

PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 23 JULY 1985

FEATURES/COLUMNISTSWASHINGTON TIMES Pg. 1
23 July 1985**Ogarkov tells
how Soviets
can win war
in Europe**By Yossef Bodansky
SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov is the Soviet Union's most important man in uniform.

He has formulated and implemented a new, comprehensive "grand strategy" for the Soviet Union holding that not only are nuclear wars winnable by the side that strikes first and without warning, but that, through a massive lightning strike by modern conventional forces.

NEWS ANALYSIS

Soviet forces could achieve victory over NATO without a single nuclear weapon being fired.

This Ogarkov "grand strategy" will dominate Soviet defense policy until the next century.

By the mid-1970s, the Soviet military had achieved the capability of mounting sudden, strategic deep offensives without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Based on his high-level experience with U.S. attitudes in the SALT I negotiations, Marshal Ogarkov realized that American political and military leaders would agonize over, and perhaps even forgo, making a decision to escalate unilaterally to the use of nuclear weapons in the event the Soviets launched a non-nuclear invasion in Europe.

Marshal Orgakov argued that, if the Soviets would capitalize on the emotional biases of the United States, they could complete the occupation of Western Europe in the non-nuclear initial period of war before Washington could decide whether to resort to nuclear weapons to stop the Soviet advance.

In other words, the deeper into Western territory the Soviets could penetrate in the initial non-nuclear stage of the war, the less likely the Americans would be to use nuclear weapons to stop them.

Furthermore, reasoned Marshal Ogarkov, if the Soviets, having in the first instance a clear nuclear superi-

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Pg. 9
23 July 1985**France is rethinking
its 'independent'
defense posture****New consensus raises hopes
for European cooperation on defense**By William Echikson
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Paris

France's defense plans are being revolutionized.

Instead of Gen. Charles de Gaulle's "independent" policy, which reserved French forces for the defense of French national territory, France now proposes to help guarantee West Germany's defense.

In recent weeks, all of France's political parties except the Communists have announced support for a plan that would throw French forces into the fray at the beginning of a European conflict. President François Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl discussed the issue briefly at a meeting last week and are scheduled to explore it further at a special summit in August.

The change in thinking brings France closer to the NATO alliance. It also raises new possibilities for European cooperation on defense, including the possibility that France would extend its nuclear umbrella to West Germany.

"A new national consensus is being created," says Dominique Moisi, director of the French Institute for International Affairs. "Many of the old ambiguities about our relationship with Germany and our defense are being reduced."

General de Gaulle's "fortress France" strategy long had looked unworkable. During the 1970s, then-President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing began suggesting that French independence would have little substance if West Germany were overrun.

During the early 1980s, President Mitterrand edged closer to a more European concept of defense, activating the security clause in the 1963 Franco-German friendship treaty and creating the rapid action force, which could intervene quickly in Germany.

Still, de Gaulle's legacy proved difficult to overcome. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's Gaullist allies, upon whom he was dependent for a parliamentary majority, ruled out any strategic shift. And Mitterrand did not move too fast out of fear of undermining the national consensus on defense.

Now the old consensus has shifted. In late June, the Gaullists abandoned their archaic doctrine. In early July, the Socialists joined them, even declaring that the

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ent radar and would dispense with jamming equipment, bomb racks and other equipment for air-to-ground attack. As General Dynamics figures it, that would make its plane about \$2 million cheaper than an F-20. General Dynamics says its specially configured F-16C should be compared with the F-20, but Northrop draws comparisons between its plane and the regular F-16C.

Still, despite all the lobbying, there are more questions than answers. What if the Air Force decided to purchase fewer than 396 F-20s? Would Northrop be able to make enough foreign sales so that the price would not go up?

Is the mission of continental air defense sufficiently important that a new type of aircraft needs to be purchased to funnel more planes to the Air National

Guard, especially now that the Air National Guard Association has said it does not want the planes unless there are at least two squadrons of F-20s in the active Air Force?

The new General Dynamics offer also deserves scrutiny. The offer has led to misleading press reports that a price war has been encouraged. But General Dynamics executives say that they have not cut into their profit margin. As a June 17 letter to Orr and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles A. Gabriel states, the cost saving "is achieved by the inclusion of selected mission-specific systems and the removal of other equipment."

Would the Air Force and General Dynamics seek to add more sophisticated equipment to the stripped-down plane once it had been purchased? The company's new proposal advertised that "future systems, such as sensors and avionics, can be easily added...." If

JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY
13 July 1985 (23) Pg. 69

Test aircraft covers for B-1B's mechanical hitch

By Hugh Lucas in Washington

THE US AIR FORCE, introducing the new Rockwell International B-1B bomber to its operational force at a ceremony attended by senior officers and an audience of 45 000 at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, had one problem. The bomber was in Nebraska, with mechanical trouble.

So instead of the first production B-1B taking part in the ceremony, a test aircraft had to be flown from California to fly over the gathered crowd.

The scheduled aircraft had been grounded at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, the day before, where it had gone to be displayed to Strategic Air Command headquarters personnel.

A spokesman said that parts in its air-conditioning equipment had become detached and some could have entered the engine intake during flight.

As it was, he said, two of the engines sustained damage during the flight just before touchdown at the base near Omaha.

The programme had been cancelled in 1977 by President Carter in favour of building up the air-launched cruise missile force. President Reagan then restarted it in 1981 as part of his massive continuing military build-up.

Rockwell is to reach a production rate of four aircraft per month in September 1986 and continue until 1989 when the 100-aircraft order is to be completed, unless more are authorised. It is to be joined by the Stealth bomber, now under development by Northrop Corp, in about 1992 as part of the Pentagon's 'triad' weapons strategy.

Dyess will eventually be the base for 29 B-1Bs for an operational wing of 24, which will train all the pilots.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
29 July 1985 (23) Pg. 16

Latest worry for the Pentagon: Evidence that its newest fighter planes, with their sharp maneuvering ability, can build up such high gravitational forces as to cause blackouts among pilots. Some recent crashes are blamed on the phenomenon.

some F-20s were purchased, would the price for the specially tailored F-16C stand? General Dynamics has conditioned the offer on an Air Force commitment to fill its active inventory with F-16s and not F-20s, but that may still be an open question.

Both planes are likely to compete for the Air Force's close air support mission. But is either plane well suited for that mission?

Finally, should the Air Force conduct a

"flyoff" between the tailored F-16C and the F-20 instead of having the two aircraft compete primarily on the basis of cost?

Those questions may not be answered before a commitment is made. But one thing is not in doubt. "Northrop has done a masterful job," said a defense industry executive. "Whatever happens with the plane, it's a major accomplishment that they have gotten this far." □

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French nuclear force should have a role in West Germany's defense.

A follow-up poll in the French daily *Le Monde* showed that a majority of the public agreed with this position.

Why the change in attitude?

The French fear West German pacifism and neutralism. In the French view, the furor two years ago over the installation of United States Pershing missiles in West Germany underlines the tenuous nature of Germany's Western connection. By offering a stronger military commitment, the French hope to strengthen that connection.

For different reasons, this argument appeals both to right- and left-wingers. Pierre Lellouche, a colleague of Mr. Moisi's at the French Institute of International Relations, argues in a new book that France must contribute more to Western defense through West Germany because of reports of growing Soviet military strength. He says a weak, divided Germany under constant Soviet pressure also exposes France to Soviet pressure.

In another book, Regis Debray, a former Mitterrand adviser who is an outspoken critic of the US, argues that France and West Germany must forge a closer defense partnership so that Europe can gain greater independence from the two superpowers. In his view, a weak, divided Germany exposes France to both Soviet and US pressure.

Money is the second motivating force behind the strategy switch. Budget cut-backs mean French defense expenditures are not rising as much as expected, and French officials admit privately that France no longer can afford the cost of a purely independent defense policy.

Hardest hit are the conventional forces. Since France depends on its nuclear "force de frappe" for its primary defense, the Mitterrand government decided back in 1982 to reduce the number of foot soldiers as well as the amount of conventional equipment purchased.

Now the Armed Forces chief of staff, Gen. Jeannou Lacaze, has revealed that the Armed Forces will have 35 billion francs (\$3.9 billion) less to spend than forecast through 1988. That translates into a further 25 percent across-the-board cut. Instead of a planned 1,200 tanks, there will be only 800. And so on.

Even the modernization of the "force de frappe" may have to be slowed. General Lacaze suggests canceling development of a new multiple-warhead submarine-launched missile and of a new land-based mobile missile.

Only a stronger defense partnership with West Germany could ease these looming deficiencies, French officials say. France and Germany are producing an at-

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ority, threatened to escalate the conflict into an all-out nuclear attack on the North American continent, they would further complicate and prolong Washington's agonizing over whether to use nuclear weapons.

This would buy more time for the Soviet armed forces in which to complete their non-nuclear occupation of Europe.

The man who has sculpted those forces is a professional soldier, utterly loyal to Russia and the Soviet system, and in return enjoys the total trust of the "nomenklatura," the high-ranking, privileged bureaucrats.

Earlier this month, Marshal Ogarkov's de facto supreme military position was recognized publicly — when the Kremlin reappointed him first deputy minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces.

tack helicopter and an antitank missile together. French officials say a long list of other projects, including a European fighter plane, also is being considered.

But the French admit that this cooperation faces big obstacles. They say that the West Germans are pleased with the increased French concern for their defense — until it infringes on their relations with the US. As far as the West Germans are concerned, neither the Rapid Action Force nor even the "force de frappe" would provide a suitable replacement for West Germany's basic defenses in NATO.

"The Germans do not say exactly what they want from us," complains one French official. "They just don't know."

The French also face problems. Joining in West Germany's defense means drawing closer to NATO, yet no one here seems prepared for a French return to the alliance's integrated military structure, from which de Gaulle withdrew in 1967. For the sake of "independence," French officials say the subject remains "taboo."

Although Western defense officials have long said NATO can live with such a public pretense as long as the French cooperate in private, the same officials fear French and NATO strategies remain incompatible.

As NATO talks more and more about fighting a prolonged conventional war, French strategy continues to stress the early use of nuclear weapons. French defense spending focuses on modernizing the nuclear "force de frappe," NATO and West Germany are emphasizing purchases of conventional arms.

"We have made tremendous progress on security issues with Germany in the last year," concludes Moisi of the Institute for International Relations. "But much ambiguity remains."

Nikolai Vasilyevich Ogarkov was born on Oct. 30, 1917, in the Kalinin-skaya Oblast in central Russia. He finished vocational high school in 1937 and joined the army the following year. In 1941 he graduated from the Kuybyshev Military Engineering Academy and was posted to the Karelian front against Finland where, as a senior fortifications engineer, he used slave and forced labor supplied by Yuri Andropov.

This was the start of a 42-year relationship with a man who later rose to the highest ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), serving as a Central Committee secretary in the 1960s, then KGB chief and finally, as CPSU general secretary, becoming the nation's top leader.

During the war, Mr. Ogarkov accumulated diversified combat and command experience in staff and engineering posts in the Kola peninsula against Finnish-German forces.

After the war, he opted for a military career, returning for advanced courses at the Kuybyshev academy. Until 1957, he served in senior command and staff positions in the Far Eastern military district. In 1959, he graduated from the Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff, a key event in the career of a future senior commander of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In December 1961, Mr. Ogarkov was promoted from commander of a motorized rifle division in East Germany to chief of staff and deputy commander of the important Belorussian Military District and, in mid-1963, to first deputy commander of that district. These posts gave him valuable experience in command and control of combined-arms formations.

After Mr. Ogarkov was made commander of the very important Volga Military District in December 1965 — which contains the supreme command post at Zhiguli near Kuybyshev (a city forbidden to foreigners) on the Volga River, which would be the supreme headquarters in the event of nuclear war — he resumed his close cooperation with Mr. Andropov, who had become the KGB chief.

The Zhiguli command post was entirely rebuilt under Mr. Ogarkov's overall supervision — a post for which his engineering background made him particularly qualified. In recognition of the excellence of his work, and with the rank of colonel general, he was made a candidate member of the Central Committee.

Gen. Ogarkov's brilliance in trickery and deception operations was displayed at this time, when he began preparations for military

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WASHINGTON POST 23 JULY 1985 Pg. 11

No 'Smoking Gun' on Nicaragua

Administration Says Hard Proof of Terrorism Must Stay Secret

By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration appears to be relying on newly captured documents and on the testimony of a defector from the guerrilla forces in El Salvador to convince a skeptical Congress and the public that Nicaragua should be held responsible for past—and future—attacks on U.S. citizens in Central America.

However, the State Department acknowledges there is no "smoking gun" in the publicly available material that links the leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua to alleged terrorist training centers or to particular terrorist acts. They say classified reports do provide that evidence but cannot be disclosed, even if the secrecy weakens public support.

In the administration's campaign for support, officials are working hard to replace the term "leftist guerrilla" with the much more negative word "terrorist" in the public mind, depicting the Sandinistas as the center of an international brotherhood of bomb-throwers and the Salvadoran rebel forces as Exhibit A in that brotherhood.

Asked early last week for all available supporting evidence for President Reagan's July 8 assertion that Nicaragua was "a focal point for the [world] terrorist network," the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy provided a 2½-inch stack of unclassified documents to The Washington Post.

The same documents, plus classified evidence, are "indications" that the Sandinistas support and "may be directly involved" in preparations for future attacks on U.S. personnel in Honduras, administration officials said later in the week.

The unclassified documents included several recent and not-so-recent public "white papers" and briefing transcripts that outline administration views, two newspaper articles on international leftists living in Nicaragua—reprinted from The Miami Herald by the conservative Cuban-American National

Foundation—and two unbound reports.

One report is an untitled set of analyses of the "debriefing" of Napoleon Romero Garcia, alias Miguel Castellanos, who was identified as a former central committee member of the guerrilla Popular Liberation Front—one of the five groups making up the El Salvador guerrilla coalition—and the political-military commander of its San Salvador unit. He was arrested April 11 and decided to cooperate with the Salvadoran government, the document said.

The other report, entitled "Analysis of Documents Captured by the Salvadoran Army, April 18, 1985," outlines papers it says were captured with Nidia Diaz, a senior commander of the Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party, PRTC by its Spanish initials, another group in the coalition.

A faction of the PRTC claimed responsibility two months later for the June 19 shootings of 13 people, including six Americans, at a San Salvador cafe, and the administration last week blamed those murders indirectly on Nicaragua.

Reagan's national security affairs adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, said Friday that the charges "derive from our knowledge, which is very concrete, that Nicaragua does support the PRTC." He and other officials declined to discuss any evidence of Nicaraguan activity in Honduras.

The Nidia Diaz report includes copies of letters from the guerrilla coalition to the Sandinistas discussing aid flow to the coalition, although not specifically to the PRTC. The papers include a discussion of the meaning of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983, lists of Salvadorans being sent to training courses in communist bloc countries, a training diagram of a surface-to-air missile, and a revolutionary handbook.

The report also includes a copy of an April 1984 meeting agenda that lists "possibility of Honduran documentation," "relations with Honduran military" and "possibility of communications network" involving

Honduras and Managua.

A document copied in the report, entitled "Territorial Efforts That the Party Will Make," includes under "Eastern Front" the notation, "to continue directing the work in the interior from the refuge located in Honduras."

These, a State Department official said, were part of the administration's proof of Nicaraguan activity in Honduras, but "not the smoking gun" indicating terrorist planning. That information remains classified, he said.

The guerrilla coalition has denounced these descriptions of the Diaz papers as lies and forgeries.

Testimony from the defector Romero, like that of the Diaz report and earlier defectors, described Nicaraguan aid to the Salvadoran guerrilla coalition in general, rather than to any specific group.

"According to Romero, materiel given to the insurgents by Eastern European countries is collected in Cuba before being sent on—mostly by air—to Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas retain control over the warehouses," one document said. "Romero said that requests for arms shipments are presented by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [the guerrilla coalition, or FMLN] leadership to a special department of the Sandinista government for approval, but that the Cubans are actually in control."

For example, "he [Romero] claimed that the FMLN was required to submit an operational plan to the Sandinistas" on the use and transport from Nicaragua of surface-to-air missiles the Sandinistas had reportedly authorized. But the SAMs never arrived, Romero told his debriefers.

Instead, "according to Romero, the Sandinista leadership is divided over aiding the Salvadorans," the report said. Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, Interior Minister Tomas Borge and Foreign Affairs Coordinator Bayardo Arce "agree with the Cubans, who see aid to the FMLN as the 'proper role' for Nicaragua in NICARAGUA...Pg. 4-F

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exercises intended to restore the land battlefield as the prime form of warfare. Some of the initial tests of new weapons and tactics and the development of the airborne forces for the exercise were conducted in Volga Military District in strict secrecy. Gen. Ogarkov devised for these exercises a major deception or "maskirovka" project that would on the one hand intimidate Western observers by demonstrating the might and sophistication of the Soviet military and, on the other hand, persuade NATO observers that it was futile to consider the Rhine as a defensive line.

Gen. Ogarkov had a special floating bridge built and invented a totally bogus "First Guards Bridge-Laying Division" to lay it. An empty train and truck caravan were raced across. Until the defection of a Soviet officer 10 years later, the West was convinced that the bridge was genuine.

Gen. Ogarkov's outstanding performance brought him to the Politburo's attention. In April 1968 he was promoted, ahead of schedule, to general of the army and was named first deputy to the chief of the general staff. His main assignment was reactivation of the Chief Directorate of Strategic Maskirovka — the GUSM, or 13th Directorate in charge of "strategic deception."

The Russian term "maskirova" includes camouflage, concealment and deception, and it does well to consider the expertise, flair and talent for maskirovka of the Soviet Union's commander-in-chief against NATO.

As chief of strategic deception, Gen. Ogarkov expanded his close work with the KGB, and he and Mr. Andropov personally were involved in some of the most daring deceptions and disinformation operations against the West. Many of these took place during the 1969-71 SALT I negotiations where Gen. Ogarkov, while head of strategic deception, was the top Soviet military delegate. One would have thought that this might have told the American SALT negotiators something about Soviet intentions.

Defectors from Soviet military intelligence, the GRU and the KGB credit Gen. Ogarkov personally with the clever maneuver by which he succeeded in drawing the United States into self-exposure of its intelligence capabilities by establishing the precedent that all future negotiations would be based solely on data provided by the American side.

In recognition of his contribution to SALT I, Gen. Ogarkov was elevated to full membership in the Central Committee. In March 1974, he

was appointed deputy minister of defense. In January 1977, he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union and appointed chief of the general staff and first deputy minister of defense. He was also made Hero of the Soviet Union.

All of his promotions and honors came earlier than would have been expected and were unprecedented.

Marshal Ogarkov worked tirelessly for the modernization and professionalization of the Soviet military forces. His engineering and command experience puts him in the unique position of being able to comprehend the latest scientific-technical developments and to follow the development of military doctrine, science and the art of war.

Furthermore, Marshal Ogarkov entered the general staff determined to make a major impact. His first task was to complete formulation of a unified "grand strategy" for the Soviet Union. He established a small group of senior general staff officers and theoreticians from the main military academies to function as his think-tank, studying the challenges of warfare in the future.

He himself is a prolific writer on military theory and strategy. His many articles and monographs, dangerously neglected by Western military strategists, provide a clear picture of his sophisticated strategic thinking and the depth of his military knowledge.

Marshal Ogarkov was responsible for the Zapad-81 military exercise, in which the Soviet military forces confirmed their ability to conduct a non-nuclear, strategic deep offensive. In this exercise, Soviet forces were able to move in just a few days across distances exceeding the distance between Minsk and Paris.

Subsequently, the Soviets have committed themselves to winning total victory in the non-nuclear initial period of war as their preferred form of warfare if they go to war in Europe. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Soviets have profoundly reorganized their entire armed forces. The senior combat commanders have been entrusted with unprecedented battlefield authority, and they are assigned diversified weapons ranging from air force through chemical troops to tank armies.

The Soviet Air Force, the fleet and other forces were reorganized and stripped of power in order to facilitate Marshal Ogarkov's new combat command structure.

Marshal Ogarkov envisages a battle fought in the future as a series of swift and massive engagements in which huge combined-arms superunits advance rapidly, despite

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support of the "international proletariat," it quoted Romero as saying.

None of the documents provide any testimony or indications that Nicaragua is being used as a training base by international terrorist groups. The Miami Herald articles name many European and Latin American leftist revolutionaries in Managua who were denounced as terrorists in their home countries, but quote western sources there as saying the city appears to be less a headquarters than "a tropical sand-and-surf watering hole for the international revolutionary set . . . a winter barracks for over-repressed guerrillas."

One key member of Congress took a wait-and-see approach to the available proof. "These are very serious charges," said Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. "We need more than this before we start flying off the handle."

mounting casualties caused by a massive use of guided munitions by the West.

Marshal Ogarkov believes most emphatically that the Soviet scientific-technological effort should be dedicated principally to integrating high technology into weapons and fighting capabilities. Every new industrial facility and most agricultural systems are built as military systems temporarily employed for non-military uses — putting a further strain on Eastern economies.

Last month, Marshal Ogarkov went still further in his advocacy of forestalling the ability of the enemy to strike the Soviet Union. It should be a chilling, but not daunting, thought that the leading Soviet general, the master of strategic deception, camouflage and concealment, is a believer in pre-emptive first strikes. U.S. strategic planners and arms control negotiators should be concerned that Marshal Ogarkov has been allowed to remold Soviet forces to carry out a pre-emptive first strike and that he now has been confirmed as commander over those very forces.

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The Perception Is the Reality

AIR FORCE MAGAZINE
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NATO may be an untidy alliance, but it endures and gets the job done.

THE fundamental fact of NATO is that it is primarily a political alliance rather than a military one. It is based on voluntary participation by nations who did not surrender their sovereignty to join.

This has been its greatest strength, enabling it to endure for thirty-six years. It has also been the source of its often-cited disarray as independent-minded members quarrel with each other on points of both major and minor consequence.

Leading off an April 23 Aerospace Education Center Roundtable on NATO, Joseph J. Wolf, director of the Atlantic Council, compared the Alliance to the Kon-Tiki raft: "It wallows partly under water most of the time, but it doesn't sink." Despite the tensions, the Roundtable panelists said, NATO still has the strong support of member governments and a majority of the citizens in Europe and in the United States.

Even political pronouncements by leftist factions may be less significant than they sound. "There has been a pattern of opposition parties being more extremist while they are in opposition than they are when they are in power," said Wolfgang Pordzik of the Washington office of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

A great many of NATO's real problems have to do with the diverse interests, the intentions, and the commitments of the member states.

"In NATO, the perception is the reality," said Russell E. Dougherty, AFA Executive Director. To deter an adversary from aggression, "you have to deny any perception of success if the other side uses its forces. In order to do that, you have to prepare a fighting force." Consensus to field that deterrent force depends on convincing people that it is necessary to do so—another perception.

The biggest perception issue of the lot, however, is the credibility of the US guarantee to use its strategic nuclear weapons, if need be, to protect Western Europe. Doubts about the continued validity of that guarantee stem from an "irreducible difference" in strategic interests, said Dr. Jeffrey Record of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

In the beginning, the NATO nations pledged themselves to regard an attack upon one as an attack upon all. Over time, confidence in this principle has diminished.

"As the nuclear balance shifted from one of substantial [US] nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union to one of parity, it became less and less credible to believe that an American President would risk the homeland of the United States on behalf of any other entity than the United States," Dr. Record said. As close as US and European interests may be, they are not identical. "It is in our strategic interest to confine any war in Europe to the European theater," Dr. Record said. "Understandably, the Europeans take a different view."

"If there is war in Europe, conventional or nuclear, the Europeans are not sure who will win—but they are certain who will lose," said Gen. William Y. Smith, USAF (Ret.), former Deputy CINCEUR and rapporteur for the Roundtable.

The best evidence of US commitment to defend Europe is the presence of US troops on European soil. "It is extremely important for reasons of deterrence and European confidence in the American guarantee that Americans get killed in the first hours of an attack on Western Europe," Dr. Record said. "It might also be important for some Europeans to be in the Persian Gulf so that when the first battalion of Marines is wiped out defending European

oil, a few Europeans will get shot in the process."

A recurring question about European defense is what the French—who pulled their forces out of NATO in 1966—would do in the event of conflict. "I would suspect that, in time of crisis, their territory and their forces would be made available to the Alliance," said Lt. Gen. George M. Seignious, USA (Ret.), president of the Atlantic Council. He expressed concern that France, as a free agent operating outside of the NATO structure, "could preempt the use of nuclear weapons."

"The French may be a little difficult at times, but they're even more difficult for the Russians, aren't they?" said Air Vice Marshal Ronald Dick, the British Defense Attaché in Washington. "There's no question in my mind that the French would use [their strategic forces], and I'm sure the Russians understand that, too. The presence of this volatile, unpredictable, separate nuclear entity on the end of the Continent seems to me to be more beneficial than too difficult for us to deal with." A key element is perception.

Perception also figures in more NATO problems, particularly the testy question of its financial support. Many Americans feel that the Europeans do not bear their full share of the expense. Europeans point out that they increased their defense spending by twenty-three percent in the 1970s while the US was cutting back on its own. The end of the argument is nowhere in sight.

Despite some of the perceptions—and because of others—NATO is still getting the job done after thirty-six years. And it is still demonstrating its ability to muster up cohesiveness and determination when it has to have them. ■