

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DATE 8-26-87 FILE
DOC NO EA M 87-20158
OIR 3
P & PD |

FILE

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

24 August 1987

The Philippines: Exploring Views on the US Military Bases

25X1

SUMMARY

Philippine public opinion will probably play an unprecedented role in negotiations between Manila and Washington about the future of US bases at Clark and Subic, especially since the new Constitution specifies that a new military bases agreement that must be negotiated by 1991 may also be submitted to a referendum. A variety of polls indicates a majority of Filipinos support the continued presence of the US military facilities and a national plebiscite now would probably reflect that sentiment. Nonetheless, poll results also suggest widespread ignorance and ambivalence about aspects of the bases, such as the perceived increased risk of nuclear attack. Between now and 1991, the Philippine leaders who will determine the terms of a new agreement and the public who will ultimately accept or reject it are susceptible to well-directed propaganda campaigns by either side that play to the public's concerns on such issues as sovereignty, the economic impact, or nuclear weapons.

25X1

This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis. Information available as of 24 August 1987 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA

25X1

25X1

EA M 87-20158

25X1
25X1

25X1



25X1

Filipinos on the Bases--A Sampling of Public Opinion

"It is the United States that needs the bases more. I would not simply say let the United States do its own thing, that we want to be free from this. We can't even if we wished to. We have five to six years and within that time let's see what happens to (Russian and US arms talks). We are not makers of our own destiny."

--Ambassador to the US Emmanuel Pelaez.

25X1

"They (the bases) are helpful. If the bases were not there many Filipinos would lose their jobs. Many Filipinos benefit from them." --Manila security guard.

25X1

"I hear that Filipinos are treated as second-class citizens inside the bases. We are like foreigners inside our own country....It is also true what they say that the military bases are under Filipino command only superficially and ceremonially. We have to have equality. Even if they pay millions for rent we should have sovereignty in our country." --Manila university student.

25X1

"We are afraid of war....I wonder if the bases are for our defense, or are they...(going to) embroil us in another war." --Mita Pardo de Tavera, now Secretary of Social Welfare.

25X1

"We all know [sic] that the US pays rental for its bases in Spain, Greece, Turkey, and where have you. Why are we Filipinos getting the short end of the stick?...It's time to cut ourselves fully free from the apron strings of America." --Columnist Max Soliven.

25X1

Philippine public opinion surveys on the bases are scarce, and most of them predate the Aquino administration. Almost all of the polls we reviewed, however, show a generally positive attitude toward the bases (see appendices.) USIA polls taken in 1985 and 1986 show that across age groups, educational levels, and for both urban and rural areas, the majority believe the bases should be kept or even expanded. The most recent data, from June 1987, show a substantial majority of the population favor retaining the US facilities--at least under certain circumstances--with only a small minority of respondents believing that the military bases agreement should be allowed to lapse or be terminated.

Attitudes on the base-related issues appear to vary with education. Respondents with no more than a high school education were most strongly committed to the bases. Polls suggest that the better educated--a group we believe is more representative of Philippine decisionmakers--are the group most critical of the basing arrangements, however. Respondents with only an elementary school education generally appear to be less opinionated on these issues.

25X1

25X1



25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

When asked to identify the benefits of the bases to the Philippines, the majority of all respondents in the polls we examined saw a definite economic and security advantage to the US military presence. However, Filipinos in all groups are clearly concerned by the added risk of nuclear attack they believe the bases represent. Sixty-eight percent of the Manila respondents in USIA's June poll said that the bases added at least a fair amount to the risk of being a target. Findings from the 1985 USIA poll are similar; 57 to 75 percent linked the bases with an increased risk of nuclear attack. University-educated respondents registered the highest rate of concern. [REDACTED]

25X1

The polls further indicated that older respondents, rural interviewees, and those who had attended only elementary school often responded by saying they "did not know."¹ This distinction is most evident in the responses to questions in a 1985 USIA poll asking if the bases are worth the risks they involve. About 30 percent of these groups responded that they did not know. [REDACTED]

25X1

Filling in the Gaps--Filipinos' Views on The Issues

We believe that the probases view of the majority conceals many underlying attitudes on the bases issue. In our judgment, Filipinos' opinions of the US military installations are a mixture of attitudes about several core issues involving sovereignty and the US role in the Philippine economy, with security concerns playing a secondary role. [REDACTED]

25X1

National sovereignty. In our judgment, sovereignty is probably the single most important issue dividing opponents and supporters of the bases. Probases Filipinos argue that the bases are the result of an agreement between two sovereign states, and point to US concessions to Manila's sensitivities during earlier reviews of the agreement as signs of good faith. During the 1970s, for example, Washington reduced the area under US control at both Clark Air Base and Subic Bay, and also conceded that the US bases are within Philippine facilities under a Philippine military commander. [REDACTED]

25X1

To antibase Filipinos, however, the bases are overt symbols of their country's close--some would say stifling--connection to its former ruler. They argue that symbolic concessions do not alter the fact that the agreement allows the United States "unhampered" use for military operations, and because Manila has no control over US activities at the facilities, the bases violate sovereignty. Some nationalists worry that Washington could use the bases in a manner inimical to Philippine interests and without Manila's approval, such as to backstop operations in the Middle East. [REDACTED]

25X1

¹ The 1980 Philippine census indicated that about 64 percent of the population lived in rural areas. Based on data extrapolated from the 1980 census, we estimate that the over-40 age group will constitute about 20 percent of the population in 1990. Current statistics on the number of people who have completed only primary education are unavailable, but 1980 data from UNESCO indicate that about 65 percent of the adult population would fall into this category. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

The left, including the Communist Party, argues that the bases are Trojan horses, allowing Washington to intervene at will in Philippine affairs. Accusations in the local press about alleged covert intelligence activities launched from the bases help to confirm these fears. In addition, opponents believe that preservation of the bases so dominated US relations with the Marcos government that the US turned a blind eye to Marcos's self-enrichment, and that continuing a relationship based so strongly on the bases only presages a similar "US-Aquino dictatorship." [REDACTED]

25X1

The provisions that give the United States primary legal jurisdiction over US personnel and offenses against the United States or US personnel and their dependents are another facet of the military bases agreement that many Filipinos view as an affront to Philippine sovereignty. The United States uses similar procedures with its NATO allies, but some Filipinos view these arrangements as a criticism of their judicial system and a reminder of their former colonial status. This perception is inflamed by sensationalist press exposes on alleged criminal behavior by US personnel or brutality against local Filipinos. [REDACTED]

25X1

Economic considerations. Polling data suggest that most Filipinos agree hosting the US bases makes good economic sense. In addition to bringing in nearly \$200 million a year in economic and military assistance, the bases are the second-largest employer in the country, after the Philippine Government itself. There are approximately 40,000 jobs for Filipinos on Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, plus sizable offbase employment generated by the US presence. A recent USIA publication estimates that, all told, the bases add over \$500 million a year to the Philippine economy, an amount equivalent to about 1.5 percent of national income. Closing the bases, supporters say, would lead to a surge in unemployment--a concern echoed by working class Filipinos recently interviewed by a US researcher. [REDACTED]

25X1

Many opponents believe the economic argument exaggerates the value of the bases. They argue that the US installations spawn a "brothel economy" of bars, prostitution, and narcotics trafficking rather than solid development, while increasing the country's dependence on aid and "other hand-outs" from the United States. In any event, most Filipinos are probably embarrassed by the tacky sprawl outside the US facilities, and those opposed to the bases see Olongapo and Angeles City as miniature examples of the Philippines' "distorted" economic relationship with the United States. Antibase Filipinos also argue that the bases' removal would not be an economic calamity because industrial development at the same sites could absorb the former employees and allow the Philippines to pursue "truly independent" economic development. [REDACTED]

25X1

Mutual Defense and Security Issues. Defense Secretary Iletto has argued publicly that the US military presence provides a security umbrella for the Philippines that Manila cannot afford to develop. According to polling data, a strong majority of Filipinos--between 70 and 80 percent, depending on how the question is formulated--appear to agree that the bases deter foreign aggression. [REDACTED]

25X1

Nevertheless, press reports and [REDACTED] unclassified sources indicate skepticism in some segments of the population about the value of the bases to

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Philippine defense. Many Filipinos--including some senior officials and legislators--are so preoccupied with their country's internal problems that they doubt that there is, or will be in the near future, a credible external threat. [Redacted]

25X1

Opponents of the bases also argue that if Manila allows the storage of nuclear weapons at the US facilities, then the Philippines is in danger of a nuclear accident or a nuclear attack. Although propaganda from the Soviets and the Philippine radical left fans these anxieties, we believe they are made plausible by Japanese attacks on US military installations in Central Luzon during World War II, and nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. [Redacted]

25X1

From the standpoint of internal security, we believe some Filipinos view the bases as assurance that the United States would intervene militarily if the Communists appeared on the brink of victory. In a recent survey of local officials, for instance, a significant number said that the removal of the bases would allow the Communists to take over. [Redacted]

25X1

ASEAN AND JAPAN-KOREA VIEWS

ASEAN. We believe Manila's neighbors regard Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Bases as contributing significantly to regional security, if only because they demonstrate a commitment by Washington to the area. Thailand and Singapore are probably the most anxious that the US facilities remain; they have repeatedly expressed concern to US officials about the possibility of a withdrawal from the Philippines. Both regard the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh and increased Soviet military activity in the region as a threat. [Redacted]

25X1

Malaysia and Indonesia share the pro-Western orientation of their ASEAN neighbors, but avoid public identification as US allies and view internal subversion as their major security problem. [Redacted] Malaysia and Indonesia thus would probably view the departure of the United States from Clark and Subic with greater equanimity than Thailand or Singapore. Indonesia has also been in the forefront of efforts to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia--a proposal Singapore and Thailand do not support. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Japan and South Korea. We believe Tokyo and Seoul view a strong US military presence in Asia, including the Philippine bases, as vital to their security. The Philippine bases extend the reach of US forces safeguarding important national interests. In the event of war in Northeast Asia, both bases would furnish logistical support for US, Japanese, and South Korean forces. In recent subministerial consultations in Manila, Japanese officials explicitly stated for the first time the importance of the bases to regional security, US diplomats report. Japanese Foreign Minister Kuranari has also warned ASEAN publicly that a nuclear weapons-free zone would undermine Washington's ability to carry out its defense commitments in the area. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Nevertheless, we believe there is little any of these countries can do to convince Manila, if it should decide against the bases, that the US facilities are in the Philippines' best interests. All of the Asian allies are sensitive to charges of meddling in their neighbor's affairs, Japan particularly so. Moreover, Tokyo and Seoul do not generally discuss security issues with Manila. Unless the ASEAN nations are willing, in our judgment, to compensate Manila for hosting the bases as a contribution to regional security, their clout with Philippine decisionmakers will be minimal. None of the Asian states--with the possible exception of South Korea--would be willing to host replacement facilities.

25X1
25X1

Outlook: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities for the United States

We believe that perceptions of the public mood will play an important role in shaping Manila's negotiating positions and the agreement ultimately reached with the United States. When Washington and Manila start to review the existing agreement--probably sometime next year--the Philippine Congress and executive branch will become particularly sensitive to public reactions expressed in demonstrations, press commentaries, and other public forums. The new Philippine Congress has already signaled its intention to direct official policy on the bases. Moreover, under the new Constitution, should Manila and Washington succeed in negotiating a new agreement, the Congress decides whether to require a national plebiscite on the draft.

25X1

Because we lack historical polling data, we have no basis for judging how Philippine attitudes about the bases may have changed over time.

25X1

In our opinion, antibase activists will target the substantial number of Filipinos who either have no opinion on the bases or who favor their retention only under certain circumstances, such as restricted operations or greatly increased compensation.

25X1

In addition, we believe antibase groups will focus on highly emotional issues surrounding the bases, such as sovereignty, the nuclear threat, prostitution, AIDS, and alleged brutality against local citizens by US servicemen. Claims that Washington has fleeced Manila in past agreements and that Filipino base workers are underpaid relative to their counterparts on other US overseas bases are sure to be common themes.

25X1
25X1

The presence of a vocal, well-organized minority opposed to the bases will probably intimidate many officials who privately favor the bases and strengthen Manila's determination not to be seen as giving in to US pressure. Moreover, we believe that antibases rhetoric strikes a sympathetic cord with many officials and politicians, because they believe Washington has given other countries better compensation packages and

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

are bitter about perceptions that the United States has failed to deliver on its funding commitments and to reward the Philippines for its return to democracy. An underlying lack of realism about how much Manila can extract from Washington will probably further complicate matters: some Philippine officials reportedly believe that a comparison with US base agreements elsewhere suggests a five-year package of at least \$2-5 billion, while some politicians are already urging that the United States assume Manila's \$28 billion foreign debt in exchange for a new basing agreement.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

Furthermore, although we have little information, we suspect the Soviets of covert efforts to bring about the closure of the US facilities. US diplomats report there is evidence, for example, that Moscow is using disinformation about AIDS to fan Filipinos' opposition to the bases, and Soviet spokesmen periodically warn that the Philippines could become a target in a nuclear exchange between Moscow and Washington. The Soviets also play down the importance of their facilities in Vietnam and hint that they might relinquish their foothold in Vietnam once the United States left its bases in the Philippines.

[Redacted]

25X1

Opportunities for the United States. Because polling results indicate a level of support that would probably help the United States if a referendum were held now, the United States may be able to exploit opportunities to build on existing goodwill. Washington's continuing efforts to help the Aquino government with economic and military aid could strengthen the position of Philippine officials who argue that the US relationship is a plus for Manila. In addition, greater visibility to the economic benefits of the bases, more publicity surrounding US aid projects, especially in rural areas, and showcasing of charitable activities by US military personnel could help win over that segment of the public that appears to have no fixed views on the fate of the US bases.

[Redacted]

25X1

In our judgment, Philippine decisionmakers will be watching closely for signs that Washington is treating Manila as a fully equal ally and is responsive to their concerns. Furthermore, as negotiations approach, Manila will be scrutinizing the whole of US-Philippine ties for indications of a US desire to be helpful. Senior officials and legislators have already mentioned publicly that they want increased concessions on bilateral trade and investment issues, for example. Manila might also view a well-publicized AIDS testing program as helpful in dampening public controversy over health concerns in areas surrounding the bases.

[Redacted]

25X1

One resource that the United States can use to its advantage is information. We believe the Philippine policymakers lack access to basic facts and documents that could help in making an educated decision about the bases. For example, US officials report that neither the executive branch nor the Congress has the staff resources needed to research, analyze, and recommend positions on key issues such as the bases. A willingness by the United States to share the necessary information in a manner that does not appear to try to persuade or condescend would more than likely be viewed favorably by Aquino and the Senate.

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

In any case, time could also play on the US side. Whether the negotiations take place in conjunction with the 1988 review or after, they will undoubtedly move slowly. This will provide US negotiators the opportunity to better assess the Philippine players and their individual stands on the main issues. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Appendix A



25X1

What Should Happen to the Bases -- by Age Group

	General	Age Group I 18-24	Age Group II 25-39	Age Group III 40-60	Age Group IV*
USIA FOREIGN OPINION NOTE 11/86					
Expand	19				
Leave as they are	53				
Reduce	14				
Remove them completely	6				
Don't know	17				
MANILA 0311 1/87 ATENEO-SWS (POLL 10/86)					
What should be done about the Bases?					
Retain	48				
Keep, regardless of terms	29				
Keep if the rent is right	18				
Remove					
MANILA BULLETIN 6/86 (Phil Lawyers Assoc)					
Bases should be retained after 91	67				
Bases should not be retained after 91	33				
PROJECT FALCON USIA 1985					
Expand	28.2	26.8	27.2	31	
Leave as they are	44.5	44.7	44.5	44.4	
Reduce	15.3	19.3	16.9	9.2	
Remove completely	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.4	
Don't know	8.2	5.3	7.6	11.9	
USIA FILIPINOS ON PHIL-AM RELATIONS 8/85					
Expand	30	35	29	29	
Leave as they are	39	37	40	39	
Reduce	8	9	9	5	
Remove	6	7	7	5	
Don't know	17	12	15	22	
BBC 1984-85 SURVEY RESULTS*					
The US bases should be kept/tolerated					
Agree	43	35	37	43	51
Disagree	23	28	25	22	18
Undecided	34	37	36	34	28

*Note: AGI=18-24, AGII=25-34, AGIII=35-44, AGIV=45 and over



25X1

Appendix B



25X1

What Should Happen to the Bases -- by Education

General University High School Elementary

USIA FOREIGN OPINION NOTE 11/86				
Expand	19			
Leave as they are	53			
Reduce	14			
Removed them completely	6			
Don't Know	17			
MANILA 0311 1/87 ATENEO-SWS (POLL 10/86)				
What should be done about the Bases?				
Retain				
Keep, regardless of terms	48			
Keep if the rent is right	29			
Remove	18			
MANILA BULLETIN 6/86 (Phil Lawyers Assoc)				
Bases should be retained after 91	67			
Bases should not be retained after 91	33			
PROJECT FALCON USIA 1985				
Expand	28.2	20.5	31.1	33.8
Leave as they are	44.5	51.1	45.3	36.4
Reduce	15.3	19.2	15.2	11.2
Remove completely	3.7	5.4	3.5	2
Don't know	8.2	3.8	4.8	16.5
USIA FILIPINOS ON PHIL-AM RELATIONS 8/85				
Expand	30	27	35	29
Leave as they are	39	45	38	36
Reduce	8	12	8	5
Remove	6	9	6	5
Don't know	17	8	13	25
BBC 1984-85 SURVEY RESULTS				
The US bases should be kept/tolerated				
Agree	43			
Disagree	23			
Undecided	34			



25X1

Appendix C

What Should Happen to the Bases -- by Region
 General Rural Urban Manila

USIA SURVEY OF 600 MANILANS (JUNE 87)

Expand				22
Leave as they are				51
Reduce				16
Remove completely				9
Don't know				3

If plebiscite were held today...

Most people would vote to keep bases				62
Most people would vote against				23
Don't know				15

PROJECT FALCON USIA 1985

Expand	28.2	30.6	24.8	
Leave as they are	44.5	43.3	46.3	
Reduce	15.3	12.8	19	
Remove completely	3.7	2.6	5.3	
Don't know	8.2	10.7	4.6	

USIA FILIPINOS ON PHIL-AM RELATIONS 8/85

Expand	30	31	30	27
Leave as they are	39	38	40	38
Reduce	8	5	11	16
Remove	6	5	8	9
Don't know	17	21	11	10

BBC 1984-85 SURVEY RESULTS

The US bases should be kept/tolerated				
Agree	43			48
Disagree	23			22
Undecided	34			30

25X1

25X1

Appendix D

Attitudes About the Bases -- by Education

	General	University	High School	Elementary School
USIA PROJECT FALCON (1985)				
Bases are worth the risks				
Strongly Agree	12	14	10.2	10.6
Agree somewhat	38.6	41.1	40.6	33.9
Disagree somewhat	22.7	24.7	24.8	18.7
Strongly disagree	6.4	8.5	6.6	4
Don't know	20.4	10.8	17.7	33.3
How much help are bases in preventing nuclear war and improving security?				
A great deal	32.7	32.5	34.9	30.8
A fair amount	42	42.8	43.9	39.3
Not very much	9.5	13.5	9.3	5.5
None	2.8	5.1	1.9	1.2
Don't know	13	6.2	10	23.2
How much do bases add to risk of nuclear attack?				
A great deal	32.9	40.8	32.2	25.1
A fair amount	32.1	32.7	31.7	31.9
Not very much	13.8	14.3	17.3	9.7
None	5	5.2	5.4	4.3
Don't know	16.2	7	13.4	28.9
How useful are bases to peace and security of Philippines?				
Very useful	31.1	30.5	32.8	30
Rather useful	50.9	53.9	53.1	45.4
Not useful	4.8	8.2	3.6	2.4
Harmful	2.2	3.9	2	0.6
Don't know	11	3.5	8.3	21.7
How much the bases contribute to the economy				
A great deal	20.4	21.9	21.8	17.9
A fair amount	56	56.8	58	53.2
Not very much	11.4	14.8	10.8	8.2
None at all	3.1	3.3	1.6	1.3
Don't know	10	3.2	7.7	19.4

25X1

25X1

Appendix E



Attitudes About the Bases -- by Region

General Rural Urban Manila Bases Area

USIA PROJECT FALCON (1985)

Bases are worth the risks

Strongly Agree	12	10	14.9	16.7	15
Agree somewhat	38.6	37.1	40.8	40.5	38.6
Disagree somewhat	22.7	21.9	25.1	21.3	35.3
Strongly disagree	6.4	5.2	8.2	10.3	4.7
Don't know	20.4	26.7	11.1	11.2	6.5

How much help are bases in preventing nuclear war and improving security?

A great deal	32.7	31.7	34.2	34	26.9
A fair amount	42	42.4	41.4	41.9	47.8
Not very much	9.5	7.8	12.1	11.7	19.6
None	2.8	1.9	5	6.3	2.8
Don't know	13	16.9	7.3	7	2.8

How much do bases add to risk of nuclear attack?

A great deal	32.9	27.7	40.5	42	38.8
A fair amount	32.1	30.9	33.9	31.3	38.9
Not very much	13.8	13.6	14.1	15	15.2
None	5	5.7	3.9	4.7	3.2
Don't know	16.2	22.1	7.6	7	3.8

How useful are bases to peace and security of Philippines?

Very useful	31.1	31.1	31	29.7	38.3
Rather useful	50.9	49.2	53.3	52.8	51.4
Not useful	4.8	3.5	6.8	7.3	5.4
Harmful	2.2	1.1	3.8	5.2	3.6
Don't know	11	15	5.1	5	1.2

How much the bases contribute to the economy

A great deal	20.4	18.7	23.4	25.3	32.5
A fair amount	56	55.8	56.2	51.5	57.5
Not very much	11.4	11.2	11.6	13.2	7.2
None at all	3.1	1	3.7	5	0.9
Don't know	10	13.3	5.1	5	2



25X1

25X1

Appendix F

[Redacted]

25X1

Attitudes about the US Bases

General

USIA FOREIGN OPINION NOTE 11/86

Bases are rather useful to
Philippine security

Agree	82
Disagree	7

Bases help at least fair
amount to deter nuclear war and
increase security of US and allies

Agree	68
Disagree	20

Bases add at least fair amount
to risk of Philippine being
nuclear target

Agree	65
Disagree	24

Bases are worth the risk

Agree	56
Disagree	31

Bases contribute at least a fair
amount to Philippine economy

Agree	75
Disagree	16

[Redacted]

25X1



PHILIPPINES: EXPLORING VIEWS ON THE US MILITARY BASES

DISTRIBUTION:

WHITE HOUSE/OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

- 1 - DON GREGG, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, RM 298, OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- 1 - JAMES H. KELLY, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER EAST ASIA, RM 302, OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
- 1 - DAVID LAUX, DIRECTOR OF ASIAN AFFAIRS RM 493, OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
- 1 - ALAN THOMAS, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RM 303, OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
- 1 - RICHARD CHILDRESS, DIRECTOR OF ASIAN AFFAIRS RM 392, OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVES

- 1 - THE HON FRANK C. CARLUCCI, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 493, OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

- 1 - CDR ED CAHILL, JOINT SPECIAL OPS AGENCY RM 2C840, PENTAGON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- 1 - THE HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE RM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC, RM 8840, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - JOHN C. MONJO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, RM 6205, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - CURTIS KAMMEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY RM 6531, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - CHARLES SALMON, DIRECTOR OFFICE OF PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS, RM 5311, DEPARTMENT OF STATE



- 1 - DAVID LAMBERTSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 6205, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - DR. JACK SHEERIN, PLANNING AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS STAFF, RM 3425, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - SCOTT BUTCHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OFFICE OF PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS, RM 5311, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - MAJORIE NIEHAUS, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC/SA, RM 8647, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - NANCY BASHOVEN, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 7424, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - PETER W. RODMAN, DIRECTOR POLICY PLANNING STAFF, RM 7311, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - RICHARD CLARK, JR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ANALYSIS, RM 6535, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - RICHARD HERMANN, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC/SA, RM 8647, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - ROBERT DUBOSE, DIRECTOR OFFICE OF GLOBAL ISSUES, RM 2844, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - THE HON MORTON ABRAMOWITZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE RM 6531, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - THE HON MICHAEL H. ARMACOST, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, RM 7240, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - THE HON GASTON SIGUR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 6205, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- 1 - ROB HUGHES, OFFICE OF PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS RM 5311, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

- 1 - REAR ADMIRAL EDWARD B. BAKER, JR, DIRECTOR. EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION, OSD/ISA, RM 4C839, PENTAGON
- 1 - REAR ADMIRAL JAMES D. COSSEY, OFFICE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 4C839, PENTAGON
- 1 - JOHN J. SLOAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC, RM 2C238, PENTAGON
- 1 - BRIG GEN (P) CRAIG H. BOICE, OJCS, J33 US ARMY, RM 2D921, PENTAGON
- 1 - BRIG GEN PHILIP M DREW, USAF, ASSIST DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICS-MILITARY, OJCS, RM 2E976, PENTAGON
- 1 - CAPT RENEE GOING, HQ USAF/INER, RM 4B-879, PENTAGON
- 1 - CAPT REGINALD AVERY, USA, ARMY ITAC, BUILDING 213 STOP 314 WASH NAVY YARD, RM, WASHINGTON, DC 20734
- 1 - CHARLES E. DOWNS, OSD/ISA/EAPR VIA SUE BENJAMIN CIA REP NMIC PENTAGON, RM 2D901A, PENTAGON
- 1 - LT CDR BILL MASON, CNO/OP-612C RM 4E-475, PENTAGON
- 1 - LT COL EDWARD HAYDASH, HQDA (DAMI-FII) RM 2A474, PENTAGON
- 1 - COL TIM BUCHANAN, OJCS/J-5/FESA RM 2E973, PENTAGON
- 1 - LT COL RICHARD A. RICE, J5 FESA RM 2E973, PENTAGON



25X1

- 1 - LT COL WILLIAM WISE, USAF, ASSISTANT FOR REGIONAL POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS, RM 4C839, PENTAGON
- 1 - LT J.G. FIJOL, NAVOPINTCEN WORLD NAVIES, RM, WASHINGTON, DC
- 1 - LTC ROBERT COOEY, USAF, HQ USAF/INER RM 4B-870, PENTAGON
- 1 - LTC MIKE O'HARA, HQ USMC/INTP RM, NAVY ANNEX
- 1 - REAR ADMIRAL W. O. STUDEMAN, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE NOP-009, RM 5C600, PENTAGON
- 1 - ROB HUDDLESTON, JSI/3B RM 1C938B, PENTAGON
- 1 - THE HON RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 43808, PENTAGON
- 1 - KARL D JACKSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 4E816, PENTAGON

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 1 - LT GEN LEONARD H. PERROOTS, DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, RM 3E258, PENTAGON
- 1 - [REDACTED] DIA/DB2C DIAC, RM C2137, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE
- 1 - DIA/DB-2C1 DIAC, RM DB4E2, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE
- 1 - [REDACTED] DIA JSI-3B, RM 1C938, PENTAGON
- 1 - [REDACTED] DIA/DB-2C1 DIAC, RM C245A, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE
- 1 - [REDACTED] DIA/DE-2 DIAC, RM 3B-823, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE
- 1 - [REDACTED] USA, DIA/DB-2C (P TEAM) DIAC, RM C2417-B, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE
- 1 - [REDACTED] DIA/JSI-3B DIAC, RM 1C938B, PENTAGON

25X1

25X1

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

- 1 - ROGER SEVERANCE, DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE PACIFIC BASIN, RM 3820, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

- 1 - ROBERT A. CORNELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, RM 3208, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

- 1 - JAMES NORRIS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR RM 6724, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVEL
- 1 - MICHAEL CROSSWELL, OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING RM 6851, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVEL
- 1 - BILL NANCE, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS RM 3214, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVEL



25X1



25X1

- 1 - CHARLES GREENLEAF, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS RM 6212, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVEL




UNITED STATES EXPRT-IMPORT BANK

- 1 - RAY ALBRIGHT, VP/ASIA DIVISION RM 1129, WASHINGTON, DC

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

- 1 - CHARLES SILVER, PHILIPPINE OFFICER RM 766, WASHINGTON, DC 20547

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 1 - CHIEF, JAPAN, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS NORTHEAST ASIA, RM 4G31, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - RESEARCH DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT STAFF, RM 4G48, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, ANALYTIC GROUP RM 7E47, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - CHIEF, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL RM 7E62, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS RM 4F18, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - DDI, RM 7E44, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - SENIOR REVIEW PANEL, RM 7B42, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF STAFF, RM 7F30, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - EA, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER RM 7E62, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - CHIEF, EA  RM 5D00, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT STAFF, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND ANALYTIC SUPPORT, RM 7G50, HEADQUARTERS
- 6 - CONTROL BRANCH, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND ANALYTIC SUPPORT, IMC, RM 7G07, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - SPECIAL ASSIST. DISSEM ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND ANALYTIC SUPPORT, RM 7G50, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 -  DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT, RM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - DIRECTOR, DDCI, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE STAFF, RM 7D60, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - CHIEF, PRODUCT EVALUATION STAFF RM 2G25, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - DIRECTOR, LDA/EA RM 1H18, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - PRODUCTION OFFICER, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT STAFF, RM 4G48, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - CHIEF, SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISLANDS BRANCH, RM 4F38, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - CHIEF, SOUTHEAST ASIA INDOCHINA, THAILAND, MALAYSIA, RM 4F24, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 - CHIEF, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS SOUTHEAST ASIA DIVISION, RM 4F38, HEADQUARTERS
- 1 -  FBIS/AG RM 1014, KEY BUILDING

25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

1 - [Redacted]

25X1

1 - [Redacted] OFFICE OF GLOBAL ISSUES TNAD/TAB, RM 2G17,
HEADQUARTERS

1 - [Redacted] A/NIO/EA RM 7E48, HEADQUARTERS

25X1

1 - [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1