's lifetime." But what is one man's opinion against the force of an idea? On Wednesday night, Peter Jennings offered a report on how the announcement of the resumed Talks was playing on the streets of Russia: "And from Moscow, the report of an elderly woman who said, 'I keep listening to hear it again; I have hope that my grandson will never know war.'"

On the previous evening, Dan Rather had spoken of having at last broken the "dialogue deadlock." And Bill Moyers cited as reason for Talking the "testimony of the ghosts who haunt this hall of the League of Nations," in which he was standing. (Note: Established to prevent conflict after World War I, the League fell into disuse after Japan invaded Manchuria, Italy conquered Ethiopia and Germany repudiated the Treaty of Versailles. Indeed, Hitler somewhat discredited the idea of Talking, but that was a long time ago.)

Anchorman Megawattage

Measured in anchorman watts, the Shultz-Gromyko meeting was surely the brightest showcase for TV news since the Republican convention. In fact, when word got out that all three anchormen would be doing their evening newscasts from Geneva, I thought the networks might have set the meeting up themselves. Something similar seems to have occurred to "Today's" Bryant Gumbel on Tuesday morning, when he suddenly found himself interviewing Tom Brokaw and John Chancellor, with additional dialogue by Marvin Kalb. It was quite fantastic.

"Henry Kissinger," said Gumbel, "has raised the prospect that what we're engaged in here is media hype. Marvin?"

"Well," said Kalb, in a comment that should be enshrined in the Museum of Broadcasting, "it has become a media event in the sense that there are perhaps journalists here at a loftier level than might normally be covering a diplomatic event." If this had been a cowboy movie,

the barroom piano would have stopped dead. "I think," said John Chancellor, leaning in, "what we have here is an enormously important event. We are talking about the next generation of the nuclear age—weapons in space."

Then Tom Brokaw, who is, after all, the actual anchorman, practically came out of his chair to raise the ante: "The two most powerful nations in the history of civilization, with enough weaponry and enough nuclear warheads to destroy the planet, have come together in Geneva. Why shouldn't we give it all the attention we can possibly muster."

It was also a tough assignment for cameramen. The most dynamic image recorded during the meetings appears to have been Andrei Gromyko walking through a doorway, lifting off his hat and saying, "Gut bye, and best wishes to you."

This is not to suggest that the networks' huge presence in Geneva was of no value. Quite the contrary. A viewer interested in arms control, strategic issues generally or East-West relations could have obtained an extremely interesting overview during these broadcasts—but from a wholly unexpected source. The Big Three—Brokaw, Rather and Jennings—were unexceptional. They competently described the context for the meeting, and Jennings was particularly good on Europe's relations with the U.S. and the Soviets. The evening news shows also did some remarkable animations of how antimissile satellites and lasers might shoot down incoming Soviet ICBMs. Probably sold millions of people on the concept. But the really useful work was done by David Hartman of ABC's "Good Morning, America."

Hartman conducted interviews with a remarkable number of specialists on strategic and Soviet affairs, including Harold Brown, Paul Warnke, Henry Kissinger (from Hong Kong; the man must carry a beeper) Marshall Goldman, Gerard Smith and William Colby. Ideologically, this is a pretty motley crew, but their replies to Hartman were often telling and revealing.

Nobody criticized Talking; indeed, Hartman's guest list was notably lacking in a serious critic of the arms-control process, such as Sen. Steve Symms. But the qualifications and caveats piled up in drifts. Harold Brown is being widely cited now as a full opponent of the administration's missile-defense proposal, but speaking with David Hartman he sounded like a skeptic who isn't ready yet to throw in with either camp. "I'm not optimistic about the talks," he said, noting "questions of Soviet compliance with past treaties."

Hartman asked former CIA Director William Colby about "this great radar station in Krasnovarsk, which is the size,

we're told, of a football field." Colby replied that "we are looking at a system that is no strategic threat to us," adding later that we "shouldn't have our whole negotiating posture hostage to absolute verification," which is a fairly amazing posture for someone in charge of U.S. intelligence.

One of the most striking remarks Hartman elicited was from Jimmy Carter's chief SALT II negotiator, Paul Warnke, who seemed willing to write off a substantial part of the world's population if we can get an arms-control treaty. Hartman asked: "How much linkage should we demand regarding the Soviets' conduct in Afghanistan when it comes to negotiating?" "Linkage ought to be scrapped," Warnke replied. "We're in the arms-control business because it's good for us. And if it's good for us, the fact that the Soviet Union is behaving badly elsewhere should not change our determination." This has a late 1930ish ring to it, but again, that was so long ago.

After a while, I began to wonder how David Hartman was coming up with so many interesting interviews. The reason, I think, is that he approaches these big subjects essentially as an outsider looking in, as a sort of informed Everyman. I doubt that Brokaw, Rather, Jennings or nearly any of TV's specialized reporters would have asked Bill Colby about a Soviet radar "big as a football field" or dragged Afghanistan into a conversation with Paul Warnke. More likely they'd ask whatever leading-edge questions are being discussed by Washington's consensus builders, which nine times out of 10 produce noncommittal replies. They are insiders talking to insiders. Most of the time that doesn't produce very good television; the Sunday-morning interview programs have proved that for years.

Jet-Lagged Incoherence

Of course, David Hartman is a product of television, so it was inevitable that he would eventually throw up an airball like this question to national security adviser Robert McFarlane: "How have you changed in the last 48 hours?" I thought McFarlane was going to laugh in his face. In fact, by Wednesday the entire network-news effort seemed to have lapsed into jet-lagged incoherence.

Continued

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Debate on Security.: Educated Views

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21 — The debate on national security versus freedom of information, long a staple in Washington, dominated discussion in the capital this week. It was prompted by The Washington Post's publication of details of the secret payload of the space shuttle mission scheduled for next month, and the condemnation of the newspaper's article by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger.

The New York Times sought comments on the controversy from several Washingtonians prominent in the fields of national security and the press. Excerpts follow.

Gen. David C. Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Unfortunately, we have arrived at a point of great confrontation between the press and the Government on national security issues and I hope that we can come to an understanding on the needs of a free press and the needs of national security.

At this point, I think that we have gone too far in revealing information with an impact on national security. The combination of leaks, a reporter putting together bits and pieces of information, creates lots of problems between the Government and the media.

I may be prejudiced, but I feel that when in doubt, you should lean toward the national security side.

Eric Sevareid, television commentator:

A great illusion exists about national security. Our true security lies in peace itself. Our weaponry and soldiery provide the first line of defense of our territory and our vital interests abroad. But our first line of defense of peace lies in the preservation of America's free institutions and civil liberties, including the First Amendment liberties.

If we gradually become like the Soviets — secretive, paranoid, politically neurotic — then world tensions would ultimately become unbearable. Hitler said that the strength of the totalitarian states is that they force their enemies to immitate them. I have an unhappy feeling that this Administration, however unintentionally, is edging us down that path.

Stansfield M. Turner, Director of Central Intelligence under President Carter:

I think the press is being very hypocritical. Most agreed with Weinberger on the need for secrecy and then when The Post published their story, which

was unconscionable, all the others used it as excuse to go ahead and print. One day the mission deserves secrecy and then the next they jump on the bandwagon.

I think the press ought to apply the following rule: Is what they are going to print really going to educate the American people? The details of the satellite The Washington Post printed were not issues of particular importance to the American public.

I. F. Stone, the journalist:

One thing puzzles me. This is the first time in my 44 years in Washington that I have ever heard of calling a press conference to announce that you were going to do something secret. If you want to keep a hold on it and secret, why scurry around town asking people please not to print it? That's the surest way of getting it in print.

Now, the second thing that bothers me is that this test on Jan. 23 is going to be a shuttle that is going to carry some commercial testing and some military testing. If you really want to keep it secret, why not carry off military testing under the cover of a commercial test?

Of course, I am not arguing that there is never an occasion when a government has no right to withhold information. Every law, including homicide, has its exceptions, but its irrelevant to an incident in which the Pentagon flaunts a secret operation as if to deliberately invite maximum visibility.

William E. Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence:

Government has a legitimate call for secrecy for some of its activities and there is a tension between that and the desire of public and the press especially to know everthing. I think that this tension is healthy. It's part of our constitutional system.

There is however, some information that should not be revealed. It remains a judgment call that we wrestle with every day.

On occasion the press has revealed

things when they shouldn't have and on occasion I'm sure the Government has withheld information when it wasn't entirely necessary.

I think that this Administration is trying to get better discipline than perhaps there was in the past.

James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence:

Balancing the claims of press freedom and security must ultimately rest on a rule of reason. This society, quite rightly, is unprepared to sacrifice either. For this reason one grows uneasy in times that the press and government are hurling absolutes at one another. It is regrettable and risky that the Government cannot maintain security for its essential though fragile intelligence activities.

But security has been breaking down for a generation. That breakdown reflects a loss of national consensus policy. Not only is the press less inhibited. Not only has the Congress been brought into such matters (members and staff are not invariably reticent!). Above all, there has been a breakdown of discipline within the executive branch.

To preserve secrecy, especially in a democracy, security must be part of an accepted pattern of behavior, outside of government and inside. Regrettably, we no longer have such a pattern.

Restoring effective security arrangements, short of a sense of shared and immediate danger, can only come from within the executive branch and by example. Unless the nation's leaders demonstrate that they respect the security rules and will not violate those rules to score political points against rivals or make their speeches more colorful, those further down the hierarchy will continue gushing (euphemistically called "leaking"). Rather than being prepared to suspend curiosity in selected areas, the press will find it too tempting to refrain from publishing the wealth of information all too readily available.

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INQUIRY

Topic: THE CIA

William E. Colby, 64, was director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1970s. Born in Minnesota, he served in the U.S. Army during World War II, rising to major, and then joined the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA. He is the author of Honorable Men — My Life in the CIA. Colby was interviewed by free-lance journalist Phil Moss.




William E. Colby

COLBY: I have no trust in the Soviet Union. In 1962, the foreign minister of the Soviet Union (Andrei Gromyko), who is still the foreign minister, lied directly to President Kennedy when he assured him that he was not going to put any offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. He said that at the very time he was doing it. I think we can watch the Soviet Union; we can tell through our own devices whether they will be complying with an agreement we reach between us or whether they'll be cheating on it.

COLBY: I think the president is quite resolved to achieve some kind of success in the arms control area. I think earlier he was very uninformed in it. But I think today he's resolved to achieve some results. I think he's taken exactly the right step of getting Paul Nitze to become the leading man to try to put together some kind of an agreement. I think the president's interest now is in the history books, rather than the next election.

USA TODAY: If we can't verify what weapons they have, is it worthwhile to reach any kind of arms agreement with them?

COLBY: It's not worthwhile if we can't verify it. But we can verify it. If you get into an arcane discussion of whether verification means you can identify the last quarter-inch of the fin of some missile, then you say no, it's not verifiable. But if you approach verification from what it really is, which is the protection of your country against strategic surprise, then you begin to realize that any kind of a strategic action on their side would be telegraphed years in advance, thanks to the intelligence technology we have with the satellites, the electronics, the acoustics. If you have any doubts, just look at what the Defense Department publishes about Soviet weapons.



By Susan Harlan. USA TODAY

USA TODAY: Before heading the CIA, you served in Vietnam. Why haven't we been able to account for all of our men who are missing in action?

COLBY: The North Vietnamese have been incredibly cynical in their use of the remains of our people killed over there, handing them out one at a time to visiting delegations. I think that our relations with the North Vietnamese are going to be very bad for a long time. Whether there are any Americans still living in Vietnam, I just don't know. I think they probably, in most cases, died of natural causes or unnatural causes, and the North Vietnamese are afraid to admit responsibility.

USA TODAY: Are we ahead or behind the Soviets in arms?

COLBY: Both nations have the ability to retaliate absolutely against any use of nuclear weapons against them. We are ahead of the Russians in some weapons. They're ahead of us in some weapons, and the difference is inconsequential.

USA TODAY: Do you think President Reagan really wants an arms agreement?

Gathering intelligence means taking risks

USA TODAY: Do you think Iran was helping the hijackers who took the Kuwaiti jet to Tehran and murdered two Americans?

COLBY: It obviously had some relationship with the group that did the hijacking. But I don't think that group did it on Iran's orders or even with conspiracy. I think the Iranians were less than helpful in the way they handled it. They knew they had a basic sympathy with the people doing it, and they were slow to realize they had an obligation to straighten out the situation.

USA TODAY: Do you agree with Secretary of State George Shultz that the USA should launch pre-emptive strikes against terrorists, even if civilians might be harmed?

COLBY: Well, if I knew that somebody was cranking up a bomb and planned to move it

into the White House to blow it up, I would take such steps as I needed in order to stop that from happening. If that meant that I had to bomb something out of the air in order to do it, I would. The pieces of the plane would have to land some place. Somebody might get hurt. But I would protect the White House.

USA TODAY: What can be done to combat terrorism?

COLBY: One rule of terrorism is that if it gets serious, it gets suppressed. It usually gets suppressed through a combination of good intelligence, good security practices and public support because the terrorist becomes the enemy of the public. Then the public begins to help you to control it.

USA TODAY: As director of the Central Intelligence Agency, you had to be something of an expert on the Soviet Union. Can the Soviets be trusted at all?

Continued

USA TODAY: In your view, which nations are the greatest threat to world peace?

COLBY: The Soviet Union is obviously the only power on earth that can destroy the United States with its nuclear weaponry. The Soviets have a terrible problem with an awful economy that they insist on running in the worst possible way. They do, however, have considerable talent in military activity and a willingness to do all they need to keep it up. I think they're very hard-nosed, difficult to live with. But they share this great earth of ours, and somehow we've got to work out a relationship with them.

USA TODAY: What about Libya?

COLBY: Libya is led by a man (Col. Khadafy) who is really quite irresponsible. He's very mercurial. He has an obviously strong hatred for the Egyptians, and I think he has ambitions to play a major role in Northern Africa, which could run into conflict with several other countries in the neighborhood.

USA TODAY: Does he represent a potential danger to our country?

COLBY: Directly, not so much. To our citizens, through the help of various terrorists, yes. He has been of help to terrorists as far away as the Philippines and Northern Ireland.

USA TODAY: Iran?

COLBY: Iran is going

through a revolutionary upheaval, an ideological intoxication, one can say. At this point I think there is very little to be done about Iran. But I think in the long term, there is apt to arise some new emanation of the Shah, who will rise up and say, "Enough of this confusion — let's get Iran back to some sensible form of organization and policy."

USA TODAY: Cuba?

COLBY: There's a paralysis there. The Soviets are going to support them and I don't think much change is going to occur.

USA TODAY: Nicaragua?

COLBY: Nicaragua is in a revolutionary situation. They want to maintain the revolutionary fervor. But they realize they're running a substantial risk of isolation and even pressure from the neighboring countries — including the United States — if they continue in a hostile attitude.

USA TODAY: What do you think of the CIA manual that suggested Nicaraguan officials be "neutralized"?

COLBY: It was a mistake. It never should have been written. The chain of command broke down in the process in which this thing was produced. I don't think there was an intent to violate the law. I think there was just a failure to command and control.

USA TODAY: During your CIA tenure, there was talk of domestic surveillance and overseas assassination plots by agents. Any comments 10 years later?

COLBY: No. It was all investigated. Was the CIA out of control? No, according to the senate committee. Did the CIA ever assassinate a foreign leader? No, according to the committee. Did the CIA violate the principles against it doing surveillance within the United States? Yes, to a small degree. In a few cases — bad cases that should not have happened. But certainly, the idea of CIA in ev-

ery bedroom in the country was a gross exaggeration and just plain wrong.

USA TODAY: Under Director William Casey, has the CIA become too politicized?

COLBY: No, I don't think so. He has done a good job. He has organized some of the analytical parts in a very useful manner. He has encouraged the agency to step back and get back to work. He's a risk taker, which you need to be if you're going to conduct intelligence operations. I think he's probably made mistakes, and he'd probably tell you so himself. But I think he's been a very good leader.

USA TODAY: The CIA is again recruiting successfully on college campuses. Is this part of the new patriotism?

COLBY: There are a lot of young Americans who would like to serve their country, who are willing to serve their country in a job which demands unanimity. Intelligence is interesting, challenging, satisfying work. There are a lot of young Americans who are willing to go through the very severe tests that we have and accept



By Susan Harlan, USA TODAY

the limitations on their lifestyle that will be involved. So I'm not worried about the future of the CIA.

USA TODAY: Similarly, there is a lot more risk working abroad at an American embassy now.

COLBY: Sure. But you find good Americans who are willing to take risks for their country. I think they should be supported and helped.

USA TODAY: During World War II, you jumped out of an airplane in France to work with the underground. Would you do anything like that again?

COLBY: Certainly. For a cause like that, certainly. I've risked my life a number of times. It doesn't bother me, if it's for a good reason.

TIMELINE: William E. Colby

- 1920: Born Jan. 20 in St. Paul, Minn.
- 1940: Received bachelor's degree from Princeton University. Entered Columbia Law School.
- 1941: Joined U.S. Army, served as paratrooper and with Office of Strategic Services.
- 1945: Returned to Columbia, awarded law degree in 1947.
- 1947-1949: In private law practice with Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine firm in New York City.
- 1949-1950: Worked on the staff of National Labor Relations Board.
- 1951-1958: Served as an attache at American embassies in Stockholm and Rome.
- 1959-1962: First secretary, U.S. Embassy, Saigon.
- 1962-1968: Chief of Far East Division, Central Intelligence Agency.
- 1968-1971: Director, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support for U.S. Embassy, Saigon.
- 1972-1973: Held high positions in the CIA, including deputy director, operations.
- 1973-1976: Director, CIA.
- 1984: Of counsel with law firm of Reid and Priest, Washington, D.C.

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ON PAGE E5

NEW YORK TIMES
16 December 1984

The 'Shultz Doctrine' Is Rendered Moot in Iran

By TERENCE SMITH

WASHINGTON — For months, Secretary of State George P. Shultz has been arguing that the time has come for the United States to use military force to either preempt or retaliate against international terrorism. The alternative, he has said, is for the United States to become the "Hamlet of nations," endlessly wringing its hands over whether and how to respond.

Last week, Mr. Shultz could cite fresh provocation. Four Arabic-speaking terrorists hijacked a Kuwaiti airliner with 161 people on board, isolated the Americans and killed two of them solely because they were Americans. The incident seemed to underscore the dangers facing the 77,032 American civilians who serve their country overseas.

A rescue attempt seemed out of the question. The United States has commando teams specially trained in storming hijacked airliners and freeing hostages. But cooperation was conspicuously missing in Teheran, where the United States is still vilified as the "great Satan." Even more, some United States officials said there was evidence that Iran was supporting the hijackers. Any assault force would have to be massive to protect both the hostages and itself against counterattack.

In the end, the hijacking concluded without any direct American action, other than strong rhetoric and diplomatic pressure applied through third countries. Two Americans were dead, two others came home battered and burned and there seemed to be little that the United States would or could do about it.

The Teheran hijacking illustrated the difficult choices that arise in attempting to implement the so-called Shultz Doctrine in a specific instance. "There was simply no practical way for the United States to use force in this case," observed Robert Kupperman, a counter-terrorism specialist at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Any rescue team we sent in would have been killed along with the hostages."

"This case demonstrated that the Shultz Doctrine — the use of force — is at best a selective tool that does not apply in every instance," Mr. Kupperman said.

Another specialist, William Colby, the former Director of Central Intelligence, agrees, but he does not believe that the difficulties posed in the Kuwaiti hijacking necessarily invalidate the Shultz Doctrine. "Don't rule it out," he said. "The moment will come when we want to use force. And when we do, the public will support it."

No Easy Targets

Another aspect of Mr. Shultz's thinking, military retaliation, also seems difficult to apply in such an instance. What would be the target? The hijackers have disappeared into Iranian custody. Iran itself is too big a target, even assuming that concrete evidence of Iranian collusion could be obtained.

"If you could find a nice little Al Dawa training camp someplace, you could hit that," observed Mr. Colby. Al Dawa is the militant Shiite terrorist organization with which the hijackers are believed to be associated. Their principal demand throughout the hijacking was that Kuwait release 17 members of Al Dawa who were convicted of the bombings of the American Embassy and French consulate in Kuwait a year ago.

But both Mr. Kupperman and Mr. Colby said that such an action would be difficult to justify to the American public. Mr. Kupperman suggested instead that the United States should retaliate against Iran with economic weapons. "We could go into court in New York and tie up Iranian funds in American banks," he said. "That would provide some counter-terror theater, which is what we need in this case."

The best solution appears to be the other part of the Shultz Doctrine — pre-emption. The United States has redoubled its intelligence gathering efforts in recent months and has been able to blunt a number of terrorist threats against American diplomats in Beirut, Bogotá and El Salvador, among others. Italy scored a notable success two weeks ago when it rounded up a seven-man Lebanese terrorist group that it said was planning an attack on the American Embassy in Rome.

But American officials say it would require super-human intelligence to pre-empt a hijacking. "We are doing what we can," a senior State Department official said, "but there is no way to track every terrorist cell around the world."

In the end, the Shultz Doctrine may be more an effort to condition public opinion about terrorism than a specific prescription for coping with it. The Secretary of State is also trying to win a policy debate within the Administration, which remains divided over the wisdom and efficacy of using force against terrorism. Each new incident adds force to his argument and most specialists in the field agree that the United States is closer today to using force than it has been before.

"We have to strike a delicate balance," Mr. Kupperman said, "between being perceived as a paper tiger if we do nothing, and being seen as terrorists ourselves if we strike back in the wrong way. The correct answer lies somewhere in between."

Westmoreland denies he put ceiling on troop strength

By JOE STARITA
Herald Staff Writer

NEW YORK — At no time during his four-year tenure as commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, Gen. William Westmoreland testified Monday, did he ever impose a ceiling on enemy troop strength or feel pressured into putting a good face on the war's progress.

To have imposed a ceiling on enemy strength, he said, would have been "improper." He was oblivious to any political heat, he said, because "I tried to stay out of the political channels."

As pointed out by CBS attorney David Boies, however, much of Westmoreland's testimony appeared to contrast sharply with numerous magazine and newspaper articles, statements made by other military officials and the findings of a 1976 House committee investigation.

Whether a ceiling was imposed and whether Westmoreland was under pressure to present good news about the war are issues at the heart of his \$120 million libel suit against CBS.

In a January 1982 documentary entitled *The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception*, CBS said that Westmoreland imposed a 300,000-man ceiling on enemy troop strengths even though his own intelligence staff believed the number to be much higher.

He did so, the broadcast said, because he believed the only way his request for more troops would be granted was if he could show that U.S. forces were winning the war.

As a result, the program concluded, Westmoreland intentionally deceived President Lyndon Johnson about the true size of the enemy and left American forces

'... To impose a ceiling that would have disregarded intelligence findings would definitely have been improper.'

Gen. William Westmoreland

ill-prepared to counter the enemy's devastating January 1968 Tet Offensive.

Vigorously denying all of the program's allegations, Westmoreland sued CBS. He is the highest-ranking U.S. public official ever to file a libel suit.

Grilling Westmoreland during a wide-ranging, five-hour cross-examination Monday, Boies asked the 70-year-old, retired general at one point whether he recalled a September 1967 meeting with George Carver, the CIA's chief of Vietnamese affairs.

Westmoreland said that he did recall that meeting.

"He [Carver] inquired if a ceiling had been imposed and I said it had not," Westmoreland replied.

"... To impose a ceiling that would have disregarded intelligence findings would definitely have been improper," the general said.

Boies then produced a portion of Carver's earlier trial testimony and read it aloud to the jury.

Carver's recollection of the meeting, Boies said, included this statement: "... His [Westmoreland's] subordinates were acting under the impression that they were under instructions to stay

below a certain overall figure or ceiling."

Westmoreland said he assured Carver during that meeting that there was no ceiling and no one in his command was under any pressure to stay within a certain figure.

Under intense questioning from Boies, Westmoreland said that he did not learn that some officials in his command believed they were under orders to intentionally underestimate enemy troop strengths until he saw the CBS broadcast.

"I did learn after the CBS broadcast ... that apparently there were some officials at a low level who apparently had an erroneous impression in that regard," Westmoreland said.

A number of those officials are expected to testify for CBS later in the trial.

Boies then asked Westmoreland whether he recalled seeing a 1976 congressional report that also questioned the reliability of U.S. military intelligence reports.

"I have no recollection of it, no," Westmoreland replied.

In a highly critical study of enemy estimates provided by military intelligence in the months preceding the Tet Offensive, the report, called the Pike Committee Report, reached many of the same conclusions that CBS did.

At one point, the report quotes then-CIA Director William Colby, who testified before the committee, saying: "Warning of the Tet offensive had not fully anticipated the intensity, coordination and timing of the enemy attack."

Later, the report said: "The validity of most of the numbers was significantly dubious. Unfortunately, they were relied on for optimistic presentations."

ABC GOOD MORNING AMERICA
28 November 1984

AA37|FORMER CIA|HARTMAN: Eleven minutes after 7 right now. As we heard
|AGENT/ARREST 5|on the news this morning, the FBI has arrested a former
CIA employee and charged him with being a spy. Carl
Koecher is his name. He faces a possible life sentence if
he's convicted of passing the national security
information to the Czechoslovakian intelligence service
not recently, but back in the mid- to early 1970s. Adm.
Stansfield Turner was director of the CIA after that time,
during the Carter administration. And he joins us this
morning from Washington. Good morning, admiral. TURNER:
Good morning, David.

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HARTMAN: Two, two words that jumped out when reading
about this last night and this morning, he is described,
Mr. Koecher, as 'a contract employee of the CIA,' and,
also, 'an illegal spy.' Now, what is a contract employee?
And what is a (sic) illegal spy? ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER
(former director, CIA): Well, all kinds of people are
contract employees. Some of them make a contract to work
only maybe a day a year, some of them full-time, 365 days.
It's just a term for somebody who's not on the full Civil
Service payroll. It's not a very significant distinction.

HARTMAN: All right. TURNER: 'Illegal spies,' that's a
term the FBI uses to mean that the man, or person, was
illegally introduced into this country, originally.
Again, it's not a very important distinction. The...

HARTMAN: All right. Here is a man who has come here to
the United States, an emigrant. He's a naturalized
citizen. He's from another country and so forth. How
could he apparently, so easily, get access to top, what
appears to be top security information? TURNER: Well,
when you have somebody come over from another country and
be willing to check us, you check him as carefully as you
can. You check the information he brings with him to see
if it is valid. You use your own spies in his country to
find out if there is some background on this man that you
should know. You run tests on him. You surveille him to
see whether he's still in contact with people he should
not be in contact with. Sometimes, you get taken in.
David, it just happens in this case that this came at the
end of a long period of rather poor counterintelligence
work in the CIA. And in the middle of this man's time

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IN PAGE D-3

WASHINGTON POST
21 November 1984

Personalities

By Chuck Conconi
Washington Post Staff Writer

"Fulfilled my promise. The mayor of Venice, Italy, married Sally Shelton and me today."

—Former CIA director William E. Colby,
long distance from Venice yesterday

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-3WASHINGTON POST
20 November 1984

Personalities

Colby, Shelton to Marry

After all the speculation, close friends say that former Barbados ambassador Sally Shelton is scheduled to marry former CIA director William E. Colby in Venice today. The couple had a pre-celebration luncheon Friday with a group of close friends here before leaving for Italy. After the wedding, the couple, both fluent in Italian, will spend a few days in Italy before returning to Washington. They will maintain residences in both New York City, where Shelton is a vice president of international economics at Bankers Trust, and in Northwest Washington. Colby has a law practice here. It is the second marriage for both.

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ON PAGE C1

WASHINGTON TIMES
8 November 1984

DIANA HEARS

Madame Earie, just recovering from several weeks of double-drill crystal-gazing for Chuck Mannatt, is on parade again this morning. Attention! Salute smartly! And speak!

Q: Madame Earie, I really miss the Journalistic Jibes of Sally Quinn, since she slid into seclusion to become a Novelist, Mama and Major Hostess. Is there no-one left who's fancy enough for her to write about?

A: Why, of course! *Herself*. She's got a dear little Piece in the current *Architectural Digest*, all about How I Fixed Up Gray Gardens, My House in East Hampton. (The best bit: She had decorating encouragement from Beyond the Grave from Big Edie Beale, its late owner.) Meanwhile, Sally's also signed on to write a Piece for *House and Garden* on How I Fixed Up My \$2.5 Million Georgetown House. No word on whether the late Todd Lincoln helped out with the swatches and fixtures, darlings, but Ms. Q's notably easier on her *self* than on her earlier victims. We all mellow, of course.

Q: Except you, Madame Earie. Well, I'm waiting. When will Bill Colby, former CIA chief, marry former Ambassador Sally Shelton, whose honeymoon cruise you've already so rudely reported?

A: Wrap the wok, now, and rejoice. The date for the formal hitching is November 21.

WASHINGTON POST
6 November 1984

6-2

WASHINGTON WAYS

By Donnie Radcliffe
Washington Post Staff Writer

"I beg your pardon?" sputtered a Central Intelligence Agency spokeswoman at the agency's Langley headquarters when asked about a cocktail circuit report—planted no doubt by the KGB—that Director William Casey and his wife, Sophia, recently had been divorced and that he had married a former American ambassador to a Caribbean country.

"Director Casey is still very happily married," said the spokeswoman who, after recovering her cool, suggested that the bridegroom in question might be a *former* director, namely William Colby.

Colby, however, said it is not he who has untied one nuptial knot and tied another.

Simply put, Colby said: "I'm not yet married because I'm not yet divorced."

ASSOCIATED PRESS
30 October 1984

POLITICAL BRIEFS
COLUMBUS, OHIO

President Reagan is opposed to a nuclear freeze now but might be more flexible on the issue after winning re-election, former CIA Director William Colby predicted Tuesday.

Colby, a veteran intelligence officer who was CIA chief from 1973-76, acknowledged at a news conference that Reagan "at the moment" opposes a freeze on the development of nuclear weapons.

"He also, however, is very much interested in some kind of progress on nuclear reduction and so forth. And I think after the election, when he will be looking more to the history books than the hustings, I think he's going to want very much to have some serious achievement on his record of an agreement with the Soviets," Colby said.

"And I frankly think the freeze is the easiest thing even to start with," he said.