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Zimbabwe: New Horizons, Old Challenges

National Intelligence Estimate

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July 1986

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NIE 72.1-86

**ZIMBABWE: NEW HORIZONS,
OLD CHALLENGES**

Information available as of 3 July 1986 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.

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SCOPE NOTE

The constitutional arrangement for contemporary Zimbabwe was prescribed in December 1979 by the Lancaster House Agreement, which ended the "liberation struggle." The government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, which came to power democratically in 1980, has been widely perceived as a "success story," in which a radical socialist liberation movement adapts to and accepts a democratic constitution and a largely capitalist economy and abandons socialist doctrine in favor of pragmatic solutions. Recently, the Mugabe government has become more authoritarian, and Mugabe once again speaks of far-reaching prosocialist policy changes in the offing. This Estimate looks at Zimbabwe on the eve of the expiration of some of the Lancaster House-mandated constitutional safeguards and examines the most likely course of the government over the next two years in domestic, regional, and international contexts.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Over the next two years, we believe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist, will continue to move incrementally toward his goal of establishing a one-party, socialist state. The central government will be likely to play an increasing and more direct role in the country's economy. But Mugabe will not attain his ideal of a socialist state during the period of this Estimate because of economic constraints and his own reluctant realization of the important role of the private sector.

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Mugabe has consolidated power and created some of the political and economic instruments necessary for an accelerated implementation of socialism by:

- Isolating all political opposition and neutralizing potential rivals within the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).
- Strengthening party control over the bureaucracy and developing an extensive grassroots infrastructure.
- Increasing government intervention in the economy and expanding social welfare programs.
- Solidifying ZANU's political control over the security forces through the creation of the 5th Brigade and the Presidential Guard, whose officers and men come strictly from ZANU party ranks, as well as by filling all key Army and police command positions with ZANU loyalists.

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Mugabe faces major obstacles in carrying out his agenda, and several key variables—internal and external—will affect both the pace and extent of Zimbabwe's movement toward a one-party, socialist state. These include:

- The level of economic growth.
- The increasing levels of factionalism and corruption within the regime.
- The ability of ZANU to reach a political accommodation with the opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) that will meet Ndebele demands for some form of power sharing and undercut antigovernment dissidence in Matabeleland.

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- The extent and nature of Zimbabwean involvement in regional conflicts, especially in South Africa and Mozambique.
- Harare's relationship with the USSR and the nature of their political, military, and economic ties. [redacted]

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The Mugabe regime will attempt to increase state intervention in some sectors of the economy despite increasing costs, such as:

- A long-term decline in economic growth as the government's interventionist policies take effect.
- Increased budget deficits, a weakening of the currency, and increased inflation and corruption.
- Driving off potential foreign investors, reducing capital inflow, and placing a further burden on the country's limited resources.
- Reducing the likelihood of any new agreement with the International Monetary Fund. [redacted]

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In the foreign policy field:

- Harare and Pretoria appear to be moving toward a more confrontational relationship. Nevertheless, we do not expect Harare openly to allow its territory to be used by the African National Congress (ANC) or other South African insurgent groups as a base for launching attacks on South Africa over the next two years. The ANC's military wing will continue to operate covertly inside Zimbabwe, however, which will force Harare to crack down on ANC guerrillas from time to time in an effort to avoid South African reprisals. Periodic crackdowns and other measures to control ANC activity will be unlikely to placate Pretoria, however, which could easily—if it so desires— increase pressure on Zimbabwe by utilizing its military and economic leverage against the Mugabe regime. [redacted]
- In our estimation, the cool relations extant between Zimbabwe and the USSR will improve, but military, economic, and party-to-party ties to Moscow and other Communist governments will probably remain limited. Mugabe might be forced to rely increasingly on the Soviets as a source of security assistance if Harare were to become bogged down in a seemingly unending military commitment in Mozambique, if Zimbabwe experiences repeated South African cross-border raids, or if other sources of assistance dry up. Although Harare will be unlikely to enter into any major arms relationship, we believe Zimbabwe and the USSR will sign a military aid agreement—including air defense equipment—within two years. [redacted]

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— Although the debate within the government over the extent and nature of Zimbabwe's commitment to Mozambique has yet to be settled, we expect Harare to continue to provide some form of military aid to the Machel government. Harare will be unlikely to repeat the large-scale counterinsurgency operations of last year, although it will probably conduct limited operations along the Beira and Tete transportation corridors with a reduced force of some 4,000 to 5,000 troops. Mugabe probably now recognizes the need for reconciliation between Maputo and the insurgents and will show less inclination to wage aggressive counterinsurgency campaigns on Maputo's behalf. [REDACTED]

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We expect relations between Zimbabwe and the United States to continue to deteriorate over the next few years, primarily because of differences over the South African issue. Other factors adding to this deterioration will be improved Zimbabwean relations with the USSR and Mugabe's posturing and drawing Zimbabwe closer to radical, anti-American Third World positions on international issues. Mugabe's assumption of the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement this summer will accelerate Zimbabwean acceptance and advocacy of radical positions on international issues hostile to US interests. [REDACTED]

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Although Harare is mindful of its dependence on Western economic aid and investment, US attempts to link Zimbabwe's political behavior to the level of economic assistance will be viewed by Harare as unwarranted interference in its affairs and largely disregarded. Moreover, any further curtailment of aid by the United States would have little immediate impact. Over the longer term, the Mugabe government's commitment to improving social welfare and the resulting need for Western economic assistance to maintain vigorous economic growth will be a moderating factor in Zimbabwean-US relations. [REDACTED]

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One alternative outcome, judged considerably less likely, which would have a negative impact on US interests, would be a more rapid and radical implementation of socialism that entails the devastation of the private sector of the economy, vastly increased social spending, and a burgeoning foreign debt. In this contingency, escalating hostilities with South Africa, a major military presence in Mozambique, and the absence of other sources of military aid would force Mugabe to seek large-scale security assistance from the USSR. [REDACTED]

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Another alternative outcome, judged somewhat more likely, would be a fragmentation of the ZANU regime into contending factions, which would probably lead to protracted instability and present enhanced opportunities for extensive external meddling. [REDACTED]

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Ethnic Composition in Zimbabwe



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DISCUSSION

Socialist Vision and Realities

1. Since assuming leadership of an independent Zimbabwe in 1980, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has remained unwavering in his commitment to build a socialist society under his ruling, Shona-based Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). While Mugabe has taken some initial steps toward implanting socialism, these efforts have disappointed the few party hardliners who favor a more rapid transformation. There continues to be a wide divergence between pronounced socialist goals and actual political and economic policies. This dichotomy results from unrealistic expectations and Mugabe's need to expand ZANU's domestic control and to address economic problems. [redacted]

2. Mugabe is a self-avowed Marxist-Leninist who appears personally dedicated to the socialist platform that ZANU adopted when it was an independence movement. Socialism is seen by Mugabe as a method by which the state can control the allocation of scarce national resources to maximize benefits for society and as a system compatible with his African and Christian values. He believes, however, that the private sector plays a valuable role in the economy and that Marxist principles must be implemented through a gradual process. [redacted]

3. Mugabe is adept at balancing competing demands within ZANU, relying on collective decision-making to build a consensus within the party. His style is to move slowly and cautiously on controversial issues, often delaying decisions until he has patiently lined up the needed support. Nevertheless, Mugabe is the primary driving force in ZANU and he retains firm, if not always active, control of the party and government. [redacted]

The First Six Years

4. In order not to jeopardize ZANU's tenuous hold on power, Mugabe did not immediately pursue policies that would aggravate internal tensions or upset external relationships:

- He made no attempt to impose a single-party state but sought accommodation with opposition leader Joshua Nkomo and his Ndebele-based

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and reconciliation with whites.

- There was no wholesale nationalization of the private sector, and state intervention was largely confined to utilizing and expanding regulatory practices inherited from the Smith regime.
- Mugabe made no move to break up the large white commercial farms, and a program to resettle 160,000 black families has achieved less than a fourth of that goal.
- Internationally, he succeeded in obtaining more than \$2 billion in Western aid and signed an IMF standby agreement in 1983.
- Harare continued to maintain economic and unofficial political relations with South Africa, its single most important trading partner¹ and largest investor. [redacted]

5. Nevertheless, beneath his veneer of political and economic pragmatism, Mugabe also gradually laid the foundation for implementing his vision of a socialist society. He began the process of isolating all political opposition outside his party by expelling Nkomo from the Cabinet in 1982 and quietly neutralizing his rivals within ZANU in 1984 by creating a new party Central Committee and Politburo loaded with his handpicked supporters. ZANU undertook initial efforts to develop an extensive grassroots infrastructure throughout the country—with the notable exception of Matabeleland—to politicize the population. ZANU's efforts to strengthen party control over the governmental bureaucracy—an essential step in order to implement fully ZANU's policies—began to take shape. Emphasis has been placed on appointing senior civil servants whose loyalty is first to the party. Emergency regulations continue to be used to circumvent judicial decrees unpopular with ZANU and to imprison its opponents. [redacted]

6. Mugabe started developing a solid basis for a loyal military force and, to a lesser degree, a professional and competent military. The government now feels comfortable with its current military leadership,

¹ About 20 percent of Zimbabwe's trade was with South Africa in 1985. (u)

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having successfully weathered a potentially disruptive ethnic and political shakedown. Shona and Ndebele rivalries, which occupied center stage in the first years of military development, are less of a problem after the reduction of the number of former Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) guerrillas loyal to opposition leader Nkomo, the removal and arrest of senior ex-ZIPRA officers last year, and the reassertion of government control over the all-Shona 5th Brigade. The 5th Brigade, the Presidential Guard, and the North Korean-trained People's Militia—whose loyalty is first to the ruling party—were created to solidify ZANU's political control over the military. Although heavyhanded repression has diminished in the past year, these units, along with ZANU's youth wing, will continue to operate against dissidents, to be used to intimidate political opponents, and to mobilize the party's rank and file. [redacted]

7. The government also has stressed gradual social and economic reform. Social spending has increased by more than 75 percent since 1980 with the number of children in school tripling and the government instituting free health care for low-income families to improve living conditions in the neglected rural areas. Harare continues to make a concerted effort to expand agricultural marketing facilities and credit for communal farmers, to increase agricultural productivity, and to lessen dependence on white commercial farmers. [redacted]

8. While maintaining relations with the West, Mugabe has moved to establish strong political and economic ties to China, North Korea, several East European countries, and leading Third World "progressives," including Cuba and Nicaragua. During its brief tenure on the UN Security Council, Zimbabwe displayed a pro-Third World and anti-Western bias, cosponsoring the resolution condemning the US intervention in Grenada in 1983 and failing to condemn the Soviet shoot down of the South Korean airliner. Although generally cool toward the USSR—because of Soviet military support and political favoritism to ZAPU during the war for independence—Mugabe began to improve relations after his visit to Moscow in late 1985. [redacted]

Mugabe's Agenda

9. Despite the slow pace of change in his first six years, Mugabe has grown increasingly self-confident. Over the next two years, we believe Mugabe will try to make major strides—with mixed success—toward implementing his socialist goals. [redacted]

Political

10. Mugabe is determined to create a one-party state with or without the cooperation of opposition parties and will use ZANU's 1980 and 1985 election victories as partial justification. Dismissing the failures of other African one-party regimes, he sees ZANU as the sole entity capable of overseeing the transition to socialism. Mugabe will undertake measures—both legal and extralegal—to circumvent constitutional obstacles. We expect he will get the parliamentary support in the next year needed to abolish the 20 seats constitutionally reserved for whites. Moreover, decisionmaking power will continue to be transferred away from Parliament to ZANU's Central Committee and Politburo. ZANU literature calls for increased training and education to develop a party vanguard that will spearhead the transition to socialism. We anticipate more determined efforts to improve party organization, discipline, and the development of an elitist party structure. The party will seek further control over the day-to-day life of individuals, including active involvement in social and private organizations, but we doubt it will make much progress. [redacted]

Economic

11. Mugabe sees increased party and governmental control as the key determinant of national resource allocation as ZANU moves to restructure the economy. According to party pronouncements, the government is willing to accept joint and private management based on the principle that the private sector will be guided by ZANU toward contributing to national goals. [redacted]


12. The government has said in its new five-year development program that it plans to direct foreign investment only into areas where the state lacks the resources to invest, especially those that enhance the national development plan. This process would include increasing the degree of ownership and control of the means of production by the state and local investors. This progressive increase in state ownership and control is part of a strategy for speeding up the establishment of a national economy, according to the party's 1985 manifesto. [redacted]


13. These policies—if prosecuted vigorously—probably would increase pressures on foreign investors for disinvestment. Foreign owners of existing investment in Zimbabwe, however, appear in general to be more optimistic now than in previous years when the economy was hit by drought and, before that, the civil war. [redacted]

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Moreover, we do not believe that Mugabe's political and economic agendas will be pushed far enough during the period of this Estimate to reverse significantly this attitude. Nonetheless, his policies will continue to have a negative impact on levels of new foreign investment, and the government will be hard pressed to find the investment capital it requires. The negative perceptions created by Mugabe's rhetoric have already limited private investment. 

14. Despite increasing fiscal pressure to limit spending, ZANU is publicly committed to improving the rural standard of living. This includes expanding extension services to small farmers, improving road networks, and providing credit facilities. The party has stated its intention to continue the land redistribution program in a more concerted manner. All land acquired by the government in prime agricultural areas is to be left intact in large-scale productive units but reorganized as state farms or agricultural cooperatives. In recognition of the positive role played by white commercial farmers, the party has said it is prepared to protect and support the efficient ones, but we believe new government policies will slowly begin to affect them adversely. However, the majority of white commercial farmers, having remained throughout the civil war and prospered since independence, are likely to remain in Zimbabwe over the next two years at least. 

Military

15. Further development of loyal and responsive armed forces—as tools for supporting government policies both at home and abroad—will remain Mugabe's priority for the military. Professional and technical development, especially training and the acquisition of modern weapon systems on concessional terms, will be emphasized, focusing largely on the South African threat. We believe Zimbabwe will increasingly look to the East for help in acquiring arms and developing an integrated air defense system, both for political reasons and because Harare doubts the West would be responsive to its defense needs, especially against the South African threat. The Air Force will probably concentrate on acquiring early warning radar, communications equipment, interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery, and the Army will seek to improve its antiarmor capability. Nevertheless, the British will be likely to continue to play an important training role for the Army because the military holds their past performance in high regard and has chosen to build on the British model it inherited. (See Annex B for details on Zimbabwe's armed forces.) 

Foreign Policy


16. Mugabe's socialist leanings, ZANU's origins as a liberation movement, and Zimbabwe's role in southern Africa will continue to set the tone of Harare's foreign policy. This perspective causes Harare to seek to define foreign policy dogmatically on issues such as nonalignment and sovereignty, often resorting to moral posturing and stands on principle—regardless of the political or economic consequences. As Mugabe assumes the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement later this year, he is likely to espouse stronger Pan-Africanist and nonaligned foreign policies as he endeavors to move closer to “progressive regimes” and increases its rhetorical support for the struggle against South Africa. ZANU will move to develop stronger ties to Communist and working-class parties in the name of socialist solidarity. 

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Key Variables

17. Mugabe faces major obstacles in carrying out his agenda, and several key variables—internal and external—will affect both the pace and extent of Zimbabwe's movement toward a one-party, socialist state. These include:

- The increasing levels of factionalism and corruption within the regime.
- The ability of ZANU to reach a political accommodation with ZAPU that will meet Ndebele demands for some form of power sharing and undercut antigovernment dissidence in Matabeleland.
- The level of economic growth, as affected by government's management of the economy, external factors affecting its performance, and the possible departure of the pragmatic and capable Minister of Finance Bernard Chidzero.
- The extent and nature of Zimbabwean involvement in regional conflicts, especially in Mozambique and South Africa.
- Harare's relationship with the USSR and the nature of their political, military, and economic ties. 

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Domestic Challenges

Factionalism

18. So far, Mugabe has been able to contain simmering tribal, personal, and ideological rivalries within

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ZANU. Although the Karanga are the largest Shona² subgroup, Mugabe and his fellow Zezuru—the second-largest subgroup—have dominated ZANU since independence, largely by allying with the third-largest subgroup, the Manyika. The Zezuru, Manyika, and other non-Karanga traditionally have banded together to deny the Karanga top leadership positions. Sub-ethnic frictions among the Shona resurfaced prior to the first postindependence ZANU party congress in August 1984 when behind the scenes machinations by the Zezuru enabled them to keep control of party leadership positions at the expense of the Karanga. More recently, tribal frictions between the Karanga and Zezuru became public following parliamentary debate over irregularities in the Transport Ministry.

19. Mugabe will find it increasingly difficult to dampen tensions within ZANU. Dissatisfied elements could seek to challenge his leadership, keeping the party in turmoil and disrupting ZANU's agenda. As the regime further consolidates its power at the expense of the political opposition, we expect ZANU to become an increasingly factionalized party with sub-ethnic divisions among the Shona reinforcing personal and political rivalries. ZANU politics will be more and more characterized by subethnic alliances, political maneuvering, and infighting as each faction attempts to increase its power.

Corruption

20. Although corruption in Zimbabwe is not severe by African standards, it is becoming a political issue. The growing number of officials under investigation and continuing reports of high-level malfeasance highlight the steady growth of corruption since independence. Popular resentment has begun to surface, and Mugabe is being criticized privately for failing to punish senior government officials under a leadership code he has promised to enforce. Few party officials will be disciplined, although the leadership code is likely to be used to crack down on political opponents from time to time. We do not believe the issue will reach a level where it threatens the regime's stability over the next two years, but corruption will increase, damage Mugabe's credibility, undercut the effectiveness of his economic restructuring, and prompt popular dissatisfaction.

² The Shona are an ethnolinguistic group composed of six basic tribal subgroupings: Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika, Korekore, Ndau, and Kalanga.

Dealing With ZAPU

21. ZANU's reliance on heavyhanded tactics, uncompromising attitudes by party hardliners, and Mugabe's lack of forceful leadership in seeking a political accommodation with ZAPU and its Ndebele supporters have made for protracted negotiations. The principal stumblingblock, however, is Mugabe's belief that unity should be primarily on ZANU's terms and that ZAPU should be the one to make all major concessions.

22. ZAPU is divided over the wisdom of merging with ZANU. Nkomo alone cannot bring an end to the antigovernment dissidence because any ZANU dictated merger would be unlikely to address the tribal grievances that fuel the violence. In addition, sources within both parties speculate that unity might create two splinter groups of hardliners that refuse to join the new combined party. We believe that some form of political merger between ZANU and ZAPU will occur during the period of this Estimate; however, such an agreement is unlikely to address fundamental Ndebele demands for power sharing, and many rank-and-file ZAPU members will reject such a merger.

The Dissident Threat

23. The regime's reliance on force to suppress the dissidents has served only to fuel tensions between the Ndebele and the Shona and has created opportunities for South African meddling, such as support for pro-ZAPU dissidents. Nevertheless, we expect that the government will continue to use the Army both as a military tool to stem highly visible dissident activity and as a political tool to demonstrate ZANU's power. This will not resolve the essentially political and ethnic problem, however, and probably will divert scarce financial resources from economic development.

24. Antigovernment dissidence in Matabeleland began in March 1982 following the ouster of Nkomo from the government and the arrest of two top ZAPU aides. The violence has continued unabated, with the dissidents—estimated to number between 600 and 800 men—attacking local ZANU party officials and supporters in Matabeleland and the Midlands, destroying schools and other public property and causing several millions of dollars in damages. According to South African support for certain dissident elements, which are often referred to as "Super ZAPU," reached a high point in early 1983 but declined by the beginning of 1984. The government has become increasingly concerned, however, that


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Zimbabwe: Economic Indicators


Real GDP Growth

Percent




Price Increases

Percent




Current Account

Million US \$




Manufacturing Output

1980 = 100




Foreign Debt Service

Percent



Foreign Debt

Billion US \$



^a Projected.

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Pretoria may once again be providing support to the dissidents. Security officials reported earlier this year an increase in sightings of heavily armed groups carrying RPG-7 rocket launchers and light machine-guns near the Botswana-South African border. These groups may have been responsible for a number of recent attacks in southern Matabeleland. We expect dissident activity to continue at current nonregime threatening levels, although South Africa could, if it decided to do so, heighten the level of violence by increasing military support to dissident elements. While such dissidence will not threaten the regime, it could result in a quasi-insurgency that would devour additional resources, further handicapping economic development, increasing ethnic polarization, and slowing down the implementation of Mugabe's agenda.

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Economic Constraints

25. Mugabe must reconcile strong political pressures for rapid improvement in black living standards and for greater government control of the economy with the need to reduce unnecessary spending because of foreign exchange shortages and to preserve the productivity of the private sector, which generates most foreign exchange earnings. White rule provided a small share of the black population with good jobs and high living standards, although the number of black university graduates was much higher than in surrounding black countries. Since independence, relative deficiencies in skills and education have held the rise of blacks into the ranks of business management and professional occupations to a slower pace than might otherwise have been the case. Zimbabwean GDP of \$2.3 billion in 1985, about \$285 per capita, is roughly in line with most other African countries, but the figures mask a major disparity between the small, mostly white upper middle class and a large mass of poor blacks.

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26. The Zimbabwean economy has averaged a growth rate of only about 1 percent annually since 1982. Although low growth during this period was largely the result of an unusually severe and lengthy drought, it also reflected Harare's decision to maintain foreign exchange allocations to importers at no more than about \$1 billion a year in order to reduce current account deficits.

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27. Chronic foreign exchange shortages will continue to impede growth for the foreseeable future. Manufacturing is heavily dependent on raw materials, and all sectors of the economy depend on imported

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capital equipment and machinery. Zimbabwe's exports, however, consist mainly of farm and mineral products that are subject to fluctuations in international commodity prices and, in the case of agricultural products, to the vagaries of weather. Increases in exports large enough to relieve foreign exchange constraints are unlikely over the next few years.

28. As a result, we believe that economic growth will average no more than about 3 percent annually over the next two years, with a further decline in the growth rate over the longer term as government interventionist policies begin to take effect. Expansion at this rate will not be sufficient to meet the government's aspirations for rapid increases in black employment, education, and income. The perception in the government that economic growth is constantly falling short of desirable levels will probably heighten the predisposition of senior officials toward greater government interference in the economy to protect or expand employment, but limited resources will hamper the government's ability to do so. Any significant increase in government ownership and operation of businesses would probably lower economic growth because of the inefficiencies of government versus private management.

29. Sharply rising budget deficits reflect the disparity between Harare's efforts to improve black welfare and the economy's ability to generate the revenue to pay for rapidly expanding social services. The growth in spending for education, which is the largest single budgetary line item, has exceeded the increase in defense expenditures since 1980 by 80 percent, and other social spending has followed suit. In total, budgetary increases have topped 20 percent annually since 1980, and annual deficits more than doubled to almost \$500 million in 1985. As a result, government debt to domestic and foreign lenders also has more than doubled to about \$2.5 billion, and interest expenditures have more than tripled to about \$400 million, one-fifth of the total budgetary outlays. The government is not at the point where it feels compelled to cut expenditures sharply, however, and we do not expect Harare to request an IMF standby agreement in the next year.

Foreign Policy

Regional Role

30. Following his landslide election victory in July 1985 and the consolidation of his political base, Mugabe assumed a more prominent leadership role in

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Zimbabwe: Economic Outlook for 1986-88

Despite a decline in the cost of oil imports, we estimate that requirements to conserve scarce foreign exchange will hold economic growth in Zimbabwe to no more than 3 percent annually during 1986-88. A rising service ratio on foreign debt—about 30 percent in 1986—will absorb much of the roughly \$100 million in annual savings from lower oil prices. Another drought like that experienced during 1982-84 would sharply reduce prospects for growth. [redacted]

In addition to the possibility of recurring drought, government policies designed to hold down farm surpluses may slow agricultural growth. Relatively strong extension and marketing institutions in Zimbabwe and favorable pricing policies led to substantial crop surpluses in 1985 and 1986. Harare is reluctant, however, to export surpluses because of the loss it would have to bear on commodities that it had purchased at subsidized domestic prices, which exceed the going rates on international markets. As a result, the government announced minimal price increases for major farm commodities in 1987 in order to depress production incentives and cut surpluses that have led to significant storage problems. Except for drought years, we expect a continued effort by Harare to control farm surpluses. [redacted]

Prospects for strong growth during 1986-88 by mining and manufacturing in Zimbabwe are poor. A likely downturn over the next year or so by the economies of

major Western countries that import Zimbabwean minerals, which are in competition with large, efficient South African mines, will slow the growth of minerals exports by Zimbabwe. Manufacturing will suffer from a scarcity of raw materials as a result of foreign exchange shortages and from the impact of racial problems on the rate of growth in South Africa, which is Zimbabwe's main market for manufactured goods. [redacted]

Controlling the budget deficit will be a major problem during 1986-88. Costs rising from Harare's efforts to increase black education and welfare and its military intervention in Mozambique have kept budget deficits above 10 percent of GDP for the past several years. Even if Zimbabwe cuts defense costs by reducing its military commitment in Mozambique, Harare's push to expand education and a continuing heavy drain for subsidies to government corporations will keep expenditures high. [redacted]

Government spending will be a major factor in boosting inflation. A near doubling of inflation to about 20 percent, for example, will accompany a decline in growth in 1986. The incentives that led to this surge—increases in administered prices for food, fuel, and industrial products in an effort to cut budgetary outlays for subsidies—probably will spur repeated increases in government controlled prices. Harare also will continue to feel heavy pressures to increase farm and civil service wages during 1986-88. [redacted]

southern African affairs. He appears to be responding to overtures from African and Third World governments who see him as a potential leader in the forefront of the struggle against apartheid, and we believe Mugabe would like to assume a more activist role in the region. We anticipate relations between Harare and Pretoria to undergo periodic crises and Mugabe's anti-South African rhetoric to become more strident. Although we do not expect Mugabe to push policies in the near term that would bring Zimbabwe into open confrontation with Pretoria, increasing turmoil in South Africa could lead Pretoria to strike at its neighbors. [redacted]

31. *Mozambique.* In large part, the decision to participate militarily represented an effort by Mugabe to repay President Machel for Mozambican assistance to Zimbabwean guerrillas during the Rhodesian civil war and reflected his growing concern over the threat to Zimbabwe's important supply and transportation links through Mozambique. The Zimbabwean Army last year estimated the cost of maintaining its troops in Mozambique at about \$15 million a month, and

equipment losses are draining the Army's resources at an alarming rate. [redacted]

32. Last summer, spurred on by appeals from Machel and the declining Mozambican security situation, Harare nearly tripled the number of its troops in central Mozambique—to about 9,000 men—and began undertaking joint counterinsurgency operations with the Mozambican Army. Since January, there has been growing debate within the military and the government over Zimbabwe's role in Mozambique. Senior Zimbabwean officers now assess the Mozambican Army as an undependable ally. They deeply resent the Mozambican Army's inability to occupy and hold positions captured by the Zimbabwean forces and have complained that the Mozambican Army appears to think it is Harare's—not its own—responsibility to defeat the insurgents. Zimbabwean commanders also fault Maputo's military for its inadequate training, poor morale, and chronic supply shortages. Citing these problems as well as other concerns, the Zimbabwean Army in mid-February ordered all its forces to cease offensive operations immediately and to limit its

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actions to defending transportation and supply lines along the Beira and Tete corridors. On Mugabe's personal orders, however, Zimbabwean forces recaptured the Mozambican rebels' headquarters at Gorongosa in April 1986. [redacted]

33. Although the debate within the Zimbabwean Government over the extent and nature of its commitment to Mozambique continues, we expect Harare to sustain some military aid to the Machel government. The Army will be likely to keep some 3,000 to 4,000 troops in central Mozambique to protect the Beira and Tete corridors, and an additional 800 to 1,000 men at a forward airfield in either Mozambique or eastern Zimbabwe to launch intermittent but limited raids against the insurgents. We do not believe Harare will repeat last year's large-scale sweep operations. [redacted]

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34. *South Africa.* Harare has pursued a mixed policy of accommodation and confrontation with South Africa. Despite Mugabe's strident public attacks against South Africa and apartheid, his government maintains a private dialogue with Pretoria. Indicative of this two-track policy was the government's handling of the strain in relations that resulted when landmines planted by the African National Congress (ANC) exploded in South Africa's northern Transvaal Province near the Zimbabwean border last fall. Despite bellicose public posturing by Harare and Pretoria, both governments were quietly able to defuse the crisis, but South Africa's inclusion of Zimbabwe in its anti-ANC raids in May 1986 has worsened relations. [redacted]

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35. Harare and Pretoria appear to be moving toward a more confrontational relationship, although we expect working-level relations to continue in some form. Some elements within the Mugabe government favor a more activist role in assisting both the ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) guerrillas and have already given limited military aid to the PAC. Others, including key security officials wary of Zimbabwe's vulnerabilities, are counseling a more cautious approach and the danger of underestimating South African resolve. [redacted]

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36. Mugabe's political affinity for the PAC over the more capable ANC probably will buttress the proponents of restraint over the short term, and we expect Mugabe to continue to place Zimbabwe's interests first. Nevertheless, we believe Mugabe's desire to play a role in toppling the Pretoria regime and in securing the gratitude of an eventual black majority government in South Africa will bring about a deterioration in bilateral relations. [redacted]

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37. Mugabe's ability to restrict South African liberation groups within Zimbabwe may well be the pivot on which Harare's relations with Pretoria will turn. We do not expect any major reduction of Zimbabwean restrictions on PAC and ANC military personnel so long as Harare feels vulnerable to South African retaliation. Although Harare only allows the group's political wing to operate in the country, ANC guerrillas have nonetheless managed—with some apparent low-level government support—to increase their operations. The ANC's military wing will continue to operate covertly inside Zimbabwe, however, which will force Harare to crack down on ANC guerrillas from time to time in an attempt to avoid South African reprisals. Moreover, periodic crackdowns and other measures to control ANC activity will be unlikely to placate Pretoria, which could easily—if it so desires—increase pressure on Zimbabwe by utilizing its military and economic leverage against the Mugabe regime. [redacted]

38. The Mugabe government is well aware that its military forces—although some of the best in the region—do not provide an effective deterrent against South Africa. Top government officials also are fearful that South Africa will step up its destabilization efforts inside Zimbabwe by supporting opposition elements or conducting unilateral covert operations. Such actions would probably act to catalyze support for moving toward a more confrontational approach in dealing with Pretoria. Although Harare has sought, since 1980, to reduce its economic dependence on Pretoria, South Africa still remains a major trading partner, Zimbabwe's largest foreign investor, and primary transportation route for its exports. A Zimbabwean Government study last spring concluded that, despite efforts to increase the use of road and rail connections through Mozambique, Zimbabwe had become increasingly reliant on South Africa to move imports and exports, and that only 16 percent of the country's surface traffic was not subject to Pretoria's control. [redacted]

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Global Relations

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
39. *USSR.* Mugabe has recently been moving to improve Zimbabwe's heretofore cool bilateral relations with the USSR. Until Mugabe's visit to Moscow last December, Harare's relations with Moscow had been proper but restrained. Mugabe's suspicions of Soviet intentions in southern Africa and Moscow's close ties to Nkomo and ZAPU during the war for Zimbabwean independence acted as a barrier to improving relations. The visit appears to have allayed some of

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Security Situation for Zimbabwe



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Mugabe's concerns, however, and laid the groundwork for future discussions on expanding political, economic, and military cooperation. [redacted]

40. Mugabe signed agreements in Moscow on economic and technical as well as party-to-party cooperation. The economic agreement appears to be a standard framework for discussions of possible future activity, while the protocol formalizes previous low-level party-to-party contacts. Early this year, both countries exchanged military delegations as a followup to general discussion concerning military assistance that began in December. Zimbabwe has also approved Moscow's request to increase its diplomatic mission by two persons, to 32. [redacted]

41. Improvement in bilateral relations is likely to be a gradual process, however, with each side being very sensitive to the moves the other makes. Mugabe will remain skeptical of Moscow's intentions in Zimbabwe, while the Soviets, fully cognizant of Mugabe's suspicions, are likely to move cautiously in their efforts to improve relations. Moreover, we doubt that Mugabe, as the chairman of the Nonaligned Movement, will want to draw too close to the USSR, thereby jeopardizing his nonaligned credentials. Moscow, however, will continue to be alert to opportunities that it can effectively exploit to promote closer ties. Mugabe might be forced to rely increasingly on the Soviets as a source of security assistance if Harare were to become bogged down in a seemingly unending military commitment in Mozambique, if Zimbabwe experiences repeated South African cross-border raids, or if other sources of assistance dry up. [redacted]

42. We believe Zimbabwe will be reluctant to enter into any major arms relationship with Moscow because of concerns over increased Soviet political influence. Nevertheless, we expect Harare to sign an arms agreement with the USSR within the next two years in order to acquire badly needed air defense equipment—including radar and surface-to-air missiles—as well as other small-scale military aid. [redacted]

43. *Cuba.* Mugabe's visit to Cuba in October 1985 and the subsequent exchange of high-level delegations is indicative of the expanding cooperation between the two countries. Mugabe is impressed with Cuba's assistance programs, although a number of his advisers remain wary of long-range Cuban intentions. They probably view limited aid programs, however, as a safe way to satisfy Havana's repeated calls for expanded cooperation. Mugabe agreed early this year to accept low-level educational and medical aid as well as limited Cuban security training—despite a belief by

Zimbabwean security officials that Havana had little to offer in either expertise or equipment. Zimbabwe's desperate need for technical and financial assistance to host the Nonaligned Movement summit, however, will make it difficult for Harare to limit future Cuban involvement in the near term. [redacted]


44. *The United States and the West.* Although Mugabe appears to desire amicable relations with Washington and the West because of the importance of Western assistance³ to Zimbabwe's economic success, the long struggle to overthrow the white minority regime—which many Zimbabweans believe was supported by the West—colors their world view and often causes Harare to define foreign policies dogmatically on issues of nonalignment and sovereignty. [redacted]

45. Harare's bilateral relations with the West are likely to be characterized by periodic outbursts of anti-Western sentiment and charges of interference in Zimbabwe's internal affairs. Consequently, Mugabe's policies, both at home and abroad, will continue to alienate Western governments, raise human rights concerns, frighten off foreign investors, and lead to a further deterioration in Harare's relations with the West. The key determinants of US-Zimbabwean relations will be Harare's jealous guarding of its own version of nonalignment and a fundamental difference of views on the situation in southern Africa. We expect Zimbabwe to remain highly critical of US policies in southern Africa, which it sees as tacit support for the Pretoria regime. Moreover, Zimbabwe is likely to oppose the US policies on Central America and arms control. [redacted]

46. *Nonaligned Movement.* Mugabe is scheduled to assume the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) for the next three years following the movement's summit in Harare this August. Cuba—probably with Soviet encouragement—played a key role in the NAM's decision to have Mugabe serve as its next chairman. Despite Mugabe's initial reluctance, Cuba appealed to his desire to keep international attention focused on southern Africa and to be seen as a Third World leader. Cuba and other radical NAM members believe they will be able to get Mugabe to adopt strident anti-American and anti-Western positions on such issues as South Africa, Central America, and the world economy because they think that Zimbabwe lacks the diplomatic experience to manage the organization effectively and that Mugabe lacks the skills necessary to bridge differences among members. [redacted]

³ The United States alone since independence has provided more than \$360 million in economic aid to Zimbabwe. [redacted]

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Scenarios

The Most Likely

47. We believe Mugabe will continue to move incrementally over the next two years toward his goal of establishing a one-party, socialist state. Despite substantial political and legal obstacles, we expect a single party state to be proclaimed by ZANU within the period of this Estimate. It will fall short of a true power sharing arrangement with ZAPU and do little to quell the antigovernment dissidence in Matabeleland. As the legal opposition begins to fade away, however, we anticipate greater—and more open—divisions within ZANU, although Mugabe probably will ward off challenges to his preeminence.

48. The central government will be likely to play an increasing and direct role in the country's economy through the use of joint ventures and the creation of new parastatal enterprises. In addition, high social spending will make budget deficits and corruption worsening problems. Harare's socialist rhetoric will drive off potential foreign investors and place a further burden on the country's limited financial resources.

49. We believe relations with Pretoria will deteriorate, but we do not expect Zimbabwe openly to allow insurgent groups to use its territory to attack South Africa. Zimbabwe will continue to lend military support to Mozambique, however, mainly to protect the vital transport facilities on which Harare depends. Mugabe probably now recognizes the need for reconciliation between Maputo and the insurgents and will show less inclination to wage aggressive counterinsurgency campaigns on Maputo's behalf.

50. We also expect Harare's anti-Western criticism to become increasingly strident after Mugabe assumes the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement and draws closer to so-called Third World progressives, placing an additional strain on relations between Washington and Harare. Zimbabwe will be likely to expand political ties to the Communist Bloc—the USSR in particular—over the next two years. Moreover, we believe Harare will sign a military assistance agreement with Moscow within the period of this Estimate, but we doubt Mugabe will seek a major military client relationship with the Soviets.

Alternative Scenarios

51. The volatility of the key variables leads us to examine two alternative outcomes, which we consider less likely but plausible, given the increasing domestic

pressures on Mugabe to meet rising expectations and fulfill preindependence promises to redress social injustices.

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52. **Radical Change.** This scenario envisions radical elements within ZANU encouraging Mugabe to push for a rapid transformation to socialism, undertaking massive social spending, and substantially running up external debt. Moderates such as Minister of Finance Chidzero and skilled white technocrats within the government would be replaced, large-scale disinvestment and abandonment of assets would ensue, large numbers of whites would flee the country, and any political opposition would be repressed and a one-party system quickly and unilaterally imposed. Harare might also provide arms, bases, and military training to South African liberation groups in Zimbabwe. Escalating hostilities with South Africa (whether initiated by either side), a continuing major military presence in Mozambique, and the absence of other sources of military aid would most likely force Mugabe to seek large-scale security assistance from the USSR. He might also cater to Soviet interests in his chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement, undermining limited US leverage and jeopardizing Western economic assistance programs.

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53. **Regime Fragmentation.** Another alternative outcome, judged somewhat more likely, would be a fragmentation of the regime into contending factions. As the political fortunes of the government's opponents begin to fade, factionalism within ZANU could increase dramatically, leading to instability and ultimately to the party's fragmentation. If such a schism were to occur, ZANU would probably divide along tribal lines with the Zezuru and Manyika uniting against the Karanga. If the Karanga formed an alliance with the Ndebele, this would cause protracted instability and disrupt Mugabe's efforts to advance socialism, preempt any activist regional role for Zimbabwe, and present opportunities for extensive external meddling.

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Implications for the United States

54. In the most likely scenario, we expect relations between the United States and Zimbabwe to continue to deteriorate. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe will remain important to US policymakers because:


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— The success of Zimbabwe's experiment with multiracial democracy and a mixed economy with a substantial private sector could serve as a model for conflict resolution and development in South Africa.

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- Over the next several years, Harare will continue to be an important political and military actor in the region.
- Major Soviet inroads would provide Moscow with a useful platform from which it could support pro-Soviet forces in the region and in South Africa in particular.
- Harare will be increasingly active internationally and will speak for the Nonaligned Movement for the next three years. 

tional or if US-Zimbabwean relations deteriorate more sharply than we now anticipate. Although Harare is mindful of its dependence on Western economic aid and investment, US attempts to link Zimbabwe's political behavior with the level of economic assistance will be viewed by Harare as unwarranted interference in its affairs and largely disregarded. Moreover, any curtailment of aid by the United States would have little immediate impact, and any future economic consequences would be unlikely to deter Mugabe from pursuing his socialist policies. Over the long term, his commitment to improve social welfare and the resulting need for Western economic assistance to maintain vigorous economic growth will be a moderating factor in Zimbabwean-US relations. 

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55. Harare will find itself increasingly at odds with US foreign policy goals in Africa and the Third World. We expect Soviet influence to grow slowly, but this growth would be accelerated if relations between Pretoria and Harare were to become more confronta-

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ANNEX B

The Zimbabwean Armed Forces

Independence and Integration

The 42,000-man Zimbabwean military establishment descends from elements of the former 38,000-man Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF), 35,000 guerrillas from Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and the 20,000 guerrillas from Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). The three groups are all represented in the new unified national military, which includes both the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Zimbabwe Air Force (AFZ), but former ZANLA are predominant. [redacted]

Suspicion and caution characterized the new government's approach to integration of the two guerrilla armies and the former Rhodesian conventional force into a single military organization. Mugabe had to place high priority on this delicate and dangerous issue. During the early 1980s, the three forces were kept separate to avoid conflict. Mugabe realized, however, that to prevent internal violence, these forces would have to be either demobilized or permanently integrated into the armed forces. [redacted]

The RSF personnel were the easiest to demobilize. By disbanding the reserves and terminating the draft, Army personnel strengths dropped and other former RSF personnel resigned, dissatisfied with the new government. Demobilization and integration of the 55,000 insurgents proved more complicated. Initially, the government intended to integrate about 19,000 guerrillas into the new Zimbabwe National Army and demobilize the remaining 36,000 into a nation-building program emphasizing agricultural projects. The failure of these projects and sporadic violence between former ZANLA and ZIPRA personnel caused Mugabe temporarily to abandon demobilization and integrate the remaining men into the Army. [redacted]

Demobilization began again in 1982. A program that combined cash incentives with the provision of educational and employment opportunities encouraged soldiers to leave the Army. By the end of 1982, a total of over 22,000 men had been demobilized and ZNA numbered approximately 45,000. [redacted]

Zimbabwean Armed Forces

Army

Strength: 40,000

Major Units: five infantry brigades, one Presidential Guard Brigade, one parachute group, one commando battalion, one mechanized infantry battalion, one horse mounted infantry battalion, one separate infantry battalion (ex-ZIPRA), one tank regiment, one armored car regiment, one field artillery regiment, and one air defense artillery regiment.

Major Weapons: 61 medium tanks, 230 armored personnel carriers, 140 armored reconnaissance vehicles, 40+ field artillery (100 mm and over), 40+ field artillery (under 100 mm), 18 multiple rocket launchers, 6 recoilless guns/rifles (100 mm and over), 58 recoilless guns/rifles (under 100 mm), 6 mortars (100 mm and over), 1,650 mortars (under 100 mm), 364 antitank weapons, 80 air defense artillery (under 23 mm), 35 air defense artillery (23 mm and 37 mm), 30+ SA-7 missiles.

People's Militia

Strength: 23,000

Major Units: eight infantry brigade headquarters, (35 infantry battalions being organized).

Paramilitary Police

Strength: 3,000

Air Force

Strength: 2,000+

Major Units: one ground attack squadron, one light bomber squadron, one helicopter squadron, one transport squadron, one light support squadron, two training squadrons, two anti-aircraft artillery squadrons.

Major Aircraft: 10 to 12 attack, 6 to 7 bombers, 9 to 11 light strike, 15 to 20 transport, 24 to 28 trainers, five utility, five to 10 utility helicopters, and 20 to 27 helicopter gunships.

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As relations between the ZANU-dominated government and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) opposition worsened in 1983, the government embarked upon a new campaign aimed at reducing ZAPU influence within the Army. By February 1984 as few as 8,000 former ZIPRA guerrillas remained, about 20 percent of ZNA strength. While most former ZIPRA guerrillas were formally demobilized, several thousand deserted and a number of these joined the dissidents in Matabeleland. By the beginning of 1984, total military strength stabilized at about 42,000 men. The demobilization program formally ended with an ethnic and political force composition more comfortable for the ZANU government. Whites and former RSF blacks probably amount to no more than 15 percent of the force, and former ZIPRA guerrillas to no more than 18 percent. [redacted]

Force Development

Army Organization

Between 1980 and 1985 the armed forces, particularly the ZNA, underwent considerable reorganization and training. The ZNA has retained basically the same Rhodesian-British staff organization and unit structure that existed prior to independence. By mid-1984 brigade organization had been pretty much standardized, with each of the five brigades and the new Presidential Guard Brigade controlling three infantry battalions. The infantry totals 18 battalions of about 900 to 1,000 men each. With the exception of the Presidential Guard Brigade, each brigade has organic engineer, signals, maintenance, intelligence, medical, educational, and finance units. [redacted]

Elite Units. The elite specialized units in the ZNA, manned largely by former RSF personnel, both black and white, include the 1 Parachute Group, 1 Commando Battalion, 1 Mechanized Battalion, and Grey's Scouts. Most of the remaining white Rhodesian officers and noncommissioned officers in the ZNA are in these units. These units have shouldered more than their share of the burden, not only against the dissidents in Matabeleland but also on external operations in Botswana and Mozambique. Overall, these units have proved their competence and effectiveness time and again on combat operations. The government tends to depend heavily upon these units for the more critical military operations because it views them as apolitical career soldiers. Many members of these units are simply building time toward retirement. In the next five years many will retire and their expertise will be difficult to replace. [redacted]

Ethnicity. True integration is not likely to be achieved in the military. Former RSF members are likely to remain in elite units. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Brigades are a mix of former ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants but are commanded almost exclusively by ex-ZANLA fighters. The 5th Brigade and the Presidential Guard Brigade represent the government's effort to build a politically reliable force; they are entirely ZANLA. The 5th Brigade, equipped and trained by the North Koreans as a combined arms brigade (1981-82) initially was accountable directly to the Prime Minister. In early 1983, when the brigade deployed to Matabeleland, its antidissident operations resembled a rampage against Ndebele noncombatants. The atrocities, since attributed not only to its Shona makeup but also to the unit's low levels of discipline, training, organization, and leadership, resulted in a relook at ethnic units and North Korean training. The 5th Brigade was placed under the direct control of the Army Commander, stripped of its organic armor and field artillery assets, and retrained by the British. Similarly, the all-ZANU Presidential Guard Brigade, trained and advised by the North Koreans (1982-83) and the Chinese (1984), has since also received training from the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT). [redacted]

Air Force Development


The Air Force has gone from a small but highly efficient organization staffed exclusively by whites, utilizing old but reliable Western aircraft, to a mostly black force employing a mixture of aircraft. Overall, capabilities have declined and are likely to improve only gradually. The July 1982 sabotage of Thornhill Airbase, which destroyed and damaged a large percentage of the AFZ's aircraft, increased suspicions about the loyalty of remaining white members of the AFZ. The investigation of the Thornhill bombing resulted in the arrest of six senior officers, all of them white, for suspected collusion with South Africa in the attack. While they were later acquitted, the damage to white morale had been done. A large exodus of white pilot and technical personnel from the AFZ in 1983, resulted in a barely operable force. [redacted]


In July 1983, Pakistani Air Marshal Daudpota and 60 Pakistani Air Force advisers took command of the AFZ. The Pakistanis were expected to not only train the required number of black pilot and technical personnel to fill the vacancies but also groom black officers to command the Air Force, and in January 1986 a Zimbabwean took command of the AFZ. Recruitment standards were lowered to increase the

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number of blacks in the Air Force, but relatively few black pilot personnel fully qualified. Of 32 pilot personnel who returned from training in Romania and North Korea in 1984 and 1985, only four were even marginally qualified. 

A large percentage of the AFZ's fixed-wing ground attack aircraft, transports, and helicopters remain grounded because of a shortage of pilots and poor maintenance. A major test of the Air Force's capabilities came in late 1985 during Zimbabwean operations in Mozambique, and the Air Force was criticized for its poor performance. 


People's Militia


The paramilitary militia will become an increasingly important adjunct to the regular Army. The People's Militia was originally envisioned as a reserve force of lightly armed personnel organized with a brigade headquarters in each of the eight provinces, controlling 28,000 militiamen who would perform local area security and reinforce the ZNA and police in antidissident operations. A worsening dissident situation in Matabeleland caused the government to accelerate militia training in 1983, and the total strength of the People's Militia had reached about 23,000. 


It now appears that the government will work toward a total force of about 80,000. All militia personnel are expected to be ZANU members. The mission of the militia has been substantially expanded, and in 1985 it was formally placed under the direct control of the ZNA as the reserve arm of that organization. In March and April 1985 militia personnel were trained in the use of medium and heavy weapons, to include antiaircraft guns and mortars, and in June 1985, militia and units assumed duties vacated by the ZNA 3rd Brigade when that regular unit was deployed to the operational area in Mozambique. Militia personnel also have been attached to the ZNA brigades operating in Mozambique. The relatively low level of militia training will prevent the militia from becoming a major factor in Zimbabwean military operations for several years, but it does enable the ZNA to stretch its resources, especially on external operations. 


Foreign Military Assistance

Further development of the Zimbabwean military will be heavily dependent upon foreign military assistance. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the United Kingdom has been the largest source of military aid. Since 1980, purchases from the United

Kingdom have included jet trainers, fighters, bombers, land rovers, and an approach radar system. The most important British contribution has been its training program. Immediately after independence the BMATT ran an individual training program to turn former guerrillas into regular soldiers. During 1981 and 1982, the British continued to provide battalion-level advisers to conduct unit training. Since 1983, the BMATT has concentrated on upgrading the quality and curriculum of the ZNA's numerous military schools. The most successful of these efforts has been the Battalion Battle School Course. All of the ZNA's infantry battalions have rotated through the school at least once, and the course has proved extremely effective in upgrading the combat capabilities of the ZNA. The high quality of the British program has contributed not only to the relatively orderly transformation of the ZNA, but also to a pro-Western sentiment among many ZNA personnel. Other military equipment and supplies have been provided by Western Europe, Canada, and Brazil. 

Among Communist countries, North Korea and China have been the major donors. In 1982 and 1983, Zimbabwe accepted a major North Korean grant of armor, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and other weapons with which to equip the 5th Brigade. Between 1981 and 1983, Korean advisers trained the 5th Brigade, Presidential Guard Brigade, and People's Militia. However, the ZNA has been generally dissatisfied with both the quality of equipment and training provided by the North Koreans. 

In 1983 China provided Zimbabwe, on a grant basis, a number of field artillery pieces, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and antiaircraft guns. China currently is delivering 10 to 12 F-7 fighter aircraft to Zimbabwe. A small Chinese military team provided field artillery and tank gunnery training and advised the Presidential Guard Brigade during 1984. The Chinese advisers were evidently well accepted by the Zimbabweans, and the BMATT, which has taken over training from the Chinese, recently gave the Chinese instructors high grades for the quality of their training. A small Chinese Air Force team is presently in Zimbabwe to assist with the F-7 fighter aircraft 

Smaller quantities of military hardware, primarily ammunition, have been provided by Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Likewise, Zimbabwean military personnel have undergone training in Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Yugoslavia. 

Until quite recently, military relations between the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe were almost nonexistent. In 1984 the Soviets made a token delivery of about \$4

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Selected Military Assistance to Zimbabwe, 1985-86

Supplier	Type	Value	Selected Equipment	Advisers	Zimbabweans Abroad
China	Pilot and technician training	\$16 million	10 F-7 fighters ^a	10	100 to 125
Eastern Europe	Artillery and armor training	Unknown	Small arms and ammunition	None	15 to 25
North Korea	Pilot training	Unknown		11 to 16	15
Pakistan	Air Force training	Unknown		30 to 40	None
Soviet Union		None		None	None
United States	Training	\$200,000		None	18
United Kingdom	Infantry training	Unknown		54	5 to 10
Italy	Equipment	\$44 million	Contract signed for 10 helicopters	None	None

^a Initial delivery started June 1986.

million in small arms and ammunition. More recently, a Soviet military team visited Zimbabwe, and an AFZ delegation visited Moscow in March to discuss the possibility of obtaining air defense equipment, which would include fighters, SAM missiles, and early warning radar. [redacted]

Growing Pains

The Zimbabwean armed forces face a number of difficulties in force development. Since independence, a major portion of the ZNA has been heavily committed to combat operations, first against Zimbabwean dissidents in Matabeleland and later against antigovernment insurgents in Mozambique. These campaigns have strained the military's scarce resources, depleted equipment, and devoured funds to purchase new weapons and equipment. Currently, most of the ZNA's black commanders are relatively young and lack experience, and their recent actions in Mozambique have highlighted these and other ZNA weaknesses. [redacted]

Capabilities

The Zimbabwean military can defend its territorial integrity against any neighbor except South Africa. The armed forces could provide little defense against a purposeful conventional South African attack. Against a small-scale unconventional South African incursion, the Zimbabwean military has a limited capability to intervene and block. Within Zimbabwe the armed forces can conduct limited joint conventional or counterinsurgency operations with some success. Its ability to project such offensive operations across its borders is limited by inventory and logistic constraints. Defensive operations abroad, limited in scope such as those it conducts along the Mutare-Beira line of communications, are within its capabilities. [redacted]

The Air Force has only a marginal operational capability. It suffers from a shortage of close air support and transport aircraft and qualified pilots and maintenance personnel. An air defense capability is almost entirely lacking. [redacted]

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