

NAPLES DAILY NEWS (FL)  
28 February 1983

# Addresses Intelligence Symposium CIA on Mend, Inman Says

By MATTHEW SPINA  
Staff Writer

America's intelligence community, hampered for years by information leaks, budget cuts and an inability to attract new blood to its ranks, is on the mend, aided greatly by CIA Director William Casey and his close friendship with President Reagan, a once high-ranking CIA official said today in Naples.

Perhaps the most important tool in breaking through dense layers of bureaucracy is access to the president, said Adm. Bobby Inman, the CIA's deputy director from 1981 to 1982.

**CASEY INFORMED** President Reagan in 1981 of the dangerous problems afflicting U.S. intelligence agencies in terms of declining manpower and spending limits, Inman told an audience of about 400 people at the Naples Beach Club. He was the first speaker in the Second Annual National Intelligence Symposium co-sponsored by the Naples Daily News and Palmer Communications.

With Reagan's help and some sympathetic U.S. senators — such as Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and Sen. Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, the vice chairman — the once sickly intelligence community seems on its way to long-term health.

Inman said the U.S. ability to learn of military movements by the Soviet Union is stronger than ever. However, he said, our knowledge of economic matters within the Soviet bloc is spotty and the ability to collect information on the political scene there is poor and always will be, because "we are dealing with a closed society, where decisions are made by a handful of people."

**THE RETIRED** U.S. Navy admiral said leaks of classified information comprise the biggest problem for today's intelligence gatherers.

The most damaging leaks in the past have come from senior administration officials, who, unaware of the importance of some information, passed it on at cocktail parties or similar social gatherings.

Others tell "their favorite newsmen some juicy tidbit in exchange for favorable news treatment later," Inman said. Such a leak can be particularly damaging if details on how the information is gathered tumble out.

Inman said the strength of U.S. intelligence agencies began to decline in 1964 when they began diverting manpower to collect strategic information for the Vietnam war. They sent agents who were needed to collect information in other parts of the world.

**ALSO AT THAT** time officials began to look at the Defense Department budget, he said. Top officials and budget planners learned that spying was perhaps one of the least cost-effective actions the department undertook and began cutting spending.

Steps to balance international payments of gold also hampered the intelligence community, Inman said, since diplomats were instructed to keep U.S. involvement in foreign countries low-key.

In the mid 1970s tales of abuses within the intelligence community, "some real, and a great many imagined," Inman said began titillating audiences of evening news programs.

Such news resulted in an executive order describing how intelligence agencies should conduct themselves.

"Think of the poor operative in the field trying to observe a manual 130 pages long of thousand-words," Inman said.

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 4NEW YORK POST  
28 February 1983

# CIA hops to probe of plot to kill the Pope

THE CIA, hit by a storm of criticism, has agreed to put a high priority on the investigation of Soviet and Bulgarian links to the plot to kill Pope John Paul II.

CIA Director William Casey, who was called on the carpet by President Reagan for his agency's foot-dragging — and later accused by Sen. Alfonse D'Amato of covering up the investigation — has reportedly assigned seven agents to help Italian authorities.

Casey relayed the new initiative to D'Amato at a top-secret meeting last week in his Langley, Va., office.

The two feisty Long Islanders had a series of acrimonious exchanges but D'Amato emerged from the meeting saying he was "satisfied" the CIA was getting into the act.

But the CIA — which once stated privately it believed Turkish gunman Mehmet Ali Agca

**INSIDE WASHINGTON**  
By NILES LATHEM

acted alone — has a long way to go to catch up with the Italians.

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WASHINGTON POST  
27 FEBRUARY 1983

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# U.S. Tracks Cuban Aid To Grenada

## In '81, Senate Unit Nixed CIA Plan To Destabilize Isle

By Patrick E. Tyler  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration, concerned that Cuba is developing better ways to extend its military influence in Central America, considered a covert intelligence operation against the leftist government of Grenada in 1981 and is now closely monitoring new Cuban activities on the tiny eastern Caribbean island.

The details of the operation are not known beyond a general description from knowledgeable sources that the CIA developed plans in the summer of 1981 to cause economic difficulty for Grenada in hopes of undermining the political control of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. But these sources said the operation was scrubbed because the Senate Intelligence Committee opposed it.

One senior Republican on the committee said in an interview last year, "Yes, there was an operation, and we all thought, unanimously I believe, that it was just a small island and so the Cubans or the communists control it, so what?"

The intelligence scrutiny of Grenada and rhetorical blasts against Bishop's government from the Reagan administration represent one side of a government debate over what, if any, danger exists for the United States or other Caribbean nations from Grenada's growing military ties with Cuba.

One of the strongest arguments that a threat exists was offered last week by Nestor D. Sanchez, deputy

assistant secretary of defense for inter-American affairs. In a speech to Florida Republicans, Sanchez disclosed that the Cubans had built a battalion-size military camp on Grenada that could supplement air and naval facilities under construction for possible military use.

Using harsh tones that have characterized earlier statements on Grenada by President Reagan and his principal advisers, Sanchez said the island had become a "virtual surrogate" of Cuba. He said the camp "includes barracks, administration buildings, vehicle storage sheds, support buildings and a training area with a Soviet-style obstacle course."

Cubans advisers and laborers are also building runways and port facilities in Grenada. "The Cubans are constructing air and naval facilities there that far exceed the requirements of that tiny island," Sanchez said.

A former CIA intelligence officer in the region, Sanchez also said Soviet military exports to Cuba in 1982 were a record \$1 billion compared with \$600 million in 1981 deliveries. Shipments included "Turya" hydrofoil torpedo boats, Sanchez said, MI24 "Hind" assault helicopters and an additional squadron of supersonic MiG23 fighter aircraft in an air force of 200 modern planes.

Sanchez's remarks reflect the frustration among many conservatives in the administration over the growing military strength of Cuba and its relatively unchallenged support for leftist governments and insurgent movements in places such as Grenada, Nicaragua and El Salvador.

But, while intelligence concerns over Grenada remain high, many officials in Congress and elsewhere believe Reagan and his policy advisers have consistently exaggerated the threat posed by the tourist-dependent nation of 110,000 people.

During Alexander M. Haig Jr.'s tenure as secretary of state, there was talk of "going to the source," meaning Cuba, to stop the flow of arms through Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador.

In November, 1981, the National Security Council authorized specific paramilitary actions against the Cuban presence in the region. "In some circumstances, CIA might (possibly using U.S. personnel) take unilateral paramilitary action against special Cuban targets,"

according to NSC minutes.

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he has pursued a close alliance with Cuba's Fidel Castro.

CIA officials presented the covert action plan to the Senate Intelligence Committee in July, 1981. Because of what were perceived as unusual and unspecified components, it met strong opposition.

Sources said Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) reacted to the CIA presentation by saying, "You've got to be kidding." Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) reportedly suggested that the CIA officials reconsider the proposal.

A senior committee member said the proposed operation did not include any plan to overthrow Bishop. "We are out of the business of overthrowing governments," he said. "We may cause a little economic trouble, a little publicity and [give] aid [to opposition groups], but we don't overthrow governments."

Another member of the committee suggested that in using the word "destabilize" in reference to the remarks of the senior Republican member, "you should go with the description that it was economic destabilization affecting the political viability of the government."

Covert operations against Grenada were first discussed in the Carter administration after the new Bishop government supported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and openly solicited economic aid from Cuba. But after reviewing options, according to current and former administration officials, President Carter rejected all but propaganda measures.

The strong rhetoric continued into 1982. During his working vacation last summer in Barbados, Grenada's neighbor, Reagan said, "El Salvador isn't the only country that's being threatened with Grenada, Reagan continued, "bears the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means it will attempt to spread

NEW YORK NEWS-WORLD  
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# OPINION

## The CIA—covering up Moscow's trail of murder

ALLAN  
BROWNFELD

The controversy is growing — as well it should — over allegations that the CIA has been downplaying the growing evidence which involves the KGB in the attempted assassination of Pope Paul II.

In a nationwide TV program which aired Jan. 25, NBC correspondent Marvin Kalb said that CIA officials were trying to cover up the matter because evidence of KGB involvement in the plot would "shatter hopes for detente, trade and arms agreements" with the Soviets.

Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, D-N.Y., accused CIA Director William Casey of covering up the Soviet-Bulgarian connection. Upon his return from Rome on Feb. 9, he revealed that Italian authorities told him they were "shocked" by the way the CIA was trying to "obstruct and deflect" the investigation of the Bulgarian connection to the assassination attempt. "I was told that the CIA is using disinformation and all sorts of other tactics to divert, dissuade and actually block this investigation," D'Amato said.

### D'Amato warned

Asked if he thought that CIA Director Casey himself was involved in the coverup, D'Amato said, "Yes." He reported that U.S. Embassy officials in Rome did everything they could to prevent him from investigating the matter himself. He said that U.S. Ambassador Max Raab sent him a telegram before he left saying, "Don't come." In addition, a staff member

of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee was prevented from going with him on the trip, because of CIA pressure.

Sen. D'Amato called the CIA's efforts "shockingly inept" and said that he had been told by a senior agency official in Rome that "not one person has been assigned to follow developments in the case."

Another member of Congress, Rep. Larry McDonald, D-Ga., has called upon the Reagan administration and the Congress to investigate allegations that the United States attempted to suppress investigations linking the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II to the KGB. In letters to President Reagan, CIA Director Casey and Rep. Edward Boland, D-Mass., chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, McDonald said that there is mounting evidence that the KGB was either directly involved in the attempt or at least knew the attempted assassination would occur. He said that there is also evidence that the CIA tried to suppress the efforts of newsmen and Italian authorities to link the KGB with the attempt on the pope's life.

### Those in the know

Those in a position to know express little doubt that Moscow is deeply involved. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski have both said that the well-established Bulgarian connection of Mehmet Ali Agca, the man who pulled the trigger, leads directly to the Soviet Union and its current leader, Yuri Andropov, who was then head of the KGB. "It had to be the Soviets," Kissinger said. "The Bulgarians had no interest in coming after the Pope."

The CIA — and the president himself — seems to be ignoring the growing body of evidence leading to the conclusion that Moscow was indeed involved in the assassination attempt. In an interview with the French newspaper *Le Figaro*, the former No. 2 man in Bulgaria's state spy service said that he is certain that Moscow was behind the shooting of the pope. Stefan Svartlev, who in 1972 became second in command of the KDS, which is directly tied to the KGB, said: "I haven't the least doubt about the participation of the Bulgarians in this plot."

Svartlev, who defected to the West in the late 1970s, pointed out that this operation would not have been decided by the Bulgarians alone since Bulgaria had no particular reason to eliminate the pope. The Russians, he declared, were certainly behind it. Asked if Bulgaria could have undertaken this operation alone, he replied: "Absolutely not ... The departments I and II — specializing in espionage and counter-espionage — are both completely controlled by Soviet advisers ... All the secret services of the Eastern bloc are simply branches of the KGB, which we call the center ... Based on my experience in the secret service, I am certain that the plot against the life of John Paul II came from an order from Leonid Brezhnev and was organized by Yuri Andropov ... This isn't in any way the first time such a procedure was followed."

### Strangely incredulous

Why does the CIA — and others in this administration — believe that it is unlikely that the KGB was

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CONTINUED

WALL STREET JOURNAL  
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## Man With a Mission

### Amos Townsend Scours Southeast Asia Seeking Proof of 'Yellow Rain'

Doctor's Aim Is to Convince  
World That Communists  
Wage Chemical Warfare

### A Senator's Aide Is Doubtful

By PAUL A. GIGOT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

NONG CHAN—Proceeding along a dirt road near this settlement on the Thailand-Cambodia border, Amos Townsend's blue Datsun pickup raises clouds of fine orange dust. But that turbulence is as nothing compared with the atmosphere inside the cab.

"Do you believe that?" asks Dr. Townsend, who is seated at the wheel. The 52-year-old retired Air Force surgeon is recounting how a British doctor working here has just refused his request to gather evidence about chemical warfare; according to Dr. Townsend, the Britisher had said the issue was too "political."

"What will you do with the evidence?" he wants to know," says Dr. Townsend, his voice rising. "What will I do? I'll tell the world, that's what I'll do. We have a moral obligation to tell the world."

For two years, Dr. Townsend and a handful of others have been trying to tell a doubtful world about what they believe is a moral outrage: that Communist forces are using chemical weapons against resistance fighters in Indochina. It hasn't been easy. Skeptics have ranged from Quaker nurses to U.S. editorialists. Said the New York Times in one editorial last year: "Reports that the Russians used toxic agents in Afghanistan and Indochina have not been fully confirmed. Besides, they describe small-scale use against unprotected people in remote areas."



So to prove his point, the passionate doctor has hitched elephant rides through the jungle, interviewed hundreds of refugees and awakened to the reveille of pounding artillery. He has also gathered specimens of blood, leaves, tissues from a dead body, anything he can find—hoping they might contain chemicals.

Some think the work has paid off. The U.S. State Department has published two reports that charge the Vietnamese with using Soviet-supplied chemicals; the reports cite evidence collected by Dr. Townsend. William Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has thanked the doctor for doing a better job than his spies. And a United Nations investigating team, though shying from conclusions, recently cited "circumstantial evidence" that chemical weapons were being used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan; the team quoted refugees referred to it by Dr. Townsend.

The Soviets and Vietnamese deny using chemicals. And many in the West, doubting the Soviets would be so ruthless, refuse to make the allegations a diplomatic issue.

Some skeptics, such as Ruth Cadwallader, co-director of Quaker refugee relief in Thailand, believe the U.S. may have planted the chemicals to smear the Communists. Others say that no one has seen the "smoking gun"—for example, a weapon containing poisons, or a photograph of a chemical attack.

#### 'The Proof Is There'

Still others suspect the U.S. of jumping to conclusions to score gains over the Soviets—and maintain that Dr. Townsend is a tool of such interests. "Amos has been a blatant promoter of this chemical propaganda that seems to be orchestrated by the U.S. embassy," says Mrs. Cadwallader. (Dr. Townsend is nominally employed by the International Rescue Committee, but his \$25,000-a-year salary has been paid by the U.S. State Department since March.)

Replies Dr. Townsend: "The proof is there. Some people won't believe because they just don't want to believe."

Two international treaties ban chemical and biological weapons: the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons. The Soviets have signed the 1972 convention, so any evidence that they now are breaking it could undermine the trust needed for future arms control.

Such evidence could also raise ominous questions about U.S. defenses. As Col. C. Dennison Lane, a U.S. military attache in Bangkok, puts it: "If they can use it here, they can also use it against us."

#### Scientific Tests

The Vietnamese are said to be using several chemicals here. Some are gases that simply incapacitate and aren't banned by the treaties. (The U.S. used such gases in Vietnam.) But one type of chemical that Dr. Townsend and others believe is being used in the area is called mycotoxin and has sent U.S. scientists scrambling to do tests. Mycotoxins can kill.

The U.S. says it has found mycotoxins in the blood or urine of several Indochinese refugees, on plant and rock samples and on a Soviet gas mask from Afghanistan. In news team from American Broadcasting

Cos. a sample of plant life from Laos that contained mycotoxins. And diplomatic sources say the French government has also found mycotoxins in samples it has collected along the Thailand-Cambodia border. The French government has confirmed the findings but has declined to elaborate on the nature of its specimens.

The poisons are thought to be delivered in "yellow rain," so described by refugees because it falls from the sky in a yellow mist. Planes spread it like crop-dusters or it bursts from artillery shells, refugees say. The mist is said to burn skin like acid and, when inhaled, to induce nausea, bloody vomiting, diarrhea and, in sufficient quantities, death from massive internal bleeding. (Scientists don't agree on the amount of mycotoxins required to kill a man.)

Mycotoxins do occur naturally from fungus in moldy grain. But scientists say the types the U.S. claims to have found here develop only in cold, dry climates and don't occur naturally in the tropics. So someone put them here, the U.S. says, and it blames the Soviets and Vietnamese.

At the heart of the diplomatic debate is Dr. Townsend, a former Air Force colonel, a veteran of Vietnam and a self-described "American primitive, politically speaking," who says, "You don't grow up in New England and not get involved."

The son of a farmer from Lebanon, N.H., Amos Townsend entered the Air Force through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps while attending the University of New Hampshire in the early 1950s; as an Air Force officer, he pursued his medical education at Dartmouth College and the University of Pennsylvania, graduating from the latter institution in 1961.

In December 1980, Dr. Townsend hadn't even heard of mycotoxins. Having retired from the Air Force a year earlier, he was working with his wife and some of his seven children at a refugee camp near Laos. Col. Lane of the Bangkok embassy asked him to keep an eye out for chemical evidence. "I was astounded that our intelligence boys weren't on top of this," the doctor says. So he began looking himself. Now, two years later, friends and enemies both call him Mr. Yellow Rain.

His base is a cluttered flat in Bangkok. (His wife and youngest children now live in Durham, N.H.) But on this day, in his blue pickup, he is entering Nong Chan. It is a resistance camp of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, which has a left-wing sounding name but is a rightist group sometimes called the Khmer Seri, or Free Khmers. It is one of the groups that are fighting the Vietnamese troops who invaded Cambodia in 1979, and its members now claim to be victims of yellow rain.

#### Exploding Shells

Nong Chan is only a few miles due east of Vietnamese tanks. Earlier in the day, the camp, but now they are quiet. Dr. Townsend asks Chan Bun

PALM BEACH POST (FL)  
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# CIA Chief: Washington Used Spies

By Patricia McGowan

Staff Writer

George Washington, the father of our country, also was the father of intelligence operations, and the lessons he taught during the Revolutionary War are applicable now, said William J. Casey, Central Intelligence Agency director.

Casey spoke last night before the Palm Beach Chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution at its 40th annual George Washington Birthday Banquet at the Beach Club in Palm Beach.

"Getting the information, no matter what the cost" was Washington's main thrust, and that is as important today as it was then, Casey said after his speech. "I keep telling Congress that."

The CIA director and former Securities and Exchange Commission chairman said Washington, the first general to use guerilla warfare in America, won the Revolutionary War without winning one battle.

In 1775, Washington "fought virtually barehanded without guns and ammunition and pleaded to Congress for help," Casey said. "And Congress responded as it does today. It created a committee."

But Washington used spies, such as Nathan Hale, to go behind enemy lines, and successfully planted misinformation among the British. After his initial retreat at Delaware, Washington began displaying his genius for hit-and-run warfare, Casey said.

He set up signal codes that included a woman spy who signaled a code using a petticoat and six hankies hung in different positions on her washline.

And the British general believed that a group four times larger than the 3,000 men Washington actually had would fight in Pennsylvania. "He was a born intelligence officer," who used whatever means he needed to get information and disseminate it, Casey said.

There are three phases of intelligence, Casey said. They are identification and collection of relevant information, evaluation of information and drawing conclusions based on facts, and finally, dissemination to those making decisions.

Washington performed all three as unrecognized head of the first intelligence agency. "Today, many thousands perform those, through multiple organizations," Casey said.

Washington insisted that no expense be spared for necessary information gathering, but that there be no waste, either, Casey said.

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WASHINGTON POST  
21 FEBRUARY 1983

## Nicaraguan Aid Called Not Vital To Salvadorans

By Christopher Dickey  
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAN SALVADOR—U.S. military officials in Central America, reassessing Nicaraguan support for El Salvador's rebels, say that foreign arms shipments to the insurgents are probably not as extensive or as vital to the outcome of the Salvadoran war as they once appeared to be.

Diplomats and other observers say the guerrillas have captured large amounts of weapons from the Salvadoran military. According to one U.S. diplomat, the guerrillas have probably captured enough arms from the Salvadoran armed forces during the past four months "to sustain their needs" if some supplemental ammunition is brought in from the outside.

Despite the insistence of administration officials in Washington that Nicaragua is continuing to provide a significant amount of weapons to the Salvadoran rebels, diplomats and military officials in Central America say that for more than a year there has been very little solid evidence of material support for the Salvadorans originating in Nicaragua.

"It is very possible Nicaragua is not feeding anything but peanuts into El Salvador," said one U.S. official concerned with investigating the traffic.

Another informed military officer said, "I never have thought [Nicaraguan arms supplies] are critical." He estimated that about "20 to 40 percent" of the guerrillas' arms may come from Nicaragua "at peak times."

"That doesn't make much difference," said the officer, except that "psychologically it's nice to know a sponsor's still there."

Administration officials in Washington, however, have continued to stress the importance of outside arms supplies. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400090003-5  
Secretary of State George P. Shultz

said at a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee last week that arms "from the Soviet Union to Cuba, Nicaragua and these insurgents" fuel the war in El Salvador. A State Department official said the Salvadoran rebels "couldn't sustain the type of fighting they're engaged in now, without outside arms and coordination from Nicaragua."

In December, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey sought to calm congressional concern over reports of covert U.S. efforts to overthrow the Sandinista rulers of Nicaragua. In closed-door briefings, he told congressional intelligence committees that interdicting the arms supply to the Salvadoran guerrillas was the administration's chief goal in supporting covert operations in the region.

A growing concern among some U.S. officials in Central America is that placing too much emphasis on foreign arms supplies as the source of El Salvador's current problems allows the military here to sidestep the serious social, economic and political problems in which the conflict is rooted.

Col. Mario Enrique Acevedo, commander of Morazan province where some of the guerrillas' strongest units continue to operate, recently told a group of journalists that he gets frequent local reports of clandestine arms supply flights. He said he had firm intelligence of a Soviet military officer who spoke fluent Spanish landing at a guerrilla camp and giving orders to the insurgents. The story was a typical one, but also typically, his intelligence did not include a date for this vividly described scene.

Such stories circulated by and among some Salvadoran officers are related to the feeling that some of them have that they are really fighting Washington's East-West war and that Washington should be doing more of the job itself.

Perhaps if El Salvador had oil, said Acevedo, using an argument common among his peers, there would be no problem about U.S. support. "They would send us one of those brigades that doesn't let anybody get by."

The rebels deny receiving any important amount of weapons from sympathetic governments. They say they buy their arms on the international black market, from corrupt or sympathetic members of the government's armed forces or capture them in combat. A recent guerrilla statement said they have seized more than 1,200 "weapons of war" from government forces since October.

U.S. officials say this figure is probably exaggerated but acknowledge that "large" quantities of arms have been taken by the insurgents. These include everything from pistols to assault rifles to 120-mm mortars.

# Libya: Plane is repelled

## Says U.S. jammed communications

Associated Press

Libya said yesterday that U.S. spy planes and ships had begun to jam Libyan communications and that Libyan jet fighters had intercepted and forced a foreign aircraft to withdraw over Libyan waters.

The dispatch by Libya's official JANA news agency gave no further details of the encounter and did not specify the nationality of the aircraft. However, it seemed likely that the Libyans were referring to a U.S. plane, since the dispatch dealt solely with what it called "U.S. aggression" over the Gulf of Sidra.

The dispatch threatened to turn the gulf into a bay of "blood and fire," a threat reminiscent of Thursday's warning by Libyan leader Moammar Khadafy to turn it into a "red gulf of blood" if the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz dared to enter. The Libyan dispatch also denied charges by the United States and Sudan that Libya was massing forces near Sudan's borders.

The statements said that American Airborne Warning and Control Systems "spy aircraft," known as AWACS, and U.S. Navy vessels started "jamming civil communications" in Libya on Friday.

JANA said that on Wednesday, "an aerial target made an incursion over our territorial water 80 kilometers [50 miles] from the city of Benghazi, but our air force intercepted it and forced it to retreat." Benghazi is a coastal town on the northeastern edge of the Gulf of Sidra.

Pentagon sources in Washington said Thursday that Libyan planes had flown out toward the Nimitz earlier in the week. The sources said that U.S. planes from the Nimitz were aloft at the time but that no direct confrontations occurred.

Libya claims the gulf as its own, but the United States contends that most of it is international waters. In August 1981, U.S. Navy aircraft shot down two Libyan fighter planes that fired missiles at them over the gulf.

The Nimitz has been maneuvering off the northwest Egyptian coast near the Gulf of Sidra to counter what Pentagon sources say is a Libyan military buildup apparently aimed at Sudan.

The sources also said that the United States had dispatched four AWACS reconnaissance planes to Egypt to monitor movements of troops deployed by Khadafy.

Sudan said Friday that Libyan jet fighters, bombers and troops directed against Sudan were massing at the south Libyan oasis of Kufra, 260 miles northwest of the Sudanese border and 100 miles west of Egypt.

But JANA said, "We have not threatened the Sudan's territory and have not concentrated troops on its border. We also have no fighter jets with a range capable of reaching the heart of Sudan so that we may strike at it, as alleged by the U.S. president."

Sudan's official Radio Omdurman also contended Friday that security agents obtained confessions from arrested "revolutionary" followers of Khadafy who had infiltrated Sudan. The radio report was monitored by Egypt's Middle East News Agency.

The Sudanese broadcast did not say when or where the alleged subversives were arrested or how many people were involved.

Khadafy denied reports that Libya had moved war planes and troops to air bases near its southeast border with Sudan.

"It is not true, but the news said Egypt is concentrating its air force near the borders of Sudan. . . . It may be preparation for aggression against Sudan," he said in a telephone interview with ABC News.

In an interview with CBS News, Khadafy was asked if he had intentions of "stepping up activities against the Sudan, or Chad or Tunisia."

Replied Khadafy: "Of course, we have no intention of war . . . against these neighbors. . . . And anyhow, America has no right to interfere in . . . Arab matters. . . . America must be outside of this area. It is aggression. It is international terrorism."

Pentagon officials said Friday that Assistant Defense Secretary Francis J. West would begin two days of talks with Egyptian officials today. The Pentagon said the talks were planned months before Libya reportedly grouped its aircraft along its border near Chad and Sudan.

The Libyan planes reportedly are considered a threat to Sudan, which has a mutual-defense pact with Egypt.

State Department spokesman John Hughes described as "routine" a meeting this week between Gen. Vernon Walters and Sudan President Gaafar Nimeiri. He said Walters' task was to assure Sudan of U.S. economic aid.

Meanwhile, Libya's ambassador to the United Nations, Ali A. Treiki, said in New York that his government had "concrete information" that CIA director William J. Casey went to Sudan last year to talk Nimeiri into starting a war with Libya "to allow them [the Americans] to intervene."

He said Nimeiri responded that "unless Egypt agrees, he will not agree."

*File Only*



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NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE  
20 FEBRUARY 1983

# Letter



## The C.I.A.'s Covert Operations

Philip Taubman's article "Casey and His C.I.A. on the Rebound" (Jan. 16) seems to assume that covert operations abroad by the United States Government are inherently evil. Some covert actions may be stupid, ineffective and even immoral, but those designed to protect the security of the United States and its allies can be wise, effective and morally justifiable.

C.I.A. covert activity should be assessed by the three principal criteria of the classic Christian just-war doctrine: (1) Is the end just? (2) Are the means just and proportionate? (3) If the action succeeds, will the chances for justice and freedom be enhanced?

So judged, many United States covert activities have been wise and right.

ERNEST W. LEFEVER  
Ethics and Public Policy  
Center  
Washington

What troubles me most are covert operations. Mr. Taubman writes: "The Reagan Administration considers covert operations a routine instrument for foreign policy," and notes, "Casey's enthusiasm for covert operations."

To the contrary, I feel deeply such operations are illegal under international law and United Nations agreements. The United States I owe allegiance to does not engage in such totalitarian techniques.

SAVI CLOUGH  
Newburgh, N.Y.

Philip Taubman incorrectly reported that the "C.I.A., with assistance from the Turkish Government, has provided millions of dollars' worth of arms and weapons to two Iranian paramilitary groups in eastern Turkey that oppose the Khomeini Government in Teheran."

The Turkish Government neither supports nor permits any activities on its soil by expatriate Iranian paramilitary groups. Nor would the Turkish Government tolerate the formation of such groups.

Turkish foreign policy is based on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring — indeed, of all — sovereign states.

SUKRU ELEKDAG  
Ambassador of the Turkish  
Republic  
Washington

## C.I.A. Reports to Senate Panel on Shooting of Pope

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 — The Central Intelligence Agency reported to a Senate committee today about the shooting of Pope John Paul II. There has been concern among members of Congress that the Reagan Administration has not shown adequate interest in determining whether Bulgaria and the Soviet Union played a role in the 1981 assassination attempt.

Several members of the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, including its chairman, Barry M. Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, and its vice chairman, Daniel Patrick

Moynihan, Democrat of New York, have privately expressed doubts about the C.I.A.'s efforts to investigate Bulgarian connections to Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turk convicted of shooting the Pope, according to committee sources.

After today's briefing of the committee, however, Senator Goldwater said he was satisfied the C.I.A. was pursuing the matter. "I don't think they've been dragging their tail," he said.

Mr. Moynihan also said he had been persuaded by the briefing that the C.I.A. was actively following developments and seemed well informed.

Other committee members, who asked not to be identified, said the C.I.A. had provided no new information about the shooting, leaving the impression, one senator said, "that they're following the case but not very vigorously."

The C.I.A.'s interest in the shooting of the Pope has been questioned in recent weeks. Earlier this month, after an NBC News report that the C.I.A. had tried to discourage investigations into the shooting by the Italian Government and American journalists, William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, met with William P. Clark, the White House national security adviser, to discuss the agency's efforts.

White House officials said Mr. Casey had initiated the discussion to deny the charges and reassure Mr. Clark that the C.I.A. had not impeded any investigations.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, addressing the Conservative Political Action Conference, said today that the United States had not tried to suppress investigations into the shooting. He added that the Government could not have "a fruitful relationship" with Bulgaria as long as it supported terrorism.

The Senate committee scheduled today's briefing, committee sources said, to learn what the C.I.A. knew about the case and find out what steps the Administration had taken to pursue possible Bulgarian and Soviet involvement. The C.I.A. was represented at the hearing by Robert M. Gates, the head of the agency's intelligence division, and John H. Stein, chief of clandestine operations.

The two officials, according to Mr. Moynihan, told the committee that American efforts to investigate the shooting were constrained by the Italian judicial system in which independent magistrates, acting in effect as grand juries, conduct inquiries without reporting to the Government or its intelligence agencies.

As a result, Mr. Moynihan said, the C.I.A. has been unable to collect information from investigators themselves and has had to rely on assistance from friendly intelligence services in Europe, most of which have only second-hand information about the case.

Mr. Goldwater said, "Since this matter is being handled by the Italians, there's a question about how far you should go in investigating it yourself."

Other committee members, however, criticized the C.I.A.'s efforts. One said, "The agency has not used its resources to trace Agca's background and examine his connections with Bulgaria. The C.I.A. could do that without interfering with the Italians."

After his arrest and conviction, Mr. Agca told Italian authorities that three Bulgarians living in Rome had helped him plan the assassination attempt, according to Italian officials. Last November Italian authorities arrested one of the Bulgarians identified by Mr. Agca, Sergei I. Antonov, head of the Bulgarian airline office in Rome. He remains in custody on suspicion of complicity in the shooting.

The two other Bulgarians, both employees at the Bulgarian Embassy, are in Bulgaria and, like Mr. Antonov, have denied knowing or assisting Mr. Agca.

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ON PAGE 28

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
18 February 1983

## REVIEW & OUTLOOK

### The Adelman Assassination

Nearby we reprint a 1978 article written for this newspaper by Kenneth Adelman, whose nomination for director of the arms control agency was just postponed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Any perusal of this article will lay to rest once and for all the notion that he is some kind of a novice or ignoramus on the issue. Quite to the contrary, his problem is that he knows too much to share the naive fashionable in dovish enclaves like the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. Adelman's critics on the committee are not troubled by the intellectual style of his views, they are troubled by the substance of them. That is to say, his views are not those preferred by the senators, but those preferred by the voters who elected President Reagan in 1980. In time-dishonored Washington fashion, the senators attack Mr. Adelman's views by attacking his person.

By the standards of these affairs the assault has had to make do with slim pickings. The attack on Mr. Adelman is feeble compared to, say, the field day critics of Mr. Reagan's environmental policies have had with shredded papers and whatever else it was (does anyone remember?) at the Environmental Protection Agency. The weapons used in trying to unseat William Casey at the CIA would not do, since Mr. Adelman has not been around long enough to acquire anything that would remotely pass as a conflict of interest. He lives modestly, with an attractive family. He has a likable personality, and in our view has one of the most brilliant young foreign policy minds around. So the character assassination had to fall back on the one card it had, Mr. Adelman's youth.

Since Mr. Adelman is only 36—as if there aren't plenty of even younger people running loose on Capitol Hill—it becomes plausible to attack him for inexperience. So his critics put it about that he is ignorant, by which they mean he doesn't accept the conventional wisdom. Or they attack Mr.

Adelman's refusal to answer fundamentally unanswerable questions, as if other presidential appointees, notably including Secretary of State George Shultz, haven't done the same thing.

The purpose of all this, of course, is to allow the senators to avoid coming to grips with the real issues raised by Mr. Adelman in the past and during his confirmation hearings. The senators know that if they honestly debated their views on arms control against Mr. Adelman's, the public would see through them. Whose views on the SALT process turned out to be more nearly correct in retrospect—Sens. Percy and Mathias, who believed that SALT would somehow shackle the Russians and cap the arms race, or Mr. Adelman, who said that that type of arms negotiation would probably lead only to failure, as in fact it did? It was a Democratic Senate, remember, that balked at SALT II, and President Carter who withdrew it from consideration.

What is fundamentally at issue here is whether arms control is an end in itself, or a means of enhancing U.S. security. That is, whether the U.S. can walk away if it proves impossible to negotiate a treaty that serves the latter purpose. The attitude of the committee has long been apparent. Indeed, its chairman, Sen. Charles Percy, journeyed to Moscow between President Reagan's election and his inauguration to go on Soviet television proclaiming the president's devotion to arms treaties (as well as tell the Soviets he favored turning the West Bank over to the PLO). Mr. Adelman, as his 1978 article shows, believes not only that the U.S. should not agree to treaties unless the terms enhance security, but also realistically believes the chances of reaching such an agreement have receded in the face of advancing technology and accumulating evidence of Soviet duplicity.

We hope at least the Reagan administration learns a valuable lesson here, for it hasn't done a very good

job of playing politics. Rather than facing up to its own differences with the committee and insisting on its right to staff itself with officials who share its own views, the administration has tried to smooth the nomination through with conventional horse-trading. Last month, for example, President Reagan traveled to Chicago for a testimonial for Sen. Percy, ignoring a competing dinner for Rep. Tom Corcoran, who is likely to enter the Republican primary to oppose Sen. Percy as unfaithful to the president's policies. Mr. Percy has repaid this favor by not voting directly against Mr. Adelman, only undercutting him with faint praise in public statements. If this is the kind of thanks the president gets for his help, it calls into question the whole notion of compromise rather than confrontation with the Congress.

And if the Foreign Relations Committee is serious about foreign relations, its members might do well to ponder the devastating impact their exercise in spite is likely to have on our allies. A West German political system already on the brink of a nervous breakdown won't be reassured by the spectacle of a president at odds with his own party on a matter of such vital importance. Many Germans may finally conclude that it would be better to come to terms with Moscow than put too much trust in Washington. Why should Chancellor Helmut Kohl put his neck out for modernizing NATO's defenses if a few senators can chop it off?

Yes, Mr. Adelman is a skeptic about arms agreements. Yes, he is a hawk on defense. He is right, in our view, and presumably in the view of the president and the voters who elected him. Many in the White House would like to skirt the real issues and fuzz over the hard questions. This was no service to Mr. Adelman, who we believe is well-equipped to handle the hard questions if instructed to do so rather than placate the senators.

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THE MIAMI HERALD  
16 February 1983

# CIA chief asks continued funding of 'secret war' in Central America

By ALFONSO CHARDY  
*Herald Washington Bureau*

WASHINGTON — Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey has asked Congress to continue funding into 1984 the controversial covert operation against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, according to congressional sources.

In a closed-door appearance Thursday, Casey reiterated assurances that the Reagan Administration will honor congressional guidelines and restrictions on the scope of the operations, the sources said.

They said Casey noted before the House Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on defense that the restrictions prohibit involvement in any attempt to overthrow the Managua regime or to provoke war between Nicaragua and Honduras.

Casey was reported to have assured the panel members that the U.S. role remains limited to advice and financial aid for anti-Sandinista forces mounting harassment raids into Nicaragua from Honduras.

The sources said Casey told the subcommittee that the U.S.-backed operation has three major goals:

- Retaliation for Nicaraguan help to guerrillas in El Salvador.
- Interdiction of Nicaraguan arms shipments to the guerrillas.
- Pressure on the Sandinista government to negotiate with its internal opposition, with its Central American neighbors Honduras and Costa Rica and with the United States on reducing regional tensions.

Casey went to Capitol Hill to review, explain and defend the administration's budgetary requests for the Nicaraguan operations and for other intelligence activities around the world.

Both the CIA and the subcommittee said that they could not comment on Casey's appearance.

The appearance constituted Casey's most recent effort to justify a less-than-secret war — an increasingly controversial operation which has touched off mounting dissension within the Congress.

The American role, which goes back to December 1981, is under fire from liberals who oppose it and moderates who distrust it.

On the other side, conservatives say that Congress is tying the administration's hands in Central America.

Liberals are drafting legislation designed to stop the operation.

"We are just waiting for the appropriate bill to come along to do it," said an aide to Rep. Tom Harkin (D., Iowa), author of last year's first legislative attempt to interrupt the covert action.

Harkin's effort failed, but the House approved an amendment offered by Rep. Edward Boland (D., Mass.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, with language specifically prohibiting U.S. support for the overthrow of the Sandinistas or for provoking a regional war.

The language was lifted from classified, explicit instructions that the Intelligence Committees gave the CIA when it went to Congress in 1981 with its original plan for the anti-Sandinista operations, the sources said.

"What I can say is that [the] Intelligence Committee is as concerned about the substance of the allegations concerning paramilitary activities in Nicaragua and Central America as anybody," Boland said last week.

"That concern led to the language in the classified annex [to the CIA's secret 1983 budget] ... that expresses the sense ... that no funds ... should be used to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, or to provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras," Boland said.

He said the Reagan Administration did not like the restrictions, "but had to agree to them."

The exact amount of the CIA budget request for the Nicaragua operation during fiscal 1984, which begins Oct. 1, remains a secret.

Congressional sources not connect-

ed to the intelligence committees speculated that it might be slightly higher than the 1983 funding, which also remains classified.

The sources say they believe the administration wants additional money because the operation has been essentially unsuccessful in disrupting the flow of guerrilla weapons into El Salvador.

According to the sources, the administration claims that the anti-Sandinista commandos may have crippled overland supply lines, but not the air supply routes seen as responsible for stepped up guerrilla activity in El Salvador. Nicaragua denies giving any assistance to the Salvadoran leftists.

Liberal Democrats say that until now, congressional moderates have continued to support the administration's stance on Nicaragua because they believe that the Sandinistas appear headed toward a Cuban-styled dictatorship and are indeed helping the Salvadoran guerrillas.

Liberals now believe that the only way to persuade moderates of the necessity to stop the covert operations is to offer an alternative to the attacks on the Sandinistas.

One group of liberals is working on the possibility of persuading the Sandinistas and "progressive" Nicaraguan exiles to open negotiations toward a reconciliation.

Their efforts center on Eden Pastora, the famed Commander Zero who fought with the Sandinistas to topple President Anastasio Somoza's national guard in 1979.

Disillusioned with the revolution, Pastora left Nicaragua in 1981, setting up an exile movement in Costa Rica and refusing to join the former guardsmen who make up a sizable portion of the leadership among the counterrevolutionary forces in Honduras.

**CONTINUED**

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THE MIAMI HERALD  
16 February 1983

## Operation against Nicaragua rooted in Reagan's campaign

By ALFONSO CHARDY  
*Herald Washington Bureau*

WASHINGTON — Details of the Reagan Administration's covert operations against Nicaragua remain largely secret, but enough information is available to piece together the origin and development of the plan some call "a slow-motion Bay of Pigs."

The account is based on information from a widening circle of congressional and administration sources.

It is believed that the Nicaraguan covert operation grew out of informal gatherings during the presidential campaign in 1980, when Reagan aides accused the Carter Administration of weakening U.S. intelligence capabilities in Central America.

According to campaign documents, it was decided early on that, if Ronald Reagan won, the United States would rebuild its intelligence network.

The work to organize a new monitoring ability in the area for the Central Intelligence Agency began shortly after Reagan took office.

Before covert action was planned, the State Department attempted to persuade Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government to halt its "Sovietization." It dispatched Thomas Enders, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, to Managua in the summer of 1981 to offer a nonaggression proposal.

What Enders offered was to rein in the counterrevolutionaries training in Florida and Honduras, in exchange for an end to Nicaraguan support for Salvadoran guerrillas and expulsion of 2,000 Cuban military advisers already in the country.

According to U.S. officials, the Nicaraguans rejected the offer, saying they could not accept negotiations because they were not helping the Salvadoran guerrillas.

By late 1981, high-level administration officials publicly vented their anger and impatience with Nicaragua.

"We have not given up on Nicaragua but the hours are growing short," said Alexander Haig, who as secretary of state also complained of a drift toward totalitarianism and an influx of Soviet-bloc military equipment into the Central American country.

It is understood now that on Dec. 2, 1981, Reagan formally set in motion the covert operation by signing a "presidential finding" — a statement, required by law, in which the President must certify a need for a specific covert operation.

Congressional oversight committees may not approve a covert operation "unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security."

Later, CIA Director William Casey told the committees in his first closed briefing on the subject that the presidential finding included "optimal" and "minimal" plans.

Under the optimal plan, the United States would provide funds and training for an existing anti-Sandinista force of 1,000 Nicaraguan exiles and for creation of another force of 500 commandos of various Latin American nationalities, including Cuban exiles. Both groups were to be directly supervised by Argentine military officers.

The optimal plan called for attacks on Cuban targets in Nicaragua, as well as on bridges, roads, farms and military posts.

The minimal plan — the one eventually put into effect — called for support of existing counterrevolutionary forces in Honduras in their attacks on economic targets and to stop the flow of arms to guerrillas in El Salvador.

The congressional committees approved the minimal-level plan and issued a set of guidelines for the CIA that ruled out U.S. involvement in any overthrow of the Sandinistas or in provoking a war between Nicaragua and Honduras.

NEW YORK POST  
14 February 1983

# GOP PUT HEAT ON PREZ OVER POPE SLAY PLOT

By NILES LATHEM  
PRESIDENT Reagan's decision to pursue the assassination plot against Pope John Paul II was prompted by pressure from Republicans in Congress.

White House and Senate insiders said there has been a growing feeling of discontent on the congressional intelligence committees about the performance of the CIA and its chief, William Casey.

And when Republicans on the committees read recent reports about how the CIA was trying to discourage all investigation into the link between Turkish gunman Mehmet Ali Agca and the Soviet KGB-controlled Bulgarian secret police, they made their anger known. In one of a series of leadership meetings with the President recently, the Senate and House GOP leaders, led by Majority Leader Howard Baker, bluntly told Reagan about their concerns.

Reagan, described as "shocked" at the outburst, immediately went into action and carpeted CIA chief Casey for failing to pursue the plot to kill the Pope.

★ ★ ★  
One big gripe about

CIA chief  
Casey  
rapped  
at stormy  
meeting



## INSIDE WASHINGTON

Casey is over a new method he authorized for delivering to Reagan his daily intelligence briefings.

Insiders said Reagan has been receiving daily briefings from the CIA on videotape instead of verbally or written reports.

Capitol Hill officials who have seen these tapes are appalled.

Not only are the videotapes potential security risks, say officials, but "they are made as if for a dunce," said one official.

★ ★ ★  
GOP Chairman Sen. Paul Laxalt last week came out the loser in a major confrontation with the White House staff over President Reagan's reelection campaign.

A few weeks ago, Lax-

alt, in a major power play, proposed that the Republican National Committee take control of Reagan's 1984 campaign.

But Laxalt and his proposal soon ran into a brick wall of furious White House staffers, led by White House Chief of Staff James Baker, who want an independent reelection committee formed.

"The big boys were feuding like crazy," said a prominent Republican.

Laxalt last week backed off and said in a press release he favors the formation of a separate committee. He also said he will be picking the committee's chairman.

But White House aides said California political whiz Stewart Spencer has already been picked as committee chairman, even though Reagan still hasn't decided whether he will run again.

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HUMAN EVENTS  
12 FEBRUARY 1983

## Are U.S. Officials Covering for Andropov?

Rep. Larry McDonald (D.-Ga.) has called on President Reagan, CIA Director William Casey and the Congress to investigate charges that U.S. officials have discouraged American journalists and Italian authorities from investigating Soviet involvement in the plot to murder Pope John Paul II.

The charges were made by NBC correspondent Marvin Kalb at the end of an updated repeat of the program, "The Man Who Shot the Pope: A Study in Terrorism," which aired January 25. Kalb said CIA officials were trying to cover up the matter because evidence of KGB involvement in the plot would "shatter hopes for detente, trade and arms agreements" with the Soviets.

But the evidence, developed by NBC television, *Reader's Digest*, and the Italian authorities, already implicates the Soviet Union in the attempted assassination of the pope. According to Kalb, the evidence shows that "the Russians hatched the plot against the pope as one desperate way of con-



CASEY

taining the crisis in Poland or, at a minimum, they knew about it and did nothing to stop it."

Indeed, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski have both said that the well-established Bulgarian connection of Mehmet Ali Agca, the man who shot the pope, leads directly to the Soviet Union and dictator Yuri Andropov, who was then head of the KGB. "It had to be the Soviets," Kissinger said. "The Bulgarians had no interest in coming after the pope."

In a letter to President Reagan, Rep. McDonald said, "In your most recent press conference, you were questioned about the KGB connection, but indicated that you had no more information on the attack against the pope than did newsmen in the audience. Frankly, one finds that hard to believe, given the resources of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies."

"One must ask," he went on to say, "whether a deliberate attempt is being made at the highest levels of our government to suppress the KGB's involvement in the assassination attempt to preserve nonexistent 'detente,' arms control talks and trade. I sincerely hope and pray that this is not the case."

McDonald requested that the President order the CIA and the State Department to cooperate fully with Italian authorities in their investigation of the case. "Further," McDonald said, "I respectfully ask that you immediately tell the American people on nationwide television about the evidence compiled to date, regarding the KGB connection, and what steps the Administration is taking in retaliation against the Soviets."

McDonald has also asked that CIA Director William Casey respond to the charges of a cover-up and that Rep. Edward P. Boland (D.-Mass.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, schedule public hearings on the matter.

Responding to Kalb's charges, the State Department said, in part: "It is certainly not United States policy to discourage journalists or the Italian authorities from investigating this case."

But a number of stories published after the NBC report was aired strongly suggest that U.S. officials are downplaying the evidence, for the reasons that Kalb mentioned.



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WASHINGTON POST  
12 FEBRUARY 1983

**JACK ANDERSON**

## The CIA Speaks No Evil, Unless It So Chooses

The CIA would like us to believe that, though it may see evil and hear evil, it speaks no evil. Its policy, reaffirmed by the current director, William J. Casey, is that the CIA will "neither confirm nor deny allegations appearing in the media."

This is patently untrue. The spooks will, when they choose, rush to deny any hint in the press that they have misbehaved. For example:

- In August, charges were published that the CIA had been involved in the death of Marilyn Monroe 20 years earlier. An official CIA spokesman dismissed the accusations as untrue, even absurd.

- In July, Casey went on record with a categorical denial that the CIA had meddled in the Salvadoran elections. Any CIA involvement, he said, had been purely benign and open; there had been no dirty tricks to affect the elections.

- In January, 1982, the CIA went public to deny official agency involvement in the gun-running activities of its former agent, Edwin P. Wilson.

But when it suits its purposes, the spy agency will adhere stubbornly to

its policy of "no comment." A Greek exile leader named Elias Demetracopoulos has been butting his head against the CIA's stone wall for years in his attempt to prove that he was the victim of a covert smear campaign.

Suspecting that he had been defamed by political enemies, Demetracopoulos obtained CIA documents concerning him through the Freedom of Information Act. The material from the CIA files showed that charges against him, accusing him of communist leanings, had been refuted by the CIA.

Yet in 1977, The New York Times published an extremely critical story about Demetracopoulos, citing as sources unidentified "CIA officials" and agency "files."

By a not-so-funny coincidence, the Times story appeared just as the Senate was getting ready to investigate charges, by Demetracopoulos and others, that the CIA had close ties to the military junta which had ruled Greece several years earlier. Demetracopoulos had long been a thorn in the side of the military dictatorship.

In his dogged attempt to clear his name, Demetracopoulos enlisted the help of Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) of the House Intelligence Committee. The congressman asked the CIA for information, which it agreed to provide.

But the material was useless. Aspin wrote Casey that the docu-

ments provided were "not only incomplete and unsatisfactory," but had been classified, which "made it impossible for me to follow up on it by reviewing the information with Mr. Demetracopoulos."

Aspin suggested a solution: have the CIA review its files and the Times story and write him "an unclassified letter that states flatly and clearly that, contrary to The New York Times article, the agency has concluded that there is no basis on which to impeach Mr. Demetracopoulos' honesty."

Casey replied with the old refrain about agency policy "to neither confirm nor deny allegations appearing in the media." My associate Lucette Lagnado obtained copies of the correspondence.

The CIA did, however, publicly deny that it had given any information to the Times reporter for his 1977 article.

Footnote: Demetracopoulos has taken his case to court. In an unusual move, Aspin has asked the presiding judge to declassify the documents the CIA gave him on the Demetracopoulos affair.

Salute to a Pro: Leo Durocher to the contrary, nice guys don't always finish last, even in Washington. President Reagan certified this when he appointed Jack A. Gertz, for 22 years the Bell System's man in Washington, to the National Commission for Employment Policy.



- WASHINGTON

Peat

The chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee has begun looking into the approval of up to \$465 million in federal subsidies for construction and operation of a peat-to-methanol conversion plant in North Carolina.

The subsidies were approved by the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corp.

The News and Observer of Raleigh reported Saturday that Rep. John D. Dingell, D-Mich., has written a letter to agency officials asking them to provide documents relating to the project's potential production, design characteristics, environmental effects and other information.

Corporation president Edward E. Noble agreed to provide the material to the committee's subcommittee on oversight and investigations, which also is chaired by Dingell.

The corporation approved the federal subsidies in December for the experimental peat-methanol plant in Washington County in northeastern North Carolina.

The project is being developed by Peat Methanol Associates, a firm whose partners include prominent Republicans such as CIA director William Casey.

Dingell apparently became interested in the project because of the political influence of its financial supporters and because an agency staff report questioned whether the project would be successful.

Dingell is expected to instruct the subcommittee to hold a public hearing on the project.

*File Only*

# 'Buy high, sell low' mentality is ripped at mining parley

By MICHAEL ROUNDS  
News Energy Writer

While the mood at the 86th National Western Mining Conference and Exhibition wasn't exactly upbeat Thursday, many of the executives attending the three-day meeting professed to see some signs of recovery for their recession devastated industry.

About 2,000 people are attending the meeting, presented by the Colorado Mining Association, at the Fairmont and Brown Palace hotels.

Colorado Mining executives said the number attending the meeting is down about 700 from last year's meeting, primarily because of the disastrous effects of the worldwide recession on the mining industry.

MORE THAN 70 exhibitors were manning booths in hopes of garnering business for everything from mining directories to geological services to diesel engines and mining equipment Thursday. Inquiries at the booths appeared to be less than the brisk pace of previous years, however.

"We've had as many people dropping off resumes looking for work as anything else," lamented one exhibitor at the Fairmont.

Theme for the meeting is "Mining: Foundation for Recovery," reflecting the industry's hope to lead national economic recovery.

"I hope we are on the road to recovery in the mining industry," retired Navy Adm. William C. Mott told several hundred people at the keynote session Thursday in the ballroom of the Brown Palace. "We are tied with an umbilical cord to the national economy."

Mott, a Navy veteran of World War II and the furious 1945 Kamikaze air battles with Japanese suicide planes off Okinawa in the Pacific Ocean, serves as vice president of the non-profit National Strategy Information Center in Washington.

"We haven't had a national minerals policy until the Reagan administration," Mott declared in a talk sprinkled with references to Washington as "Disneyland East."

"We are dangerously dependent on foreign supplies of strategic minerals," Mott said, declaring that Soviet Union involvement in South Africa is aimed at "getting control of minerals to use for economic leverage" on the United States and other free world nations.

AT THE same time, Mott declared, American "mines are being closed down that will require years to reopen."

National policy regarding the national stockpile has thus far been to "buy high and sell low," usually in a futile attempt to help balance the swollen, deficit ridden federal budget, Mott said. In one instance, the government sold cobalt from the stockpile for \$2 a pound, then bought \$78 million in cobalt from Zaire for \$15 a pound, ignoring cobalt reserves in Idaho, Missouri and California which aren't being tapped.

"Faceless bureaucrats are making these decisions. We favor independent management of the strategic stockpile to take it out of politics and get away from 'buy high, sell low,'" he said.

Mott quoted Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey who said a cut off of strategic minerals would create "massive shocks to our economic systems and lifestyles. The implications for defense are just as glum; there would be no supersonic jets and no submarines."

Sen. William Armstrong, R-Colo., sought the support of mining executives attending opening sessions of the conference in reducing federal spending.

"One third of the mines in the country have been shut down since 1979," Armstrong said. Mining revenues have dropped drastically in the last several years and the mining industry's rate of return of 6.5 percent in 1980 dropped to minus 3 percent in 1982, he said.

2.

"The recovery is coming but just surviving isn't enough," Armstrong contended. "We have to learn from the horrible experience your industry has been through. When Congress goes back to work next week there will be a pitched battle over restraining government spending and retain tax cuts."

"There are signs of a recovery," he said, saying that overregulation of the mining industry and other segments of the economy have helped lead to the nation's fiscal woes.

# CIA harms Pope probe — senator

From Chicago Tribune wires

NEW YORK—Sen. Alfonse D'Amato [R., N.Y.] claims the Central Intelligence Agency is obstructing Italy's investigation of the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II.

D'Amato told a press conference Wednesday after his arrival from Rome that the CIA conduct was "very suspicious" and that it was obvious "the CIA would have liked the investigation dropped."

Asked if he was suggesting that CIA Director William Casey may be involved in a cover-up, D'Amato said, "Yes."

D'Amato accused the CIA of attempting to "cast doubt on the competence and integrity of Italian authorities."

D'Amato was in Rome for five days conducting what he called a one-man investigation into the 1981 wounding of the Pope. Officials in the U.S. Embassy there regarded his visit as a publicity stunt to influence Polish and Italian Catholic voters back home.

D'AMATO HAS BEEN saying that the Bulgarian government and the Soviet KGB secret police were behind the shooting by Mehmet Ali Agca.

D'Amato accused CIA officials of spreading "disinformation" to lend credence to theories that Agca was a madman acting on his own.

He said there were other factors he could not disclose, but that he would inform National Security Adviser William Clark.

D'Amato also said he was "shocked to learn from a high CIA official in Rome that not one agent has been assigned exclusively to the case."

An Italian spokesman in Washington said no assistance was requested from the CIA. "Why should we have assistance in this matter?" said Paolo Trabalza, first secretary of the Italian Embassy.

THE REAGAN administration has taken the public position that the



Sen. Alfonse D'Amato

shooting is "an internal matter" for the Italians to handle.

"That's nonsense," D'Amato said. "We are talking about implications that go far beyond an internal affair, to the Bulgarians and the Soviets."

Last week, CIA officials in Washington told reporters that the Italian investigation so far had turned up no conclusive proof that the Soviet Union was behind the shooting. They said, though, that circumstantial evidence linked Agca to the Bulgarian secret police.

If a Soviet connection were proved, it would chill East-West relations and negotiations over arms control, trade and other matters.

D'Amato cited three examples of what he called CIA obstruction of the investigation.

HE SAID THAT unnamed CIA sources spread stories lending credence to the theory that Agca was insane and that the CIA suggested that Italian authorities had tainted Agca's testimony by improperly giving him information.

He also accused the CIA of stopping a key Senate Intelligence Committee aide from going with him to Rome by spreading information about the aide's interests in terrorist activities. He refused to identify the aide.

"There is no positive information coming forth from the CIA, only disinformation intended to cast doubt," D'Amato said.

NEW YORK POST  
11 February 1983

# The KGB and the Pope: let the CIA speak up

New York Sen. Al D'Amato's accusation that CIA Director William Casey is involved in a cover-up of the Soviet-Bulgarian connection in the attempted assassination of the Pope is a most serious charge.

It follows the disclosure by The Post on Wednesday that President Reagan summoned Casey to the White House and personally condemned the CIA's failure to investigate Moscow's involvement in the assassination plot.

The State Dept. has been trying to play down the growing evidence pointing to the KGB's involvement in the plot so as not to jeopardize a possible summit meeting with Soviet leader Yuri Andropov.

Andropov was head of the KGB at the time of the assassination attempt.

D'Amato's accusations demand a prompt and public response by Director Casey.

● Is it true that the CIA brought pressure to prevent a Senate Intelligence Committee staffer from accompanying D'Amato on his trip to Rome to check with Italian authorities on the assassination attempt?

● Why did U.S. Ambassador Max

Raab send D'Amato a cable from Rome saying "Don't come." Was Raab advised to do this by the CIA or by the State Dept.?

● How does Raab justify the tactics used by U.S. Embassy officials in Rome to prevent D'Amato from investigating the affair?

The significant aspect of D'Amato's charges is that he is close to both Casey and Raab. Presumably he has strong grounds for making such serious charges.

Both the State Dept. and the CIA have a dubious record in cover-ups. The State Dept., it is now being revealed, played a spooky game in helping to protect Nazi Gestapo chieftain Klaus Barbie, who has just been extradited from Bolivia to France for trial as a war criminal; the CIA for four years blocked the U.S. investigation of the Soviet use of lethal "yellow rain" poison gas in Afghanistan, Laos and Cambodia.

D'Amato's accusation demands a full investigation — not by the Senate Intelligence Committee, which meets behind closed doors, but by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

11 FEBRUARY 1983

## WASHINGTON TALK

### *New Hampshire's Man*

**M**ax Hugel, who had a short and stormy career in the Central Intelligence Agency early in the Reagan Administration, is back in Washington as the official representative of the state of New Hampshire.

Mr. Hugel, who resigned as C.I.A. chief of clandestine operations in 1981 amid reports he had been involved in fraudulent securities transactions, has sent out invitations for a reception here Feb. 25 in honor of New Hampshire's new Republican Governor, John H. Sununu, and the opening of his offices. The invitation says Mr. Hugel will represent "his associated companies" as well as the state in Washington.

Before the 1980 Presidential campaign, Mr. Hugel was executive vice president of an electronics company in Hudson, N.H. He volunteered for the Reagan primary campaign there and went on to help organize voter groups in the national headquarters, run by William J. Casey. After the election, Mr. Casey was named Director of Central Intelligence, and brought Mr. Hugel in as a special assistant, then deputy director for administration and finally as director of clandestine operations.

When Mr. Casey accepted Mr. Hugel's resignation in July 1981, Mr. Hugel called the reports of improper stock market activity "unfounded, unproven and untrue," but admitted that they constituted "a burden" on the Administration.

Mr. Hugel did not return a call to his office here in search of more information on his new position. A secretary said he was leaving town and would not return until next week.

Phil Gailey

Warren Weaver Jr.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK POST  
10 FEBRUARY 1983

STAT

## Sen D'Amato's bombshell charge:

# CIA BOSS SABOTAGES POPE PROBE

By NILES LATHEM  
*Bureau Chief*

WASHINGTON —  
New York Sen. Alfonse D'Amato accused CIA Director William Casey yesterday of covering up the Soviet-Bulgarian connection of the plot to kill the Pope.

In a telephone interview with The Post upon his return from Rome, D'Amato revealed that Italian authorities told him they were "shocked" by the way the CIA was trying to "obstruct and deflect" the investigation of the Bulgarian connection to the assassination attempt.

"I was told that the CIA is using disinformation and all sorts of other tactics to divert, dissuade

and actually block this investigation," he said.

Asked if he was suggesting that Casey himself is involved in a coverup, D'Amato said "Yes."

D'Amato also said U.S. Embassy officials in Rome did everything

they could to prevent him from investigating, the matter himself.

He said U.S. Ambassador Max Raab sent him a telegram before he left saying "Don't Come."

D'Amato also said a staffer on the Senate Intel-

ligence Committee was prevented from going with him on the trip because of CIA pressure.

"And while I was there I had to scratch, stumble and fight for everything."

He said he would complain personally to

President Reagan and National Security Adviser William Clark about his findings.

"It's very suspicious. It smells of a coverup."

D'Amato's statement comes one day after it was revealed that President Reagan himself called Casey on the carpet for the CIA's mishandling of the case.

But other sources said the CIA made the decision to stymie the probe in Casey's absence.

The CIA's General Counsel Stanley Sporkin reportedly told European field agents to drop the matter after he checked with officials at the State Dept.

Many officials at the State Dept. are anticipating a summit meeting between Reagan and Soviet strongman Yuri Andropov — the ex-KGB

chief suspected of being the mastermind of the plot — and do not want to antagonize him with a strong pursuit of the assassination attempt.


But D'Amato said he was told by Italian officials there is strong evidence of direct links between the Soviet-controlled Bulgarian Secret Service and the plot to kill the Pope, despite CIA claims that Turkish gunman Mehmet Ali Agca was insane or lied to cooperate with Italian police.

He revealed there is other evidence that the Bulgarians are using Italian agents in a plot to discredit Lech Walesa, leader of the banned Solidarity Union in Poland, and that the Bulgarians are

huge gun-running and heroin-smuggling operation involving the Sicilian Mafia and Turkish businessmen



SEN. D'AMATO  
*Fight for info.*





SCRIPPS-HOWARD NEWSPAPERS

WASHINGTON BUREAU  
1110 VERMONT AVENUE, N.W., SUITE 61  
WASHINGTON, DC 20005  
(202) 833-9520

10 Feb 83

Dear Dale,

Here's a clip of the piece I did as it appeared in the Pittsburgh Press, and as it went out--a fuller version.

Many thanks for your help, and I hope I neither misinformed the readers nor maligned the agency too badly.

Cordially,

Walt Friedenbergs

ply focused on

ite House

Langley, Va.,  
CIA's

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et secret police

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Western Europe

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or terrorist

spokesmen say.<  
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vert operations

dampened initiative - "You had to take along a lawyer," complains an old hand -- and issued instead a short memo that boils down to "use common sense."<

In fact, Casey has not begun many new covert action operations, but has put more resources, manpower and enthusiasm into such "cloak and dagger" projects. The list of projects includes Costa Rica and elsewhere in Central America to raise the cost of Marxist support for insurgencies, arms aid to Afghan freedom fighters, clandestine activities to help...



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CN PAGE 7

NEW YORK POST  
9 February 1983

# RON BLOWS STACK AT CIA OVER POPE PROBE FOULUP

**Tells agency boss  
to 'get to bottom'  
of Red link to plot**

By NILES LATHEM, Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — President Reagan, furious at the recent performance of the CIA, has called Director William Casey on the carpet over the agency's failure to investigate Soviet and Bulgarian links to the plot to assassinate the Pope. The Post has learned.

Top White House aides said last night that Reagan was "enraged" on reading recent reports that CIA stations in Europe are not pursuing the unfolding drama — and are actually trying to discourage the probe.

Last week Reagan ordered Casey to get down to business and get to the bottom of the mystery.

In handing down the order, Reagan sided with hardliners on the National Security Council who believe the CIA is being run by "a bunch of liberals."

The same people also tried to discourage a U.S. probe into the Soviet use of chemical weapons in Asia, White House aides said.

Reagan also went against the advice of advisers who believe the U.S. should stay out of the probe so as not to jeopardize plans for a summit meeting with Soviet strongman Yuri Andropov

White House aides said last night the failure of the CIA to pursue the case is just one example of a much larger problem with the secret government operation.

Hardliners on the National Security Council believe the CIA is being run by a "bunch of bureaucratic liberals," and that the conservative Casey can't control them.

These officials noted that CIA analysts, whom they would not name, have discouraged numerous probes of Soviet behavior for fear it would antagonize the Kremlin.

For example, it is recalled that the CIA for


four years blocked the U.S. investigation of the Soviet use of lethal "Yellow Rain" chemicals — even though there is now irrefutable evidence collected by the State Dept. proving that the chemical weapon was used in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea.

"The same people who are responsible for the Yellow Rain Gap are responsible for the Pope Gap," said a knowledgeable source.

Other officials close to the intelligence community said the reasons for the failure of the CIA to get out front on these issues may not be ideological — but a confession of incompetence.

These officials believe there has been a lack of adequate field work by the CIA, and that analysts in Washington are trying to cover for the field agents by pouring cold water on the information in front of White House officials.

Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, who is in Europe investigating the plot to kill the Pope also has criticized the CIA, calling its agents "shockingly inept."



FLASHBACK: How The Post broke the story in Sept., 1981

*File Only*

9 February 1983

By PAUL MINOUSY

NEW YORK, Feb 9, REUTER -- New York Senator ALFONSO D'AMATO TODAY ACCUSED THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) OF DELIBERATELY OBSTRUCTING THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF POPE JOHN PAUL II.

D'AMATO TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE HERE AFTER HIS ARRIVAL FROM ROME THAT THE CIA CONDUCT WAS "VERY SUSPICIOUS" AND THAT IT WAS OBVIOUS "THE CIA WOULD HAVE LIKED THE INVESTIGATION DROPPED."

ASKED IF HE WAS SUGGESTING THAT CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM CASEY MAY BE INVOLVED IN A COVER-UP, HE SAID "YES."

D'AMATO ACCUSED THE CIA OF ATTEMPTING TO "CAST DOUBT ON THE COMPETENCE AND INTEGRITY OF ITALIAN AUTHORITIES."

THE NEW YORK REPUBLICAN ALSO SAID THAT STRONG FACTS LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET KGB WERE INVOLVED IN THE MAY 1981 PAPAL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.

HE SAID HE WAS "SHOCKED TO LEARN FROM A HIGH CIA OFFICIAL IN ROME THAT NOT ONE AGENT HAS BEEN ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE CASE."

HE ACCUSED CIA OFFICIALS OF SPREADING "DISINFORMATION" TO LEAD CREDENCE TO THEORIES THAT WOULD BE ASSASSIN MURKAT ALI BOGA WAS A MADMAN.

HE TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE CIA "CARRIED OUT A WAR OF SILENCE, OBSTRUCTION AND DISINFORMATION" IN THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION.

D'AMATO, A CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICAN WHO HAS GENERALLY BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, BLASTED IT FOR NOT HAVING THE CIA ACTIVELY COOPERATE WITH ITALIAN AUTHORITIES AND FOR TREATING THE INVESTIGATION INTO WHY THE POPE WAS SHOT AS "AN INTERNAL MATTER" FOR THE ITALIANS TO HANDLE.

"THAT'S NONSENSE. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT IMPLICATIONS THAT GO FAR BEYOND AN INTERNAL AFFAIR, TO THE BULGARIANS AND THE SOVIETS," HE SAID.

HE ADDED: "THAT IS THE MOST SHODDY, ILLOGICAL EXPLANATION I HAVE HEARD."

EARLIER TODAY, WHITE HOUSE DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY ROBERT ALLIN TOLD REPORTERS: "THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FEELS VERY STRONGLY THAT THIS IS AN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION BEING CARRIED ON WITH CONSIDERABLE CARE AND WE HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE IN WHAT IT IS DOING."

CONTINUED

# RADIO TV REPORTS, INC

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM NBC Nightly News

STATION WRC-TV  
NBC Network

DATE February 6, 1983 6:30 P.M.

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Probe of Assassination Attempt

CHRIS WALLACE: George Bush is in Italy tonight, continuing his trip through Western Europe to sell the Reagan nuclear arms policy. But on this stop, NBC News has learned that the Vice President has a secret mission, to tell Italian leaders to continue their probe into the shooting of Pope John Paul, even if that investigation ends up involving the Soviet Union.

Diplomatic correspondent Marvin Kalb reports.

MARVIN KALB: It is not on the Vice President's public agenda, but we've learned he's been instructed by the White House to assure anxious Italian leaders that President Reagan fully supports their controversial investigation into the papal plot, even if the trail leads to Soviet leader Yuri Andropov.

During his visit to the U.S. Embassy in Rome today, Bush had a related chore, to stop all leaks, principally from CIA officials, that tended to dishearten the Italians and discourage the investigation. Similar leaks from CIA officials in Washington flooded the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal this past week, stating, among other things, that Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turk who tried to kill the Pope, was crazy; and therefore neither the Bulgarians nor the Russians would have used him. But on this point, it seems that either the CIA is badly informed or chooses, for whatever reason, to badly inform the public, because the evidence suggests Agca was anything but crazy.

Severino Santiapichi, the Roman magistrate who sat in on the early interrogations:

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL  
6 February 1983

REAGAN REASSURES ITALIANS ON PAPAL PLOT PROBE  
WASHINGTON

The White House told Vice President George Bush to reassure anxious Italian leaders that President Reagan supports their probe into the alleged plot to kill the Pope, even if the trail leads to Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, NBC News reported Sunday.

NBC, on its evening news, said Bush, during his visit to the American embassy in Rome Sunday, also was charged with stopping "all leaks, principally from CIA officials, that tended to dishearten the Italians and discourage the investigation."

Following the report, a White House spokesman said Reagan last month publicly stated the U.S. position on the probe, expressing "full confidence that the investigation is in capable hands, that the Italians are carrying out a rigorous investigation."

"The various reports in this country that the U.S. is encouraging or discouraging the investigation just are not true," spokesman Mort Allin said. "We think the Italians should proceed without people prejudging them. The fact is they are carrying it out and you accept the results of the investigation."

Allin said the topic of the probe "certainly is expected to come up during Vice President Bush's meetings with Italian leaders, but he simply is stating U.S. policy in this matter."

A U.S. embassy spokesman in Rome said most of Bush's time Sunday was "private time" with a few meetings with Italian leaders at the embassy. He said no details of the meetings would be disclosed.

Allin said the White House would have no comment on stories regarding the leaks.

"There have been stories the last couple of weeks that U.S. government officials have been putting a little bit of cold water on the whole story," he said. "We're just not taking a position. The Italians will make the decision on the outcome of the whole investigation."

NBC said leaks from CIA officials in Washington appeared in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Wall Street Journal this past week, stating that Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turk who tried to kill the Pope, was "crazy," and therefore neither the Bulgarians nor the Russians would have used him.

"But on this point, either the CIA is badly informed or chooses for whatever reason to badly inform the public," NBC correspondent Marvin Kalb said, "because the evidence suggests Agca was anything but crazy."

NBC quoted Roman magistrate Severino Santiapichi, who said in on the early interrogations, as saying "all the interrogations of Agca revealed a lucidity."

**CONTINUED**

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THE WASHINGTON TIMES  
2 February 1983

# COMMENTARY

STAT

ARNOLD BEICHMAN

## The CIA, Andropov and possible papicide

What is going on with the White House, the CIA, the Soviet KGB, Italy, Bulgaria, Turkey — and Yuri Andropov, as the suspect in the Case of the Pope's Assassin?

Something is going on and my "scenario" may explain the strange lassitude exhibited by the CIA and CIA Director William Casey towards what is potentially one of the greatest scandals in modern history — the greatest since the June 1914 events at Sarajevo. The reputed lack of interest by the CIA in the Italian judicial investigation of the attempt on the pope's life almost two years ago has become a subject of private discussion by former CIA executives who still maintain connections with the agency.

If it is true the CIA is maintaining a lofty attitude towards the Italian probe, such inaction would come only on direct orders from the White House. Such orders may well have been issued by President Reagan for all kinds of reasons. One of them: to get Soviet agreement on some acceptable form of arms control or on a pullout of Cuban troops from Angola or on some other contentious question.

There is a clue which might confirm this scenario:

On Dec. 20, 1982, *The Christian Science Monitor* published a tape-recorded interview with Vice President George Bush. In the question and answer session, Bush, former head of the CIA, made several statements about the Soviet secret police, the KGB — until recently headed by Yuri Andropov — which implied that the KGB was much maligned. The crucial paragraph in the interview quoted Bush as follows:

"My view of Andropov is that some people make this KGB thing sound horrendous. Maybe I speak defensively as a former head of the CIA. But leave out the operational side of KGB — the naughty things they allegedly do..."

*The Washington Times* of Dec. 27 published my critical commentary on this interview. Now one must assume that Bush, like any ambitious vice president, wouldn't have made such an outrageously idiotic statement about the KGB without some encouragement or even an order from the president himself or from a trusted Reagan aide. Bush and the president had several meetings following the vice president's meeting with Andropov, Brezhnev's successor as party chieftain.

If this theory is correct, then what Bush was doing was exonerating in advance Yuri Andropov of any involvement with the assassination plot against the pope. Bush's kind words about the KGB are, of course, belied by everything we know about the KGB and a lot of that knowledge is to be found in the recently published report, "Soviet Active Measures," issued by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

The House report details some KGB activities against the enemy, the United States — activities which range from the disgusting to the unspeakable. Obviously, the CIA, which uncovered some of these "active measures," the White House and Bush himself know what the KGB is capable of. Yet, strangely, Bush deprecates the exaggeration about the KGB's "naughty things."

Were the *attentat* successfully tied to Andropov and the KGB, which, judging by the *Readers Digest* and NBC exposes, seems to be probable, Andropov's position as the new Politburo boss and as the U.S.S.R.'s spokesman would be so seriously compromised as to make possible his ouster by his own and, perhaps, unhappy colleagues in the Politburo. There is precedent for such an ouster — Nikita S. Khrushchev was "voted" out of office in October 1964.

From a U.S. standpoint, Andropov is in a tough spot. The Italian judicial investigation proceeds with all deliberate speed, although the news from Rome has been meager recently. Even the Vatican seems to be avoiding comment on the investigation, a strange phenomenon, since after all a pope, the vicar of Christ, was shot and almost killed.

Further, a source who follows the Catholic press in America told me that leading Catholic journals have kept their reporting of the case to a bare minimum, if reporting at all. Is the pope also signaling that he is ready to forgive and forget if Andropov will soften the Soviet attitude toward Poland and elsewhere towards Catholics in the Soviet empire? Is there some kind of "blackmail" operation going on because, for a change, the West holds some trumps and has displayed those trumps by discouraging rather than encouraging speculation about Andropov and by leashing the CIA while awaiting some more by Andropov?

*The New York Times* seems to be the only daily newspaper working on the mystery of the pope's assassin. A.M. Rosenthal, its executive editor, has assigned at least five of his top correspondents to keep working on the case.

There is something going on and there is no doubt that Vice President Bush's tour of Western Europe has more to do with Yuri Andropov than with any of the cover stories put out for his *tour d'horizon*.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES  
1 FEBRUARY 1983

# \$800,000 Asked for New FBI Hostage Rescue Squad

By RONALD J. OSTROW, *Times Staff Writer*

WASHINGTON—President Reagan's fiscal 1984 budget for the Justice Department calls for spending \$800,000 for a special FBI hostage rescue squad that already is in training at the FBI's Quantico, Va., national academy and at an undisclosed site with the military.

The surprise creation of the anti-terrorist unit helped lift the Justice Department's budget to \$3.4 billion, an unprecedented 15% over its budget for the current fiscal year.

The unit, which will complete its training in several months, will be based at the FBI's Washington field office and will be available for



assignments throughout the country. As one Justice Department official explained, "It will be an alternative to calling in the military" when a major hostage situation occurs.

Presently, the FBI's 59 field offices have SWAT teams made up of marksmen who serve on the team in addition to their regular duties. Agents will serve full-time on the anti-terrorist unit, with hostage rescue their "No. 1 priority," the department official said.

Lee Colwell, executive assistant director of the FBI, said the team "is designed for special situations, such

as the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles" and the incident here last December in which an anti-nuclear demonstrator threatened to blow up the Washington Monument and finally died in a hail of police bullets.

The unit "will be above the usual competence of a SWAT team and short of that which would require

military intervention," Colwell told a budget briefing at the Justice Department. "For several years, we have been concerned that we would not be able to meet an organized threat that falls within the civilian jurisdiction area," he said.

The \$3.4-billion budget for the Justice Department marked the first time it has topped \$3 billion and also the first time that the proposed spending program for FBI, which is included in the department's budget, exceeded \$1 billion.

A major part of the \$447-million increase in the department's spending would be \$185 million for the Administration's attempt to curb organized crime and its narcotics trafficking.

Twelve regional task forces have been established, including operations in Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco, to carry out the attack on such criminal activities. The fiscal 1984 budget would provide for 1,260 agents—760 from the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration and 500 from the Treasury Department—and 340 prosecutors to staff the task forces.

Atty. Gen. William French Smith,

noting that the Administration added \$150 million to his department's funds last Nov. 30, said the 1984 budget request "should leave no doubt about this Administration's resolve to meet its leadership responsibility in addressing the nation's crime problem."

An undisclosed part of the added spending would go to beef up the FBI's foreign counterintelligence program. These "significant enhancements in both staff and funding," as the Justice Department described the increase, are intended to carry out recommendations made by William J. Casey, director of central intelligence, to improve the FBI's capability for countering foreign spies operating within the United States.

The increase is a major part of \$40,142,000 that the FBI would draw for its highest priority field programs, but the specific amount for foreign counterintelligence was kept secret.

Colwell said the ratio of Soviet-bloc intelligence agents operating in the United States to FBI counterintelligence agents currently approximates 5 to 1, believed to put the FBI in its most outnumbered position in several years.

Steps to relieve the overcrowded federal prison system, now operating 21.5% above capacity with 29,097 inmates, include building a 500-bed metropolitan correctional center in Los Angeles, building and planning two additional 500-bed facilities at sites in the Northeast yet to be designated and adding 340 bed spaces at existing facilities. The price tag for the prison expansion is \$96 million.

Officials regard \$175 million earmarked for "high technology" operations by the FBI and other department units as one of the most significant elements in the budget request.

"The days of putting an FBI agent on the street with a .38 (caliber pistol) and a shield are over," one official said. The equipment includes upgrading FBI computer capability and that of the Immigration and Naturalization Service as well as giving FBI agents radio communications that cannot be monitored with a simple scanner.