





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Afghanistan Situation Report



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
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT




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CONTENTS



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PEACE OFFERS TAKE SHAPE



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The Revolutionary Council announced that it will extend its six-month cease-fire offer if the resistance ceases combat and resupply activities, but the offer is unlikely to attract many insurgents, who dismiss it as the latest regime propaganda.



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BEIJING DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN WITH ISLAMABAD



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Chinese officials reaffirmed their hardline stance on Afghanistan during meetings with Pakistan Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, who was in Beijing from 24-29 December.



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IN BRIEF

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PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN: GROWING PROWESS OF THE JAMIAT-I-ISLAMI



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Despite problems with factionalism and rising transportation costs, the Jamiat-i-Islami has become the dominant insurgent group in northern and western Afghanistan.




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
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
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PEACE OFFERS TAKE SHAPE

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Kabul announced more details of its peace overtures on Saturday. The Revolutionary Council said Kabul would

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extend its six-month cease-fire offer--which is to start 15 January--if the resistance halted all attacks and resupply activities and if foreign journalists stopped entering the country illegally. In addition, the government would set up national reconciliation commissions at the village, district, subdistrict, and provincial levels to serve as intermediaries between the regime and its opponents. Kabul would also give limited autonomy to areas that cooperated, including the right to create organs of local government, to elect local leaders, and to sign truces with local opposition groups. The Revolutionary Council also declared Islam the official state religion. Details of "national reconciliation" are to be handled by a Supreme Extraordinary Commission for National Reconciliation, composed of party, government, religious and tribal figures, according to press accounts. The commission will be led by Abdul Rahim Hatif, head of the National Fatherland Front.



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Press reports indicate that some prominent exile figures--former Prime Minister Yussuf and ex-diplomats Tabibi and Pazhwak--are now in Kabul for talks with the regime.



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COMMENT: The national reconciliation process is unlikely to attract any significant resistance figures and those exiles pursuing negotiations are likely to be discredited in resistance circles. Although opponents of the Soviet invasion, they have not been active participants in the jihad and almost certainly did not obtain prior resistance approval for the talks. Moscow may be planning to use them as intermediaries between the regime and the resistance leadership. By placing the reconciliation process under the direction of the head of the Fatherland Front--a puppet organization completely controlled by the PDPA--Najib, however, has signaled that the talks must be held on the regime's terms.



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
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BEIJING DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN WITH ISLAMABAD




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According to a senior official in China's Foreign Ministry, Beijing and Islamabad focused on Afghanistan during Pakistan Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan's visit to Beijing on 24-29 December. The Chinese agreed with Yaqub's assessment of recent Soviet "gestures" as more a change in tactics than in strategy. When US Embassy officials inquired whether Beijing or Islamabad were contemplating a response to the Soviet initiatives, the MFA official replied that until Moscow takes some concrete action toward resolving the Afghanistan issue, no response would be warranted.



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
The Chinese publicly reiterated their position that the key to a political solution in Afghanistan is the early withdrawal of Soviet troops. According to press reports, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian called for unconditional implementation of UN resolutions concerning Afghanistan, the quick withdrawal of foreign troops, and the true resolution of an independent, neutral, and nonaligned Afghanistan. The Chinese official told US Embassy officers that Foreign Minister Yaqub agreed with his Chinese hosts that to encourage a "reasonable timetable" of Soviet withdrawal--one measured in months, not years--political and military pressure on the Soviets must continue.



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COMMENT: Beijing's public and private treatment of Yaqub's visit indicates that the Chinese will maintain their hardline stance on Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian's public promise to provide full assistance to Pakistan in safeguarding its independence and territorial integrity was probably calculated to bolster Islamabad's resolve during the upcoming indirect talks in Geneva and send a direct message to Moscow. By reassuring Islamabad both publicly and privately, Beijing seeks to keep Pakistan from moving toward a separate peace with Moscow. The Chinese may worry that Islamabad is prepared to compromise on the timetable for Soviet withdrawal, hence Beijing's private encouragement of a short Soviet troop withdrawal schedule.



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


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
-- [redacted] since mid-October, the Soviets have expanded their major logistics base at Pol-e Khomri to include a large, double-fence secured munitions storage facility and an increased petroleum storage capacity of approximately 162,000 gallons.

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--Since late November 15 medium tanks, 15 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles, and 42 BTR-70/80 armored personnel carriers were delivered to Soviet forces in Afghanistan from the Soviet Union [redacted] [redacted] They are probably replacements for battle-damaged equipment. [redacted]

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--On 28 December Afghan Prime Minister Keshtmand participated in a ceremony inaugurating a 56-kilometer electric power transmission line from the Soviet Union to Konduz city. The project is part of Moscow's plan to extend transmission lines from the Soviet border into several areas of northern Afghanistan and eventually to Kabul. The Soviet Union began supplying electricity to




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Afghanistan in June 1985 with the completion of a line to Mazar-e Sharif. 

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--Reconstruction and modernization of the Salang Tunnel--a key part of the main road linking the Soviet Union and Kabul--was recently completed, according to official Soviet press reports. Since 1979, the volume of traffic through the tunnel has increased significantly, resulting in frequent bottlenecks. Soviet officials claim the modernization work has increased the tunnel's capacity by a factor of three. The project--which began in late 1984--was financed with Soviet assistance. 

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--The volume of trade between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in 1986 increased 6.7% over 1985. According to Kabul press reports, Afghanistan exported goods worth \$360 million to the USSR and imported \$600 million in Soviet goods in 1986. Afghanistan's principal export to the Soviet Union is natural gas; food supplies and petroleum products are important imports. 

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PERSPECTIVE

Afghanistan: Growing Prowess of the Jamiat-i-Islami



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The Jamiat-i-Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, has become the dominant insurgent group in northern and western Afghanistan. Rabbani's popularity among insurgents and his ability to select dynamic and competent field commanders has helped him forge a highly motivated organization. Still, factionalism and difficulties in meeting transportation costs for supplies could limit the Jamiat's influence unless Rabbani moves quickly to correct the problems.



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
Leadership in Peshawar--How the Jamiat Works

Rabbani exercises final authority over all major decisions and leadership appointments.



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Under Rabbani is a staff of advisers and committees administering the organization from Peshawar. The primary role of the Peshawar-based hierarchy is to obtain and distribute money and weapons to the insurgency inside Afghanistan.

--The Military Planning Commission, chaired by Engineer Ayyub, weighs arms requests from Jamiat field commanders and formulates military strategy and policies.



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Rabbani formed the commission in late November 1986 to replace the Military Commission headed by his deputy, Musa Tawana. The Military Commission was formed last spring to allocate munitions but

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


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
had apparently ceased functioning by summer because of Tawana's poor leadership capabilities.

- Engineer Ayyub also heads the Military Committee, a separate organization coequal to the Military Planning Commission that is responsible for insurgent training and the receipt, storage, and transport of nearly all Jamiat weapons and supplies.
- The Political Committee, headed by Engineer Ishaq, is the Jamiat's liaison with Pakistani authorities, private international support groups, and foreign embassies. It aggressively pursues contacts with foreign journalists and seeks to arrange publicity for the Jamiat.
- The Finance Committee, headed by Ahmed Zia, is responsible for financing the political and humanitarian operations of the Jamiat and also occasionally provides money to individual commanders to cover the cost of weapons transportation into Afghanistan.
- The Regulation and Procedures Committee, formed in April 1986 reviews the organization and the administrative procedures of all Jamiat committees. It is redefining procedures for allocating arms and ammunition, 

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The Jamiat hierarchy in Peshawar also includes "provincial houses." 

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The Panjsher Valley House, representing insurgent commander Ahmed Shah Masood, is the most influential,



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Masood is the only party commander represented by his own house, and as a result, he alone receives a separate allocation of weapons from the party outside the provincial distribution.

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In addition to having a representative in these houses, each major Jamiat commander has a personal delegate in Peshawar that petitions directly for support. Despite numerous, overlapping formal and informal procedures involved in requesting and transporting weapons and ammunition, the Jamiat system seems to work well. Most field commanders say they are relatively well supplied and that the needed materiel reaches troops inside Afghanistan.

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Leadership Inside Afghanistan

The provincial Amir (or chief) and provincial military commander are the two most important Jamiat positions inside the country,

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Both are elected by a majority of local party commanders and are approved by Rabbani.

--The provincial Amir exercises overall political, military, and administrative leadership of Jamiat elements in his province and is responsible for submitting reports to Peshawar regarding the general status of the insurgency there. He usually commands an insurgent group of his own but rarely holds the position of provincial military commander as well.

--The provincial military commander is typically the strongest and most influential commander in the province, as measured by his manpower, organization, and contacts with other commanders. He is responsible for organizing combat operations, improving military cooperation among various Jamiat




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
field commanders, and for coordinating insurgent activity with other resistance groups, .

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--The relative strength of the Amir and provincial military commander varies, depending on the local situations and personalities. In Parvan and Kapisa Provinces, for instance, Masood holds both positions. In Konduz Province, however, provincial military commander Arif Khan is considered the more important political leader, while Amir Rahmattulah--the nominal political chief--exercises little influence,



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
<u>Province</u>	<u>Provincial Amir</u>	<u>Provincial Military Commander</u>
Kabul	Mohammad Anwar	Unknown
Lowgar	Dr. Anam	Dr. Fazlullah
Vardak	Maulavi Mohisherin	Jek Jorun Hamashagul
Kapisa and Parvan	Ahmad Shah Masood	Ahmad Shah Masood
Laghman	Mohammad Ismail Tariq	Hamid
Ghazni	Khulilullah Hotuk	Dalili
Paktika	Maulavi Abdul Rahim	Maulavi Mirza Mohammad
Paktia	Abdul Ghaful	Miagul Sahibzada
Nangarhar	Jaglan Saifurrahman	Unknown
Konarha	Dr. Mohammad Sadiq	Mohammad Salim
Badakhshan	Aryunpur	Abdul Basir Khalid
Takhar	Sayed Ahmad	Qazi Islammudin
Konduz	Qari Rahmattullah	Mohammad Arif
Baghlan	Abdul Haq Haqjo	Shamsurrahman
Bamian	Maulavi Rahimullah	Faiz Mohammad
Samangan	Maulavi Mohammad Zahir	Arshad Farid
Balkh	Maulavi Mohammad Alam	Alam Khan
Jowzjan	Maulavi Mohammad Zahir	Abdul Wahab
Faryab, Badghisat, Ghowr, Herat, Farah, Nimruz, Helmand, Zabol, and Qandahar	Ismail Khan	Allahuiddin
Oruzgan	Unknown	Unknown

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Weaknesses in the Jamiat

Despite its organizational strengths, the Jamiat has significant problems. We believe Rabbani's nonconfrontational leadership style and his tendency to procrastinate over tough decisions have been continuing sources of tension with party officials and field commanders.

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[redacted] Rabbani has come under pressure from party moderates and field commanders to take firm action against his personal adviser Sayyed Nurullah--leader of the party's contentious fundamentalist clique and personal adversary of Herat commander Ismail Khan. Rabbani's reluctance to check Nurullah has tended to promote factionalism within the organization and we believe it could reduce the effectiveness of the Jamiat in Herat.

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Jamiat military commanders in the field and political officials in Pakistan often are at loggerheads. Resistance fighters complain that Peshawar-based officials are unsympathetic to the cause and have only a superficial understanding of the local military situations because they refuse to travel into the war zone. Although Rabbani urges all of his staff officials to visit the field commands, most are reluctant to take the risk and leave comfortable offices in Peshawar, [redacted] Jamiat military leaders also generally believe, [redacted] that the Peshawar officials feel threatened by insurgent commanders who develop independent power bases inside Afghanistan.

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The dominance of northern Tajik advisers in the Jamiat's formal hierarchy has generated ethnic tensions in the organization.

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[redacted] approximately 150 of the 200 Jamiat officials in Peshawar are Tajiks from Badakhshan, Takhar or Konduz Provinces. Although numerous Pashtun members hold upper-level positions, there are concerns among Pashtuns, Tajiks from other provinces, and Uzbeks that they will be denied influential positions in the party. Some Jamiat military commanders--including Mohammed Anwar, a Pashtun from Kabul Province and Dr.

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[Redacted]

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Fazlullah, a Tajik from Lowgar--are displeased with Peshawar because they believe too much of the Jamiat's support and attention goes to the north,

[Redacted]

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The Jamiat's Fighting Capability

Despite tensions between field commanders and the Peshawar leaders, the Jamiat has been one of the most successful insurgent groups militarily, particularly in northern and western Afghanistan. Jamiat field commanders are generally well trained, disciplined, and highly motivated. Building on his successes in the Panjsher Valley, Masood is now working to improve cooperation in his newly-established seven-province insurgent front in the north. In the west, Ismail Khan's forces have repeatedly prevented the Soviets and Afghan regime from consolidating control of Herat.

[Redacted]

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Many Jamiat commanders have a national concept of the guerrilla struggle. The party's relatively sophisticated communications network generates cooperation among commanders and keeps them aware of fighting in other parts of the country.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Kabul Province commander Mohammad Anwar increases his interdiction efforts on the Kabul-Jalalabad road in order to take pressure off Masood when his forces are being attacked in the Panjsher Valley.

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Lowgar Province, several area Jamiat commanders cooperated to keep local Soviet and regime troops busy in mid-September so they could not be deployed to Herat

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
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
to take part in the Soviet and Afghan offensive against Ismail Khan's forces there. 


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Poor leadership in some provinces degrades military performance. The Jamiat position in Balkh Province, for example, continues to decline because the party has not been able to recover from the assassination of provincial commander Zabiullah Khan two years ago. The provincial leadership which replaced him, because of weak personalities and lack of experience, has not been able to maintain unity and cooperation among Jamiat forces 

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Currently on the battlefield, meeting transportation costs is a key concern among Jamiat commanders. As a result of Rabbani's visit to the US in June, displeased conservative Arab donors cut off their financial support to the Jamiat--funds frequently used to pay for the transportation of weapons, ammunition, and supplies into the country. The cost of transportation has also escalated because of an increased demand for trucks and pack animals and a greater risk of Soviet interdiction. The loss of the Arab funding, together with increased transportation costs, will strain insurgent finances and tend to hinder combat effectiveness from time to time. 

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The Jamiat's continued conflicts with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's Hizbi-Islami hurts military performance. Gulbuddin--jealous of Masood's growing political and military power in the north--directs attacks against Jamiat forces in the northeast and interferes with their operations against the Soviets and Afghan regime. Masood and other Jamiat commanders have pressed Rabbani to take a firmer line with Gulbuddin, with no results.

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