Central Intelligence Agency



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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The Soviet Role in Afghan Terrorism in Pakistan

Summary

The escalation of terrorist bombings in Pakistan that has been undertaken by KHAD this year is primarily intended to build domestic pressure for a change in Islamabad's policy of supporting the Afghan resistance. The Soviets, who control KHAD, are almost certainly the originators of this scheme, but they have been careful to avoid clear links to specific incidents and may, in fact, be leaving the details of implementation to KHAD.

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KHAD has concentrated its resources on activities that directly affect the Pakistani population because these stand the best chance of producing public pressure for Islamabad to be more accommodating to Kabul's "peace" initiatives and of disrupting aid to the insurgents. Nonetheless, Kabul--and, presumably, Moscow--has apparently decided to include US facilities in the expansion of sabotage, perhaps partly in retaliation for the provision of Stingers to the insurgents, although so far attacks on US targets have been few.

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The Expansion of Sabotage

Until spring this year, most sabotage in Pakistan by the Afghan intelligence service (KHAD) was confined to Peshawar and other areas in the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan with large concentrations of Afghan refugees. Recently, however, sabotage has been directed increasingly towards Pakistani as well as refugee targets, and it has been extended beyond the border areas into Punjab and Sind, where the majority of Pakistanis live.

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This memorand	dum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis	25X1
	Comments and queries are welcome and may be	_
addressed to	the Chief, Third World Activities Division	
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Recently, saboteurs have increasingly targeted bazaars, bus depots, and other public places, where the explosions are likely to generate maximum casualties and thus publicity and increased public pressure on Islamabad.	25X1
The present sabotage is undoubtedly designed to stir up anti-refugee, anti-government, and anti-US sentiment among the Pakistani population in the hope that this will destabilize the Zia regime or make it more amenable to a settlement on Soviet	
terms.	25 X 1
It is highly likely that this policy was implemented on orders from Moscow. The intensity of recent terrorist activities is probably a sign of the Soviets' frustration over their inability to master the Afghan situation. This frustration has recently been compounded by the provision of Stinger missiles and other improved weapons to the insurgents and the negative reception that Islamabad and the resistance gave to Kabul's national reconciliation initiative:	
Soviet officials have threatened in the past that continued Pakistani support for the resistanceespecially the introduction of Stingerscould result in more vigorous efforts to exploit the country's internal vulnerabilities.	
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A recent report in a widely circulated Asian news magazine that the Kabul regime has undertaken the current bombing campaign without Soviet approval and specifically to undermine Moscow's efforts to reach a compromise settlement is so implausible that it is most likely disinformation.	25 X ′
The Soviets may, however, be leaving the details of operations to KHAD's discretion the Soviets regard KHAD as more effective and reliable than other Afghan institutions, and the expansion of terrorist operations may have made it more difficult for the Soviets to direct all of	25X1

Hav	e US Interests Been Targeted?
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thi	A few incidents suggest that s policy has been put into effect:
	In December last year, a car bomb left near the US Consulate in Peshawar exploded after it was towed by Pakistani police.
	In mid-June a powerful briefcase bomb was found near the US Agency for International Development office in Quetta.
	On 13 July, a small bomb exploded in a hedge near the US Consulate in Peshawar, causing minor damage.
ent aid sho	There is nothing so far that explicitly links the Soviets to se incidents, though it is unlikely that they are merely rogue erprises by KHAD. The Soviets may hope that pressure against ing the insurgents would build in the United States if it were wn to be costly in terms of American casualties. At a
mor att pro int	imum, they would see the bombings as a means of creating a e intense public debate in Washington. They might also regard acks on US installations as justifiable retaliation for the US vision of Stingers to the resistance or for insurgent raids o the Soviet Union, for which the Soviets have blamed the ted States.

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Incidents directly affecting the Pakistani
population stand the best chance of putting pressure on Islamabad
to be more accommodating to Soviet initiatives on a settlement.
The Soviets and Afghans are, therefore, likely to continue to
concentrate their resources here.

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SUBJECT: The Soviet Role in Afghan Terrorism in Pakistan

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