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Analysis Report

The Soviet Succession

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The Soviet Succession

Foreword

This is the second of two reports examining aspects of the transfer of the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party to Mikhail Gorbachev following CPSU General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko's death on 10 March. *Analysis Report* FB 85-10009 of 11 March 1985, "Gorbachev: A Political Profile," reviewed the new general secretary's public statements and activities over the past 15 years to sketch a profile of his political views. This report focuses on the initial days of the new regime.

Major portions of the foreign policy section of this report were compiled from articles previously published in the FBIS *Trends* of 13, 20, and 27 March 1985. The section on the new regime's treatment of China and Beijing's response appeared under separate cover as *Analysis Report* FB 85-10013 of 26 March 1985, "Sino-Soviet Relations: Ground Prepared for Fundamental Change."

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The Soviet Succession

Highlights

By all appearances, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected general secretary of the CPSU without any serious opposition at a CPSU plenum on 11 March. His elevation closed the books on a long period of uncertainty during which the health of his predecessors and the succession question seemed to dominate Soviet domestic politics. The succession differed from the previous ones in significant respects—the speed with which it took place, the unusual nature of the speech by Foreign Minister Gromyko nominating Gorbachev, and the low profile of the military in the proceedings.

The elevation of the youngest member of the Politburo to the post of general secretary is a major watershed in the transfer of power from the generation of Soviet leaders that rose in the party leadership under Stalin. Over the past three years most of the inner core of the leadership that ruled the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev regime has passed from the scene. In overseeing the completion of this transition, Gorbachev appears to be in a favorable position to build a solid base of power and move on to address domestic problems that his predecessors were unable to tackle.

Despite the obligatory reaffirmation of continuity in foreign policy, Gorbachev gave early hints that he was prepared to try to accelerate changes begun under Chernenko and to take new initiatives in some areas that have long been neglected. At the same time, Gorbachev exhibited an energetic leadership style by meeting with an unprecedented number of foreign dignitaries at the Chernenko funeral.

Gorbachev's most dramatic move was his meeting with the Chinese representative—the first such meeting in more than 20 years. The new regime also indicated that it was prepared to look for ways to improve relations with the West and with former adversaries in the communist movement. Gorbachev's rhetorical restraint and the Soviet media's nonpolemical coverage of his meeting with Vice President Bush suggested that Moscow will continue the effort begun under Chernenko to ease tensions with the United States.

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Emergence of Gorbachev

Mikhail Gorbachev rose to the post of general secretary in part by being at the right place at the right time, and he does not appear to have an independent base of political power. After serving as a full Politburo member for only two years and working only in agriculture, he emerged as a contender for the leadership of the party during the regime of Yuriy Andropov, who apparently turned to Gorbachev as one of the few young members of the Politburo and Secretariat who could help him gain control over the party apparatus. The public record of Gorbachev's advancement during this period suggests that Andropov relied increasingly upon the younger man as his own health deteriorated:

- In April 1983 Gorbachev's name began to appear with those of other senior Politburo members on obituaries for a wide range of officials, and he delivered the annual Lenin Day speech—an honor given to Andropov in 1982 and Chernenko in 1981.
- By June, when he helped install a new party leader in Leningrad and a new RSFSR premier, it was evident that he had assumed responsibility for the key area of personnel matters.
- In August 1983, shortly before Andropov was removed from public life by his illness, the general secretary symbolically gave Gorbachev special attention among the leaders of the new generation. Andropov and Gorbachev were the only party leaders that addressed a meeting of older cadres at which Andropov made a special plea for orderly transfer of power and authority to younger leaders.

When Andropov died in February 1984, the party leadership again put off handing over power to a member of the younger generation and turned instead to 72-year-old Konstantin Chernenko, the senior-ranking member of the Secretariat. The transfer of power nevertheless involved another big boost for Gorbachev, who assumed most of the responsibilities Chernenko had been exercising as second secretary under Andropov without giving up any of his previous duties:

- He took over supervision of ideological matters from Chernenko, for example, succeeding him as chairman of the Politburo commission on education reform.

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- He began playing a lead role in economic planning, addressing meetings on long-term planning in mid-1984.
- He succeeded Chernenko as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union and made a widely publicized trip to Britain in December 1984.



General Secretary Gorbachev speaking at Chernenko funeral. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985)

By contrast, Grigoriy Romanov, the only other full Politburo member also in the Secretariat, and Gorbachev's chief rival in the succession, apparently assumed no new responsibilities outside his sphere of security matters and heavy industry. Moreover, despite the vacancies in the Secretariat, no new secretaries were named, leaving Gorbachev a free hand.

Under Chernenko there were persisting signs that some members of the leadership were trying to slow Gorbachev's rise. There were inconsistencies in his ranking in the leadership throughout the period, and although he was ranked third—after Chernenko and Tikhonov—on many important occasions, he sometimes appeared below Kremlin elders Gromyko, Ustinov, and Grishin. During October and November signs of resistance to Gorbachev increased, and for a brief period it appeared that Romanov was being advanced at Gorbachev's expense. At an 18 October award ceremony attended by the Politburo, Gorbachev appeared in an unusually low ranking position, while Romanov stood in Gorbachev's usual spot. During the same period Romanov played a much more active public role, while Gorbachev was conspicuously absent from several key leadership meetings.

Gorbachev resumed a high profile in early December, and by the time of Chernenko's death on 10 March he was the best placed to succeed him. He was the second-ranking party secretary and was already exercising oversight responsibility for most key areas of party work. Foreign Minister Gromyko revealed in his nominating speech that Gorbachev had "led" the Secretariat and chaired Politburo sessions in Chernenko's absence.

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The option of again turning to a member of the older generation had largely disappeared: Defense Minister Ustinov died in December; Premier Tikhonov is almost 80; 75-year-old Foreign Minister Gromyko has had no experience in domestic affairs; 70-year-old Moscow party leader Grishin, a more likely candidate, has never worked in the central party apparatus. Moreover, the deaths of Ustinov and Chernenko had significantly reduced the voting power of the older generation in the Politburo.

Transfer of Power

Departures from precedent during the leadership transition reveal something of the politics and character of the new regime. The transition took place much faster than after the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov, projecting an image of efficiency and suggesting that there was no serious opposition to Gorbachev's selection. Gromyko's unusual nominating speech was marked by a personal tone totally unlike the set-piece nominating addresses delivered at the two earlier plenums. The meager role of the military in the transition was also a break with the past.

Timing of Succession: Leadership Moves With Unusual Speed

The current transfer of power was faster than previous transitions in a number of respects.¹ The announcement that Gorbachev would head Chernenko's funeral commission came earlier than the comparable announcements after the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov. In all three cases the person who would be named general secretary headed the commission, suggesting that the Politburo had discussed the decision about the new general secretary before the announcement was released. The CPSU plenum that elected Gorbachev was convened hastily, the day after Chernenko's death, with the result that many Central Committee members not already in Moscow probably were unable to attend. Not even all the Politburo members were present—Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy was leading a parliamentary delegation to the United States and did not return to Moscow until the day after the plenum. The plenum had been held one day later following the deaths of Brezhnev in 1982 and Stalin in March 1953, and three days later following Andropov's death last year. Chernenko's funeral was also held one day earlier than the ceremonies for Brezhnev and Andropov.

¹ Table 5 provides details on the timing of the last three Soviet successions.

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CPSU Plenum: Nominating Speech Breaks With Past

Gromyko phrased his nominating address in direct, colorful idiom totally unlike that normally used on formal party occasions. Unlike the nominating speeches for Andropov and Chernenko, delivered respectively by Chernenko and Tikhonov, Gromyko's speech was not publicized in Soviet mass media, although it was published in a pamphlet on the proceedings of the plenum, released on 14 March.

Its intriguing statements about Gorbachev aside, the unique character of Gromyko's speech is apparent in the ways it differed from the nominating speeches in 1982 and 1984:

- Gromyko did not once mention Chernenko. By contrast, Tikhonov devoted half of his speech to praising Andropov before he nominated Chernenko, and Chernenko spent more than half of his nominating speech for Andropov praising former General Secretary Brezhnev.
- Gromyko claimed to be revealing the "content" and "atmosphere" of the Politburo meeting that selected Gorbachev to replace Chernenko. Previous nominating speeches included stock phrases about the Politburo's belief in the worthiness of the candidate, but otherwise did not purport to reflect the discussions among the top party leaders.

Gromyko's accolades for Gorbachev were far different from the dry records of party service and qualities of character that were marshaled in speeches nominating Andropov and Chernenko. His emphasis on pragmatic qualities of intelligence and reason was so atypical of Soviet statements that it may have reflected his personal enthusiasm for Gorbachev. Other areas discussed in the speech—Gorbachev's abilities and attitudes in foreign affairs and security matters—may have been stressed by Gromyko not only because of his own expertise in these fields but also because Gorbachev's public record and experience are so thin in these areas.

Outlining what he presented as the view of the Politburo, Gromyko praised Gorbachev as a "man of principle" who speaks his mind directly, has a "keen profound intellect," and approaches problems analytically. Noting that politics will "just stand still" without more than analysis, he also maintained that Gorbachev had demonstrated "many a time" in the Politburo and Secretariat that he also had the ability to draw conclusions. Appearing to suggest that Gorbachev would not be dogmatic, Gromyko maintained that he does not see

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issues in terms of "black and white" but in "intermediate colors." At the same time, Gromyko described Gorbachev as a man of "strong convictions" who "states his position frankly," whether or not others agree. He also said the Politburo agreed that Gorbachev was gifted in organizational and communication skills.



Foreign Minister Gromyko at Chernenko funeral. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985)

In the area of foreign policy, Gromyko spoke in more personal terms and used language apparently designed to allay misgivings about Gorbachev's experience. He stated that by virtue of his own service it might be "clearer" to him than to "certain other comrades" that Gorbachev "grasps very well and rapidly the essence of the processes taking place outside our country," and he added that Gorbachev had repeatedly drawn "correct, party conclusions" in foreign affairs. Gromyko also offered assurances about Gorbachev's views on defense, asserting that Gorbachev had argued at Politburo sessions that the Soviet Union must "keep its powder dry" and that defense must be kept "at the necessary level." Going unusually far in acknowledging Soviet concern about the

impact of the succession on world opinion, Gromyko also warned that the world was watching, looking for "cracks of some kind in the leadership." He affirmed that the Politburo was unanimous in the opinion that the leadership "will not allow our political opponents any satisfaction on this score."

The Election

In reporting the election of Gorbachev, the plenum communique published in *Pravda* used an unusual term in characterizing the decision as unanimous. Rather than the term used to describe the elections of Andropov and Chernenko, *yedinoglasno* (a unanimous vote), the communique used the less precise term *yedinodushno*, implying full agreement. *Yedinodushno* had been used to describe Brezhnev's reelection as general secretary at the plenums in 1971, 1976, and 1981 but has rarely been used in accounts of plenums in recent years.

The implications of this terminology are not clear. The two terms have appeared to be used interchangeably on some occasions in the past—for example, at the conclusion of the 1981 CPSU congress *Pravda* on 4 March

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used both terms to describe Brezhnev's election. At other times, there appears to have been a distinction: An account of the June 1983 Central Committee plenum contained in the plenum's stenographic report suggests that *yedino-dushno* means approval by acclamation rather than by vote. Chernenko, who was chairing the plenum, used both terms in describing approval for a draft resolution on the nomination of Andropov as Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman. Chernenko characterized the "stormy applause" that greeted the resolution as "unanimous (*yedinodushnoye*) acceptance" of the resolution. But he added, "In view of the importance of the question, I consider it advisable to have a vote." The plenum then approved the resolution *yedinoglasno*.

**Gorbachev's
Acceptance
Speech**

Gorbachev's plenum speech was more conventional than Gromyko's nominating speech, assuring his audience of his commitment to collective decisionmaking and the maintenance of Soviet defense capabilities, as Chernenko and Andropov had done in their speeches to the plenums that elected them:

- On collectivity, Gorbachev pledged to implement policies "elaborated collectively" and appealed to the rest of the leadership, saying he was "counting on the support and active help of the Politburo members, candidate members, and Central Committee secretaries and of the party's Central Committee as a whole." Chernenko, in his acceptance speech, had similarly pledged that he would "exert every effort" to work "together" with other members of the leadership and would further advance "by collective efforts" the work initiated by Andropov. Andropov's acceptance speech is not known to have been publicized by Soviet media, but in his opening speech to the plenum he observed that "the collective wisdom of the party, its collective leadership" must play an important role in policymaking.
- On defense, Gorbachev pledged to maintain Soviet defenses "at a level such that any aggressors" will recognize that attempts to encroach on the security of the USSR or its allies "will be met with a crushing retaliatory strike." To accomplish this, he said, the armed forces would continue to receive "everything necessary." Chernenko had similarly pledged to "further see to it that our country's defense capability is strengthened so that we should have enough means to cool the hot heads of belligerent adventurists," calling this "a very substantial prerequisite for preserving peace." Andropov paid direct tribute to "the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces" as the

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Military leaders stand honor guard at Chernenko lying-in-state ceremony; left to right: Main Political Directorate Chief Yepishev, Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Kulikov, General Staff Chief Akhromeyev, Defense Minister Sokolov. (Soviet television, 12 March 1985)

only means of defending peace and implicitly promised to continue Brezhnev's policy of ensuring that defense capability meets "present-day requirements."

Military Eclipse: The Symbols Were Missing

The military played a sharply reduced role compared with the two previous transitions. Given the highly symbolic implications of the ceremonies surrounding successions, it is unlikely that the changes in the protocol of the funeral can be explained merely by the fact that the defense minister is no longer a member of the Politburo or by Chernenko's lack of military rank. The exclusion of the military comes in the wake of earlier indications of reduced military influence in the political leadership.

The military's role in the public ceremonies has declined successively in each of the last three transfers of power:

- The military was most prominent at Brezhnev's funeral in November 1982 when Defense Minister Ustinov delivered a eulogy and was the only

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Politburo member other than General Secretary Andropov to speak. The next four ranking senior officers—First Deputy Defense Ministers Ogarkov, Kulikov, Sokolov, and Main Political Directorate Chief Yepishev—were also present on the mausoleum with party leaders and the members of the funeral commission.

- At Andropov's funeral in February 1984, the military was given less symbolic importance. Ustinov shared the limelight with Foreign Minister Gromyko as supporting speakers at the funeral. Ogarkov, Kulikov, and Yepishev again stood on the mausoleum, but Sokolov was apparently away from Moscow.
- Military leaders had no role at Chernenko's funeral. Only civilians stood on the mausoleum and delivered eulogies. Defense Minister Sokolov was not even named to the funeral commission. (Ustinov was on the commissions for Brezhnev and Andropov along with all the other Moscow-based Politburo members.) By contrast, in 1953 Defense Minister Vasilevskiy was named to Stalin's funeral commission even though he was not a Politburo member. The military leaders' only public role during the Chernenko funeral was a brief appearance in the honor guard during a lying-in-state ceremony shown on television on 12 March.

New Regime

Gorbachev is in a highly favorable position to influence the composition of the top leadership. Additions to the Politburo and Secretariat over the past three years have not kept pace with departures, bringing the size of both bodies to their lowest levels in two decades; other leaders can be expected to depart soon.² In addition, Ustinov's replacement as defense minister is 73 and clearly intended to be an interim choice. As the party prepares for the 27th CPSU Congress in the coming year, Gorbachev will also be able to influence the composition of the Central Committee and the regional party leadership.

An early indication of Gorbachev's political strength could be the handling of the chairmanship of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. When Gorbachev nominated Chernenko for the post in April 1984 he linked the

² In the past three years nine Politburo and Secretariat members have died or resigned: Suslov, Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Rashidov, Kiselev, Pelshe, Andropov, Ustinov, and Chernenko. Many of the remaining members are old: Kuznetsov is 84, Ponomarev is 80, Tikhonov is 79, and Gromyko is 75; Kunayev, Solomentsev, Grishin, and Kapitonov are all in their early 70's.


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office with that of general secretary, stating that it was in the national interest for the same person to hold both posts. He maintained that the Central Committee, proceeding from the interests of Soviet society and government, "recognized the necessity" for Chernenko to hold both posts and that this arrangement had "great significance" for the conduct of foreign policy. Having thus made an institutional case for linking the two positions, Gorbachev would suffer an important loss of prestige if he were not also elected head of state, an office held by Brezhnev (since 1977), Andropov, and Chernenko.

Leadership Rankings: Continuity on Top, Confusion Below


There were no signs of change in the power relationships among top leaders in the immediate aftermath of Chernenko's death. Aside from Gorbachev's rise to the top spot, the senior Politburo members remained in their presuccession order during all the formal lineups connected with Chernenko's funeral, with Tikhonov coming first, followed by Gromyko, Grishin, and Romanov. Romanov was in a more prominent position during graveside ceremonies where the ranking was less formal, standing on one side of Gorbachev while Tikhonov stood on the other.



Leadership lineup at lying-in-state; left to right: Romanov, Grishin, Gromyko, Tikhonov, Gorbachev. (Soviet television, 12 March 1985)

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Vorotnikov, Gorbachev, Tikhonov (left to right) at lying-in-state. (Soviet television, 11 March 1985)

In contrast to the clear lineup of the top five, the rankings of other members of the Politburo and Secretariat were inconsistent. There were nine lineups during the lying-in-state and funeral ceremonies, and no two were alike.³ At least one anomaly may have some significance: Vorotnikov, who normally appears in last place among full Politburo members, had a more prominent spot at the 11 March lying-in-state ceremony following the plenum when he stood on one side of Gorbachev, while Tikhonov and the other top leaders stood on the other. Gorbachev's appearance in this same position at a lying-in-state ceremony following the plenum that elected Chernenko apparently reflected his increased status, but it is too early to tell if the parallel will hold true for Vorotnikov.

Building a Coalition: Gorbachev's Allies and Opponents

Among the elders in the Politburo, Gromyko and Grishin have given Gorbachev the strongest public show of support—Gromyko with his impassioned nominating speech and Grishin by referring to Gorbachev as the head

³ See Tables 1 and 2 of this report.

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of the Politburo in a speech reported in *Moskovskaya Pravda* on 19 March. Gorbachev may get his firmest backing from the younger members of the leadership brought in under Andropov: Vorotnikov, Ligachev, and Ryzhkov. Several other leaders, including Romanov, Shcherbitskiy, and Dolgikh, may pose obstacles to his consolidation of power.

Vorotnikov

The leader with a public record closest to Gorbachev's on economic issues is 59-year-old Politburo member and RSFSR Premier Vitaliy Vorotnikov, who had the most meteoric rise of any leader under Andropov. For reasons that are unclear, Vorotnikov was removed as RSFSR first deputy premier and exiled as ambassador to Cuba in 1979. He was brought back into domestic politics in mid-1982 when Andropov's KGB campaign against corruption brought down Krasnodar First Secretary Medunov, an apparent crony of Brezhnev; Vorotnikov was installed in his place and carried out a vigorous purge of local officials. In June 1983 he was elected premier of the RSFSR, after being nominated by Gorbachev, and candidate member of the Politburo. He was promoted to full membership in the Politburo with unusual speed in December 1983.



Vitaliy Vorotnikov

Like Gorbachev, Vorotnikov has publicly stressed a need to stimulate initiative through economic incentives and administrative decentralization. As RSFSR premier, he has vigorously shaken up the republic ministries and promoted economic management reforms, including a major economic experiment in the services sector that is designed to reduce planning controls and stimulate initiative and quality work. In a speech in Turkmenistan, reported in the 23 December 1984 *Pravda*, Vorotnikov called for a new approach to solving economic problems at all levels, "from the worker and kol-khoznik to the minister." According to the 27 November 1984 *Zarya Vostoka*, he "highly praised" economic experiments being conducted in Georgia during a November 1984 visit to the republic and stated that this experience should be "disseminated in other parts of the country." In recent years Gorbachev has also shown more interest in Georgia's economic experiments than any other national-level leader.

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Ligachev

Yegor Ligachev, 64, is Gorbachev's direct subordinate in the leadership. He was brought to Moscow to head the Central Committee's Party Organization Work Department in April 1983, and by June 1983 there were clear signs that Gorbachev was overseeing this department. Ligachev was raised to Central Committee secretary at the December 1983 plenum and succeeded Gorbachev as chairman of the Council of the Union's Legislative Proposals Commission in April 1984, when Gorbachev moved up to chairman of the council's Foreign Affairs Commission.

*Yegor Ligachev*

Prior to Chernenko's death Gorbachev seemed to be relying on Ligachev to fill some gaps in the Secretariat. Ligachev appeared to be taking on duties in the agricultural sector as Gorbachev assumed more and more responsibilities. For example, in January this year in a keynote address to a conference in Leningrad, Ligachev kicked off a campaign called for by Gorbachev to introduce the collective contract system of labor organization throughout the country's farms. On two occasions he also intruded into police activity, a sphere supervised by Romanov, most recently attending a 4 March conference of internal affairs ministers as the only representative of the leadership.

Ryzhkov

Nikolay Ryzhkov, a 55-year-old economic specialist, has probably also been working directly under Gorbachev. In November 1982 he became a CPSU secretary and head of the Central Committee's new Economics Department and became involved in efforts to work out changes in the methods of planning and management. During 1984 Gorbachev apparently took over supervision of this department. Ryzhkov and Gorbachev's subordinate Ligachev were the only party secretaries to attend Gorbachev's February 1985 election speech.

*Nikolay Ryzhkov*

Ryzhkov also appears to support changes in economic management. Like Gorbachev and Vorotnikov, he has visited Georgia to observe economic experiments. According to the 24 September 1983 *Zarya Vostoka* report on his visit, he praised innovations in the republic as a positive example for other areas. In speeches in February 1984 and February 1985 Ryzhkov praised national economic experiments begun in 1983 that increase the independence of enterprises.

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Romanov As the only other senior CPSU secretary, 62-year-old Grigoriy Romanov is Gorbachev's most obvious rival for political power. As overseer of the military-industrial complex and machine-building sector he is the chief spokesman for defense interests and will be a key actor in debates over allocation of resources. Even before he assumed this role Romanov was one of the strongest advocates in the leadership for the defense sector. If he is not constrained by political rivalry, Romanov may side with Gorbachev in efforts to change economic policy. He has long pressed for economic incentives and promoted many economic experiments.

Shcherbitskiy Noted for his obvious ambition and his strong opinions, 67-year-old Ukrainian party leader and Politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitskiy may have sharp conflicts with Gorbachev. Shcherbitskiy has been outspoken in upholding defense interests and has often taken a hard line in foreign policy matters. In two September 1984 speeches he lobbied for beefing up defense, criticized reliance on trade with the West, and urged a big effort to develop Soviet technology independent of the West's.

Shcherbitskiy's sharpest disagreement with Gorbachev may be in the sphere of economic policy. In a November 1984 *Kommunist* (No. 17) article he took positions which appeared opposed to Gorbachev's calls for transferring more rights to plants and increasing "self-management." He argued that any weakening of central planning and turn to market forces would disrupt economic production, would be conducive to the "restoration of capitalism," and could not be called "genuine people's self-management." Shcherbitskiy has not opposed all changes in economic management, however. In fact, he has cultivated an image of innovator in experimenting with new methods of advancing scientific and technological development.

Dolgikh As a Politburo candidate member and the third or fourth ranking secretary (after Gorbachev, Romanov, and perhaps Ponomarev), 60-year-old Vladimir Dolgikh also is an important political figure. He has been most closely associated with Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and Chernenko. Although Dolgikh was the ranking secretary for economic questions when Andropov took over, Andropov bypassed him, naming Ryzhkov secretary for economic planning and later bringing in Romanov to be senior secretary for industry, outranking Dolgikh. Dolgikh has not been an enthusiastic advocate of economic innovation and may not share Gorbachev's approach to improving economic performance.

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Military Role: Evidence of Decline

Initial indications are that the military's influence in political matters will be minimal in the Gorbachev regime. This was suggested by the military's exclusion from a prominent role in the transition, against the background of apparent efforts by the party leadership to reduce the influence of the military under Chernenko. Gorbachev's own views on the military are largely unknown: He has no experience in military affairs, having never even served in the army, and has not taken clear public positions on defense matters.

The most significant reduction of military influence in the leadership was produced by the death of Defense Minister and Politburo member Ustinov in December 1984 and the selection of a replacement who seemed to have been chosen precisely because he would be relatively weak and ineffectual. Ustinov's successor, 73-year-old Sergey Sokolov, was the oldest and least controversial of the three first deputy defense ministers and cannot be expected to rise to a position of power comparable to Ustinov's. Before too long, Gorbachev will probably have an opportunity to influence the choice of a new defense minister.

The change in the Ministry of Defense came against the background of other indications of reduced military influence during the Chernenko regime. With the demotion of Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov three months before Ustinov's death, the party leadership removed a forceful advocate for defense interests from contention for the post of defense minister. Ogarkov's removal on 6 September was accompanied by the appearance of a formula in editorials in *Pravda* and the military paper *Krasnaya Zvezda* that asserted that funds would not be diverted from the consumer to meet defense needs, suggesting that a key resource decision that went against military interests had just been made.

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New Dynamism in Foreign Policy

Like Andropov and Chernenko before him, Mikhail Gorbachev began his tenure as general secretary by vowing to continue the broad outlines of foreign policy that he had inherited. While his public statements and actions during his first days in power supported this pledge in many key areas of Soviet international relations, including U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, there were also a number of signs that he will impart a more dynamic style to foreign policy and that he may be significantly more open to changes in Soviet policy than his predecessor.

Gorbachev's energetic leadership style was most evident in the unprecedented number of meetings he held with foreign dignitaries attending Chernenko's funeral.⁴ Whereas Chernenko had met separately with 13 heads of state delegations at Andropov's funeral and Andropov with only seven at Brezhnev's, Gorbachev met individually with 25 heads of state delegations as well as with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and the heads of delegations from the Italian and Japanese Communist Parties. In addition, like Chernenko in February 1984, he met collectively with the six leaders of the other Warsaw Pact member-states. In a further indication of personal style and willingness to bend protocol, Gorbachev spent more time than planned with several foreign leaders, according to Western press accounts, forcing reshuffling of the schedule.

Despite repetitions of the usual pledge of continuity in foreign policy, the new Soviet regime has given hints that it might both accelerate changes begun under Chernenko and take new initiatives in some neglected areas of foreign relations. In its most dramatic move to date, the Gorbachev regime made an important symbolic gesture toward China when the new general secretary met with the Chinese representative at the funeral—the first such meeting in 20 years. Soviet actions in other key areas have contrasted less sharply with previous practice, but nevertheless have created an impression of movement toward both improved relations with the West and closer ties with several former adversaries in the communist movement:

- Gorbachev's conciliatory statements and nonpolemical Soviet press reporting of his meeting with Vice President Bush suggest that Moscow may want to give new impetus to the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations that began during the last few months of Chernenko's rule.

⁴ For a list of meetings between the Soviet general secretary and foreign heads of delegations at the Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko funerals, see Tables 3 and 4.

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- The Soviet media's positive portrayal of Gorbachev's meetings with West European leaders, including West Germany's Chancellor Kohl, may reflect Gorbachev's interest in cultivating even stronger ties to the region.
- The breakthrough with China and an apparent effort to court the Yugoslavs suggest that higher priority will be given to improving Soviet relations with ruling communist states and parties outside the Soviet bloc.
- Gorbachev's meeting with the heads of delegations from the Italian and Japanese Communist Parties also raises the possibility that the new general secretary will push for a more accommodating approach toward dissident nonruling parties.

Chernenko's passing may have little immediate effect on the conduct of Soviet foreign policy:

- In the authoritative tributes paid to him during the funeral period, Chernenko was credited with a comparatively minor role in the formulation of foreign policy, suggesting that Moscow wants to give the impression that Gorbachev and others in the present leadership were involved in and committed to the foreign policies followed over the past year. This characterization may be genuine, given the high level of activity the Soviet leadership, particularly Gromyko, maintained during Chernenko's final period of grave illness and incapacitation.
- Gorbachev has relatively little experience in foreign affairs and may rely heavily on more experienced advisers, such as Foreign Minister Gromyko. Soviet media publicized Gromyko's presence at an overwhelming majority of Gorbachev's meetings with foreign leaders. Moscow has not yet identified any Gorbachev personal aide for international affairs although Andrey Aleksandrov, a foreign policy aide to every general secretary since 1966, and Viktor Sharapov, a specialist in relations with communist countries originally added to the general secretary's staff by Andropov, were—judging by pictures shown on Soviet television—also involved in most of Gorbachev's meetings. In the previous two successions, Soviet media at comparable meetings explicitly identified aides to the general secretary.

Despite the continuity lent by Gromyko's presence in the foreign affairs leadership, however, there are signs that continuity may be less in vogue than

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it was in the previous two changes of general secretary. *Pravda's* handling of the question as well as remarks by a highly placed commentator point to the new regime's greater receptivity to change:

- An alteration in *Pravda's* handling of the question of continuity in its two editions on 13 March suggested a desire to avoid overplaying that theme in either domestic or foreign policy. In a sentence that in the first edition said Gorbachev's election had been seen both at home and abroad "as yet more proof of the CPSU's unshakable loyalty to the Leninist course of creation and peace and as evidence of complete continuity in the party's policy," the second edition deleted the word "complete."
- *Izvestiya* political observer Aleksandr Bovin, a member of the party's Central Auditing Commission and an influential foreign affairs journalist who is widely reported to have close contacts with the Soviet leadership, also appeared to indicate that continuity would not be accentuated as heavily under Gorbachev. Bovin told listeners to a domestic radio discussion program on 24 March that the regime's rhetorical devotion to "consistency, continuity, and stability" should not be interpreted as "immobility." No foreign policy can be immobile "if it wants to be effective," he said. Moscow's commitment to "stability of principles" does not rule out but "presupposes," he argued, "flexibility and the ability to alter one's actions depending on changing circumstances."

United States: Moderate Stance

Gorbachev adopted a moderate public posture toward the United States during his first days in power and reaffirmed Moscow's interest in arms control negotiations, particularly the U.S.-Soviet talks that opened in Geneva two days after Chernenko's death. Soviet leadership treatment of the United States traditionally has been circumspect in the early days of a new regime, but Gorbachev has been more restrained than Andropov was in 1982 and Chernenko in 1984.

Gorbachev's first statement on foreign policy as general secretary, in his 11 March speech to the CPSU Central Committee, seemed calculated to reinforce the warming trend in U.S.-Soviet relations in recent months. He echoed positive statements about detente that had been made in two of the last

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public statements attributed to Chernenko and avoided even the indirect criticism of the West that had marked early speeches by Andropov and Chernenko:

- Gorbachev used powerful images of U.S.-Soviet cooperation that had been invoked in Chernenko's 22 February RSFSR Supreme Soviet election address and his 28 February reply to U.S. war veterans. He endorsed the "success of detente achieved in the 1970's," affirmed that the Soviet Union was "prepared to participate in a continuation of the process of establishing peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation between states," and added that "new steps in this direction" would be a fitting commemoration for the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II.
- In arguing for arms control, Gorbachev warned that a "frightful threat" faces mankind but did not go on to blame the West explicitly for the problem. Both Andropov and Chernenko had been more critical on similar occasions, although both, like Gorbachev, had avoided any direct reference to the United States. In his funeral eulogy for Brezhnev, Andropov had accused the "forces of imperialism" of trying to "push mankind onto the road of hostility and military confrontation." Chernenko, in his speech to the extraordinary plenum that elected him, had denounced the "threat created today to humanity by the reckless, adventurist actions of imperialism's aggressive forces."

Arms Control

Gorbachev signaled that arms control will be given a high priority by devoting more attention to the subject in his 11 March plenum speech than to any other foreign policy issue. He said that "the only sensible way out of the present situation is an accord between the forces opposed to each other on the immediate cessation of the arms race," particularly regarding nuclear and space arms. In describing Moscow's approach to the U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva, he adopted the formulation used in Chernenko's election speech last month, saying that the Soviet Union does not seek "unilateral advantages," wants a "termination" rather than "continuation" of the arms race, and endorses a mutual "freeze" on future nuclear missile deployments and a "real and major cutback" in stockpiled armaments on both sides. In keeping with the traditional constraints of the occasion, Gorbachev did not raise questions about U.S. earnestness toward the Geneva negotiations, as he had done in his election speech last month, but simply called on Washington to reciprocate the Soviet approach to the talks.

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The attention devoted to arms control in Gorbachev's speech stands in marked contrast to the treatment of the issue in Chernenko's plenum acceptance speech in February 1984, at a time when Moscow was refusing to return to the negotiating table in Geneva. Chernenko spoke only in general terms of Soviet readiness for peaceful settlements of all disputed international problems through "serious, equal, and constructive talks" and, without naming the United States, complained that "some leaders" in the West "do not realize or do not wish to realize" the unprecedented need for cooperation to limit armaments.



Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz meet in the Kremlin with General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Gromyko. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985)

Meeting With Vice President Soviet media took a slightly more positive approach to the United States in coverage of the general secretary's 13 March meeting with Vice President Bush than they had taken during the two previous successions. The authoritative TASS report on the meeting said that Gorbachev had "noted the importance of Soviet-U.S. relations" and expressed Moscow's "readiness, provided the U.S. side also was ready, to work in practice to improve them." TASS also reported that the Vice President similarly expressed Washington's desire to "have better relations with the Soviet Union." In contrast, the TASS reports on the similar meetings with Chernenko and Andropov had not cited views

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expressed by Vice President Bush, reporting only remarks by the Soviet leaders. Both Chernenko and Andropov were said to have insisted that bilateral relations be based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in internal affairs, and Chernenko had implied that U.S. failure to adhere to these principles was the key obstacle to an improvement in relations.

Soviet media took the unusual step of calling attention to optimistic remarks by the Vice President after his meeting with Gorbachev and gave some indirect signals that Moscow may be receptive to the idea of a summit meeting between Gorbachev and President Reagan. A TASS dispatch from New York, quoted on Soviet television on 14 March, cited UPI in reporting that the Vice President had brought away from his conversation with Gorbachev "a hope for an improvement" in relations and had expressed the opinion, which he said was shared by President Reagan, that a summit would be "useful." Soviet media discussion of the possibility of a summit meeting has been rare in the recent past and has adhered to the position articulated by Gromyko in June 1983 that any such meeting must be adequately prepared in advance and that certain prerequisites must be met, including some degree of mutual understanding on major questions.

West Europe: Stress on Improved Relations

The Kremlin's treatment of West Europe during and immediately after the Chernenko funeral suggests that Moscow will continue to encourage improved ties with most West European countries and to promote opposition to U.S. defense policies. Soviet coverage of West German Chancellor Kohl's meeting with Gorbachev was markedly less critical than Moscow's accounts of other recent Soviet-West German meetings.

Following the example set by Chernenko at the time of Andropov's funeral, Gorbachev met with the delegation heads of the major West European countries, including Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and West Germany. Authoritative TASS reports on these meetings avoided polemics and appeared to reinforce the effort to improve relations that characterized Gorbachev's December 1984 trip to Great Britain and Gromyko's recent visits to Italy and Spain.

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France As at the time of Andropov's funeral, Moscow reserved its warmest comments for the 13 March meeting between the new general secretary and the head of the French delegation. Gorbachev was quoted by TASS as referring in the meeting with President Mitterrand to the "traditional sentiments of friendship and affection" between the Soviet and French peoples, and both leaders were cited as endorsing the "extension of political dialogue" between them as an important factor affecting "the political climate in Europe and elsewhere."


Italy The official Soviet account of the new Soviet leader's meeting with Italian President Pertini and Foreign Minister Andreotti was somewhat warmer than the TASS report on their meeting with Chernenko in February 1984, avoiding criticism of Italy's support for NATO's INF deployments. As in the report on the Soviet-French meeting, it affirmed that Italy and the USSR intended to broaden their political contacts "so as to promote the restoration of detente in Europe."

Spain The reception Moscow gave the Spanish delegation indicated Soviet interest in strengthening ties with Madrid. Last year Spain sent a lower ranking delegation, headed by a deputy prime minister, which was not received by any of the top leadership. This year Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez journeyed to Moscow for the funeral and was received by the new general secretary. As in Soviet media treatment of Gromyko's recent visit to Madrid, the TASS report on Gorbachev's meeting with Gonzalez portrayed Spain as siding with the USSR in opposing the arms race "in space," even though the Spanish Government has not adopted a formal public position on this issue.

Great Britain Gorbachev's remarks to British Prime Minister Thatcher paralleled his statements during his visit to Great Britain last December and seemed designed to encourage improved relations. The report on the post-funeral Gorbachev-Thatcher meeting credited both sides with an interest in "political dialogue" and in stepping up cooperation in economic, scientific, and other fields. As he had done in Britain, the new Soviet leader was reported by TASS as expressing opposition to the "arms race in space . . . and on earth," and he called on London to "make a contribution toward changing the world situation for the better." Like the TASS description of the Soviet and British leaders' meeting after Andropov's funeral last year, the TASS report on the Gorbachev-Thatcher conversation did not mention INF.

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General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Gromyko pose with West German Chancellor Kohl prior to their Kremlin meeting. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985)

West Germany Although Moscow aired a sterner depiction of Chancellor Kohl's 14 March meeting with Gorbachev than of any of the other meetings with West European leaders, the Soviet account was notably milder than Moscow's characterization of other Soviet-West German meetings over the past year:

- Last year, Moscow signaled its irritation with Bonn in its treatment of the Chernenko-Kohl meeting that took place after Andropov's funeral. Chernenko, according to TASS, drew attention to West Germany's support for NATO's missile deployments and restated the USSR's "principled" opposition to them. By contrast, the report on the 14 March meeting between Gorbachev and Kohl failed even to mention the INF issue.
- The contrast was even more striking between Moscow's treatment of the Gorbachev-Kohl meeting and its description of the meeting 10 days earlier between Foreign Minister Gromyko and West German Foreign Minister Genscher during his 4 March visit to Moscow. The latter report cited Gromyko as calling for an end to U.S. missile deployments in West Germany and warning Bonn that its cooperation with the United States in strategic defense research would lead the USSR to regard it as an

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“accomplice in the violation of the treaty on antiballistic missile defense.” The TASS account of Gorbachev’s remarks to Kohl failed to mention either the strategic defense issue or U.S. missile deployments in the FRG. TASS added, however, that the Soviet side emphasized that the “decisive” element in Moscow’s posture toward Bonn was West German policy on matters concerning the “security interests” of the USSR and its allies.

- Although Soviet leaders have referred sporadically to West German “revanchism” in their speeches over the last 10 months, the TASS account of Gorbachev’s talks with Chancellor Kohl made no mention of this subject. This was in line with the official Soviet pronouncements on other leadership-level exchanges with the West Germans since last spring, when the “revanchism” campaign got under way. However, judging by the communique issued after East German Foreign Minister Fischer’s 19-20 March visit to Moscow, the Soviet Union is still determined to impress on its East European allies—and particularly East Germany—its concern over the contacts with Bonn. The communique pointedly noted that the Soviet Union, the GDR, and “all the fraternal socialist states” are determined to deal the “most resolute rebuff” to “manifestations of revanchism” in West Germany.

Japan: Evidence of Strains Predominates

Moscow’s account of Gorbachev’s meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, the first between a Japanese prime minister and a Soviet general secretary since 1973, provided no evidence that Gorbachev is more flexible than his predecessors about the longstanding substantive differences between Moscow and Tokyo.

Gorbachev’s reception of Nakasone on 14 March represents an elevation in Soviet treatment of Japanese delegations compared with the previous two successions. In 1982 then Prime Minister Suzuki attended Brezhnev’s funeral but was not received by any Soviet leader, although Gromyko received then Japanese Foreign Minister Sakurauchi. In 1984 Gromyko met with Foreign Minister Abe, who led the Japanese delegation to the Andropov funeral.

Despite the change in the level of the meeting, it is not clear that the Soviets were eager to raise bilateral contacts to the top level. According to Japanese press reports citing Nakasone himself, Moscow agreed to the meeting only

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General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Gromyko together with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone at 13 March reception. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985)

after the Japanese prime minister refused to meet with Prime Minister Tikhonov, as the Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed, and threatened to go home without meeting any Soviet leader unless Gorbachev received him.

The authoritative TASS report on the Gorbachev-Nakasone meeting suggests that Moscow is maintaining its critical, inflexible position on Soviet-Japanese relations. The report, one of the sternest of the many TASS reports on Gorbachev's meetings with foreign visitors, indicated that the Soviet side had dismissed Nakasone's expression of good will toward the Soviet Union and "stressed" that Japan was "artificially" creating "difficulties and limitations" in bilateral relations. "Japan's pursuit of a peace-loving policy in practice would undoubtedly be conducive to improving relations and good-neighborliness," the Soviet side was reported to have added.

This year's TASS report was similar in tone to that of the TASS report at the time of Gromyko's meeting with Abe at the Andropov funeral. That report had said the Soviet side had expressed regret that there was "no sign" of Japanese readiness to reciprocate a Soviet desire for relations of "good-neighborliness and cooperation."

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East Europe: Positive Image Projected

Gorbachev moved swiftly to underscore ties with Moscow's East European allies and to encourage cordial relations with Yugoslavia. His meeting with Warsaw Pact leaders on 13 March was portrayed as more substantive than a similar gathering following Andropov's funeral in 1984. The TASS report on the meeting, which it said took place in an atmosphere of "cordiality and unanimity," indicated that many domestic and international topics were discussed and that participants expressed determination to improve cooperation. They also emphasized a need to "strengthen unity and cohesion" and "step up coordination of action in the international arena." By contrast, the report on the 1984 meeting noted only a "cordial, fraternal" atmosphere and said nothing about the content of the discussion.

Warsaw Pact Countries Most congratulatory messages to Gorbachev from Warsaw Pact countries did not differ significantly from comparable messages sent to his predecessors, but those from the GDR and Poland were notable:

- Possibly in an effort to dispel tensions that arose last year when GDR party chief Honecker canceled a visit to the FRG under Soviet pressure, Honecker departed from past protocol to assure Gorbachev that the GDR is Moscow's "loyal" and "reliable" ally and a "firm member" of the socialist community. No such assurances were included in Honecker's messages to Chernenko a year ago and to Andropov in November 1982.
- The message from Polish leaders Jaruzelski and Jablonski assured the new Soviet leader that the Polish party and government would "do everything possible to increase Poland's contribution to our joint cause"—a statement that could be taken as a response to complaints in recent years that Poland was not fulfilling its CEMA obligations. Perhaps acknowledging Gorbachev's relative lack of experience, the message omitted a statement contained in messages to Andropov and Chernenko that those leaders "understood Poland's problems."

East European media comment on the succession revealed differing views on the new Soviet leader:

- A Prague radio commentary on the 17th seemed to reflect apprehension in its defensive insistence that Soviet domestic and foreign policy would not

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change under Gorbachev and that Western conjectures on this score were "only wishful thinking."

- By contrast, effusive Hungarian comment seemed to reflect relish for the prospect of change. An article in the trade union daily *Nepszava* on 12 March described at length what it claimed was Gorbachev's "expert" interest in new Hungarian agricultural and industrial methods during a 1983 visit. The party paper *Nepszabadsag* on the 16th, in a dispatch from a Moscow correspondent entitled "Continuity and Dynamism," portrayed Gorbachev as having energy, aptitude, and "composure and openness" and described his speeches as presaging a "needed decisive change" in the Soviet economy.

Yugoslavia Gorbachev's apparent desire to improve relations with the Yugoslavs was underlined by a 12 March Belgrade radio report that he had personally telephoned the Yugoslav delegation that day to express thanks for their attendance at the funeral and for their condolences.

Soviet and Yugoslav reports on the delegation's meeting with Gorbachev on the 13th noted a cordial and friendly atmosphere and the readiness of both countries to promote further all-round cooperation. The Tanjug account of the talks reported that "both sides stressed that Yugoslav-Soviet relations are developing successfully based on the principles of the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 and the Moscow Statement of 1956, which were also confirmed in subsequent joint Yugoslav-Soviet documents at meetings at the highest level." Moscow, as on past occasions, avoided reference to the specific agreements, with TASS noting only that cooperation between the two countries and two parties would be based on "joint documents and accords." TASS also omitted the information, supplied by Tanjug, that Gorbachev had accepted an invitation to visit Belgrade and extended a similar invitation to the Yugoslav leadership to visit the Soviet Union.

No meeting between Chernenko and the Yugoslav delegation was reported a year ago, although Andropov had met with the Yugoslavs at the time of Brezhnev's funeral. The descriptions of the atmosphere of the 1982 meeting were similar to the present one, although the reports on the meeting were much shorter.

The Yugoslav message to Gorbachev appeared to reflect a warmer climate than at the time of the previous successions. Yugoslav party leader Sukrija's message implied that bilateral relations were good by voicing the "conviction"

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that ties would "continue to develop successfully." Yugoslav messages in 1984 and 1982, by contrast, had expressed Belgrade's readiness to improve relations.

Yugoslav media comment on Gorbachev was less restrained than that following the accessions of Andropov and Chernenko. Stressing that Gorbachev's work style differs from that of his two predecessors, Tanjug's Moscow correspondent on the 17th said that the new Soviet leader's initial speeches and meetings with foreign visitors showed him to be a "modern-concept politician." The daily *Politika* on the 13th enthused that Gorbachev has a "statesman's personality" marked by "resoluteness, clarity, and authority."

Albania Following past practice, Albania briefly reported without comment the death of Chernenko and election of Gorbachev. Presumably to project an image of Soviet collusion with the United States, however, Tirana radio on the 14th reported that "the Kremlin's new boss, Mikhail Gorbachev," met with Vice President Bush.

In 1982 Tirana waited almost a month to comment on Andropov's rise to power. A 7 December article in the Albanian party paper declared that Albania had no relations with Khrushchev or Brezhnev and would have none with Andropov "or anyone else who might come to lead the revisionist Soviet Union."


Gorbachev gave special attention to Albania last year in a speech at an anniversary celebration in Sofia, published in *Pravda* on 10 September, in which he affirmed that the Soviet Union "favors normalization of relations with the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania." Although his statement reflected official Soviet policy, he was breaking with convention by raising the issue explicitly. No other Soviet leader has directly discussed the question of relations with Albania since Brezhnev, in a speech to a 25 October 1976 CPSU plenum, affirmed that the Soviet Union was prepared to restore relations with Albania. Tirana is not known to have commented on Gorbachev's remark at the time.

China: Ground Prepared for Fundamental Change


The Soviet succession provided the stage for a historic drama in Sino-Soviet relations, as Gorbachev broke with two decades of precedent to meet the Chinese delegation to the funeral and Beijing laid aside its doctrine of 18 years

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General Secretary Gorbachev accepts condolences from Vice Premier Li Peng at Kremlin reception. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985)



Meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev, with Foreign Minister Gromyko to his right and Vice Premier Li Peng, second from left. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985)

by referring publicly to the Soviet Union as a socialist country. While both sides unmistakably signaled their desire to accelerate the pace of improving ties, it is not yet clear whether these important symbolic actions presage fundamental changes in relations. Neither side has acknowledged a departure from past policy or articulated a rationale to explain a departure. Particularly on the Chinese side, such a rationale will be necessary to justify further moves

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toward reestablishment of party relations. Any radical change in doctrine or relations may provoke controversy and opposition in either party.

Moscow Gorbachev set forth policy on China with a simple declaration in his 11 March CPSU plenum address: "We would like a serious improvement in relations with the PRC and consider that, given reciprocity, this is fully possible." He underlined his apparent seriousness three days later when he met with Chinese delegation head Vice Premier Li Peng. It was the first such meeting between a Soviet general secretary and a Chinese official since Brezhnev met with Zhou Enlai in November 1964, when the Chinese premier came to Moscow following the ouster of Khrushchev to explore the possibility of overcoming differences with Moscow.⁵

Gorbachev's formulation of policy toward China was more positive than any used by Chernenko during his tenure as general secretary. While Chernenko had expressed hope for improved relations, his statements tended to be linked with criticism of the Chinese or qualified with assertions that the interests of "third countries" could not be prejudiced. Gorbachev avoided such a link, but did reflect similar concerns in his conversation with the Vietnamese delegation to the funeral on 14 March. In an implicit reference to China, reported by Soviet media, he offered support to Vietnam's struggle against "the intrigues of imperialism and *those who abet it.*" (Emphasis added)

Pravda gave the authoritative TASS report on the 14 March Gorbachev-Li Peng meeting the prominent treatment that accorded with such a significant meeting and with an effort to improve relations. It published the report of the meeting on page one together with reports on meetings with such Soviet friends and allies as Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, Angola, South Yemen, and Mozambique. The report on Aliyev's meeting with Wan Li in February 1984 appeared on page two of *Pravda* between reports on leadership meetings with the delegations from Malta and Japan. The report on Gromyko's meeting with Huang Hua in November 1982 was on page four, isolated from other reports on bilateral meetings.

⁵ Beijing sent State Councillor and Foreign Minister Huang Hua to Brezhnev's funeral in 1982, and he was received by his counterpart, Gromyko. To represent China at Andropov's funeral in 1984, Beijing sent Vice Premier and Politburo member Wan Li, a leader of state rank equivalent to Huang Hua but of considerably greater political stature. Wan received less favorable treatment, however, meeting with Geydar Aliyev, who held comparable government and party posts but was lower in stature than Gromyko.

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The TASS report on the Gorbachev-Li Peng talks indicated that the general secretary had reiterated his plenum formulation on relations. Otherwise, the report followed the pattern of accounts of Sino-Soviet meetings in 1982 and 1984, conveying little of the substance of the meeting beyond noting that the Chinese side had also expressed an interest in improving relations.

Four days later, however, *Pravda* printed excerpts of a much warmer Chinese report. Not only did *Pravda* note that Li had "agreed with the statement made by Comrade Gorbachev" at the CPSU plenum about the desirability of improving relations, but it recorded the key Chinese statements that reflected Beijing's willingness to grant the Soviet Union socialist status and to communicate informally between party leaders. Citing the Chinese party paper *Renmin Ribao*, *Pravda* reported that Li Peng had conveyed congratulations to Gorbachev from Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, had referred to the Soviet Union as a "socialist" country, and had "stressed" that China was prepared to assist the further development of relations in the "political" as well as other spheres.

Moscow may see China's gestures in this regard as responding to Soviet sensitivities expressed late last year in an article written under pseudonyms associated with the USSR Foreign Ministry. Appearing in the prominent foreign policy journal *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn (International Affairs)* under the names "I. Alekseyev" and "F. Nikolayev," the article chided Beijing for refusing to recognize the USSR as "socialist."

By publishing the markedly different accounts of the meeting without further explanation, Moscow reinforced a public appearance of uncertainty about China policy: Earlier, *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* had omitted Gorbachev's statement on China in their otherwise thorough reviews of his plenum address in their 13 March editorials. *Pravda* included a reference to the "authoritative statement" at the plenum calling for better relations in its followup editorial three days later, but the formulation was not cited in similar editorial reviews of the speech in *Izvestiya* on the same day or in the military daily *Krasnaya Zvezda* on the 15th, 16th, and 21st or in the Russian republic paper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on the 15th.

Despite these mixed signals, there are tentative signs of central direction to Soviet media to soften their treatment of China—a tactic employed on many occasions by Moscow in the past to encourage an improved atmosphere in relations. There has been little critical comment on China, and the TASS

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report on U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Michael Armacost's 17-19 March visit to China failed to mention that Sino-Soviet relations were discussed.

Moscow also encouraged the impression that efforts on normalization would continue to move forward, reporting on such bilateral contacts as Gromyko's 22 March meeting with the Chinese ambassador, First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov's meeting on 21 March with a Chinese economic official and on the 26th with the Chinese ambassador, and First Vice President Vasilii Kuznetsov's meeting on 12 March with a Chinese parliamentary delegation. According to a Soviet television news report on Gromyko's reception of the PRC ambassador, both sides expressed an interest in normalization, and the Soviet side again "drew attention" to Gorbachev's plenum statement on relations.

In addition, a Soviet expert on China, Lev Delyusin, in an interview with the Japanese daily *Yomiuri Shimbun*, published on 23 March, encouraged the restoration of CPSU-CPC relations. Delyusin said he did not think the issue could be "solved right away," but he noted that the Gorbachev-Li Peng meeting showed that party leaders on both sides were "concerned about the development of friendly, comradely" party relations and that it did not make sense for relations between "two socialist countries" to improve while their party relations remained frozen.

Background There is nothing in Gorbachev's record of public statements on China that anticipated his initiative to meet with Li Peng or that might have prompted Beijing's effusive response. He is not known to have ever made a public statement on relations with China. The few statements in which he mentioned China were delivered at formal party occasions abroad—such as the Vietnamese Communist Party congress in March 1982—and offered only conventional Soviet criticism of Chinese policies. Judging by published reports, he said nothing about China in his RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech last month.

Despite the meager Gorbachev record on the China question, his apparent ties with Andropov and Gromyko associate him with a perspective that has given more priority to improving relations than did Chernenko. Different approaches to the China issue may explain some of the twists and turns in Soviet policy and behavior since Brezhnev's call in March 1982 for improved relations and his affirmation that China had a "socialist system":

- Polemical attacks on China were dropped from Soviet media in September 1982 shortly before Brezhnev's death that November, and Andropov

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reaffirmed Moscow's interest in better relations with China in a plenum speech 10 days after becoming general secretary. Andropov referred to China as "our great neighbor" and said that the USSR pays "great attention to every positive response" to Soviet efforts to "overcome the inertia of prejudices." The November 1982 speech did not criticize China, and all Soviet leaders refrained from direct polemical attacks on Beijing during Andropov's tenure, although Soviet media did resume lower level criticism by the end of 1983—at a time when Andropov's terminal illness may have reduced his influence.

- Chernenko was less positive than Andropov in his first public remarks on China after becoming general secretary in February 1984. In his 2 March USSR Supreme Soviet election speech, he affirmed an interest in improving relations but noted that "differences on a number of questions of principle" remain and ruled out any agreements that would "prejudice the interests of third countries." Moreover, while stating that "the Soviet Union stands for the level of contacts being raised," he added that this should take place "to the extent acceptable to both sides."
- By April 1984 low-level criticism of China was becoming more serious, and on 4 May Moscow released an authoritative TASS statement excoriating Chinese "military provocations" on the Sino-Vietnamese border.
- An effort at higher level contacts was aborted in May, when Moscow postponed a scheduled visit to Beijing of First Deputy Premier Arkhipov—a move seemingly designed to demonstrate displeasure with Chinese policies toward Indochina and the United States.
- In June Chernenko publicly attacked Chinese policy in Southeast Asia during visits by Vietnamese and Lao party leaders, condemning Beijing in stronger terms than had been used by any Soviet leader since October 1982.
- By the fall of 1984 Soviet media had toned down their attacks on China, although criticism still appeared in scholarly journals.
- Chernenko was also milder in his rhetoric in remarks during a visit of a Mongolian delegation in October. In his first comment on China since June, using the most positive language that he employed during his tenure as general secretary, he stressed the importance of normalization of relations

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and asserted that “we always keep open the door to constructive talks with China.” His only criticism of China was implied when he stressed that socialist countries must “hold clear-cut class positions in international affairs.”

- Gromyko, who has a consistent record of temperate formulations on China in recent years, was even more positive in his 6 November address marking the anniversary of the October Revolution. He stated that the Soviet Union’s commitment to “normalizing and improving” relations with China “has repeatedly been confirmed by us, even at the very highest level,” and added that “we consider a continuation of contacts between representatives of the two countries useful and important.”
- In December the Arkhipov visit to Beijing was revived amid signs that Beijing was attempting to mollify Moscow on issues that had led to postponement of the visit the previous spring. Both Beijing and Hanoi renewed publicity for clashes on the Sino-Vietnamese border as Vietnam’s dry season offensive in Cambodia began, but the level of Beijing’s protests was distinctly lower and their tone more restrained than they had been the previous April. While Arkhipov was in Beijing in late December, Beijing conspicuously avoided previously routine denunciations of Moscow on the anniversary of Moscow’s intervention in Afghanistan, marking the occasion only in early January.
- From late January to mid-February 1985, Soviet media increased criticism of China in the wake of the visit to the PRC of Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Vessey. Much of the Soviet criticism was pegged to a Kabul protest about alleged Chinese involvement in the Afghan conflict. A 14 February article in *Izvestiya* by “I. Alekseyev” also complained about the “ambiguous” Chinese leadership approach to the Soviet Union. It noted that Beijing had “verbally” declared its desire to normalize relations and allowed limited progress but was raising preconditions, had undertaken action “harmful to the interests of world socialism,” and was even posing a “threat to the security of socialist states.” The article advocated bilateral dialogue and normalization of relations and observed: “We would like to believe that common sense and a correct understanding of the Chinese people’s interests will sooner or later gain the upper hand in Beijing.”
- The last speech attributed to Chernenko—a 22 February USSR Supreme Soviet election address that was read for him because he was too ill to appear—was positive about the need for normalization of relations and noted

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there should be "efforts by both sides," but again pointed to "serious political differences" dividing Moscow and Beijing.


Beijing

In marking Chernenko's death and welcoming Gorbachev's succession, Beijing violated strictures against confusing party and state relations with Moscow that it had scrupulously observed for nearly two decades. Taken together, these departures from precedents and practices rigidly observed in the past appear intended to convey dramatically a new Chinese assessment of the potential for fundamental change in Sino-Soviet ties:

- Beijing extended congratulations to Gorbachev on his succession as CPSU general secretary. The congratulations were extended not only by a Foreign Ministry spokesman on 12 March, according to Xinhua that day, but also personally by several Chinese leaders. As recorded by Xinhua, these include National People's Congress (NPC) Chairman Peng Zhen in his condolence call at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing on the 12th, Vice Premier Li Peng directly to Gorbachev in Moscow, and CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang, as conveyed to Gorbachev by Li Peng. At the time of Andropov's and Chernenko's successions, Beijing observed constraints in place since the break in CPC-CPSU ties in 1967 and did not extend congratulations of any sort—either from party or state spokesmen.
- On meeting Gorbachev at the reception for foreign delegations attending Chernenko's funeral on the 13th, according to Xinhua the same day, Li Peng wished the USSR well in "socialist construction." In his meeting with Gorbachev the next day, by Xinhua's account, Li described China and the USSR as "great neighbors and socialist countries." These references to the "socialist" character of the Soviet Union are the first in authoritative Chinese public statements in at least 18 years. The closest Beijing had come to such an acknowledgment appeared in Xinhua's account of CPC Politburo Standing Committee member Chen Yun's meeting with Soviet Deputy Premier Arkhipov last December, in which Chen observed that China and the USSR "practice economic planning and are neighbors."
- In his meeting with Gorbachev on the 14th, Li expressed Beijing's readiness to improve relations in the "political" sphere as well as in the economic, technical, and cultural fields. Although Beijing has routinely in the past three years indicated a readiness to improve cooperation in these latter

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Li Peng meeting Gorbachev and Gromyko in the Kremlin on 13 March. (Renmin Ribao, 15 March 1985).

fields, it has not previously done so in the "political" arena. The closest it has come to doing so also emerged from Arkhipov's visit to China last December, when, according to Xinhua, Premier Zhao Ziyang suggested that "problems in the political relations" between the PRC and USSR should "not be difficult to solve" if both sides took the same "positive" approach that they have adopted in cooperation in other areas.

- In reporting Peng Zhen's call at the Soviet Embassy on the 12th, Xinhua's English-language report cited the Soviet ambassador's expression of gratitude for Chinese congratulations to "Comrade" Gorbachev. Reports on the same event by Beijing radio and by Xinhua's Chinese service, as published in *Renmin Ribao*, went even further, citing Peng Zhen himself as extending congratulations to "Comrade" Gorbachev. Since the break in party ties, PRC media ordinarily have shunned reference to Soviet leaders as "comrades," regardless of the speaker. The only known exception again emerged from Arkhipov's visit to Beijing last December, when Chinese media repeatedly cited Chinese leaders calling Arkhipov "comrade." Judging by the context in which they were made, these references appear intended to convey Beijing's gratitude for Arkhipov's contributions to the PRC's development as supervisor of Soviet aid to China during the heyday of Sino-Soviet cooperation in the 1950's.

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- The condolence message sent by President Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen on behalf of the NPC on the 11th, Peng Zhen's remarks in his call at the Soviet Embassy and comments by the Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 11th and 12th, as reported by Xinhua, all praised Chernenko for his work as an "outstanding" and "supreme leader" of both the Soviet party and state. By contrast, comparable authoritative statements had called Brezhnev "an outstanding statesman of the Soviet Union" and Andropov "supreme leader of the Soviet Union."
- The party newspaper *Renmin Ribao* on the 12th carried on its front page pictures of both Chernenko and Gorbachev together with Xinhua's reports on the condolence message sent by Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen and on the CPSU plenum that elected Gorbachev. NPC condolences on Brezhnev's and Andropov's deaths and Xinhua reports on Andropov's and Chernenko's successions were also carried on *Renmin Ribao*'s front page, but there were no pictures. Chernenko's picture was also framed in black—treatment that the Chinese press normally reserves only for the CPC's own leaders and for leaders of ruling foreign communist parties.

Other Gestures

These departures from longstanding practice indicate that China has begun to apply to the Soviet Union some of the protocol trappings it ordinarily confers on socialist countries, but other signs suggest that it has not yet resumed party links with the CPSU. Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen's condolence message, for example, was sent only in the name of the NPC to the USSR Supreme Soviet and not also in the name of the CPC Central Committee, as was the practice before 1967. Chinese media also were scrupulous about referring to Li Peng as head of a Chinese government delegation. The PRC-owned Hong Kong newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* on 16 March cited a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's comment, not reported in PRC media, that Hu's greetings to Gorbachev as conveyed by Li do not mean that CPC-CPSU relations have been formally resumed.

The highly suggestive changes in Chinese practice do, however, appear designed to convey to Moscow the potential for fundamental change in Sino-Soviet ties. The gestures were complemented by other Chinese signals in the same direction. At no time in statements and comment on the Soviet leadership succession did Beijing raise the three "obstacles" that it long has insisted block fundamental change in bilateral relations—Moscow's military buildup along the Soviet and Mongolian border with China, the Soviet

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intervention in Afghanistan, and Soviet support for Vietnamese actions in Cambodia. By contrast, Xinhua cited Vice Premier Wan Li raising them in his meeting with Soviet Deputy Premier Aliyev after attending Andropov's funeral last year.

Beijing's choice of leaders to attend the funeral in Moscow and to convey condolences at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing seems calculated to convey a cautiously positive message. In terms of state rank—which in view of the gap in party relations is the only protocol strictly appropriate—both choices were marginally lower in level than the leaders chosen when Andropov died.⁶ However, in both cases Beijing may have had reason to believe that the Soviets would be pleased with the selection:

- Although Li is marginally outranked by Wan Li in state protocol and vastly in terms of party level (Wan is a full Politburo member, Li is not), his selection is important symbolically in terms of his youth and education. Li was promoted to vice premier as part of Deng Xiaoping's reform effort to invigorate the Chinese party and state apparatus with a successor generation of leaders competent technically and administratively to guide PRC modernization. In his early 50's, Li is of the same generation as Gorbachev. Li, according to the biography Xinhua publicized when he was promoted in 1982, was also educated in the Soviet Union and presumably speaks Russian.
- Although marginally outranked by Ulanhu in state protocol, Peng Zhen far outranks Ulanhu in party stature. Peng is normally listed among the four veteran Politburo members named after the Politburo Standing Committee members and ahead of the rest of the Politburo members. Ulanhu falls among the latter. Judging by his public statements—during Arkhipov's China visit, for example—Peng may also be more flexible in his views on Sino-Soviet relations than others in the Chinese leadership.

Implications Beijing's readiness to treat the USSR as a socialist country effectively overthrows two decades of pessimistic media assessments about the potential for positive change in Soviet state and society. The traditional Maoist critique of Soviet "revisionism" (Beijing's term for Moscow's abandonment of class struggle in both the foreign

⁶ Li Peng and Wan Li are both vice premiers of the State Council, but Wan Li as a veteran is always named ahead of Li in lists of public appearances by state leaders. Similarly, Peng Zhen as NPC chairman ordinarily follows PRC Vice President Ulanhu—who led the leaders paying respects at the Soviet Embassy on Andropov's death last year—in name lists following strict state protocol.

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and domestic spheres under Khrushchev) and its pursuit of "social-imperialism" (the harnessing of the resources of a society organized formally along socialist lines to pursue imperialist aggression externally) saw little possibility of fundamental change because Soviet leadership policies drew on attitudes embedded in Soviet society itself and on predilections deeply rooted in Russia's tsarist past. Soviet leaderships could come and go, according to this critique, but there was little prospect of fundamental changes in policy. Public acknowledgment of the "socialist" character of the USSR implies, conversely, that Soviet policies can change for the better, particularly when the Soviet leadership chooses to do so.

By the same token, the revised placement of the USSR in Beijing's political taxonomy introduces a deep cleavage in the foundations of China's foreign policy, which long has included the principle that a socialist country cannot also be "hegemonist."

As Deng Xiaoping moved in recent years to dismantle Mao's ideological legacy on China's domestic scene, he attempted to remove the same ideological constraints from PRC foreign policy, and particularly as applied to the USSR, while still upholding Mao's anti-Sovietism. From this process of demaoification emerged a new body of ideological principles that Beijing has used to distinguish real socialist parties and states from false ones.

In recent years Beijing's rare public analyses of the origins of Soviet foreign policy have reaffirmed the pessimism of the Maoist critique on prospects for change. The traditional Maoist critique of Soviet "revisionism" was abandoned not because of a changed attitude toward the USSR, but clearly because of Beijing's reassessment of the role of class struggle under socialism in its own domestic context. In its place there emerged a Dengist critique of Soviet social imperialism based on an analysis of Soviet "hegemonism."

These changes are recorded in the CPC's most authoritative documents. The landmark resolution on party history adopted by the Central Committee in 1981, for example, reaffirmed China's "just struggle" against Soviet "big-nation chauvinism" in the 1950's and 1960's, the formulation of the "correct strategy" of the "three worlds theory," and the PRC's pursuit of "genuine internationalism," and not hegemonism, as "indelible contributions" of Mao Zedong and the party leadership. The prevailing CPC constitution, adopted at the party congress in 1982, formally enjoins the party to unite with all progressive parties and groups in the world on the basis of proletarian internationalism in the "common struggle" against hegemonism.

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Although Beijing since Mao's death has moved gradually to reestablish ties with foreign communist parties, it has done so on the basis of a series of four principles that together, according to Beijing comment, advance its struggle against Soviet hegemonism. These four principles are mutual respect, equality, independence, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other parties. As Beijing has articulated and applied them in resuming ties with parties it once dismissed as revisionist—as in Yugoslavia and West Europe—or in exploring the possibility of ties with those it formerly regarded as Soviet pawns—as in East Europe—the emphasis has been to encourage independence from Moscow and its “hegemonic” ambitions within the international communist movement.

As applied to the CPSU itself, the new critique of Soviet hegemonism—and the four principles Beijing has enunciated on that basis for interparty ties—has provided the foundation for continued explicit criticism. On the basis of the four principles, Beijing says it is no longer appropriate for China to criticize Soviet domestic policies, but asserts that it remains obliged to criticize Soviet hegemonism in the international communist movement and in international affairs generally. Hu Yaobang was cited by Xinhua in 1983, for example, dismissing the CPSU's claim to being a socialist party in view of Moscow's pursuit of hegemonism in Afghanistan, citing Lenin's observation that a proletariat that inflicts the slightest degree of coercion on another nation cannot be a “socialist proletariat.”

With respect to state relations, Soviet hegemonism as a “difference in principle” between the two countries is embodied in the “three obstacles” that Beijing asserts impede full Sino-Soviet normalization. Beijing's recent public treatment of the USSR as a socialist country, therefore, appears to be fundamentally inconsistent with the ideological framework of its approach to communist relations and to state foreign policy.

Prospects Beijing has thus far not offered a rationale that attempts to reconcile the discontinuity between its longstanding policies and the principles that justify them on one hand and its public acknowledgment of the USSR's socialist credentials on the other. Media coverage of an NPC delegation that arrived in the Soviet Union before Chernenko's death and left after his funeral, however, suggests that Beijing's treatment of the Soviet Union as socialist is not a one-time gesture extended to Moscow on the occasion of a major leadership transition. A mid-tour

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commentary on the delegation's progress carried in Beijing's Russian-language broadcasts on 10 March conventionally recounted the delegation's favorable impressions of achievements in "economic construction." Reports on the delegation after Chernenko's funeral in *Renmin Ribao* and Beijing Russian broadcasts on the 16th, however, said that the group had familiarized itself with Soviet successes in "socialist construction."

Although Beijing apparently has not changed its views on Soviet "hegemonism" or on the substance of the three "obstacles" to Sino-Soviet normalization, it has not explicitly reiterated that the obstacles continue to confound bilateral ties. Low-level commentary continues to criticize the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and to denounce Hanoi's actions in Cambodia. Post-funeral commentary is not known to have criticized Soviet complicity in Cambodia, but such omissions have been the rule, not the exception.

Li Peng himself appeared to assert the constancy of PRC foreign policy goals in his conversation with Gorbachev on the 14th, as reported by Xinhua. In remarks implying that Beijing is retaining its views on "hegemonism" in world affairs, he reaffirmed that China "pursues an independent foreign policy" aimed at establishing a lasting world peace. Implicitly reiterating Beijing's oft-stated corollary position that it will participate neither in an American axis against the USSR nor join the Soviet bloc against the United States, Li stated that China "is not aligned with and does not establish strategic relations" with other countries.

With respect to potential CPC-CPSU ties, the pattern of China's interaction with the East European bloc parties, Romania aside, is suggestive. In the East European case, Beijing's public acknowledgment of those countries' socialist credentials—made by Zhao Ziyang at the NPC session in June 1983—has been accompanied by numerous gestures and signals in the same direction, only some of which have been reproduced in the Soviet context. For example, SED chief Erich Honecker and Hu Yaobang were reported by GDR and PRC media to have exchanged greetings last year, paralleling the Gorbachev-Hu exchange via Li Peng.

At the same time Beijing has undertaken some steps in dealing with the East European bloc that it has not yet extended to the Soviets:

- PRC media accounts of bilateral dealings with East Europe now ordinarily include the party titles of both Chinese and East European officials. PRC media accounts of Sino-Soviet dealings, including those connected with the Chernenko funeral observances and bilateral dealings since then, still do not.

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- Zhao's public recognition of the bloc countries' socialist nature was accompanied by concrete contacts between the parties. A delegation of CPC propaganda officials toured the GDR in 1983, for example. No such exchange has been reported with the Soviet Union, though the way may now be open for contacts of this nature.
- Li Peng's comments to Gorbachev on the potential for Sino-Soviet ties also were cast in a framework that appears to be more limited than that applied to some East European bloc countries and to preclude CPC-CPSU ties, at least for the time being. According to Xinhua, Li expressed China's hope to "coexist peacefully" with all countries, including the Soviet Union, and to establish friendly relations with them, effectively reaffirming the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" as the basis for Sino-Soviet ties. Beijing has publicly gone further with at least one East European bloc country. During the China visit of Hungarian Deputy Premier Marjai last August—the highest ranking East European bloc leader to visit China since the mid-1960's—his host, Li Peng, cited Beijing's four principles of interparty ties, modified slightly to accommodate Hungarian sensitivities, as the basis for improved ties with Budapest.

Indochina: Gorbachev Reassures Hanoi

At a time of potentially fundamental change in Sino-Soviet ties, Moscow's leaders have firmly underscored the continuity of Soviet support for Hanoi and its Indochinese allies in meetings with their representatives after Chernenko's funeral. Indochinese treatment of Chernenko's demise was virtually identical to the attention the three countries gave to Andropov's passing, and none of the three countries has publicly signaled concern over new departures in Sino-Soviet relations.

In his 14 March meeting with the Vietnamese delegation, headed by CPV Politburo member and SRV President Truong Chinh, Gorbachev reaffirmed Moscow's relationship with Hanoi and its approach to Southeast Asian regional questions. According to Moscow radio the same day, the two sides noted their satisfaction with the "unshakable cohesion" of Soviet-Vietnamese relations, an assertion that was not recorded in Soviet media accounts of Truong Chinh's meeting with Chernenko after Andropov's funeral last year. They also underlined their "determination" to continue "actively cooperating"

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Vietnamese State Council Chairman Truong Chinh with General Secretary Gorbachev and Central Committee Secretary Rusakov (front left) prior to their 14 March meeting. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985)

in the international arena. Gorbachev reassured Hanoi of his continued support for Vietnam on Southeast Asian issues, expressing Moscow's "solidarity" with Vietnam in its struggle against the "intrigues of imperialism and those who abet them."

As Soviet media did last year in reporting Truong Chinh's meeting with Chernenko, Moscow radio's account of the meeting with Gorbachev again underscored the special relationship between Moscow and Hanoi, noting that the two leaders reached a "complete identity of views." In only one other case—Gorbachev's meeting with representatives of the Warsaw Pact countries—did Moscow report that the new Soviet party leader reached "unanimity of views" with the foreign leaders that he received.

Moscow radio's report on the Gorbachev meeting with Truong Chinh in its Vietnamese broadcasts on 15 March went even further. After noting that both leaders expressed satisfaction at the "close and unshakable solidarity" between the two sides, Moscow radio's commentator observed that the Soviet Union has always given Vietnam reliable support in its "fierce struggles

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against foreign invaders and in its peaceful construction." The radio commentator went on to recall that Gorbachev, at the Vietnamese party congress in 1982, had pledged that the two countries would remain united due to common goals and mutual regard for each other's achievements.

Neither Soviet nor Vietnamese media accounts of the Gorbachev meeting with Truong Chinh cited either leader referring directly to China or to recent developments in Sino-Soviet relations. Moscow radio's broadcasts in Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian all included Gorbachev's brief statement on the potential for improvement in Sino-Soviet ties in reporting his CPSU speech on 11 March and have reported Gorbachev's landmark meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng. Vietnamese media have not commented directly on any of these developments.

Reception for Lao, Cambodian Leaders Moscow upgraded its welcome for both the Lao and Cambodian delegations attending Chernenko's funeral. Gorbachev received the Lao delegation headed by Politburo member and President Souphanouvong on 14 March, an honor not bestowed on Souphanouvong by Chernenko at Andropov's funeral. Gorbachev used his meeting with Souphanouvong to offer reassurances on regional issues, routinely reiterating Moscow's "firm support" for Indochina's "constructive stand" for solving Southeast Asian problems. In addition, Moscow radio on the 15th noted that Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov on the same day had a "warm and friendly" conversation on questions of "mutual interest" with Lao Politburo member and Defense Minister Khamtai Siphandon, a member of the Lao delegation to the funeral.

Soviet Premier Tikhonov met with Cambodian party and state chief Heng Samrin on 14 March, a gesture that may signal a greater willingness on the part of Moscow's new leadership to lend diplomatic support to Phnom Penh and to Hanoi's policy on Cambodia. Heng Samrin was not received by any Soviet leader following Andropov's funeral last year. According to TASS on the 14th, Tikhonov pledged Moscow's continued "all-round support" for the Phnom Penh regime's efforts to build the country and "defend the gains of the revolution."

The new regime's support for Cambodia was also reflected in routine media commentary. An atypical Moscow radio commentary in Cambodian on the 13th, for example, welcomed the fall of the last Cambodian resistance camp at Ta Tum to the combined forces of the Phnom Penh regime and Hanoi. And on the 15th, Moscow radio's *International Situation: Questions and Answers*

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program praised the "vigorous attacks" that wiped out the resistance bases. Under Chernenko, Moscow was generally more restrained in voicing its own support for Phnom Penh, tending to offer only indirect support for the fighting against the resistance by publicizing Phnom Penh reports.

Hanoi Hanoi's observances of Chernenko's death closely followed the pattern of its treatment of Andropov's. Truong Chinh had attended Andropov's funeral in Moscow as he did Chernenko's. The party Central Committee, National Assembly, Council of State, and Council of Ministers issued a joint communique announcing Chernenko's death, and the party paper *Nhan Dan* carried two editorials mourning Chernenko's passing and highlighting his contributions to Soviet-Vietnamese relations. A joint party-state delegation led by CPV Politburo member and SRV Premier Pham Van Dong paid the traditional condolence call at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, and on 13 March Dong delivered a eulogy at the customary memorial service that underlined the "unshakable friendship" between Hanoi and Moscow.

The Vietnamese leadership's condolence message on Chernenko's death, publicized by VNA on the 11th, was virtually identical to the message they sent on Andropov's death, although the present message seemed to imply that Chernenko was a better benefactor than Andropov. It recalled that Chernenko had "always rendered profound sentiments, precious support, and assistance" to Vietnam's cause; the condolence message on Andropov's death recalled only that he had rendered Vietnam "great service." Similarly CPV chief Le Duan's message congratulating Gorbachev on his election as CPSU general secretary seemed to suggest that the new Soviet leader was expected to be an even closer supporter of Hanoi. It praised the new Soviet leader as a "close friend of the Vietnamese people," a characterization that had been lacking in Le Duan's congratulatory messages to both Chernenko and Andropov on their succession.

Le Duan failed to appear to sign the condolence book for Chernenko at the Soviet Embassy. In 1982 at the time of Brezhnev's demise, he led the Vietnamese delegation to pay its respects to Brezhnev at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi; in 1984 he made a separate appearance at the Soviet Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City to sign the condolence book for Andropov. There is no media evidence, however, to suggest that Le Duan's absence on this occasion was intended as a snub. In addition to his message to Gorbachev, Vietnamese media reported that Le Duan sent a wreath to the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi.

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The reasons for Le Duan's failure to extend condolences in person either in Hanoi or in Ho Chi Minh City are not clear. Le Duan also failed conspicuously to receive a delegation of the Portuguese Communist Party, led by Political Commission member and Central Committee Secretary Octavio Pato, which arrived in Hanoi on 11 March. Le Duan customarily receives all major visiting communist party delegations. In mid-February, for example, he received an Italian Communist Party delegation. The Portuguese delegation, however, left Vietnam on the 13th without seeing Le Duan, paid a three-day visit to Cambodia, and returned to Hanoi to meet on the 18th with CPV Politburo member Truong Chinh, Le Duan's routine stand-in at meetings with visiting communist party delegations on several other occasions in the past two years when the Vietnamese party chief has been absent for prolonged periods.

All of Le Duan's recent appearances, both before and after the funeral, have put him in the south. He appeared most recently, according to Vietnamese media accounts, at a liberation anniversary celebration in the southern province of Binh Tri Thien on 25 and 26 March. VNA on 6 and 20 March reported that he "recently" visited dockworkers in Ho Chi Minh City and a construction site in the southern province of Dong Nai respectively. Before that, Le Duan's most recent appearance was in late February, when he was reported attending the 21-23 February plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front in Ho Chi Minh City.

**Vientiane,
Phnom Penh**

Like Hanoi, both Vientiane and Phnom Penh followed established precedents in marking the passing of Chernenko. The attendance of Souphanouvong and Politburo member and Defense Minister Khamtai Siphandon at funeral ceremonies in Moscow repeats their appearances in Moscow for Andropov's funeral. In Vientiane, Lao party chief Kaysone Phomvihan led the turnout at the Soviet Embassy, as he had on the occasion of Andropov's demise, and delivered a eulogy at a 13 March memorial service that closely paralleled one that he gave for Andropov. Both the leadership condolence message and Kaysone's congratulatory telegram to Gorbachev were virtually identical to the messages sent by the Lao following Andropov's passing.

As before, party and state chief Heng Samrin headed Phnom Penh's delegation to the funeral in Moscow. At home, Phnom Penh followed past precedent by sending a high-ranking delegation to the Soviet Embassy to pay condolences and sending condolence and congratulatory messages that were virtually identical to those sent on the occasion of Andropov's demise. At a

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14 March memorial service, Politburo member and PRK National Assembly Chairman Chea Sim delivered a eulogy that mourned Chernenko's passing in terms similar to those used in the eulogy for Andropov at the memorial service last year.

Korea: Pyongyang Seeks Improved Ties

Moscow upgraded its reception for Pyongyang's representatives at Chernenko's funeral but was characteristically cautious in its expressions of Soviet-DPRK solidarity. Pyongyang's observances of Chernenko's death reflect the improvements in Soviet-Korean relations that have emerged over the past year, a trend Pyongyang appears eager to further.

While North Korea's delegations for the funerals of Brezhnev and Andropov were not received by high-level Soviet leaders, DPRK Premier Kang Song-san met with his counterpart Tikhonov on 13 March. DPRK media accounts, describing the atmosphere as "friendly," reported that Tikhonov praised the results of Kim Il-song's May 1984 visit to Moscow and that he claimed relations were "developing onto a high stage." A TASS account of the meeting, transmitted on the 13th, characterized the talks as "warm and friendly," paralleling Soviet media formulations depicting the atmosphere in Gorbachev's meeting with the Mongolian and Yugoslav party heads on the same day.

TASS's account of the substance of Kang's meeting with Tikhonov also was virtually identical to that used for Tikhonov's talks with the head of the Mongolian Council of Ministers, Dumaagiyn Sodnom, also on the 13th. TASS thus cited both Tikhonov and Kang expressing "satisfaction" with the development of relations and pledging to work to the "utmost" to strengthen ties.

Pyongyang Pyongyang's upbeat observances reflected trends in Soviet-North Korean relations over the past year. Kim Il-song's 12 March condolence message credited Chernenko with having "greatly" contributed to raising relations between the two parties and countries to a "new, higher stage." The North has used this evaluation repeatedly over the past year to describe the results of Kim's meetings with Chernenko last May.

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Similarly upbeat, Kim Il-song's congratulatory message to Gorbachev, carried by KCNA on the 12th, was warmer than his greetings to Chernenko last year on his succession. Kim described Gorbachev as an "outstanding activist," praise that Pyongyang extended to Chernenko and Andropov only after their deaths. Kim also went on to call attention to the "correct" leadership of the CPSU and to note the "long historical tradition based on a solid class alliance and comradeship" of Korean-Soviet friendship, characterizations that were not included in Kim's congratulatory messages to either Andropov or Chernenko.

Also reflecting the improvement in party ties, a *Nodong Sinmun* editorial on the 13th pegged to Chernenko's passing was markedly warmer in describing USSR-DPRK relations than one in February 1984 on the death of Andropov. This year's editorial described the two sides as "close revolutionary comrades" and praised their "militant fraternity and revolutionary unity." Last year's editorial referred merely to the "firm solidarity" between the two sides as "class brothers."

The delegation Pyongyang sent to funerary observances in Moscow appeared to reflect the closer party ties suggested in these formulations. The delegation was led by Premier Kang Song-san, who is equivalent in party ranking to the head of the DPRK representation for the Andropov and Brezhnev funerals. The delegation to Chernenko's funeral, however, also included the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) secretary in charge of international affairs, Hwang Chang-yop.

North Korean comment pegged to Chernenko's death praised the former Soviet leader for his efforts to promote "the unity of socialist countries," a theme that Pyongyang has emphasized during the past year to signal its interest in closer solidarity with Moscow and East Europe. The call for unity—which was not included in the North's eulogies for Andropov or Brezhnev—was stressed by Kim Il-song during his visit to the USSR and East Europe in 1984. It received prominent attention at the ninth WPK plenum in July 1984, and Kim emphasized it again in his New Year address in January. In an apparent effort to reaffirm the North's commitment to closer cooperation with the Soviet Union at a time of transition in Moscow, *Nodong Sinmun* on 12 March carried an article, reported by KCNA the same day, that recalled Kim's New Year remarks on this score and renewed Pyongyang's views on the importance of improving "socialist unity."

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Cuba: New Signs of Strain Apparent

Fidel Castro's failure to attend Chernenko's funeral and other anomalies in Cuban observances of the occasion sharpened earlier signals of tension between the two allies. Second-ranked party and state leader Raul Castro, who headed Cuba's delegation to the funeral, was accorded a chilly reception in Moscow.

Possibly reflecting Moscow's pique at Fidel Castro's absence at the funeral, Gorbachev's meeting with Raul Castro on 20 March was blatantly belated, coming several days after the new leader's meetings with the heads of other delegations. TASS characterized Gorbachev's meeting with Raul Castro in routine fashion, noting that the talks took place in an atmosphere of "fraternal friendship, cordiality, and full mutual understanding." TASS used the same formulation to describe Fidel Castro's talks with Chernenko following Andropov's funeral last year.

The day before meeting with Gorbachev, Raul Castro, who is also Cuba's minister of defense, met with Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov. TASS reported, without elaboration, that the two had held a "cordial and friendly conversation" on "questions of mutual interest."



Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro (foreground) offers condolences to Soviet leadership at reception following Chernenko's funeral. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985)

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Soviet media attention to Raul Castro's presence in Moscow was otherwise routine. *Pravda* listed him among Soviet bloc delegations arriving and paying last respects to Chernenko in the Hall of Columns on the 12th and reported him attending funeral ceremonies and the Soviet leadership reception on the 13th. Soviet media also publicized Fidel Castro's condolence message and briefly acknowledged his message of congratulations to Gorbachev.

Havana Havana has offered no explanation for Fidel Castro's decision not to attend Chernenko's funeral, a trip he had made to mark the passing of Brezhnev and Andropov. Cuban media also are not known to have publicized Castro signing the condolence book for Chernenko at the Soviet Embassy, though *Pravda* in its 15 March issue stated that he had. Cuban media had reported him doing so in marking the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov. Havana radio on 12 and 13 March did report several Cuban leaders signing the book but Castro's name was not included.

Havana media also ignored Western press speculation about Castro's absence from Chernenko's funeral. Castro's 14 March interview with CBS, in which he briefly explained that his absence was because of a heavy workload, received virtually no attention in Cuban media. This treatment contrasts with the extensive coverage Havana accorded other interviews Castro gave with Western reporters last month. The only Cuban media coverage of Castro's CBS interview was a brief Prensa Latina report on 18 March that failed to mention Castro's disclaimer that his absence from Moscow should not be read as a sign of strain in Cuban-Soviet relations.

Castro did send a condolence message on Chernenko's death, but its tone and substance contrast sharply with the one he sent after Andropov's death, differences that seem to point up Havana's dissatisfaction with Soviet attitudes toward Cuba under Chernenko. Castro's message last year effusively praised Andropov as "a true friend" who had demonstrated his "affection, understanding, and support" for Cuba and who had "confirmed" his understanding of Cuba's need for Soviet economic and military cooperation. In contrast, Castro's message marking Chernenko's death, reported by Havana radio on 12 March, was cooler in tone, eulogizing Chernenko only as a "constant friend" who had expressed the solidarity of the Soviet party, government, and people with Cuba.

By the same token, Castro's message to Gorbachev on the death of Chernenko appeared to seek reassurance from the new party chief on the issue of Soviet cooperation with Cuba. In the message, Castro pointedly expressed confidence

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that "Soviet cooperation with the cause of defending national sovereignty and with the building of socialism in Cuba are irreversible," a conviction he did not find reason to include in his message last year.

Background These signs of strain in Cuban-Soviet ties comport with earlier indications of Cuban dissatisfaction with the terms of Soviet economic aid and of Soviet pressure on Havana to improve economic efficiency and fulfill its economic commitments to the communist bloc. Castro's absence from Chernenko's funeral is the second time in recent months that the Cuban leader has passed up an occasion to visit Moscow. Castro was the only top leader of a country having full membership in CEMA to miss the organization's summit meeting in Moscow last June, a snub that may have reflected Cuban disappointment over the level of economic aid it was receiving from the Soviet-dominated organization.⁷ In October, during the meeting of CEMA premiers in Havana, Castro acknowledged that Cuba had been criticized by its partners for delaying economic deliveries to the socialist bloc. These criticisms in turn may have played a role in Cuba's ongoing campaign, launched by Castro in several speeches last December, for greater economic austerity at home in order to meet international economic obligations.⁸

Nicaragua: Cautious Support for Sandinista Regime

Although Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega may have sought out promises of stronger Soviet support for Managua while he was in Moscow, Gorbachev's expressions of solidarity cautiously hewed to traditional Soviet lines.

Moscow's reception for Ortega, who headed Managua's delegation to Chernenko's funeral, mirrored its welcome for him last year when he attended Andropov's funeral and reflected the care it usually takes in public statements about the extent of Soviet support for Nicaragua. As Chernenko had done last year, General Secretary Gorbachev received Ortega on 13 March. According

⁷ For a discussion of Castro's absence at the CEMA summit last June and Cuban unhappiness with CEMA aid, see the *Trends* of 20 June 1984, pages 7-8.

⁸ Castro's speeches on the revision of Cuba's economic plans and the need to improve productivity are discussed in the *Trends* of 16 January 1985, pages 14-17, and 30 January 1985, pages 12-13.

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to TASS's account that day, Gorbachev went no further than to express the "Soviet people's solidarity" with Nicaragua, repeating the stock formulation Chernenko used in his talks with Ortega last year.

Both sides routinely denounced U.S. policy on Central America and reiterated longstanding positions on the need for efforts, like those of the Contadora Group, to find a political settlement for the conflicts in the region. In this regard, Gorbachev, according to TASS, gave a "high" assessment of the "constructive" initiatives put forward recently by Managua on ways to resolve Central American conflicts.⁹ Unlike last year, when Ortega's meeting with Chernenko was described as "friendly," neither Soviet nor Nicaraguan media characterized the atmospherics of the recent talks.

Managua's observances of Chernenko's death closely paralleled the pattern it used to mark Andropov's passing last year. As he did last year, Ortega declared a national mourning period of three days and sent a condolence message to the Soviet leadership in the name of the Nicaraguan Government and the Sandinista leadership, in addition to leading the Nicaraguan delegation to funerary ceremonies in Moscow.

In both his condolence message and his statement on arrival in Moscow, as reported by Managua radio on 13 March, Ortega went out of his way to recall Chernenko's "special love and understanding" for Nicaragua's "struggle for development and independence." In his arrival statement, he recalled that Chernenko first met Ortega and other Sandinista leaders at the Cuban party congress in 1980, where he began a pattern of regular "brotherly communication" that reflected Chernenko's "great understanding" of Central American and Nicaraguan problems. Ortega had not made parallel comments about either Brezhnev or Andropov in observing their deaths.

Although both Managua and Moscow were reserved about publicizing the substance of Ortega's conversation with Gorbachev while he was in Moscow, Ortega confidently asserted after leaving Moscow that Soviet economic and diplomatic support for Nicaragua would continue. In remarks during a brief stopover in Havana on the 19th, reported the same day by the Nicaraguan news agency (ANN), Ortega claimed that Gorbachev pledged to continue Soviet economic cooperation with Nicaragua. Ortega added that he also "perceived clear support" for his government's peace initiatives during his talks in Moscow.

⁹ Nicaragua's recent initiatives and Moscow's reaction to them are discussed in the *Trends* of 6 March 1985, pages 1-4.

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Nonruling Parties: Dissident Communists Cultivated

General Secretary Gorbachev's meeting after Chernenko's funeral with leaders of the Italian and Japanese Communist Parties, two of the nonruling communist parties with which the CPSU has had its most troubled relations in the past, suggests a more flexible Soviet approach toward dissident parties. Moscow's primary aim with both parties appears to be to obtain their endorsement of Soviet positions on space and nuclear weapons.

Gorbachev's meetings with the representatives of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) represented a departure from Soviet practice after other recent Soviet leaders' funerals. It was the first meeting of Soviet and Italian party heads since 1979. Former PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer attended both the Brezhnev and Andropov funerals but did not meet separately with the new CPSU general secretary on either occasion. Similarly, the JCP representative at the two previous funerals did not meet with Soviet leaders.

The significance of Gorbachev's meetings with the PCI and JCP representatives was underscored by his failure to meet with representatives from other nonruling parties, even from the more orthodox parties, including such longtime pro-Soviet figures as Alvaro Cunhal of the Portuguese Communist Party and the leader of the pro-Soviet Spanish communist faction, Ignacio Gallego. The only other earlier meeting with a nonruling party was Andropov's talk with French Communist Party (PCF) leader Georges Marchais after the Brezhnev funeral in November 1983. Marchais did not attend the Chernenko funeral although he had been present for Andropov's final rites and was not received at that time.

The language of the authoritative TASS reports on Gorbachev's meetings with the Italian and Japanese communist representatives—both of which appeared on page one of *Pravda*—projected a picture of improved CPSU cooperation with both the PCI and the JCP and a common outlook on disarmament issues:

- **PCI.** The TASS report on Gorbachev's 14 March talks with PCI General Secretary Alessandro Natta described the atmosphere of their discussion as "friendly" and conveyed the impression that the two parties had agreed to strive jointly to end the arms race "both on earth and in outer space." The report said nothing about any past or current differences between the two sides. Strengthening the impression of a common CPSU-PCI view on the

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international situation, Soviet television on 22 March publicized Natta's praise for the USSR's stand against the "aggressive plans of imperialism" and its "struggle" to end the arms race on earth and "to prevent it in outer space."

The Gorbachev-Natta meeting came in the wake of a gradual improvement in CPSU-PCI relations over the past 30 months. During that period, Moscow has generally avoided direct attacks on the PCI despite periodic criticism of Soviet policies by the PCI and its leaders. This period of relative quiescence followed sustained attacks on PCI leaders in Soviet journals during 1981 and 1982 for their criticism of martial law in Poland and their reservations about the applicability of the Soviet "model" of socialism.¹⁰ Gorbachev's attendance at former PCI leader Berlinguer's funeral in Rome last June strengthened the impression of a more favorable Soviet attitude toward the PCI.

- **JCP.** Gorbachev's meeting with the Japanese party's de facto leader Tetsuzo Fuwa apparently was aimed at sustaining the momentum toward improved CPSU-JCP ties that developed in late 1984. The official TASS report on the Gorbachev-Fuwa talks was even more upbeat than the report on JCP party chairman Kenzi Miyamoto's meeting with Chernenko last December. It approvingly noted CPSU and JCP agreement in December on "cooperation in the struggle for preventing nuclear war" and for the "complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons." It also cited Gorbachev as personally calling for increased cooperation between the two parties in the struggle for better Soviet-Japanese relations and recorded the Japanese delegation as expressing "the same opinion." The report made no reference to any disagreements between the sides.

By contrast, although the joint statement issued after Miyamoto's December visit to Moscow described his talks with Chernenko as having taken place in an atmosphere of "friendship and comradely solidarity," it also acknowledged the two parties' "divergences of opinion" on a variety of issues including their evaluations of responsibility for the nuclear arms race. Unlike the report on the 15 March Gorbachev-Fuwa talks, the December joint statement made no mention of both sides' interest in joint efforts to improve Soviet-Japanese relations.¹¹

¹⁰ For a discussion of Moscow's attacks on the PCI in 1981 and 1982 see the *Trends* of 14 April 1982, pages 6-7.

¹¹ For more detailed treatment of Miyamoto's December 1984 visit to the USSR and continuing signs of contention between the two parties, see the *Trends* of 9 January 1985, pages 14-16.

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South Asia: Concern Over Afghan Conflict

Soviet accounts of Gorbachev's meetings on 14 March with the leaders of Afghanistan and Pakistan illustrated Moscow's concern and frustration over developments in the Afghan conflict, and there was evidence of tension in Soviet-Afghan relations. Upbeat reports on Gorbachev's meeting the previous day with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi underlined Moscow's desire to maintain close ties with India in the wake of the assassination of its longtime friend, Indira Gandhi.

Afghanistan Despite expressions of "satisfaction" with "friendly relations" between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and reaffirmations of a desire to strengthen them, the official TASS report on Gorbachev's 14 March meeting with Karmal was notable for its lack of warmth. By contrast with previous accounts of Afghan leader Karmal's post-funeral meetings with Chernenko and Andropov, which were described as taking place in a "warm and friendly atmosphere," TASS merely characterized Karmal's session with Gorbachev as a "comradely conversation."

Soviet reporting on the Gorbachev-Karmal talks gave unusual prominence to the Afghan conflict. Unlike reports of Karmal's comparable meetings with Andropov and Chernenko, which dealt only with bilateral questions, the report on the meeting with Gorbachev contained an explicit denunciation of the "continuing aggressive actions by outside forces" and reiterated Moscow's longstanding position that foreign intervention in Afghanistan must cease before any settlement is possible.

Pakistan Consistent with the pattern in recent months of Soviet pressure on Pakistan for its policy toward Afghanistan, Gorbachev's meeting with Pakistani President Zia appeared designed to reinforce Soviet complaints about Islamabad's support for the Afghan rebels. According to the TASS account, Gorbachev forcefully reiterated Moscow's displeasure with Islamabad's policy, directly accusing Pakistan of allowing its territory to be used for mounting "aggressive actions" against Afghanistan and warning that this policy "cannot but have a most unfavorable effect on the state of Soviet-Pakistani relations."¹² The TASS account of Andropov's November 1982 meeting with Zia merely noted that the two sides held a

¹² According to the TASS report issued at the time, Gromyko delivered a similarly pointed rebuke to Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan during their meeting in New York last September. For a further discussion, see the *Trends* of 12 December 1984, pages 4-5, and 3 October 1984, pages 1-2.

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“short conversation” concerning the “situation around Afghanistan,” although disagreement between the sides was reflected in TASS’s failure to provide a characterization of the atmosphere of the session. Chernenko did not receive Zia in 1984.

India A strong bid for maintaining close relations with India seemed to be reflected in the report of Gorbachev’s meeting with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Using markedly warmer terms than had been applied to comparable meetings with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1982 or 1984, TASS said that the Gorbachev-Gandhi meeting took place in an “atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual understanding,” with the two sides noting the “high level, dynamism, and diversified character” of their “fruitfully developing” relations. By contrast, Soviet accounts of the 1984 Chernenko-Indira Gandhi meeting cited a “warm, friendly atmosphere,” while the parties merely noted the “steady development of Soviet-Indian relations.” The more terse account of Indira’s 1982 meeting with Andropov referred to an “atmosphere of mutual understanding” and reported only that the two sides agreed on the importance of “deepening and strengthening Soviet-Indian cooperation.”

Middle East: Low Profile

For the most part, Moscow observed past practice in its relatively low-key treatment of Middle East leaders at the funeral. The highest level reception was given PDRY President ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad, who met with Gorbachev. Soviet accounts of the funeral underscored the deterioration in Moscow’s relations with PLO leader Yasir ‘Arafat.

South and North Yemen Delegations from both South Yemen (PDRY) and North Yemen (YAR) were granted higher level audiences than at the time of previous Soviet successions, with Gorbachev meeting PDRY President ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad and Soviet Premier Tikhonov receiving YAR Prime Minister ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Abd al-Ghani. At the 1982 and 1984 funerals, the Soviet leadership received neither the PDRY nor the YAR delegation.

Syria Consistent with his status as deputy general secretary of the ruling Ba‘th Party, Syrian delegation leader ‘Abdallah al-Ahmar was received by candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev. In 1984 al-Ahmar also headed the Syrian delegation but was not reported to have met with the Soviet leadership.

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Iraq The Iraqi delegation, which included party Vice Chairman 'Izzat Ibrahim and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz, was not reported to have been granted a meeting. There were similarly no reported meetings with high-level Iraqi delegations following the Andropov and Brezhnev funerals.

Lebanon Soviet Premier Tikhonov's reception of Lebanese Premier Karami was unprecedented for the occasion. Lebanon had not sent comparable delegations in the past—none was listed by Moscow in 1982, and in 1984 Lebanon was represented only by a former president.

Egypt and Jordan Moscow kept unchanged its treatment of Egypt and Jordan at the Chernenko funeral compared with the Andropov funeral. The low-ranking Egyptian representative, Consultative Council Speaker al-Hakim, met with candidate Politburo member Kuznetsov, as had the Egyptian delegate at Andropov's funeral. In 1982 the Egyptian delegation had no reported meeting. There were no reported meetings with Jordanian representatives at any of the funerals.

PLO



PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat pays final tribute to Chernenko at formal lying-in-state ceremonies. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985)

Consistent with its arms-length treatment of 'Arafat over the past year, Soviet press reports on the funeral proceedings noted his presence but did not acknowledge his title as chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, simply referring to him and his lieutenant, Faruq Qaddumi, as representatives of the PLO. As was the case at past funerals, there was no Soviet report that 'Arafat had had a private meeting with any Soviet official. Soviet television, however, gave 'Arafat considerable attention, showing him bidding farewell at the lying-in-state ceremonies, focusing on him during the funeral proceedings at the Lenin Mausoleum, and showing him warmly greeting Gorbachev at the reception following the funeral.

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Algeria Candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev's meeting with the Algerian representative, FLN Politburo member Messaadia, is consistent with earlier signs of improved Soviet-Algerian ties, highlighted by Ponomarev's visit to Algiers in August 1984. Messaadia had attended both Brezhnev's and Andropov's funerals, but in neither instance was he reported to have met with a Soviet leader.

Africa: Ties With Allies Highlighted

Gorbachev met with three African leaders, Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos, Mozambique President Samora Machel, and Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam. None of them had previously been received by a new general secretary following a funeral.

Angola Gorbachev's 14 March talk with dos Santos, the first between the Angolan president and the Soviet leadership since dos Santos visited Moscow in May 1983, raises the possibility of a higher Soviet profile on Angolan issues. According to the authoritative TASS account of the meeting, both sides expressed "satisfaction" over the state of Soviet-Angolan relations while Moscow reaffirmed its "solidarity and support" for Angola's "rightful cause." The image of increased Soviet attention to Angola is reinforced by the 6 March high-level Soviet-Angolan-Cuban meeting in Moscow. As reported in *Pravda*, the participants at the 6 March meeting upheld Angola's public proposals as a "just foundation" for ensuring peace and security in the region and pledged "to further coordinate" their actions in "strengthening the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Angola."

The TASS report on the Gorbachev-dos Santos meeting, however, also reflected the strains that have been evident in Soviet-Angolan relations since Luanda began negotiating its disengagement agreement with Pretoria. TASS failed to provide any characterization of the atmosphere of the 14 March meeting, an indication that the discussion may not have gone smoothly. By

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contrast, the communique issued on dos Santos's May 1983 visit depicted the talks on that occasion as "warm and friendly." Dos Santos inexplicably failed to attend Andropov's funeral in February 1984, and during a tour of East Europe that April he again failed to visit the Soviet Union. Moscow has not directly criticized Luanda for its policy of negotiations with South Africa, but has shown a distinct coolness for Luanda's willingness to deal directly with South Africa and the United States.¹³

Ethiopia Gorbachev's reception for Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam befitted Mengistu's position as Moscow's closest African ally and head of a newly formed workers party. TASS noted that the meeting took place in a "warm and comradely atmosphere" and that the two leaders expressed satisfaction with relations between their countries and parties. In addition, according to TASS, Moscow reaffirmed its "invariable solidarity" with Ethiopian efforts to "defend the gains of the revolution."

Mozambique Moscow's willingness to grant Mozambique President Machel a meeting with Gorbachev, despite apparent reservations about recent Mozambican policy toward South Africa and the West, underscored Soviet interest in southern Africa. The TASS account of their meeting gave no hint of serious disagreements, noting that it took place in a "friendly atmosphere and in a spirit of mutual understanding." Machel had been received by Premier Tikhonov at the 1984 funeral and by Defense Minister Ustinov at the 1982 funeral.

¹³ For further details, see the *Trends* of 4 April 1984, pages 7-9, and 18 April 1984, page 15.

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Media Behavior After Chernenko's Death

As was the case following the deaths of Andropov and Brezhnev, anomalies in Soviet media behavior signaled Chernenko's death before it was officially announced. Program changes were noted in the media less than six hours after Chernenko's death, which occurred at 1620 GMT (1920 Moscow time) on 10 March. At 2155 GMT national television omitted a regular program preview and a concert of gypsy music. From this point on, departures from scheduled radio and television programming were noted with increasing frequency. By 0200 GMT on 11 March, most regular programs on all audible channels of Soviet domestic radio had been replaced by classical music. After the normally scheduled *Vremya* television newscast at 0500 GMT, which begins the broadcast day in the Moscow area, there were major departures from scheduled programming.

In all three cases Soviet radios linked up before broadcasting announcements of the death of the general secretary, providing a clear indication that a major announcement was imminent. In the case of Andropov this linkup occurred 15 minutes before the announcement and in the case of Brezhnev approximately an hour before the announcement. There was less advance warning this time, since the linkup of the radios was delayed until immediately before the announcement of Chernenko's death.

A detailed chronology of significant Soviet media behavior following the deaths of Chernenko, Andropov, and Brezhnev is presented in Table 5.

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Table 1
Leadership Rankings at Lying-in-State
(Soviet Television)

11 March		12 March		13 March	
Lineup Before Approaching Family ¹		Honor Guard ²	Lineup Before Approaching Family	Honor Guard ³	Lineup Before Approaching Family
Politburo Members					
Vorotnikov	Gorbachev	Gorbachev	Gorbachev	Gorbachev	Gorbachev
	Tikhonov	Tikhonov	Tikhonov	Tikhonov	Tikhonov
	Gromyko	Gromyko	Gromyko	Gromyko	Gromyko
	Grishin	Grishin	Grishin	Grishin	Grishin
	Romanov	Romanov	Romanov	Romanov	Romanov
	Solomentsev	Aliyev	Solomentsev	Aliyev	Solomentsev
	Kunayev	Shcherbitskiy	Shcherbitskiy	Solomentsev	Kunayev
	Aliyev	Kunayev	Kunayev	Kunayev	Shcherbitskiy
		Vorotnikov	Vorotnikov	Shcherbitskiy	Aliyev
		Solomentsev	Aliyev	Vorotnikov	Vorotnikov
Candidate Politburo and Secretariat Members					
Ponomarev	Dolgikh	Kuznetsov	Kuznetsov	Demichev	Chebrikov
Demichev	Chebrikov	Demichev	Demichev	Ponomarev	Kuznetsov
Rusakov	Zimyanin	Dolgikh	Dolgikh	Dolgikh	Dolgikh
Shevardnadze	Ryzhkov	Chebrikov	Chebrikov	Kuznetsov	Ponomarev
Kapitonov	Ligachev	Ponomarev	Ponomarev	Chebrikov	Demichev
	Kuznetsov	Ligachev	Zimyanin	Ligachev	Zimyanin
		Shevardnadze	Ryzhkov	Ryzhkov	Shevardnadze
		Kapitonov	Rusakov	Kapitonov	Rusakov
		Rusakov	Shevardnadze	Rusakov	Kapitonov
		Ryzhkov	Kapitonov	Shevardnadze	Ryzhkov
		Zimyanin	Ligachev	Zimyanin	Ligachev

¹ Shcherbitskiy was absent; Vorotnikov stood apart from other Politburo members on Gorbachev's right, followed by Ponomarev, etc. When the Politburo members lined up to approach the family, Vorotnikov fell in after Aliyev (last). Leaders did not line up in groups as an honor guard as they did on 12 and 13 March. This lineup was shown in the 12 March *Pravda*.

² The television announcer also listed them in this order. The 13 March *Pravda* carried a photo of the ten Politburo members in this order.

³ The television announcer also listed them in this order. There was no photo of this event in the press.

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Table 2
Leadership Rankings at Chernenko Funeral in Red Square
(Soviet Television)

On Tribune, Before Burial ¹	Walking Behind Coffin to Grave	At Grave ²	On Tribune, After Burial
Politburo Members			
Gorbachev	Gorbachev	Gorbachev	Gorbachev
Grishin	Tikhonov	Romanov	Tikhonov
Romanov	Gromyko	Solomentsev	Gromyko
	Shcherbitskiy	Aliyev	Grishin
	Kunayev		Romanov
	Solomentsev		Solomentsev
	Aliyev		Vorotnikov
	Vorotnikov		Kunayev
			Aliyev
			Shcherbitskiy
Candidate Politburo and Secretariat Members			
Chebrikov	Ponomarev	Dolgikh	Ponomarev
	Demichev	Chebrikov	Kuznetsov
	Kuznetsov	Demichev	Shevardnadze
	Dolgikh		Kapitonov
	Shevardnadze		Ligachev
	Kapitonov		Zimyanin
	Ligachev		Rusakov
	Zimyanin		Ryzhkov
	Rusakov		
	Ryzhkov		

¹ This lineup was also the order shown in *Pravda's* 14 March photo.

² Vorotnikov, Shcherbitskiy, and Kunayev stood in a second row.

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Table 3
Meetings With Foreign Leaders ¹

Country or Party	Chernenko Funeral		Andropov Funeral		Brezhnev Funeral		
	Soviet Leader(s)	Visiting Leader	Soviet Leader(s)	Visiting Leader	Soviet Leader(s)	Visiting Leader	
Warsaw Pact Countries—Group Meetings ²							
Bulgaria	Gorbachev Tikhonov Gromyko Rusakov	Zhivkov Husak Honecker Kadar Jaruzelski Ceausescu	Chernenko	Zhivkov Husak Honecker Kadar Jaruzelski Ceausescu	— ³	Zhivkov	
Czechoslovakia			Tikhonov		Husak	—	Husak
East Germany			Gromyko		Honecker	—	Honecker
Hungary			Kadar		Kadar	—	Kadar
Poland			Jaruzelski		Jaruzelski	—	Jaruzelski
Romania			Ceausescu		Ceausescu	—	Ceausescu
Other Countries—Individual Meetings							
Afghanistan	Gorbachev Gromyko	Karmal	Chernenko Gromyko	Karmal	Andropov Gromyko Ponomarev	Karmal	
Angola	Gorbachev Gromyko	dos Santos	Shalayev ⁴	Luvualu	—	dos Santos	
Austria	Gorbachev Gromyko	Kirchschlaeger	—	Sinowitz	—	Kirchschlaeger	
Cambodia	Tikhonov Maltsev	Heng Samrin	—	Heng Samrin	— ⁵	Heng Samrin	
Canada	Gorbachev Gromyko	Mulroney	Chernenko Gromyko	Trudeau	Tikhonov Suslov	Trudeau	
China	Gorbachev Gromyko	Li Peng	Aliyev Ilichev	Wan Li	Gromyko Ilichev	Huang Hua	
Cuba	Gorbachev Rusakov Sokolov ⁶	Raul Castro	Chernenko Gromyko Rusakov	Fidel Castro	Andropov Rusakov Ustinov ⁷ Ogarkov	Fidel Castro	
Cyprus	—	Ladhas	Tikhonov	Kiprianou	—	Kiprianou	
Ethiopia	Gorbachev Gromyko	Mengistu	—	Mengistu	—	Mengistu	
Finland	Gorbachev Gromyko	Koivisto	—	Koivisto	—	Koivisto	
France	Gorbachev Gromyko	Mitterrand	Chernenko Gromyko	Mauroy	Tikhonov	Mauroy	

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Table 3 (Continued)
Meetings With Foreign Leaders ¹

Country or Party	Chernenko Funeral		Andropov Funeral		Brezhnev Funeral	
	Soviet Leader(s)	Visiting Leader	Soviet Leader(s)	Visiting Leader	Soviet Leader(s)	Visiting Leader
French CP	—	Plissonnier Gremetz	—	Marchais	Andropov Ponomarev	Marchais
West Germany	Gorbachev Gromyko	Kohl	Chernenko Gromyko	Kohl	Andropov Gromyko	Carstens
Great Britain	Gorbachev Gromyko	Thatcher	Chernenko Gromyko	Thatcher	Gromyko	Pym
Greece	—	Kharalambopoulos	Tikhonov	Papandreou	Tikhonov	Papandreou
India	Gorbachev Gromyko	Rajiv Gandhi	Chernenko Gromyko	Indira Gandhi	Andropov Gromyko	Indira Gandhi
Indonesia	—	— ⁸	—	Mokhtar	Tikhonov	Malik
Italy	Gorbachev Gromyko	Pertini	Chernenko Gromyko	Pertini	—	Fanfani
Italian CP	Gorbachev Ponomarev	Natta	—	Berlinguer	—	Berlinguer
Japan	Gorbachev Gromyko	Nakasone	Gromyko	Abe	—	Suzuki ⁹
Japanese CP	Gorbachev Ponomarev	Fuwa	—	Kaneko	—	Kaneko
North Korea	Tikhonov Maltsev	Kang	—	Pak	—	Pak
Laos	Gorbachev Gromyko Rusakov	Souphanouvong	—	Souphanouvong	—	Souphanouvong
Lebanon	Tikhonov Maltsev	Karami	—	Helou	—	— ⁸
Madagascar	—	Andrianarajinjaka	Chernenko Gromyko	Ratsiraka	—	Babeony
Malta	Tikhonov Maltsev	Barbara	Tikhonov	Barbara	—	Barbara
Mexico	Tikhonov Maltsev	Bartlett	—	Lugo	—	Gonzalez Avelar
Mongolia	Gorbachev Gromyko Rusakov	Batmonh	Chernenko Gromyko	Tsedenbal	—	Tsedenbal

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Mozambique	Gorbachev Gromyko	Machel	Tikhonov Ilichev	Machel	Ustinov Ogarkov	Machel
Nicaragua	Gorbachev Gromyko	Ortega	Chernenko Gromyko	Ortega	—	Ortega
Norway	Tikhonov Maltsev	Willoch	—	Harald Willoch	—	Harald
Pakistan	Gorbachev Gromyko	Ziaul Haq	—	Ziaul Haq	Andropov Gromyko	Ziaul Haq
Philippines	Gorbachev Gromyko	Imelda Marcos	—	— ⁸	Gromyko	Imelda Marcos
Portugal	—	do Amaral	Tikhonov	Soares	—	Pereira
Spain	Gorbachev Gromyko	Gonzalez	—	Guerra	—	Perez-Llorca
Turkey	Tikhonov Maltsev	Ozal	Tikhonov	Ozal	Tikhonov	Uлуу
United States	Gorbachev Gromyko	Bush	Chernenko Gromyko	Bush	Andropov Gromyko	Bush
Vietnam	Gorbachev Rusakov	Truong Chinh	Chernenko Gromyko Rusakov	Truong Chinh	— ¹⁰	Truong Chinh
North Yemen (YAR)	Tikhonov Maltsev	'Abd al-Ghani	—	al-'Arashi	—	Salih
South Yemen (PDRY)	Gorbachev Gromyko	'Ali Nasir Muhammad	—	'Ali Nasir Muhammad	—	'Ali Nasir Muhammad
Yugoslavia	Gorbachev Gromyko Rusakov	Djuranovic Sukrija	Arkhipov	Spiljak Markovic	Andropov Rusakov	Stambolic Ribicic

¹ Table includes representatives from countries or parties that were received by either the new general secretary or the Soviet premier while attending the funerals in 1982, 1984, or 1985. Meetings were reported by Soviet media unless otherwise noted. See Table 4 for full names and official positions of leaders listed in this table.

² The Soviet leaders met collectively with the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in 1984 and 1985. No meetings were reported in 1982.

³ A dash indicates that no meeting between any Soviet leader and the head of the delegation listed for the country is known to have been reported in Soviet media.

⁴ Reported by Angolan domestic radio.

⁵ Cambodian media reported that Cambodian Foreign Minister Hun Sen met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev.

⁶ Castro was received in a second meeting by Sokolov.

⁷ Castro was received in a second meeting by Ustinov and Ogarkov.

⁸ Delegate, if any, not known to have been named by Soviet media.

⁹ Suzuki was not reported to have met with any Soviet leaders; Foreign Minister Sakurauchi was received by Gromyko.

¹⁰ SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach met with Ilichev.

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Table 4
Full Names and Titles of Leaders

Name	Position
'Abd al-Ghani, 'Abd al-'Aziz	Prime Minister
Abe, Shintaro	Foreign Minister
Aliyev, Geydar A.	First Deputy Premier, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member
do Amaral, Fernando Monteiro	Speaker of the Assembly of the Republic
Andrianarajinjaka, Arema L.	President of the National Assembly
Andropov, Yuriy V.	General Secretary of the CPSU
al-'Arashi, 'Abd al-Karim	Vice President
Arkhipov, Ivan V.	First Deputy Premier
Babeony, E.	Chairman of the Military Committee of the Development of Madagascar
Barbara, Agatha	President
Bartlett Diaz, Manuel	Secretary of Government
Batmonh, Jambyn	General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural
Berlinguer, Enrico	General Secretary of the Communist Party of Italy
Bush, George	Vice President
Carstens, Karl	President
Castro Ruz, Fidel	First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers
Castro Ruz, Raul	Second Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, First Vice President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers, Defense Minister
Ceausescu, Nicolae	President, President of the State Council, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party
Chernenko, Konstantin U.	General Secretary of the CPSU
Djuranovic, Veselin	President of the Presidency of the Republic
Fanfani, Amintore	Speaker of the Senate

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Table 4 (Continued)

Name	Position
Fuwa, Tetsuzo	President of the Japanese Communist Party Central Committee Presidium
Gandhi, Indira	Prime Minister
Gandhi, Rajiv	Prime Minister
Gonzalez Avelar, Jose Miguel	Chairman of the Grand Commission of the Senate of the National Congress
Gonzalez Marquez, Felipe	Prime Minister
Gorbachev, Mikhail S.	General Secretary of the CPSU
Gremetz, Maxime	French Communist Party Central Committee Secretary, Politburo Member
Gromyko, Andrey A.	First Deputy Premier, Foreign Minister, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member
Guerra Gonzalez, Alfonso	Deputy Prime Minister
Harald	Crown Prince
Helou, Charles	Former President
Heng Samrin	Chairman of the Council of State, General Secretary of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
Honecker, Erich	Chairman of the Council of State, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party
Hun Sen	Foreign Minister, Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo Member
Husak, Gustav	President, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
Huang Hua	Foreign Minister
Ilichev, Leonid F.	Deputy Foreign Minister
Jaruzelski, Wojciech	Prime Minister, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party
Kadar, Janos	First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
Kaneko, Mitsuhiro	Japanese Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat Chief
Kang Song-san	Premier, Worker's Party of Korea Central Committee Politburo Member

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Table 4 (Continued)

Name	Position
Karami, Rashid	Prime Minister
Karmal, Babrak	General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council
Kharalambopoulos, Ioannis	Foreign Minister
Kiprianou, Spyros	President
Kirchschlaeger, Rudolf	President
Kohl, Helmut	Federal Chancellor
Koivisto, Mauno	President
Ladhas, Yeoryios	Speaker of the House of Representatives
Li Peng	Vice Premier
Lugo Gil, Humberto	Chairman of the Grand Commission of the Senate of the National Congress
Luvualu, Pascoal	MPLA-Labor Party Central Committee Politburo Member
Machel, Samora	President, Frelimo Party Chairman
Malik, Adam	Vice President
Maltsev, Viktor F.	First Deputy Foreign Minister
Marchais, Georges	General Secretary of the French Communist Party
Marcos, Imelda	Human Settlements Minister, Wife of the President
Markovic, Dragoslav	President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee Presidium
Mauroy, Pierre	Prime Minister
Mengistu Haile Mariam	Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, General Secretary of the Workers Party of Ethiopia
Mitterrand, Francois	President
Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja	Foreign Minister
Muhammad, 'Ali Nasir	Prime Minister, President of the Supreme People's Council, General Secretary of the Yemeni Socialist Party
Mulroney, Brian	Prime Minister
Nakasone, Yasuhiro	Prime Minister

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Table 4 (Continued)

Name	Position
Natta, Alessandro	General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party
Nguyen Co Thach	Foreign Minister, Candidate Member of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo
Ogarkov, Nikolay V.	First Deputy Defense Minister, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
Ortega Saavenda, Daniel	Coordinator of the Junta of the Government, Member of the Leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (1982, 1984), President (1985)
Ozal, Turgut	Prime Minister
Pak Song-chol	Vice President, Member of the Workers Party of Korea Central Committee Politburo
Papandreou, Andreas	Prime Minister, Defense Minister
Pereira, Vasco	Foreign Minister
Perez-Llorca, Jose Pedro	Foreign Minister
Pertini, Alessandro	President
Plissonnier, Gaston	French Communist Party Central Committee Secretary, Politburo Member
Pym, Francis	Foreign Secretary
Ratsiraka, Didier	President
Ribicic, Mitja	President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee Presidium
Rusakov, Konstantin V.	CPSU Central Committee Secretary
Sakurauchi, Yoshio	Foreign Minister
Salih, 'Ali 'Abdallah	President
dos Santos, Eduardo	President, Chairman of the MPLA-Labor Party
Shalayev, Stepan A.	Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
Sinowatz, Fred	Federal Chancellor
Soares, Mario	Prime Minister
Sokolov, Sergey L.	Defense Minister
Souphanouvong	President, President of the Supreme People's Council
Spiljak, Mika	President of the Presidency of the Republic

Table 4 (Continued)

Name	Position
Stambolic, Petar	President of the Presidency of the Republic
Sukrija, Ali	President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee Presidium
Suslov, Mikhail A.	CPSU Central Committee Secretary, Politburo Member
Suzuki, Zenko	Prime Minister
Thatcher, Margaret	Prime Minister
Tikhonov, Nikolay A.	Prime Minister, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member
Trudeau, Pierre	Prime Minister
Truong Chinh	Chairman of the State Council, Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo Member
Tsedenbal, Yumjaagin	General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural
Ulusu, Bulent	Prime Minister
Ustinov, Dmitriy F.	Defense Minister, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member
Wan Li	Deputy Premier, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo Member
Willoch, Kare	Prime Minister
Zhivkov, Todor	President of the State Council, General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party
Ziaul Haq	President

