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## The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #02938-88 19 August 1988

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Fritz W. Ermarth

Chairman

SUBJECT:

Big Pictures in Small Frames

Following our conversation about your impending briefing of Governor Dukakis, I asked the NIOs each to give me a "one liner" from his area, what he would want to say if he had the chance to speak but one sentence to the candidate.

The attached is my own effort to synthesize what the NIOs gave me, reflecting some implicit differences (e.g., on how much Gorbachev is likely to seek constraints on military competition) and forcing my own opinion in some cases (e.g., narcotraffic interdiction will not work). Although these words are solely my responsibility, I think they reflect the state of NIC thinking on some big issues.

I hope these points prove useful.

Fritz W. Ermarth

Attachment: As stated

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19 August 1988

### Perspectives from the National Intelligence Council

#### USSR

Under Gorbachev the USSR is trying to appear less threatening to the West and is expected by many (not all) in the Intelligence Community to seek substantial relaxation of arms competition and regional conflicts, to promote both foreign policy goals and domestic economic revival. For now at least, the modernization of strategic and general purpose military forces continues as in the past. Resource concentration and foreign infusions should keep Soviet military technology competitive in the years ahead. All agree that Gorbachev will present a much more formidable political challenge to the West, and the Soviet espionage threat shows no sign of subsiding.

#### **EUROPE**

Some redefinition of the security relationship between the US and Europe is going to come about in the next decade; that redefinition must either be led constructively by the United States or it will "happen" on its own, perhaps not so constructively. One can say approximately the same thing about the Soviet-East European relationship, where destructive prospects for the region, for Moscow, and for East-West relations are even richer.

#### EAST ASIA

Sino-Soviet rapprochment, the growth (slowly) of Japanese assertiveness, and the retrenchment of US power purported to be sensed by the countries of the region are creating a new political climate which may make East Asia a less predictable and congenial area for the US in the 1990s than it has been in the 1980s.

#### NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the death of Zia, the prospect of an end to the Iran-Iraq war, developments surrounding the Palestinian uprising, more enterprising Soviet diplomacy, and the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry have made the whole region one of more volatile challenge to the US than even a few months ago. Some developments have been sought by the US, but the net trends are toward instabilities and conflicts hostile to US interests and more demanding of political and military engagement than we have the stomach for.

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#### THIRD WORLD

Proliferation of sophisticated weapons, including nuclear potential, is a "megatrend".

The debt crisis threatens otherwise promising movement of Third World countries toward open political and economic life, particularly in Latin America.

Notably in Africa, AIDS threatens to wipe out entire elite and urban populations on which development progress depends.

Interdiction and eradication efforts are not going to materially stem the tide of narcotics into the US from Third World countries, especially in Latin America. Rather, until the US curbs its domestic demand, trafficking will threaten the stability and civility of a number of supplying countries, and US interdiction/eradication policies will seriously trouble our relations with them.

19 August 1988

NOTE FOR:

Chairman, NIC

Vice Chairman, NIC

FROM:

Murat Natirboff

NIO/FDIA

SUBJECT:

NIO/FDIA Contribution to Dukakis Briefing

Per your request, following is judgment statement which we feel is vital for Dukakis to hear:

Despite refreshing winds of change in Gorbachev's new "openness" policies, the prospects are for continued aggressive Soviet espionage efforts against the United States; new arms control developments such as the INF--and perhaps a START--treaty will not diminish this activity, merely require adjustment by US counterintelligence to changes in its modalities.

Murat Natirboff

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CN

The international narcotics issue will escalate in importance in the near term and will further complicate and aggravate US bilateral relationships in Latin America until its level of priority within foreign policy planning is firmly established; the issue will also deliver unprecedented pressures upon US intelligence resources to help guide more effective and efficient counternarcotics programs.

William R. Kotapish
NIO/Counternarcotics

#### LATIN AMERICA

Without relief from the staggering economic problems that are led by the debt burden, the prospect is for the election of more leftist leaders, a weakening of incumbent civilian governments and greater opportunity for military dominance, and scarce resources to combat narcotrafficking and Marxist insurgencies—the sum of which promise more difficult and probably more confrontational relations with the United States.

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE** 

National Intelligence Council

19 August 1988

TO: Fritz W. Ermarth

FROM: Andre LeGallo

SUBJECT: Your Request for a Statement on Terrorism

International terrorism, while not threatening to the survival of the United States, is a serious International issue with potentially high political impact; the most serious threat to the United States is from State sponsored terrorism as manifested by Iran's involvement in the hostage situation which Tehran is trying to exploit during this U.S. election period.

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19 August 1988

T0:

C/NIC

FROM:

A/NIO/EUR

Herewith a one-sentence judgment on Europe for possible DCI/DDCI use in next week's briefing.

There is a growing conviction on both sides of the Atlantic that underlying differences in security orientation will demand a redefinition of the transatlantic partnership and a new conception of European security into the next century -- which only we can provide.

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# National Intelligence Officer For Economics

National Intelligence Council

19 August 1988

The six-year-old "crisis" in foreign debt has brought new investment in many Latin American countries to a near halt -- a trend which must be reversed in order to achieve economic and political stability in the years ahead.

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NIO/Africa 19 August 1988

A key issue for the next six months and beyond is the extent to which the Soviets will back up their endorsement of "political solutions to regional conflicts" with effective pressure on their African clients, particularly Ethiopia and Angola, to make meaningful concessions.

Defining the global dimensions of AIDS poses a major intelligence challenge, but the evidence available so far suggests the potential for political and economic catastrophy in some Third World countries, particularly in Africa, from high rates of infection among elites and urban populations.

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#### NIO/NESA

Developments in the Middle East and South Asia over the past nine months have significantly altered the challenges facing the United States in the year ahead: the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan coupled with the death of Pakistan's President Zia have ushered in new uncertainties over the character and strength of leadership in Kabul and Islamabad; Iran and Iraq remain heavily armed, antagonistic forces to be reckoned with by other oil-rich states in the Persian Gulf; and, young Palestinian nationalists in the occupied territories have as a consequence of their uprising defied two decades of Israeli military rule, PLO inertia, Jordan's guardianship, and US diplomatic peace strategies. Major US security interests are at stake in all three of these arenas and must be resecured in the face of energized, more skillful Soviet policy, a greater independent-mindedness among our regional friends and foes, and a steady escalation in sophisticated weaponry.

#### EAST ASIA

Rapidly improving relations between China and the Soviet Union will allow the Chinese and Soviets to enhance their positions in Asia; this, along with growing Japanese assertiveness, could prompt some countries that have strong ties to the United States to reassess their relationships with Washington, to the likely detriment of US interests in the region.

**USSR** 

The ongoing reassessment of Soviet policies under Gorbachev is likely to present the US with a a more sophisticated Soviet political challenge around the globe in the years ahead; but the USSR will also be open to more substantial steps to constrain strategic and conventional arms and to dampen regional conflicts.

19 August 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman NIC

FROM:

Charles E. Allen

National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT:

Critical Issue for the Democratic Presidential Candidate

Given the fact that over the past 14 years the Soviets have produced 4 times as many ICBMs, 2 times as many SLBMs, 3 times as many helicopters, 12 times as many artillery pieces, 5 times as many APCs, 3 times as many tanks, 3 times as many attack submarines, about the same number of surface ships, as well as continuing to expend from 15 to 17 percent of Soviet gross national product on the military, we offer the following statement for the DCI to convey to candidate Dukakis:

If Gorbachev is successful and there is no significant change in traditional Soviet political and military goals, the US will face a more formidable adversary worldwide in the 1990's.

Charles E. Allen

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19 August 88

from SP:

Despite a growing Western public perception that the Soviets have changed their military doctrine to be less threatening, we see no evidence to indicate that they are making any changes in their forces or operations; in fact, their program to modernize strategic offensive forces and to develop advanced strategic defensive weapons continues apace.

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from NIO/S&T:

We believe that future Soviet military systems will continue to compete effectively in overall capability with US systems during the next 15 years because of effective R & D management practices, prompt incorporation of technology into military system designs, and extensive use of foreign technology.