


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Guatemala: Prospects for the New Government

National Intelligence Estimate Annex C

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NIE 82-86

February 1986

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The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the Treasury.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

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GUATEMALA: PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT ANNEX C

Information available as of 30 January 1986 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 13 February 1986.

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ANNEX C

FOREIGN SUPPORT TO THE INSURGENTS

Cuba, Nicaragua, and some of the Soviet Bloc countries have provided Guatemalan insurgents with training, money, and perhaps some arms. Over the past few years, however, the success of the Guatemalan Government's counterinsurgency campaign and the failure of the various guerrilla groups to unify appears to have caused foreign support to the rebels to diminish. During 1985 Havana and Managua continued to supply communications support and training assistance, while Moscow reportedly gave financial aid to the PGT/O. We have no evidence to confirm that any significant arms transfers were completed during the year.

we judge that the bulk of the training given to the Guatemalan extreme left occurs in Cuba, although a limited amount is provided by the Sandinistas. Managua probably plays a greater role in facilitating the travel of training candidates to Havana.

a captured insurgent	25X1
claimed he received one month of guerrilla training in	
Nicaragua and 18 months in Cuba. The insurgent also	
reported that two 40-man platoons received similar	
training in Nicaragua in preparation for their infiltra-	
tion into San Marcos Department, Guatemala, from	
Mexico. March	25 X 1
1985 that most FAR commanders and troops were	
trained in Cuba and Nicaragua and that most ORPA	
commanders and half of their troops also were trained	
there. Last July,	25 X 1
that several new guerrilla instructors were	25X1
infiltrated from Nicaragua into Guatemala using falsi-	20// 1
fied Nicaraguan passports. The new instructors report-	25 X 1
edly were Colombian, Nicaraguan, and Chilean, and	ı
all traveled as Nicaraguan refugees.	25 X 1
Solid evidence of foreign arms support in recent	
years is sporadic.	25 X 1
last summer that Bulgaria was planning to send an	
arms shipment to the PGT/O.	25 X 1
Managua agreed to allow the shipment to pass through	
Nicaragua and that the Communist Party of El Salva-	
dor would help transfer the arms to the Guatemalans.	
Thus far, we have no indication that the guerrillas	25 X 1
have received the Bulgarian shipment.	25X1 25X1
also report that Guatemalan insurgents receive arms	
and other supplies through Mexico, and sometimes	
Belize. In addition, we believe that land routes	
through Honduras for weapons from Nicaragua des-	25X1
tined for the Salvadorans probably are also used to	25 X 1
transport materiel to the Guatemalans.	-5/125X1

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