

BOOK III

EDITORIALS, COLUMNS, AND BY-LINE ARTICLES

(arranged in Chronological Order)

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Time for Common Sense

A sense of uneasiness is settling over America. It goes deep down. There is a feeling that we are undergoing a moral shrinkage in the eyes of the world community.

The bigness of our history seems to have been interrupted. The large image of America created by our past seems less clear than it was only a short while ago. And we are sensing a mood of disconnection—disconnection between what we stand for and what we do; disconnection between ourselves as individuals and those who speak and act for us as a nation.

It is natural for Americans to think of their country as a prime source of stability and responsibility in the world. We have traditionally interposed ourselves against hotheads and bullies in the international arena. We have denounced aggressors, instituted action to stamp out brush fires, and called for a code of responsible behavior for nations.

Only three years ago, in fact, the President dissociated the United States from the action of Great Britain and France in the attack on Suez. He properly declared that the United States could not observe a double standard in its foreign policy. We could not approve in our friends that which we denounced in our foes. World law meant obligations binding on all. This was the position we took when we went before the United Nations and supported the resolution against our friends.

Another question of right and wrong has now come up—but this time we ourselves are wrong.

We dispatched jet planes on military reconnaissance over Russian territory. In doing so, we took appalling risks.

The main danger of nuclear war today comes not from a definite policy by any nation to launch such a war, but from an act of carelessness or a hideous miscalculation.

An alien military reconnaissance plane taking photographs over any country—whether the Soviet Union or the United States or Great Britain or Pakistan or India or whatever—is a specific and volatile act of provocation that could ignite the war fuses. Our armed forces are constantly monitoring their radar screens and are prepared immediately to send jet planes in the direction of the Soviet Union if we should see any possible hostile object. Thus, precisely the same violation we committed, if carried on against us, would trigger our swiftest retaliatory measures.

In any case, the plane incident is at the opposite end from the code of responsible international behavior and world law advocated by the President and the Secretary of State. It creates a strange atmosphere for a meeting of heads of government called for the purpose of reducing world tensions. It gives world Communism its biggest propaganda boost in many years. It puts us in a harsh and damaging light before the world's peoples, whose good will and respect are more vital to our security than any reconnaissance photographs or even stockpiles of nuclear bombs.

Only a week ago the President sought to dramatize

for the nation the importance of maintaining a human fund of good will and respect, in connection with his proposals for economic aid. But we can't place a high value on world opinion about our economic policies and then disregard that same world opinion about our military policies.

Just as disturbing as the incident itself was the manner of our response. When it was announced that an American plane had been shot down, we made a false explanation that the plane had wandered off its course, and that the pilot had perhaps been in a daze. (If this statement had been true, consider its implications alongside the recent proposal by American military officials to keep hundreds of bombers in the air on a round-the-clock basis, fully loaded with nuclear explosives and within ready striking distance of the Soviet Union.)

Meanwhile, by way of compounding the damage, several Washington sources were quoted as saying that our only mistake was that we were caught. This is a curious definition of morality to come from a capital that only recently was making headlines with its investigation of rigged TV quiz shows.

An equally astounding comment was that, if only the pilot had chosen to go down with his ship, instead of bailing out, the United States might have been spared the embarrassment represented by the Soviet ability actually to produce the captain of the American plane. In other words, we are now calling on our soldiers to give their lives, not to serve our honor or our freedom, but to spare us the indignity of being caught in a lie.

In any event, the sense of fright and shock felt by the world over the incident was not allayed when it was demonstrated that the initial American explanation was untrue. **In this connection, one thing is clear: the American people have not given leave to their government or any branch thereof to speak falsely in our name or make us look like fools.**

Most serious of all is the later statement that the reconnaissance one thousand miles inside the Soviet Union was carried out without knowledge of the White House or the State Department. What it means is that not all the major decisions having to do with war and peace are being made by those who are constitutionally entrusted with the responsibility. It means that the military has arrogated to itself powers intended for the President and the Congress.

No one doubts that the American military was attempting to serve the national security as it sees it. The location of our missile bases is a matter of common knowledge. We live in an open society. But very little is known about the Soviet bases. And there is the fear of surprise attack. It was for the purpose of reducing this danger, it is now officially stated, that the reconnaissance flights were authorized.

The danger, however, of a surprise attack against us may proceed more out of jitters caused by high-flying planes where they shouldn't be than by inadequate intelligence. Moreover, the best pictures in the world will not tell us whether the Soviet is about to spring a surprise attack—any more than Soviet pictures of American military sites can tell them when our bombers will go into operation. Only a knowledge of intentions can provide

adequate information about lightning attack. The principal value of mapping is that it provides knowledge about what targets to hit. The Soviet knows this; we know this; other countries know this.

Meanwhile, the gravity of the situation has not produced in either government an appropriately sober recognition of the perils involved. Mr. Khrushchev puts a nuclear chip on his shoulder and says the Soviet may bomb bases from which our planes took off. Not to be outdone, the United States says it may continue its provocative flights and come to the defense of countries in which we maintain bases. The distance between nuclear threats and nuclear horror grows shorter by the minute.

Ultimatums and counter-ultimatums will not save the peace, but common sense may. If we are really serious about wanting to reduce or eliminate the danger of a Soviet surprise attack, we should vigorously pursue the new Soviet offer to disarm. Instead of locating Soviet rocket sites, we ought to be locating the true nature of the Soviet intentions. At long last the Soviet claims it is now willing to accept inspection and controls as part of a comprehensive disarmament plan.

If we can get the Soviet to give up its capacity to wage surprise attacks, this will contribute much more to our security than a gallery of photographs showing every military installation in the Soviet Union. And if the Soviet offer to submit to controls is just a propaganda maneuver, it will be easy enough for us to unmask it as such. We can make counterproposals to give the United Nations the specific machinery for carrying out a program of effective disarmament under enforceable safeguards.

Let's test the policies of the Russians and not their tempers.

Here we get to the heart of the matter. The Atomic Energy Commission and certain military officials have made it clear that they are opposed to any program of disarmament—even if we could get the Russians to agree to everything we asked. One thing is certain, however. We are not going to get others to submit to controls and turn in their hardware unless we are prepared to do the same.

The result is an American policy of uncertainty and drift. The President speaks on a plane of important principle; but major parts of the government go off in entirely different directions and act in violation of those principles.

Hence, the present feeling of uneasiness in the nation, the feeling that things are going against the American grain. For when we lose ground in world opinion, we lose vital security. **What does a nation do when it is wrong? The answer need not be obscure. We can admit it and face up to it. We can act promptly and resolutely to guard against a recurrence. And we can do the things that can restore both our pride and our station in the world.**

We can identify ourselves mightily with the big ideas that are directed to the control of force in the world, and not with the exercise of force. Ideas calling for a United Nations with the responsible powers of world law. Ideas concerned with the development of the world's resources for a more productive and healthier human commonwealth. Ideas that serve freedom by dramatizing the moral imagination of free men.

NORMAN COUSINS,
EDITOR / Saturday Review

History in the Making: A Review of the Week by Marcus Duffield

Our Spy Planes Told a Lot... Khrushchey's Sneers at Eisenhower

'Vital' Facts Given by U-2s

Our reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union by U-2 high-flying planes were vastly more productive of information than has been generally realized in this country. Even the Russians were astonished at how much we found out.

The story was told by Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr. in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The inquiry about the U-2 episode was conducted behind closed doors, but parts of the testimony were made public after having been censored.


By means of the reconnaissance flights, which have been going on for four years, the United States found out about: Soviet atomic weapons. Missiles and missile bases. Location of war planes. Submarine production. Special weapons storage. Anti-aircraft emplacements.

"These were all types of vital information," Gates said. "These results were obtained in formulating our military programs."

Censored though they were, Gates' disclosures lent credence to reliable reports in Washington to the effect that the Soviet Union had received a big scare about its missile-launching sites. The Russians were amazed and alarmed about the photographic film captured with the U-2.

In fact, they were so alarmed, according to the reports, that they are going to the great expense of moving missile bases to the interior of the country.

He got a reply that was doubly so, and asked to be assured that bookies would not operate in Lambeth Palace. The Archbishop rang in the House of Lords, warning his white robe, and asked to be assured that bookies would not operate in Lambeth Palace.



British Bet Bill Stuns Archbishop

One provision of the new betting bill before the British House of Lords allows bookmakers' runners to operate in "premises where people work."

The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Geoffrey Fisher, is the top prelate in the Church of England. He has a historic Lambeth Palace in London grounds are clogged with people working.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, it appeared that the ill-fated U-2 flight was nominally under the N. A. S. A., but was in reality under the operation of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Soviet Warning

The warnings of Premier Khrushchey that the Soviet Union might attack foreign bases harboring American U-2 spy planes were vague. Now they have been spelled out.

The order for attack has been given, according to an announcement by Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, the saturnine Defense Minister who accompanied Khrushchey to the summit conference. He never was. His troops in Moscow were warned: "I have given the order to the commander of rocket forces directing him to deliver a blow against bases from which airplanes take off with the aim of violating our borders."

Rude Khrushchey

Prime Minister Khrushchey found occasion to take more cracks at President Eisenhower in a Moscow press conference Friday.

Dulles in Secret

Blankets were hung at the doors of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee room to muffle the sound voices when Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified about the U-2 spy plane.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S JOURNEY TO ASIA—Starting next Sunday, he will travel more than 22,000 miles, his longest trip as President, almost all the way in his jet plane. He will be away about two weeks. The map is an orthographic projection, a global view that gives a better idea of great distances than does the traditional Mercator projection.

Rioters' Sign in Tokyo: 'Ike, Don't Come'

Unfazed by Russia's withdrawal of its invitation to visit, President Eisenhower will leave next Sunday for a trip to the Far East. Under the original plan, the uproar over the U-2 spy plane, Eisenhower was to have been a guest of Premier Khrushchey from June 19 through June 19. But this trip went down the drain at the behest of Khrushchey.

Now the President's Far Eastern trip will allow him to visit more friendly nations. On the way he will pay calls on our newest states, Alaska and Hawaii. Traveling aboard his jet airplane, Eisenhower will go to the Philippine Islands, which had not been on the original schedule.

Two or three days will be devoted to rest in Honolulu on the way home, with a return to Washington about June 26. The President's visit to Japan is complicated by the recent outburst of protest against ratification of the new mutual defense treaty with the United States.

War on Red China

SEATO is six years old. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which is somewhat comparable to NATO in Europe, held its first meeting in Washington, a long way from home, last week.

Purge in Turkey

The purge in Turkey conducted by the military group that office after a series of violently anti-government riots, mainly engineered by students. In the background was the dictatorial nature of Rhee's rule. In the foreground was the "big dog" who resorted to intimidation to keep the regime in power.

Rhee to Hawaii

Back in 1913 Syngman Rhee fled from his homeland of Korea to escape persecution by the Japanese conquerors. He went to Hawaii, living there in exile, later living in Washington, always working for the freedom of his country.

National Songs That Lack Words

Two countries on the Persian Gulf have national anthems with no words at all. Bahrain's song has forty notes in seven bars. Qatar has thirty-five notes in eleven bars. All wordless.

Theaters Close

New York's Great White Way was the Great Dark Way for the first time in forty-one years. All the Broadway legitimate theaters went dark Thursday evening. The producers said it was a strike by Actors' Equity. The actors said it was a lockout by the producers.

Court Oil Ruling

A case involving potentially billions of dollars has been in the Supreme Court on and off for more than a decade. Few cases in recent times have been more complicated.

Gen. Cemal Gursel, Premier of Turkey

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Is the big loser. More than 1,500 oil wells are in production off its coast, a great many of them more than three and one-half miles off. Texas has only six. The wells now in production were leased out by the Department of Interior, which has amassed royalties of more than \$300 million. The money is held in escrow pending final decision. The Supreme Court decision probably is final, but not necessarily so, because Congress could get back into the money situation if it is bold enough.

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Anyway, twenty-two Broadway plays closed, putting 750 actors and actresses out of work, not to mention 4,000 stagehands, electricians, etc. Movies and off-Broadway plays were not affected.

The producers stood to lose \$100,000 a night. And some 20,000 players, many of whom had tickets in advance, were left to find some other form of entertainment. The actors will receive from Equity \$10 for each performance missed—a small sum.

Longest national anthem discovered was Greece's, which at last count had 158 verses.

Cemal Bayar but also more than 400 Deputies in the Parliament—almost every one of the Democrats party representation.

The new regime in Turkey accused its predecessor of having committed atrocities by killing students demonstrating against Menderes and hiding their bodies. Diplomatic estimates in Ankara were that twenty or twenty-five students were killed.

All of them will be put on trial, Gursel announced. The charges against them will be "very, very severe," and if they are found guilty of subversive activities contrary to the constitution, the penalty could be death.

Probably the most hated man in the Menderes regime purged himself. He was the Minister of the Interior, Namik Gedik, forty-nine. As head of Turkey's internal security forces, he directed the state police, who aroused public anger by using tear-gas bombs and pistol fire to quell the student demonstrations of last month.

Along with numerous other people prominent in the Menderes regime, Gedik was arrested. One night last week he shouted "Ya Allah! (which might be translated, "Oh God!)" and jumped through the glass of a closed window to his death four floors below.

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The basic question is: Who owns the rights to the rich oil deposits under the water off the shores of states? Ten years ago the Supreme Court said the Federal government had paramount right to submerged coastal lands. Three years later Congress passed a law giving states ownership of offshore lands. But how far off?

Congress hedged on that crucial question, passing the bill to the Supreme Court. Last week the court handed down what Justice Harlan called "a shocking and free election" of different opinions—four took eighty-one pages.

The gist of it all was that two states, Texas and Florida, came off triumphant. They can dig for oil, gas and other resources for ten and one-half miles off their shores in the Gulf of Mexico. That is, they get the revenue from leasing privileges to private concerns.

Three states came off second best, Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi. Their offshore rights extend only three and one-half miles, the U. S. Dept. of Interior.

The night the theaters closed

Just Canada, of "West Side Story," one the many at Actors' Equity headquarters.


That probably won't be collected by out-of-work big stars such as Mary Martin, Jackie Gleason and Ethel Merman, the three highest paid.

The last time Broadway theaters went dark was in 1919, when Actors' Equity managed to close thirteen theaters.


The actors also wanted minimum pay increased from \$103.50 to \$115 a week. They asked more rehearsal aid and road show pay and the pension principle to be financed by a producers' contribution of 1 per cent of a show's weekly payroll. The producers balked at this because they feared they would have to extend the pension principle to other unions with which they deal. The producers did, however, offer to start contributions one year after a pension plan was set up.

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
The back-out began Wednesday with only the theater that housed "The Tenth Man." Actors' Equity did not acknowledge a strike, but just a union meeting of that cast. The strategy was to bring about similar close-downs of other theaters on a scattered basis. The producers, banded together in the League of New York Theaters, contended that a strike against one was a strike against all, so




Thomas S. Gates Jr., Secretary of Defense.




Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.




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
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
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
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
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TAB

The New York Times.

ADOLPH S. Ochs, Publisher 1896-1935

PUBLISHED EVERY DAY IN THE YEAR BY THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY

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Crisis in the Cold War

When the Russians shot down an American observation plane far inside their frontiers on May 1 they inflicted on the United States a costly diplomatic defeat. In the Cold War the guilty person is the one who gets caught—a Soviet spy on our soil, an American aviator in Russian air. Worse yet is the melancholy evidence that our right hand in Washington did not know what our left hand in Turkey or Pakistan was doing.

It is time to ask what the Cold War, on the surface and underneath the surface (or in the air), is really like, where it is leading us and what we can do about it. Time hurries. It is only seven days to the projected date of the summit conference.

I.

Competition at Two Levels

For the past decade and a half the Cold War has proceeded consistently on the two levels, the public and the clandestine. Overtly each side maintains large armies equipped with the most destructive weapons known to modern science. Each side wages open propaganda war by words disseminated through every medium of communication and by deeds—including victories in sports competitions and in the race for space—intended to show the greatness and beneficence of each side. Finally, there is the economic struggle with its two aspects, one revolving about the standard of performance demonstrated by each nation's economy at home and the other centering about competitive forays into individual commodity markets or in winning economic and political positions in under-developed countries.

What the plane incident did was to bring into the center of the stage the usually unpublicized underground struggle. Each side is omnivorously hungry for information about the other. To get that, information secret agents are employed, telephone wires are tapped, radio communications are recorded, radar screens are watched intently, planes violate national boundaries, "fishing vessels" show up at the other side's naval maneuvers, citizens of the other side are corrupted through every available means from ideological persuasion to bribery and blackmail. Each side engages in activities as varied as operating radio stations that pretend to be something other than what they really are to smuggling prohibited literature into the enemy camp.

In the underground struggle the Soviet Union has many advantages and almost certainly carries on a much greater effort in terms of quantity than we do. Premier Khrushchev's words to the

contrary last Saturday notwithstanding, the record shows that no consideration of morals or ethics stops Soviet intelligence, and even murder—including that of many individuals besides the late Leon Trotsky—is considered permissible.

The semi-military discipline normal for all Soviet citizens means that every such citizen abroad is an actual or potential intelligence agent. The Communist parties in the free world, as much past experience has shown, are fifth columns whose members and sympathizers are available for, and are used for, purposes ranging from information collection to overthrow of the legal government of their country. Numerous Soviet spies have been caught here and abroad in the past, and some of them are now in jails here. The pilot of the U-2 plane downed by the Soviet Union committed the same cardinal sin that they did—he got caught.

But from the broader national point, there are other serious questions raised by the plane incident. If Premier Khrushchev's account of the plane's mission is correct, then there was a serious American intelligence failure committed in not appreciating that a plane engaged in such a mission could be detected and downed by Soviet weapons.

But even more important, there was political stupidity involved. Intelligence activity is not an end in itself but an arm of policy for serving the national interest. It should have been obvious before the plane was sent that the timing of the mission—two weeks before the summit conference—was such that the probable gain in information could not possibly measure up to the probable loss should the mission miscarry. We have the right to expect that changes will be made which will prevent such gross miscalculations again.

II.

Opportunity at Paris

If we consider the Paris conference as a game we will enter that meeting with a handicap because of the episode of Francis Gary Powers and his plane. But the conference is not a game. When it is over the defeated players will not jump over the net and exchange handclaps with the victors.

There can be no victory in this conference, any more than there could be in a shooting war. We are not playing for diplomatic advantage. We are playing for the future of civilization. We place on the green cloth of the conference table all the cities of men, all the cultural and material wealth of our fathers, all the hope, the beauty, the promise of modern life—and not just in our own country but in the lands of our allies and in the homes of our chief antagonist and his allies.



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Mr. K. Thunders on the Left

Premier Khrushchev waited four days to tell the world that Russian gunners had shot down an American plane with what Foreign Minister Gromyko subsequently defined as a "remarkable rocket." Mr. Khrushchev did not in the interim publicly address questions to any American air base in Turkey or elsewhere or to Washington. He did not say what had happened to the pilot of the lost plane. He did not explain why it was necessary to shoot down a plane when it could easily have been forced down if it were over Russian territory.

Mr. Khrushchev saved this disclosure for a speech he was making before the Supreme Soviet, which is Russia's make-believe parliament. He milked the episode of all its possible propaganda value for Russia, for the satellite states, for neutral nations and for our smaller and relatively weak allies. He conveyed the impression that an accidental violation of Russian air rights by an unarmed plane, piloted by a civilian, was one of a series of "aggressive acts" by the United States against his country.

To say that he misrepresented the facts, as far as we know them, is a mild form of statement. He said that the plane had no identification signs, although the only plane missing last Sunday was plainly marked with the insignia of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He hinted — surely not for consumption among people who can and do read the world's newspapers — "that the American militarists decided to act independently, as did the Spanish military junta which rose up against the legal Spanish Government." The spectacle of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration marching on the White House or the Capitol is indeed an appalling one. If the widely traveled Mr. Khrushchev were to fall into this error the spectacle would be baffling and ominous.

Of course Mr. Khrushchev is not falling into any error, except as he overestimates the credulousness of the Western populations or underestimates their firmness in a time of stress. Mr. Khrushchev is talking for effect. Since Mr. Khrushchev is not too restrained to suggest that President Eisenhower might lie about the necessity of going home early from the Paris conference, we need not be too restrained to suggest that sometimes Mr. Khrushchev tells a fib.

The truth, as even Mr. Khrushchev would not deny, is that as long as we have a cold war and frontiers which conceal highly prized secrets there will be occasional trouble in the air. Boundary lines can easily be overshoot when one is ten miles up. The cure for the situation that has cost this country ten or more planes during the last four years is relaxation of international tensions and an agreement to exchange pertinent information as a prelude to disarmament. Mr. Khrushchev's remarks on Thursday, and the sneering warning with which Foreign Minister Gromyko followed them up yesterday, will not relax international tensions and will not contribute to the success of the coming summit conference.



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Behind Khrushchev's Wrath

Last Friday the Mexican Government finally released the man who calls himself Jacques Mor-nard. This is the killer who twenty years ago wormed his way into the confidence of Leon Trotsky and then ended the latter's life with axe blows on the head. For two decades the world has been reasonably sure the killer was a Mos-cow agent sent by Stalin to murder the hero of the Bolshevik Revolution who had lost the Krem-lin power struggle. If any doubt of this remained, it was dispelled last Friday when the killer walked out of jail with a diplomatic passport from Communist Czechoslovakia and, accompa-nied by two Czech diplomats, boarded a plane with Prague as his final destination.

All this is worth bearing in mind as we ponder the situation created by the latest Khrushchev outburst yesterday with regard to the American plane he says was shot down over his country. The facts about the plane have been stated quite differently in Washington and Moscow and no doubt will be a matter of continued discussion and argument for some time to come. But what-ever the facts, the more important question re-mains of why Premier Khrushchev chose so radically to worsen the international situation virtually on the eve of the summit meeting.

Every informed person knows that espionage of various sorts is common in the relations among the powers. Some months ago Premier Khrushchev twitted the head of our Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, by saying that he reads many of the same documents Mr. Dulles reads. The history of Soviet intelligence activity against the free world fills many unsavory vol-umes. During the past decade and a half we have learned of the Soviet spy network in Canada exposed by former Soviet Embassy at-tache Igor Gouzenko, of the theft of atomic secrets by rings in which such figures as Klaus Fuchs—now occupying a high scientific post in East Germany— and Bruno Pontecorvo—now an honored scientist in the Soviet Union—played roles. Soviet espionage agents are to be found everywhere in the free world, even in such a peaceful and neutralist country as Burma where these activities have recently been exposed by a Soviet defactor.

Premier Khrushchev knows all this and there-fore his decision to use the plane incident—what-ever the facts—to worsen the international sit-uation was a political decision for which political motives far transcending the intelligence field must be sought. Has he finally surrendered to the obvious Peiping distaste—probably shared by some of Khrushchev's colleagues—for efforts to reach interna-tional agreement? Has he been encouraged by the recent disturbances in South Korea, South Africa, and Turkey, as well as by the large anti-nuclear weapon demonstration in Britain, to feel that the West is weaker than he originally thought?

Finally, has the past year's improvement in the international situation stimulated demands for greater freedom and greater material welfare among his own people? It is in such questions that the answer must be sought for yesterday's amazing performance.

For fear we must substitute peace of mind; for suspicion we must substitute a system of international relations under which confidence will be guaranteed; for the overwhelming and ruinous confrontation of brute force we must substitute reason. This is the true American policy, this and not the game of spies and conspiracies.

We have been forced into a ruder course by the announced determination of the Communist world to prevail over the non-Communist. We ourselves have neither territorial ambitions nor doctrinal aims that need to be advanced by violence. We have seen Russia move by trickery and strength into lands whose people wished to be free. We watch her frontiers lest she move farther. Such is the grim necessity that has led to an acknowledged military preparedness that burdens our economy, and to a usually unacknowledged maneuvering behind the scenes.

We would abolish this necessity if we could.

These past few days have changed the mood in which we shall approach the summit conference. Berlin, Germany, disarmament, an atomic truce, controls and inspections—these are symbols of what is for us a quest for peace.

The plane episode has dramatized what should have been recognized all along: the tension along the world's principal frontiers is unspeakably dangerous. It ought to be the business of the Paris conference, and of other conferences that may succeed it, to reduce that tension. If this is what the Russians want they can have it. The West is ready.

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The Impasse of Mistrust

With the renewal of naked threats of war that he has made many times before in different language and in different circumstances to the nations of the free world—especially the less powerful ones—Premier Khrushchev is squeezing with dangerous gusto every drop of psychological advantage America's latest intelligence fiasco has thrust into his hands. He is riding the propaganda offensive full speed ahead, and we can be sure that no momentum will be lost during the forthcoming trial of the captured pilot.

Nor could he have been expected to miss the extraordinary opportunity we afforded him through a unique combination of bad policy, bad luck and bad judgment. The bad policy was adopted with the decision to continue aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union right up to the eve of the summit; or perhaps it would be more accurate to describe it negatively, as the failure to call off the reconnaissance flights during the few weeks prior to May 16. The bad luck came, of course, when that amazing reconnaissance plane, the U-2, was forced down and its pilot seized. The bad judgment was displayed by the absurd lying and confused half-explanations on the part of the United States that followed Mr. Khrushchev's disclosures—a degrading spectacle that was only redeemed with Secretary Herter's statement of the facts, in regard both to the intelligence operations as such and to the ultimate Presidential responsibility for them.

There is no use trying to disguise the fact that the United States and Russia and every other power on the face of the earth attempts to learn by both overt and covert intelligence operations what its potential enemies are capable of and what they intend to do. Our sending high-flying reconnaissance planes across the frontiers of Russia should occasion no more astonishment than the Russians sending reconnaissance planes across Europe or submarines into American waters; and Mr. Khrushchev's reference to "a shocking act of aggression" is hypocrisy to the nth degree. That does not make his threats to our allies any the less serious, or make our use of bases on their soil for reconnaissance inside Russia any the more palatable to them. A delicate political issue has thus been opened up between us and our allies, of which the opposition in each country will of course take full advantage in an effort to embarrass the government.

But however this issue is settled, Mr. Herter's statement still stands as sound policy: (1) since 1946 "the world has lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions"; (2) our "open skies" and later inspection proposals have been constantly rejected by the Soviet Union; (3) it is "unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction"; (4) we have in the past and will continue "to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack"; (5) the whole incident should serve at Paris to underline the importance of achieving "effective safeguards" leading to disarmament.

Starting from the "open skies" plan of 1955, the accomplishment of mutual air and ground inspection would eventually remove the need for such reconnaissance forays as that of the downed U-2. Until agreement is reached we can leave no stone unturned to find out what is going on inside Russia's borders, because we do not trust Russian intentions. Because they do not trust ours, they fear and suspect our mutual-inspection proposals. While this serious impasse leaves us with the necessity of continuing our intelligence operations, it also underlines the importance of accepting some risks ourselves to reach agreement with the Russians on even a limited inspection system in order to get this increasingly dangerous diplomatic struggle off dead center.



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The Issue Is the Iron Curtain

In the face of Premier Khrushchev's campaign to heat up the cold war atmosphere over an incident in rival espionage, President Eisenhower is making a valiant effort to keep world attention focused on the real issues of the day so that the work of safeguarding peace may proceed. These issues, as he again outlined them in his press conference yesterday, are controlled disarmament, Germany and Berlin, and, as a problem suddenly most pressing, East-West relations, in which the Iron Curtain plays a decisive role.

To cope with these issues the President announced that he is going to the East-West summit meeting, beginning in Paris next Monday, and that he still plans to visit Soviet Russia, Japan and Korea. This dispels any doubts about his attendance at the summit. Moreover, far from shirking the issue of the downed American reconnaissance plane, the President proposes to use this very incident to challenge the Soviets to abolish the Iron Curtain as a major cause of suspicion and world tension.

To this end he will again propose his "open skies" plan, which would open up Soviet Russia to the same kind of aerial inspection which the West itself is willing to accept and thereby eliminate the fear of a surprise attack. Until this is done, he warned, the United States will continue its intelligence work as a distasteful but essential work, both to safeguard this nation against an atomic Pearl Harbor and to deter any Soviet attack on the free world.

Somewhat along the same line the President also announced that Soviet observers will be invited to attend the new underground explosions planned by the United States. These explosions are to be part of the joint research program to which the Soviets have agreed, in order to find adequate means of detecting underground tests.

Unfortunately, even as the President spoke, Foreign Minister Gromyko announced in Moscow that the Soviets will again reject the "open skies" plan, as they did in 1955, and that Soviet skies "will remain closed." Premier Khrushchev's latest contribution was to cast such doubt on the wisdom of President Eisenhower's visit to Moscow as in effect to qualify the invitation. As for the feigned Soviet indignation over the American plane, its real character is exposed by the American photographs of Soviet planes reconnoitering over Western bases and by the arrest as spies of two Soviet Embassy members in Switzerland.

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The Breast Beaters

The fervent sincerity with which some naive Americans have been publicly beating their breasts because we have sent reconnaissance planes across the Soviet Union's frontiers is matched by the nauseating hypocrisy with which Premier Khrushchev, who is not naive, has been castigating us for our "act of aggression."

The Americans should know, as Mr. Khrushchev knows, that every nation in the world attempts, in peace as well as in war, to learn what it can about its potential enemies. That is not only a function of self-defense, it is a prime requisite. Above all, it is not a question of morals, it is a matter of necessity. Let us have done with the whimpering about espionage being a departure "from the code of responsible international behavior" and look the facts in the face: it has been part of the code from the beginning of time and it will be to the end. Unacknowledged, yes; distasteful, as President Eisenhower observed, yes; dangerous, yes—but necessary and inevitable.

What is not inevitable is that a government should have been so clumsy as ours was over this incident, not so much in the timing as in the handling of it when the plane was downed. Even the wording of the first admission on Saturday, as approved by the President, was peculiarly inept. It was not until Secretary Herter's statement Monday and the President's on Tuesday that the matter has been put in perspective. What is this perspective?

First of all it is not true, as has been alleged by the breast beaters, that aerial reconnaissance over Russia is being defended on moral grounds. It is no more moral and no more immoral than planting a spy in the Kremlin, or listening to a government telephone conversation between Moscow and Peiping. And, so far as we understand their statements, neither the President nor the Secretary of State has raised the question of morality in discussing Presidential directives "to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack."

We of the free world may indeed have a "Pearl Harbor complex" quite comparable to the security complex of the Russians. Both complexes are going to plague this earth until we and they agree to a disarmament and inspection system. Until we and they do so, no responsible American could approve a willful refusal to take every possible unilateral measure "to lessen and to overcome," in Mr. Herter's words, "this danger of surprise attack." It was inexcusable for our Government to have made the stupid and false statements that were made in the first days of this incident; but it would be equally stupid and false for us at this stage to try to pretend that active intelligence operations do not exist and will not continue to exist.

Mr. Khrushchev's injured innocence is ludicrous, though in the midst of his threats he does admit that the reconnaissance flight was made "not as a preparation for war." It is perfectly natural that he is exploiting all the propaganda advantage possible out of our bad luck and bad judgment—but that does not mean that we must act as though we had been caught in the middle of a Czechoslovakia or a Hungary or a Korea.

If we had found a Russian reconnaissance plane flying over the United States, we would doubtless have shot it down too—this is a risk inherent in espionage activity. The way to decrease the tensions raised by this unfortunate incident is to make progress toward disarmament and an end to nuclear testing; and for this we on our part must be willing to accept risks just as we are willing to accept them when we send an unarmed reconnaissance plane high above the skies of Russia.



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The Wrecker

The collapse of the summit talks before they had fairly begun is a deplorable turn of events, even to those of us who never expected momentous settlements to result from it. Disruption of the peaceful dialogue between the Soviet and the Free World is an extremely serious matter at any time, but especially so when it occurs in such thunderous circumstances as those of the last few days.

The extraordinary feature about this conference-that-never-had-a-chance is that responsibility for its failure can be laid objectively, uniquely and unequivocally on one man and one nation, the very man and nation that have most loudly promulgated the idea of a "summit" as a panacea for the ills of humanity. The fascinating and disturbing question that is today plaguing every capital and every chancery of the free and uncommitted worlds is: Why did Mr. Khrushchev deliberately assume the role of wrecker?

* * *

That he did so is beyond any shadow of doubt. He opened the parleys with a passionately violent, if utterly hypocritical, tirade against the United States for having sent reconnaissance planes over the Soviet Union. He included in this statement demands that the United States "condemn the inadmissible provocative actions" of the Air Force, "refrain from continuing such actions" and "call to strict account those who are directly guilty"—an ultimatum that Mr. Khrushchev knew President Eisenhower could not possibly accept in toto though its one key point, cessation of the flights, had already been put into effect.

Yet, even after the President had informed him that the flights "were suspended * * * and are not to be resumed," Khrushchev insisted on publishing his own insulting statement accusing the President of making "treachery the basis of his policy toward the Soviet Union" and withdrawing his invitation to visit Russia next month. On top of all that, Mr. Khrushchev flatly refused to go on with the conference unless the other points of the ultimatum were also accepted by the United States. Nothing could be clearer than his desire to wash out the parley, which he himself described in his statements as now "a useless waste of time."

It is almost equally clear that the U-2 incident itself could not have been the actual reason for this extraordinary action. Granted that the security psychosis that has characterized Russia from Czarist days was wildly stimulated by the shooting down of an American plane 1,200 miles inside the Soviet borders, according to the Russian account, and by the capture of an American pilot "alive and kicking." Granted that the initial comments of the United States Government only exacerbated the situation. It is still true that Mr. Khrushchev had long known of such flights—perhaps for three or four years—and had said nothing about them. It is still true that he knows the United States and every other power engages, if it can, in espionage within the borders of all potential enemies, and that, as Mr. Macmillan pointed out, most espionage activities involve "violation of national sovereignties." It is still true that he knows of continuous Russian efforts to do exactly the same thing, as the President of Pakistan laconically observed this week. It is still true that satellites will soon be opening the skies of all countries and, as General de Gaulle noted, the newest Soviet satellite is actually crossing France eighteen times a day. No, it is perfectly clear that the U-2 incident in and of itself did not shock Mr. Khrushchev so severely as to impel him to call off the conference.

* * *

What it did do, however, was to give him a golden opportunity to use it for all—and a good deal more than—it was worth as an excuse to achieve that end. Mr. Khrushchev almost certainly came westward with no intention of entering into the summit talks; as President Eisenhower concluded, it is apparent that the Soviet Premier was "determined to wreck the Paris conference." The reasons are of course not known, but they are not hard to surmise.

In the first place, it is evident that for the past two or three months the Russians have been coming to the conclusion that they were not going to be able to achieve in Paris their goals on Berlin, i. e., an "accommodation" that would result in the loss of ~~control~~ for the Free World. They deduced this from strong American statements earlier this year, and presumably confirmed it with the recent visit of a high Soviet official to Washington. If they were not going to be able to achieve their main goal at the summit on their terms, why have the summit—especially as the U-2 offered such a wonderful opportunity to place the blame on the United States?

But there must have been other reasons too. Mr. Khrushchev's astonishing reference to the U-2 incident as to quote Mr. Bohlen—"a matter that involved deeply the internal politics of the Soviet Union" suggests strongly that he has been under intense pressure at home to toughen his line vis-à-vis the allied powers. The Red Army officer corps, reportedly discontented because of recent reductions in force, may have joined up with old and new Stalinists, of whom plenty are to be found in the crevices of the Kremlin, to influence Soviet policy in a harder direction, especially since the softer policy seemed to be yielding no results on Berlin. If this interpretation is correct, and no one can yet know for certain that it is, then it might forebode bad tidings for the Geneva conferences on nuclear tests and on disarmament. In the interests of world peace one can only hope that such is not the case.

Whatever the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's action, he has succeeded in proving that a top-level conference without carefully laid prior understandings, based on detailed diplomatic negotiation, can turn at the snap of a finger into a house of cards. When a firm base is

lacking, personal diplomacy can become mere summitry without substance. In this nuclear age neither the free nor the Soviet world can afford to play at this game.

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... AMILUSICHIEV S Adieu

At his final press conference in Paris yesterday Premier Khrushchev renewed his accusations against the United States. Essentially his argument fell into two parts: a complaint that President Eisenhower has promised the ending of the espionage flights only until the end of his own tenure in office next January, and a complaint that this country's promises cannot be respected since they can be changed from Administration to Administration.

On the first point it may be noted that neither Mr. Khrushchev nor any of his subordinates have even promised to halt for one day—let alone the remainder of Mr. Khrushchev's stay in office—the gigantic espionage effort his country maintains constantly against the free world. And Mr. Khrushchev surely knows that if he really wants the end of aerial espionage for all time he need only accept President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal and formalize that plan in an international treaty which would be binding upon all American Administrations once it had been duly ratified.

On the second issue it may be suggested that Premier Khrushchev is the last man in the world who is entitled to raise questions about the value of the promises of others. Has he forgotten how many Soviet promises have been betrayed under his own and earlier Soviet Administrations?

In Hungary in November, 1956, for example, were not all kinds of promises and pledges made to the Hungarian people and their legal government and were not all betrayed? Premier Nagy and General Maleter have long since already paid with their lives for having believed Soviet promises. Has Premier Khrushchev forgotten Poland, where Stalin once promised that a representative democratic government would be installed? Has he forgotten Molotov's long-since violated pledge that the institutions of Rumania would be respected, a pledge made as Soviet troops entered that country during World War II? Has he forgotten Soviet promises about Western access to West Berlin, promises that Stalin broke in the era of the Berlin blockade and which Mr. Khrushchev himself now threatens almost daily to break again? We of the free world know that on the issue of broken promises Mr. Khrushchev lives in a very glassy house indeed.



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At the Security Council

Premier Khrushchev—as was predicted here many days ago—is squeezing every last drop of propaganda value out of the U-2 incident, and his demand for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss it is fully explicable in that context.

The United States has no reason whatsoever to fear such a meeting, and in fact has every reason to welcome a channeling of the wild Soviet charges into the great international forum of the U. N. Most of the free world knows that the Soviet Union's charges about "aggressive" and "provocative" actions of the United States are carefully studied hypocrisies, and that the real menace to "the cause of peace" lies in the Soviet Union's truculent security-psychosis, epitomized by Khrushchev's frequent threats to use missiles and atomic bombs on our allies and ourselves.

At the outset of the U-2 affair the United States Government was guilty, in the earliest statements issued in its name, of incredible ineptitude revealing a serious lack of internal preparation and even of control. But to admit that is one thing and to accuse ourselves—as some Americans are doing—of responsibility for virtually everything else that has developed out of the U-2's unfortunate disaster is as absurd as it is demeaning. While the United States will come before the Security Council next week having openly admitted espionage, the espionage complained of was carried out as a defense against the possibility of surprise attack, and every nation on the Council, including our accuser, knows that it would have done precisely the same thing if it had had the means to do so. To quote no less an authority than the Russian propagandist Ilya Ehrenburg: "Supervision of the armaments of another country is * * * part of the function of army intelligence services. There is no difference between the telephoto cameras of spy planes today and the field glasses used by spies in the old days."

The United States Government and the people of the United States have no apologies to make to themselves or to anyone else for the use of high-flying reconnaissance planes as a means of self-protection; but even if this were an "aggressive" or "provocative" act, as the Soviet Union proclaims, the whole procedure was called off by President Eisenhower a week ago in an effort to calm the atmosphere. Much more to the point, so far as the Security Council is concerned, is the basic danger of surprise attack, which the American proposal for an international air reconnaissance force under United Nations supervision would do a great deal to alleviate.

This step, which our Government presumably will suggest to the Security Council, would constitute a genuine move toward peace; but it is unfortunately clear that the Russians will refuse to accept it, as they have refused every other version of the "open skies" plan. It is still worth making the attempt, because, as Secretary General Hammarskjold observed yesterday, "the problems which would have been taken up in Paris remain with us and require as much of our honest efforts as ever." If Premier Khrushchev wants and is able to pursue once again a policy of *détente*, as we hope he is, he will have ample opportunity to re-establish his false and shattered pose of "peacemaker" at the U. N. in New York and at the continuing conferences on disarmament and nuclear testing.

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Friday, May 6, 1960

Most Inflammatory Speech Since the War

It has for some time been apparent that the Western leaders have anticipated little from a summit conference except some improvement in the international climate, some relaxation of tension—a détente, to use the diplomatic phrase.

Clearly, Mr. Khrushchev does not expect even that.

He has made his point with deliberate brutality—the shooting down of an unarmed American plane near his borders. And he has backed this murderous act by the most inflammatory speech that has come from the lips of the responsible head of any great power since the end of World War II.

That shooting down the weather plane was premeditated is the inevitable conclusion from Khrushchev's reference to another alleged border crossing in the neighborhood of Afghanistan, and his assertion that on the second occasion "the order was given to shoot down the invader."

As for the speech, its bellicosity, its implication that President Eisenhower

is the prisoner of some sinister forces, its coarse animosity toward Vice-President Nixon have few parallels in the public pronouncements of heads of state.

It may not be very rewarding to search out the sources of Khrushchev's performance before the Supreme Soviet. A volcano which alternately erupts soft soap and white-hot lava, the Russian Premier is still a psychological and political enigma. Nevertheless, the combination of act and word with which Khrushchev has confronted the West is so serious that some attempt must be made to understand it.

The most obvious conclusion is that Khrushchev is not satisfied with a summit which promises no more than some general détente. He wants a Berlin solution and a German solution on his own terms and makes these threatening gestures to insure that his demands will be taken seriously.

There is also the possibility that

the Premier is under pressure from Stalinists within the Soviet Union and in command in Peiping to take a tougher line toward the West. The shake-up in the Soviet high command, though its implications are still obscure, might be connected with this process.

Finally, there is the possibility that again Khrushchev is attempting to pressure the free states on the Soviet border, by threatening them with a wrath to come if they continue their close association with the United States.

Whatever the Soviet Premier's motives, his conduct intensifies the dilemma which the original proposal for a summit meeting created for the United States government. True, Khrushchev has not presented this country with an ultimatum, a threat of action with a definite time limit, which President Eisenhower refused to accept as a background for Big Four discussions on Berlin. But his insults have been so flagrant and the prospect of any amelioration of the international situation now seems so remote that a journey to the summit appears only an exercise in futility.

It is the President who must determine whether the meeting in Paris, ten days hence, offers any hope of practical accommodation. The country will back his decision in the matter.

This nation wants peace, it wants a less strained and dangerous international atmosphere. But it is under no obligation to swallow, without protest, whatever violence of word and deed suits Khrushchev's mood or purpose.

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Monday, May 9, 1960

Our Plane Was Shot Down

There is no obscuring the fact that the prestige of the United States has received a blow. When the Russians shot down a reconnaissance plane deep in their territory, captured the pilot and his films and discovered his flight plan, Premier Khrushchev exploited the event with great shrewdness to undercut the American stand at the summit.

The special difficulty at this time is that the summit conference is generally expected to deal mostly with intangibles. The chief hope of the world is for some relaxation of tensions springing from the meeting of the heads of government. To achieve that and to avert pressures which the Soviet Union is expected to exert for a change in the status of Berlin and Germany, the West must bring into play all the moral authority it can muster.

In the eyes of very many that

moral authority has been impaired at a critical moment. Even those who accept the absolute necessity of maintaining intelligence services to learn as much as possible about the massive military machine poised against the free world by the Soviet Union must question why this particular flight—on the face of it a very dangerous one—was made at this particular time.

Perhaps the answer may never be known to the public. In the nature of things, intelligence activities are secret in virtually all their aspects—if any of the latter become known, it is almost always an error. In this instance, the United States must face up to the consequences of such an error. But the consequences should not be overstated.

In the first place, the downing of the American plane, however costly its diplomatic and propaganda effects, is no argument whatever against intelligence work in general. The world in which we live makes such work supremely necessary to the security of this nation and all its allies.

The number of Communist spies who have been caught, the ramifications of their network of espionage, sabotage and subversion are common knowledge. To meet this by the most efficient possible system of intelligence and counter intelligence is a first responsibility of any free government.

In the second place, however gleeful

Mr. Khrushchev and the Soviet press may be over the episode, whatever doubts it may stir among the uninformed, it does not affect in the slightest the basic goals of the United States and the West.

The freedom of two million residents of West Berlin is no less important because of the public revelation that the United States has engaged in a form of reconnaissance that both sides have practiced for years. The safeguarding of West Germany is no less significant. The need for controlled disarmament is even more evident.

Finally, while many Americans will be disturbed and unhappy over the equivocal position in which their government has been placed, there is no disunity here. The American people insist that their guardians be alert. If that involves errors or incidents the price may be high—but not as high as being taken unawares by aggression. Sen. Lyndon Johnson, in offering his support and that of the Democratic party to the President in this crisis, put the fundamental American reaction well:

"We do not know just how far Premier Khrushchev intends to push his saber rattling. But we do know just how far Americans intend to go to preserve their freedoms—right to the limit. And by that I mean all Americans—Republicans and Democrats alike."

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Not So Brave New World

For the time being, the United States is not going to deflect much of the doubt and criticism aroused by the downing of the reconnaissance plane in the Straits. The reaction, in good part, owes much to the fact that the world has two sets of balances for weighing the respective sins and errors of East and West.

Britain, France and Israel learned that in the Suez crisis, despite the concurrent Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt. In a way, the far higher standards expected of the West are a tribute, but they do constitute a real obstacle when it is necessary to fight Red fire with fire.

The peculiar moral climate that has prevailed since the end of World War II is without precedent in history, because the objective facts of the world are unprecedented. There are, in essence, three of these glaring facts, to which international relations have been adapting themselves with varying degrees of clumsiness for the past fifteen years:

1.—Unquestionably first in importance, the nuclear weapons which, by the rapidly progressing techniques of delivery, have translated all-out war from an enduring goal of foreign policy to something closely approaching mutual suicide. On the one hand, the nuclear weapons constitute a threat of sudden annihilation. On the other, the recognition of this danger brings a strong tendency to act in extremes.

2.—The existence of the Soviet Union as a power revolutionary in origin, dictatorial in fact, conspiratorial by nature and aggressive in its goals, is another major element.

3.—The emergence of new na-

tions, especially in Asia and Africa, eager and often underfed peoples testing political and economic methods in which they are unskilled, has created wide areas of flux. A corollary of this development has been the weakening of the older European powers and a tendency for strength to polarize in the Soviet Union and the United States.

Within this framework exists the peril of devastating war, checked chiefly by a realization of how devastating it would be. Methods short of full-scale war, aggression by indirection, widespread espionage and subversion characterize this not so brave world.

There are some landmarks in the building of this world. One is, of course, the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima. Not less significant was the Soviet refusal to accept the American plan for control of nuclear materials a year later.

Then, too, there was the defection of Igor Gouzenko in Ottawa on Sept. 5, 1945, which provided the first clear picture of the extent and methods of Communist espionage. It was to be followed by many others, of course, and lead to a reign of suspicion that poisoned the atmosphere of many democratic countries.

The Indonesian revolt on the heels of the defeat of Japan was one of the most conspicuous of the early efforts by former colonial peoples to gain independence — again followed by many and changing the power patterns of the world.

How the Soviet Union used revolution as a weapon of policy was demonstrated in Czechoslovakia early in 1948—the most blatant of the many cases in which the U. S. S. R. subverted its border states. The loss of China to the Reds was the most important of these—its full implications may still only be guessed at.

In Korea, the Reds used naked force

in an attempt to take the remainder of a country which they had in part already subverted; broken by a war which brought troops from many countries. In a joint effort, the North Korean Army was joined by Red Chinese "volunteers"—an example of the kind of transparent subterfuge which the fear of all-out war had produced. The armistice which ended the war where it had begun was a different illustration of the same thing.

In this tangled context, the plane incident must be viewed. More important, it is with the mixture of fear, ambition, genuine desire for peace with honor and the assorted kinds of devious actions which spring from such an international climate that the summit conference must really deal.

The prospects have not been too favorable from the start; they grow worse with each speech of Mr. Khrushchev, whether or not he can illustrate his oratory with captured pictures from a so-called American plane. But if there is to be any rational settlement of the world's affairs, a beginning must be made somewhere. And it is not symptoms—like the plane—that are important.

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Wednesday, May 11, 1960

The U-2, Mr. K., and American Opinion

If it were not for the State Department's frank admission that reconnaissance flights by American aircraft over the Soviet Union are a matter of policy, Nikita Khrushchev's pre-summit trump card would have considerably less embarrassment value.

The Soviets have been discovering "spies" in their midst for so long that, in the absence of impartial observers, such accusations in themselves no longer command any respect. And the story of the U-2 is full of the kind of discrepancy which has accompanied them in the past.

Was the plane really knocked down by a rocket, for instance? If so, how were the pilot's equipment and the photographs he took so well preserved? A Soviet newspaper now says that the pilot, Francis Powers, thinks the cause of the crash was an explosion in one of the engines.

Then the man who designed the U-2 affirms, after studying pictures of the crash, that the wreckage is not that of a U-2 at all. And the "spy" photographs—are they really of practical value? Mr. Khrushchev claims he has known all about these reconnaissance flights for years. Has he been unable, until now, to bring down an unarmed plane? If he has already done so, why did he wait to tell us?

It must be said that our government has spread its own share of confusion. Mr. Herter's statement of Monday clearly says that surveillance of the Soviet Union "by penetration" has been carried out by American aircraft at various times. But we have just assured the Japanese that the U-2's based in Japan have never been used for overflight intelligence. The implication here—and also in the original disclaimer of knowledge about Powers' flight from Washington—is that he did or was made to do something illegal. Or has the State Department hastily reverted to the normal diplomatic convention of denying that spies exist when they get caught?

It is a pity that this business has committed us to a moral defense of spying. Espionage is of course defensible, particularly as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, and all that Mr. Herter says about the necessity for protecting the world with information obtained in this way is quite true. But we should not forget the indignation of innocence which greeted Mr. Khrushchev's original accusation last week, nor the fervor with which a number of men in Congress have since leaped to defend spying once the government admitted it.

The flight of the U-2 was an incident which the cold-war experts have taken in their stride. But for the general public it was a disquieting surprise. Part of our strength in the world lies in our belief, of which we seek to convince others, that our motives and methods are invariably pure.

If this is an illusion to diplomats and politicians, it is not yet one to the ordinary American, and the U-2 incident may tempt him to regard the question of his country's leadership in world affairs with apathy. It is possible of course to argue that no other nation has been so pure in acknowledging its espionage activity, but that argument will have to journey far in search of proponents.

A silver lining, however, is also to be found in Mr. Herter's statement. That is that the incident should emphasize to the world and to the summit meeting, the importance of removing the fear of instantaneous mass destruction through sudden attack. Disarmament remains the chief hope of the world. Perhaps the unfortunate flight of the U-2 will bring us a little nearer to that goal.

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Friday, May 13, 1960

Hypocrisy and Power Politics

By publicly justifying espionage, President Eisenhower has, as Mr. Lippmann pointed out on this page yesterday, breached one of the oldest conventions of power politics.

The gathering of secret intelligence is inevitably a messy business, involving all sorts of violations of domestic and international law, as well as most moral codes. But, since it is essential in a competitive world that might at any time turn to the guns for competitive advantage, governments tacitly agree to maintain intelligence on their own activities in this field and more or less accept the same rule when applied to others.

The breaching of this convention entails a number of serious consequences. Mr. Khrushchev professed to be (and probably was, although not in any moral sense) "horrified" by Mr. Eisenhower's statement on espionage and overflights.

That the Soviet government expected denials from Washington is evident not only in Mr. Khrushchev's early remarks excluding the American President from direct responsibility for the Powers flight but in the

very elaborate measures taken to "prove" that the flight was officially authorized. These measures looked rather silly in the face of American admissions.

Mr. Khrushchev, too, was more or less impelled, under the circumstances, to cast doubt on Mr. Eisenhower's reception in the Soviet Union. The Premier had been doing his best to create an embarrassing atmosphere for the Eisenhower visit, by exploiting the plane incident. But he would probably have contented to throw a condescending mantle of understanding and protection around the President if Mr. Eisenhower had not made that impossible.

The effects of the President's candor will not only be in Moscow, America's allies, and the rest of the world, but also in the old rule and being very close to the pockets, and themselves impelled to demand that no overflights be based on their territories.

British Labor party leader Hugh Gaitskell, while expressing sympathy for the point of view expressed by Mr. Eisenhower on the "urgent and natural need for intelligence," was perturbed by the timing of the Powers flight and urged that such reconnaissance missions be undertaken only with the assent of the entire NATO alliance—which might well result in open espionage, openly arrived at, but no intelligence of any value.

But while these embarrassments, and others that may still occur, are the natural consequences of breaking the secrecy rule on espionage, there is one horn of the President's dilemma that has not been stressed.

Mr. Khrushchev certainly was not

solely concerned with protecting Mr. Eisenhower or playing the game according to the rules when he pointedly excluded the President from his early condemnation of the overflight. He was also endeavoring to present the President of the United States as a peace-loving man, helpless in the grip of war-like forces. This is not only an insult which Mr. Eisenhower would resent as a man; it is a cunning blow at his authority, at his high prestige among the nations, and at the moral strength which the United States derived from both.

Moreover, while it is relatively easy for a government to disavow or ignore a spy (as the Russians ignored Col. Abels) it is less easy to overlook a whole plane, filled with identifiable equipment. True, since Rudolph Hess, there have been a number of unauthorized flights by defectors and others. But the Soviet government was evidently prepared to make out a very good case linking Powers to his government; and if Mr. Eisenhower had stuck to the rules and denied all knowledge of the flier, he would have been impaled by the dilemma's other horn.

No one can yet assess the full impact of all the conflicting events set in motion by Powers' unhappy descent in the Urals. Most of them seem still, from the standpoint of the United States, extremely unfortunate. But it is too soon to write off the value of President Eisenhower's truth-telling. The ground rules of espionage have been brought into acceptance because espionage breaks all other rules. Perhaps breaking the ground rules themselves may prove useful.

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Tuesday, May 17, 1960

A Crime Against Peace . . .

Khrushchev Blows Up the Summit

Like the volcanic island of Krakatoa, the Paris summit has blown up. And like that East Indian explosion, Khrushchev's eruption has darkened the world skies and disturbed the international climate.

But unlike the real volcano, the destruction of the summit meeting was not an inevitable act of nature. It was the work of Nikita Khrushchev, done deliberately and in a manner calculated to wreak the maximum amount of damage to world peace.

For Khrushchev had won a sizable diplomatic victory in the opening session of the conference at Paris. President Eisenhower took that occasion to announce that American reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union had been suspended and would not be resumed. Under the circumstances this was a most important concession. It should have made it possible for the conference to continue, and for a serious discussion of those root causes of international tension of which the U-2 flight of May 1 was merely a symptom.

But Khrushchev wanted more. He wanted a public humiliation of the United States and its President; he wanted apologies and punishments and guaranties. He wanted more than he could possibly expect to receive.

The conclusion, then, is inescapable: that, in Mr. Eisenhower's words, the Soviet Premier "came all the way from Moscow to Paris with the sole intention of sabotaging the meeting on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested."

Why?

Khrushchev indicated pointedly that he hoped eventually to deal with a different American President, by revoking the invitation to the President to visit Russia, by suggesting a postponement of the summit conference for six to eight months (that is, until there is a new Administration in Washington) and by his flat statement that if the present government of the United States did not understand his position, a later government would.

He cannot be naive enough to believe that any government of the United States would go hat in hand to the Kremlin. Whatever criticism there has been in this country of details of the May 1 episode, or the subsequent diplomatic handling of it, no basic American policies are affected by such criticism, nor will they be.

A more sinister possibility suggested by Khrushchev's conduct in Paris is that he intends to take dangerous action in respect to Berlin and Germany, and wishes to create an atmosphere of extreme

tension in which such action might seem less blatant than if committed in cold blood, so to speak.

But again, none of the perils of unilateral moves against the Western position in Berlin have been removed by the U-2 incident. So far as Western and uncommitted opinion is concerned, Khrushchev's refusal to accept President Eisenhower's concession on overflights can only be regarded as a stubborn rejection of a genuine overture toward an amicable settlement, and certainly no justification for political adventures in Germany.

Finally, Khrushchev may have been pressured into his intransigence by extremists within his own government. As to that, no one outside the Kremlin can speak with assurance.

There may be another switch in the Soviet line before the Paris conference really breaks up. If there is not, the world can only prepare for a period of great uncertainty and danger; the West can only make ready against a time of acute crisis.

This much Americans can comfort themselves with: their President has done as much as any responsible leader of a great nation could do to save the summit. The responsibility for the break, if it finally comes, rests squarely on the shoulders of Nikita Khrushchev.

Mr. Khrushchev's Performance in Paris

Yesterday in Paris the world was treated to one of the most fantastic spectacles in the annals of diplomatic history. At the Elysee Palace, the Presidents of the United States and France and the Prime Minister of Great Britain waited for the appearance of the ruler of Soviet Russia and the beginning of a conference it had taken a year and a half of interminable toil to arrange.

Across the Seine in his embassy, the ruler of Soviet Russia waited for an impossible, as he knew, humiliation on the part of the President of the United States. The fate of nations hung on the transparent device of Mr. Khrushchev's injured innocence.

Yet his grotesque tantrum has quite blotted out the issue of the U-2's reconnaissance flight, although that is the ostensible reason for it. His behavior would reflect the obstinate rage of an unruly child were the possibilities of his power not so menacing. Suffice it to say that he has given the world a shock and that he has played his hand very stupidly.

The question is: why has he behaved in this particular way? If he wanted merely to torpedo the conference, he could have done it in the negotiations and avoided the damaging responsibility for doing so which he must now bear. Or he could have canceled the summit from Moscow without coming

to Paris at all. Or he could even have contracted a cold again.

And why has he insisted on a public penance from President Eisenhower which cannot possibly be done and which would accomplish nothing anyway? If the handling of the U-2 business was a blunder on our part, this is not the way for the Soviet Premier to turn that blunder to advantage.

The assumption is that Mr. Khrushchev has to placate powerful people in the Soviet Union who disapprove of a relaxation of tension and of friendlier relations with the West. Because he himself has posed as an advocate of such relations, the assumption goes, he has to spread it on very thick to escape the condemnation of these powerful people.

It is certainly true that Mr. Khrushchev is not the holder and puller of all strings that Stalin was. There is, no doubt, a degree of consent to his rule among the marshals and the party hierarchs which influences his actions. The recent reshuffling of the Soviet government may have been a sign of this. But we do not know, and if there were a kind of reconnaissance which could tell us it would be far more valuable than U-2 photographs.

The danger is that the impetuous but crafty Soviet Premier is not the only adversary and that we must deal besides, by means of intuition, with the men in the Kremlin who maintain him in power. If that is so, it will make our effort in the world much more difficult.

But one thing is sure. Whatever happens, Mr. Khrushchev's insulting and inexcusable performance in Paris will serve neither himself nor his

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Wednesday, May 18, 1960

The Obstructive Voice of Paris

In the angry, insistent and contentious clamor of Paris, there are voices that have not been heard—the silent voices of millions of people the world over who have also been at the summit. They came with hope and with earnestness, for they understood as well as or better than the statesmen that the alternative to success in this case might not be merely failure, but disaster.

The summit is aptly named, for there is nothing beyond it—nothing except continued tension and hostility, growing increasingly more intolerable until the breaking point is reached. Millions of people in the United States, in the Soviet Union, in Britain, in France, yes, even in China, may know little of the niceties of power politics and less of the intricacies of Berlin, of U-2s, of who was right and who was wrong at any given moment. But they do understand, with a sure instinct and clear intuition,

It has been in the power of the men of Paris to lead the nations into ways of hopefulness or ways of futility. And they have waited, with the agonized suspense of all who have known tragedy in their lifetime, to see which it would be.

That is why if, as seems evident, the Paris conference is over, the man responsible will bear on his brow the reproach of humanity.

That is why, at a late hour last night, none of the conferees had as yet taken that final, irrevocable step which would actually take him from Paris.

That is why hope cannot be abandoned even in this grim, grave hour.

That mistakes have been made on both sides is universally conceded. Few of history's great international conferences have been preceded by as many fumbles and follies. We have committed our share—indeed, more than our share.

The President's announcement of

a cessation of American reconnaissance flights over Soviet Russia was a sincere effort to rectify the situation. Yet Premier Khrushchev's reaction, his demand for abject apologies and public contrition, were errors far more reckless and willful. In so important a setting they became mere acts of childishness, unbecoming to a statesman of stature and ill-fitting a person who professes a love for peace.

Perhaps it would not be out of place even now for President de Gaulle to remind Mr. Khrushchev of the famous judgment passed by a great French statesman upon one of Napoleon's fatal acts: "It is worse than a crime, it is a blunder." In this case, it is a blunder whose capacity for damage is almost incalculable. That some way will be found at the last moment of retrieving it and of mitigating its effects remains the hope and the prayer of those millions who listened in Paris, but who could not speak.

TAB

EDITORIAL PAGE

Journal American

MONDAY, MAY 9, 1960

Facing Up

THE DECISION of President Eisenhower to acknowledge that our reconnaissance plane was deep over Soviet territory on an espionage mission when it was shot down, is the most intelligent and courageous move that could have been made in this acutely awkward situation.

To deny it, against the evidence Khrushchev has gloatingly assembled, would play into his hands. It would enable him to exploit his propaganda-psychological victory all the way to and through the Summit beyond. By acknowledging it, the President has scored a counter point of candor. He has also directed the attention of Americans and the world to what should be common information but perhaps is not . . .

This is that spying has been carried on by both sides for years. It has been international practice for centuries. The reconnaissance airplane has merely added a new dimension.

Besides the agents that have been caught here, and the espionage-diplomats Russia has assigned to the United Nations and Washington, Soviet planes have spied over parts of the United States, and over Allied air, naval and missile bases throughout the world. One thing to be regretted is that we didn't shoot any down.

Scores of Soviet "fishing" trawlers have been fishing for information off our military posts in the Atlantic and Pacific. Recently one trawler was photographed very close to missile launching exercises of the first Polaris submarine.

Always Risk

In Failure

There is no reason to be shocked at disclosures that we have been spying too. We would be neglecting our security if we didn't. And we have a great deal more reason to do so. What is public knowledge here, such as location of missile and strategic airplane bases, would be a treasonable revelation in Russia.

What is appalling is the inexcusably bad timing of this particular mission. Whoever ordered it did not stop to consider how failure—which is always a risk—would damage Summit preparations.

Khrushchev is a realist. It goes without saying he is aware of what is happening on both sides. In fact, he conceded it a few months ago when he remarked sardonically that he reads many of the same documents that come to the desk of Allen Dulles, head of our Central Intelligence Agency.

Therefore his simulated fury over the plane incident is a political maneuver aimed at subverting our position and blackening the President's image at the Summit.

We offer this recommendation. The State Department in cooperation with Central Intelligence, should put together a documented bill of particulars of Soviet spying and be ready to sign Khrushchev with it if he continues to use this single incident as a diplomatic hydrogen bomb.

Let's Level Off

IT SEEMS to us that Americans, who go to extremes of emotionalism, humiliation and conclusion-jumping about our espionage plane that was shot down deep in Russia, are unwittingly assisting Khrushchev's propaganda offensive.

The timing of the mission was a bungle. So was the original explanation of the State Department and National Aeronautics and Space Administration that the plane was studying the weather when the pilot blacked out and strayed across the Turkish border. There isn't any question about that, but the way some people are talking you would think he had sold our world leadership down the Volga.

In the business of spying it is inevitable that bungles will be made and individuals caught. Consider the number of Russian spies the great CIA has taken. There is no cause for shame because we booted a big one.

In this connection we would like to put in a word of caution against jumping to conclusions about the Pilot, Francis G. Powers. Some newspaper commentators are suggesting he went chicken because he (a) didn't destroy the plane and (b) didn't destroy himself.

No verdict of cowardice should be returned against any American unless the evidence is incontrovertible. It is far from that. It is quite possible the mechanism presumably installed to destroy the plane did not work after he was shot down.

Also, it would be remarkable if the Central Intelligence Agency had a pledge of suicide from its members if their mission failed. The Russian spies captured here have shown no compulsion to kill themselves. Mr. Powers deserves the break we would give any American which is to wait until all the evidence is in.

Walter Reuther, head of the United Auto Workers, isn't doing our side any good when he says this affair is "the most stupid blunder in American history." Nor were the few members of Congress who called for a public investigation, a demand that fortunately seems to be subsiding.

In the world as it is today—and as it always has been—espionage is a fact of life.

This fact was implicit in Secretary Herter's statement yesterday that our reconnaissance planes have engaged in "extensive aerial surveillance" of Communist territory as a vital precaution against surprise attack. If the Administration did not do so, Americans would have real reason to be disturbed.

So let's put this incident in the proper perspective and form up behind President Eisenhower as he gets ready to meet Khrushchev next Monday.

EDITORIAL PAGE

Journal of American

WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 1960 *****

That's Talking!

A SUPERB EXAMPLE of patriotic statesmanship in dealing with the spy plane incident has been shown by Democratic Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas.

He told the Senate that Khrushchev's attempt to use the incident to divide the American people will not succeed because "the people are united in a determination to preserve our freedoms and are not going to be shaken from that course."

He emphasized that any inquiry into whatever blunders have been made will be conducted objectively, carefully, without consideration of partisan advantage and when conditions are right, which is not now.

"This is certainly a time," Senator Johnson said, "in which Americans—and people everywhere—must keep their heads. We cannot afford hysteria, panic, or hasty and ill-advised action."

Also heartening was the firmness of Secretary Herter in notifying the Russians in effect that we intend to continue aerial reconnaissance unless Moscow agrees to steps that would be a guarantee against surprise aggression.

This was followed by a tone of equal firmness in the State Department, pledging we will go to the aid of our Allies if Khrushchev carries out his threat of rocket attack against countries which permit us to use their air bases. In this period of cold war crisis, the chief thing, in the words of Senator Johnson, is to keep our heads.

EDITORIAL PAGE

Journal American
THURSDAY, MAY 12, 1960

The Real Reasons

SOMETIMES life is a master of irony. Just as Premier Khrushchev was suggesting yesterday it would be a good idea if President Eisenhower cancelled his visit to Russia in June because the President authorized espionage flights over Soviet territory, two Soviet Embassy officials were thrown out of Switzerland for spying.

The coincidence illustrates the complete fraud of Khrushchev's "horror" in learning the President approved the flights and the hypocrisy of Khrushchev's conclusion that the President is therefore "not a nice person."

It is our opinion that the real reasons why Khrushchev would like the President to call off the visit are these:

1—He fears the effect of President Eisenhower's sincerity, obvious humanity and his profound desire for honorable peace, upon the Soviet people.

Vice President Nixon made a tremendous impression on his trip to Russia last year. The President would make a much greater one, and would undercut Khrushchev's attempt to picture him as the leader of aggressive imperialism. Khrushchev is building up that picture as a kind of political insurance if he returns from the Summit with nothing to boast about.

2—Khrushchev is under pressure from hard-core Stalinists, such as Mikhail Suslov, to revert to the tough anti-U. S. line.

As Frank Conniff pointed out in an interpretive Hearst Headline Service article a few days ago, Khrushchev is the boss but he cannot ignore the "vital reality" of Stalinist influence, particularly since it is supported by the leaders of Communist China.

Based on this reasoning, we think the President should go through with his trip to Russia unless Khrushchev officially slams the door.

On the Line:

We Go On the Offensive

By **BOB CONSIDINE**

THE PASSING SHOW . . .

The way things are shaping up, we'll soon demand an apology from the Russians for shooting down (if they did) our helpless little old plane that was taking innocent snapshots of the rocket installations around Sverdlovsk.

We started out on this goof-off looking just about as bad as we've looked since the birth of the nation. The State Department put out a spurious communique, then humbly acknowledging we had broken international law. But since then we've gone on an exhilarating offensive kick. It seems to be working, too.



CONSIDINE

The fact that we've been doing this sort of spying for 14 years, and getting away with it (and with pictures which are graven in the minds of Strategic Air Command navigators and bombardiers), must shake the confidence of the Russians in their vaunted military prowess and build us up in the eyes of nations who felt we were getting fat. We're even bragging that the Russian rocketeers didn't knock Francis Powers out of the sky, but that his engine conked out.

Well, no sense having Ike walk into that first summit meeting Monday with a sheepish and apologetic grin on his kisser.

Stephen Decatur, wherever he is, must be cackling, "Didn't I tell 'em—our country in her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong." * * *

THE VOYAGE of the Triton around the earth under water points up a further inroad made by the machine into man's province. It's no longer a question about the efficiency of the machine in any test of this gargantuan scope. It's the matter of whether man is good enough to go along.

The Triton's atomic power plants had enough fuel to continue circling the globe for years, submerged. But man just isn't made that well. The chief petty officer who was removed from the submarine after a month or two because of kidney stones was, in truth, a symbolic figure—symbol of his species' decline in the face of the Frankensteins he has created.

* * *

FIDEL CASTRO has flunked his history course. No dictator ever completely throttled a good newspaper, and just about every one of them tried. The seized newspaper inevitably rose triumphantly from the ashes of the despot's ruin.

The Cuban leader, through stooge organizations named the Graphic Arts Union and the National Collegium of Newspaper Workers, has grabbed the 128-year-old "Diario de la Marina," one of the great daily journals of the hemisphere.

The newspaper, though shockingly boycotted, still had the audacity to criticize the way Castro has been turning Roman Catholic and Democratic Cuba over to atheistic communism.

So its freedom had to be crushed. One supposes that its new editorial director will be Castro's crackpot friend Carlos Franqui whose "Revolucion" is now the Pravda of our old neighbor and mixed-up friend to the south. Where once it told the truth it will now lie. The presses that for more than a century spun out news without bias, warmth, friendship, cheer, hope and intelligence will be mired—so long as Castro lasts—in the sour bile and windy nothingness of dictatorial journalism.

But then a day will come, just as sure as twenty-past-eight in the clock ads, when a great white roll of newsprint will be cradled in place, and as it rolls through the thundering presses it will once again speak the truth, the whole truth, and note the passing of one more egocentric who deluded himself into thinking he could crush it.

(Reprints Handling Service)

TAB

DAILY NEWS

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NEW YORK'S PICTURE NEWSPAPER

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THE SPY PLANE AND THE SUMMIT

It is widely believed in the free world that N.S. Khrushchev is making such a to-do over the downed U.S. spy plane because he is expecting few if any concessions

from the Western Allies at next week's Paris summit conference.

Therefore, this theory goes, Khrushchev is using the plane incident as an advance excuse for blaming Western "aggressors" if the summit talks net him no real gains.

We hope this theory is true; also, that the Western Allies will let neither the plane episode nor anything else keep them from being as tough at the summit as they have often said they will be.



Francis G. Powers

It's too bad civilian pilot Francis G. Powers and the U-2

plane came down—maybe blasted by a miracle rocket as Khrushchev claims, or maybe (which seems at least as likely) because something went wrong with the aircraft.

But this unarmed, unescorted plane did penetrate some 1,400 miles into Soviet Russia—a fact which is worrying a lot of Russians. And such high-altitude reconnaissance flights have been carried out by our side for the last four years.

That would indicate, it seems to us, that the West has the ability to send nuclear attack air squadrons deep into Russia and wreak deadly damage there.

Why, then, shouldn't the Western Allies simply sit tight at the summit, let Khrushchev bluster to his heart's content, then send him home without a victory?

The world in that case would know Khrushchev had lost this particular battle in the cold war. Any excuses he might offer would have the hollow ring that the beefing of the man who didn't win always has; and such a showing-up of this fellow, we think, would be a first-rate cold-war victory for our side.

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WE DIDN'T KNOW HERTER HAD IT IN HIM

I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction.

The quotation is from Secretary of State Herter's Monday statement about the U. S. spy plane which came to ground some 1,400 miles inside Soviet Russia on May 1.

Mr. Herter went on to say in effect that the United States, for better or for worse, has become the leader of the free world, feels responsible for much of its defense against the Red Slave Empire, and does not shirk that responsibility.



Christian A. Herter

It has been spying on Soviet Russia for years, with reconnaissance planes and other devices, said Herter, and intend to go on doing so, without apologies to anybody. Thereby, we are only fighting the devil with fire.

In our opinion, the Eisenhower Administration in this official declaration has moved boldly

to remedy whatever mistake may have been made in sending the plane on its espionage flight at a time so near the scheduled opening date of the Paris summit conference.

The State Department has dropped the old self-righteousness, frankly admitted that we will do anything and everything within our capacities to win the cold war or any hot war it may breed, and tossed N. S. Khrushchev's "we will bury you" crack back into Khrushchev's ugly

We didn't know Herter had it in him to talk so frankly and to the point, and only hope he will carry on along this line regardless of the retreat and hostile advice he is getting from numerous kibitzers, both here and abroad.

As for—

KHRUSHCHEV'S TREAT

—to bomb U. S. bases in other countries if our spy planes are permitted to take off from such bases, the State Department answered that yesterday as it should be answered.

In case of such attacks, said State, the United States would live up to its defense commitments to the countries which have let us set up bases within their borders.

Again for better or worse, we are committed to the defense of almost all the free nations; and we keep our commitments. By attacking one of these bases, Khrushchev would invite terrible nuclear retaliation.

That we are very strong now and growing more so was evidenced anew yesterday, when our—

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE TRITON

—surfaced after an 84-day, 41,519-mile underwater voyage around the world. It would seem to be no coincidence that this trip was scheduled to wind up a few days before the summit meeting. It is to be hoped, for his own safety, that Khrushchev understands the significance of the Triton feat as well as do military men the world over.

Speaking of Khrushchev, his boy—

MIKHAIL BOTVANNIK

—last Saturday lost the world chess championship, after holding it since 1948 except for one year, to Mikhail Tal. Tal is a slashing 23-year-old player who gave the 48-year-old Botvinnik the screaming meemies several times during the two-month contest. Worse than that from Khrushchev's point of view, Tal is from Latvia, one of the Kremlin's slave states; and chess is the national game of Russia.

Maybe we're drawing a long bow here; but does Tal's victory conceivably symbolize an aging and stiffening of the brains that rule Russia, including the brain of Khrushchev himself? Are these much-touted old masters of international chess losing their skill at razzle-dazzling free-world leaders, even as Botvinnik appears to be losing his mental agility at the conventional chess board?

We don't know; but at least it's a thought, folks, it's a thought.

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AN ABEL FOR A POWERS

The Kremlin has announced espionage charges against Francis G. Powers, pilot of the U. S. spy plane that came down some 1,400 miles inside Soviet Russia on May Day.

If the Soviets follow their usual script, they'll give Mr. Powers a "trial" designed to get all the propaganda mileage they can out of this affair.



Powers Abel

Now in Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, serving a 30-year sentence dealt him in 1957, is a Col. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, the highest-ranking Soviet spy ever yet convicted in the United States.

It is safe to assume that Abel is of no further value to our Government as a source of information about Red spy activities. After the Kremlin has wrung all the propaganda it can out of Powers, he will be of no further value to the Kremlin—or, most likely, to us as a spy.

Why, then, shouldn't Washington try to persuade the Kremlin to return Powers to us, after his "trial," in exchange for Abel? Such a trade looks like a natural from here. If Khrushchev is as sensible and realistic as his admirers (including himself) claim he is, he would gladly accept this exclusive offer.

The Inquiring Photographer

By JIMMY JEMAIL

THE NEWS will pay \$10 for each question accepted for this column. Today's award goes to Max Wolf, 43-15 45th St., Long Island City.

THE QUESTION

Would you care to engage in espionage work for the United States?

WHERE ASKED

Maidenhead, N.Y.

THE ANSWERS



Herbert A. Williams, Maidenhead, N.Y., insurance executive: "I'm in retirement on June 1, after 39 interesting years in the insurance business. I'd be delighted to have espionage fill the gap. I think I'm qualified. In World War One I led a scouting force into Norway's Land every night. I was also part of the military police."

T. William Williams, Garden City, N.Y., many years in the defense industry: "Under the circumstances and for love of country. Of course, trained skills are required for espionage work. One of my handicaps would be that I talk too much, that I might unwittingly give away our own military secrets."



Mary Jane Rogers, E. 83d St., secretary: "No. I'm not daring enough. A woman would really have to be adventurous to be a spy. I couldn't roam the world spying, even for my country. Even though I'm no Mata Hari, I have the utmost respect and admiration for those who live with danger like pilot Francis Powers."



Theresa K. Ludwig, Jersey City, secretary: "I'd like to give it a fling. Espionage work certainly would be interesting, a lot different than the routine of office work. It would be a real opportunity to serve my country. Gosh, I hope Allen Dulles, head of CIA, sees this and calls me."



Malcolm B. Hicks, Chatham, N.J., advertising director: "No, but only because I'm not trained for espionage and, at my age, it is too late to start. However, if I could live my life over again, I know of no more interesting and fascinating occupation to choose than that of diplomacy or espionage."



George H. Miller, Staten Island, museum curator: "Yes. As a museum curator, I've been secluded and protected too many years. I even envy the exploits of the firemen that are so graphically illustrated in this museum. Oh for the chance to live dangerously just once before meeting St. Peter at the Pearly Gates."



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MAY 1960

New York Post

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Matters Up in the Air

Premier Khrushchev's disclosure that the Russians shot down an American plane over Soviet territory, mingled with his fierce assault on the U. S. and its allies, has cast a sudden shadow over the summit and chilled the international air. The odds against any East-West accommodation have suddenly jumped precariously.

Whether Mr. K regards the plane story as valid cause for mistrust or is recklessly using it as an excuse for a shift in diplomatic strategy is debatable. Washington contends



that the craft was an unarmed weather plane based in Turkey, manned by only one pilot who may have been off course and unconscious because of difficulty with his oxygen equipment. The full facts are still unknown.

There is nothing to be gained in the urgent search for sanity by wasting time at this crucial juncture in exchanges of denunciation, drum-beating or "expertising" about what is on Mr. K's mind. Conceivably he has intensified the rasp in his voice for domestic political reasons. Possibly he is preparing to blame a summit failure on the West, or even for abandonment of the whole project for reasons related to Moscow's elusive internal politics.

But if the Kremlin's motives are cloudy, neither is it clear, as James Reston suggests in *The Times* today, why somebody in Washington felt obliged to "send planes aloft to check weather data and wind-shear on the Soviet-Turkish frontier" on the eve of the summit meeting—apparently without the knowledge of President Eisenhower.

There are ominous signs that some characters in both Moscow and Washington welcome the plane incident as a rebuke to those who genuinely believe the summit talk can and must be more than a futile bull-session.

Ike has often urged more frequent recourse to the UN in the quest for peace. Premier Khrushchev has now said Moscow will "complain" to the UN Security Council about the plane incident. Let us, then, second and amplify his proposal: let us call for a prompt, sweeping UN investigation of the affair, and for a cessation of war-cries while the inquiry goes on. The world is too fragile a place to permit such episodes to remain unexplored or to let headline-writers dictate history.

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Setback in the Sky

The United States has suffered another massive setback in the international political war. It is a defeat so humiliating, so unnecessary and so plainly the result of gross negligence, confusion and inertia in high places (mingled with folly on lower levels) that we dare not permit it to be buried in the sacred archives of security.

Undoubtedly, Moscow will feverishly exploit The Case of the Downed Flier for its own devious reasons. But what the Russians do at this moment is less important than what we do.



The only way the damage can be partially retrieved is for the President and Congress to insist on a full airing of the facts, designed to expose at once those responsible for the debacle and reestablish faith in our integrity, if not in our wisdom and coordination. Such an inquiry will give temporary aid and comfort to the commissars. What is crucial now, however, is that we provide reassurance for our allies—and, indeed, for ourselves.

THE MAN THEY DIDN'T TELL: The most ominous element in the story is the indication that statesmen may be losing control of history, and that our destiny may be shaped by the caprice of some military bureaucrat or some lonely fanatic, operating in a world of his own. Obviously the same condition applies on both sides of the great divide, but Mr. Khrushchev is currently able to make the most of it; for it was our man who was caught.

Washington's admission that the plane was engaged in aerial espionage was grave enough. It is no answer to say that spying is a big international game which the Communists were playing when we were kids. The game has a different, far more dangerous dimension when it takes place over the sky of a suspicious, jittery rival power than when it is played by cloak-and-dagger experts in the saloons and salons of intrigue-ridden foreign capitals.

The impact of the U. S. confession is compounded by a series of circumstances. The perilous flight took place less than two weeks before the historic summit meeting. It will look to many like a calculated effort to disrupt that session. Our acknowledgment came several days after a pious claim that one of our more serious students of weather had lost his way. Worst of all, our government now feels obliged to offer, as an extenuating remark, the assertion that the President of the United States just didn't know what was going on.

WHODUNIT? We accept the explanation that Mr. Eisenhower was in the dark. Authorization of so provocative a flight at this juncture is inconsistent with his character; lack of such vital knowledge is consistent with his record. Certainly he would not have hinted on Friday that he might abandon his Moscow trip as a retaliatory move against the downing of the plane if he had known the story might blow up in America's face the next day.

There is little solace in these conclusions. The intimation that some subordinate officer would sanction so hazardous an adventure without the awareness and approval of the President is perhaps the most appalling aspect of the event. What has happened has hurt us badly enough; but the excursion might have produced a far more fateful accident if some zealous Bolshevik had identified our intelligence agent as a carrier of atomic bombs. Who would be around to analyze the misunderstanding?

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS: Limitless questions remain unanswered. Have such flights been routine procedure? Did CIA's Allen Dulles simply forget to countermand earlier orders as the summit meeting approached? Was the President never told that we engaged in such escapades? Could the findings of such a journey possibly justify the risks involved? Did CIA experts never guess that the pilot might survive—and that Mr. K was luring us into a false explanation before mischievously breaking the news that our man was very much alive, in his hands, and telling all?

As matters stand we are being depicted by both our friends and enemies as a nation which lets lower-echelon military officials play lightly with the issue of war and peace while the President plays golf.

Surely Ike cannot let the record stand that way; surely too, this is the time when a responsible political opposition should be heard, not reveling in the Administration's disaster, which is our common plight, but demanding that the whole truth be told as a deterrent to future fiascos.

FOOTNOTE TO FURY: Let the episode also give pause to those typewriter warriors who pounded out their declarations of war when the first version of the plane incident was released, and were prepared to give their all for our weather expert.

ON TOP OF ALL THAT: Almost as fantastic as the bungling of the plane incident was Washington's timing of the announcement that the U. S. is resuming underground atomic blasts. One need not argue at this point the merits of the decision. It might even have been originally visualized as a bargaining move for the summit talks. But to release the announcement on the same day on which we were compelled to admit our "weather-man" was engaged in aerial espionage was to multiply all our troubles.

The State Dept. hastily asserted there was no connection between the events. Yet throughout the world the news was headlined simultaneously. It must have been viewed as the gesture of an angry, vindictive nation which had been caught in a dubious act.

Jim Hagerty has long operated on the theory that the way to handle bad news is to blanket it with bigger news. If that was the excuse for this atrocious piece of timing, we have learned once again that press-agents should never be allowed to toy with history.

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Mr. Johnson's Abdication

Senate leader Johnson (D-Tex.) has summoned us all to rally round the flag in the face of the spy debacle. His words were sufficiently eloquent to provoke Vice President Nixon into a warmly passionate bipartisan embrace based, no doubt, on a coldly dispassionate appraisal.

Johnson conceded that large questions had been stirred by the episode. But he made it plain that now was the time for all good Americans to make their questions secondary to their loyalty pledges.



JOHNSON

We said the other day that there is no ground for partisan delight in the national humiliation. Neither, however, do we accept the view that this is an occasion for polite acquiescence in an inexcusable blunder that has shaken the world. The truth is that Mr. Johnson's high-minded words are something less than statesmanship. They are a continuance of his private political view that, in some elusive way, a Texas Democrat can ride to the White House on the coattail of a Republican President.

It is not an excess of debate that imperils the country. It is lack of debate, failure to explore great questions, refusal to challenge the tired premises of our foreign policy, bipartisan agreement to postpone all serious matters, that are undermining our world position. Mr. Johnson has blurred all these questions.

Certainly Mr. Khrushchev should not be deluded into believing that any substantial number of Americans will accept his prescription for world order. But neither should there be any doubt about the extent to which millions of Americans are troubled and dismayed by the fabulous follies of recent days, and demanding better answers than we have received.

In these last few fateful hours before the summit there should be full, free examination of all the positions we have taken, of all the imponderables in our world view, of all the sacred cows on our animal farm. The most tragic aspect of the plane episode is the evidence of abdication by the President of the United States. Johnson's pious cry for "national unity" suggests that the opposition leader has similarly abdicated.

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Quick Review of the U-2

President Eisenhower came to his press conference prepared to evade the most embarrassing—and most important—questions about flying spying spooks over Russia. He read a rather lengthy (for him) statement about espionage and the flight that ended in Sverdlovsk with a thud heard round the world, and he concluded, as he began, with an announcement that he would have nothing further to say about it.

But Ed Morgan, of ABC, made a brave attempt to reach the heart of the matter. "Do we infer correctly," he asked, "that your prepared statement this morning is the final, complete and ultimate answer to your critics, friendly and hostile, on the subject?"



MORGAN


The President: "I said at this time I could see nothing useful more that I could say, so that's where I stand at this moment."

Thus the question about the President's responsibility for being caught in a stupendous bungle with his U-2 down in the wrong place at summit time was neither asked nor answered. The clumsy lie about a lost weather plane, shamelessly concocted by the CIA and with foolish haste repeated by Washington officials, remained. So did the country's enormous loss of moral stature when Khrushchev gleefully exposed the fairy tale the next day and the State Dept. had to repudiate it.

The whole world is talking about the snafu of the U-2 in terms of the dangerous non-leadership these unasked questions raise. Our President, however, apparently considers them improper for public discussion.

Mr. K's Circus

of a post with the New York Housing Authority. "No Rockefeller ever has held public office," he said. "No Rockefeller ever will."
UNIQUE HONOR: Cole Porter's Alma Mater, Yale University, wishes to give him an honorary degree at the June convocation. Porter, however, is unable to make the trip to New Haven because of his leg amputation. Yale never confers degrees in absentia. On June 10, therefore, 10 officials from Yale will convene at Porter's New York apartment and, in this unprecedented gesture, confer the degree upon him.
THE LOST INVITATION: Sharmian Douglas, Princess Margaret's closest friend, almost didn't make the wedding. The invitation had been sent to her at her father's home in Arizona. A servant had put the invitation in the deep-freeze. It was found when someone ordered meat for dinner.
THE REMINDER: At his press conference this week President Eisenhower, discussing President Truman's Look article about the 1949 Inaugural, said he didn't think he attended the Inaugural Ball. He did attend it, in blue dress uniform. I saw



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Dead End at the Summit?

We can hear the rumbles of the gathering storm of righteous indignation and reckless exultation. "Capitol Sees Ike Triumph in Red Move," said a local headline yesterday. The dispatch explained that many Congressional leaders regarded Khrushchev's threatened walkout as a tribute to Ike's strength and wisdom.

In the poet's phrase, ~~it was a famous victory, but what we cannot see~~ As this is written the summit conference is in the gravest peril.

Such a moment is hardly one for raucous ranting or rejoicing. Nor can we derive any comfort from any signs that Mr. K arrived in Paris determined to wreck the session almost before it began, and has come very close to doing exactly that.

For the test of Western diplomacy was not to achieve conditions under which Mr. K could be justly accused of torpedoing the negotiations, but to make it politically impossible for him to do so. In this mission we have seemingly failed, and there is even grave uncertainty whether much of the world shares our view that the Soviet leader bears total responsibility for the perilous deadlock.

BACKGROUND FOR DISASTER: The truth is that the U-2 episode was a major debacle. But the misfortune was compounded by another blunder of equal magnitude. Last Thursday, we are now told, the Administration secretly decided to ban all aerial reconnaissance over Soviet territory. The decision was a wise, responsible one. If it had been promptly announced, Mr. K could hardly have come to Paris with so big a chip on his shoulder.



WOODLIFF

But the masterminds who shape our policy decided to gamble again. They decided to withhold the decision until the summit talks began; it was to be a strategic surprise. Meanwhile, Administration spokesmen—including Ike and Secretary Herter—continued to defend the business of reconnaissance; as late as Sunday night Vice President Nixon was solemnly assuring a TV audience that the security of the U. S. demanded continuance of the hazardous business of aerial espionage over Russian land.

Now, once again, the American story is awkwardly and belatedly changed. What should have been proclaimed as new proof of the President's peaceful intentions is being assailed as another anti-climax to bungling and deceit.

Of course Mr. K's demand that the U. S. not only suspend all such flights but also "punish those responsible" was foolhardy and incendiary. Would we demand that Mr. K be brought to trial when one of his agents was caught on our territory? This is child's talk; but this is not the children's hour for humanity.

MR. K'S BIG TALK: Obviously, Mr. K's bellicose behavior provides serious ground for despair. It is even highly doubtful whether he can any longer choose his own words; more and more he appears the prisoner of resurgent Stalinist fanatics in his own hierarchy. If this is the true condition, is it not in part the product of the awful failures of imagination and intelligence in high Washington places?

The Administration dissembled when it first denied the nature of the flight over Russia. It was equally disingenuous when it denied a published report last week that such flights would be discontinued. There also appears to be a grave possibility that the Administration, subsequent to the Camp David talks and under the pressure of Chancellor Adenauer, sharply altered its view about the prospect for reasonable negotiation in Germany. Did this sequence finally enthrone the adventurers and irresponsibles in Moscow?

These things need to be said out loud because the stakes are too high for the kind of obsequious bipartisanship being provided by Sen. Johnson and his cohorts, and because only a handful of rational voices—notably that of Walter Lippmann—are being raised to challenge the terrifying course of events in Paris.

The tragedy is that there can be no dispute about the sincerity of the President's quest for honorable agreements. But neither can there be any doubt that his inattention and negligence—and we use the words sadly—have resulted in a cruel distortion of his own purposes and the defacing of his image throughout the world.

MORE MILITARY MANEUVERS: As if things were not bad enough, consider the Times dispatch from Washington reporting yesterday that "the nation's global military commands conducted a pre-dawn combat readiness test on orders sent from Paris by Defense Secretary Thomas Gates Jr." The dispatch added:

Questions were raised privately in some official quarters about the timing of the exercise, coming as it did in the wake of the U-2 reconnaissance plane incident and in the midst of a tense international situation.

Again, however, the business is done. Did Ike know in advance? Did anyone tell the Vice President or the Secretary of State? Will we be subjected to another bewildering sequence of subterfuge, denial and affirmation?

Above and beyond all the questions, the issue remains: how has a nation which cares so deeply about peace been maneuvered so often in recent days—and months—into the role of "warmonger"? How have the managers of U. S. policy succeeded so consistently in providing the script for the world-wide Communist propaganda machine?

THE FINAL EFFORT: Britain's Prime Minister Macmillan is feverishly striving to prevent total collapse of the summit conference. Mankind's prayers are with him. If there remains the slightest chance that he can achieve the resumption of communication, let there be no doubt that the U. S. is trying to seize the chance. If everything fails, let there at least be no ribald hosannahs on our side. Nobody can win an atomic war; and by the same token, nobody can claim real diplomatic victory out of a deadlock which doubly increases the prospect of such a conflict.

TAB

REVIEW *and* OUTLOOK

Playing With Matches

It is always embarrassing for a nation to be caught red-handed in the act of gathering information. It is even more embarrassing when a nation is forced by circumstances to admit it.

The gathering of information has always been an accepted business among nations. It even has two names. Those who are in the act of doing it call it intelligence work; those upon whom it is being practiced call it spying. It is dangerous work, and largely thankless. No country will ever acknowledge a spy when he is caught if it can help itself.

That, of course, explains the first nonsense issued by the State Department that the unarmed U-2—a highly specialized craft capable of flying 10 miles high—was on a weather flight for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. From first reports, this country doubtless thought the pilot was killed. But since the Russians claim to have captured him, the United States now admits that we do engage in intelligence reconnaissance near the borders of Russia, as a safeguard against surprise attack. But we say no flight over Russia was “authorized,” by Washington.

Mr. Khrushchev, we may be sure, will get all the mileage he can out of this event. It should be noted that he has already used it to boast of the speed with which Soviet internal defense operates: He himself ordered the plane shot down after it penetrated Soviet territory. And he ordered it

shot down, he claims, with a new missile in one shot.

But it is not likely that the worldly Mr. Khrushchev is really as upset about all this as he makes out. Delighted in the way it turned out, yes. Disturbed, no. The head of as far-flung an espionage system as Russia's would think us fools if we weren't doing this sort of thing to keep an eye on the Soviet and to ferret out Mr. Khrushchev's intentions wherever possible.

All the same, it seems to us that some questions ought to be raised about the judgment used in gathering intelligence.

Sending a cloak-and-dagger operative into Russia to pick up papers is one thing. Sending an unidentified plane far into Russia is quite another. A cloak-and-dagger operative could hardly start retaliatory missiles on their way. A plane, even unarmed, might.

We do not know what the United States would have done if an unidentified plane had flown across our borders, declined to answer and refused to land. But we think we know what should have been done.

So while we are as mindful as anyone of the need for intelligence about what goes on inside Russia, it still seems to us that somebody is playing with matches. There may be reasons having to do with national defense that require us to do that. But when you start striking sparks around a tinder box you run a grave risk of starting a fire.

REVIEW and OUTLOOK

The Way of the Self-Righteous

Up until now it has been possible to say to the world that what came out of the Kremlin was deceitful and untrustworthy but that people could depend on what they were told by the Government of the United States.

Now the world may not be so sure that this country is any different from any other in righteousness. And that, we fear, may turn out to be the saddest injury we have suffered from the incident of the American reconnaissance plane brought down over Russian territory. Like the clergyman caught in nocturnal activities, we will no longer be able to be so self-righteous.

It is true enough that intelligence work—or spying, if you prefer that word—is an accepted business among nations. And we doubt if the world will be shocked, or even surprised, to find that the United States tries to find out as much as it can about the capabilities and intentions of Soviet Russia. Indeed, if the circumstances of our intelligence probing were somewhat different, both the American people and our friends abroad might be reassured to know that intelligence work is no monopoly of the Russians.

But this particular incident is doubly unfortunate. In the first place it is going to be very hard to persuade people that sending a Government plane deep into the territory of another country to photograph its terrain is not what the diplomats would call “provocative.” We need only imagine what the reaction of Americans would be if we caught a Russian airplane over Chicago or a Russian submarine in New York harbor.

In the second place it is going to be

hard to convince people hereafter that explanations from Washington can be taken at their face value.

For the first reaction of Washington to Mr. Khrushchev's announcement about the U-2 was to dismiss it as pre-summit ranting. Then we were told that there was after all a “weather plane” that had been missing for several days near the Turkish border, and that maybe the trigger-happy Russians had shot down this innocent pilot. Only when it became impossible to maintain this cock-and-bull story was it admitted that “someone” had deliberately sent a plane into Russia on an intelligence mission.

So we have been caught not only in a rather provocative act but also in dissembling. The one can be explained as a piece of bad judgment. The explanation for the other will come harder.

No one will argue, we suppose, that this country has done anything different from what the Russians do all the time. Being provocative is habitual with them; deceit is part of their normal way. Therefore the argument that we have done no more than what others do all the time is quite accurate.

The difficulty is that we have told others and ourselves we are different. The image we have created before the world is that “we don't do what the Russians do.” We don't engage in international provocation. We do tell honestly what is going on.

And now the sad part is that this image, which has been one of the strengths of America, is now sullied by our own self-righteous zeal that led us to believe that, because we are opposed to wrong, anything we choose to do is right.

REVIEW *and* OUTLOOK

U-2 Snafu

Among the more red faced people around Washington are officials of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration who said last week that the plane the Soviets claimed was spying was really only a U-2 weather plane that probably wandered off course.

Now, it seems, N.A.S.A. officials say they were telling the truth so far as they knew it. They had entered an agreement long ago with the Air Weather Service of the Air Force, and four of the space agency's U-2 planes were attached to the Air Weather Service in Turkey. Air Weather told N.A.S.A. a plane was missing, and might have wandered across the border, and N.A.S.A. put out the word which the State Department later repudiated in admitting the plane was on a reconnaissance flight deep into Russia.

Well, we're not surprised if Uncle

Sam's right hand didn't know what his left hand was doing, and we doubt that Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington is either, considering the results of an investigation into governmental machinery by a Senate subcommittee he heads.

Senator Jackson reports that there are more than 900 committees operating in the Pentagon all the time, each working on one kind of project or another, ranging from the Department of the Army Accelerated Item Reduction Program Task Group to the Interdepartmental Screw Thread Committee.

Among all this proliferation, clearly there's a place for another one to take custody of just such things as the Snafu of the U-2. We'd suggest the Committee for Ascertaining Who's Doing What Prior to Correlating the Explanations of the Explanation.

REVIEW and OUTLOOK

A Need for Intelligence

In all its recent statements, the State Department has been careful to note that President Eisenhower had not "authorized" the particular flight of the U-2 plane that penetrated more than 1,200 miles into Russia before it fell into Russian hands.

At his press conference the other day Mr. Eisenhower made plain that this was a mere quibble; the gathering of any information that will protect the United States was "authorized" by him long ago. Intelligence operatives are to use "whatever means necessary short of the use of force" to learn what Russia may be up to. Implicit in his statement was that while he had not authorized the specific flight of May 1, he had authorized any and all such steps.

His statement clearly backed up Secretary of State Herter's announcement that the United States would continue to do what it had been doing for some time past about aerial reconnaissance of Russia. But it did nothing to clear up his own statement of just a year and three months ago that "the orders were very strict" about flying near Russia's borders.

In answer to a question in 1959 whether a missing Air Force research plane had been lost testing Russian preparedness procedures, the President then said, "Actually now, I have forgotten the fact, but I established it personally some time back a couple of years ago, and I am sure this happening is accidental." It is hard to see how anyone can infer from that statement anything except that U.S. planes were under orders not to cross Russian borders.

Perhaps the President means to make a distinction between using Air Force planes, which could be considered as the "use of force," he has said will not be employed, and using National Aeronautics and Space Administration planes engaged only in intelligence. It is a distinction, however, that will escape the Russians.

And it is a distinction that certainly will continue to escape some members of Congress. The other day Speaker Rayburn demanded that the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency inform Congress who ordered that pilot into the air over Russia. Senator Willis Robertson said he had attended many meetings of the Appropriations Committee, but nobody had ever said anything about flying planes over Russia, certainly the C.I.A. chieftain, Mr. Allen Dulles, hadn't. Senator Styles Bridges demanded that the State Department and C.I.A. explain the whole story to Congress. A day or so later Representative Clarence Cannon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, said right out that the aborted flight over Russia was one of a series planned by the C.I.A., approved by the White House, and known to a few members of Congress as well.

So to say that Congress is somewhat confused over the operations, as well as the role, of the C.I.A. is to note the obvious. Even though Mr. Herter now says that our "extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft" was apparently not "a secret to the Soviet leadership," it was obviously a secret to many members of the House and Senate.

But if the President's orders of 15 months ago never applied to the C.I.A., if the limits have been lifted, and if flights into Russia are no longer accidental happenings and only a handful of Congressmen knew about the changes, Congress is in poor position to complain about the matter.

For Congress has consistently declined to keep itself—or even its leaders—responsible for knowing what goes on in the C.I.A. Senators and Representatives have acted as though this agency, whose far-flung operatives are answerable only to one man, is somehow not only beyond an accounting but also above the errors that are common to all men.

What Congress learns of C.I.A.'s activities Congress learns only if and when Mr. Dulles is inclined to disclose some information, and then only what he wishes to tell.

The sole mission of the C.I.A. is to gather intelligence and assess it, and it may very well be doing this job in an able manner. The point is that Congress does not know whether C.I.A. is or not.

Therefore Congress should require that Mr. Dulles give an accounting of his stewardship so that it will know whether C.I.A. is soundly manned and directed or whether it is perhaps more adventurous than it ought to be to serve the nation best. In a word, Congress ought to choose a committee of responsible men to whom C.I.A. is made responsible by statute. And Congress should waste no time doing so.

It is not our purpose here to pillory Mr. Dulles individually, for his responsibilities are very great. But the fact is that in a country where, by the words of the Constitution, only Congress has the power to declare war, Mr. Dulles's responsibilities seem to us to be far greater than they ought to be and his power of decision far broader than it ought to be.

We are not suggesting that Mr. Dulles should be forced to expose his espionage apparatus to the full gaze of the American public and thus to its enemies. But clearly an agency whose enthusiasm for gathering intelligence and whose lack of judgment in doing so can actually endanger our overseas bases, our alliances and our reputation for candor and truth shall no longer be permitted to remain almost a law unto itself.

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The psychologists say that toward the major affairs of life we all have moments of ambivalence, that we can suffer all at once the mixed feelings of joy and anxiety.

If we can judge by the samplings of public opinion, and by our own feelings, Americans have had something of this same ambivalence in their reaction to the spy-plane incident. Pride, relief, uneasiness of mind, and even dismay, have been intermingled. Each of these emotions is understandable, and it is not easy to strike a balance among them.

The causes of pride are simply stated. Ever since Sputnik the American people have had a vague but strong uneasiness that somehow we were falling behind the Russians in the struggle. There was not merely the concern over the scientific competition and basic military capabilities; there was also worry about intangibles, that we were soft, bungling, lacking in initiative, energy and alertness when compared with the ruthless, monolithic Communist empire.

Then suddenly we learned that our defense forces were not so listless after all. Hearts were bound to leap with pride at the knowledge that an American reconnaissance plane had penetrated deep into Russian territory, and that furthermore this was but one of many. Here is tangible evidence that our Government is not "asleep at the switch," that our intelligence forces have diligence and the equipment and skills to apply it.

And not the least of our pleasure at events is the way in which this incident has shaken the Russians. For make no mistake about it, the fact that their vaunted defenses can be so readily penetrated is not something that Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues can blithely dismiss.

Reflect for a moment on the dismay, and the fear, we would feel if we discovered that Russian planes had been flying over the United States for months undetected. This country would suffer a psychological trauma of major proportions; it would be a national scandal and heads would roll all over the place.

Something like this may be happening in Russia now. Because of that, Mr. Khrushchev's anguished outcries are not all tears and flappedoodle. His military men have a lot of explaining to do to him, and he has a lot of explaining to do to the Politburo and to the Russian people. Whatever posture Mr. Khrushchev puts to the world, his arrogance has been humbled.

That, in turn, is bound to have an effect on the affairs of the summit conference which begins this morning. For all that the spy-plane incident has given Mr. Khrushchev something to scream about, he cannot now be so cocksure. The repercussions of this affair are by no means all to Mr. Khrushchev's advantage in the realms of diplomacy.

In a world that everyone knows is perilous, there is comfort and reassurance in all this. Not only has our side scored on their side, but when this incident is added to our recent successes in space and under the sea we can feel less intimidated by Russian prowess and more confident in our state of preparedness.

As President Eisenhower put it, "no one wants another Pearl Harbor" and so we rejoice at anything that increases our knowledge of military forces that might launch a massive surprise attack in which survival would be the prize.

This being so, then, why should there be any cause for uneasiness over the events of the past ten days?

It is not simply stated. For it stems from less readily apparent consequences, and in some cases not so much from immediate consequences as from anxieties about the future which have here been sowed.

Part of it, perhaps, comes from the performance put on by the State Department that famous week-end. Either the State Department was ignorant of what was going on, which is quite possible, or else it had given no thought to anticipating that a plane might be caught and planning what it should do then. In either case, the

Government of the United States was caught not only spying but lying. It did not make a pretty spectacle.

Part comes, perhaps, from the fact that the confusion extended all the way to the White House. It's very clear that although President Eisenhower had authorized the C.I.A. to do "whatever is necessary" to obtain information, he was as surprised by this particular plane incident as everyone else.

But bureaucratic bungling is something to which, sadly, we have grown accustomed. The anxiety strikes much deeper. It comes precisely because we do all know this is a perilous world and that the prize in the next war will not be victory but survival. And for some of the older among us, because we do indeed remember Pearl Harbor.

Whatever mystery lies behind that naval disaster, it was no fault of military intelligence. We had the Japanese code; we knew what they were doing, even unto the hour. Besides, Pearl Harbor was no moment's inspiration of the Japanese; it came as the culmination of events in which our own mistakes played some small part.

The next world war, if it comes, can come as well from bungling as from design. An adventurous American, a trigger-happy Russian, a moment of panic—these can easily be the seeds of holocaust. And just because we can understand the panic that would come from Russian planes over Kansas City, we need have anxiety about American planes over Sverdlovsk.

It is all very true when we say we have "no aggressive intent" but it is wholly wrong to mark. For fate depends on the Russian with his hand on a button believing that that plane overhead is not on a warlike mission. It also misses the mark, though true enough, to see the hypocrisy of Mr. Khrushchev crying out against spies. We ourselves would see a difference between a Colonel Abel, spying in Brooklyn, and those planes over Kansas City.

So the uneasiness of mind has nothing to do with spying; we all accept the necessity for it and desire that it be done diligently. Mr. Khrushchev's self-righteous screams on that score can be dismissed for what they are. The concern is over an adventure which, by its very nature, risks bringing on the very thing against which it is supposed to be guarding.

Yet even all this, we think, might be accepted as a hazard under different circumstances; anxiety has become a daily habit which we have learned to wear patiently. But it would be one thing to know that these risks were recognized, measured and accepted by the highest elective officers of the State into whose judgment we have put ourselves. It is quite another thing to feel that things are done by subordinates left free to do "whatever is necessary."

Here is the Government of the United States engaging in an act that by its very nature must carry always the sparks of an explosion, and yet so far as anyone can see it was an act thought up, initiated and carried out in secret not only from the enemy but from ourselves.

Their zeal is commendable; perhaps even their judgment in this case may be right. But if they have done this, unknown, what else is unknown? And if subordinate officers, not responsible to the people, are to have in the future a blank check to fill in as they please, who can know what demands their zeal may put upon the world tomorrow?

And there is one other matter. The strength of this country in the free world has always been that, unlike the Russians, we could be trusted not to do provocative things and that whatever our Government said was true. We hope that image is too strong to be shattered by any one incident, but we think it too precious to risk having it sullied.

So for our own part, we share the pride in discovering that here, in one more area, we are not being outdone by the Russians, and we do not hide our human satisfaction at the consternation that must now be wide among them.

And yet for all of that, we confess that in this incident we, too, have anxieties that will not down.

MAY 18 1960

REVIEW and OUTLOOK

The Battle of Errors

Diplomacy, like tennis, is often less a game of clever strokes than a battle of nerves. And, as in tennis, you can't always tell until the game is over who has made the most errors.

So it would be a bit premature to jump to quick conclusions as to who has won or lost in the thunderous volleys at the summit. It may well turn out that there are some surprises in store for everyone.

Still, it's useful to take stock of the mistakes so far. We can draw some lessons from them, because the common denominator of the errors of our side and the errors of the Communist side is that both came from trying to be too clever.

The mistakes of the United States may well have begun with the original acceptance of the summit idea. There was nothing, really, in the basic situation to suggest that any of the issues between the West and the Soviets, unsettled by normal diplomacy, could be settled by a week's meeting of heads of State.

The U.S. seems to have accepted primarily because we thought it would be a clever maneuver. Either we would (a) win a propaganda victory by "exposing" the intransigence of the provocative Communists, or possibly (b) the combined forces of Mr. Eisenhower, Mr. Macmillan and General DeGaulle might out-match Mr. Khrushchev.

This maneuver, if it had any chance, was wrecked by the spy-plane incident. Amid all the other mystery about this, it is plain enough that nobody really thought the thing through. It just seemed like a good idea "to take some pictures of Russia." So it might have been, but somebody ought to have asked the question what would happen if we got caught on the eve of

the summit meeting. If anybody did ask, nobody tried to answer it.

Then, being caught, the "smart" thing to do seemed to be to deny everything. That turning out badly, the next brilliant maneuver was to bull it through and assert our right to fly over Russia anytime we pleased, now or hereafter.

Americans need not put on sack-cloth and ashes in order to recognize that the incident gave Mr. Khrushchev a chance to be "one up." Gave him a chance which he promptly threw away.

With an opportunity to stand back in injured innocence and lob some telling blows at the Americans, Mr. Khrushchev got the bright idea that he should rush up to the net and clobber us once and for all. But his outrageous behavior, his violent language, his arrogant demand for "unconditional surrender" undid him.

For President Eisenhower met all this with quiet dignity and a clear willingness to continue negotiations on the real issues before the meeting. One result is that in the eyes of the world it is the Russians, not the Americans, who are wrecking what little hope there may have been in a summit meeting. Another is that our allies, who may have been a little shaken by the plane incident, have drawn together with us in solidarity. For this, we can be grateful to Mr. Khrushchev.

So there you are. Blunders to the right of us, blunders to the left of us. And the spectators are a little dizzy trying to figure out who's ahead or what's next.

It would all seem like a delightful comedy of errors. Except that in this game the price of cleverness, whoever makes the errors, can be tragic.

TAB

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The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

FRIDAY, MAY 6, 1960

PAGE A18

Mr. Khrushchev's Warning

How much of Nikita Khrushchev's new bluster is real, and how much is feigned to create apprehension about the summit meeting? It would be difficult to know precisely. What does seem clear is that if the summit meeting actually were to go awry and if President Eisenhower were to cancel his visit to the Soviet Union, the result would be more than a blow to the West. It would also be a defeat for Mr. Khrushchev's position.

In respect of the border violation by an American aircraft about which he complains so loudly, Mr. Khrushchev may have a point—but the point may be less sharp than he attempts to make it. Any violation of territory is cause for concern. But if the plane actually was the unarmed single-engine "high altitude weather reconnaissance" craft reported missing by the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, it is difficult to understand how the plane could have been mistaken for a military type on an invasion of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, it is possible that the Soviet Union, suspecting that new scientific equipment was aboard, deliberately created the incident by shooting down the plane to learn its contents. The locale of the incident, along the Turkish-Iranian border, suggests that there also may have been a confusion of radio beams such as figured in the disappearance of an American Air Force plane in 1958.

Still, some pertinent questions need to be raised in the investigation that the President has ordered. The fact that the research plane was not military may account for the dispute about its markings, but should not such planes be boldly marked? Why was the plane dispatched so close to Soviet territory that it could stray across the border even by accident? If, on the other hand, the plane was gathering intelligence, there is no cause for piety—but there is no cause for injured innocence on the part of Mr. Khrushchev, either, for Soviet aircraft also have engaged in overflights.

In respect of the possibility that Vice President Nixon may substitute briefly for President Eisenhower at the summit meeting, Mr. Khrushchev was insulting from the standpoint of official decorum. Still he said nothing more bitter than what some Democrats already have said. His likening of this role to that of a goat taking care of a cabbage patch, however, suggests more vegetarianism than one might suppose would characterize such a carnivorous occasion.

Changes in the Soviet hierarchy seemingly have no direct relation to the bluster. The major significance seems to be in the shift of Frol Kozlov, said to be favored as Mr. Khrushchev's successor as head of government, to the Communist Party secretary—perhaps thereby combining real power with his ostensible authority. The new Deputy Premier, Alexei Kosygin, also appears to be a man to watch.

When the current warning is combined with Mr. Khrushchev's stern words at Baku last week, however, it suggests that his position at the summit may be far less conciliatory than sometimes supposed. Perhaps Mr. Khrushchev has been miffed by the speculation set off by President de Gaulle to the effect that he would be content not to press the Berlin issue at the summit. He has left himself very little out.

Thus the plane incident may really afford an excuse for tough talk so as to place the West, and particularly the United States, on the defensive in advance of the summit meeting. It may be that this country technically owes an apology. But there is no reason whatever for the West to be placed on the defensive respecting the Berlin issue. Mr. Khrushchev has a great deal at stake at the summit, especially in a nuclear test agreement and its bearing on Soviet relations with China. He needs to understand, and the President needs to be prepared to make him understand, that if he forces a crisis on Berlin there will be no agreement on anything else.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

.. TUESDAY, MAY 10, 1960

PAGE A18

Iron Curtains Are Obsolete

The title of this editorial seems to us the most appropriate conclusion from the bizarre episode of the American espionage plane brought down in the Soviet Union. Unquestionably the incident has had the momentary effect of damaging the prestige of the United States, of alarming or embarrassing the Allies and of fueling Mr. Khrushchev's propaganda machine. This country was caught with jam on its hands. Yet the reason why the United States has been driven to such tactics, why such extreme measures are necessary to obtain information, is simply the existence of hermit states behind the Iron Curtain.

Accurate maps of the United States and of most free countries of the world are available for the asking. Detailed figures are published about the armed forces and the press carries stories about the location of missile bases and other military installations. But in the Communist states secrecy is all-encompassing and such subjects are matters only for speculation. With the advent of inter-continental missiles and the simultaneous downgrading of the effectiveness of warning systems, information of the sort gathered by the intelligence plane has become imperative for survival.

Private citizens initially may be repelled by the method, but they will understand upon reflection that intelligence operations are a necessary fact of contemporary life. Indeed, there is some ground for satisfaction in the deduction that such operations have been carried on successfully for several years, that they represent a high degree of technological proficiency and that they apparently have furnished, with Allied cooperation, much valuable information to the free world.

No good purpose would have been served by attempting to deny the obvious situation or by attempting to blame it wholly on the Russians. Despite the embarrassment, we think that Secretary Herter was right to acknowledge the matter candidly when his hand was forced—though it is regrettable that one ancillary effect has been to expose the companion part played by British intelligence and to subject certain of the Allies to uncomfortable pressures.

Unquestionably the operation was handled clumsily, particularly in the weird initial explanations—and here Mr. Khrushchev scored a point. The timing just in advance of the summit meeting also seemed bad, though as we understand it such photographic flights have been most feasible during only a limited part of the year (and the timing was no worse, in any event, than that of the episode of the British frogman who sought to gain information on the Soviet cruiser that brought Messrs. Khrushchev and Bulganin to England).

It is especially unfortunate, we think, to have the National Aeronautics and Space Agency tied up in the affair, for NASA does much valuable work not directly related to either the military or to intelligence. And, of course, the lamentable result of the exposure of such covers is to cast suspicion upon a great many activities that may be altogether innocent. Members of Congress ought to be wary, however, lest they compound the clumsiness and impair intelligence collection in the process.

At the same time, it ought to be noted that Mr. Khrushchev may have embellished the facts in his great propaganda play. There is some reason to think, for example, that the photograph of the downed plane published in the Soviet Union may have been doctored or faked. It is not certain, despite Mr. Khrushchev's claim, that the plane actually was hit by a new Soviet rocket; if it was, why was not more of the equipment

destroyed? Moreover, the behavior of the pilot, Francis G. Powers, suggests that lack of oxygen may indeed have been a factor.

When these details are weighed along with certain other evidences of Soviet behavior, the outpouring of virtue from Moscow may be a trifle overdone—and this may become increasingly apparent to the outside world. The Soviet Union is known, for example, to have conducted overflights of its own over Alaska, Britain, Japan, Pakistan and Turkey. Chinese planes have been seen over India. Soviet submarines and trawlers have come close to American shores and they have not, to repeat the euphemism, been checking on the weather.

And then there is the matter of direct espionage itself. Consider the ramifications of the spy ring operating while the Soviet Union and the United States were allied and exposed by the defection in Canada of a Soviet code clerk, Igor Gouzenko. Consider the Rosenberg case, or the more recent case involving Colonel Abel. Or consider the mammoth subversion apparatus fed from Moscow. These are not manufactured excuses; they are real. Whatever the activities of Americans, in other words, this is far from a one-sided business.

All such activities are provocative. Those conducted with aircraft, however, contain an exceptional element of danger, and for that reason the incident of the espionage plane is particularly serious. There is always the possibility that aerial excursions of this sort will trigger a clash through misunderstanding or even set off a major retaliatory attack.

In the circumstances the Russians have shown some degree of restraint. No doubt it is humiliating for the Kremlin hierarchy to acknowledge that an American plane could have penetrated Soviet defenses so far; and the actual fact, that the overflights have been going on for several years, is even more humiliating. A considerable amount of annoyance on the part of Mr. Khrushchev thus is understandable.

Yet Mr. Khrushchev has conspicuously avoided placing the blame directly upon President Eisenhower. The President probably did not know of this flight in advance, but unquestionably he is responsible for intelligence policy. Thus the Soviet approach seems to indicate a desire to save face on both sides, to make the most of the incident for propaganda purposes and to use it as a lever at the summit, but not to queer the summit meeting itself.

When all of these factors are evaluated however, the root of the problem remains the Iron Curtain itself. This is a manifestation of the constant struggle between the open society and the closed corporation; the open society has little to fear from another open society. However distracting and distressing the present incident may be, it is bootless to talk about trust and confidence so long as one part of the world is walled off from the others.

Fortunately, there is reason to expect that with the perfection of Samos and other photographic space satellites, such information as that sought by the plane in this situation will become freely available to both sides. In that sense the Iron Curtain is already obsolescent, whether or not the full implications are immediately realized, and soon will become obsolete. Until this is recognized, however, the collection of intelligence by unorthodox methods is an unhappy necessity. We trust that American officials at the summit will talk with the utmost frankness about the intimate relationship between information and international confidence.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

THURSDAY, MAY 12, 1960

A26

Distasteful But Necessary

The more that is learned of the incident of the American espionage plane in the Soviet Union, the less of a moral question the matter becomes. The Soviet government is hardly the most plausible champion of international morality in any event, and Mr. Khrushchev's pretense of shock over President Eisenhower's acknowledgment of responsibility discloses either an incredible naiveté or a grossly transparent double standard.

Indeed, the manner in which Mr. Khrushchev is magnifying and distorting the affair invites the suspicion that he is preparing an advance excuse for any impasse at the summit meeting. Why he should go to the extreme of virtually inviting Mr. Eisenhower to cancel the visit to the Soviet Union is not readily understandable, but it is possible that Mr. Khrushchev has been caught in the furor he himself helped arouse. The disclosure that American planes have penetrated Soviet defenses not once but many times may well have caused him some domestic embarrassment that he seeks to allay by indignation.

It is no doubt true that if a Soviet espionage plane had been forced down over this country there would have been a great public outcry. Such flights, from whatever source, are perilous and provocative. Nevertheless, Mr. Khrushchev's pose of injured piety is contrived. The Soviet government had long known of the flights. When the plane was forced down, the government faked and embellished the details.

Obviously it would have been foolish to expect Soviet authorities not to exploit the incident. But the way in which Mr. Khrushchev led the Administration on and then shot down the initial false explanation reflected a deliberate and skillful propaganda gambit. Mr. Khrushchev's reaction is reminiscent of the lines from Alexander Pope's *Essay on Criticism*:

All seems infected that th' infected spy,
As all looks yellow to the jaundic'd eye.

President Eisenhower yesterday gave a lucid account of the nature of intelligence activities in today's world as what he called "a distasteful but vital necessity." So they are, and there is nothing new about them. They go back to Greek and Roman times and before; and so illustrious a figure as Daniel Defoe, the author of *Robinson Crusoe*, was a highly successful intelligence agent.

In a sense the entire business of secret intelligence is morally offensive. But if the American overflights are morally questionable from some standpoints, what of the Soviet spy version, not to mention a long list of aggressions?

Judgments of international morality cannot fairly be based upon a narrow standard; they must comprise the whole record of conduct. By such a criterion the United States, in serving its own interests, has a pretty good record of also serving the interests of freedom.

Undoubtedly there is some danger in what Mr. Eisenhower conceded are efforts to "mislead and obscure" for purposes of concealment. The "cover" in this case—that of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency—was not airtight, and the result was to make a liar of the Government. It does not follow, however, that all covers are inept or that the Central Intelligence Agency on this account needs overhauling.

Indeed, we think that the restraint shown by congressional leaders in the face of cries for "investigation" is altogether wise. No investigation would repair past damage. Members of Congress are certainly entitled to assurance that there is firm control of intelligence activities, but they would be imprudent to insist on disclosure of intimate details unless they were prepared to assume individual responsibility.

The simple truth is that the United States, having been caught in the act, must now take its medicine. But there is no cause for bad conscience. The one remedy that would make such activities unnecessary is the development of a Union lamentably has again rejected.

WASHINGTON POST

MAY 3 1960

The Elusive Truth

Would it have been better for American policy, having been shot down in a diplomatic lie, to crash spectacularly in flames? Or was it better to bail out, figuratively speaking, and soften the descent with a confirmation of the painfully obvious truth? This was the dilemma Secretary Herter faced in the incident of the American espionage plane. We think that he made the right decision in acknowledging what Mr. Khrushchev, by a rather coy bait-and-hook technique, had made evident that he already knew.

The next question is whether the Administration should have slapped its own wrist and promised that such deplorable events would not happen again. President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter chose not to be defensive in their defense. In justifying the surveillance flights as a necessary safeguard against surprise attack because of Soviet secrecy, they implied without saying so directly that the flights should continue.

But this in turn invited new problems. If the official statements did not in so many words make further overflights of Soviet territory an "avowed" policy, as charged by Walter Lippmann, certainly the policy has not been disavowed. Mr. Lippmann registered what seems to us an altogether valid criticism in saying that this puts everybody on the spot, particularly the Allies whose bases have been used at the beginning or end of the overflights.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Khrushchev has made known his extreme annoyance at the implication. Continued rumbles from Moscow about "brinkmanship" indicate that he will attempt to force the United States to eat its words, perhaps as the price of validation of the invitation for Mr. Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union. We hope in this connection that if there is to be any cancelling the Administration will let Mr. Khrushchev do it. Apart from that consideration, however, Mr. Khrushchev's participation in the thought of further overflights is understandable. One may suspect, indeed, that Mr. K. is not completely sure that he could catch the next one.

Here is an exquisitely tangled web. Mr. Khrushchev does not have to discover subversion or Colonel Abel or the Rosenberg or the wartime spy ring or the two Soviet spies just exposed in the first place. Everyone knows about them, but because of the doubletalk associated with espionage the Soviet government is not confronted directly with them.

The United States, however, has found it necessary because of a lie that became increasingly implausible to tell at least part of the truth. If the Administration were now to say that the whole idea of further flights were preposterous, no one would believe it. Everyone knows that they must and will continue. But because the public confirmation of a fact admitted only in private is offensive, the United States and its Allies are now squirming very uncomfortably.

Despite its serious connotations, the situation is not without its amusing aspects. Honesty is still the best policy, it seems, but with the proviso that in diplomacy there is not too much of it. The moral, we suppose, is that if the cover doesn't fit it's bound to leak.

WASHINGTON

MAY 14 1960

Good Luck, Mr. President

To wish President Eisenhower a successful journey to the summit is far more than a formality in view of the unpleasant international climate. In the current atmosphere the President may feel less like Sir Edmund Hillary in the exhilarating ascent of Mount Everest than like Admiral Peary in his trek across the frozen wastes to the North Pole. Mr. Eisenhower already carries with him the bipartisan good wishes of Congress, and to these will be joined the confidence of his countrymen generally.

The United States and its Western Allies go into the summit conference in Paris on Monday with a considerable dent in their prestige because of the spy plane incident. Obviously Mr. Khrushchev is determined to wring the last drop of propaganda from it. There are many in the West who deplore the bad timing of the flight or who apply a new moral judgment to a new chapter in an age-old practice. Perhaps the timing was bad—though there also was an element of bad luck. But we suspect that if Mr. Khrushchev had not been enabled to seize upon this affair he would have found other means of building at least an appearance of tension.

For it has been evident over a period of weeks that the Soviet position in respect of the summit has been hardening. Mr. Khrushchev's Baku speech made this clear, and there were earlier indications. He has become more explicit about Berlin with his insistence that if his terms were not met all Western rights would be abrogated unilaterally, including rights of access.

The reasons for all of this may be complex. Perhaps the United States has contributed unwittingly to some of them. The pulling and hauling over the nuclear test issue, with deliberate efforts by some groups to prevent an agreement, may have created an impression of bad faith. The unfortunate manner of the White House announcement the other day about a program of test detection research may have tended to confirm previous suspicions. Under Secretary of State Dillon's speech last month, to which Mr. Khrushchev took such strong exception, may have been unnecessarily brusque—though perhaps what Mr. Khrushchev found most objectionable was the indication that he would not get away with his game of euchre.

Then there may have been some domestic Soviet reasons. Some of the Stalinists among Mr. Khrushchev's colleagues may have been mistrustful of his initiatives. There is said to be discontent among Soviet military officials discomfited by recent manpower cuts. There may well be pressure from the fanatics in Communist China; and the hardshell views of the hierarchy in East Germany can no longer be overridden as contemptuously as those of other satellite satraps. For all such reasons Mr. Khrushchev may have found the diversionary benefits of the plane incident irrefragable.

Whatever the explanation, it seems likely that Mr. Khrushchev's tactic is to attempt to place the West on the defensive and thereupon to demand concessions in order to prevent a breakdown at the summit. He seems likely also to employ this technique, we trust unprofitably—in respect to Mr. Eisenhower's visit. Thus whether anything constructive can be developed out of this conflict of motives remains very much in doubt.

There is still a chance for a nuclear test agreement—though not, it must be made clear, at the expense of Berlin. But it is hardly a cheery environment into which Mr. Eisenhower is going. Out of respect for the sincere and deep-seated hopes of humanity for real peace, however, it is far better to avoid great expectations than to invite cruel disillusionment.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

WEDNESDAY, MAY 15, 1960

PAGE E4

Suicide by Order

Mr. Khrushchev, at a dramatic point in his speech the other day to the Supreme Soviet, exhibited to the gaping delegates something that he called a "poison needle." It was, he explained, part of a "suicide kit," found among other effects of the unhappy American espionage pilot, Francis Powers, after his plane had been shot or forced down on Soviet soil. According to Mr. Khrushchev, Powers had been instructed to use this kit rather than permit himself to fall alive into enemy hands.

Up to now our own authorities have been silent about this aspect of the Powers story. Still, it is no great secret that most modern governments, including that of Soviet Russia, have provided their agents engaged on specially hazardous missions with the means of suicide, either for the purpose of enabling them to evade torture or to prevent a hostile power from extorting important information whether by physical torture or by the more advanced and efficient technique of "brainwashing." All this raises an interesting question of ethics, so that some moralists have already challenged the right of any government to demand or to recommend suicide under any circumstances.

This view, of course, accords with the teaching of some Christian groups that direct suicide, or the willful and violent destruction of one's own life, is for any reason and in any situation irremediably sinful. Indirect suicide, or the deliberate exposure of one's person to circumstances in which death may seem probable or even certain, is another matter. This may be not only not sinful but an evidence of heroism, as for example in the case of a physician, nurse, cleric or public official who remains at his post during a virulent epidemic.

In the Christian Middle Ages occasional victims of self-slaughter were usually denied Christian burial and were often interred under some public crossroads with a marker designed to serve as a warning to wayfarers. Today most Christian groups are more compassionate and indulgent in such cases; and wherever there may be the slightest doubt of the rationality of the deceased, the question is invariably resolved in his favor. And indeed, according to a recent report by Dr. Robert E. Litman of Los Angeles to the American Psychiatric Association, a large proportion, of apparent suicides by emotionally disturbed persons should really be classified as "accidental deaths," since

sooner than complete self-destruction is
and intended.

case of a sane and rational person confronted with the prospect of certain death presents another and more difficult problem. How far is such a person justified in hastening the inevitable? As concerns persons suffering from incurable and agonizing disease, many traditional moralists have already answered the question with condemnation of both suicide and euthanasia. But what of Socrates, who knowing himself to have been unjustly condemned, nevertheless accepted and drank the hemlock when it was offered him? What of the condemned revolutionary who requests and—after the chivalrous Latin custom—is granted the privilege of giving the command to fire to his executioners? What of the Stoic Roman who opened his veins after learning of his proscription by an imperial tyrant? These are pertinent questions which the case of Mr. Powers, whatever his "instructions," merely serves to emphasize.

MAY 16 1960

WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD

Space-Age Perspective

The Soviet Union's new space ship, with its pressurized cabin and dummy astronaut, adds to the air to space furor over the American spy plane. This successful scientific feat, timed to impress the world on the eve of the summit conference, was specifically designed to prepare the way for putting men into space. One reason for doing so will be to observe what is taking place in all parts of the earth. Indeed the globe-circling American T-16 has already demonstrated the possibility of photographing the earth from satellite altitudes with no human passengers. Yet the Soviet Government has been behaving as if its continued existence depended upon keeping the space above its territory closed to observers from other parts of the world.

There is some difference, of course, between a high-flying airplane and a space vehicle. The plane must keep within the air space, and the satellite sent up with rocket thrust operates in what is known as outer space. When planes fly so high as to be neither seen nor heard in ordinary circumstances, however, the difference seems to be one of degree rather than kind.

It had been widely predicted that the Soviet Union would attempt another spectacular feat in outer space as a preliminary to the summit conference. Suppose it had sent aloft an espionage satellite, with or without human passengers, capable of photographing military installations in every country! The achievement would have been generally regarded as a great scientific coup, and the Moscow propaganda machine would have almost burst its seams proclaiming the glories of Communist progress.

Well, the sputnik makers are not yet ready for precisely that kind of venture, but it is certain to come. Both the United States and the Soviet Union will have intelligence-gathering satellites spying upon everything that is not concealed underground. In the absence of agreement to prevent space travel and space photography, which is highly improbable, every country will have to adjust itself to living in a goldfish bowl.

The Administration also seemed to lose space-age perspective in dealing with the incident. With an intelligence-gathering satellite already in use and vast improvements in process, it was not necessary to imply that the United States would continue to send planes into the Soviet's air space for this purpose. For a number of other reasons, the U-2 may soon prove to be obsolete as an espionage device. Fortunately, these aspects of the situation now seem to be getting recognition from the American delegation in Paris.

The big question of the future, then, is not whether planes will continue to fly over countries suspected of hostile intent, but what steps will be taken to regulate the use of outer space. The free world has a vast interest in maintaining free use of space for peaceful purposes, as it has in freedom of the seas. Fortunately, the Chicago convention, which was ratified in 1946, now regulates the rights of civilian aircraft in the air space above 74 countries, although the Soviet Union and a few other Communist-bloc states are not included.

What may be really troubling Mr. Khrushchev is that he now sees the doom of his closed system, either through negotiations on the control of outer space or the loss of them. If this is the case, it is not surprising that the American exploits in the upper layers of inner space should have caused an angry explosion.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1960

PAGE A10

Picking Up the Pieces

If an apology from President Eisenhower actually would have saved an opportunity for constructive business at the summit meeting, it might have been worth while. But Mr. Khrushchev made that all but impossible by ostentatiously burning the bridges. He was not interested in satisfaction over the U-2 incident or assurance for the future; he was interested in discrediting the President and publicly humiliating the United States. He sought to place this country in a situation quite as untenable as that in which the Administration's handling of the U-2 affair, by some analyses, had placed him in his relations at home.

Mr. Khrushchev's overbearing behavior seems to have alienated much of the sympathy to which he appealed in the espionage plane episode. This, however, does not minimize the seriousness of the chasm at Paris. If the Soviet leader now goes to East Germany with the idea of concluding a separate peace treaty, a new and more dangerous Berlin crisis may ensue. The treaty by itself would not necessarily make a conflict likely, but any attempt to curtail access to Berlin certainly would.

Whatever the outcome, the United States has suffered a grave erosion of confidence and faces new problems in relations with its free world friends, particularly its smaller allies. There can be no doubt that Mr. Khrushchev is using the U-2 affair to undermine the whole system of bases. Already Norway and Pakistan, which are in a sense innocent victims of the acknowledgment that their territory has been used in connection with aerial espionage, have protested to the United States. Turkey is under pressure and there is edginess in Japan, where the security treaty is up for ratification.

To see one's own country in such a predicament is distressing in the extreme. It is not pleasant to be branded, even technically and with extenuation, as an "aggressor." Hindsight shows that the Administration should have handled matters differently, even after the fact of the overflights was disclosed. By failing to seize the opportunity for a more graceful "out" and by implying that the violations would continue, this country may well have forced Mr. Khrushchev's hand. The Administration acted more clumsily than a group of Cub Scouts when the tent collapsed. Had Mr. Khrushchev been content to rest with his initial strong protest without attempting to make the United States grovel, the domestic criticism of the Administration would have been overwhelming.

But the self-examination and the excoriation of amateurishness and blunders can be carried too far. Constructive review must start with the existing dilemma. The United States committed and

compounded an offense, but this need not have doomed the conference if Mr. Khrushchev had wanted to save it. There is an understandable repugnance at the provocation and deception that go with intelligence operations. It is part of the ritual that such operations must be disavowed, condemned and abhorred. But to say that this country handled its role maladroitly is not to say that the role itself was wrong.

Even though the particular flight was mistimed, it does not follow that the overflights were morally improper. They were different in degree from other intelligence operations, and perhaps on that account more objectionable. But they were essentially similar to what all large nations do, and they certainly were no more offensive than more conventional Soviet espionage or more provocative, by any logical test, than Soviet submarine surveillance. To regard them as in the same category with Mr. Khrushchev's threat on Berlin or the more flagrant acts of Soviet subversion would be to stand morality on its head.

Indeed, the explanation that such activities are made necessary by the Iron Curtain, although not the wisest official use, is still the most accurate. Despite all the turmoil the issue is in some degree academic. The imminence of practical surveillance satellites surely means that an open world for intelligence purposes is looming whether or not Mr. Khrushchev recognizes it.

Now, none of this makes any more promising the immediate outlook for relations between the Soviet Union and the West. All the king's horses and men could not put this shell together again. Mr. Khrushchev is being very optimistic in talking of another summit meeting in six or eight months. Quite apart from his degradation of President Eisenhower, it may be a very long time—perhaps longer than Mr. Khrushchev himself will be in power—before anyone else in the West will find it feasible to consider another summit meeting. That is an especially sad aspect of the debacle at Paris.

For the moment the United States and its allies must heed the storm warnings. Mr. Khrushchev has been acting like a human hurricane, and the prudent course will be to batten down the hatches, particularly in respect of Berlin. For the longer run it would be wise for this country to examine, with a view to urgent correction, the reasons why its prestige has slipped during the last five years—among them the psychological negativism, insensitivity and loss of dynamism, the appearance of subordination of defense primacy to the budget, the refusal to acknowledge that we are in a contest in space. That would be much more in point than a binge of self-doubt over the U-2 affair.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

THURSDAY, MAY 19, 1960

PAGE A22

The Stakes Are Still High

Having blown up the summit conference, Mr. Khrushchev proceeded yesterday to describe his performance in Paris as a "brilliant success" which he likened to the performance of a "great artist". It was as if, after the conference, he insisted on showing the world that he made sure everyone knew his capacity for madness.

All of this tends to lock the door and throw away the key. Democratic leaders in the United States made a highly commendable gesture of national unity yesterday by appealing for a new summit conference before the American elections, thereby minimizing political differences and disavowing any partisan advantage. But any American President, Democrat or Republican, would find it difficult to meet with a man who demeans the country and its institutions.

What has motivated Mr. Khrushchev in these outbursts is a question on which every man can be his own expert. Perhaps it must be left to the God Mr. Khrushchev disclaims but invokes. The manner in which Mr. Khrushchev threw his weight around recalled not merely his great penchant for Soviet equality but also the swagger he exhibited after the first sputnik. At the same time he scarcely enhanced the plausibility of his performance in Paris by acknowledging that he knew of the U-2 flights when he met with Mr. Eisenhower last September. The glum presence everywhere of Defense Minister Malinovsky suggests that Mr. Khrushchev may in actuality be a sort of hostage to the disgruntled Soviet armed forces.

Yet as the damage at Paris is surveyed, both sides must take stock of the world in which they must live—or die. Mr. Khrushchev has conducted a brutal piece of sabotage for which the United States unwittingly and unhappily set the stage. But this explosion does not make any more palatable the thought of nuclear war or even of expanded cold war that could suddenly become hot.

The Soviet chieftain undoubtedly is impetuous, but unless a suicide complex has engulfed him he knows as well as do the leaders of the West that in a nuclear holocaust there probably would be no real winner. Therefore the utmost restraint will be necessary on both sides to avoid new acts or provocations that could trigger an irrational response or lead to a situation from which there would be no escape.

Despite Mr. Khrushchev's insults, both sides share in the blame for the debacle. Apart from the U-2 affair itself, the Administration in failing to seize the opportunity to extricate itself may have underestimated the strictly nationalistic reaction in the Soviet Union. It also contributed unnecessarily in other respects to Mr. Khrushchev's "justification."

Firmness on Berlin was and is imperative; but the ostentatious deference to Chancellor Adenauer, who is the Kremlin's *bête noire*, may have exposed a sensitive nerve. By contrast to this firmness, the day-to-day wobbling on the nuclear test issue was sufficient to cause doubts in a less suspicious mind than Mr. Khrushchev's. The announcement that Vice President Nixon might

substitute for Mr. Eisenhower at Paris may have appeared as a deliberate attempt to slight Mr. Khrushchev and degrade the summit meeting.

Perhaps, notwithstanding the purposeful scuttling of the conference, there will be similar post-mortems in the Soviet Union. If the carefully nurtured hope for results through personal diplomacy has been blighted, what chance is there for at least minimal agreement through more conventional diplomatic means?

No one knows. It may be in the interest of Mr. Khrushchev and of the groups influencing him to renew the cold war and embark on a Soviet version of brinkmanship. But there are limits beyond which this could not prudently be pushed. The Soviet Union is militarily no stronger as a result of the bluster at Paris; and though the people may be denied goods, the economy is no more capacious. More important, although the leverage of the fanatical Chinese Communist appears to have increased, the long-range identification of interests between Moscow and Peking has not automatically increased. Conceivably Mr. Khrushchev may even regret the necessity of abetting or appeasing the Chinese diehards.

Thus it does not follow that the break at Paris inexorably means an immediate reversion to the worst tensions of Stalinism. The disarmament discussions are an obvious casualty, but it is hardly possible that the nuclear test negotiations at Geneva may be spared this fate. The outlook is far from promising, but it must be explored in good faith.

For example, there still may be a mutual interest between Mr. Khrushchev and the West in evolving a treaty and inspection system that would inhibit the development of nuclear weapons in additional countries such as China. This may be wishful thinking; we shall have to see.

There can be no blinking the likelihood that the extremism in Paris has made the task of getting any test treaty through the Senate enormously more difficult. Still, the regrettable split does not mean that the opposition to a test agreement represented by Dr. Edward Teller and Chairman McCone of the Atomic Energy Commission has been right from the beginning. One of the problems in the days ahead will be to avoid being drowned in a wave of I-told-you-soism.

A similar problem affects other fields of national effort. The immediate and urgent necessity is for the United States to reassert its determination and undergird its military and economic defense programs—but in such a way as to avoid panic, provocation or flamboyance. The most urgent challenge is the passage of an adequate foreign aid bill; if it was vital before Paris it is now crucial.

At the same time, the era now opening may be a very long one, and the magnitude of East-West differences can be influenced by the manner of what we do as well as by what we may fail to do. We cannot afford to lose reason or hope—to doubt our own capacity or resolution. There will be a great difference between preparing for the worst and conveying the impression that we think it inevitable.

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A-8 MONDAY, MAY 9, 1960

Redhanded Is Right

It is true, as Mr. Khrushchev rather indelicately puts it, that the United States has been "right redhanded" in an espionage effort directed at the Soviet Union. Only the naive and the innocent will be shocked, however, by this disclosure. For one of the inescapable facts of life in the cold war is that the United States, Russia and most other nations are relentlessly engaged in undercover intelligence work. However distasteful espionage may be to some people, it is imperatively necessary to survival—especially in a time when any nation may be destroyed by surprise attack.

To explain away, or rationalize, this incident, however, hardly serves to minimize its injurious impact on the American position. Those who engage in spying are not supposed to get caught. When they are caught the consequences, as in this case, can be painful.

Obviously, Mr. Eisenhower will go to the summit under a cloud. For the moral position of the United States, a position about which we perhaps have talked too much, has been prejudiced. It was nice of Mr. Khrushchev to "fully admit" that the President didn't know that a plane was sent beyond the Soviet frontiers and did not return. In his strong propaganda position, he can afford to indulge in tongue-in-cheek gen-

erosity. And what of the State Department's assertion that Mr. Powers' flight was not authorized by any official in Washington? This, we assume, is of a piece with that fairy tale about the oxygen trouble and the possibility that the pilot might have crossed the frontier while unconscious. If the authorities in Washington didn't know about this particular flight, they certainly knew that this espionage program was in operation. And if, as a result, our moral position at the summit must suffer, there simply is no help for it. We will have to do the best we can.

A second aspect of this affair has to do with the effect on our allies overseas, from whose territory intelligence operations have been conducted. Assuming that the whole truth of the U-2 incident has been told—an assumption which may be unwarranted—the plane took off from a base in Pakistan for its flight across Russia, and was supposed to land in Norway. Mr. Khrushchev did not hesitate to threaten countries which permit such operations, and we must assume that his threats will have some effect. At the least, they will make such intelligence flights as that of the U-2 more difficult and more hazardous in the future. Still, as a matter of self-preservation, we must continue our effort to learn about anything the Russians are doing which poses a threat to us. And we should remember that they will be doing the same.

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A-10 TUESDAY, MAY 10, 1960

Our Best Weapon

Secretary Herter's statement on the U-2 incident appears to be a forthright disclosure of our own government's connection with this unhappy affair. And the truth, we think, is the best weapon available to us now.

The gist of Mr. Herter's comment is that the massive Soviet missile threat, together with Mr. Khrushchev's rocket rattling, poses a menace to our survival which cannot be ignored. It is indeed "unacceptable" that the Soviet Union "should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the Free World with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction." This is the privilege which Mr. Khrushchev, in effect, is demanding. And this is the opportunity which our espionage activities presumably have denied to him.

There are those who say we should not have admitted that the downed U-2 was on an intelligence mission. And it is possible, just possible, that it would have been better to have said nothing from the beginning. After Mr. Khrushchev had punctured our clumsy and specious initial "explanations," however, it was hardly possible to remain silent without appearing utterly ridiculous in the eyes of the world. At that point it became necessary to tell the truth, and we are glad that Mr. Herter has done so—that he has said that the President issued the directives for the gathering of information by "every possible means," even though specific missions such as the U-2 flight may not be individually authorized by him. This will not surprise or shock Mr. Khrushchev, who might better be called Mr. Espionage. If it shocks the emotional infants of this world, that is too bad—but it cannot be helped.

This leaves a question as to why Mr. Khrushchev is making such a production of this incident, and whether he, too, is telling the truth. His purpose may be to frighten our allies, especially Pakistan and Norway, in an effort to hamper if not to prevent further American "penetrations" of Russia. As for the second point, we simply do not know. We, meaning this government, do not know how the Russians happened to capture the U-2 pilot alive, why he apparently has talked so freely, or whether the photo released by the Russians really shows the wreckage of the missing U-2. Officials of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, which built the plane, say flatly that the wreckage shown is not that of a U-2, but appears to be the remains of a crashed Soviet bomber. If so, there is the possibility that the Russians have the U-2 more or less intact, not to mention its secret equipment and its pilot. If the Lockheed officials are correct, what is the explanation? We will not know the answer to that one until Mr. Khrushchev decides to be at least as candid as Mr. Herter now has been, and for this we may have to wait until the shrimp whistles.

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FRIDAY, MAY 13, 1960

At the Water's Edge

Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and Chairman Clarence Cannon of the House Appropriations Committee have just offered the world, including particularly the Soviet Union, another striking example of how domestic politicking stops at the water's edge in our country—even in the midst of a presidential election year.

This is in keeping, of course, with an old and basic American tradition. Although Mr. Johnson and Mr. Cannon are key members of the Democratic Party, they have lived up to the tradition by giving all-out support to President Eisenhower's Republican administration in connection with the downing of our U-2 "spy plane" deep inside the USSR.

Thus, in his statement to the Senate, Mr. Johnson has been at pains to emphasize that our two major parties are in full agreement on the proposition that intelligence-gathering operations will continue to be essential to the security of the United States and the free world in general as long as the USSR insists upon hiding behind the Iron Curtain. Such secretiveness, as pointed out by the President at his latest news conference, makes it imperative for us to take measures (such as U-2 reconnaissance flights) to guard against the enormous danger of surprise attack. And Mr. Cannon, in his eloquent address to the House, has summed up the whole matter by declaring that all operations of this sort are completely justified on the following basis: "Absolute and unavoidable military necessity and fundamental national defense."

Accordingly, with this rule of thumb in mind, Mr. Johnson has told the Senate and the world: "I think that one point should be crystal clear. Nikita Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united in a determination to preserve our freedom, and we are not going to be shaken from that course."

The significance of all this ought to be mulled over most carefully by the men of the Kremlin. They will be making a great mistake if they fail to keep in mind—as Hitler and others should have kept in mind—that it is never wise to underestimate the unity or power of America in time of crisis or challenge.

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Samuel H. Kauffmann
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Editor

Let's Take No Chances

There is some reason to think that what happened in Paris, that when Mr. Khrushchev relaxed East-West tensions, that he advocated this with his position in the Kremlin, the U-2 incident, or, more particularly, our official statements in connection with it, must have come as a faring shock to the Soviet leader.

There is nothing in this, however, which destroys the belief that the Soviet leader deliberately and wilfully wrecked the Summit conference. The conditions which he laid down were as insulting and as arrogant as anything ever put forward by Hitler. Mr. Eisenhower couldn't possibly accede to them, and Mr. Khrushchev knew this. Therefore, whatever the reasons, it has to be assumed that Mr. Khrushchev has knowingly embarked upon a course which will certainly further impair relations between our two countries and which may lead to armed collision.

In this situation, the statement issued by Secretary Herter on May 9 takes on new significance. Trying to justify the U-2 flight over Russia, Mr. Herter said the United States would be derelict to its responsibility to the American people and to the people of the free world if it did not "take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome the danger of surprise attack. In fact, the United States has not, and does not shirk this responsibility."

It was this language which encouraged the belief that it was our purpose to continue with U-2 surveillance. Mr. Eisenhower disclosed in Paris, however, that the U-2 flights, subsequent to the Herter statement, had been suspended and "are not to be resumed." So presumably we will have to find other means of keeping tabs on the Russians with a view to guarding against surprise attacks.

We do not know whether this can be done effectively without flying over Russian territory. But there is one thing which can and most certainly should be done. This is to take every precaution to guard against destruction of our strategic air force in a surprise assault. The President, despite congressional prodding, has dragged his feet on this score, but there should be no more of that. If Mr. Khrushchev will wreck a Summit conference he may embark upon other adventures, and we should take no chances.

Chronological Account Of U. S. Reports on U-2

By The Associated Press

Following is a chronological account of conflicting statements and comments by the spy plane incident as made by administration spokesmen and agencies.

MAY 6 (five days after the flight), an announcement by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

"One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956

in a continuing program to study gust-meteorological conditions found at high altitude, has been missing since about 9 o'clock Sunday morning, when its pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over the Lake Van, Turkey area.

"If the pilot continued to suffer lack of oxygen, the path of the airplane from the last reported position would be impossible to determine. If the airplane was on automatic pilot, it is likely it would have continued along its northeasterly course.

"The pilot, as are all pilots used on NASA's program of upper atmosphere research with the U-2 airplane, is a civilian employed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp., builders of the airplane.

MAY 6—Comment by State Department Spokesman Lincoln White at a news conference:

QUESTION—Has there been any change in the orders under which the planes continue to operate in the vicinity of the Soviet border?

MR. WHITE: "There is no change to be made. This gentleman (the pilot) informed us that he was having difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Now our assumption is that the man blacked out. There was absolutely no—no—deliberate attempt to violate the Soviet air-space."

MAY 7—Statement by the State Department:

"As previously announced, it was known that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev.

"Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.

"The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world."

"It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type of unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have made flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past four years."

MAY 7—Comment by White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty when asked about a report that Mr. Eisenhower has ordered a halt to all further spy flights over Russia:

"I know of no such order."

MAY 7—Statement by Secretary of State Herter:

"In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense.

"Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral nature but on occasion by penetration.

"Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to presidential authorization.

MAY 8—Comment by Mr. White at second news conference:

MR. WHITE: "As this airplane

this policy has any aggressive intent, or that the unarmed U-2 flight of May 1 was undertaken in an effort to prejudice the success of the forthcoming meeting of the heads of government in Paris or to return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the cold war.

"Indeed, it is the Soviet government's treatment of this case which, if anything, may raise questions about its intention in respect to these matters . . ."

MAY 13 — Comments by George V. Allen, director of the United States Information Agency, in replying to questions on a television panel show (ABC's College News Conference):

Mr. Allen—"I will say that I know that the spokesman of the State Department who gave out the information was acting in entirely good faith when he said that it was a weather plane. . . ."

"There has been a great misunderstanding that I would like to correct today. Mr. Herter, the Secretary of State, has not said that we are going to continue to fly. He has said that there is an obligation and a responsibility on the part of the Government of the United States and of the free world to try to obtain information to guard against surprise attack but he has not said that we are going to continue to fly. He hasn't said one way or another . . ."

MAY 15 — Vice President Nixon, answering questions on the television program "Open End":

"There is never a right time to make one of these flights if you're going to get caught.

"The plus is this. You realize that this flight clearly demonstrates the feasibility of the 'open skies' proposal of the President.

"This flight demonstrates that unarmed planes can take photographs without causing any damage, any harm at all to commercial aviation or the national security of the country over which the flights are made. . . ."

MAY 16—Mr. Eisenhower's remarks at summit meeting in Paris:

"We pointed out that these activities (plane flights) had

no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads. . . ."

"There is in the Soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one key point. It alleges that the United States has, through official statements, threatened continued overflights. . . . In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed. . . ."

ment says, it is incumbent upon us to take any measures we can to guard against surprise attack . . ."

QUESTION: You realize that a normal interpretation of this would be that we intend to continue?"

WHITE: "Well, I will leave it to your interpretation."

MAY 12 — President Eisenhower said at his news conference:

"No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those that could be used for surprise attack. . . . The safety of the whole free world demands this. . . ."

"We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities, and second because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given latitude under broad directives but must be kept under strict control in every detail. . . ."

"The normal agencies of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special efforts to conceal them. . . ."

"How should we view all this activity? It is a distasteful but vital necessity. . . ."

MAY 12—United States note replying to Russia's protest:

"In its note, the Soviet government has stated that the collection of intelligence about the Soviet Union by American aircraft is a 'calculated policy' of the United States.

"The United States Government does not deny that it has pursued such a policy for purely defensive purposes. What it emphatically does deny is that

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The Washington News

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SCRIPPS-HOWARD NEWSPAPER

John T. O'Rourke, Editor

Ray F. Mack, Business Manager

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Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

Let's Keep Our Shirts On

FIRST, we should candidly admit that America is in an embarrassing psychological position when Nikita Khrushchev presents to the world a picture of an American "espionage" plane shot down 1300 miles inside the Soviet border only a few days before a scheduled Summit Conference called "to ease world tensions."

Unless there was an overriding reason for doing so, we must admit it was stupid to send a plane on such a mission at such a time.

And it was a blunder of the first magnitude for the State Department to have rushed into print with an explanation that it was a "weather observation plane" and then later not be able to verify it.

Of all the crimes in human or political relations, the worst is to get caught lying.

Yet, having admitted all our shortcomings, let's put this matter into perspective and tighten our belt.

The Cold War contest is no game of mumblety-peg.

Mr. K. is playing for keeps, and he is exploiting this incident for all he can get out of it.

We need not wring our hands in a guilty feeling that we are war-mongers. We need not apologize for having a Defense Department and an Intelligence Agency, nor blame them for working at their jobs.

We have the good reason—of survival—to justify us in trying to find out what goes on behind the Iron Curtain. Just as the Russians try to find out all they can about our country.

The Russians don't have to send a map-making plane over our country. The Russkies can get, for the asking, plenty of maps from the U. S. Coast Guard and Geodetic Survey, from Interior Department's Geological Survey, from Agriculture Department's Soil

Conservation Service, from pipeline companies which have photographed our land aerially—or if that's too much trouble, just write a congressman or any chamber of commerce.

Looking at all evidence in hand, it is not required that we accept Mr. Khrushchev's version.

Maybe, but it is hardly likely, a plane shot down from 70,000 feet could have fallen in such a neat bundle as presented in the official USSR photograph all bunched together in a three-column cut. (In our country, when a plane crashes, even from 7000 feet, it's scattered over several miles of landscape.)

It's perhaps possible, but remarkable, that the pilot should have escaped unharmed, that the film out of the camera was intact, that the so-called "suicide kit" was unruffled. The evidence is almost too perfect.

Anyhow, this is not a game of mumblety-peg. Shortly after World War II, the United States—then the sole possessor of the atomic bomb—offered to turn all fissionable material over to the United Nations. But the USSR vetoed that offer.


Now Russia, Britain and France also have the atom bomb. Soon many other nations will have it.

Our Defense and Intelligence agencies are charged with knowing and advising what occurs elsewhere. It may be embarrassing to get caught trying to find out. But it could be fatal to get caught not knowing.

Russia has spies operating all over our country. Some have been caught—just as Pilot Francis G. Powers has been spotted and knocked down over Sverdlovsk. (Read Jack Steele's article, Page 23.) Others are still at work, gathering information for the USSR.

When a plane is shot down, Soviet borders, we can be embarrassed, but we need not apologize for our work for us.

NEWS



The WASHINGTON DAILY News

A SCRIPPS-HOWARD NEWSPAPER

"Give light and the people will find their own way."

John T. O'Rourke, Editor Ray F. Mack, Business Manager

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®

A small country is one not playing in any of the conference games.

Maytime is when the girls blossom out in a color.

Who Watches the CIA

EXCEPT on the rare occasions when it may choose to leak out a small tid-bit, nobody much knows what our Central Intelligence Agency is doing. Nobody knows how much it spends, how many people it has. And by and large it is better most of us don't know these things.

But there should be a check on CIA—is it doing the job it is supposed to do, and doing it properly and effectively? Who can tell?

Five years ago the Hoover Commission urgently recommended that Congress set up a House-Senate "watchdog" committee, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which keeps a sharp and useful eye on the Atomic Energy Commission. This never was done.

Now, in the light of the Soviet claim that a U. S. spy plane has been captured, the role of the hush-hush CIA is being scanned again by Congress. The

Hoover Commission's proposal is getting new life.

At the time, the Hoover Commission task force headed by Gen. Mark W. Clark said there were "flaws" in the CIA and recommended an "internal reorganization." Nobody knows whether the flaws have been removed, or the reorganization effectively completed. A watchdog committee would know.

The public, said the Clark report, is entitled to assurance that its investment in the CIA is "paying dividends." Full public accounting of the CIA's business obviously would be impossible. But there isn't any reason an outside committee, preferably in Congress, shouldn't be kept informed—so the public honestly can be given this assurance.

"Our intelligence effort must be the best in our history," said the Hoover Commission.

It's Congress' job to find out.

Summit Spectacular

NEXT week's Paris summit conference, which seemed likely to feature an anti-climatic repetition of old platitudes, now looms as something of a spectacular.

Nikita Khrushchev has served notice that he intends to make this a gala Soviet propaganda circus, exploiting every last scrap of advantage from America's spy-baiting embarrassment. President Eisenhower, in turn, intends to play up world suspicion of Soviet intentions—which, incidentally, we need to spy—and repeat his longstanding proposals for "open skies" over all countries, including the U. S.

Thus the emphasis so far is on efforts from both sides to place blame on the other for tensions which alarm the world. The problem at Paris, and in all East-West contacts, will be:

- How can we stop name calling and get emphasis back on negotiating the real tensions, of which Khrushchev's tough words—and the U-2 flight itself—are merely symptoms?

For the root of today's diplomatic crisis—and it is a crisis—isn't aerial spying. It's the Iron Curtain. President Eisenhower spoke accurately this week when he said: "We prefer and work for a different kind of world—and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer."

The noisy events of recent weeks have merely proved that the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance simply don't

trust one another, no matter how melodiously the peace doves can occasionally be induced to coo. Not trusting, yet living in an era when distrust could be lit by some incidental spark into suicidal world destruction, the only practical course is to seek some way of living less tensely on a divided globe.

This involves accepting control systems which will permit both sides to breathe easier and relax their fears of surprise attack from the other. Control systems are necessary—and quickly—not because we trust one another, but because we expect distrust to be a factor in the world for a long time.

A halt on nuclear weapons testing is useful because it helps stop the spread of war-triggering capability to more hands, perhaps hands (like Red China's) even more irresponsible than Mr. K's. A measure of disarmament is useful, because it lets each side relax a bit behind a fence of mutual destructibility which is already stout enough.

These are the topics which must be discussed at Paris, if the propaganda clouds can ever be dispersed from the summit. This is why President Eisenhower seems disposed to go on trying to make Khrushchev talk sense about world peace, even tho it must be no fun to sit down with someone who talks about America as he has this week.

At stake is not only this summit, but the question: Will it ever be worth talking to the Russians at all—in a world where not talking has been equated with risking an unthinkable war.

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MAY 8 1960

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Sobering News

The State Department's announcement on the American observation plane shot down by Russian security forces in a flight over Russian territory is a very grave one. It concedes much of what Mr. Khrushchev told the Soviet Parliament, and enough to explain the vigorous Russian reaction. It is good to have a candid American statement including clear affirmation that the plane was on a mission considered necessary to the safety of the West. At the same time it is unfortunate that American spokesmen had given earlier suggestions that the episode was much less serious than now it appears. It is never wise to talk until the facts are in — as they may not all be, even now.

Coming as it does within a few days of the scheduled Summit conference, the plane incident merely adds to the shadow hanging over that project. For almost coincidental with the plane statement the President had announced that underground nuclear testing would resume in a few months. Here again we may be sure that the decisions taken were considered truly in the interest of the West. But here again it would be pointless to minimize the gravity of what is decided.

The nuclear testing announcement, while technically a mere extension of earlier American policy comes after Russian proposals for a long-term moratorium on the smaller kind of underground explosions. This moratorium would be by gentlemen's agreement only, since there is now no known way to detect such testing. The harsh possibility thus existed that a country given to keeping its pledges might honor the moratorium while a country with a less reassuring treaty record might ignore this treaty to its own military advantage.

The Presidential announcement is couched in placatory terms, given the underlying implications. Further exploration of possible peaceful uses is stressed and, of course, the hope of developing new detection knowledge.

But the American announcement comes in the wake of hearings before the joint Atomic Energy Committee of the Congress which brought admissions from leading scientist supporters of

test suspensions that no air-tight check of even the larger nuclear blasts was as yet available in the present state of knowledge. And the Presidential timing, no less than the plane incident, clouds the Summit prospect.

THE SUN

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THE A. S. ABELL COMPANY
 WILLIAM F. SCHMICK, JR., PRESIDENT

U-2 Affair

The more the hands of modern government multiply, the harder it becomes for one hand to know what the others are doing. Faulty liaison is the simplest explanation of the deeply embarrassing position the United States has blundered into in the affair of the U-2 weather plane which seems not to have been a weather plane after all.

To try to discover an enemy's plans and potential is an aspect of national security. Call it intelligence or call it espionage, all countries do it. The Soviet Union does it on a scale we can guess from the number of Russian agents who have been caught. For the Soviet Union's opponents in turn not to keep themselves well-informed would be a dereliction of duty.

Getting caught is one of the hazards of this kind of work. But to take exceptional chances of getting caught at the wrong time, and then to be found out in flimsy fiction—to take exceptional chances, that is, without having determined in advance what to say if the essay should fail—is not good intelligence operation.

A pre-summit moment when Mr. Khrushchev was obstreperously rattling the saber was no moment for the United States to lay itself open to similar charges unless it did so on purpose, by diplomatic decision, to show itself un intimidated. Neither from Washington nor from Moscow has the full story of the U-2 affair been told, but from what we know it does not appear that the plane's excursion over territory where it might well be detected was a calculated diplomatic maneuver.

Let us honestly admit, lest it keep on happening, that Mr. Khrushchev has outsmarted us. He withheld some of his information, hoping that we would put ourselves in a false position. Innocently and hastily we did so, and were trapped. If we had found out the facts before we spoke, the timing of the occurrence might still have been unfortunate, but our credibility would remain unimpaired. The real damage is to our credibility.

The State Department says that no one in Washington authorized any such flight as Mr. Khrushchev described, which is to say that liaison is faulty. The responsibility is none the less Washington's. Many-handed though modern government has become, it is still presumed to have a head.

BALTIMORE SUN

MAY 1959

THE SUN

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WILLIAM F. SCHEMCK, JR., PRESIDENT

Nature Of The Damage

Our task now is to make the best of the bad affair of the U-2 reconnaissance plane. The White House and the State Department are trying to do so, under the pressure of time. The President is said to believe that the incident shows in a dramatic way how the Soviet system of secrecy makes for world strain and fear of war. Carefully handled, it is a tenable argument; but we need to be ready with rebuttal if Mr. Khrushchev contends that to the contrary the incident justifies the secrecy. Firmer yet is Mr. Herter's point that this event underlines the importance of agreed safeguards against surprise.

With the summit conference only six days away, all efforts are concentrated on diminishing the effects of the biggest Soviet propaganda coup since Sputnik I, and cutting down the advantage Mr. Khrushchev has been handed for the Paris sessions. Yet even as we press those urgent purposes we would do well to understand the extent of the damage that has been done and, more important for the future, the nature of the damage.

We have in part lost, and will have to work hard to regain, the asset of having our word generally credited. On the great issues we are still believed. In the eyes of most of the world we are plainly more to be trusted than are the Russians. But to get caught out in simple falsehood makes our friends at best wish we had not done it. We have caused difficulty not only for our allies at the summit but for others. Pakistan and Norway are disturbed over the Soviet charge that the U-2 took off from one country and was to have landed in the other. In Japan, opponents of the security treaty with the United States are making much of three U-2 "weather" craft based there. Such is some of the damage.

It is by no means irreparable, if we will perceive its nature. The injury lies in the area of prestige, psychological contest, propaganda. This is where the cold war is waged. Mr. Khrushchev knows the battlefield. He is a student of its terrain, an expert in its tactics. Not often enough in recent years has the Government in Washington shown that it understands where to fight, or how to.

SUN

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Threat And Reply

Mr. Khrushchev's threat of attack against any allied base from which United States reconnaissance planes take off flights over Soviet territory has been answered in the only way possible: This country would then stand by its defense commitments to its allies. Though in fact the attack and the need for defense are not likely, Mr. Khrushchev had to be told that.

Other things also that have been made necessary by the U-2 incident are being done. Some are not pleasant. Some show a heartening unanimity in this country in the face of a hard blow to our international prestige.

Once the supposed weather plane was disclosed to have been not exactly that, questions about other U-2 planes arose, particularly in Japan, where three are based. Many Japanese naturally asked whether flights by these planes, over which Japan has no control, might involve the Japanese in international incidents beyond their power to prevent. Now they have been informed that the U-2's there have not been used for spy work, and will not be.

In this country, criticism of the Administration for not keeping operations of such importance under the strictest and highest control has been severe and deserved. The questions raised by the incident are profoundly troubling, and have not been answered in full by official statements of recent days. But the responsible leaders of both parties know that the first problem, to keep the country together on the eve of the summit conference, is not a partisan matter.

As Senator Johnson suggested yesterday, the story of the incident demands investigation, so that such inadvertencies will not happen again; but the investigation must be undertaken calmly, not in panicky reaction. The only odd thing about the scene in the Senate was the eagerness with which Vice President Nixon and Senator Dirksen hurried to congratulate Mr. Johnson as "statesmanlike" when all he was talking was common sense.

Consequences

Serious consequences, and a few not so serious, continue to pile up in the fantastic U-2 story. It is most serious that one of our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has protested formally about the reported flight plan of the downed reconnaissance craft. Mr. Khrushchev said that the plane was to have landed in Norway. That country's position is that its membership in NATO does not mean that it sanctions any flight which violates the territory of other nations. The Norwegian Government's protest, almost on the eve of the summit meeting provides a measure of how strong its feelings must be on the matter. Other NATO nations as well, particularly among the smaller ones who are aware always that their destinies lie in the hands of the big powers, must feel much the same, though they refrain from saying so at just this moment.

It is not perhaps altogether serious that the head of the Soviet Air Force, Chief Air Marshal K. A. Vershinin, has postponed "until a more suitable time" a visit to the United States. More likely than not, the postponement was decided upon for reasons other than to increase the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, its purpose may be to ease them a bit, as a move in a calculated tighter-easier-tighter-easier technique on Premier Khrushchev's part. On the evidence we have, this development is minor.

More minor still are the many stories now in circulation as to what did happen in the case of the U-2: it glided part way down before it was hit; its pilot was "sold out"; the mission's objective was to try to spot any Soviet plans for a spectacular space shoot at the time of the summit meeting or in the course of Mr. Eisenhower's projected—and now somewhat doubtful—trip to Russia. Some of the stories may be true. After the events of recent days no one dares call any tale untrue. We do not know.

Further consequences are certain. Our job is to try to sort them out in their degrees of seriousness, and keep them firmly in mind; but not throw them as obstacles in Mr. Eisenhower's path on his way to the summit.

TAB

Moves in a Hard Game

The disclosures or purported disclosures made by Premier Khrushchev regarding an American plane assertedly shot down over the Soviet Union underscore the fact that the Communist and anti-Communist worlds still are engaged in a cold war.

In a contest where the leader of one side boasts, "We will bury you," the leaders of the other side have got to be on their guard. It may be unpleasant but it is only factual to assume that both sides are engaged in espionage. The profession of spying is as old as mankind and involves certain well-understood risks.

If Mr. Khrushchev's account of a confession from the plane's pilot is true (and there may yet be other light shed on the affair from Washington) many Americans will be surprised to think that their agencies have violated Soviet air space by a long-distance, high-altitude reconnaissance flight.

Some will ask if such activities really are necessary and if Americans would not be hotly offended if Soviet planes made photographic or other flights over the United States from nearby bases. On the other hand, considering the now renewed Soviet claims of rocket power, would the United States be fulfilling its duty as front-line guardian of the free world if it neglected any means of detecting possible preparations for surprise attack?

If, as Moscow charges, this is not the first such flight, then it is possible that Soviet authorities have

timed this particular incident to provide fuel for a meeting of the Supreme Soviet or Parliament and to build a supposed "position of strength" on the eve of the scheduled summit meeting of heads of state in Paris this month.

The fact that the pilot reportedly has been brought down alive marks an improvement over most previous Soviet practice in incidents of alleged infringement by planes that may have made errors of navigation. The change apparently serves their own purposes.

One question inevitably raised is whether it is part of the Communist purpose at this late hour to bring about a cancellation of the summit conference and possibly of President Eisenhower's intended visit to the Soviet Union, the latter a return of Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States.

Undoubtedly Moscow will make the most of every propaganda opportunity it can wring out of the affair. But this does not mean necessarily that Mr. K's intense desire for a four-power meeting with Britain, France, and America has changed.

The United States and its allies should continue fully willing to participate in a heads-of-state conference. If the Soviet Union desires otherwise, let it be the one to say so.

Meanwhile, Washington surely will review its military intelligence practices to determine if any are out of line, and will trust that if new modes of reconnaissance are really necessary an adult world will understand.

The Editor and the News

By ERWIN D. CANHAM, Editor of The Christian Science Monitor

Plane Episode and Its Lessons

The world is contemplating in various ways the effects a serious mistake can have on international relations. The mistake, of course, was the apparent decision to send a high-altitude photographic reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Union, especially at this time.

The consequences of the mistake, while embarrassing to the United States and its friends and beneficial to the Communist world, do not seem to be catastrophic. There may even be some lessons learned and values gained from the sorry episode. Far more seriously, the world is reminded of what catastrophes a not dissimilar mistake might visit upon mankind.

Suppose the Soviet authorities—or our own authorities, if the situation had been reversed—had interpreted the plane as the forerunner of an invasion. Under the particular circumstances, such a misinterpretation was probably unlikely. But a flight of bombers—and there are flights of bombers in the air all the time on both sides—might easily be misinterpreted. And the misinterpretation might lead to aggressive action—to the outbreak of world war and quite possibly to the destruction of human civilization.

The plane episode reminds everybody of the extremely delicate and dangerous world situation in which we live—and of the urgency of doing something to make it safer.

More Facts Needed

Much remains to be clarified about the plane incident. Perhaps the Soviets are telling the literal truth—they have every motive and advantage to do so. Or perhaps they have falsified things, as they have done before. Earlier, Prime Minister Khrushchev falsified the facts in order to lead the American State Department into a booby trap. He succeeded. But we need to know a lot more about the facts.

The United States will want to know who gave the order to send out the spy plane. Was it the Central Intelligence Agency, or somebody else? Did President Eisenhower know of these flights at this time? Are there other similar mistakes that can be prevented in the future? The egregiousness of this blunder—a flight deep inside the Soviet Union—on May Day of all days—just before the summit meeting and the President's visit to the Soviet Union—makes it look very suspicious indeed.

The thought that military authorities or intelligence authorities were trying to sabotage the summit meeting is too Machiavellian, too disloyal, to be believed. But certainly the United States needs to tighten up on its chain of command right up and down the line.

The United States' best friends around the world are dismayed, but they seem to be standing by with real friendliness. Some of them, such as Rome's conservative newspaper *Il Tempo*, have said the Washington statement was dignified and reduced to its right proportions an episode to which Moscow wanted to give a highly dramatic character.

The London Observer balanced things by saying, "It is hard to say which is the more irresponsible. The American order for such a flight at this politically sensitive time or the Russian exploitation of this folly."

And the Stockholm *Dagens Nyheter* wrote that if Khrushchev's claims are correct "those responsible for sending out the aircraft have been guilty of a lack of judgment exceeding permissible limits."

Soviet Violations Recalled

There are meantime many reminders that the Soviet Union itself has frequently violated the air space of the United States, its allies, and its overseas bases. Soviet planes, it is creditably believed, have frequently been seen over Alaska and the Canadian Arctic. They have crossed American bases in Europe, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and elsewhere. Soviet submarines or surface craft have been spotted close to American naval bases and test areas, but they were technically on the high seas.

The grim game of espionage is one both sides are playing. Furthermore, the United States and the areas where vital American defense installations are located overseas are wide open in comparison to Soviet skies, seas, and lands. The most casual traveler in the United States can take photographs from the air. In our diverse society, which is not a police state, people can wander quite freely close to defense installations. The Soviets are skilled at spying, and their agents must have penetrated far and deep, despite all our preventive efforts. The embarrassment of the plane episode is very flat-footedly. And none of their planes have been shot

down over the equivalent of Wichita, Kan.

Meantime, Mr. Khrushchev, even before he had the windfall of the spy plane, was roaring criticisms of the United States. The summit atmosphere turned bad before the Powers plane came down. Mr. K reacted sensitively to the recent speeches of Secretary Herter and Undersecretary Dillon, which reiterated American rights vigorously. He sent his propaganda chief, Yuri Zhukov, to Washington to talk with a few officials and more unofficially in order to voice his protest and sound out the atmosphere.

And after Mr. Zhukov's return to Moscow, Mr. K decided to turn on the propaganda blasts. Either he wanted to ruin the chance for a good atmosphere at the summit meeting, or he decided Soviet policies get further by bluster and threat than by docile persuasion. He has tried both techniques in his time. During his French visit, he was relatively calm. In the United States, on the whole, he was calm.

Mr. K Maneuvers

Up to a fortnight ago—up to the return of his man Zhukov from Washington—he was relatively calm. He was either seriously disturbed and annoyed at the stiffening of the American attitude toward the summit, or he was trying to play hard to get. He was Stalinist in his rough talk. Now the plane episode falls in his lap, and he must be hugely delighted, rejoicing in the embarrassment of the United States. He has played his hand hard—perhaps he has overplayed it. But under his blustery reaction there has been a significant note of restraint. He evidently isn't trying to upset the summit meeting, but just to bring the United States there under the most difficult of circumstances. He has certainly had a partial success.

But the score isn't all in. There are many things President Eisenhower can do. Among other things, he can lay emphasis on his open-skies plan—the proposal, dating from 1955, by which he has urged that the American skies, and all others, should be open to air reconnaissance so that all may see what kind of war preparations are and are not taking place. The willingness of the United States to be spied upon openly is surely a position of international good faith.

Moreover, a good deal of rational public opinion around the world knows the score as between the United States and the U.S.S.R. People know that in the last 15 years alone, the Soviet Union has aided in the enslavement of hundreds of millions of people, against their will, in Communist regimes to which they object. The most recent example, of course, was in Hungary. During the same 15 years, the United States has aided in the freeing—or the movement toward freedom—of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world.

U.S. Positions Well Known

The United States believes in the right of free choice of government for everybody. It does not seek to impose any kind of regime on any other people. It has no aggressive ambitions or purposes. Most of the world knows all this, too. And much of the world knows that the United States can make mistakes, is not too clever in its propaganda, its strategy, its espionage. The blunders the United States makes are regrettable, but they are sometimes human and even appealing.

The skillful, ruthless propaganda and strategy of the men in the Kremlin may seem to succeed, but sometimes they succeed all too well, and people discount them. There can be little doubt in the uncommitted world today which nation threatens aggressively to disturb it. And yet, as so often happens in human affairs, appearance and reality get mixed up.

The Soviets put on the lamb's wool and the language of peace lovers, and for a time may convince some people of their peaceful intent. But the effect wears off. Appearance and reality get straightened out. The United States, which devised and used the first atomic bomb, which maintained bases throughout the world, which blundered into a spy fiasco over Soviet territory, is by very deep reality dedicated to peace and to peace alone.

That is the basic position of the American Government and the overwhelming majority of its people. If an individual here or there gives voice—as he can in a free country—to some misguided concept of preventive war, he is soon shouted down. And that in giving orders which might subject the world to a hazard it must avoid.

The Challenge of Secrecy

In a sense, the episode in which the United States finds itself embarrassed by the discovery of strategic mapping flights over the Soviet Union has its origins a long way back in Russian history.

At various times during the centuries of the czars Russia cut itself off or was cut off from Europe much as a hermit kingdom. Its exclusiveness and suspicion of foreigners were not at all dissipated when the Communists took over in 1917 and felt their system embattled in a capitalist world. To [redacted] then added a sense of ideological [redacted].

Premier Khrushchev, who announced the asserted capture of an American flier and photographic plane in central Russia, has brought an era of improved contacts with the West as compared with Stalinism, but even he has boasted from time to time of a power of atomic rocket weapons which could retaliate catastrophically to an attack.

Power for retaliation, in any hands, is also power for surprise attack unless some international safeguards can be devised for the world's assurance. The United States for more than a decade has joined with other free-world nations in advocating a limitation of nuclear arms which would include mutual inspection.

The effort to negotiate such a system has encountered so much resistance that Fredrick M. Eaton, chief United States delegate to arms control talks in Geneva, protested last month that the "obsessive secrecy" of the Soviet Union in contrast to the open societies of its contemporaries could be "the aggressor's cloak."

In the United States and numerous

other countries maps as revealing as any from a high-altitude camera can be purchased from a bookstore or an aerial survey company or obtained by a private flight in a rented plane. In the lands of the Communists were equally open there would be near trust and less espionage. As it is, numerous Soviet agents have been convicted of spying in the United States and Canada.

It is in the light of these and similar facts that any propaganda victory of Soviet Premier Khrushchev must be weighed. There certainly is ground for serious criticism to the effect that flights of this sort, even if successful before, should have been suspended in the weeks immediately preceding a conference of such importance as the four-power summit meeting scheduled for May 16 in Paris. Is there a possibility, however, that at just such a time aerial surveillance might prove crucial to the safety of one of America's allies?

Many questions are involved for which there is as yet no satisfactory answer. It may be that in the long run there should be closer liaison between the diplomatic and the military or between Congress and the Central Intelligence Agency.

But the essential and overriding consideration in this situation is that America and the rest of the free world face a continuous and unwithered threat from the Communist world. With advances of technology and weaponry new concepts sometimes are compelled in international law. These are facts with which the heads of state would have been dealing at the summit in any case. Possibly it is not all loss that the facts are in the open.

A New Test of Alliance Ties

One of the most serious aspects of the mapping plane incident between the Soviet Union and the United States is the possible effect it could have on some of the smaller members of the Western Alliance.

Premier Khrushchev already has moved to exploit any possibility of friction or misunderstanding by threatening such countries that "if they allow others to fly from their bases to our territory we shall act at those bases because we assess such actions as provocations."

This is akin to a threat that has been faced before by non-Communist nations on the periphery of the Communist bloc. They have been threatened with virtual annihilation if they allow missile sites to be placed on their soil; yet weighing the prospects of annihilation in an opposite course, they have gone ahead.

Indeed, the United States has moved to give reassurance in the present case by declaring it will go to the aid of any ally attacked by the Soviet Union or a take-over by American forces.

The Soviet threat of reprisal for having permitted a reconnaissance flight is out of proportion to any overt damage done by a plane that carries a camera instead of bombs. It also assumes that the host nation knew of the nature of the flight and could have prevented it.

In the tradition of such matters, officials of a nation whose fields were being used might have preferred not to know the details of the operations. From this time on, however, one may be sure that authorities in Pakistan, Norway, Turkey, or other countries so situated will want to know and to

have a controlling voice in the use of their territory.

If on thorough consideration a nation receiving military aid from the United States should conclude that it wishes the risks of a gap in surveillance on its borders rather than the risks of reconnaissance flights from its fields, that is its choice and should be respected by the United States.

Countries which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization there is a further possible area of deliberation. The foreign ministers in the North Atlantic Council might conclude that the availability of a certain number of bases for observation flights is essential to the safety of all. The heads of governments would have a more broadly supported plan to submit to their people.

People whose countries are both peculiarly protected and exposed might then come to a conclusion similar to that of American Secretary of State Herter, who says his government "would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome the danger of surprise attack."

It is regrettable indeed if any misjudgment by American leaders or lack of coordination in the American Government has caused doubt or alarm among America's allies. Every possible avenue of consultation with them must be used to assure that vital decisions are so far as possible shared decisions. But we believe the allies understand the seriousness and magnitude of this task and are prepared to stand by.

Pre-Summitry at Paris

The advantages that the spy-plane incident has given Premier Khrushchev on the eve of the summit meeting are superficial. The disadvantages he now must face are rooted in fundamentals.

This is a central fact in the situation as the foreign ministers of the Western powers gather in Paris to prepare for the East-West confrontation next week.

In the Western position today there are elements of strength that Mr. Khrushchev cannot reach with divide-and-rule tactics. They exist because a considerable part of the recent Western diplomatic effort has been properly directed to building basic unity from within rather than to improvising responses to shifting Soviet challenges.

Perhaps the Soviet leader had already discerned this fact when he decided to enlarge on the American espionage slip. He may well have been willing to endanger the summit meeting in order to stage a propaganda show for his people, feeling that in any case he would get nothing more valuable from the summit.

The uppermost question for America's Secretary Herter, Britain's Secretary Lloyd, and France's Foreign Minister Couve de Murville at Paris this weekend concerns what new departures the plane incident may have suggested to Mr. Khrushchev for Soviet summit strategy. Disarmament, nuclear testing, Berlin, and the "two Germanys" issue — in which of these areas may Mr. K try to pull an ogre out of the diplomatic hat?

On disarmament some Western opinion still divides rather easily. Is an unenforced ban as a start preferable to no ban on atomic weapons testing? Or is not international polic-

ing really the heart of the matter? If the spy-plane crash had shattered Western unity on the necessity of espionage, disarmament would have offered Mr. Khrushchev a field day at Paris.

Now it appears more likely to give opportunity for the West to raise the "open skies" banner which had worldwide appeal when unfurled by President Eisenhower at the Geneva summit in 1955. French-German understandings over European economic unification and on the practical limitations of present hopes for German reunification — understandings which tend at last to include British interest — have dulled the cutting edge of the Moscow-made Berlin wedge.

The Big Three, moreover, are strengthened not only by agreement among themselves but within themselves. While some strains appear in de Gaulle's new France, that country is incomparably sounder within than when the last summit conference met. And it is no longer the malcontent among the Western powers, having achieved a sense of near-equality with the other two big allies. In Britain boom economic conditions have curtailed the influence of Labor Party leaders who ordinarily urge a softer line than that of the Conservative government (or that of Washington or Paris) toward Moscow.

One result of the plane incident that Mr. Khrushchev may regret is that it has shown him frowning again when his smile would be a much more confusing weapon for the West to face. Even if, as one experienced commentator observes, he goes to Paris with the advantage of being the accuser, it begins to look as if he has already accused too much.

TAB

Chicago Daily Tribune

THE WORLD'S GREATEST NEWSPAPER
FOUNDED JUNE 10, 1847

KHRUSHCHEV FLEXES HIS MUSCLES

Hardly more than a week before the summit meeting, Premier Khrushchev informed his supreme soviet that the Russians had shot down an American plane. He made this announcement with an air of great satisfaction that he has the military strength at his command to put the Americans in their place. He threatened retaliation with rockets.

According to his account, the American plane, without proper markings of identification, was over Russian territory in soviet Armenia when it was knocked down on orders given in person by him. We are told that when Premier Khrushchev reported the incident his hearers in the supreme soviet expressed indignation at the infamy of the capitalists and satisfaction at the prompt rebuke they received.

All of which indicates what a grim and thankless task it is these days to direct the foreign policy of the United States. It is no fun being secretary of state, under the necessity of dealing with as noxious a character as Khrushchev.

For months he pleaded for a summit conference, saying that he wished, above all, to relax international tensions; and then, from the moment the conference was agreed upon, he began his campaign of abuse in the soviet provinces and wound up with an act of violence of the kind that only a few generations ago would have all but guaranteed war.

President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter have remained calm under these provocations. Khrushchev must have calculated, correctly, that they, like the American people generally, are in anything but a belligerent mood.

Obviously, Khrushchev doesn't expect agreement at the summit. If he did wish the conference to succeed, he would have made every effort to avoid shooting down an American plane; if, by chance, his forces had shot one down, he would try to explain it away as a regrettable error; and surely he would not have boasted about the incident as if it reflected the greatest credit upon him, his government and his military forces.

We can only speculate about the real meaning of Khrushchev's behavior.

One point that deserves to be noted is that of recent months he has been traveling around the soviet empire making bellicose speeches exactly opposite in tone to the sweet talk that he has frequently addressed to the western powers.

The speeches to his own people can be read as an attempt to convince them that they are menaced from abroad and would be in the gravest danger except for Khrushchev's wisdom, his foresight in building up soviet might, and the fear he has instilled in the hearts of Eisenhower, Macmillan, de Gaulle, and the rest.

Now why should Khrushchev feel the need at this particular juncture of taking this line? One reason could be the crop failure last year that has left the soviet empire short of food in these last months before the new crop comes in. The shooting of the plane would show any disaffected elements in the soviet empire how hopeless it would be to rebel, for even the United States is unwilling to accept Khrushchev's challenge.

Another could be a desire to quiet any unrest that might result from the recent demotions he has ordered. Functionaries from the provinces to whom he gave important positions in the central government at the time he was consolidating himself in power as Stalin's successor are being sent back to the bush leagues and don't like it.

Khrushchev does not really want to see tensions relaxed because in a less anxious world he would find it harder to keep his people content with his regime. The allegation that the American plane was deliberately invading Russia will make it easier for the dictator to pretend that it was the bellicent American. But he who caused the conference to fail.

Chicago Daily Tribune
 THE WORLD'S GREATEST NEWSPAPER
 FOUNDED JUNE 10, 1847

THE STORY OF THE U-2

The shooting down of an American observation plane in Russia is being described as a costly diplomatic defeat and as a blow to the forthcoming summit conference.

What has happened is that the Russians have succeeded at last in knocking down one of the high altitude planes which they have seen often on their radar screens and which they had good reason to believe were on reconnaissance missions. The Russians were not surprised.

Readers of THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE—at least those with long memories—also should not be surprised. More than three years ago—on April 17, 1957—this newspaper published an exclusive story by its aviation expert, Wayne Thomis, describing the U-2 and telling how it was being called the “super-snooper” or “St. Peter’s special,” because of its very high ceiling. The story mentioned that an extensive camera installation is included in the airplane’s nose section. Mr. Thomis also reported that it was believed the U-2 flew nearly two miles higher than any jet fighter then in operation.

It is the job of our central intelligence agency to get all the information it can about Russia’s military power. In the pursuit of that objective it is probable that many U-2 flights have been made to photograph missile launching sites and other installations. The flight of Pilot Francis G. Powers was made on May 1, an important holiday in the soviet world, when there was likelihood that an effort might be made to do something spectacular. While it may be unfortunate that May 1 was shortly before the opening of the summit conference, there was also good reason for keeping Russia under close observation on May day.

No doubt the Russians have been trying for about five years to knock down a U-2, first with jet fighters and then with anti-aircraft missiles. The United States also has an anti-aircraft missile, the Nike Hercules, which has hit targets at altitudes up to 100,000 feet. The tardiness of the soviets in developing anti-aircraft missiles against high altitude airplanes may be judged by the fact that it took about five years to get a U-2.

It is possible that a lucky hit brought down Pilot Powers, that he was projected from the plane automatically, that he was unconscious as he drifted down in a parachute, and that he had no chance to use any instrument of self-destruction. So until more facts are known it would be unfair to censure him. On the contrary, Americans can take satisfaction in knowing that we have the technological skill to build such a remarkable machine as the U-2 and young men brave enough to fly them on the most dangerous missions.

Premier Khrushchev of course is trying to make propaganda hay out of the incident and he will continue to do so. At the summit conference, however, he cannot seriously contend that the United States has done anything new or anything that Russia itself hasn’t done or tried to do. He also goes to the summit conference with the knowledge that the United States has some good photographs of the Soviet Union taken from high altitude airplanes.

In the bargaining at the summit the soviet demands and claims will be deterred only by the knowledge which the Russians have of United States power. The incident of the U-2 should not encourage them to believe that the United States is powerless.

Chicago Daily Tribune

THE WORLD'S GREATEST NEWSPAPER

FOUNDED JUNE 10, 1847

SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND OURS

Premier Khrushchev continues to threaten retaliation because an American plane has been downed while on an observation mission over Russia. He warned that Russia might use rockets against bases used by Americans for spying flights.

Such threats of course are not new. Whenever it suits their purpose the Russians can find an excuse to make inflammatory statements and so to increase the world's tensions. The United States could do the same whenever it found evidence of soviet espionage operations, but has not taken advantage of these opportunities.

Recently a Russian trawler was reported in the Atlantic near where an American atomic submarine was undergoing tests. No emphasis was given to the incident; it was taken for granted as just another Russian effort to get American military secrets.

Many times the United States has learned of the spying activities of diplomatic agents of Russia and satellite countries. The latest example was provided by Col. Frantisek Tisler, former military and air attache of the Czechoslovak embassy, who renounced communism and defected to the United States last July.

Tisler told the House un-American activities committee that it was his mission to recruit American citizens to act as agents to furnish him with intelligence on United States military developments. He estimated that nearly half of the employes of the Czech embassy and the Czech delegation to the United Nations were engaged in some type of intelligence activities.

There has been so much testimony of this kind that it is hardly considered news any more and the United States does not bother to make protests. Secretary of State Herter summed up the situation in his statement on the shooting down of the American plane by the Russians.

"The soviet leaders," he said, "have almost complete access to the open societies of the free world and supplement this with vast espionage networks. However, they keep their own society tightly closed and rigorously controlled."

This ugly fact is one of the things that will or ought to be presented to Premier Khrushchev at the summit conference. We do not trust him and we fear a surprise attack with nuclear weapons. So long as this situation exists, he must expect our spying operations to continue.

Chicago Daily Tribune

THE WORLD'S GREATEST NEWSPAPER

FOUNDED JUNE 16, 1837

HOW HIGH IS A SPY?

During all the talk about the American reconnaissance plane which was caught over soviet territory, little if anything has been said about Tiros I, the United States weather satellite. For more than a month, Tiros has been repeatedly passing over soviet territory—as far north as the 50th parallel—taking photographs of the surface of the earth with two cameras and sending them back to this country by television.

There are differences, of course. The U-2 plane was flying at an altitude of about 12 miles and was manned; Tiros is unmanned, and flies at a height of about 450 miles. With present equipment, its photographs are probably not clear enough to be of any reconnaissance value; but it is safe to assume that the equipment will be improved and that the satellite will live up to its name, which stands for Television and Infra-Red Observation Satellite.

If one is a spy, then what about the other?

This leads to a question which has not been answered by international law, and that is how high a country's sovereignty extends. The problem arose after World War I and was thought to have been answered at the Paris convention in 1919: "Every power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory."

This seemed adequate until after World War II, when the question arose: How high does air space extend? Those who drafted the Paris regulations probably intended "air space" to mean all space; but the development of rocket power emphasized the difference between airplanes, which can fly only where there is enough air to support them, and rockets, which provide their own lift and can fly into what is called "outer" space, where there is no air.

Various definitions of "air space" have been proposed. The strictest one limits it to the height to which airplanes can ascend, a height which changes with improved airplane design. Another carries it to the altitude where "all aerodynamic lift ceases," or about 50 miles up. Another carries it to the highest level at which any air particles are found, or about 1,000 miles. And the most liberal theory, in line with the intent of the Paris convention but unlikely to be accepted now, carries air space out indefinitely.

With the launching of Sputnik I, Russia became a supporter of the air limits, because its satellite passed over

other countries. As an added precaution, Russia made the curious but not illogical point that, after all, the earth is turning, and it is not Russia's fault if a country happens to arrive under its Sputnik.

These arguments now make it difficult for Russia to object to Tiros I. But when telescopic and infra-red television is improved so as to become useful for military reconnaissance, the question of spying by airplane will become academic. The more stubbornly Mr. Khrushchev refuses to open his military secrets to international observers as part of a world disarmament program, the sooner he is likely to find his installations being photographed from the legitimate safety of outer space.

TAB

MAY 6 1960

POSTAL SERVICE

An Incident to Clear Up

We are glad that President Eisenhower ordered an inquiry and public report on the unfortunate plane incident announced by Premier Khrushchev. The first reports published by the State Department and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, however, raise questions that need answering. The American people, the Soviet Government and all countries where this affair could be exploited for anti-American propaganda are entitled to an explanation.

The biggest question raised by the NASA report is why it is necessary to conduct upper atmosphere weather research of the type referred to so close to the Soviet-Turkish border that a malfunctioning of the pilot's oxygen equipment might cause an accidental crossing of the frontier. Apparently the pilot was a Lockheed company test pilot, and NASA indicates he was conducting research into the effects on airplane structure of air turbulence and other weather conditions at high altitudes. Why should that research be conducted in Asia Minor, rather than someplace farther away from the Soviet frontier? And if there is good reason for conducting peaceful research there, why should not the Soviets have been notified that it was going on?

We hope that these and other questions will promptly be cleared up in a way that fully disposes of any suspicion that the plane was on a military or intelligence mission in violation of Soviet air space. For as long as that suspicion can be held, the incident provides opportunity for Soviet propagandists to depict the United States as more interested in military objectives than in peaceful negotiation.

Why Premier Khrushchev chose to make public the shooting down of the plane 10 days before the summit conference is a mystery. Perhaps he wanted to lay a foundation for accusations of militarism against the West in event the summit conference fails. Perhaps he is genuinely baffled and scared by Western attitudes. After all, there would probably be a considerable degree of excitement and bitterness in this country if Soviet planes had violated our frontiers twice within a month, whatever the reason.

But the remarkable thing may be not that Khrushchev makes a speech of this sort, bound to create apprehension everywhere in the world, but that he still wants to go ahead with the summit talks he has so long and sedulously promoted.

He has seen the conference postponed time after time, he has heard repeated warnings by Western statesmen that it is not likely to accomplish much, he knows that some opposition to it exists, he has noted that President Eisenhower publicly proclaimed an intention to leave Paris after seven days and perhaps send Mr. Nixon back as his stand-in—and now he sees what may look from his side of the border like military or intelligence probes intended to learn whether relaxed tensions mean relaxed vigilance.

If in the face of all this Khrushchev can still want to attend a summit conference, he must want one very much indeed. The pressures that push his regime toward an accommodation with the West—including the pressure from a growing rival in Red China—must be so intense as to offset the pressures toward isolationism, militarism and extreme nationalism exerted by the old Stalinists.

Some Americans with a vested interest in the cold war seem to think that if the Russians want an accommodation very much that is reason for us to resist it. But our interests also lie in that direction. And so it must be hoped that President Eisenhower and Khrushchev together will clear up the plane incident quickly and do what can be done to improve the atmosphere for the summit talks. Each side, naturally, is getting set for hard negotiation, but both need to guard against freezing a situation in which the results could be minor or altogether negative.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

Founded by JOSEPH PULITZER

December 12, 1878

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Investigate!

A careful, responsible congressional investigation of the intelligence operations which culminated in the shooting down of an American spy plane deep in Russian territory seems to us clearly called for.

The Eisenhower Administration says this disastrous adventure which has given the Soviets a great propaganda victory was undertaken without orders from Washington. In that case two questions urgently need answering.

Do our intelligence operatives enjoy so much free-wheeling authority that they can touch off an incident of grave international import by low-level decisions unchecked by responsible policy-making power?

Or, if intelligence activities are subject to any kind of general policy control, as they should be, why were they not in this case and at this particular time restrained from action so obviously fraught with danger to peace and good international relations?

* * *

Admittedly a congressional investigation into matters of such delicate security import would have its risks. But the risks need to be taken in the interest of clarifying the nature of policy control over military activities capable of plunging us into war. It is not hard to imagine an incident like this triggering a Soviet rocket attack upon our overseas bases and thereby touching off a full-scale conflict. Congress needs to know why and how this could happen.

A responsible investigation could be conducted, with its public report screened to protect essential security interests. The need for an independent review of an exploit which on its face suggests either irresponsibility or stupidity outweighs the risks.

It is easy enough to say that everybody engages in espionage and that the only misfortune is in getting caught. But aerial mapping of bombing targets is something different from the ordinary run of espionage. It is the kind of action we would bitterly resent if applied to us. It is the kind of action that is appropriate to wartime, or brink of wartime, but is highly provocative at any other time. Congress ought to find out whether the results obtained justify the hazards run.

* * *

Not should the investigators neglect to inquire into the circumstances which placed our country before the world in the light of a bare-faced liar. The cock-and-bull story which Khrushchev trapped the State Department into telling about weather observation flights in Turkey was a disaster not merely because Khrushchev could expose it as false, but, more basically, just because it was a lie.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that somebody deliberately undertook an adventure calculated to inflame international suspicions on the eve of the summit conference. If this is so, Congress needs to know it. Congress needs to know, above all, what kind of policy control is called for to prevent military officials from creating situations that seriously impair the standing of the nation before the world.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

Founded by JOSEPH PULITZER

December 12, 1878

Published by

The Publisher

For Independent Review

Much of what the President said at his press conference about military intelligence in general is true. There is no doubt that in an arms race among nations every nation resorts to espionage where it can. This distasteful but necessary practice, as he said, is part of our deterrent power and cannot be unilaterally abandoned any more than armament itself can be unilaterally abandoned.

Nevertheless to declare openly, in effect, that this nation will follow a policy of violating international law is another blunder in handling this affair which the President will regret. The real issues raised by the spy plane incident he did not deal with at all. These are the timing of this particular adventure and the question of how much continuous policy control is exerted over intelligence activities. At the proper time, there ought to be a sober and responsible congressional inquiry into the broad questions thus raised.

(UNWA)

As the Harper's article reprinted on this page today suggests, there has long been a feeling in Congress that somehow the needs of military secrecy must be reconciled with the need for review of intelligence activities so dangerous that they might touch the spark to war. We favored Senator Mansfield's proposal for a special watchdog committee when it was first made, and we favor it now.

Since every form of intelligence activity must be evaluated by balancing the results obtained against the risks incurred, one of the questions that ought to be independently studied is the value of reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory. It may be that Congress could be convinced that even though this form of espionage is one of the most provocative and hazardous that exists, the information thus obtained is so vital as to justify the risks. The point is that our military leaders should be required to prove it to the satisfaction of critical and independent judgment.

Both the President and Secretary Herter laid great emphasis upon the need for such overflights to guard against surprise attack. This is a persuasive point. Yet, as it happens, the Army only last week published an analysis in which its own experts concluded that Soviet strategy is not based upon the doctrine of surprise attack, that the Soviet Union is not even attempting to build a force that would enable it to start a general nuclear war. The Soviets, said this analysis, have concluded that since they could not entirely destroy the United States even by all-out surprise attack, they cannot afford to risk the damaging counter-blows that such an attack would incur.

It can be argued that the Army takes this view because its role in our strategy of nuclear deterrence is so small, and because its own parochial interests call for greater stress on limited war tactics than on nuclear strategy. But if that is true, then it could be equally true that the Air Force as the chief sponsor of nuclear deterrence derives its views from its own function, too. Both services, we think, must be given credit for honest convictions. The fact that they disagree on a question so vital to defense planning and intelligence activities like the U-2 flights merely reinforces the need for an independent review of the whole problem.

With one of the President's points nearly everybody can agree. This was his statement that we should not permit the U-2 furore to distract us from the important problems to be discussed at the summit conference next week—problems like the future of Berlin, and disarmament. Surely the whole nation will hope that the President's continued optimism proves justified, and that the conference will indeed accomplish something to help ease international tensions.

TAB

Communists Demand Probe of Guilty In Espionage Flight

The Communist Party demanded, on Tuesday, that President Eisenhower "repudiate" the declaration of Secretary of State Herter that U. S. spy flights will be continued.

A statement by the party's national secretariat, signed by Gus Hall, general secretary, called for a "full investigation" as to why the "disgraceful" plane flight into the Soviet union occurred, and demanded the removal of all who are responsible for it.

"Every public official and political figure must speak out and be judged by the people," the CP statement said.

The statement follows:

The flight of an American plane over the heart of the Soviet Union has aroused widespread reactions of shock and anger. Rarely have the American people been moved to such indignation by an act of their own government. And they are all the more disturbed by the fact that this shameful incident took place on the very eve of the long-awaited summit negotiations.

This provocative act, fraught with the danger of triggering off a war, cannot be considered an isolated, accidental occurrence. It is part of a pattern of poisoning the air prior to the summit meetings, which is being followed by die-hard advocates of the Dulles cold-war line. Included in this pattern are the recent bellicose speeches of Secretary of State Herter, Under Secretary Dillon and Vice President Nixon on the Berlin question. Included, too, is the recent AFL-CIO con-

ference instigated by George Meany with the aim of undermining the summit meetings.

The plane incident is a disturbing reminder that the "preventive war" mentality is still very much with us. It is a reminder that there are powerful forces — particularly the cold war promoters, the cold warriors of the State Department and the Pentagon, and the sinister, top-secret CIA headed by Allan Dulles — who are deeply committed to the progress of the movement for peace and are ready to go to any lengths to scuttle the summit meetings, even at the risk of precipitating war.

★
INCIDENT cannot be explained away on the grounds that "everybody spies". The fact is that other nations do not practice such aerial espionage. And no nation can arrogate to itself the right to conduct aerial forays over the territory of other nations.

Equally specious is the argument that these actions are justified by Soviet secrecy and the fear of a surprise attack. Indeed, only a week earlier the Army Department had reported that the evidence clearly shows the Soviet Union is not preparing to launch a war, and that our entire approach to national defense must therefore be revised.

Particularly ominous is the announcement that such dangerous games are being played without the President's knowledge. Neither President Eisenhower nor any other public official can escape responsibility for such actions. He owes it to the American people, who expect him to fight for implementation of the spirit of Camp David, to speak out in sharp condemnation of such actions, and to repudiate the declaration of Secretary of State Herter that they will be continued.

WHATEVER ITS implications, this debacle does not basically alter the situation with regard to the summit conference. On the contrary, it shows that agreement at the summit is all the more urgent. And it demonstrates with special vividness the menace to peace inherent in the present intolerable status of West Berlin.

But more is required. A full investigation is demanded as to how this disgraceful action came about, with the removal of all who are responsible for it. And every public official and political figure must speak out and be judged by the people.

The American people want peace no less than before. They want an end to the cold war. They expect, no less than before, that President Eisenhower will do all in his power at the summit meetings to achieve agreement to outlaw nuclear tests, institute steps toward total disarmament and end the dangerous situation at West Berlin.

By DANIEL MASON

THE DISTRUST and fear spread throughout the world by the U. S. spy plane's violation of Soviet territory on May 1 and the lying that followed were intensified last Monday by Secretary of State Christian Herter's irresponsible and arrogant assertion that Washington would continue to send planes deep into the USSR in what can only amount to provocative acts or aggression.

But while Washington was compounding the dangers of the present tense situation, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, in letters to President Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Macmillan and French President De Gaulle, and in a speech at the Czechoslovaks' Moscow Embassy, sought for cooperation at the forthcoming Paris summit meeting to end world tensions.

At the same time, Khrushchev warned that if countries bordering on the Soviet Union persisted in allowing the U. S. planes to violate Soviet borders, the USSR would be forced to aim its rockets at those countries.

The seriousness of the international crime committed by the U. S. plane, specially designed by the Lockheed Corp. for espionage work, was emphasized

by Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana, deputy Democratic leader of the Senate, who warned that:

"This incident or any other of this kind might well have accidentally set off the holocaust of nuclear conflict."

Implicit in Mansfield's horrified comment was the recognition that Soviet defense authorities might well have thought this U. S. plane was the beginning of an all-out attack. Herter, in an effort to justify the violation of Soviet territory, claimed it was necessary to prevent surprise attacks by the USSR. Some Washington observers, however, ask pointedly whether this type of plane penetration is not itself a feeler for a surprise or provocative attack by U. S. nuclear weapons.

Mansfield's warning was reinforced by Canada's foreign affairs chief, Howard Green, who declared in Ottawa that if the U. S. continued to violate Soviet air space, incidents "like this will go on and on like it might just one day trigger off a nuclear war."

PUNISHMENT URGED

This fear and horror has undoubtedly reached up into high quarters when the very conservative New York Times Washington columnist Arthur Krock felt compelled to demand that the officials who were responsible for the provocative violation of the Soviet territory be exposed and punished.

Krock attacked the incompetence and irresponsibility of the officials who, having been given authority by the President, issued the order for the plane flight just before the summit meeting. And, he declared further, that if the order had been given without the authority granted by the President, the act "merits severe punishment." He charged the action could well have been a violation of the Constitution and could in effect have given the decision of war or peace to subordinates. (The Constitution gives to Congress alone the power to declare war.)

PROBE

In any effort to fix the immediate responsibility for sending the plane deep into the Soviet Union, the Central Intelligence Agency should be at the top of the agenda for any probe. This agency, which has at least a billion dollars at its disposal every year, is permitted to operate — probably without any Constitutional right — with no supervision or control or even examination by any public legislative or administrative body of the government.

Heading this all-powerful secret extra-governmental organization is Allen W. Dulles, who first achieved world-wide notoriety in connection with the Geneva disarmament conference of 1925, which was aimed at curbing arms sales by the international munitions cartel.

The 1935 Senate hearings on the munitions trust, in probing for the reasons the 1925 disarmament parley failed, found a letter from a Winchester Arms Co. official to the firm's Washington lobbyist, early in 1925, which asserted:

"I have just received a letter from Congressman Tilson in which he states that Mr. Dulles, Chief of the Near Eastern Division of the State Department, called him on the phone and stated he would like to talk over personally with me the proposed restriction of traffic in arms."

The Winchester man's efforts apparently succeeded, because the Secretary of Commerce called conferences in March and April, 1925, among representatives of the American munitions monopoly and the government's delegates to the disarmament parley, at which Hoover pledged that the U. S. would bar any curb on international arms sales.

Dulles, who was at Hoover's meetings as one of the U. S. delegates, then went on to Geneva, where he helped to kill the disarmament parley.

Dulles, with such a background, undoubtedly is part of the Pentagon-State Department-Wall Street combine, which is seeking to undermine the May 16 Paris summit meeting and all efforts aimed at disarmament, nuclear test bans and settlement of the West Berlin question. Choosing the eve of the summit for sending the plane into the USSR was obviously a provocation to sabotage it. Fortunately, the Soviet Union, actually by a responsible attitude to the welfare of the world's people, re-

NO HELP

Secretary of State Herter's statement last Monday, however, certainly is of no help to the forces seeking success at the

summit for peace. In the first place, his admission that President Eisenhower had the ultimate responsibility for setting the policy to send the spy planes into the Soviet Union can only breed more distrust of the U. S. government in its international relations.

It should be recalled that on Feb. 11, 1958, according to the shooting down of a U. S. plane in Soviet Armenia. President Eisenhower insisted its presence must have been accidental, since he had given orders to avoid violations. Eisenhower, at that time, emphasized that "the orders are very strict," and went on to say:

"Actually, now I have forgotten the limit, but I established it personally some time back a couple of years ago, and I am sure that this happening is accidental."

Herter's further assertion that Eisenhower would continue to order violation of Soviet territory for spying purposes by U. S. planes not only has created further dangers, but has alarmed even the governments which are Washington's allies.

PROTEST

The Pakistani embassy in Washington declared that its government would protest against any possible use of its airfields as a base for U. S. plane operations in the Soviet Union. The Norwegian ambassador called on Herter to insist that if the U. S. is violating its agreement with Norway not to have U. S. military personnel in that country, it must halt this transgression immediately.

Capt. Francis Powers, the pilot of the U. S. spy plane, which had been downed at Sverdlovk, 1800 miles inside the USSR by a rocket, had revealed a week ago that he had flown his plane from Turkey to Pakistan, where it remained for three days before it took off for a spying flight across the Soviet Union with its final destination an air base in Norway.

MAY 1960

The effect, however, goes beyond these countries. In the Japanese parliament, under pressure from the Socialists, Foreign Minister Fujiyama was forced to announce that he was going to query the State Department whether a group of planes similar to the downed one, now at a Japanese base, are to be used for like purposes.

Undoubtedly, the governments of other nations, whose territory is being used as air bases by the U. S., will be forced by their peoples to forbid further use, especially since their real use has been bared and the peril involved has become clear.

The warning by Khrushchev in his Czech embassy speech that the nations which permitted the U. S. bases on their territory must accept responsibility for their actions has forced a second and soberer look by these governments at the agreements with Washington.

In that speech, Khrushchev said:

"We tell the governments of these countries, if you leased your territory to others and are not the masters of your land, of your country, hence we shall have to understand it in our way. Those who lease your territory operate against us from your territory. Their lands are far from us while your land is near. That is why as a warning to remote targets, we shall find the range to the near ones . . ."

But even as he issued this strong warning, the Soviet premier made clear the earnest desire of the USSR's people for peace by emphasizing:

"I should not like to heat up passions . . . Our strength is being tested. Therefore, let us not draw conclusions aggravating relations between countries, such conclusions as would hamper us in the future. I should like to say, even in building good

relations with the United States of America. Today I declare once again that we want to live not only in peace but in friendship with the American people. The American people want no war. I am sure of that."

This was also the tenor of the letter sent by the Soviet premier to Eisenhower, Macmillan and DeGaulle. In these letters, he urged cooperation among the four of them at the summit to achieve results that would aid the cause of peace and relieve the tensions that plague the world. Khrushchev pledged his utmost efforts to that end.

World Fears War Peril In Spy Plane Flights

By JOHN AND MARGRIT PITTMAN

MOSCOW — Premier Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet that the Soviet government will persist in its efforts at the Summit conference, which begins in Paris, on

May 16 — despite discouraging words and actions by the Western governments — to reach “mutually acceptable agreements” on the problems of disarmament, a German peace treaty, and other questions between the socialist and capitalist states.

The foreign policy issue arose during the premier's report on prospects for the summit meeting, in which he revealed that the Soviet defense forces had shot down an American plane invading Soviet territory on May 1. Khrushchev reported that another American plane had violated Soviet air space earlier, on April 9, but that the government had decided against action then.

The deputies expressed anger and indignation during the speech and the debate that followed it over the violation of Soviet air space on the day of international labor solidarity, a national holiday in this country.

UN PROTEST

Khrushchev declared the Soviet government would protest to Washington and to the Secur-

ity Council of the United Nations. He warned the governments of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan against allowing their territories to be used as bases for “aggression” against the territory of another state, and appealed again to the U.S. Government to end the cold war.

“The invasion of our country's air space by the American plane is a very disturbing incident indeed,” said Khrushchev. “Therefore we shall bring this before the Security Council in order to get aggressive actions by the United States stopped, for such actions are fraught with great dangers.”

“It is difficult to see how one can assess such actions by the aggressive forces of the United States of America. Indeed, we are to meet President Eisenhower of the United States at the summit conference on May 16, but just a fortnight before it the United States Air Force undertook an act of aggression against the Soviet Union.

“What is that, May Day greet-



KHRUSHCHEV

ings? Didn't those who sent the plane see what they were doing? They must have hoped they would get away with it, believing that the plane they had sent for piratical purposes would come back. But such actions are utterly incompatible with the tasks before the heads of government who are to meet in Paris.”

TO SCUTTLE SUMMIT

“One cannot suppress the conclusion that the aggressive im-

perialist forces of the United States of America have lately been most active in their efforts to wreck the summit conference, or at least to prevent it from achieving agreements the whole world is waiting for," Khrushchev said.

"The question is, who has sent that plane which intruded into the Soviet Union? Was it sent upon approval by the supreme commander of the United States armed forces, the office which is known to be held by the President, or was this act of aggression committed by the Pentagon militarists without the President's knowledge?"

"If such actions are undertaken by American brass hats at their own risk, this should worry world opinion all the more. Maybe that as a result of the friendship now being established between the United States and Franco, American militarists have decided to do things at own discretion, just as the Spanish military junta did in coming out against a legal government of Spain? It is not uncommon for military dictators in the so-called 'free world' to implant their regimes by Franco's methods."

APPEALS TO U. S.

"The Soviet Union again appeals to the government of the United States of America to end the state of 'cold war' and to stop provocations against other nations," he said.

"Speaking to the people of the United States of America, we say that, in spite of the aggressive actions against our country, we still remember the friendly meetings we had during our visit to America.

"It is still my firm belief that the American people, except certain imperialistic and monopoly circles, want peace and friendship with the Soviet Union and so do we. But the aggressive actions I am reporting to you here must alert the American people as well."

Khrushchev observed that the Soviet Union could not be intimidated or pressured by force, that it had all the means required to repel any attack, and that nothing would be able to stop its advance to communism.

"We go to the Paris conference with an open heart and good intentions," he said, "and we shall stint no effort to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement."

Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet that Powers had confessed working for the Central Intelligence Agency since 1956 at \$30,000 a year, under the command of Col. William Shelton and Lt. Col. Carol Funk of Unit 10-10 stationed in Turkey under the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Powers was assigned to fly a Lockheed U-2 plane over the entire Soviet Union from the airfield in Peshawar in Pakistan to the Bude airfield in Norway. He had been given a detailed map to photograph sites and to record radar stations. He had previously made prolonged investigations of Soviet radar and Norwegian airfields.

Khrushchev presented develop-

ed film taken from the plane, showing Soviet airfields, fuel bases and industrial sites. He presented also pictures of the plane's equipment including cameras, a tape recorder for radar signals, and a device for self-destruction in the case of capture or abandonment. Also pictures of the pilot's equipment, including an automatic with a silencer, a short dagger, a poisoned pin for suicide, two extra gold watches, six gold women's rings, also Soviet, French, Italian, and West German money.

ONE SHOT

Khrushchev disclosed that the plane had been under observation for two hours while the government weighed what action it would take. The order to shoot was executed by a single rocket which hit the aircraft at an elevation of over 12 miles above Swerdlovsk, 1,200 miles inside Soviet territory.

The pilot was stunned by the fall when he parachuted. Soviet collective farmers assisted him and treated him hospitably.

TAB

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Case Of The U-2

In late April, the U. S. Navy photographed a Soviet "fishing trawler" Vega—with no fishing gear visible—60 miles off Long Island and one mile from where the first Polaris submarine was conducting dummy-missile tests. Thus the Vega was not only spying on our Polaris submarine but was within very easy rocket-distance of New York City and other vastly important strategic points. The Vega is only one of very many Russian intruders around our coasts and indications of high-altitude intruders also are reported.

This massive and repeated spying of the Reds has not triggered any high-decibel complaints from our government nor from the friendly governments who depend on our armed might for protection. Perhaps the first lesson to be drawn from the Russians' protest over the flight of the U-2 is the necessity for more vigorous protesting by our government to the Red's spying. It should also be noted that we now have in our jails convicted Red spies including the infamous Colonel Abel, one of their most gifted agents.

The crucial need, we feel, at the present time, is for a mature and reasonable attitude by our people towards the U-2 flight and the sudden, novel policy adopted by our government. Despite our understandable disappointment with the result of the flight, we should not be overly dismayed or cowed by the Red propaganda blasts. The security of our country from a declared mortal enemy demands such measures and the failure of one mission should not occasion despair or even great alarm.

Furthermore, our citizens should not embarrass our government by intemperate demands to "know all" about our security measures. The pacifist should be disregarded. Even those who disagree on the sudden departure by the State Department from our traditional policy—and granting the merit of their cogent arguments—should not urge a public debate on this matter just on the eve of the Summit Conference. The national good seems to us to demand that there be no rending debate that will weaken the President's hands and strengthen the voice and hands of Khrushchev.

This is not to say that there should not be an appropriate and earnest debate in the future about such a change in State Department policy. Such a change, which involves the security of all, almost demands careful discussion and debate.

Perhaps the best comment of all on this matter was that by the doughty Chancellor of West Germany. After reciting the instances of violation of West German skies by the Reds and their flying City RDPs, he said: "Thank God the Americans have been making similar flights over Russia."

TAB

TULSA DAILY WORLD

Oklahoma's Greatest Newspaper

EUGENE LORTON
1869-1949

Page 8

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BIBLE THOUGHT

We shall show forth Thy praise.—Ps. 79:13

How Much Should We Reveal?

THE CAPTURE by Soviet Russia of an American airplane spy, and the subsequent embarrassment to this country on the eve of the Paris Summit conference are prompting demands in Congress for public explanation.

Explain what? The reason for the capture of FRANCIS G. POWERS? Why he was spying? Why our first line of defense is our espionage system?

While time at this session of Congress is short, an attempt almost certainly will be made next year to revive the proposal of Sen. MAURICE MANSFIELD (D-Mont.) four years ago that a permanent joint committee be established to make continuing studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. We see nothing wrong with such studies—if they are private.

The C.I.A. is one gigantic secret operation and, of necessity, must so be. Its "highly confidential" budget is estimated at anything from \$100 million to \$1 billion annually; its manpower at anywhere from 3,000 to 30,000.

Congress established the agency in 1947, and Congress votes its funds although only a few members know what they're voting for. The C.I.A.'s authority was greatly extended by Congress in 1949. Wisely, we feel, the C.I.A. Act of 1949 exempts the agency from the provisions of any law requiring publication or disclosure of the "organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or number of personnel employees." The Director, ALLEN DULLES, brother of the late Secretary of State JOHN FOSTER DULLES, has authority to hire and fire without regard to any other law pertaining to government employment.

Congress has a perfect right to investigate the C.I.A. as well as any other branch of the Federal Government. But, we hope it goes slow and uses extreme caution in what should be revealed publicly. Past experience has revealed too many headline-conscious Senators and Representatives who could not resist the temptation of showing they were "in the know" by leaking information to various news media.

The tighter the web of secrecy is spun around our espionage program, the better for our national security. There must be limitations on the public's right-to-know.

TAB

THE CIA'S WATCHDOG TASK IS NOT FOR CONGRESS.

K.C. TIMES ———— 5/16/60

Of course Congress can be expected to take a sharpened interest in the Central Intelligence agency as a result of the spy plane disclosure. The lawmakers will want to know if the CIA has exceeded its authority. If Congress has an issue, it is with the National Security council which sets policy for the CIA. But it would be dangerous for one or more congressional committees to assume a watchdog role over the nation's principal gatherer of foreign intelligence.

The danger would lie in the well known inclination of congressmen to talk too much. Sensitive information is often blabbed outside the committee rooms. Many politicians simply can't resist the temptation to share government secrets.

Mainly for that reason The Star has been opposed to close congressional checks on the CIA. The issue has lain dormant since 1956 when the Senate rejected a resolution to establish a joint committee on foreign information and intelligence. We believe that such a group would contribute little to national security. And it could easily become a source of embarrassing leaks.

Moreover, the executive branch already includes an appropriate body for keeping tabs on the CIA. The group with this responsibility is the National Security council. Congress established this agency in 1947. The President heads the council. Other members include the vice-president and the secretaries of state and defense. The director of the CIA and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff are the principal advisers.

The CIA is not empowered to exceed the policy lines laid down by the National Security Council. Secretary Herter indicated that the spy plane operation was part of an approved information-gathering program. But a single incident brought U. S.-Soviet relations to a new low on the eve of the Summit. It also jolted this country's alliances with Norway, Turkey, Pakistan and Japan.

Thus the perforce shadowy CIA has directly influenced the international position of the United States. No other proof is needed of the necessity of close and unremitting surveillance of CIA activities by the top-level National Security council. But it is not a responsibility which Congress is well suited to take over.

TAB

Expert Calls Spy Fuss 'Noise Over an Omelet'

By KEN PEARCE
Rocky Mountain News Writer

"Why make noise over an omelet?"

That's how Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby (Ret) reacted to the shooting down of an American spy plane over Russia.

Gen. Willoughby, who was Gen. Douglas MacArthur's chief of intelligence from 1941 to 1951, was in Denver to address the Knife and Fork Club at the Cosmopolitan Hotel.

Concerning the recent spy plane incident, Gen. Willoughby said Thursday:

"There's no reason to get excited. That's being done by every nation on everywhere. The Russians are especially active. They're the greatest spy masters in the world."

Military Editor

Gen. Willoughby, now military editor of American Mercury Magazine and a consultant to the House Un-American Activities Committee, snapped "of course" when asked if the Russians are

doing the same thing over U.S. territory.

"Vapors have been picked up over Alaska time and again—so high, so fast—by the time you can start an alarm they're gone.

"But this isn't the point," he stressed. "Russia does not have to fly over us. It has the American Communist Party at its beck and call. They pick up all the information Russia wants.

"We pick up a Russian spy every other hour. But unlike us, Russia has no supreme court to let off these traitors like we have."

Gen. Willoughby found both good and bad in the ill-fated flight.

Encouraging Fact

He saw it as a "pathetic little makeshift" when compared with the "tremendous advantage" the USSR has with the Communist

Party "operating in every country."

He was encouraged by the fact the spy plane got some 1400 miles inside Russia. "This looks awfully good for SAC (Strategic Air Command)," he said.

As for the fate of the spy plane pilot, Francis G. Powers, of Albany, Ga., Gen. Willoughby suggested he may have to be written off as a casualty of the cold war.

"It's customary in the intelligence fraternity, if an agent is out of luck, you just check him off—he's one of the expendables," said the general.

Gen. Willoughby commented on other facts of the spy plane case.

Talk Too Much

The Central Intelligence Agency—"Allen Dulles (CIA chief) is a first-class executive. He'll handle his assignments extremely well."

The State Department—"I wouldn't have talked that much. Why admit anything to Khrushchev—a mass murderer—the slave master of the Ukraine? What with the U.S. crawling with spies."

Could an unidentified plane flying into Russia touch off a hot war?

"That's the \$1 million question," said the general. "It depends on how nervous the other fellow is."



Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby

TAB

Today and Tomorrow • By Walter Lippmann

The Spy Plane

IN THE muddle and mess of the affair of the spy plane there is one critical question of particular urgency and importance which needs to be dealt with. This is the official statement made with the President's approval that "it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev." If this is true, then the command of very dangerous military missions is not securely and unquestionably in the hands of the responsible authorities in Washington, in the hands, that is to say, of the President, the Secretary of State, the Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.



Lippmann

Who, then, has the authority? If the authority to order a deep penetration of Soviet territory with a military reconnaissance plane is in some headquarters command not in Washington, how do we know, how does the world know, that the authority to strike a blow is not also outside of Washington?

In denying that it authorized the flight, the Administration has entered a plea of incompetence. For there can be no acceptable excuse for an unauthorized flight of this kind. The President cannot afford to let the question of where the responsibility to authorize such flights resides go by without an unequivocal

answer. By word and by deed he must remove all doubt that the authority to command in these dangerous matters is in Washington and nowhere else. The honor, the self-respect and the self-confidence of the country demand it.

ALTHOUGH it is no doubt true that the President did not himself authorize this particular flight, it is no doubt true also that he knew such flights were being made. The general public was perhaps surprised to hear about them. But for the Russians and for many others among us there was no surprise at all.

Why, then, knowing that such flights were being made, did the President fail to realize the risks of continuing them right up to the meeting at the summit? Is it because he was not paying sufficient attention? Is it because his closest advisers were not paying sufficient attention? It looks like that. It seems as if the country has been humiliated by absent-mindedness in the highest quarters of the Government.

THERE is nothing shocking or novel, of course, in the disclosure that we have been spying on the Russians. They have been spying on us. Spying is in its very nature a dirty business, outside the law and outside the moral code. The only crime recognized in the spy business is to be caught, although this crime can be compounded by lying about it and then being caught in the lie itself.

In this affair, there is on the record as we know it serious prima-facie evidence,

not of unusual immorality but, of inefficiency. Why did not the President forbid all such flights when the summit meeting was agreed to? It is not enough to say that he did not authorize this flight. Why did he not forbid it?

THERE is reason to suspect, also, that whoever did authorize the flight and was responsible for preparing it was unaware that the Russians had developed a missile capable of knocking the plane down. The equipment carried by the pilot, the Soviet money and the poison needle, suggests that he was prepared for a forced landing through engine trouble perhaps, after which he would work his way across country, or failing that and having been caught, would commit suicide.

What the pilot was not prepared for was to have his plane disabled by a Russian missile. For this meant that the Russians had him spotted. Under these circumstances once his plane had been hit, his money and his poison needle were useless. If he had killed himself, if he had exploded his plane, there would still have been his corpse and the wreckage of the plane twelve hundred miles inside the Soviet Union.

It was a failure of intelligence not to realize that the Soviets had a missile capable of knocking down so high flying a plane. It was inefficient not to take this possibility into account as a factor which greatly multiplied the risks of making such a flight on the eve of the summit meeting.

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Today and Tomorrow . . . *By Walter Lippmann*

The Spy Business

IN THE whirl of incidents following the capture of the spy plane the Administration has featured, perhaps the right word for it would be stumbled, into an untenable policy which is entirely unprecedented in international affairs. Our position now seems to be that because it is so difficult to collect information inside the Soviet Union, it will henceforth be our avowed policy to fly over Soviet territory, using the territory of our Allies as bases.



Lippmann

Although the intention here is to be candid and honest and also to make the best of a piece of very bad luck, the new policy—which seems to have been improvised between Saturday and Monday—is quite unworkable.

To avow that we intend to violate Soviet sovereignty is to put everybody on the spot. It makes it impossible for the Soviet government to play down this particular incident because now it is challenged openly in the face of the whole world. It is compelled to react because no nation can remain passive when it is the avowed policy of another nation to intrude upon its territory. The avowal of such a policy is an open invitation to the Soviet government to take the case to the United Nations, where our best friends will be grievously embarrassed. The avowal is also a challenge to the Soviet Union to put pressure on Pakistan, Turkey, Norway, Japan, and any other country which has usable bases.

Our Allies are put on the spot because they must either violate international law or disavow the United States.

Because the challenge has been made openly, it is almost impossible to deal with this particular incident by quiet diplomacy.

THE READER will, I hope, have noticed that my criticism is that we have made these overflights an avowed policy. What is unprecedented about the avowal is not the spying as such but the claim that spying, when we do it, should be accepted by the world as righteous. This is an amateurish and naive view of the nature of spying.

Spying between nations is, of course, the universal practice. Everybody does it as best he can. But it is illegal in all countries, and the spy if caught is subject to the severest punishment. When the spying involves intrusion across frontiers by military aircraft, it is also against international law. Because spying is illegal, its methods are often immoral and criminal. Its methods include bribery, blackmail, perjury, forgery, murder, and suicide.

The spy business cannot be conducted without illegal, immoral, and criminal activities. But all great powers are engaged in the spy business, and as long as the world is as warlike as it has been in all recorded history there is no way of doing without spying.

All the powers know this and all have accepted the situation as one of the hard facts of life. Around this situation there has developed over many generations a code of behavior. The spying is never avowed and therefore the government never

acknowledges responsibility for its own clandestine activities. If its agent is caught, the agent is expected to kill himself. In any event, he is abandoned to the mercies of the government that he has spied upon.

The spying is never admitted. If it can be covered successfully by a lie, the lie is told.

ALL THIS is not a pretty business, and there is no way of prettifying it or transforming it into something highly moral and wonderful. The cardinal rule, which makes spying tolerable in international relations, is that it is never avowed. For that reason it is never defended, and therefore the aggrieved country makes only as much of a fuss about a particular incident as it can make or as it chooses to make.

We should have abided by that rule. When Mr. K. made his first announcement about the plane, no lies should have been told. The Administration should have said that it was investigating the charge and would then take suitable action. We should then have maintained a cool silence.

This would have left us, of course, with the unpleasant fact that our spy plane had been caught. What really compounded our trouble, and was such a humiliation to us, is that before we knew how much Mr. K. knew we published the official lie about its being a weather plane. Then finding ourselves trapped in this blatant and gratuitous lie, we have tried to extricate ourselves by rushing into the declaration of a new and unprecedented policy.

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Today and Tomorrow II. By Walter Lippmann

The U-2 in Paris

AS OF Monday afternoon, Eastern time, there is only the faintest chance that the Summit meeting will not break up. It is certain that the President will not go to Russia, the invitation having been withdrawn. Thus the attempt to arrive at a truce in the Cold War and to relax the tensions has, unless there is a diplomatic miracle, ended in a tragic fiasco.



Lippmann

THE ISSUE on which the conference has been disrupted is the flight of the U-2, or more precisely the position taken by the President and his Administration. We must remember that when the plane was captured, Mr. Khrushchev opened the door to the President for a diplomatic exit from his quandary: he did not believe, said Mr. K., that Mr. Eisenhower was responsible for ordering the flight.

Undoubtedly Mr. K. knew that Mr. Eisenhower must have authorized the general plan of the flights but he preferred to let the President say what in fact was a sorry kind of truth, that he did not authorize this particular flight. The diplomatic answer would have been to say nothing at the time or at the most to promise an adequate investigation of the whole affair. Instead, Mr. Eisenhower replied that he was responsible, that such flights were necessary, and then he let the world think even if he did not say so in exact words that the flights would continue. This locked the door which Mr. Khrushchev had opened. It transformed the embarrassment of being caught in a spying operation into a direct challenge to the sovereignty of the Soviet Union.

THIS avowal, this refusal to use the convention of diplomacy was a fatal mistake. For it made it impossible for Mr. Khrushchev to bypass the affair. Had he done that, he would have been in a position of acknowledging to the world, to the Soviet people, to his critics within the Soviet Union, and to his Communist allies, that he had surrendered to the United States the right to violate Soviet territory. No statesman can live in any country after making such an admission.

The news from Paris on Monday shows that Mr. Eisenhower had already realized that his making an avowed policy of the flights was a crucial mistake which had to be corrected. On Saturday there was, it appears, a briefing of the correspondents to tell them that we had never meant to say that the flights would continue. On Sunday in a broadcast in this country Mr. George V. Allen said the same thing. And on Monday the President told Mr. Khrushchev that the flights over Russia have been suspended "and are not to be resumed." A week ago this might have sufficed to quiet down the affair.

The withdrawal was, however, late, and it may prove to have been too little. For during the past week the flight, and the way it was handled have given the Soviet Government a rich opportunity to weaken the ring of America's Allies around Russia. Those who say that Mr. K. has seized upon the opportunity solely in order to make propaganda have not, I think, realized the gravity of the disaster which has befallen us. For the Soviet Union there is in this much more than propaganda. There is an instrument for disturbing if not disrupting the encircling alliance.

It would be wishful thinking to suppose that the So-

viet Government will not seize this opportunity to push countries like Norway, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Japan into pledges and into measures which in some considerable degree neutralize them as American air bases. Morally and legally these allies of ours are defenseless against these Soviet demands.

The Soviet Government is at least as interested in neutralizing our allies around her borders as she is in neutralizing West Berlin. We dare not hope that the Soviet Government will not make the most of the opportunity which has so unexpectedly and so unnecessarily been opened up to her.

BEFORE the affair of the plane, there had been, as Mr. Reston wrote on Monday from Paris, a strong indication that Mr. Khrushchev was very uneasy about the prospects of the Summit meeting. I myself was one of those who talked to his personal emissary, Mr. Zhukov, when he came to Washington in April. The burden of Mr. Zhukov's complaint was that about March 15 American policy had suddenly hardened against a negotiation about the status of West Berlin, and that this was a reversal of the understanding given to Mr. K. by the President at Camp David.

Almost certainly, therefore, the affair of the plane offered Mr. K. an opportunity to make a diplomatic gain against the small encircling Allies from Norway to Japan. If he was stymied in Berlin, he had the chance to recoup elsewhere. We have not heard the last of the troubles of the encircling Allies.

There is not much comfort for us in this. For our own blunders provided Mr. K. with his opportunity.

AT THIS writing it is still conceivable that a way will be found to carry on in Paris. Let us hope so.

MAY 13 1960

WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD

Today and Tomorrow • By Walter Lippmann

First of All

AMID the wreckage, and as we recover from the shock, the long work of rebuilding will have to begin. Where must it begin?

It must begin at the point where the most critical damage has been done. Where is that point? It is not in what Mr. Khrushchev said or did to us. It is in what we did to ourselves. It is that we "first did help to wound ourselves."

The wound has been made by the series of blunders on the gravest matters in the highest quarters. These blunders have not only angered the Russians and wrecked the summit conference but, much worse than all that, they have cast doubt among our allies and among our own people on our competence to lead the Western alliance on the issues of peace and war. Mr. Khrushchev's harsh and intemperate language has produced a reaction and evoked sympathy for the plight of the President. But we must have no illusions about the depth and the extent of the loss of confidence in American leadership, in the judgment, sagacity, and political competence of the Government in Washington.

THIS is the damage to which we must address ourselves. We are a free people, and one of the blessings of

a free society is that, unlike an unfree society, it provides a way to deal with error and correct mistakes. This is to investigate, to criticize, to debate, and then to demonstrate to the people and to the world that the lessons of the fiasco have been learned and will be applied.



Lippmann

In a situation like ours the damage to our prestige would be irreparable if we all rallied around the President and pretended to think that there was nothing seriously wrong. For that would prove to the world that the blunders will not be corrected but will be continued, and that our whole people are satisfied with bad government. It is the dissenters and the critics and the opposition who can restore the world's respect for American competence. We cannot do this by pretending that the incompetence does not exist.

THESE are hard words. But in what other words shall we describe the performance on Sunday night when the Secretary of Defense, who is in Paris as one of the President's advisers, ordered a world-wide alert of American combat forces? On Sunday night Mr. Macmillan and General de Gaulle were still struggling to find some way out of the affair of the spy plane. Yet this was the time chosen by the Secretary of Defense to "stage a world-wide readiness exercise" which, though not the last stage before actual war, is one of the preliminary stages to it.

Why Sunday of all days? This blunder was not the work of some forgotten colonel on a Turkish airfield. This was the work of the Secretary of Defense and of the President. The timing of the "exercise" was just a shade worse than sending off the U-2 on its perilous mission two weeks before the summit. The timing of the so-called exercise makes no sense whatever. For if the alert was concerned with a possible surprise attack, when in the name of common sense could there be less danger of a surprise attack on the Western world than when Mr. K. in person was in Paris?

Unhappily, too, Secretary Gates's "exercise" was just about as incompetently administered at the top as was the affair of the spy plane. This time, it appears, the top people forgot to say anything about the "exercise" to their press officers who did not know what to say, and were not even in their offices, when the public was being frightened by the "exercise."

A GREAT government faced with a most formidable adversary, itself the leader, champion and mainstay of the non-Communist world, cannot be conducted in such a feeble and haphazard way. That is the damage that first must be repaired before we can begin to deal with the general international wreckage, and to regain our confidence in ourselves.

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TAB

Soviet Lag Indicated

Intelligence and Survival

Plane Incident Points Up the Dilemma Involved in Missions for Information

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

One young American faced his "moment of truth" about 65,000 feet over the Soviet Union a week ago yesterday. He apparently decided that life was better than death and his instinctive reaction produced an international incident of unpredictable consequences. The capture of Francis G. Powers, pilot of a United States reconnaissance aircraft, gave Premier Khrushchev an important political and psychological advantage just prior to the East-West summit conference. It was an advantage the Soviet leader was quick to exploit.

The United States Government, many members of Congress and much of the press had been mouse-trapped into premature denials. Mr. Khrushchev was able to show—with the capture of the pilot—that these were, as he bluntly put it, "complete lies." The United States had been caught red-handed in a major espionage operation, with all the embarrassment that such a coup causes.

All these and other consequences stemmed from one man's instinct for survival in the few seconds when Francis Powers faced his crucial decision.

The negative aspects, from the United States point of view, of the young pilot's decision are obvious. They are so obvious that a demand for the scalps of the "guilty" officials already has started. Harold E. Stassen, former disarmament adviser to President Eisenhower, implied Saturday that "some of our military officers" had engineered Mr. Powers' flight to upset the prospects for the summit conference.

But the negative aspects of the Soviet counter-espionage coup must be balanced by the entire history of the Lockheed U-2 project. It is a history that effectively answers Mr. Stassen's accusation. The U-2's es-

essential feature is its amazing high-altitude capability. The plane has extremely long wings and its very light wing loading enables high subsonic speed and maneuverability in very thin air. Mr. Khrushchev said Mr. Powers' craft was flying at 65,000 feet when shot down; presumably even that rarefied altitude is not its absolute ceiling. Thus the U-2 must have had, when it first became operational about five years ago, a ceiling considerably higher than any of the far faster but heavier of the world's fighter-interceptors.

Greater Altitudes Reached

The latest United States interceptors produced since the U-2 was designed are able to reach 60,000 to 70,000 feet; in fact, altitude records above 90,000 feet have been established by both United States and Soviet military aircraft. But these records were established by high speed "zoom-ups"—that is, sharp pull-ups with maximum power from straight and level flight. Maneuvering ability at these high altitudes is extremely limited and interception at such altitudes by a piloted fighter, especially if the interceptor must then take up a pursuit, is very difficult.

Thus the U-2's high-altitude capability gave it until a week ago a certain degree of invulnerability to anti-air defense.

It is noteworthy that it was an anti-aircraft rocket fired from the ground—not a piloted interceptor—that brought down the first U-2 lost to Soviet attack in five years of operations. The feat of rocketry, despite the Soviet boasting about it, is not remarkable. It has, in fact, been within the United States capability for a long time.

The United States Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft missile, which can carry either a nuclear or a conventional warhead, has shot down targets traveling at three times the speed of sound and has hit targets at altitudes ranging from 1,000 to 100,000 feet. Even the Nike-Ajax, which has been operational for seven years, has an altitude capability of at least 60,000 to 70,000 feet.

The shooting down of Mr. Powers' U-2 on May 1 indicates not a Soviet lead in defensive anti-aircraft missiles but, on the contrary, a Soviet lag. There have been rumors that the Russians were having trouble with their anti-aircraft missiles and there had been little hard evidence of the tremendous defensive strength so often credited to the Soviet Union.

Two deductions are possible from this successful firing of an anti-aircraft missile against the U-2.

The shot could have been "lucky"—that is, the pilot might have blundered within firing range of a missile battery that reconnaissance planes normally would try to avoid.

At the same time, the Soviet Union may at last have corrected some of the faults in its anti-aircraft missiles and may now have in operation weapons comparable in effectiveness to the United States' earlier Nike-Ajax, or perhaps approximating the Nike-Hercules.

Both deductions are probably correct.

A broader evaluation of the U-2's career gives reason to conclude that it probably has been one of the most successful reconnaissance planes ever built.

Many Flights 'Along' Borders

Judging from the Government's own account, the U-2 has made numerous flights in the last five years "along" the Communist frontiers. It has operated from Alaska, Japan, Germany, the Middle East and elsewhere. Mr. Khrushchev declared in his first speech on the present incident that another United States aircraft, presumably also a U-2, had crossed Soviet frontiers on April 9 from the direction of Afghanistan, and that that one, though detected, was not intercepted.

All this would seem to indicate that the U-2's flight plan on May 1, which according to Mr. Khrushchev was to take it straight across the Soviet Union, from south to north, was not unusual. It seems likely, judging from the Soviet revelations and the United States Government's somewhat equivocal admissions, that similar flights had occurred in the past.

If this is so, the data gained in photographs and by other means must have been of immense importance. The U-2 project and other secret methods of intelligence collection, presumably explain in part the Government's confidence about United States military strength relative to that of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, if repeated flights over the Soviet Union have actually occurred, the conclusion would seem to be that Soviet defenses have been weaker than the world realized. In fact, if photographs similar to those from the downed U-2 that

News
Analysis

Mr. Khrushchev proudly exhibited were taken in previous flights, the U-2 program must have been until eight days ago the most successful reconnaissance espionage project in history.

This chapter abruptly came to an end May 1 when Mr. Powers made his decision to live.

Date of the Flight Significant

Numerous questions remain: Why was such a flight made just before the summit conference? It may be noted that the incident occurred on May Day, a day dedicated in the Soviet Union to glorification of

the Communist regime, and at a time when the Russians were widely expected to attempt a spectacular pre-summit space or missile shot.

Was the flight authorized by Washington?

Saturday's somewhat equivocal United States statement, probably deliberately cloudy on this point, declared that "in so far as the authorities are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flights as described by Mr. Khrushchev."

But it would be stretching a very long bow to infer from this, as Mr. Stassen did, that some United States military commander had gone off "half-cocked" on his own initiative. The whole history of the U-2 project, as revealed piecemeal in Washington and through Mr. Khrushchev's revelations, shows clearly that the activities were managed and probably closely directed by Washington.

What was the directing authority?

It has been acknowledged that the initial version of the incident issued in Washington—that the U-2 was a weather plane operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration—was false. It is easy to deduce from this, from Mr. Khrushchev's assertions, which there seems no reason to doubt, and from the United States' own somewhat lame explanations, that the U-2 project was a Central Intelligence Agency effort, and a very successful one.

Space Agency Seen as 'Cover'

The N. A. S. A. and the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation were probably so-called cover agencies. The pilots, judging from Mr. Powers' background, were apparently former Air Force or Air Force Reserve pilots on inactive duty, attracted to their hazardous occupation by adventure and very high pay.

Do the Russians do this sort of thing?

Of course, and perhaps much more. Soviet planes do not have the advantage of bases close to the continental United States. But Soviet aircraft have flown over parts of Alaska, Northern Canada, Japan and other Western defense areas. The Communist espionage system is one of the world's most efficient, whereas that of the United States has always been handicapped by the Iron Curtain.

Why did the pilot survive?

This is a question that only Mr. Powers can answer, and he may spend the rest of his life trying to answer it satisfactorily.

The instinct of self-preserva-

tion is strong in every human and it is contrary to the Judeo-Christian and the American ethic to destroy one's own life.

Yet an unwritten law of every secret intelligence organization postulates the suicide of an agent rather than capture, possible torture and revelations of importance to an enemy.

Mr. Khrushchev has quoted from an alleged confession by Mr. Powers and has declared that a hypodermic needle or pin and a pistol were recovered. These, he said, were for use by the pilot to prevent his capture alive.

The photograph of the wreckage of the U-2 released by Moscow and the fact that Mr. Powers lived to fall into Soviet hands indicates something of how the flier must have reacted in time of crisis.

The plane apparently was hit by a fragment of the rocket's explosive warhead and was disabled. Apparently Mr. Powers rode it down for some distance and then parachuted. The U-2 almost certainly had a self-destructive charge, which apparently was not set off.

Films Aid Khrushchev

Mr. Powers' alleged confession, the plane's wreckage and even films from its camera thus have aided Mr. Khrushchev's dramatic psychological coup. It is safe to guess that all that Mr. Powers knew about the U-2 operations is now known to the Russians.

Thus The Central Intelligence Agency, an agency of a nation that is formally dedicated to the protection of human life, undoubtedly would have wanted Mr. Powers to destroy his plane and himself—a concept wholly antithetical to the average American.

Mr. Powers' dilemma in the few seconds of free choice he may have had is indeed the dilemma, not only of a secret intelligence agency in a democratic government, but of a democratic nation facing a secret Communist conspiracy in the atomic age.

It is part of the world we live in. Values often become mixed, and truth often becomes falsehood. But the greatest value, and the reason for the U-2 program itself, is survival—not the survival of Francis Powers but national survival. The danger of surprise attack in the age of hydrogen bombs is so great that responsible government feels it must have all possible information.

Mr. Powers and his agonizing decision and the secrecy with which the whole U-2 project was necessarily surrounded were inescapable results of this overriding need to know.

The Vulnerable Soviet

Moscow Reveals Defense Weakness In Publicizing U. S. Plane Incursion

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Moscow continued to make political and psychological capital out of the U-2 plane incident yesterday, but it did a price

was the reason. Soviet officials said the Lockheed plane had been shot down over the "heartland" before, according to Soviet statements.

It was shot down. Moreover, statements from Moscow and Washington made it clear that United States aircraft flying at high altitudes over the heart of the Soviet Union with impunity is a Soviet counter-measure in many instances.

Mr. Khrushchev has closed one of the Soviet's eyes in his limited at the Czechoslovak in Moscow Monday.

He declared in 1956 a United States plane flew over the Soviet Union near Kiev, 250 miles from the frontiers of the Eastern Communist states. He added that "from such behavior we drew the conclusion: to improve rockets, to improve fighters."

Another Penetration Cited

This suggests that at that time there was no Soviet anti-aircraft defense that could intercept or shoot down a plane flying at high altitude. Mr. Khrushchev knows there have been many other deep penetrations of Soviet air space since then.

High-flying Lockheed U-2's, often described as powered gliders because of their extremely light wing loading and their ability to glide long distances with a slow loss of altitude, undoubtedly made most of these penetrations, but not all of them. It is quite possible that the Khrushchev flight to which Mr. Khrushchev referred was made by a stripped-down bomber.

It has been known for some time that not all of the Soviet frontiers are ringed with heavy anti-aircraft defenses. On the contrary, the Russians seem to have adopted the "island" system of defense. Their important cities and military and industrial areas are heavily defended; other areas only lightly guarded, if at all.

Nevertheless, some of the most important of these defended areas almost certainly have been photographed by the U-2. Until now, there has been no evidence of any Soviet plane or missile that could bring down the U-2. Even now the evidence is incomplete.

One Soviet statement published yesterday indicated that the captured American pilot, Francis Gary Powers, had declared that he believed an engine failure, rather than a Soviet anti-aircraft rocket, had forced him down.

The altitude of the plane at the time it was alleged to have been hit is important to any analysis of the effectiveness of present Soviet anti-aircraft missiles.

If the pilot had had mechanical trouble or oxygen failure and had been forced to a lower altitude, he would have been a "sitting duck" if this occurred near a missile battery.

If, on the other hand, his plane was hit with a fragment while he was flying at about 65,000 feet, it must be assumed that the Soviet Union has developed anti-aircraft missiles comparable, in general, to the United States' Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules types.

Defection Question Raised

Another question posed by the capture of the pilot, important parts of the plane, and much equipment is: Was the pilot a double-agent, a defector or traitor?

Those who have suggested this possibility base their conjecture on the ground that an extraordinary amount of equipment and wreckage has been publicized by the Soviet Union. If the plane really crashed or were hit by a rocket little would have survived, it is contended.

Yet all available evidence, filtered through the veil of secrecy that surrounds every security operation, tends to refute this theory. Members of Congress who heard Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, discuss the Powers case Monday, declare that Mr. Dulles had said there was no evidence that Mr. Powers had defected.

Plane Could Have Glided

His plane could have been disabled by a rocket fragment, and after Mr. Powers jumped, it could have glided to a crash landing.

The Russians could, of course, have "faked" some of the evidence. Indeed, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation designers and manufacturers of the U-2, believes the photograph of piled wreckage released by Moscow as that of the downed U-2 was "faked." Yet, the Russians are preparing to exhibit sections of the wreckage and equipment to public view in Moscow, and the U. S. Ambassador has been told by Mr. Khrushchev that he will probably be allowed to see Mr. Powers.

NEW YORK TIMES

Khrushchev and Army

Officers Fearful of Cuts in Forces Said to Be Factor in Summit Line

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The Soviet Army's attitude in Paris was an important factor in the Communist leader's hard line on intelligence experts.

The shifts in power indicated before the U-2

servicers had long stressed privately that there was a powerful dissent from Mr. Khrushchev's policies among a considerable group of army officers represented part of the internal Premier's hard line.

Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, who has been much evasive during Mr. Khrushchev's visit to Paris, is believed to have been influenced by the Premier to limit his policies and to strengthen the army. Khrushchev's policies have been particularly unpopular in sections of the army where a relatively softer tactics the Premier often employs, to the detriment of the international situation, particularly his emphasis on complete disarmament and a reduction—undoubtedly, in the segments of the officer corps.

These developments were accompanied by a shift in emphasis—from piloted planes and surface forces to missiles—that was bound to result in the retirement, or transfer to less important jobs, of sizable numbers of officers. Also a possible factor is a projected shift in military organization that would de-emphasize the regular services.

The stresses produced by all these changes are described in an article by Nikolai Galay in the April, 1960, edition of the Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U. S. S. R., an exile organization in Munich, Germany. Mr. Galay's analysis is regarded as logical by United States intelligence sources.

Mr. Galay estimates that if the present scheduled reduction in the armed forces—a reduction necessitated by economic, technological and social reasons—is carried out, about 250,000 officers will be demobilized by the end of 1961. Mr. Galay declares that this will mean a "mass declassment."

Malinovsky Is Quoted

The author cites Marshal Malinovsky's statistics, given in a speech dealing with the problem of assimilation of former officers into civilian occupations, to show that the position of those demobilized will deteriorate both economically and socially.

"In the light of such facts," the article continues, "the fear and panic which have taken hold of Soviet officers become comprehensible. They are now faced by the possible danger of having to seek new work without a civilian qualification, without having earned a pension and burdened by a family."

Mr. Galay says the Government's attempt to "sweeten the pill by granting 'privileges for officers transferred to the

serve' is limited to extremely modest sops." He compares the situation of a captain on active duty with that when he has been demobilized and is engaged in a civilian occupation.

"Thus," Mr. Galay writes, "a captain, the commander of a company, received while on active service 700 rubles for rank and 900 for his post, a total of 1,600 rubles per month, not counting allowances—for linguistic knowledge, service abroad, in the polar, remote and mountainous regions, and so on. He also received a flat (which he can retain for three months only, after demobilization).

"Now, this former captain who has, for example, enrolled in courses as a locksmith receives during the year's training 700 rubles for his former rank, and 75 per cent of the earnings of a locksmith in the first or lowest category, who receives 312 rubles. The (former) captain thus receives 834 rubles.

"His position will not be much better after a year. He can increase the 312 rubles to 372 rubles by being promoted to the highest or eighth category, and also probably receive 20 per cent more by overfulfilling his quotas. Thus, as this example shows, the standard of living of the demobilized officers will drop.

'Bitter Feelings' Foreseen

Mr. Galay concludes that the demobilization is "from the social standpoint a major blow at the armed forces, primarily the officers," and that "such a step cannot but lead to bitter feelings toward the authorities and the regime."

This demobilization, with its inevitable strains, is associated, Mr. Galay maintains, with a proposed emphasis on a territorial system in the organization of the armed forces.

Instead of maintaining many long-term units on active duty, the Soviet Army of tomorrow may put greater dependence—as it did in its beginnings—on a sort of national guard system, organized by geographic or territorial units. These territorial units, unlike the full-time units, will train at intervals only and most of their men will continue in civilian occupations.

This may "weaken somewhat present Soviet military potential," the author estimates. The change not only is a result of economic pressure but is intended, Mr. Galay states, to be "the decisive blow at the present social structure of the armed forces, intended to restore the standards of Marxism-Leninism."

To these long-term factors, which pre-date the U-2 case, must be added a reaction that stems directly from the downing of a United States reconnaissance plane in the Soviet Union on May 1. The incident, and subsequent revelations that Lockheed U-2's had penetrated Soviet air space repeatedly, despite the vaunted Soviet air defense, must have come as a shock to the Soviet Army, particularly to the prestige of those responsible for the effectiveness of air defense. The inevitable reaction was toughness.

News Analysis

TAB

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Washington

Why Khrushchev Flexes His Rockets

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, May 5—Every time an American plane is shot down over or near the Communist empire, it is useful to recall certain basic facts about the "cold war."

It is a war, much as we'd like to forget it. The forces of two hostile coalitions face each other across half the world, and they are constantly watching each other from the skies and probing each other's lines.

Moreover, the disposition of these forces is spread along the whole vast periphery of the Eurasian continent from the North Cape of Norway through the heart of Europe to the Middle East and thence into South Asia and the Far East.

The preponderance of ground power and rocket fire may lie with the Russians and the Chinese, but it is the United States that has military and air bases close to the Soviet and Chinese borders and not the other way round.

These are the unpopular facts which are seldom mentioned in this part of the world, but they help explain Nikita Khrushchev's melodramatic and bad-mannered outburst over the American plane today.

There is a tendency here to dismiss Khrushchev's tantrum as part of the usual Soviet tactics just before a summit meeting with President Eisenhower, President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan, and there is undoubtedly something to this theory.

Soviet Tactics and Fears

By creating a crisis over Berlin in September of 1958, they forced negotiations on Germany at Geneva. By refusing to budge there they created another crisis and got the Khrushchev-Eisenhower visits and a summit meeting.

Accordingly, Khrushchev's present ugly mood may be tactical, but there is probably more to it than that.

On one thing all the Soviet experts here agree: Any suggestion of military action close to the Soviet frontiers produces an immediate savage response. Khrushchev is still of the generation that remembers the Allied invasion of Russia in 1917 as the critical moment of the Communist revolution.

This pathological fear of attack was still so great at the time of the Anglo-French invasion of Suez in November of 1956 that Moscow mobilized its forces in Poland, fearing United States intervention—this at a moment when Washington was using all its energies to rescue London and Paris.

What is not clear, in the light of all this, is why it is necessary a few days before President Eisenhower's last-chance summit meeting with Khrushchev to send planes aloft to check weather data and wind-shear on the Soviet-Turkish frontier.

Our instruments are so close to the Soviet Union at that point that they can actually pick up the inter-plane communications of the Red Air Force flying over Soviet territory and track their missile tests inside the Soviet Union.

This is undoubtedly necessary as part of an Allied defensive posture created by Moscow's aggressive actions since the war, but we should not be surprised if the Russians are a little quick on the trigger when our planes stray over their frontier.

To See Ourselves as Others * * *

"It is the Russians who are being provocative," cried Senator Mike Mansfield in the Senate today, "and it is they who are jeopardizing the peace." Whereupon he noted that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was apparently testing along the Soviet frontier without the knowledge of President Eisenhower.

There is nothing anybody can do about Khrushchev's attitudes, but our own are sometimes very odd.

This is no panty-waist exercise taking place on the southern border of the Soviet Union, and nations, like individuals, have to ask themselves occasionally how they would feel if things were reversed.

Suppose the Soviet Union had a base in Mexico from which planes went aloft daily along the Texas border: sometimes bombers, sometimes weather planes, sometimes photo reconnaissance planes. Suppose they strayed over the United States from time to time. Would Washington "shoot first and complain later?"

A fact is a fact, even if Khrushchev identifies it. The United States is policing most of the free world. It has been doing so now for almost a generation and policemen get killed. It is patrolling the enemy's back door night and day, and the surprising thing under these circumstances is not that men lose their way and get ambushed but that it happens so seldom and that it always creates so much surprise here when it does.

Washington

How to Make Things Worse Than They Really Are

By **JAMES RESTON**

WASHINGTON, May 7 — Every time an uninvited American plane crosses the Soviet frontier, Nikita Khrushchev's shirttail flies up his back like a window blind.

The surprising thing is not that this happens but that the United States should have been monkeying around with the string at this particular moment.

Timing in politics, as in love, is important. The summit meeting with Khrushchev is only nine days off. This was an odd moment to play peekaboo around the frontiers of Russia.

The case for sampling the upper air near the U. S. S. R. is strong enough. This is one way to check whether nuclear tests are going on at a time when the United States has voluntarily stopped testing.

What even our best friends are asking here is: Why now? And why there? And even if it is assumed that the Administration's explanation is geometrically accurate, the judgment of the United States Government is bound to be questioned.

Element of Accident

The reason for this is that the element of accident in this kind of world is frightening. Few people believe in a calculated nuclear war. What worries our allies and many of our own officials is the accidental incident touched off by some human failing of mind or character or judgment.

Accordingly, it is assumed that the most careful discipline will be exercised, and when, instead, we are told that United States planes are in the air along the Soviet frontier to test things that can be tested elsewhere—when official spokesmen say publicly that the United States never has voluntarily sent a plane over Soviet territory—then, not only the good judgment but the good faith of the Government gets involved in controversy.

The political fall-out from this incident is bound to be great. Khrushchev, never a trusting soul, has recently been accusing the United States of trying to ruin the chances of agreement at the summit meeting before it started.

For example, Yuri Zhukov, head of the State Committee of the U. S. S. R., came here the other day to complain that the Voice of America had assumed a new and more ominous tone. This started, Mr. Zhukov told George Allen, head of the United States Information Agency, around May 15. Mr. Allen asked for evidence.

Mr. Zhukov pointed to one reference in a Voice of America broadcast to "slave labor camps" in the U. S. S. R. He pointed to another broadcast to the effect that there was a serious shortage of consumer goods in the Soviet Union.

Coincidentally Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov has been complaining about the speech made by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter in Chicago on April 4, and protesting even more about the much tougher and even scornful speech made by Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon in New York on April 20.

Who's in Charge?

Khrushchev himself has been complaining publicly about these two speeches and asserting that they indicated a calculated decision by Washington to "revive the cold war."

As a matter of fact, there was no such policy decision taken by this Government. The tone of the Voice of America was not purposely changed. It was decided in late March to make clear to both the Russians and the West Germans that United States policy on Berlin and Germany remained the same. It is also true that the tone of Mr. Dillon's speech was sharper than anything delivered by so high an official in a long time, but this was not the result of any calculated decision to stir up the animals.

Moscow, however, was in a mood to believe precisely this when the plane incident occurred, so it is no surprise that Mr. Khrushchev took off like the Terrible Tempered Mr. Bang.

In fact he was so furious that on Monday, the day after the plane incident, Moscow cabled the State Department that Khrushchev had canceled the visit to the United States of the head of the Soviet Air Force, Marshal Konstantin Andreevich Vershinin. Then, quite as suddenly, on Wednesday another cable arrived from Moscow restoring the visit.

This has encouraged officials here to hope that perhaps Khrushchev will exploit his propaganda advantage and let his shirttail settle down. At least they hope so, for the President is not trying to ruin or manage the summit meeting. He is not even managing his own departments presently. As this course, is precisely the trouble.

Pressure program of industrializing China and... they have needed a warlike atmosphere to induce their populace to accept extreme hardships. As faithful believers in the "religion" of Communism, they have viewed Khrushchev's pragmatic ideas on coexistence with the West as a deviation from true Marxism. And in Russia, too, there are old-line Stalinists who agree with them and have been pushing the Russian premier.

Pressures From Others

Further pressure comes from the smaller satellites such as East Germany, Albania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary—though not Poland. Leaders in these countries are of Stalinist bent. More than that, they maintain that Communism can never really cement its hold on Eastern Europe until the West is driven out of its West Berlin outpost.

Equally potent are pressures within Russia. Great blocs of citizens are showing signs of dissatisfaction, according to diplomatic intelligence reports.

Enlisted men and officers demobilized from the vast Soviet war machine as the nation switches to reliance on rocketry have been forced out of lifetime posts and are having to take less rewarding jobs.

The much-trumpeted Khrushchev farm reforms are failing to produce on schedule; last year's crop was disappointing and this year the "virgin lands" plowed for grain have been swept by dust storms, delaying planting.

Industry is falling short of goals in such vital sectors as iron ore and steel; there's a campaign on right now to get the public to scrape up scrap and to induce factories to scrimp on steel. Manpower shortages plague industry generally, forcing a shakeup of education to put youngsters in the factories at an earlier age.

An Itch for More

Consumers have been promised more goods—and have received more. But each increase creates an itch for more. Despite a boost in apartment construction, there have been public demonstrations recently demanding better housing faster. Many little indications of this unappeased appetite for consumer goods come to light; the other day a worker wrote in to the trade union publication, *Trud*, asking why the Soviet was exporting autos to the U.S. while he still couldn't get one.

Like the politicians of most any other country, Khrushchev knows there's no better way to distract an irritated populace than to denounce a foreign evil. By the same words, he satisfies the leaders of China and his allies to the west. Whether he will stop at words remains to be seen.

By rejuvenging his official family, Khrushchev may have eased pressures a bit, too. The view of experts here is that Frol Kozlov got a promotion when he was moved from the post of First Deputy Premier to a spot on the seven-member party Secretariat. But Khrushchev got a more tractable associate when he named a man of limited ambition, Alekssei Kosygin, as the new First Deputy Premier.

Tax Cut's Appeal

Among Mr. Khrushchev's other moves, the income tax cut has obvious appeal to the populace. The Russian leader made the most of this in his oratory. But the fact is that it was not news; it had been announced late last year. And its impact will be limited. The income tax has never been a heavy burden in Russia; most of the government's income comes from sales taxes and profits of government enterprises. In 1959 less than 10% of government income came from personal income taxes.

Nevertheless, almost all the populace will consider itself benefited as the tax disappears gradually between now and 1965. When the deed is done, nobody will be paying income taxes. But for higher income folk earning more than the ruble equivalent of about \$200 a month this boon will be nullified by salary cuts equivalent to the tax savings.

Russian juggling of the ruble appears to be aimed at heightened prestige at home and abroad, rather than at any very practical change. The experts say any final interpretation must await study of the Khrushchev text, and of its application. But at first glance it seems similar to the move of France, which is making its citizens exchange 100 old francs to receive one new "heavy" franc. In the case of Russia, 10 present rubles will have to be turned in to get one new "heavy" ruble. But there is no general domestic impact in either case, for wages and prices are being adjusted in proportion. It's just a matter of striking off final zeroes on numbers adorning the currency—two zeroes in the case of France, one in Russia.

Searching for genuine impact of the currency move, authorities spot one interesting possibility: The Soviet government may now be able to either catch or bankrupt the swarms of "speculators" of capitalist bent who have kept appearing in the socialist economy despite all previous attempts to weed them out. Some of these are illicit businessmen, who manage to get raw materials through black market channels, have them manufactured into clothing and other wares in little back-room "factories," and sell these profitably. Others are farmers who grow produce on private plots and sell it on the free market.

Any of these who have accumulated capital and can not justify its possession may be nabbed when they turn in old currency for themselves with paper that will cease to be negotiable in three months.

One U.S. authority suspects the Russians, apart from catching "speculators," may take this occasion to find out just who does have money. Says he: "It might be nice to know just who does have boodles of cash lying around."

The impact on foreigners who must deal in rubles, either as traders or tourists, remains "a dark mystery," according to analysts. All Russian exchange rates are entirely arbitrary. In trade, the theoretical value of the old ruble has been 25 cents. For tourists, new ruble in each case is not yet announced. Anyhow, the exchange rate is not necessarily a dominant factor in trading with the Russians, because prices also can be set arbitrarily.

Nevertheless, the revaluation of the ruble might well have psychological impact on the world, giving Russian money new stature and prestige. Depending on how you figure it, the new ruble could be worth more than the American dollar and nearly equal to the British pound. If the trick is successfully performed, says one Washington money man, it's a genuine piece of international nerve.

Washington

What Kind of President Do You Want?—III

By JAMES BOSTON

WASHINGTON, May 10—The tragedy of President Eisenhower in the spy-plane case is that he and his colleagues have created almost all the things he feared the most.

He wanted to reduce international tension and he has increased it. He wanted to strengthen the alliance and he has weakened it. He glorified teamwork and morality, and got lies and administrative chaos.

Everything he was noted for—caution, patience, leadership, military skill, and even good luck—suddenly eluded him precisely at the moment he needed them most.

And the paradox of it all is that, despite the wonder of the world, there is an element of reason and even of inevitability in the whole melancholy story.

This is the main point at a time when the nation is picking a President for the Sixties. For the heart of the problem here is that the Presidency has been parceled out, first to Sherman Adams, then to John Foster Dulles, and in this case to somebody else—presumably to Allen Dulles, but we still don't know.

Institutionalized Presidency

From the "personalized Presidency" of Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson and the two Roosevelts we have passed to the "institutionalized Presidency" under Eisenhower. It has some good points, but it disperses authority, removes the President from many key decisions and leaves the nation, the world and sometimes even the President himself in a state of uncertainty about who is doing what.

Long before the spy-plane case some of the nation's most distinguished historians noted this trend.

"To a far greater degree than any of his predecessors," wrote Edward S. Corwin of Princeton in "The President—Office and Powers," "President Eisenhower has employed the Cabinet as an instrument of collective policymaking.*** Each member is expected to assume full responsibility for the conduct of the affairs of his department.***"

"Each of these gentlemen, according to the President, is an independent officeholder with his own views of appropriate policy, with which the President has no warrant to interfere."

It may be going far to say that the President felt no "warrant" to interfere with the established policy of aerial intrusion over the Soviet Union, but there no doubt exists here what Professor Corwin has called "detachment," an

attitude of "reigning rather than ruling" and relying on the staff to carry on established policies even when new conditions, such as an impending summit meeting, intervened.

The Central Point

Prof. Walt W. Rostow of Massachusetts Institute of Technology spells out the problem in "The United States in the World Arena."

"For whatever reasons—diffidence, uncertainty, or inner convictions—" he wrote, "President Eisenhower did not impose his own insights, his own sense of direction on the nation's policy."

"He remained loyal not to his views of substance but to his principles of administration. He decided, in effect, only when his immediate subordinates could not. * * * He maintained the kind of relationship [with the Cabinet] he had built up during the war with Alexander, Montgomery and Bradley—a relationship in which, within the agreed strategy, the field operator was given maximum scope. * * *"

Here, perhaps more than anywhere else, lies the explanation of the spy-plane confusion. The field operator was given "maximum scope." There was an "agreed strategy" in Washington, but the specific operation was not authorized by the President, or even on the President's mind until the crash.

The President, in short, was loyal to his subordinates and to his principles of administration, but the tragedy is that he "did not impose his own insights, his own sense of direction in the nation's policy."

By nature no man could be less inclined than Eisenhower to risk a provocative adventure into the Soviet Union just before perhaps the last Big Four summit meeting of his career, or to say when it was done that it had not been done, or to insist in the end that he would do it again.

This is why it is a tragedy. For in an instant of savage misfortune he was caught in a system of his own choosing, and the question now is whether this concept of the Presidency is adequate for the future.

Washington

The Political Consequences Following the U-2

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, May 12—There is one charge that cannot fairly be made against the Administration in the U-2 spy case. It is not playing Presidential politics with the foreign policy of the United States. As a matter of fact, it may in the last week have lost the "peace issue," which was the best issue it had.

The best politics for the G. O. P. this summer lay in creating an atmosphere of peace, an air of progress toward an accommodation with the Russians on Berlin, Germany, nuclear testing and disarmament.

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of Britain demonstrated the possibilities of such an atmosphere in the British election of last year. This is not to say that his peace efforts were an insincere campaign maneuver—they obviously were not—but the fact remains that his patient and persistent negotiations in Moscow, Paris and Washington helped his party win the election.

The same opportunity was open to President Eisenhower. He had agreed to go to the summit with Nikita Khrushchev. He had worked out the possibility of associating Vice President Nixon with the Paris talks. He had a date with Khrushchev in Moscow on June 10, followed by a dramatic flight into the Far East just before the nominating conventions.

All these events, combined with the nuclear testing talks and the disarmament negotiations in Geneva, gave the Administration the chance to start a long process of negotiation; and this, in turn, put Mr. Nixon in a position to argue that he should be elected to keep the process going in the years ahead.

The Sudden Switch

The U-2 case has not destroyed these political opportunities but it has certainly minimized them. Instead of a calm atmosphere the political weather is now stormy. Instead of the "spirit of Camp David" we now have the "spirit of Sverdlovsk." Instead of President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev writing mash notes to each other about "peaceful coexistence," Khrushchev is now making like the unrequited lover whose trust was betrayed.

There is still just a chance to save things at Paris but not if the President continues on his present theme. He is insisting that he must continue crossing the Soviet frontiers. He is saying that the security of the United States demands it. He is saying all these things openly, and therefore Khrushchev cannot let them pass.

By demanding the right to intrude into the Soviet Union, the President has defied Khrushchev to stop him, put Khrushchev on the spot with the Stalinists who have always been against a détente, embarrassed the allies by making their bases a target of Khrushchev's anger, and even repudiated one of Washington's own favorite principles—namely, that each nation has the right to choose its own form of government.

Maybe the President has made the right choice in demanding the right to challenge the authority of the Soviet Government over its own territory; maybe this was essential to protect the United States against another Pearl Harbor. But the President cannot have it both ways: he cannot defy Khrushchev and have his cooperation too.

Bad Politics

Accordingly, much depends on whether Mr. Eisenhower goes to Paris in his present mood, blaming Soviet secrecy for United States aerial espionage. Asking the Russians to give up secrecy, as anybody who knows Russian history will tell you, is asking the Russians to stop being Russian. And if the President rests his case on this point, the summit will be highly volcanic. Instead of a "peace issue" the G. O. P. may very well, in that case, face a "war issue."

In domestic political terms—to say nothing of international politics—this situation, created largely by accident, bad luck and bungling, will do the Republicans no good. And this is especially so since Vice President Nixon has known all about the aerial espionage and boasted about the wonderful photographs the U-2 brought back.

The fate of one political party in one election is not, of course, the main consideration. The fate of much more is at stake in the present trend of events. But it is a factor. The G. O. P. has unwittingly, by bad administration, bad judgment and bad luck, stumbled into a course which is also bad politics.

Paris

Paris in the Spring— Cold War Version

By JAMES RESTON

PARIS, May 14—Paris was so beautiful this morning that even Nikita Khrushchev seemed in an agreeable mood. When he arrived at Orly the sun was shining, the flags were flapping bravely in the wind, the white and pink blossomed chestnut trees were in bloom, and the lovers were carrying on their own immemorial cold and hot war in the parks.

How long the spell of Paris lasts, however, will depend on the ability of Mr. Khrushchev and President Eisenhower to remove, or at least set aside, two immense blunders when they meet.

These are (1) the Eisenhower blunder of insisting publicly that the United States has the right and even the duty, to continue aerial espionage over the Soviet Union, and (2) the Khrushchev blunder of insisting that the Western nations must leave Berlin if Moscow makes a separate peace treaty with Communist East Germany.

The Pre-Summit Crisis

These have to be set aside if there is not to be an eruption at the summit for the simple reason that Khrushchev cannot acquiesce in what amounts to a threat to defy the authority of the Soviet Government over its own territory, and Eisenhower cannot acquiesce in what amounts to a claim that the Soviet Union has the right to destroy by itself an international agreement entered into with the United States and Britain.

If these two demands were turned around it would be obvious that they had to be rejected. The United States would not for an instant tolerate a demand that the Soviet Union should fly over the United States without the permission of the United States Government. The Soviet Union would certainly not agree that the United States had the right to alter the terms of an international agreement without the approval of the Soviet Union and other parties to that agreement.

Yet this is what Mr. Khrushchev and the President have done. The Soviet Premier said at Baku on April 25 that if the Western powers did not sign a peace treaty with Germany, he would sign one with the Communist half of Germany

He then went on to say that if he did that "the terms stemming from the surrender will lose their force * * * consequently, the rights which the Western powers obtained as a result of the surrender of Hitler Germany, including the right for the further preservation of the occupation status in West Berlin, will also lose their force with regard to this territory. * * *"

The President was equally emphatic. He said: "We must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack. Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential."

Thus both sides are now under threat from the other. Washington, which has insisted that negotiations in the face of threats are impossible, is threatening to go on intruding into the Soviet Union, and Moscow, which arranged the summit by withdrawing the Berlin threat, is again threatening to kick us out of Berlin.

Accordingly, the essential meeting here is the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting before the summit, for until these two threats are withdrawn the whole basis of any agreement is in jeopardy, and it is not even certain that the negotiations on other points can begin.

A Possible Compromise

There is one possible and even reasonable way out of this dilemma. Negotiations for a system of international control and inspection of arms limitation and nuclear test suspension are in progress. So are negotiations for a settlement of the Berlin question.

Accordingly, both Khrushchev and Eisenhower could ease the present tension by agreeing that there should be no more threats of kicking the Allies out of Berlin while the German talks are in progress and no more unauthorized United States flights over the Soviet Union while the negotiations for a legal system of international arms inspection and control are going on.

In practical terms, it is highly unlikely that the United States can carry on additional flights over the Soviet Union anyway, for the Allies, who have to provide the bases for these flights, are opposed to them and are likely to remain so until the present tension is reduced.

Beyond this, such a compromise agreement might not mean much, but at least it would save two red faces, and permit the Allies to get down to the larger questions they were negotiating before all the foolishness of the last three weeks.

MAY 17 1960

Crisis at the Summit

Conflict Created by Khrushchev Appears At Variance With Some Basic Facts

By JAMES RESTON
Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, May 16—The general reaction in Paris tonight was that the situation was not as bad as it looked, for the simple, illogical reason that nothing could be quite that bad.

On the open record there was a crisis of impressive proportions. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union, had accused the President of the United States of "treachery." He had demanded that the Government of the United States apologize to the Soviet Union for having sent

planes over Soviet territory, promise never to do it again and punish the persons responsible. This appeared to be, in effect, a demand that President Eisenhower punish, or maybe even imprison, himself.

In short, Mr. Khrushchev brought up almost everything but the lynchings in the South and insisted that unless the President cried "uncle" the Soviet Union could not negotiate with such a country.

All this was news of boxcar headline proportions. But was there a difference between what was "news" and what were the actual facts? This was a principal question being asked in Paris tonight.

The reaction of a few experienced and detached diplomats who were not blown over by Mr. Khrushchev's storm was that there was an enormous difference.

In the first place, while it was "news" that Mr. Khrushchev had presented what President Eisenhower called an "ultimatum" that there be no more flights over the Soviet Union, the actual fact was that President Eisenhower had reassured Mr. Khrushchev that the sky-spy flights had been grounded and Mr. Khrushchev knew it.

U. S. Accused of Treachery

Second, while Mr. Khrushchev said that his country could not "be among the participants in negotiations where one of them [the United States] has made treachery the basis of his policy," his subordinates were running all over the Palais Chaillot tonight saying that of course the Soviet Union did not mean to break off negotiations in Geneva with those Americans who were engaged in the talks on disarmament and the suspension of nuclear testing.

Third, these Soviet officials were also saying that while President Eisenhower had really been very irresponsible in the spy plane case, and was not wanted as a visitor in Moscow, actually he was a pleasant man, who had merely come close to the end of his term and therefore had no authority to negotiate big issues.

There was general agreement among Westerners here that Mr. Khrushchev's performance was a masterpiece of bad judgment, bad manners and bad diplomacy.

In fact, few here thought this morning that it was possible for the Soviet Union to equal what were widely condemned as the blunders of the United States in the last two weeks. But the conclusion here tonight was that Mr. Khrushchev actually had topped them.

It was clearly felt that the Soviet leader did not come here to negotiate but to attack, not to remove difficulties with the United States but to exploit them, not to reach a reconciliation with President Eisenhower but to kick him when he was down.

This astonished Paris. Most observers started out this morning condemning President Eisenhower for the clumsiness of the whole U-2 reconnaissance plane incident and ended the day by sympathizing with him. Mr. Khrushchev's savage attack was responsible for this transformation. Instead of dividing the Allies, who were already divided despite their protestations to the contrary, Mr. Khrushchev united them.

Internal Pressure Seen

This leaves the interesting question of why Premier Khrushchev chose to perform today as he did. One persistent answer to this in the French capital tonight was that Mr. Khrushchev did not make the choice by himself but was under strong pressure from the Soviet hierarchy to use the U-2 case to further Moscow's policy in Berlin.

After Mr. Khrushchev threw out his thunderbolt at the Elysée Palace this morning, his assistants were at great pains to explain to reporters that this did not mean that the Soviet Union was now prepared to create a new and larger crisis by making a separate peace treaty with the Communist East German Government.

Despite these protestations, however, the judgment of qualified Western Diplomats at the conference is that this is precisely what the Soviet Premier was preparing to do.

According to this thesis, the Soviet Union—not Mr. Khrushchev, but the whole Communist apparatus—has come to the conclusion that it cannot have both a calm international atmosphere and Berlin, and that it has decided to destroy the former in order to promote its policy of capturing the latter.

So long as it appeared that President Eisenhower might be willing to make concessions to the Soviet Union on Berlin, he was a useful and even hopeful figure in Moscow.

Personal Diplomacy Accepted

So long, too, as the policy of personal diplomacy and international good-fellowship helped promote the possibility of an accommodation on Berlin, the Soviet hierarchy was willing to go along with it, even if it began to give the Soviet people some strange ideas about freedom and the good life.

But once it began to become apparent that President Eisenhower was coming to his last summit meeting without bearing down on Berlin, the mood in Moscow changed. So at least is the thesis of those diplomats who think this crisis is not about the American spy in the sky but about the American innervations of pie in the sky over Berlin.

Accordingly, there is a strong feeling in Paris tonight that the Soviet Union, having boomed the idea of friendship with President Eisenhower as a man of peace, having decided that he was not going to give them what they wanted, decided to use the U-2 case to move over to a harder policy directed at the conquest of Berlin.

This does not mean that the revelation that the U-2 case was not by the Soviet Union, and the four years were not by themselves a serious issue in the Soviet mind. These flights demonstrated that the Soviet defenses were not as invulnerable as had been believed, even by many observers in the West.

The case also demonstrated that President Eisenhower was talking with Mr. Khrushchev, and was also personally responsible for a planned system of aerial intrusion within Soviet borders.

No doubt this did surprise and disappoint the Soviet leadership. But the feeling here is that, more important, it provided just the incident that was needed to give the opponents of Mr. Khrushchev's policy the upper hand.

In conclusion, if it is true that the spy plane case is merely a prelude to an offensive on Berlin, then the day's events are not merely historic in themselves. They are, on that hypothesis, the preliminary to a new phase in the Soviet Union's foreign policy.



NEW YORK TIMES

MAY 19 1960

The Summit Tragedy

Breakdown of Parley Shakes World's Faith in Wisdom of Top Leaders

By JAMES RESTON

Special to the New York Times

PARIS, May 18—The tragedy of the Paris Conference, which ended tonight, is that it shook the confidence of the world in the wisdom and judgment of the two nations that hold the key to war and peace.

What troubled Paris tonight was not primarily what President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev would do now—which nobody knows—but the realization that the two most powerful nations in the world are also the least experienced of the great powers, both subject to the element of accident, to the ingrained habits of the past and to the whims of personal power and caprice.

This was the conference that everyone lost. It did nothing no one thought possible. It out-failed the Paris Conference of 1919. After forty years President Eisenhower, Premier Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan and President de Gaulle made Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando look good.

It was this sense of uncertainty about the giants of the world that dominated the atmosphere in Paris today. Here was Mr. Khrushchev this afternoon in the great hall of the Palais de Chaillot shouting at the West, paying deference to the glowering Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky on his left and threatening to smash American planes like an impudent cat against a wall.

Eisenhower Silent and Angry
Here, too, was the President of the United States, angry and silent, visiting cathedrals while his allies praised his dignity and sympathized with the failure of his last great chance for an East-West accommodation, but condemned in private his absent-minded behavior on the reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union.

Everyone was trying to be very considerate and hopeful about the mess, but all had to admit it was a mess, brought on by the unplanned blunders of Washington and the savage planned reaction of Moscow.

The general reaction to the two men was quite different. One was restrained, the other was violent; one was silent and defensive today, the other loud and offensive.

One was trying to remove misunderstandings, the other was exploiting them. But the main point was that both were shaking the world, one by accident and the other by design.

The nub of the whole thing seemed to be that both President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, for different reasons, had lost control over the direction of the immense power they are supposed to govern. The fact that the President came here and announced that he had grounded all flights over the Soviet Union for the rest of his term in office, is clear enough proof that, if he had been aware of the fact of these flights at this sensitive moment, he would not have approved the flight of the U-2 that was downed in Soviet territory on May 1.

Confidence in U. S. Shaken

The President has conceded this here in his private talks with Mr. Macmillan and General De Gaulle. They do not condemn his objective or his personal motives; in fact, he is so obviously disappointed by the melancholy turn of events since the sky-spy case that the British and French leaders are more sympathetic to him now than ever before.

Nevertheless, the lack of control and discipline over the Central Intelligence Agency by General Eisenhower, and the

failure of the State Department to retain civil dignity over the Administration's intelligence-gathering activities have inevitably shaken the confidence of the allies in the judgment of the nation that is their primary line of defense.

Mr. Khrushchev lost control, apparently for different reasons. General Eisenhower led his party out of isolationism, but Mr. Khrushchev has been engaged in the even more delicate operation of fraternizing with the "capitalist enemy."

By doing so, he was going against the militant Communist philosophy that nothing matters except the class struggle. Many of his own powerful associates in the Communist party's Central Committee apparently did not approve of the manner in which he was hobnobbing with the capitalists, and the Chinese Communists felt that this whole process of itinerant good fellowship was bound to create what they called "ideological confusion" within the Communist world.

So long as it appeared that Mr. Khrushchev might sweet-talk the Russians into West Berlin, his jaunts were tolerated. But when this dream began to fail, and particularly when it was discovered that President Eisenhower was responsible for sending the U-2's over Soviet territory, the other leaders of the Soviet Union, it is felt here, demanded a change—with or without Mr. Khrushchev's approval.

Western leaders who were present at the Monday meeting at the Elysee Palace with Mr. Khrushchev got the impression that the Premier was nervous and perhaps even a little unhappy in his about-face role. But by this afternoon, he was as hard as Vyacheslav M. Molotov and as vivid and vituperative as Andrei Y. Vishinsky.

The last time Mr. Khrushchev saw Paris he was the benign and jovial "Mr. K." He made a special point then with President de Gaulle that their conversations should be held without anyone present except the interpreters.

Joviality Is Put Aside

This week all was changed. The "jovial Mr. K." became the arm-waving "naughty Nik," and Marshal Malinovsky was there as a witness of his every word and move, even when Mr. Khrushchev said good-by to President de Gaulle.

None of this was missed by the press of the world or the diplomatic corps of Paris, and the inevitable reaction was not only that the giants were quarreling—which always terrifies the world—but that they were blundering in a most extraordinary way.

This was particularly true of Mr. Khrushchev after he got well into his new role. He overplayed every card he had. He was rude and primitive. He was not only a boor, but what is worse in Paris, he was a bore. And instead of splitting the Allies, he even drove the press of London and Paris to the President's support, which is not easy to do.

There are the things that have spread the feeling of uneasiness about the leadership of the great powers. The two men who started out to reduce tensions ended up by increasing them here in Paris, and the question now is how far the present "dukes-up" attitude will go.

About this, no one really knows, probably not even Mr. Khrushchev. For until he gets back to Moscow and reports to the Central Committee, there is no way of knowing what will happen to Berlin, or for that matter, what will happen to Mr. Khrushchev.

News Analysis

Paris

How to Turn Defeat Into 'Victory'

By JAMES RESTON

PARIS, May 19—The official line of the United States Government on the summit conference is almost as surprising as the conference itself. For the White House theme, put out nightly by James C. Hagerty and his aides at official briefings, is that United States officials won a victory here over Nikita Khrushchev and solidified the Western alliance.

Even when allowances are made for the difficulties of any United States spokesman at the summit, this is an extraordinary claim, and it is all the more astonishing and even disturbing because some of the American officials actually believe it.

They justify their conclusion very simply. They merely leave out the U-2 spy incident and the contradictory explanations which followed it in Washington. All that, they say, is old stuff, whereas what happened in Paris, rather than Sverdlovsk, was "pretty good."

On this sharply limited ground, there is something to be said for the argument. Nobody could have been worse than Khrushchev in Paris. It is not only that he was bad-mannered and inaccurate, but there were times in yesterday's press conference when he seemed almost out of control.

In the face of this obvious determination to try to humiliate and intimidate President Eisenhower, it is also true that President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan rallied to the President, and de Gaulle in particular handled a difficult situation with serenity and skill.

Catalogue of Defeat

There is another gain: Unlike the summit conference of 1955, which concealed the hard realities of the East-West struggle (again with the aid of Mr. Hagerty's press-agentry), this one at least dispelled the rose-colored fog of the last few years and exposed the unpleasant truth.

Nobody is against expressions of sympathy for the sad conclusion of the President's efforts at accommodation, but the truth is unpleasant and dangerous, and it is not going to be handled by adding jingoism to sloppy staff work and absent-minded administration in the White House.

This whole thing is not a "victory" for anybody. It is a serious defeat for Secretary of State Herter and his aides who did not alert the President to the dangers of these flights before the summit. It is a serious defeat for Allen Dulles and the Central Intelligence Agency for not coordinating the timing of the May 1 flight with the State Department's summit plans.

It is a serious defeat for the President and his whole system of delegating Presidential power to subordinates at critical moments in the history of the nation. It is a serious defeat for Prime Minister Macmillan, who defied 300 years of British diplomatic experience and pressed relentlessly for summit diplomacy. And it is a serious defeat for Khrushchev and his policy of coexistence.

There would be no point in going over this tiresome catalogue of gloomy facts if there was any evidence that the President was now prepared to put his official house in order, but there is no evidence of this. On the contrary, we are now told officially that the relationships between the White House and the C. I. A., the State Department and the C. I. A. remain the same.

Self-Pity, Self-Deception

The events of the last few weeks have not only exposed the weaknesses of the National Security Council system within the United States Government but dramatized the failure of the alliance members to plan together in their common interest.

There has seldom been better preparation for any conference since the war than for this summit. Literally hundreds of thousands of words were written and exchanged among officials in Washington, Paris and London. But the British and French knew nothing about the U-2 flight on May 1, and neither did the Turks, Pakistanis and Norwegians, who are now under threat of rocket retaliation from Moscow as a result.

Everybody in the top rungs of the United States delegation here agrees that the test of the alliance now lies ahead on Berlin. It is not going to be possible to coast and wait for the next Administration. The pressure is starting now at a time when the confidence of the alliance in Washington's judgment has been badly shaken.

This is inevitably going to call for better administration in the United States and better coordination within the alliance, and these things are not likely to occur in a mood of self-pity or self-deception.

TAB

Foreign Affairs

When Peace Is Peace by Any Other Name

By C. L. SULZBERGER

PARIS.

On the eve of the summit the sky is black with platitudes coming home to roost. One hears anxious talk that, unfortunately, the cold war is now likely to continue and cannot, as had been hoped, be replaced by peaceful coexistence.

This is fallacious thinking. Cold war and peaceful coexistence are precisely the same thing. Furthermore, they are equivalent to peace itself. During many decades it is improbable we shall know any other kind of peace. For peace, after all, is absence of war; and war means hot conflict, not cold.

Semantics confuse this issue, yet they cannot obscure reality. Trotsky once coined the phrase "neither war nor peace" and, thirty-five years ago, Stalin invented the term "peaceful coexistence." These are meaningless slogans. They serve to hide the truth that if there is no killing there is peace, whether formal or informal.

German strategists first defined war as a continuation of policy by other means and Soviet strategists first contemplated peace as a continuation of war by other means. Stalinist peaceful coexistence referred to a "period of respite" in the ideological struggle which, for all Communists, inevitably persists. Today, for evident reasons, it is preferred that the continuation shall be nonmilitary.

There are historical precedents. When Islam and Christianity waged an ideological contest there were long interludes without fighting. But neither the Vatican nor the Caliphate abandoned its determination to triumph ultimately for what each considered humanity's good.

Against this background we may view the sudden ups and downs of world opinion speculating on the summit. Until last week an aura of optimism seemed to think malevolent cold war could suddenly be stopped and replaced by beneficent coexistence. In fact, no matter how agreeable or disagreeable the summit is, peace itself will not be altered. Neither side can afford the risk of touching off active conflict.

Today's Unpleasant Peace

Nevertheless, neither will cease espionage, propaganda or economic competition for world favor. We will continue to develop mechanical devices to check on Soviet missiles, to fly radar planes (away from Russian territory, one imagines) and to

try to photograph sensitive points from satellites spinning through open skies. And the Russians will continue to assemble reports from their far-flung intelligence network and to send trawlers "fishing" near our nuclear submarines.

Espionage and counter-espionage are as much a recognized—if disavowed—form of power relationship as the politely accepted function of service attachés in any embassy. Nor can any code of coexistence conduct, such as that desired by Britain's optimistic Foreign Secretary, modify this unpleasant verity.

The only rule of the game is not to be caught as was the unfortunate Mr. Powers or, in 1957, Col. Rudolf Abel, the Soviet spy now in an American prison. Nations may endeavor to promote international relaxation by limiting such activities, but they won't stop them. They will merely become more discreet.

Desperate rivalry persists. Khrushchev pretended to Italy's President Gronchi that foreign Communist parties can't be influenced by Moscow. Furthermore, he refused to disclaim his ideological offensive because, according to Marxist conviction, it stemmed from an inherent class struggle existing independently of Moscow's control. The only cold war he wished to see called off was that engendered by the West.

Whether discord or concord results from the summit, substantially the same kind of uneasy peace will endure without essential change. Khrushchev argues peaceful coexistence is merely renunciation of force in settling controversies. But members of the United Nations have already been bound by that promise right through a decade and a half of crises.

We were embarrassed by the destruction of our aircraft where it had no legal business being and the Russians were embarrassed when Abel was exposed. But neither incident was a *casus belli*.

Undoubtedly both East and West must restrain flamboyant cold war impulses so that at least the atmosphere of détente can be presented. The balance of terror should encourage common sense. But the world division will inexorably persevere no matter how much good words are uttered. It is a reality founded by semantics.

TAB

MAY 9 1950

Admission to Sverdlovsk

By MARGUERITE HIGGINS

WASHINGTON.

THE State Department's admission Saturday night that an American plane "probably" had violated Russia's frontiers on purpose was greeted in this normally garrulous capital with the kind of embarrassed hush that was inverse testimony to the box in which we have been placed by Mr. Khrushchev and (how painful to admit) by ourselves.

With the usual prop of national self-righteousness vis-a-vis the Communists so conspicuously missing, what was a Congressman, or a Senator, or even an official member of the National Space Agency to say?

But in an expectedly speedy overnight recovery this town regained its vocal chords, and the next phase was at hand. Inevitably it involves a buzz of recriminations, buck-passing and calling on the carpet.

Administration sources insisted over the week end that the expected furor both here and abroad was fully taken into account by President Eisenhower in deciding in effect to admit publicly that the American plane shot down over Sverdlovsk at a point 1,300 miles inside Russia had been part of a plan although the plan had not personally been cleared with him.

To outcries that the mission ending so tragically at Sverdlovsk was the wrong plan at the wrong place and—above all—at the wrong time, the State Department was preparing to repeat in effect: "We made a mistake. We have no alternative but to keep a stiff upper lip, examine the consequences realistically and prepare to cope with them."

But was there an alternative to admitting even indirectly that the plane downed in Sverdlovsk was snooping? Is such an admission throwing the plane's pilot, Francis G. Powers, to the Russian wolves? Or had he already done this himself by telling all to the Russians?

• These are among the points of controversy about which the United States is going to hear a very great deal for a very long time. On this at least Washington is unanimous.

And as one British diplomat put it, "Your friends are going to ask a lot of questions and some of them—particularly the professionals in espionage—are going to ask why, even if your agent got caught, your government had to admit to it? Long before the United States came into being, the cardinal point of international espionage has been that an agent is dispensable. The fate of a nation is above the fate of an individual. And if you are going to act like amateurs, for God's sake get out of the espionage business. For when your country is approached, it speaks the voice of the entire West.



Higgins

Cynical? In the George Washington theory of history the admission "Yes, I did chop down the cherry tree" is a virtue in itself. The question before the world is whether the George Washington theory of history as applied to Sverdlovsk is valid for our times.

At a minimum, diplomats here see that the plane incident will put the United States at a serious psychological disadvantage in the summit confrontation with the Russians.

It's true that Khrushchev's own dramatic accusations have much in common with the pot calling the kettle black. But the Russians have the advantage that their espionage forays have not been so dramatically exposed.

As a matter of fact the United States, in its own naive way, has often helped Russia from hurting her reputation. For example, isn't it time that the secret stamp is taken off the incidents in which Soviet planes have been sighted over Alaska and friendly countries to the north?

There are problems raised also by the admission that the flight was unauthorized and that the President did not know of the plane's destruction. Thus Mr. Eisenhower has claimed that his official business is so pressing that he cannot remain more than seven days at the summit. And yet such was Mr. Eisenhower's disengagement from events that he did not even know of the presence of an American plane over Russian territory until Mr. Khrushchev announced it was shot down.

In Left-wing, neutralist and other circles, the incident is an opportunity to raise doubts about America's true willingness to relax tensions. Mr. Khrushchev knows perfectly well that Mr. Eisenhower didn't order that trip "to undermine the summit." But that won't keep him from repeating this thesis unrelentingly.

But perhaps the best key to Washington's mood after the admission about Sverdlovsk was the official who said, "Well, if the Russians could make the world forget about Hungary, we can

Suddenly— No Platitudes

By MARGUERITE HIGGINS

PARIS.

WHAT every one expected to be a tired old rerun of last year's diplomatic position papers, platitudes and propoganda suddenly bids fair to be spring's splashiest spectacular, complete with Russia's new four-and-a-half-ton "space ship."

For this summit held in the shadow of the giant wings of America's unlucky spy plane now offers the element of drama so rarely found in these communique-ridden diplomatic encounters—the element of the unexpected.

Even some of the main characters in the drama are in unfamiliar roles.

Soviet Premier Khrushchev, a man of many parts, has arrived here as, of all things, a defender of the right to know.

In refusing to accept any extended secrecy about the conference, except perhaps for the first few days and as it suits his purposes, Mr. Khrushchev has taken the position that the Soviet Union is proud of its international position and has nothing to hide. This is no doubt Mr. Khrushchev's way of saying that silence is not to be made the most of a situation in which the Russians think they have their opponents in a corner. Still, whatever the merits of open covenants secretly arrived at (as distinguished from open covenants openly arrived at) Mr. Khrushchev's sudden interest in telling all makes it a bit awkward.

For his part, President Eisenhower has arrived here almost inevitably faced with the unfamiliar duty of sounding moralistic on an intrinsically unmoral subject—spying.

In this matter, not only are there no position papers to serve as guide lines, but, look—suddenly no platitudes.

To add to the drama, each of the main protagonists is on record as saying things that would seem almost inevitably to point toward conflict except for the apparent tacit belief by both sides that the other doesn't really mean it.



Higgins

Thus President Eisenhower in his defense of the need to collect information about Russia "by all possible means" has at least left open the possibility of continuing high altitude reconnaissance flights over Russian territory. The Russians have countered by saying that any further aerial reconnaissance will bring atomic retaliation against the United States and against such allies as offer facilities for these reconnaissance planes.

But as seen from Paris the world is not on the brink of anything more than a few verbal fireworks.

For one thing, whatever may be said publicly it now appears totally unlikely that the United States would in fact continue to send planes into Russia under present circumstances. And why should the Russians risk war over the next violation of their frontier—if there should be one—when they have been so stolid about the reconnaissance flights that have been going on for the past four years?

What does go straight to the heart of a widely unrecognized Soviet dilemma.

In his now famous speech at the Czechoslovak Embassy, Khrushchev himself established the fact that an American plane reached Kiev in the Ukraine the day after Gen. Nathan Twining, of the Air Force, left Russia after his historic exchange visit. For some inexplicable reason Mr. Khrushchev also revealed that an American reconnaissance plane penetrated Russia on April 9 of this year and that the Soviet military was chastised because the aerial intruder escaped scot-free.

Nobody in the West has chosen to press the point, but there must be many Russians asking about the true state of their defenses in light of the fact that reconnaissance flights have been intermittently and successfully conducted over their territory. For despite Khrushchev's claims, the Russians have not been able to catch such planes when they were at high altitudes.

Mr. Khrushchev's recent rocket-rattling was almost certainly connected with a desire to divert attention from the evidence of vulnerability implicit in the ability of reconnaissance planes to penetrate Soviet air space almost at will.

But can Khrushchev hide from himself the implications of this vulnerability? And will his own knowledge of this vulnerability help to restrain him from drastic actions in such crucial areas as Berlin? Can a face-saving formula be found whereby the United States will not confront Mr. Khrushchev with the humiliation of repeated exposures of his weakness through continued penetrations of Soviet air space?

These are among the key questions of a summit held in the shadow of the incident at Sverdlovsk.

World Hails Patience of Eisenhower

Most Reaction Turns Against Khrushchev

By Marguerite Higgins

From the Herald Tribune Bureau

PARIS, May 17.—President Eisenhower has weathered in the summit crisis here the heaviest barrage of insults ever hurled at an American chief executive. But his determined patience was rewarded today by seeing most world reaction turn angrily against Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev for the debacle.

Inwardly, the president's reaction to Mr. Khrushchev's impossible demands for apologies in the spy-plane incident and the Russian's on-again, off-again attitude toward the summit could be summed up, aides said, by one word: "Disgust."

But, these aides add, the President decided from the moment the crisis became evident on Sunday to avoid at all cost being provoked by Mr. Khrushchev's snubs. For he believed that the Soviet leader's cavalier, often contemptuous attitude toward the summit would provide the propaganda rope with which Mr. Khrushchev would, eventually, hang himself.

President's Idea

This belief, aides said, is one reason the President suggested that a timetable be given out showing how the Western leaders were kept waiting in uncertainty while Mr. Khrushchev ate a late lunch at the Soviet Embassy.

The Russian leader interrupted his lunch for a series of phone calls to the palace, in which, among other things, he declined to give written answer to the invitation to participate in the meeting. When the Russian answer finally was delivered—it amounted to "NO"—the Western leaders had already adjourned.

By tonight the rise or resentment against Mr. Khrushchev for his high handed tactics on a meeting on which Europe had set many hopes was already running high.

One notable result was that the wave of denunciations against Washington's "bungling" of the spy plane incident was being overtaken by indignation at the Soviet leader for having brought the Allies all the way to Paris only to stage his spectacular sabotage of the summit.

Show the World

A main reason that the President and the British and French leaders went through the motions of asking Mr. Khrushchev once again to attend the summit meeting this afternoon was, officials said, to dramatize to the world their conviction that he had no intention whatsoever of being reasonable or reaching a compromise.

The two points of Mr. Khrushchev's demands that Mr. Eisenhower refused to meet were the insistence on a public apology for the intrusion of the downed American spy plane into Soviet air space and his call for punishment of those responsible.

This last, officials pointed out, amounted in effect to the absurd request that Mr. Eisenhower punish himself. Since the President has publicly assumed responsibility for the espionage policies involved in aerial reconnaissance over Russia, how could he punish others and exempt himself?

During the day the President was widely praised for the important concession that he did make—an announcement that no more spy planes would be sent over the Soviet Union. The Allied press and radio were generally of the opinion that the concession was a necessary one and one that should have sufficed to bring Mr. Khrushchev back to the conference table.

Despite the difficult day, President Eisenhower still had a smile for the waiting crowds this evening when he reached the Elysee Palace for a final conference with Mr. Macmillan and Gen. de Gaulle on what the West should do next.

TAB

PLANE INCIDENT SHOWS RUSSIANS ARE VULNERABLE

**Its Lack of Security
Is Bared by Flight,
Apart From Charges
by Khrushchev.**

By **BRIG. GEN. THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, USA (Ret.)**
Military Analyst of the
Post-Dispatch.

WASHINGTON, May 7—If the report made by Soviet Premier Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet detailing an alleged confession by United States pilot Francis G. Powers is true, circumstantially, it appears to be the American people should be reassured about our ability to obtain information inside the Soviet Union.

All the incredible security measures in the great police state, vosting billions of rubles annually, will have been insufficient to deny information of open type, such as location of airfields, industrial and missile sites, that can be seen and exactly located in any of the Western countries without interference or charges of espionage.

Unlikely Pilot Bungled.

According to Khrushchev, Powers failed in failing to destroy the apparatus in the plane. This could be accounted for by the confusion that ensued after the plane was fired upon at 63,000 feet altitude.

The circumstantial evidence produced by Khrushchev will convince many Americans and all foreigners, friendly and unfriendly, that this flight was a photographic intelligence mission. Our friends will be pleased that such missions have been possible and that we have not been blinded by Soviet security.

It will make no change in the attitude of the unfriendly.

The route of the flight, as reported by Khrushchev, would take the pilot from Pakistan, possibly over the test—and perhaps operational—missile-launching sites in the vicinity of the Aral Sea, over the industrial cities of the Ural mountains, beyond Sverdlovsk, where he was alleged to have been shot down, thence across northern Russia, over Archangel and Murmansk, to Norway.

Khrushchev reported that another flight had been detected from the area of Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan, April 9. If such

flight was made, this pilot evidently did not pass over areas where Soviet air defense missiles were available to attack him. Khrushchev stated that they let it pass. This is as absurd as the United States explanations of the weather purpose of Powers' flight were.

The U-2 flown by Powers flies too high to be intercepted by Soviet aircraft. It could be detected and shot down easily by air defense rockets (anti-aircraft guided missiles) such as the United States's Nike-Hercules, but it would have to pass within range. Naturally, a flight would be programmed to pass over areas where such missiles were

known to be in readiness.

The Nike-Hercules has shot down 2000-mile-an-hour drones at altitudes of almost 100,000 feet. The range of the Nike-Hercules is from 75 to 85 miles, a limitation imposed by the effective range of the guidance radar and not by the missile itself.

The Nike family of missiles, starting with the Nike-Ajax and now going into the third generation Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile, was the outgrowth of the German Wasserfall anti-aircraft guided rockets developed at Peenemunde, Germany, by the Bornberger-Von Braun team. Both Dornberger and Von Braun chose to come to the United States.

Overrun by Russians.

The experimental areas and manufacturing facilities were overrun by the Russians and they were able to collect a great deal of material ready to assemble and test. While the top-flight scientists and technicians mostly came to the United States with Von Braun, many of the lesser technicians and engineers were taken by the Russians and put to work at once to continue the German missile programs for the Soviet Union.

The scientific and intelligence consensus is that the development of air defense guided rockets in the United States has been much superior so far, to the Soviet Union. Both had operational air defense guided rockets at about the same time in 1953, but the Nike-Ajax is considered superior to the Soviet T-7, which has about the same range.

Both are guided by radar toward the target plane. The Nike-Ajax is exploded by radio command. This system was adopted to be sure that a homing device would not home on friendly aircraft. The Soviet T-7 uses an infrared homing device that is highly accurate once it is locked on the target.

The German Wasserfall and a shorter

range guided air defense rocket, a further development of the German Rheintochter, were emplaced around Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad and the atomic weapons development center at Ulan-Ude in 1953.

Soviet development of large air defense guided rockets has continued, but its next generation is believed to be considerably less effective than the Nike-Hercules, both as to guidance and range, the range being generally estimated as about 50 miles.

But development has not ended. There are reports of Soviet air defense guided rockets with a range of 100 miles that use infrared tracking and guidance systems, as well as infrared homing. Infrared has advantages of some importance over radar, but the rays are absorbed by moisture in clouds and rain. The Russians have made a major advance if they have overcome this.

The frequent references to anti-aircraft artillery in Soviet military literature in recent years, when it has been wholly replaced by guided air defense rockets in the United States, indicate that the manufacture of air defense rockets has lagged considerably in the Soviet Union.

It is known, nevertheless, that one of the most urgent military programs in the Soviet Union has been that of air defense. A system of ground control, similar to the United States SAGE system, but simpler, is being expanded to cover most of the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Union lacks the great wire systems of communications that serve the United States, point-to-point radio is used.

ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH

U-2 Type Spying Going on for Years; Russians Fly Over Alaska, Canada

By BRIG. GEN. THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, U.S.A. (Ret.)
Military Analyst of the Post-Dispatch.

WASHINGTON, May 9—The worst crime in espionage is to get caught and the next worse crime is to admit anything. The United States stands guilty in both respects.

The U-2 plane shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft rockets at an altitude said by Soviet Premier Khrushchev to have been 20,000 meters, or about 65,000 feet, was capable of much higher flight and was built to cruise at 90,000 feet or higher.

If it was hit at 65,000 feet, it is probable that the pilot was having trouble with oxygen and pressure and was forced to fly lower. At the altitude at which the plane was designed to fly, the flight could have been detected with the latest type of radar, but so far as is known, the Russians had nothing to knock it down at that height.

The plane was provided with destruction mechanisms that were automatically actuated after the pilot had ejected the pilot capsule. This would destroy the cameras, recording and detection instruments in the plane and leave no positive evidence of the purpose of the mission.

The plane could be destroyed also by the pilot if he pressed a button that would destroy him as well. There is much criticism of the pilot in inner circles for his failure to destroy the plane. This is premature, since no information is available about his condition after the plane was hit. He may have experienced a sudden loss of oxygen and consciousness and only recovered in time to bail out at low altitude.

The admission by the United States in a statement approved by the President that our aircraft engaged in intelligence flights over the Soviet Union is a shock to the intelligence community. No responsibility for such activities should ever be admitted, according to their code. The first story should have been maintained, although it was needlessly repeated, regardless of the circumstantial evidence in the hands of the

Russians. These flight have been going on for years and have been so uniformly successful and undisturbed that in some areas they are termed "milk runs."

Unquestionably the timing on May 1, the Soviet Union's greatest holiday, was in the hope that there would be less alertness on the part of the air defense radar systems. It probably never occurred to those responsible for the flights that there was even a remote possibility of trouble that would influence the summit conference.

The United States is not alone in flying over other countries for intelligence purposes. The Russians fly over northern Alaska and Canada, taking photographs of the Distant Early Warning line. So far north there are no fensive missiles or aircraft, so it has never been possible to bring down the planes, whose vapor trails are seen and which are tracked by radar.

So far as is known, Soviet flights have not been extended to the continental United States nor to southern Canada. Nor is it necessary that they should do so. Soviet agents in a car can learn everything about our defense installations without difficulty.

The British have also flown regularly over the Soviet Union, an activity they call "spoofing." Spoofing is intended to locate the opponent's defenses by bringing them into action. The aircraft have radar detection instruments that let them know that enemy radar is on them.

Several years ago two university students in England published in a university magazine a detailed account of British spoofing activities. It caused a great furore and the men were haled into court.

The details given by Khrushchev show how much information the United States has been getting from such flights. He said that besides the photographic equipment, which he said was excellent but, of course, not as good as the Soviets', the plane carried "reconnaissance equipment for spotting radar networks, identifying the location and frequencies of operating radio stations and other special radio engineering equipment."

There is also a tape recording of the signals of a number of

our ground radar stations," he said. This sort of information would enable our defense forces to locate exactly the air defense net work of the Soviet Union. The photographs permit determining exactly where Soviet air fields and other defense installations, such as missile sites, are.

All this information, which is open in the United States, is concealed at great cost in the Soviet Union. About 40 per cent of its area is closed to foreigners. In some parts, great areas are closed to Soviet citizens who do not have special permits to enter.

Since these activities have now been admitted by the United States, it can be said that the Iron Curtain has been penetrated and far more is known of Soviet secrets than is realized by anyone outside an inner circle in intelligence and a limited circle of high officials.

The Russians have known of these activities for years, but have not previously been able to interfere with them. It is unlikely they did not know the extent and effectiveness of the equipment used, however.

There have been four U-2 airplanes, the type brought down May 1, stationed in Turkey and Three in Japan. Another is in California. They have been in operation between four and five years. They were especially designed and built for high altitude reconnaissance flights. Before they became available, other aircraft especially rebuilt for flying at high altitudes were used. The older aircraft did not however, have the altitude capability of the U-2.

Expressions of indignation by citizens and congressmen over the fact that the United States was engaged in intelligence activities over the Soviet Union are considered in intelligence circles to show a lack of understanding of the problems of the cold war.

The information obtained can mean the difference between national survival and extinction. It can mean, they say, the saving of tens of millions of lives in case of war. Against an opponent as skilled in espionage, and one that practices it on a worldwide scale, failure to use methods open to us to gain information is a grave error of opinion.

MAY 10 1960

Apparently Confusion, Panic In Washington Over Plane Led To Series of Contradictions

Yet It Is Contended That No Admission Was Needed, for Khrushchev's Evi- dence of Spy Flight Could Have Been Faked—Damage to Our Allies.

By BRIG. GEN.
THOMAS PHILLIPS, U.S.A.
(RETI.)
Military Analyst of the
Post-Dispatch.

WASHINGTON, May 10—The most humiliating aspect of the loss of the U-2 reconnaissance airplane near Sverdlovsk May 1 was the way the United States walked into Soviet Premier Khrushchev's mouse-trap.

In an address to the Supreme Soviet May 5, Khrushchev said: "It has been established that this plane that crossed the state frontier of the Soviet Union was coming either from Turkey, Iran or Pakistan."

The United States swallowed the bait. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration released the same day a circumstantial statement detailing how a weather research aircraft had been missing since 9 a.m. Sunday, May 1, "when the pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over the Lake Van, Turkey, area."

Flight Course Reported.

The alleged flight course was given as the triangle: Lake Van-Trabzon-Antalya. A description was given of the aircraft, how it obtained information of clear-air turbulence, convective clouds and wind shear and that it could fly for four hours at 55,000 feet altitude.

The following day the State Department announced that the American Ambassador in Moscow had delivered a note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry stating: "As already announced on May 3, the United States National Aeronautics and Space Agency has been advised that an unarmed weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, and piloted by a civilian American has been missing since May 1."

This was what Khrushchev was waiting for. The next day he again addressed the supreme soviet. "Comrades, I must tell you a secret," he said. "When I was making my report I deliberately did not say that the pilot was alive and in good health and that we have got parts of the plane. I did not deliberately because I told everything at once, the Ameri-

cans would have invented another version."

He then detailed the pilot's career, his pay of \$2500 a month, the equipment he carried, the plane's photographic and electronic equipment, and he showed photographs developed from the film taken from the plane.

'No Authorization.'

The State Department then issued a further statement: "As previously announced; it was known that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President, it has been established that, insofar as the authorities are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flights as described by Mr. Khrushchev."

"Nevertheless," the statement continued, "it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane."

This did not satisfy the clamor at home. Why was the flight denied in the first place and then admitted? Why was it undertaken at such a critical time before the summit conference? How could such a flight be undertaken without authorization of the authorities concerned?

Admitted Now.

Late yesterday, after a briefing of selected members of Congress, a further statement was made by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter. It was now admitted that the flight had been authorized. "The President has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense," the statement says.

"Programs," the statement continues, "have been developed and put into operation which have included surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, nor-

goes on, "have not been subject to presidential authorization."

At about the same time that Herter's statement was issued, Khrushchev was in his vodka-toasting glory at a Czechoslovak embassy reception in Moscow. "It is said that this was the work of the military," he told the guests. "What kind of a state is this if the military can do what the government opposes? How can the government tolerate this?"

And then he advised us to "pluck up your courage and say, yes, there was such a disgraceful fact. And this is a big disgrace for America since everyone sees now how disgraced in the eyes of the whole world are those who committed such a shocking act of aggression."

The latest Herter statement took Khrushchev's advice by-

it was given. There was a admission that intelligence flight had been under way during the Eisenhower Administration. The necessity for them was declared and no apology for them was given. It was implied that they would be continued.

"The United States has no and does not shift this responsibility" for the defense of the free world, Herter said.

How did the United States put itself involved in such contradiction—first it was a weather flight in Turkey and next the plane may have gone astray on its automatic pilot; then the flight was without authorization and next it was authorized generally, but not specifically, by the President?

Confusion and Panic.

It appears that there was confusion and panic in Washington. An officer who was in the Middle East at the time of Khrushchev's first announcement told the Post-Dispatch that officials there gave him the same story that was put out in apparent good faith by the NASA.

This was an amateurish cover story. It failed to take account of the possibility that the U-2 had been forced down inside the Soviet Union when it was reported missing from its destination in Norway. Possibly it was thought that the pilot had blown up his plane and himself as he was expected to do.

This was obviously the cover story to account for the presence of these airplanes in the area and perhaps the local officials could not think of anything better. The opinion of the intelligence community was shown to be a little and stuck to it.

Have Been Faked.

The circumstantial evidence all have been faked. Indeed, the picture of the alleged wreck-

age of the U-2 has been developed by the designer of the U-2, G. L. Johnson of Lockheed Aircraft Corp., to be spurious. He gives excellent technical reasons for this judgment.

The same doubts apply to all the cloak-and-dagger equipment and the various deficiencies alleged to have been carried by the pilot. The photographs shown by Khrushchev could have been photographs made by Soviet aircraft. No admissions need have been made.

Our admission is little short of disastrous to many of our allies. Khrushchev threatened the ambassadors of Norway and Pakistan at the Czechoslovak party that if the United States is allowed to continue the use of bases in their countries "we will have to aim our rockets at your bases."

"We shall strike at those bases," he added, "because we regard these acts as a provocation against our country."

The Soviet minister of defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, declared: "In such cases we have the right to take any measures against bases and airfields and can deal them such a blow that nothing will be left of them."

Empty Boasts.

These are empty boasts because a strike at the bases of our allies would be responded to by a full-scale strike against the Soviet Union. Indeed, the warning would enable the United States to make the first pre-emptive strike. The Soviet threat will never be carried out.

But Norway, Pakistan and Turkey have common frontiers with the Soviet Union. They are subject to other pressures than the fear of annihilation of their bases. In every country there are political elements against the alliance with the United States. Friendly governments may be overturned.

It is strange that although everyone may be nearly certain

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of the facts of American intelligence operations, so long as they are not admitted, so long as they are denied with every appearance of truth, and so long as there is no positive handle for the dissident party to grasp.

Norway is the weakest of the three in the West. The friendly government can be overthrown and Norway can leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In the Far East three U-2 airplanes are based in Japan. The reason is the same as for those in Turkey — to gain intelligence of the Soviet Union. There is a struggle now over ratification of the new treaty between Japan and the United States. The Kishi government can be turned out and the treaty lost because we have admitted the purpose of these airplanes.

Criticism of CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency is being criticized over the U-2 operations. The probing and penetrating flights were obviously CIA operations using the NASA weather research as a cover.

It is alleged that the CIA does these things in its own authority. Nothing could be more wrong. The CIA undertakes no operations of any sort without the approval of the National Security Council and the President.

Because of the character of its operations, the CIA can neither boast of its success nor explain its failures. The fumbling in Washington over the loss of the U-2 is the worst trouble it has encountered.

The Hoover Commission in 1955 criticized the CIA for "lack of intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain."

The CIA was called upon in the report for "greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated and diplomatic risks" to get "the information we need, particularly for the armed forces, (which) is potentially available."

The CIA has been getting it

masses of it. Its planes flying from 17 to 19 miles have photographed Soviet airfields and industrial establishments and, possibly, many Soviet I.C.B.M. sites. We know where they are, if they should ever become targets.

Radar Information.

The same aircraft, working along the frontiers and in deep penetrations, have spotted radar sites and radar frequencies. The later information will enable our bombers in the unlikely event of war to blanket the Soviet radar with counter electronic measures and thus to blind their air defenses.

The operations over many years have substantially provided a pattern of Soviet air defenses as well as the location of most of the important targets, in time of war, in the Soviet Union.

The CIA has penetrated the Iron Curtain in this way and in many other ways. It cannot publish what it has done, but those who know its operations consider it to be the best intelligence operation in the world, except in the field of espionage. In this field the Soviet Union, with its world-wide chain of Communist parties and fanatical followers, is supreme.

Khrushchev is getting the maximum mileage out of the accidental capture of an American intelligence airplane. His defenses could not have touched it if it had not had trouble and been forced to lose altitude. The intelligence community believes that the less assistance he gets by blowing the matter up in public and in Congress in the United States, the less harm he can do to the free world.

TAB

The Wonderful News

By Joseph Alsop

WASHINGTON.

TH**ERE** is also wonderful news in the bad news of the American plane that was shot down in the Soviet Union.

To begin with, the American government's national intelligence estimates of the Soviet military posture now have an entirely new look. For many years after the war, the estimates consistently erred on the optimistic side. The current estimates, of such crucial matters as the number of operational Soviet intercontinental missiles, had a strongly optimistic smell. Those who remembered the past errors, like this reporter, were bound to suspect present errors.



Joseph Alsop

But the fate of the U-2 that fell near Sverdlovsk has broken a great corrective secret. Over four years ago, the Central Intelligence Agency organized systematic over-flights of the Soviet land mass. With a bold realism that any sensible American must admire, the C. I. A. thus began to secure infinitely more reliable data for the national estimates. The main cause of the errors of the past was thus eliminated.

This does not mean, to be sure, that there is no room at all for error in the estimates. Careful concealment may sometimes succeed, even against all the resources of modern aerial photography. In sub-Arctic Russia, too, the cloud cover is so heavy and permanent that aerial photography is virtually impossible, except with the far less accurate radar cameras. But it can now be rather safely assumed, all the same, that Nikita S. Khrushchev will not go to the summit with a heavy but hidden advantage in long-range rockets or other weapons.

The nightmare of the summit has always been that Khrushchev might possess such a hidden advantage. If this had been the case, President Eisenhower would have found himself playing a life-and-death game with a hand of deuces against a hand of aces suddenly pulled from Khrushchev's sleeve. Unless all the brave men who went before Lt. Francis G. Powers have altogether failed, this nightmare need not trouble the sleep of the West any longer.

That is by no means the end of the wonderful news, either. The fate of the U-2 also quite clearly implies that the power cards the President still holds—the jet bombers of the Strategic Air Command—are still much better cards than the previously known facts appeared to suggest.

One among these facts was the enormous proportion of the enormous Soviet military budget, reaching as much as 20 per cent of the total, that has been regularly invested in air defense in all the years since the war. In view of this gigantic Soviet expenditure on air defense, many experts suspected that SAC's B-52s were losing their capability of penetrating their targets.

But it is now clear that the Soviets cannot feel any real confidence in their air defense against SAC's bombers. The U-2, it must be remembered, was first produced by Lockheed in 1955. The plane, which is essentially a giant glider powered with a single jet engine, has been used for over-flights of the Soviet land mass for over four years. These U-2 flights through the upper air have quite certainly been observed on Soviet radar screens. Until Lt. Powers' unlucky mission, no U-2 was ever brought down.

Regular over-flights, carried on for years with perfect impunity, imply a Soviet air defense system that is very weak indeed at high altitudes. The simple fact that Lt. Powers' U-2 safely got as far as Sverdlovsk, in the very heart of the Soviet land mass, also implies a Soviet air defense system that is still full of exceedingly large holes. The system may be in the process of improvement, with high-altitude rockets of the type of the American Nike; but the improvement cannot have got far to date.

There are certain inconsistencies, too, in the technical details of the Soviet story of the fate of Lt. Powers' U-2. The way the plane is alleged to have been shot down at 65,000 feet is particularly fishy. It appears much more probable that the U-2's single engine failed, forcing Lt. Powers into a gliding descent. This would mean that the U-2 was hit, not at 65,000 feet but at a very much lower altitude. And if this is true, in turn, the Soviet air defense system is not merely imperfect; it is almost useless against SAC's B-52s.

In any case the fate of the U-2 proves to the world that the balance of terror still holds. It has been shockingly neglected by the present administration. It is beginning to tilt as Soviet rocket power grows. But for the present, the balance holds. The nature of the proof and the timing of the proof are both regrettable. But the proof itself is deeply reassuring.

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Matter of Fact By Joseph Alsop

Lightning Demonology

PARIS—The specialists in the demonology of the Kremlin will no doubt be arguing for another three years about Nikita S. Khrushchev's motives for blowing up the summit conference which he had sought so hard and long. But in all the demonological analyses, one point already receives major emphasis.



Alsop

Something very important has happened to change Khrushchev's views about the summit, between his preliminary explosion at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet on May 5 and his final explosion at the opening of the summit conference here. The chronology clearly proves that a radical change of approach occurred. The dates, so to say, speak for themselves as follows:

On May 1, the U-2 that is the alleged sole cause of the final explosion came down near Sverdlovsk.

On May 3, forty-eight hours after the fall of the U-2, critically important concessions were offered to the Western negotiators at Geneva by Semyon Tsarapkin, the Soviet representative at the conference dealing with a ban on nuclear tests.

On May 3 or 4, the chief of the Soviet Air Force, Marshal Konstantin Vershinin, also confirmed his intention to visit the United States.

On May 5, Khrushchev made his first revelation of the fall of the U-2. In this speech, he carefully inserted what amounted to a series of escape clauses for the American Government. These took the form of statements that the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow was undoubtedly a "clean" man; that there was no question of President Eisenhower's sincere devotion to peace; that one must conclude the President did

not know about the U-2 overflight, and so on.

On May 6, Marshal Vershinin, still all smiles, asked the American air attache to come with him to the U. S.

THIS chronology makes it almost certain that at least for the first several days after the U-2's fall, Khrushchev still intended to begin again very nearly where he had left off in his previous meetings with the Western leaders. Vershinin's behavior; the important move made by Tsarapkin; the escape clauses offered to Eisenhower by Khrushchev himself—all constitute very strong evidence. This evidence, pointing to a continuing intention to negotiate at the summit, first of all casts doubt on the theory that Khrushchev had already changed his mind about a summit meeting's usefulness at all.

The speech on Berlin by Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon and all the other indications that the West was not in a "giving" mood dated from long before May 5. They undoubtedly provoked Khrushchev's threatening speech at Baku. That speech said Khrushchev would talk tough at the summit. But he certainly continued to want to talk.

TURNING again to the post-May 5 chronology, the most conspicuous developments of this period were the series of statements in Washington which knocked all of Khrushchev's offered escape clauses into the next county. In particular, the President briskly claimed both knowledge of and full responsibility for the U-2 overflight. And it was even officially intimated that overflights were a good thing which ought to be continued.

In sum, Washington followed the rules long ago laid down by the President's press secretary, James Hagerty, that the useful reply, "No comment," is no longer permissible, and the President can never be portrayed

as ignorant of any doings in the Government. It seems pretty clear that Washington's rigid adherence to the Hagerty rules, laid down for domestic political reasons, in turn put Khrushchev in a domestic political situation requiring an explosion that has now occurred.

It is obviously wrong to think about Khrushchev's domestic political situation in terms of an "opposition" and an "administration party." But every government in the world is divided into the orthodox and the imaginative, the cautious and the bold, the conservative and the experimental groups. Pretty plainly, the orthodox, cautious, and conservative men in the Kremlin, no doubt with the somewhat discontented army chiefs in the lead, were sharply insisting that an issue must be made of the U-2 overflight, as soon as proof of the overflight was in the Kremlin's hands.

The issue was made, but with escape clauses. One can imagine the clamor, the "we told you so's," the parade of indignation of this orthodox group when Washington dealt as it did deal with all the escape clauses which Khrushchev had offered. Quite possibly, Khrushchev himself felt unable to defy the Kremlin consensus. More probably, he did not wish to do so.

THE Baku speech had clearly indicated that there would be hot arguments at the summit. The new Kremlin consensus called for no summit at all. The new decision of the Presidium was telegraphed ahead, though few understood the message, by Marshal Vershinin's sudden abandonment of his American visit. And Khrushchev came to Paris with a prepared brief drafted with the specific purpose of blowing the summit conference higher than a kite before it began.

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TAB

WILLIAM S. WHITE

Putting Spy Case in Perspective

Exaggerators Urged to Quit Buying Khrushchev's Melodramatic Rubbish

The people who ought to be on the side of the United States are doing more than its enemies to destroy its influence as the irreplaceable leader of the free world.

Of course, the Eisenhower administration itself is partly to blame, but only partly. Hysterical exaggerations of its sins, both here and abroad, are far more to blame.

The incident of the American "spy plane" over Russia is being inflated to manifest absurdity.

One might think this Government had committed the most sordid crime of the century. The truth, of course, is that a government responsible for the safety of its own people (and of millions of other peoples) has a plain duty to run reconnaissance over a vast, hulking and secret power like the Soviet Union.

The truth, of course, also is that our first explanation for this particular plane was clumsy nonsense. But another truth is that our Government has now surely made enough public confessions to satisfy the most petulant here and among the Allies. What more do these people want our Government to do? Must it wallow in the very streets in self-abasement? Must it publicly promise Nikita Khrushchev that the United States will go to the summit as a humble penitent so as not to annoy Mr. Khrushchev or those who want a settlement at almost any price?

There is great need to see this episode in some perspec-

tive. Yes, it was a bad business. But has a Communist dictatorship that has looted and murdered across half of Europe now become a spotless victim of a dreadful scourge to peace, the United States of America? Is the downed aircraft the equivalent of the bloody Russian suppression of Hungary? Is it possible that the home of the most massive and malignant espionage system in all history, the Soviet Union, can put our small efforts into such vast discredit?

True, one unarmed aircraft was shot down in Soviet airspace without the personal command of the President of the United States. The President did not personally pack the pilot's lunch, either. But does this really suggest that some reckless band of militarists has taken over the foreign policy of the United States?

Is there anational content whatever in the argument that because this could happen it follows that some intelligence agent set off a nuclear war? Do the people who make such suggestions know the immense pressures that would make any such thing really and physically impossible? If a gun shop sells a rifle without proper safeguards, does this prove that anybody can walk in off the street and buy a loaded atomic cannon?

Why don't we—and our friends abroad—quit buying the melodramatic rubbish the Russians are putting

don't we quit reading automatic breast-beaters? And if the United States Government had not undertaken the intelligence activities it has undertaken—and will go on undertaking—would we not now be denouncing that same government for being asleep against the possibility of another Pearl Harbor?

Significantly, the official opposition to the Eisenhower administration, the leaders of the Democratic Party, are acting responsibly and speaking softly. Those now raising the shrillest clamor about this dreadful, dreadful administration are those who only weeks ago were intoning hymns to the wonderful, wonderful cold war policy of that same administration.

The responsible Allied statesmen have a plain duty—and powerful men here who are their good friends are going privately to remind them of it. They ought to speak out for a Nation which has, after all, poured out billions in their defense. An alliance has a leader who is supported when things are rough—or an alliance has no leader at all.

Kennan Urges Limited Scope For Summits

George F. Kennan, former State Department official and onetime Ambassador to Russia, said today the United States, "should look very carefully" before submitting the prestige of the President to another summit meeting.

Mr. Kennan now at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton, N. J., emphasized the dangers in personal, as against formal, diplomacy in the setting of a State Department machinery for setting national policy.

He appeared in an open session and was scheduled to testify later in a closed meeting to discuss the work of the National Security Council, the U-2 spy plane and the lead to the breakup of the Paris summit conference.

Discusses Summit

Mr. Kennan was asked by Chairman Jackson, Democrat of Washington, to discuss diplomacy and summit meetings after he urged some streamlining of State Department organization.

The diplomat cited a speech he made here last fall in which he warned that "much damage might be done by summit meetings which failed to take place or to take place and not lead to agreements. He noted that he had said at that time that such meetings lead to "very limited and unstable relaxation of tensions" which could very easily change to something worse.

Asked by Senator Jackson if this situation applied to the recent summit meeting, Mr. Kennan replied that it did.

Limited Scope Seen

He testified that summit meetings should occur only at the very end of negotiations for the purpose of signing agreements already reached.

He also said the coordination of intelligence work with the State Department was of the highest importance. He said he suspected that the people charged with gathering intelligence were not informed on the way for foreign policy. He said "organizational deficiencies" and "cumbersomeness of our governmental machinery" have been important factors in "hampering our performance as a world power."

He deplored what he called the "contagion of business" in the Government and a growing tendency to use advisory committees in seeking policy decisions. The committee system produces "endless compromises" and weak decisions, he said.

Mr. Kennan proposed that one cabinet officer be designated as the President's "principal executive agent for all matters affecting the national security, and indeed, our relations with the outside world generally."

"This would include military as well as other matters," he added.

Of the several ways in which this might be done, Mr. Kennan said the most desirable seems to be that "the office of Secretary of State should be recognized as enjoying a certain primacy in all matters of external relations, including the national security."

TAB

CONSTANTINE BROWN

Khrushchev's Twists and Turns

Insults, Wheedling, Tricks and Threats Used by Red Dictator Against West

Should Nikita Khrushchev ever be kicked out of his present exalted position (and allowed to live) he could qualify for a top job with any of the Madison Avenue advertising and public relations agencies. He is a genius at turning to his advantage the absurd and the ridiculous — and at the same time making an impression.

His skill was best demonstrated in the way he maneuvered the West into another summit conference and the manner in which he prepared its demise by spectacularly making it known to the world that he had personally ordered the shooting down of an American plane which "threatened" the security of Russia by "its provocative flight" over what he said was Soviet air space.

The plane involved apparently was an unarmed, high-flying craft on a scientific mission, and it was piloted by a civilian. But Khrushchev overlooked such details.

The barbaric action aroused Washington political leaders. But we have learned to be tolerant about such incidents which have cost us 12 planes and about 30 lives in the last 10 years. The suggestions made to President Eisenhower that under such blatant provocations there can be little purpose for him attending a summit meeting are unlikely to be heeded.

Official quarters take the stand that the free world is one unit, hence we could not assume the responsibility of acting unilaterally. Khrushchev was certain that the West would not do this in any event, and he was right. He has placed himself in such a favorable position that even if the Allies had taken a strong stand at his latest provocation he could tell the gullible world that we were the guilty party which refuses to consider a relaxation of tensions.

The Kremlin boss has a sufficiently large crowd of loud-mouthed sycophants in the free world to further muddy the international waters. The timid free world fears their shouts. Khrushchev does not want to involve the Soviet Union in a war with the United States. He fears the consequences. If there is any fighting to be done he wants to push his Chinese allies into the forefront. But he wants to take advantage of what he terms the "decadence" of the Western democracies to place himself and international communism in a commanding position. In order to achieve this, he had to compel the Big Three Western leaders to agree to another summit conference, spectacular and fruitless—except for the propaganda value to himself. He did this in November, 1958, when he issued an ultimatum to the Allies to quit Berlin. It caused a furor in the Western capitals. Washington and Paris, prodded by London, fell for the Khrushchev trick and accepted the meeting to "relax tension."

Khrushchev's first victory

was followed up by pressures on Washington for an exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and the Soviet boss. For this purpose Khrushchev varied his tactics. He carried the Red peace dove in his hand for a little while. When his mild and kind words did not succeed, especially after his sharp encounters last year with visiting Vice President Nixon, he resumed his blood and thunder tactics. This resulted in his obtaining an invitation to visit America and the promise of Mr. Eisenhower to return the call.

Other Western leaders — and particularly France's tough Gen. de Gaulle — felt compelled to invite the Red boss, too. Italy's president Gronchi was also enticed to go to Moscow, only to be insulted by his host. But the second phase of this skillful plan to establish the prestige of the butcher of Budapest in the free world succeeded.

The polite, stern reception he received from De Gaulle convinced Khrushchev that he won't have much chance to get the Big Three to knuckle under to his threats at the forthcoming meeting in Paris. As a last effort to intimidate the Western powers and also to prepare a successful exit from Paris this month, he took advantage of the flight of an innocent American civilian plane to shoot it down.

After having created and capitalized on this incident in a Madison Avenue spectacular manner, Khrushchev feels that regardless of what happens in Paris he will come out on top.

CONSTANTINE BROWN

Soviet Spies Active in U. S.

Russian Espionage in This Country During the War and Since Is Cited

The Soviet government and the Russian people are indignant; Western Europe (allies and neutrals) is dismayed and in Washington the administration is beating its breast chanting: "Mea culpa; mea maxima culpa."

All this because the Russians caught an American espionage agent and have had the skill to exploit for more than it is worth.

Premier Khrushchev says that we are trying to find out what he is doing in preparation for the unlikely possibility of an armed conflict with the United States. He is also more aware than President Eisenhower of the presence of Soviet agents in the United States. He knows that Russian spies in this country have been active for many years and did not curtail their activities during the war when the Soviet Union posed as an ally and could obtain military and economic information for the asking.

Our counter-intelligence and the FBI caught red-handed a number of Russian spies, including members of official missions, engaged in espionage. Yet in order not to upset relations with Moscow the State Department ordered the matters should receive no publicity. For instance, in 1944 one of the top men in the Soviet espionage system in this country, an individual who went by the name of J. Peters, was arrested after a long search when he was boarding a ship

on the West Coast to return to Russia by way of Siberia. Within hours the FBI was ordered by the State Department to release the man and allow him to continue his voyage. The explanation was that the individual's arrest and trial might interfere with the prosecution of the war and our good relations with the Kremlin.

Ever since the world began there has been spying. This fact is well known to the Russians and to the rest of the world which appears so incensed over the most recent blundering of our civilian intelligence agency.

There is indignation in congressional circles over the fact that we were caught and handed by the Soviets and made the target of severe criticism of the Communist bloc and also by our allies and friends because of our methods on the eve of the summit meeting.

Senate leaders of both parties are incensed, not over the actual espionage attempts, but over what happened last week. Congress has appropriated more than \$5 billion in the last 13 years since the Central Intelligence Agency was organized for such purposes, which are important to our national security and survival in this nuclear age. Senate leaders want to find out a number of things which are still obscure. These Senators know that the official admission of our guilt was ordered by the Chief Executive. He did not want to meet Khrushchev face to

face in Paris next week with the handicap that he had not been entirely candid over this unfortunate affair.

The legislators want to find out from the authorities responsible for defensive intelligence why the pilot of the plane did not press the button which would have ejected him strapped in his seat. They want to know why the ejection machinery which also—within 45 seconds—would have blown up the plane was not employed.

The legislators also want an explanation from the professionals of how it happened that the light plane flying at 60,000 feet was smashed to smithereens by the missile which hit it yet the photographic equipment, films and other paraphernalia landed intact and are now in possession of the Soviet propagandists.

WASHINGTON

CONSTANTINE BROWN**Soviet Policy in Spy Harangues****Reds' Aim Called Splitting U. S. Ties
With Allies and Ending Foreign Bases**

Despite the U-2 espionage incident and Premier Khrushchev's hurrying to Paris 48 hours ahead of time to prevent private consultations between the Big Three, the prospects of the summit conference are neither worse nor better than they were before.

If the ruthless but skillful Soviet leader decides it would serve his purposes to pull out of his sleeve a Red peace dove he will do so and the "aggressive espionage act of the United States" will be ignored.

On the other hand, if he wishes to continue his attacks on President Eisenhower, he will keep on ranting and make every effort to discredit the United States which he considers the only real barrier to his efforts to establish international communism as the supreme power in the world.

Most Americans, not familiar with the techniques of communism as practiced by the Soviet leader, have frequently regarded his threats and insults as mere propaganda rantings which should be glossed over as such. But bearing in mind the widely published and often stated foreign policies of the Kremlin, Mr. Khrushchev's rantings are not rantings at all. They are, indeed, the application of the fundamental principles of Communist foreign policy to current events

Thus the statement of the Soviet dictator of May 9 concerning the American U-2 plane claimed to have been shot down by a Soviet missile carries a salient message. He said, "Those countries that have bases on their territories should note most carefully the following: If they allow others to fly from their bases to our territory we shall hit at those bases." Norway has reacted to that threat and Pakistan and Turkey are giving it consideration.

The importance of the above is that for the last five years one of the main Soviet policies has been to persuade the free countries where the United States has bases to tell the Yanks to go home. They have been doing this by terrorizing the natives with fear of nuclear war.

It is no coincidence that over the last few years there have been "inspired" demonstrations in England demanding the removal of our Air Force. And the first success of this policy has been in Morocco where the Air Force is in process of abandoning our air bases built at great expense to the American taxpayers.

If Americans take the Khrushchev threat lightly, the citizens of some of the allied nations where our bases are located do not. The Communist apparatus in

each of these countries already has begun to throw gasoline on the smoldering fires of fear, and their governments must take heed.

It is not beyond speculation that a new issue will be taken up at the summit meeting and that issue may be American bases abroad. There are indications that Mr. Khrushchev once more may ask President Eisenhower to give up our air bases.

But the Soviet leader did not end his tirade with threats to air bases. He also made hay with the Soviet policy of disarmament—a policy formulated on February 9, 1955, by the Supreme Soviet. He said that if "our partners agree to disarmament we shall effect it honestly." Then he continued, "We are not afraid of controls. Gentlemen, you could then fly over our territory, check, take pictures, do what you please. Such an issue as this (the plane incident) would not arise."

With such an argument being pushed by Communists in every free country the choice between fear of retaliation as against a pleasant relationship with Soviet Russia may bring about a perilous disarmament agreement sooner than most people had thought. The clamor is led by well organized and well rehearsed students in the free nations.

Indeed, the U-2 incident may easily have changed the entire agenda of the summit meeting.

TAB

Today in World Affairs

Soviets Chose Provocative Confession Plane Incident

By DAVID LAWRENCE

WASHINGTON, May 8.—Nikita Khrushchev had two courses open to him. He could play down for the time being the case of the U. S. unarmed plane, so as not to jeopardize the success of the "summit" conference. Or he could add to the international tension created by his speech at Baku recently when he threatened anew to make a separate peace with East Germany.



Lawrence

The Soviet premier decided in favor of more tension, more friction and more propaganda of a provocative nature against the very governments with whom he is supposed to be striving to make a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues.

Why did he do it? Because the Soviet premier relies on bluster and bluff. He thinks the peoples of the West are in the midst of a defeatist mood and that he can get what he wants without war.

As for the American government's "admission" that the plane was traveling on an intelligence errand, why should this be such a "sensational"? It isn't the first time the carrying on of intelligence activities has been publicly acknowledged by the United States. Not long ago a Senate committee talked for several days about various "intelligence estimates" on the missile production of the Soviets. How else was the information obtained except through the usual activities of intelligence agents paid for by the United States government?

Indeed, Soviet Premier Khrushchev himself has previously commented in public on the Soviet intelligence operations. It will be recalled that, at a White House dinner on Sept. 16 last, Mr. Khrushchev was introduced by Vice-President Nixon to Allen Dulles, director of U. S. Intelligence. They had a long talk. Two days later the press reported that Mr. Khrushchev had said jocularly:

"Oh, yes, I know you (Allen Dulles). I read your reports."

"I hope you get them legally," replied the director of American intelligence.

"We all have the same agents," bantered the Soviet premier, "and we both pay them and hence we ought to get together and save money."

The reference, of course, was to the "double agent" technique in espionage, wherein the agent of one country succumbs to bribery and, while ostensibly continuing his operations against another country, reveals to both sides a part of the information he gathers.

The episode, however, shows clearly that Mr. Khrushchev is certainly not naive about intelligence work. In fact, he is the head of the biggest spy system in the world, which operates not only inside the United States and other Western countries but throughout Latin America, as is evidenced by the outcropping of well-organized Communist activities in Cuba. The Soviet government sends submarines to Canadian waters to interrupt or intercept trans-Atlantic cables, and puts trawlers in New England waters to spy on our Polarix submarines.

Aware of Criticism

The Soviet premier, in his latest speech about the ill-fated airplane incident, revealed that he was well aware of the criticism that might come his way if he magnified a routine occurrence in intelligence work so as to pull off a propaganda maneuver. He said:

"Now I read in the press that they are accusing me of trying to sabotage the meeting of the heads of governments; otherwise, I would not have raised this fact at the session of the Supreme Soviet. It is said I

would have raised this question along other channels."

The Soviet premier then insisted he just had to reveal it all, but he gave no persuasive reason. Indeed, he went on unwittingly to confirm the American reasoning behind the affair, as expressed in the State Department's comment last Saturday declaring that intelligence observation wouldn't be necessary if the "open skies" proposal of the United States had been adopted.

Called Unwise Step

Mr. Khrushchev said:

"What could have driven the Americans to such an unwise step? . . . It is known that the American 'open skies' proposal was rejected by us. Then the United States militarists decided to open up the Soviet skies for themselves. But there are international laws. There are such things as national frontiers, and no one is permitted to disregard these laws and invade other countries."

Yet the Soviets are "invading" other countries every day. The United States proposed in 1955 that international law cover mutual inspection systems by airplanes so as to detect in advance any potential attack. Almost everything in the free world — like missile sites — is open to observation, but the Soviets have consistently refused to agree to mutual inspection of an effective character for nuclear testing or general disarmament. Until there is mutual trust, there can be no real progress toward disarmament either through

"summit" conferences or otherwise. The gathering of military intelligence is, therefore, necessary in the meantime to protect the American people against surprise attack by the Soviets, who have an advantage because they know the United States will never strike "the first blow."

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Today in World Affairs

Naivete Found in Criticism Of U. S. Spy Plane Incident

By DAVID LAWRENCE

WASHINGTON, May 10.—Some of the comments being made currently on the United States plane that went down in Russia are stranger than the incident itself.

Thus, it is being lamented that the incident happened "just before the 'summit' conference," as if this were something "inopportune." Actually, it would have been most unfortunate if the episode had occurred after the "summit" conference. For then a long time would have elapsed before the matter could have been disposed of by the government, and then at a subsequent "summit" show.

It is also asserted that the President should be known in detail every minute of the day what missions were planned for every pilot in the far-flung operations of the United States overseas, so that this particular flight could have been cancelled. This is precisely what the Communists desire—to halt all defense operations by the Allies, including information-gathering, while they themselves pursue their customary infiltration and spying projects.



Lawrence

Critics Found Naive

It is obvious that many of the critics either are naive or just do not understand the importance of intelligence work in a period like the present. To say that the President should have known about the Powers' flight or similar projects so as to be able to turn them on or off at will is to attribute to the Presidency superhuman responsibilities. The concept of such flights has, of course, been discussed at the top level and a policy adopted. General authority to carry them on was delegated. The United States government, under this or any other administration, is not likely to be lulled into the dangerous attitude that, when diplomats talk, all weapons must be grounded and America must take the chance of being subjected to surprise attack with missiles that carry nuclear weapons.

Fortunately, criticism from Congress is more restrained and sensible. The Administration has again and again briefed members of both parties in secret about intelligence activities. These are delicate operations, but the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Risks must be taken because the stakes are high—the defense of the United States.

Sen. Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic Majority Leader, during the course of a splendid speech to the Senate, said on Tuesday:

"Espionage and intelligence-gathering are not something that cause the 'cold war.' They are merely by-products of the 'cold war'—something that follows logically when nations cannot trust each other. . . .

"Nikita Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united in a determination to preserve our freedoms and we are not going to be shaken from that course."

Chairman Clarence Cannon, Democrat, of the House Appropriations Committee, in a similar note of statesmanship, said to the House of Representatives that the Central Intelligence Agency has been admonished by Congress each year that it must meet situations that might result in surprise attack by adopting effective measures. He declared:

"The American forces must be apprised of any future preparation for attack in time to meet it. The plan they have been following is their answer to that demand. And I want to take advantage of the opportunity to compliment and thank Director Allen W. Dulles

and his remarkable staff for the admirable way in which they have met the situation through these later years. They are entitled to the highest commendation by the department and the Congress and the American people.

"We cannot permit another Korea. We cannot take the risk of carnage and national devastation which would follow a similar attack from across the Russian borders. And since the Russians refuse to cooperate in our efforts to establish permanent peace—or even to agree to ethical standards of warfare—we have no choice but to protect our nation and our people through the age-old methods of defense so long in use by the Communists themselves."

Both sides are engaged in spying. Khrushchev talks in righteous tones as if the Communists do nothing on this score. An important revelation, however, has just been made. It is disclosed that the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington is the center of a spy ring. The military attache of the Embassy defected recently and gave the whole story to the House Committee on un-American activities. His testimony has just been released to the committee. The Soviet Union undoubtedly uses all of its satellite embassies for espionage work. If spying is to be abolished, it will be necessary to abolish the satellite legations. The House committee in a recent report says:

"The facts brought out in this report make it plain that Communist embassies, consulates, U. N. delegations, trade and other missions have been, and are presently, used as legal covers for international Communist spy rings. There is no reason to believe that their use for this purpose will ever be discontinued by the arch conspirators in the Kremlin."

But somehow, when the Communists do the spying and Congressional committees expose it, this hasn't been front-page news. Moscow wins propaganda victories primarily because the truth about Soviet espionage and infiltration in the "cold war" rarely gets attention and is brushed aside by too many people here and in Britain as just so much "McCarthyism."

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RECEIVED
MAY 13 1960

Today in World Affairs

Wisdom of Eisenhower's Russian Visit Questioned

By DAVID LAWRENCE

WASHINGTON, May 12.—Do the American people want President Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union next month as planned?

This question will be asked again and again as news dispatches telling of the insults flung at the President by Soviet Premier Khrushchev are widely read. For the Soviet Premier has just about announced that the President would not be welcome in the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, self-respect and the dignity of the nation would seem to require a polite statement postponing the visit till some day when the climate is better and there is a better understanding between the Soviet people and the American people of the issues in controversy.



"I would not like," said the Soviet Premier, "to be in President Eisenhower's shoes when he comes to the Soviet Union. People will have a lot of questions to ask and they will be right, too. But there will be no excesses."

Lawrence asks: "Do the Russian people are open-hearted. Can we expect them to welcome him as a dear guest? I would be mad to say to the Russian people to welcome as a host a man who sends espionage planes here."

But the converse is also true. The President of the United States would be going to Russia to fraternize with a ruler who has for years sent thousands of espionage agents to America and other countries.

Mr. Eisenhower has been ready to go to Russia despite the fact that Mr. Khrushchev in the order in 1956 to shoot in cold blood the men, women and children of Hungarians and today maintains in camps where they are kept up on public affairs are imprisoned.

Personality

The President's interest of finding a better understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States government has been willing to put aside all personalities. But Mr. Khrushchev now injects personalities. Asked whether the President had changed his opinion of the President, he said: "It has, of course. I was not aware of the fact that the plan of air espionage over the Soviet Union was not the caprice of an irresponsible officer. I am responsible for the acts of this government and I was horrified to learn that the President had endorsed these acts."

But the interview with the Soviet Premier, which several newsmen had in Moscow, happened before a press conference was held in Washington on Wednesday in which Mr. Eisenhower formally explained American policy toward Soviet threats and arbitrary acts that have led to the tensions of the "cold war." The President said: "No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack."

Russian Secrecy

"Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret. But in the Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this."

ardly. The safety of the whole free world demands this.

"As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever since the beginning of my administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense."

Holier Than Thou

Even while Mr. Khrushchev was adopting a holier-than-thou attitude in Moscow, news dispatches from Switzerland at the same moment were telling the world that two officials of the Soviet Embassy in Bern were arrested there for spying and for bribing an agent to obtain plans of the Swiss Army radar establishments and plans for rocket bases in West Germany. Yet Mr. Khrushchev in his Moscow interview had said: "I am responsible for the acts of this (the Soviet) government."

If so, then it would be as "logical" for President Eisenhower to begin wondering whether he should stay home lest a visit to Russia would seem to imply approval of the Soviet acts of espionage against countries in the free world.

Maybe Mr. Khrushchev, who blows hot and cold, may tomorrow be in another mood. Asked in Moscow if he really wanted Mr. Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union, the Premier replied: "We can exchange views with the President on that in Paris."

So the "summit" conference may unexpectedly have on its informal agenda the same question—does the Soviet Premier really want the President to visit Russia, and do the American people really want their President subjected to the indignities which Mr. Khrushchev hints at as he describes the doubtful role of an unwelcome guest?

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MAY 13 1960

NEW YORK
HERALD TRIBUNE

Today in World Affairs

Khrushchev Policy Called Likely to Anger Russians

By DAVID LAWRENCE

WASHINGTON, May 17.—Is the world face to face with another Hitler? Will the next few months see another set of appeasement maneuvers in the West such as began at Munich in 1938?

These are strange questions to be asking, but no less strange than a Reuters news dispatch from London last night which read as follows:

"Threatened breakdown of the Paris 'summit' talks tonight stirred a world-wide wave of pessimism and talk of war.

"Will there be war? People in Paris were asking, echoing the anxious words of others elsewhere.

"Some West German newspapers said Khrushchev's conduct brought back grim memories of Hitler and 'the period of surprises' with which the Nazi dictator opened what one paper called 'the most terrible period of history.' Another compared Khrushchev to 'Stalin in his best days' while a West Berlin daily said the Kremlin leader 'plays poker with peace.'"

Thus does a world in jitters speculate as it sees again what damage a one-man dictatorship can do. But just as at Munich a firm hand might have checkmated Hitler, so today a firm hand can checkmate a Khrushchev. While talking arrogantly and threateningly, the Soviet dictator knows that if there are no conferences to relieve tension and no progress toward agreements on outstanding issues, the people of Russia will also get bitter.

They could oust Khrushchev for fear he might plunge them into a nuclear war.

Outwardly, therefore, things look grim but actually there are signs that Khrushchev is playing a game. He is blunt, defiant, outspoken, but he is also cautious. He will discover that the Western Alliance cannot be divided, and he will learn, too, that Americans will rally behind their President despite the minority of shortsighted politicians here who show signs of trying to get some political mileage out of an insinuation that President Eisenhower is somehow to blame for the torpedoing of the "summit" conference.

The Soviet leader cannot pose as a peacemaker and then suddenly be revealed as a maker of war. The reaction of the West indicates an apprehension that he may overplay his hand and that his arbitrary tactics some day will force a war.

The texts of the various communications indicate that the Soviet Premier is almost childlike in his defensiveness. Once President Eisenhower refused to go to a "summit" conference because Mr. Khrushchev threatened the West with an ultimatum. So today the Soviet Premier says he, too, can refuse to go, under the duress of the spy-plane incident.

Russian Revolt Possible?
But, as any student of diplomatic history would tell Mr. Khrushchev, it's all right to make demands and to bluff, but it's also wise to leave a way out for the other side. Thus he could have construed President Eisenhower's decision to suspend the reconnaissance flights as a point that he had won. But Mr. Khrushchev wasn't satisfied and—like Hitler—has demanded the humiliation of his adversary. This

can only lead eventually to a break in diplomatic relations and constant talk of war—something that will arouse the people of the Soviet Union even more quickly than the peoples of the West. For the Russians have memories of many millions of their countrymen who died in the last war.

There could be a revolution inside the Soviet Union if tension increases and war threatens. Since the "satellite" nations behind the Iron Curtain would be in the path of a war, they, too, must inevitably rise up to protest. They would surely join any revolt that breaks out.

Mr. Khrushchev, moreover, has unwittingly opened up the whole question of who should rule in his own country. For he has, in effect, told the world that he wants to postpone any serious negotiations till after the Presidential elections in the United States next November, when he hopes the kind of administration will be elected with which he can do business. If he is trying to choose a President for the United States by throwing his propaganda support to an opposition party, then it might be asked whether it isn't fair play also to let the Americans have something to say about who is to rule Russia.

There ought to be some way to propose reciprocity to the Soviet leader—a free election for Russia in November, with a slate of opposition candidates, in exchange for a moratorium on spy flights or even on some nuclear tests. An announcement that such elections would be held could do more to bring peace in the world than a hundred "summit" conferences. Unfortunately, such elections cannot be held till the people of the Soviet Union have recovered possession of their own government.

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NEW YORK
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MAY 19 1960

Today in World Affairs

Way Seen Clear for U.S. To Break Ties With Russia

By DAVID LAWRENCE

WASHINGTON, May 18.—It may now be asked why the United States government should continue diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Every American ambassador is a personal representative of the President of the United States. If the Soviet government refuses to do business with the President, then the American government continues to keep its ambassador and his staff in Moscow. And if the United States withdraws its ambassador, would it be logical to have its ambassador and his staff in Moscow? And if the Soviet government could be conducted through other governments' embassies, as is the case when no direct diplomatic relations exist, it would be logical to have its ambassador and his staff in Moscow.



Lawrence

Mr. Khrushchev has just said that he does not wish to negotiate or do business with the United States. He adds that if the kind of President he likes isn't elected in November by the American people, he will keep up the boycott and will till then refuse to see if a man will be elected to see if a

Called Eromaniac
This sort of comment, made by Mr. Khrushchev at a lengthy press conference in Paris, is the outburst of an eromaniac who happens to possess governmental power for the moment. There is no rule in this book which says the American people must continue to maintain diplomatic relations with a government that has publicly insulted the President of the United States. Indeed, the history of diplomacy shows that, for much less violent language or discourtesies by another government, many an ambassador has been handed his traveling papers.

The hypocrisy of Mr. Khrushchev is illustrated by what he said at his Wednesday press conference about how he visited President Eisenhower in September, 1959, when there had been U-2 flights over the Soviet Union's territory.

"I almost opened my mouth," said Mr. Khrushchev in referring to his knowledge of the U-2 flights. But, he added, because the atmosphere at Camp David was so cordial, he said to himself, "why raise this matter with this friend then?"

Made No Protest
But if the flights over Russia are as serious a matter as the Soviet Premier now pretends, why didn't he at least send a note of protest to the Department of State through his Embassy and say in 1959 all that he now says about the seriousness of any violations of Russian "sovereignty" by the flights of the U-2 type of plane?

Clearly Mr. Khrushchev had a reason for stirring up a fuss now. First, he wanted to prevent Mr. Eisenhower from going to the Soviet Union this summer. The Soviet Premier was afraid the visit might open the eyes and ears of the Russian people. For they would learn at first hand from the President of the United States some simple facts that the Soviet press and radio have kept from them by government order. Mr. Eisenhower, it was feared, would tell about the way freedom of speech, freedom of worship, and freedom of the press and radio and television are practiced in the United States, and of the high standard of living enjoyed by the workers here. Now, for instance, could the Soviet Government afford, without taking big risks internally, to let Mr. Eisenhower speak on the television and radio for the same length of time that American stations gave to Mr. Khrushchev when he visited American last autumn?

So the VA... thing, Mr. Khrushchev... was to find a reason for cancellation of the trip. Once this had been publicized, he could consistently fraternize with Mr. Khrushchev in Paris and carry on his travels with the heads of state... Mr. Khrushchev was in itself a portrait, and hence Mr. Khrushchev had to appear very sorry about something, and bring up the matter incident to the press conference.

But what happened next? The Soviet Premier has had all his bluff used up several months. He pretends to be friendly to Prime Minister Macmillan and General de Gaulle, but he knows that the West is united and will not be divided. He pretends to show hostility to the British and French, but he knows that the Soviet Premier is getting ready to make a separate peace with East Germany and to complicate the European situation further.

War of Nerves Seen
In that event, the Western allies will have to decide whether they will submit to the explosion of their armed forces from West Berlin—and then anything could happen. Most likely it would be a period of high tension—a sort of war of nerves. Khrushchev, like Hitler, is capable of carrying his bluffs to extremes. That's why there are fears that a one-man dictatorship may again plunge the world into a bloody conflict—perhaps a so-called "limited" war. As the chances of such a contingency become a subject of world-wide discussion, it seems logical to assume that the Russian people will exercise a restraining hand and that the peoples in the "satellite" countries may find it opportune to voice their protests by means of public demonstrations such as occurred in 1956 in Hungary. Meanwhile, Republicans and Democrats are uniting to present a common front to Khrushchev. If diplomatic relations are severed, it will be done only after consultation with the leaders of both parties in Congress.

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TAB

WASHINGTON

MAY 1961

U.S. on the Spot In Geneva Talks

By Marquis Childs

GENEVA—The incidents of the past few days are readymade for those who want to continue the cold war and who have persistently by every means sought to prevent any meaningful negotiation with the Soviet Union. Here in Geneva, where a negotiation has been going on for 18 months, this is seen in the sharpest and most dramatic fashion.

The announcement from Gettysburg by President Eisenhower that the United States intends to resume nuclear explosions for research purposes fits the pattern. It was made without any notice to the American delegation. More important, it came as the three powers—Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union—were trying to get agreement on a joint program of research into improved methods for detecting nuclear explosions.

What is little understood is the way in which the Soviets have made one concession after another, coming around time after time to the Western view. They began by saying they would not discuss any control system until after a treaty on general principles had been signed. After four months they agreed to talk about how a control system would function in the Soviet Union and the United States.

They came around to agreeing to a discussion by scientists from each country on the problem of underground identification. Having said they would never agree to a threshold and a moratorium outside a nuclear test treaty on explosions below that threshold, they finally accepted this position. They would never accept our criteria for detection which they called "absurd," but they accepted them.

WITH LITERALLY dozens of concessions by the Soviets, the outline of a treaty has evolved. Major issues—the number of inspections in each country, the make-up of a control commission, the length of the moratorium—remain to be determined presumably by the heads of government when they meet in Paris.

The American negotiator through all these long, trying months has been James J. Wadsworth, who is deputy head of the American delegation to the United Nations. Wadsworth's Western colleagues say he has shown more skill, patience and persistence in dealing with

What has made Wadsworth's position doubly difficult is that, while he pushes the Russians up little by little to the Western view, he has constantly been fighting a rear-guard action with those in Washington who have been determined to block any treaty. In this context the Gettysburg announcement is seen as the latest attempt to sabotage the negotiation. While no one will say this officially, it is the view of observers close to the conference for many months.

No one would accuse President Eisenhower of such an intention. But since he has not followed at close range the complex negotiations he must take the lead from one faction or another. And while the committee of principals dealing with this matter at the top level of government in Washington is reportedly in favor of a test treaty with proper inspection and control by a majority of four to one, the minority in the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission has shown great resourcefulness in blocking tactics.



Childs

THERE SHOULD be no illusions here at home about the situation the United States confronts. If a treaty fails to be agreed to because of what seem to be constructionist tactics from the American side or if a treaty is rejected by the Senate, the Western alliance will be split apart and the United States put in the position of standing almost alone in the world. Here are the reasons why.

The Conservative government in London has never wavered in the determination to get a treaty that would mean the beginning of inspection behind the Iron Curtain and perhaps the beginning of a pattern of disarmament. They concede the risk of some cheating under any control system, but they believe this is minimal and is heavily outweighed by the gain of a beginning at inspection and control.

Opinion in Britain is virtually unanimous on this score, as it is in the Scandinavian countries, West Germany and most of Asia and Africa. Furthermore, the British here believe that it would have been possible to get a treaty with adequate guarantees any time during the past nine months if it had not been for America's delaying tactics.

TAB

WASHINGTON, D.C.
MAY 12 1960

MAY 12 1960

These Days By George E. Sokolsky

Espionage Is Normal Activity

ESPIONAGE is a constant and normal activity of governments. All governments engage in it, according to their means and their purposes. It is often referred to by such fancy names as intelligence or information, but it is always the same task. A competent agent does not get caught. He commits suicide or he melts away. A spy that is caught deserves death from either side. When one engages in such activities, he knows what he is doing. He knows that there are practically no very significant rewards, except the satisfaction of having served his country. His job is not to get caught.



Sokolsky

The professional agent often works for both sides, and sometimes for both sides. Such a spy is many named a double agent. The agent is known to both sides as such and is used to plant false information. He is valuable for leads. Also he is sometimes watched and tailed in the hope that he will lead to the real man, his employer.

SOVIET Russia has maintained an open and a secret espionage corps in this country, at least, since 1920. The open espionage corps is the Communist Party of the United States. Every member

of that Party owes allegiance to the mother country of socialism, Soviet Russia. Every member of that Party, literally is a spy upon the United States, but not every member is sufficiently intelligent for espionage which is one of the most skilled professions on earth, requiring abilities far beyond most men.

Therefore Soviet Russia employs two other agencies in this country. One is the Communist underground, skilled and even brilliant Americans with special abilities. Such persons as the Rosenbergs were this kind of agent and their organized efforts made it possible for Soviet Russia to spy on the Manhattan Project where the atom bomb was invented and manufactured. There were many, many Whittaker Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley, and Enza Ben Barbery, who was a courier among them, has also provided valuable information.

There are many other Americans and Russians, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians and Rumanians, these professionals who are engaged in this business. Each of the Warsaw Pact embassies, both in Washington and at the United Nations in New York, is engaged in the usual espionage activities.

Attention must always be called to the fact that the Communist Party also main-

tains a United States government-in-exile in Mexico City.

THE United States engages in espionage the same as any other government. Its principal agency for this work is the CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency, a very secret body. The Army, Navy, Air Force and State Department also gather information as do all similar agencies of all governments. The effectiveness of the CIA cannot be judged because its work must be secret and it is impossible to know how much of its evaluation of subjects is accepted by the State Department and the President who make policy.

The FBI also performs an important function in this regard. It deals with counter-espionage within the United States. Its function is to discover what the spies of all countries are doing in the United States, but the FBI is permitted to make arrests only on order of the Attorney General.

Khrushchev makes a great fuss over the American airman caught as a spy in the Ural. Our State Department, in one of the stupidest and most unnecessary releases, admitted his espionage. To retaliate, the FBI should be instructed to pick up a dozen or so Soviet spies immediately, including a few American-born Russian agents. Two ought to be able to play at this game.

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These Days . . .

By George E. Sokolsky

Spies on the Record

ANDREI Gromyko said that Soviet Russia did not employ spies in the United States. Gromyko had lived in the United States for many years before he became the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position he now holds. There is a long record of espionage. Here is a case:



Sokolsky

On the evening of April 12, 1951, a lone male emerged from the darkness and made his way to the base of the Washington Monument in Washington. On his left hand he wore a glove, a strip of adhesive tape circled the middle finger of his right hand, and he carried a red-covered book under his left arm. This man was Mr. Z (fictitious), who was employed in a sensitive position by a United States Government agency. Moments later, he was joined by Yuri Novikov, Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. This meeting signified the initial effort to expand, on American soil, a Soviet espionage apparatus developed in Austria in 1948. This apparatus had been under the watchful eyes of our military authorities abroad for two years.

From that night on, through the spring of 1952, Novikov met on 12 occasions with Mr. Z at numerous meeting places in Washington. Information which Novikov solicited from Mr. Z on behalf of Russia included data relating to the American Air Force personnel stationed abroad, morale among Air Force officers and enlisted personnel, Air Force interrogation techniques, the identity of the American intelligence sources, the identity of fellow employes of Mr. Z and the names of American

military personnel destined for overseas assignment. Novikov also requested information about U. S. intelligence files dealing with Russian installations and Russian military capabilities, American preparations for war or defense, and the current location of defected Soviet airman then in this country.

IN Vienna, Austria, two naturalized citizens of the U. S., Kurt L. Ponger and Otto Verber, knew of the meeting between Novikov and Mr. Z and had, in fact, been instrumental in making arrangements for the event.

Ponger and Verber had returned to Austria with their families after service in the American Army in Europe during World War II. In early 1949 Ponger was recruited in Vienna by Soviet intelligence and shortly thereafter, in March, 1949, he recruited Verber, his brother-in-law, for the same kind of work. Verber, in turn, recruited Mr. Z, then an employe of American Forces in Austria assigned to intelligence work. After that, Verber had frequent contact with Mr. Z and obtained certain data from him concerning intelligence personnel, policies, activities and other information pertaining to U. S. Forces in Austria. In December, 1950, however, Mr. Z, Verber's principal source of intelligence information, left Europe on transfer to the United States. Ponger and Verber persuaded Mr. Z to continue as a member of the Soviet espionage ring in connection with his new post in the United States.

They paid Mr. Z a special bonus on behalf of their Soviet masters, relayed Soviet praises for his valuable assistance, and issued final instructions to Mr. Z concerning his proposed first meeting with his new principal at the Washington Monument. This is the meeting which occurred on the even-

ing of the second Tuesday in April, 1951.

Verber and Ponger continued their Soviet intelligence efforts, operating in Austria and West Germany, until apprehended in Vienna by U. S. military authorities in January, 1953. Arraigned at Washington, D. C., Verber and Ponger pleaded not guilty to a secret indictment by a Federal grand jury charging them with conspiracy to commit espionage. Novikov was named in the indictment as a co-conspirator, whereupon Novikov was declared persona non grata by the State Department. He left the United States en route to the Soviet Union soon thereafter.

ON BEING confronted with information indicating specific knowledge of their activities abroad, Verber and Ponger, changed their pleas to guilty. In June, 1953, they were sentenced and imprisoned in U. S. Federal penitentiaries. Verber received a sentence of 3 years, 4 months to 10 years, while Ponger was sentenced to serve a term of from 5 to 15 years.

And Mr. Z? Mr. Z, throughout the operations involving Verber, Ponger, and Novikov, maintained the illusion of conspiracy. While Verber, Ponger, and Novikov greedily contemplated even greater achievements by Mr. Z, Z enriched the Treasury of the United States by several thousands of dollars emanating from Russian hands. He also furnished information and made observations of inestimable value to the FBI in the course of its investigation.

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TAB

Don't Get Caught

By Lyle C. Wilson



THERE are Ten Commandments and an eleventh.

The Eleventh Commandment is: Don't get caught.

Caught is a word which scarcely conveys the meaning of what happened to the U. S. Government when an American spy was somehow brought down alive and talkative from an airplane miles above the Soviet Union.

Entrapped would be a better word for it.

Nikita S. Khrushchev baited his trap skillfully. An American airplane had been spotted and shot down. It had scientific equipment and was far inside the borders of the USSR. The U. S. Government gulped the bait like a hungry trout. Our side said the airplane was a stray, its pilot probably incapacitated by failure of navigation equipment, its mission weather and atmosphere observations. Nothing more.

The trap closed instantly with K's evidence of espionage: a talkative pilot, his equipment, what purported to be his pictures of Soviet Union military installations. The evidence was sufficient to compel the United States to change its story. And there went another commandment because the first explanation of Pilot Francis G. Powers' mission surely shattered that one about bearing false witness.

What happens now is anybody's guess. There will be some questions asked. Why, for example, was a married man accepted for such duty as was assigned to Pilot

Powers? Was the pilot, in truth, under orders to take his own life if that were the only alternative to seizure by the cold war enemy?

If so, why did he not do so? Was the ejection seat of his airplane triggered to a bomb which would have destroyed the airplane if he had pushed the ejection button. If so, why did the pilot fail to make use of that device? Who chose Powers for his mission? Who ordered Pilot Powers to take off?

In its political capital the incident is examined in relation to its impact on presidential politics. If the incident maintains its proportions as the most incredible official goof since Pearl Harbor, the impact will be considerable. Politicians pray for an exploitable issue. It looks like the Democrats have one.

Vice President Richard M. Nixon will suffer for that, if suffering there is to be. Peace and prosperity are the issues upon which the Republicans are maneuvering to campaign in this election year. Validity of the peace issue will depend very much in next autumn's presidential campaign on the intensity and temperature of the cold war.

A summit conference is coming up with the question of Berlin lying like a time bomb under the conference table. The outcome of the summit and of President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to the Soviet Union will determine largely how readily U. S. voters will accept the campaign argument that it is to the Republican Party that the nation must look for a guarantee of peace.

If the voters reject that campaign argument there will be some major changes made here in Washington on Inauguration Day.