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FILE

Estimated Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1965-90

Reference Aid

DATE 9-16-87 FILE
DOC NO SOV M 87-20085
OIR 3
P & PD 1

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Summary

Information available as of 15 July 1987 was used in this report.

We estimate that Soviet spending for defense increased from about 60 billion rubles in 1965 to nearly 110 billion rubles in 1985, when measured in constant 1982 prices. Growth in defense spending in this period roughly paralleled that of Soviet Gross National Product (GNP), averaging more than 5 percent a year from 1965 until 1974, then slowing to an annual average of less than 2 percent through 1985.¹ As a result, the share of Soviet GNP allocated to defense--again in 1982 prices--remained roughly constant--at about 15 percent.

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Procurement expenditures--which historically have accounted for about half of total Soviet defense spending--grew at an average of more than 5 percent a year during the late 1960s and early 1970s. After 1974, although remaining at a high absolute level, procurement was essentially flat through 1983, as decreased military purchases of ships, missiles, and aircraft offset rising expenditures for Soviet land arms and space programs. Since 1983, procurement has begun to show some growth--1 to 2 percent per year on average--but it does not appear that this growth represents any change in defense spending policy since Gorbachev's arrival. Rather, it has been largely driven by the start-up and early stages of production of several new weapon systems that were under development before Gorbachev took office.

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¹ We calculate growth rates by determining the annual percent changes in the data and then taking the arithmetic mean of those changes. The resulting average annual rates of growth are slightly higher than the compound growth would be. We prefer the annual change method because it takes into account all of the year-to-year changes rather than just the difference between the first and last years.

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Although procurement expenditures levelled off during the late 1970s and early 1980s, total defense spending continued to grow because of increasing expenditures for research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) and operations and maintenance (O&M). We estimate that spending for both of these categories has increased at an average annual rate of 4-5 percent since 1965. [Redacted]

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We believe that total defense spending will grow by approximately 2 percent per year on average during the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90) and that cumulative expenditures for procurement during this time will be almost 10 percent higher than in the previous five years. O&M and RDT&E--both growing 4 percent per year on average--will continue to drive overall expenditure growth. [Redacted]

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Scope Note

The purpose of this reference aid is to provide consumers with a summary of CIA's estimates of Soviet defense expenditures. Similar reference aids will be issued periodically, as our database is updated.



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With the exception of the current price estimates in section 4, data on defense expenditures in this reference aid are measured in constant 1982 rubles. We use constant rubles to measure the real growth in defense--that is, changes in military manpower, the volume of procurement and construction, and the scale of RDT&E and O&M excluding the effects of inflation. The Soviets, however, do not use Western-style constant prices. Rather, most references in Soviet literature to defense spending are in terms of current prices, and presumably the leadership uses this measure, along with various physical indicators, to assess trends in resource allocation.




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The data on defense expenditures presented in this report are derived from building-block estimates of the costs of Soviet defense activities. These estimates are made by identifying the activities that make up the overall Soviet defense effort and costing each separately. For some activities--the pay of military forces, for example--the costing is done directly in rubles on the basis of known pay factors or prices. Other programs--the procurement of a given ICBM, for example--are costed in US dollars and then converted to rubles on the basis of information on the relationship of dollar prices to ruble prices for a sample of similar programs.



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This report uses a definition of defense that reflects our best estimate of what the Soviets would regard as defense activities. It includes those activities which the US would consider as national defense, as well as some civil defense programs, civil space activities, and the equipping and maintenance of internal security, construction, and rail-road troops.




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USSR: Expenditures for Defense


Billion 1982 Rubles




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Between 1965 and 1985, the Soviets spent *almost* 2 trillion rubles on defense activities and programs. Total Soviet defense spending grew at an average annual rate of 1 to 2 percent during the 10th and 11th FYPs--1976-80 and 1981-85--compared with a rate of 5 percent annually during the 8th and 9th FYPs--1966-70 and 1971-75. 

Throughout the period, total Soviet defense spending remained roughly in step with overall growth in the economy. As a result, between 1965 and 1985, Soviet defense spending accounted for a roughly constant 15 percent of GNP² (see Appendix). 

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² The estimates of Soviet defense expenditures are in 1982 established prices, i.e., the prices which we believe the Ministry of Defense actually paid in 1982 and would have paid for other years had no price change occurred. To calculate the share of GNP allocated to defense, we estimate both defense spending and GNP at factor cost. In moving the estimates from established prices to factor cost, we attempt to eliminate the distortions in Soviet prices which have occurred because they have been set administratively rather than by market forces. 


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USSR: Distribution of Defense Expenditures by Resource Category

Percent



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The building-block methodology allows the breakdown of defense expenditures into resource categories: investment, operating, and research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E). Investment expenditures are those associated with procurement and capital (major) repair³ of weapons and equipment--currently about 50 percent of total expenditures--and the construction of military facilities, which now accounts for less than 5 percent of the total. The operating category includes expenditures for military personnel--about 10 percent of the total--as well as for the operations and maintenance (O&M) of current forces, which comprise approximately 15 percent of the total. RDT&E expenditures--currently almost 20 percent of the total--are those devoted to exploring new technologies, developing new weapons, and improving existing weapons.

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
³ Capital repair consists of major overhauls on an item to preserve its value--putting a new engine into a tank, for example. Minor repairs, on the other hand, are maintenance-type activities to keep an item functional--changing the spark plugs or tightening a bolt.

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USSR: Expenditures for Defense Procurement


Billion 1982 Rubles



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Measured in constant 1982 prices, procurement expenditures totaled almost 1 trillion rubles during the past two decades, increasing from more than 30 billion rubles in 1965 to more than 50 billion rubles in 1985. Spending on procurement grew at an average annual rate of more than 5 percent during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Our estimate of procurement shows no growth between the mid-1970s and early 1980s. This plateau in procurement reflects slow or negative growth in spending for three major categories of weapons--ships, missiles, and aircraft. Since 1983, procurement has begun to show slow growth--1 to 2 percent per year on average--driven largely by upturns in aircraft and missile procurement. 


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USSR: Distribution of Defense Procurement Expenditures by Weapons Category

Billion 1982 Rubles
100



[Redacted]

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Soviet spending for procurement of military aircraft--currently more than a quarter of total procurement expenditures--rose sharply during the late 1960s and early 1970s--more than 5 percent per year on the average--as the Soviets deployed new generations of fighters and helicopters. With the deployment of these aircraft largely completed in the mid-1970s, aircraft procurement spending leveled off. Since the early 1980s, there has been a return to rapid growth in aircraft procurement, as the Soviets have begun to deploy a new generation of tactical aircraft. [redacted]

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Procurement of missiles currently comprises more than one-fifth of total procurement spending. Primarily as a result of the deployment of the third generation ICBMs--the SS-9, -11, and -13--missile procurement increased at an average of more than 6 percent per year in the decade prior to 1975. During 1976-82, these expenditures decreased at an average of more than 3 percent a year. Subsequently, missile procurement has again begun to grow, due largely to increased expenditures on air-to-air (AAMs), air-to-surface (ASMs), and surface-to-air (SAMs) missiles. [redacted]

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Procurement of ships and boats--which accounts for 10 percent of total procurement spending--grew at an average of 6 percent per year during 1966-74. This was primarily the result of very rapid growth in SSBN procurement--more than 40 percent per year on average--as the first generation of SSBNs was deployed. Since then, procurement expenditures on ships and boats have declined almost 1 percent annually, largely as a result of decreased purchases of SSBNs. [redacted]

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Land arms procurement has risen almost every year since 1965 and currently averages more than 10 percent of procurement expenditures. The growth in spending was especially high--more than 6 percent--before 1974. Since then, growth has continued, albeit at a slightly lower rate. [redacted]

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Procurement of military and civilian space items has also shown relatively constant high growth since 1965--4 to 5 percent per year on average. This has kept this category's share of total procurement spending at about 10 percent. [redacted]

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
We estimate that expenditures on the "other" procurement category--nuclear weapons, electronics, ammunition, and miscellaneous support equipment--grew at approximately 3 percent annually during 1966-85. This category's share of total defense spending remained fairly constant at almost 20 percent. [redacted]

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[redacted]
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USSR: Expenditures for Defense Construction

Billion 1982 Rubles
5




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Soviet expenditures on military construction increased fairly sharply during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The fastest growth--7 percent a year on average--took place during 1966-70, as a result of the building of the silos for the third generation ICBMs and the construction of new airfields. After a short period of absolute declines, spending for military construction has increased at an average annual rate of approximately 1 percent since 1974. 


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USSR: Expenditures for Defense Personnel


Billion 1982 Rubles



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


The growth in military personnel expenditures paralleled the growth in military manpower during 1966-84, both averaging slightly more than 2 percent each year. Growth was fastest during 1966-71--about 4 percent per year on average--as the Soviets expanded their armed forces by about 1 million men. Since then, average annual growth since the early 1970s is estimated to have been considerably slower--about 1-2 percent--reflecting the slower growth of military manpower. 



USSR: Expenditures for Defense O&M

Billion 1982 Rubles




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
In 1985, the Soviets spent more than 20 billion rubles to operate and maintain their armed forces. Since 1965, these costs have been increasing at 4-5 percent annually, a substantially higher rate of growth than estimated for procurement. This trend is a result of an increase in the stock of weapons--the order of battle has increased for many major weapon categories--and the increasing complexity--and, hence, increasing maintenance costs--of the advanced weapons the Soviets have deployed. 

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USSR: Expenditures for Defense RDT&E


Billion 1982 Rubles
25




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The Soviets have invested large amounts of resources in military RDT&E. We estimate that 1400-2000 facilities are involved in some way in military research. At any one time, 150-200 major new or modernized weapon systems are in development. More than half of the Soviet scientists and other RDT&E personnel are engaged in defense-related production. 

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
Military RDT&E has been the quickest growing category of defense spending since 1965, averaging more than 5 percent per year. These expenditures rose from 8 billion rubles in 1965 to 21 billion rubles in 1985. This has increased this category's share of total defense spending from about 13 percent in the late 1960s to 20 percent in 1985. 

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USSR: Distribution of Defense Investment and Operating Expenditures by Service

Billion 1982 Rubles



[Redacted]

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
The Soviet armed forces are organized into five services--Ground Forces, Air Forces, Navy, National Air Defense Forces (PVO), and Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). Our direct-costing methodology enables us to estimate the allocation of much of defense spending among these services. We cannot, however, estimate how the costs of RDT&E or of certain command, rear service, and other support functions are allocated among the five services. Thus, RDT&E has been excluded from this discussion and the command and support functions and the space program have been assigned to a residual category.

- Expenditures for the Air Force have consistently accounted for nearly one-fifth of total investment and operating spending. Spending on this service leveled off in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, after growing at an average of about 6 percent per year during the previous ten years. Expenditures have begun to grow in the past several years, driven by the upturn in aircraft procurement.
- The Ground Forces have been the fastest and steadiest growing of all the services, with increases averaging more than 4 percent per year during 1966-85 and with fairly robust growth both before and after the mid-1970s. As a result, their share of total military operating and investment expenditures increased slightly during this period, exceeding one-fifth of total operating and investment expenditures in 1985.
- Investment and operating expenditures for the Soviet Navy comprised a fairly constant one-fifth of such spending for the military services from 1965-74. Expenditures for procurement accounted for almost three-fourths of this amount. As procurement declined in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Navy's share of total spending dropped, falling to 15 percent in 1985.
- The PVO's share of total investment and operating expenditures averaged more than 10 percent, but declined slightly during 1965-85. PVO spending exhibited the slowest growth of all the services for 1966-85, with growth averaging less than 1 percent per year.
- Spending for the SRF averaged less than ten percent of investment and operating spending during 1966-85. Spending for this service was the most volatile--the share fluctuated between 5 and 14 percent--because of the cyclical nature of missile procurement. From 1979 to 1985, SRF procurement spending plummeted more than 60 percent, causing total SRF spending to decline almost as much. [redacted]

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USSR: Distribution of Defense Investment and Operating Expenditures by Mission

Billion 1982 Rubles



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
Investment and operating expenditures can also be divided into missions encompassing both strategic and general purpose forces, again with a residual category that includes support forces as well as most space expenditures. Each of these missions can be further broken down into subcategories; strategic divides into *offense* and *defense*, and conventional into *ground forces*, *general purpose naval forces*, and *tactical air forces*.

- Expenditures on *strategic offensive forces* currently account for almost one-sixth of total investment and operating expenditures. These forces were the quickest growing of all the missions during the late 1960s and early 1970s, averaging more than 10 percent growth per year. Since then, however, expenditures have declined by an average of 2 percent per year.
- Spending on *strategic defensive force* has declined from a share of 18 percent of total investment and operating expenditures in 1969--when the Moscow ABM system was being deployed--to 9 percent in 1985. After peaking in 1969, strategic defense expenditures declined for almost one and one half decades. A slight upturn has been noted since 1983, however, reflecting increased expenditures on fighter/interceptor aircraft.
- *Ground force* expenditures account for the largest share of investment and operating spending--approximately 22 percent in 1985. This mission has enjoyed fairly constant high growth--more than 4 percent on average per year during 1966-85. The ground forces also have the lowest ratio of procurement to total spending--less than 60 percent--due to the large share of personnel costs included.
- *General purpose naval forces* have accounted for a fairly constant 11 percent of total investment and operating expenditures since 1965. Expenditures on the general purpose navy have grown at somewhat more than 2 percent per year since the early 1970s, a change from the previous decade when expenditures actually declined by 1 to 2 percent per year.
- *Tactical air forces* have shown the most growth since 1965--almost 4.5 percent per year on average. This has driven their share of total investment and operating expenditures from a low of 7 percent in 1968 to 12 percent currently. Expenditures on tactical air forces have been rising quickly since 1983 because of the increase in aircraft procurement spending. [redacted]

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USSR: Defense Expenditures by Resource Category

Billion 1982 Rubles




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We have recently introduced a new methodology for estimating future Soviet military procurement for use with our constant ruble price base. These projections are based on an analysis of the available indicators of future Soviet defense programs, including weapons now in production and in advanced development and test stages. For each identified program, our uncertainties about the evidence are explicitly examined and quantified. The procurement projections are then made, taking into consideration the uncertainties as to the existence, pace, and duration of future Soviet weapons programs. Other indicators of Soviet intentions--such as Gorbachev's statements or five-year or annual plans--are not explicitly considered. 

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We expect the Soviets will continue to maintain a high level of procurement during the 12th FYP (1986-90), albeit with relatively slow growth, so that cumulative expenditures in this period will be almost 10 percent higher than in the previous five years. Reflecting continued high growth--4 percent per year on average--in O&M and RDT&E expenditures, projected total defense expenditures will grow at about 2 percent per year, somewhat faster than the rate of procurement. If real growth in GNP is what we expect--about 2 to 3 percent per year--defense's share of Soviet GNP will remain at roughly 15 percent. 

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


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USSR: Expenditures for Defense

Billion Current Rubles

120



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313602 7-87

When measured in current rubles, defense expenditures grew faster than when measured in constant rubles--almost 6 percent per year on average during 1970-82 compared with a real average annual growth rate of just more than 2 percent.* This higher growth was caused by inflation on weapons already in series production as well as price increases--above those justified by quality change--on newly introduced weapons. Unlike the constant ruble estimate, however, the current ruble estimate shows slightly higher growth after the mid-1970s, increasing from about 6 percent per year on average during 1971-75 to almost 6.5 percent per year on average during 1976-80. This higher growth was caused by a sharp increase in RDT&E expenditures--average annual growth rose from just under 7 percent during 1971-75 to more than 10 percent during 1976-80. The current ruble estimate does, however, show slower growth during 1981-82--4 percent per year on average--due largely to much slower growth in procurement. [redacted]

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When measured in current rubles, defense's share of GNP rose from 13-14 percent in 1970 to about 15 percent in 1982. Although the real growth in defense activities and overall economic output was roughly the same in this period, defense's share of Soviet GNP increased when measured in current prices, because prices of defense-related goods and services increased more rapidly than those of nondefense goods and services. Between 1970 and 1982, the average annual price change for the goods and services purchased by the military was 3.5 percent, more than 1 percentage point higher than for civilian goods and services. [redacted]


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* The figures cited earlier in this reference aid have been derived using constant 1982 rubles. We use constant rubles to measure the real growth in defense--that is, changes in military manpower, the volume of procurement and construction, and the scale of RDT&E and O&M excluding the effects of inflation. The Soviets, however, do not use Western-style constant prices. Rather, most references in Soviet literature to defense spending are in terms of current prices, and presumably the leadership uses current price measures, along with various physical indicators, to assess trends in resource allocation. Until recently, though, we have been unable to construct a current price estimate using the building block methodology. As a byproduct of our move to 1982 prices, we are now able to make preliminary current price estimates. We are limited, however, to estimating defense spending in current prices to the 1970-82 period, that is, the years between our two constant ruble price bases. [redacted]

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USSR: Expenditures for Defense Procurement

Billion Current Rubles



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Expenditures on procurement also show a different trend when measured in current rubles than when measured in constant prices. Growth for the 1970-82 period is substantially higher in current rubles--more than 5 percent on average--than in constant rubles--more than 1 percent on average. The current ruble estimate does not level off after 1974 like the constant ruble estimate, but growth does slow somewhat, dropping from 7 percent for 1971-75 to just under 6 percent for 1976-80. Growth slows even more dramatically in the early 1980s--the average annual growth for 1981-82 is only 1 percent.



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APPENDIX I

Soviet Defense Expenditures
Ruble Rules, Broad Definition, Established and Factor Cost Adjusted Prices
Billion 1982 Rubles

	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	
Procurement	31.8	33.2	36.3	39.6	42.8	42.2	42.0	42.3	47.0	50.9	51.6	52.4	52.0	51.9	53.3	53.7	50.7	50.3	50.1	50.5	51.9	
RDT&E	7.8	8.5	8.5	9.1	9.4	11.0	11.6	12.9	12.9	13.8	14.3	15.0	15.9	16.2	16.5	17.3	18.0	18.9	20.1	20.6	21.4	
O&M	8.9	9.0	9.5	10.8	12.0	12.3	12.9	13.2	14.8	15.6	15.7	16.4	16.8	17.1	17.6	17.7	18.4	19.0	19.6	20.0	20.3	
Personnel	7.6	7.8	8.2	8.6	8.9	9.2	9.6	9.8	9.9	10.1	10.3	10.4	10.5	10.6	10.9	11.2	11.3	11.7	11.7	11.8	11.7	
Construction	3.1	2.9	3.5	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.0	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.5	4.3	
Total, Estab- lished Prices	59.	61.	66.	72.	77.	79.	80.	82.	88.	94.	96.	98.	99.	100.	102.	104.	102.	104.	106.	107.	110.	
Total, Factor Cost Adjusted	62.	64.	69.	75.	80.	82.	84.	86.	92.	98.	100.	102.	103.	104.	106.	109.	107.	109.	110.	112.	115.	25X1
GNP	415.	435.	455.	483.	491.	531.	546.	550.	596.	614.	617.	649.	665.	686.	686.	692.	701.	720.	743.	753.	761.	25X1
Defense Share of GNP (Percent)	14.8	14.6	15.1	15.5	16.3	15.4	15.3	15.6	15.4	16.0	16.1	15.7	15.5	15.1	15.5	15.7	15.2	15.1	14.9	14.9	15.1	25X1

Ruble Rules. The Strategic Cost Analysis Model (SCAM) database--the database that has been developed to track Soviet defense activities--provides output in SCAM rules, which can then be reorganized to reflect both US (dollar rules) and Soviet (ruble rules) accounting practices. The Soviets record capital repair costs as investment rather than operating expenses. Therefore, we adjust the SCAM estimates to "ruble rules" by including one-half of weapons maintenance (except space)--capital repair--in procurement and one-half of facilities maintenance in construction.

Broad Definition. We estimate Soviet defense spending using both a broad and a narrow definition. The narrow definition--used in our dollar estimates--corresponds to the definition of defense used in the United States. For our ruble estimates we use the broad definition, which includes additional activities the Soviets are likely to classify as defense--expenditures on internal security, railroad, and construction troops, certain civil defense activities, and space programs that are operated by the military in the USSR but by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the United States--and excludes pensions.

Established Prices. Our estimates are calculated in established prices which we believe are representative of the Ministry of Defense outlays for goods and services in the base year of our estimate. The prices are established administratively, not by market forces, and are often inaccurate reflections of the relative scarcity and value of goods and services within the country.

Factor Cost. To calculate the share of GNP allocated to defense, we estimate both defense spending and GNP at factor cost. In moving the estimates from established prices to factor cost, we are attempting to correct for distortions in these prices resulting from turnover taxes, subsidies, and widely different profit-to-capital ratios that push Soviet prices away from the theoretical standard--prices which reflect the costs of the factors.

APPENDIX II

Soviet Procurement Expenditures
Ruble Rules, Broad Definition, Established Prices
Billion 1982 Rubles

	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85
Land Arms	2.3	2.7	3.0	3.7	3.9	4.0	3.9	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.9	4.3	4.4	4.7	5.1	5.6	5.2	5.4	5.0	5.4	5.8
Ships	3.8	4.0	4.2	5.0	5.3	5.6	5.1	5.0	6.0	6.3	5.7	5.4	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.9	5.8	5.8	5.6	5.5
Aircraft	8.7	7.4	7.2	7.6	9.2	9.9	10.9	11.3	11.8	13.4	14.2	14.5	13.7	13.0	12.7	13.2	12.6	12.3	12.5	12.9	14.0
Missiles	9.1	11.2	13.4	13.6	14.3	12.7	11.8	11.8	13.4	15.1	15.6	15.3	15.7	15.3	16.1	15.5	13.0	11.8	11.2	11.3	11.5
Space	2.5	2.1	2.6	3.2	3.4	2.9	3.2	2.9	3.8	4.1	3.9	4.5	3.7	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.5	5.2	5.4	5.5	5.0
"Other"	5.5	5.7	6.0	6.6	6.7	7.2	7.2	7.4	8.0	8.3	8.4	8.6	8.8	9.2	9.4	9.4	9.6	9.8	10.0	10.0	10.1
Total Procurement	31.8	33.2	36.3	39.6	42.8	42.2	42.0	42.3	47.0	50.9	51.6	52.4	52.0	51.9	53.3	53.7	50.7	50.3	50.1	50.5	51.9

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APPENDIX III

Soviet Investment and Operating Expenditures by Mission
Broad Definition, Established Prices
Billion 1982 Rubles

	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85
Strategic Offense	6.5	9.5	12.3	11.2	11.5	11.8	10.3	9.9	12.1	14.1	14.1	13.6	13.8	13.7	14.6	14.6	13.3	12.9	12.6	11.5	11.6
Strategic Defense	7.5	7.5	8.0	9.9	11.9	10.8	10.1	9.1	9.5	9.8	10.1	10.5	9.3	8.8	8.2	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.7	7.9	8.3
Ground Forces	8.7	9.4	10.4	12.4	12.8	13.2	13.6	14.5	15.2	15.2	15.4	15.5	16.0	16.4	17.3	18.0	17.6	17.5	17.7	18.4	19.4
GP Navy	9.0	8.0	7.7	8.2	7.9	7.7	8.3	8.1	7.8	8.4	8.9	9.4	10.2	10.7	10.7	10.6	10.1	10.4	10.0	10.6	10.0
Tactical Air	5.2	4.4	4.1	4.3	5.0	6.3	7.8	9.1	9.8	10.2	10.5	10.9	11.3	10.9	11.1	12.0	11.3	10.2	10.1	10.7	11.0
Space	4.1	3.6	4.3	5.5	6.1	5.2	5.7	4.9	6.8	7.4	6.9	7.6	6.6	7.0	7.2	7.1	7.7	8.6	9.1	9.3	8.7
Misc Support	10.3	10.4	10.7	11.5	12.2	12.7	12.8	13.5	14.1	15.3	15.5	15.7	15.9	16.1	16.7	16.9	17.0	18.0	18.3	18.5	19.2
Total Investment and Operating	51.3	52.8	57.6	63.0	67.8	67.9	68.8	69.4	75.3	80.4	81.5	83.2	83.1	83.7	85.9	86.7	84.5	85.2	85.7	86.8	88.3

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APPENDIX IV

Soviet Investment and Operating Expenditures by Service
Broad Definition, Established Prices
Billion 1982 Rubles

	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85
Ground Forces	8.7	9.4	10.4	12.4	12.8	13.2	13.6	14.5	15.2	15.2	15.4	15.5	16.0	16.4	17.3	18.0	17.6	17.5	17.7	18.4	19.4
Navy	9.5	8.9	10.0	11.5	11.7	11.8	12.1	12.3	13.3	14.2	13.0	13.0	13.9	14.6	14.4	14.8	13.6	13.8	13.3	14.2	13.6
Strategic Rocket Forces	4.4	6.8	8.2	6.0	6.0	6.4	5.2	4.2	5.0	6.7	8.5	8.3	8.4	8.2	9.3	8.4	6.8	6.2	5.8	4.9	4.2
Air Forces	8.6	7.9	7.6	7.9	9.0	9.8	11.1	12.9	13.4	14.7	15.0	15.1	15.6	15.0	15.3	16.7	16.7	16.4	16.7	16.7	18.3
Air Defense Support	7.5	7.5	8.0	9.9	11.9	10.8	10.1	9.1	9.5	9.8	10.1	10.5	9.3	8.8	8.2	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.8	7.9	8.3
Support	12.6	12.4	13.5	15.5	16.2	15.9	16.6	16.4	18.9	20.0	19.6	20.7	19.9	20.6	21.3	21.4	22.3	23.7	24.5	24.7	24.6
Total Investment and Operating	51.3	52.8	57.6	63.0	67.8	67.9	68.8	69.4	75.3	80.4	81.5	83.2	83.1	83.7	85.9	86.7	84.5	85.2	85.7	86.8	88.3

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
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