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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DATE 3/3/87 FILE

DOC NO EA M 87-20037

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**DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE**

27 February 1987

**NORTH KOREAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF MOSCOW  
Clues to Future Ties?**

**Summary**

P'yongyang's radio and press radically changed the quality and quantity of their reporting on North Korean-Soviet ties in the 1980s, reflecting an increasingly positive view of ceremonies, events, and issues that has paralleled--and in some cases preceded--tangible progress in the relationship. The change was particularly apparent in 1986, when North Korea and the Soviet Union dramatized common anti-US themes in their rhetoric. Problems remain in the relationship, but we believe the two sides are closer now than at any time since 1948. Judging from the pattern in media coverage, [redacted] we expect the warmer atmosphere in North Korean-Soviet relations to continue in 1987.

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[redacted] Office of East Asian Analysis.  
Information available as of 27 February 1987 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia, OEA, [redacted]

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**Media Analysis as a Gauge: The Rationale for a Close Look**

The warming trend in Soviet-North Korean relations that began in 1983 was clearly signaled by President Kim Il-song's visit to Moscow in May 1984. Since then, evidence of the improved relationship, [Redacted] has included:

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- Soviet aid in building a nuclear power plant in North Korea.
- A recent unprecedented joint naval exercise. [Redacted]

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But P'yongyang also has altered its public behavior, offering Moscow greater support in the media, as well as changing its treatment of Soviet-North Korean relations:

- P'yongyang has significantly upgraded its rhetoric marking major Soviet-North Korean anniversaries and celebrations.
- The North has also expanded media support for Soviet foreign policy and security proposals. [Redacted]

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Sometimes, however, North Korean and Soviet media accounts of the same event have been very different--and occasionally one country has failed to report an event that received play in the other's press. Explanations include North Korea or Soviet disapproval of an issue or exaggeration of an event's importance for use in domestic or international propaganda. For example, items such as Soviet banquet toasts and birthday greetings to Kim Chong-il, Kim Il-song's son and apparent successor, play prominently in the North Korean media but not infrequently are omitted from the Soviet press. [Redacted]

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Our review of P'yongyang's media treatment of the Soviets since the 1960s confirms patterns that in some cases presage tangible steps. P'yongyang's public commentary consistently mirrored the declining state of bilateral relations in the 1970s. Compared with that period, in the past three years the North Korean press has significantly increased both the number of its items about Moscow and the effusion of its rhetoric. [Redacted]

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**The Historical Perspective**

In the 1970s, the media reflected P'yongyang's correct but cool ties to Moscow as the Soviets significantly reduced their public backing as well as shipments of military equipment. P'yongyang rarely noted Soviet foreign policy initiatives, and it virtually ignored milestones in US-Soviet relations--including President Nixon's trip to Moscow

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
in 1972, SALT I that same year, and the strategic arms limitation talks during the Ford-Brezhnev summit in Vladivostok in 1974. The only notable exception came in June 1979, when P'yongyang radio briefly reported, without comment, the conclusion of the SALT II agreement at the Vienna summit. P'yongyang's coverage of events that were bad news for Moscow reflected the same treatment. For example, NATO's decision in December 1979 to allow the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)--a major policy defeat for the Soviet Union--received no attention in North Korean media.



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P'yongyang similarly tempered its public treatment of ceremonial milestones. Observances of the Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty of 1961 are a case in point. Ceremonies marking the 10th, 15th, and 20th anniversaries indicated a steady downward slide in the relationship:

- In 1971, P'yongyang's celebration was far less lavish than its observance that year of a similar treaty with China, and it did not reciprocate the visit of a high-level Soviet delegation to mark the occasion.
- P'yongyang failed even to hold rallies in 1976 and downplayed traditional messages of Kim Il-song and Premier Pak Song-chol to their Soviet counterparts. In the same vein, the Soviet Union's congratulatory message to the North Korean leadership omitted the salutation "Dear Comrades," the first time the Soviets had dropped the greeting to P'yongyang on a major anniversary.
- By 1981, General Secretary Brezhnev--not even mentioning Kim Il-song by name--had downgraded his "warm congratulations" of 1976 to merely "congratulations." Unlike Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hu Yaobang, he voiced no support for Korean reunification or Kim Il-song's confederation proposal. At the same time, Beijing upgraded its message to Kim Il-song who, in turn, emphasized that North Korea's relations with China were "bloodsealed" and "militant."



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### The Warming Trend

Viewed against the backdrop of the 1970s, Kim Il-song's visit to Moscow in May 1984--his first in 23 years--signified a dramatic realignment in P'yongyang's relations. The message from that visit, since underscored in the media, has been the North's closer identification with Soviet interests, and cooler ties to Beijing. Still, media reporting suggests the relationship has grown at a measured pace, which is perhaps not surprising given the arms-length nature of past ties.



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To determine whether tell-tale media clues foreshadowed the possibility of progress during Kim's visit in 1984, we discovered that, in the months preceding Kim's trip, the press contained hints of a new direction in policy. Our retrospective analysis of




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radio and newspaper reporting indicates P'yongyang had begun to upgrade its treatment of Soviet affairs--a move reciprocated by Moscow--in 1983. Even so, examples of the new state of affairs were relatively few and far between:

- In September 1983, P'yongyang, for the first time in several years, took a clearly positive stand on a Soviet position by supporting Moscow's version of the Korean Airlines 007 shootdown. P'yongyang's action occurred just after Moscow withdrew from the Interparliamentary Union meeting in Seoul. Although we have no evidence of a causal link between the IPU withdrawal and P'yongyang's stance on the KAL shootdown, we surmise the North welcomed Moscow's boycott.
- Four months later, North Korean media reported that, for the first time, the Soviet Union sent official New Year's greetings to Kim Il-song as well as Kim Chong-il, suggesting Moscow had softened--although not abandoned--its disapproval of the elder Kim's plans for dynastic succession.
- In the same month, the Soviet press promptly reported North Korea's proposal for tripartite talks with the United States and South Korea. They did so without comment, however, suggesting displeasure over Moscow's exclusion from the talks.
- The clearest indication that Kim Il-song would visit Moscow occurred about a month before the trip. On 10 April 1984, KCNA published the text of a TASS interview with Kim. 

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Media treatment of the Kim-Chernenko summit in May 1984 was restrained, providing little clue to the extent of cooperation that has since transpired. 

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 Although North Korean media portrayed the meeting in generally favorable terms, they did not specifically endorse Soviet foreign policy positions. But both sides hinted at fundamental agreement on broad goals--for instance, repeating their opposition to "imperialist aggression," a phrase used by Kim in a banquet speech on 23 May. Moreover, North Korean media reported that Chernenko "warmly hailed" Korean economic achievements and indicated Soviet support for a US troop withdrawal. 

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Given the more detailed Soviet media accounts of the talks, North Korea's treatment suggests that P'yongyang's self-styled "independence" may have inhibited an admission of the extent of Soviet interests in Northeast Asia. For example, only TASS reported that Kim and Chernenko emphasized the importance of the 1961 treaty for the development of bilateral relations and the "preservation of peace in the Far East." Six years earlier--the last time both sides referred to the treaty--Moscow had noted merely that the treaty had served to consolidate friendship. 

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**Media Treatment of Ceremonial Events**


Kim's visit was followed by a distinctly more positive tone in North Korean-Soviet protocol coverage. One of the first upbeat signs occurred in July 1984, when the two sides marked their treaty anniversary:

- In P'yongyang, the North Korean delegation to the Soviet Embassy's reception was prominently reported to include three full Politburo members. Since 1971 the anniversary had not drawn more than one North Korean official at the Politburo level, and in many years the turnout was led by an alternate member.
- P'yongyang's media coverage of the anniversary--including reports of ceremonies in Moscow for the first time in a decade--was also the most extensive in years. P'yongyang's characterization of relations with Moscow warmed noticeably, echoing language used during Kim's visit. Nodong Sinmun, the official Korean Workers' Party newspaper, called the two countries "friendly neighbors linked by a river" and "class brothers and intimate comrades-in-arms." Similar, but much less effusive, language had last appeared in 1979.
- Moscow also upgraded its treatment of the anniversary--Soviet officials attending a reception at the North Korean Embassy were of a higher level than those attending the year before. 

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
**Security Cooperation**

In retrospect, clues in the media that the two countries were cooperating more closely preceded concrete evidence of the warmer relationship. After Kim's 1984 trip to Moscow, North Korean-Soviet security cooperation surfaced as a recurrent theme in P'yongyang media:

- For example, in August 1984, during the 39th anniversary celebration of Korea's liberation from Japanese rule, North Korea paid special attention to the Soviet role in defeating Japan. Kim Il-song's anniversary message to Moscow, carried by KCNA, was the warmest in over 20 years, referring to the Soviet Union as North Korea's "liberator."
- A Nodong Sinmun editorial echoed the "liberator" theme and went on to praise current Soviet domestic and foreign policies. By contrast, editorials on the anniversary for more than a decade had contained no more than a brief reference to the Soviet Union's past assistance. 

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**1986--The International Year of Peace**

In 1986, both P'yongyang and Moscow spoke out repeatedly on the UN peace theme. North Korea has vocally backed Soviet policy stances that complement its own attempt to project a moderate, peaceful image. 

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In November 1985, P'yongyang abandoned its traditional silence on US-Soviet summits, praising Gorbachev's performance in Geneva and endorsing his proposal for a collective Asian discussion of regional security issues. During the 1970s, P'yongyang had consistently turned aside Moscow's periodic efforts to elicit approval of a collective security arrangement. The endorsement--made in a speech by Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam marking the October Revolution as well as a Nodong Sinmun editorial--apparently impressed Moscow. The Soviets reciprocated in February 1986 via a TASS statement that supported P'yongyang's condemnation of Team Spirit and the North's unilateral suspension of military exercises. The Soviet pronouncement was the clearest statement in nearly 20 years supporting P'yongyang on a peninsular issue. [Redacted]

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In 1986, North Korean calls for a nuclear-free zone on the peninsula were echoed in Moscow, forging a new common stand:

- The Soviet Foreign Ministry issued its most authoritative statement of support for North Korea in 26 years, seconding P'yongyang's antinuclear theme. Gorbachev also included the refrain in his Navy Day speech in Vladivostok in July.
- Less than three weeks later, North Korea's Foreign Ministry followed up, expressing "full support" for Gorbachev's announcement of an extended nuclear test moratorium. The declaration marked P'yongyang's first formal statement supporting a Soviet position in 25 years. [Redacted]

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Both sides have used the peace theme to demonstrate their broader accord:

- As part of its campaign to add tension-reduction proposals to the proposed agenda for North-South talks, the North announced in September 1986 that 150,000 troops were to be assigned to civilian construction projects. P'yongyang's "initiative" was picked up by Pravda and aired on Moscow television. Such use of military personnel is not new, and, in this case, probably rooted in economic necessity--North Korea is grappling with shortages of raw materials, energy, and labor. But the attention given the alleged action also is consistent with P'yongyang's year-long propaganda campaign to portray itself as a peace-loving nation.
- Similarly, in September, P'yongyang's role as host of an international antinuclear conference was well publicized both in North Korea and the Soviet Union. Pravda and TASS highlighted those sections of the conference declaration praising Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals and Gorbachev's extended nuclear testing moratorium, and condemning the Strategic Defense Initiative.
- Common themes figured prominently in press coverage of Kim Il-song's October 1986 visit to Moscow. Both Kim and Gorbachev condemned US imperialism, reiterated Gorbachev's Vladivostok proposals for Asian security, and praised the Soviet position at the Reagan-Gorbachev talks at Reykjavik. P'yongyang's media accounts of the summit were more extensive and effusive than the reports of


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Kim's 1984 visit. Upon Kim's return, KCNA publicized a Korean Workers' Party communique proclaiming the two leaders reached "full consensus on all the questions discussed."

- Both North Korean and Soviet media harshly criticized the US announcement in November of plans to deploy Lance missiles in the South, asserting that Washington had escalated the arms race while praising Moscow and P'yongyang for their peaceful initiatives.
- During the same month, North Korea acknowledged Soviet interest in an intra-Korea issue--the Kungangsan Dam--by replaying Soviet media coverage that mirrored P'yongyang's line. 

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
### **Media Omissions: Tacit Signs of Disagreement**

The increasingly positive media treatment of bilateral issues and events suggests that North Korean-Soviet ties are stronger than would be indicated solely by other, more tangible measures of the relationship. Nonetheless, we do not underestimate the differences. Like information on improvements in Soviet-North Korean connections, the indicators of friction are sparse. Frequently our best clues of policy disagreements are gleaned not from what press statements say, but from what they omit:

- The Soviets have given only lipservice to P'yongyang's demand to cohost the 1988 Olympics with Seoul and have failed to support the North's threat of a boycott.
- In contrast to Moscow, P'yongyang recognizes Prince Sihanouk's Cambodian coalition. The Soviet press does not publicize events related to Kim Il-song's personal friendship with Sihanouk.
- Perhaps most important, Soviet coverage of its North Korean relations reveal Moscow's reluctance to approve Kim Chong-il as Kim Il-song's heir. 

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Moreover, on several of these and other issues, the Chinese are more supportive than the Soviets:

- The Chinese press has publicized periodic North Korean calls for Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia.
- China implicitly blessed the elder Kim's succession plan by giving Kim Chong-il the red-carpet treatment during his visit to Beijing in 1983. He has not yet visited Moscow. 

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Notwithstanding the North's shift toward the Soviets, we believe P'yongyang is reluctant to abandon its image of fierce independence and self-proclaimed status as a



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Nonaligned nation. In fact, public behavior the North's sensitivity on this score:

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highlights

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- During the 25th anniversaries of the Soviet and Chinese treaties in July 1986, North Korea tried to balance its position between the two sides, dispatching full Politburo members to both Moscow and Beijing.
- North Korean media frequently extol the virtues of Kim Il-song's philosophy of chuche or self-reliance.

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**Implications**

We believe analysis of the media remains a useful complement to other intelligence in gauging the direction of North Korean-Soviet relations. There are several areas that bear watching to discern how bilateral ties may change:

- Economic cooperation. The Soviets have been tightfisted on economic issues, demanding balanced trade and repayment on debt obligations, and we do not expect Moscow to change its tack significantly in the near term. But a rise in media attention to bilateral economic issues--articles on joint exploitation of North Korean resources, for example--in consonance with new trade agreements and exchanges of economic delegations, could be a tipoff of improved cooperation in this area. To date, media accounts of economic meetings have been vague, and terms of agreements have not been publicized.
- Defense cooperation. Public references to defense agreements historically have been sparse on details, but nonetheless indicators of broader accord. In December 1986, for example, KCNA described the aim of Soviet General Lizichev's visit to P'yongyang as the expansion of military cooperation "in accordance" with the Kim-Gorbachev summit. We would read such statements as well as reports of visits of military delegations, or articles on each other's defense posture, as barometers of the defense relationship. They could offer tipoffs of possible new Soviet aid or joint military exercises.
- New common policy themes. North Korea's media have hinted that P'yongyang is inching toward an acknowledgement of its role in the Socialist community. For example, occasionally P'yongyang will use codewords that traditionally imply membership in the Soviet Bloc, such as "proletarian internationalism." More frequent use of such terms would suggest further movement in this area. In January 1987, the North Korean Vice Foreign Minister joined his counterparts from the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Mongolia at a meeting in Moscow for the first time. North Korean attendance at the first Asian Communist party convention in Mongolia this summer would provide evidence of a convergence of policy interests.

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- **Cooperation Abroad.** Evidence is sparse on collusion between Moscow and P'yongyang in the Third World and elsewhere. Although we do not expect to see radical changes soon, we cannot rule out cooperation as a result of closer North Korean-Soviet ties. Media features on topics such as joint military or economic aid to third countries, or increased rhetorical support for diplomatic overtures, could mark such a new direction in policy.



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### Appendix: Chronology of Selected Events

The following chronology presents the key events in North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and China, including a short description of P'yongyang's media treatment. We also list in boldface selected developments involving the major powers in Asia to provide a backdrop to relations between North Korea and its major allies.

- |                  |  |
|------------------|--|
| 9 September 1948 | North Korean Communists establish the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in P'yongyang.   |
| July 1961        | North Korea signs friendship treaties with China and the Soviet Union.   |
| February 1965    | <b>The United States begins bombing North Vietnam.</b> Improved North Korean-Soviet relations during 1965-68 may stem from hopes Soviet support would help counter US power in Asia.   |
| 1966-69          | <b>The Chinese Cultural Revolution</b> strains China's ties to North Korea. Posters in Beijing call Kim Il-song a "fat revisionist" and a "disciple of Khrushchev."  |
| 1966             | <b>China refuses an invitation to the Soviet Communist Party Congress, starting a long period of noncommunication.</b>   |
| January 1968     | North Korean commandos attack the South Korean presidential mansion in an abortive effort to assassinate Park Chung Hee.   |
| January 1968     | North Korea seizes the USS <u>Pueblo</u> , an intelligence-gathering ship operating near the coast. Moscow gave minimal media coverage to the incident, omitting any mention of its role in settling the crisis, illustrating a cool state of North Korean-Soviet relations. |
| November 1968    | North Korean commandos infiltrate the east coast of South Korea and terrorize a village. The series of violent acts in 1968 reinforces North Korea's image of dangerous unpredictability.  |

- 1969 **China and the Soviet Union clash along their border, leading to a further deterioration in relations.**
- April 1969 North Korean fighters shoot down a US EC-121 reconnaissance plane. As with the Pueblo incident, Soviet media reports did not mention Moscow's intervention--Soviet ships helped the United States search for the downed aircraft.
- April 1970 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visits P'yongyang to mend relations damaged by the Cultural Revolution.
- 1972 **President Nixon visits Moscow and Beijing.** North Korean apprehension over the China trip is probably a factor in a temporary increase in P'yongyang's contacts with Moscow:
- The two exchange high-level delegations.
  - The Soviets provide additional economic and military assistance.
- 1972 **The US-China Shanghai communique criticizes (Soviet) "hegemony."**
- August 1974 South Korean President Park narrowly escapes assassination by a North Korean agent; Mrs. Park is killed.
- April 1975 **The United States withdraws from Vietnam.**
- August 1976 North Korean soldiers attack a UN Command tree-cutting team at Panmunjom, killing two US officers.
- October 1978 **China and Japan normalize relations.**
- November 1978 The **Soviet Union and Vietnam** sign a treaty that gives Moscow access to military facilities in Vietnam.
- December 1978 North Korean-Soviet friction over Cambodia begins as P'yongyang denounces **Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia.**

December 1978	North Korean media report the <b>normalization of US-China relations</b> but do not comment on its implications for the Korean peninsula. P'yongyang probably fears its interests could be sold out in US-China discussions about Korea.
February 1979	<b>China launches a limited border war with Vietnam.</b>
December 1979	<b>Soviet forces invade Afghanistan.</b> North Korea criticizes the move.
September 1981	<b>The IOC selects Seoul to host the 1988 Summer Olympics.</b>
September 1982	Following a series of high-level exchanges, Kim Il-song receives a red-carpet welcome during his 11-day visit to China.
October 1982	Soviet press and cultural officials visit South Korea for the first time to attend an international conference.
January 1983	Kim Il-song tells Japanese reporters it is inconceivable Beijing or Moscow could recognize the "illegitimate" authorities in Seoul.
May 1983	South Korean and Chinese officials conclude direct negotiations--their first official contact--to resolve the hijacking of a Chinese airliner.
June 1983	Kim Chong-il visits China. The trip marks Chinese recognition of Kim Il-song's succession plans.
1 September 1983	<b>Soviets shoot down a South Korean passenger plane over Sakhalin Island.</b> The halt in Soviet contacts with South Korea--including Moscow's withdrawal from the Interparliamentary Union meeting in Seoul--is accompanied by an improvement in Soviet-North Korean relations. For example, P'yongyang media cover Soviet INF initiatives and Andropov's "peace" initiatives.

22 September 1983	P'yongyang radio echoes the Soviet allegation that KAL 007 was on a spy mission into Soviet airspace.
28 September 1983	<b>Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping meets with US Secretary of Defense Weinberger in Beijing.</b> Their talks include discussions on Korea.
9 October 1983	Chun Doo Hwan narrowly escapes a North Korean assassination attempt in Rangoon; 17 South Korean officials are killed.
October 1983	Two South Korean officials attend an international conference in Shanghai.
November 1983	Chinese media report a fairly balanced view of the Rangoon bombing, reporting both Burma's announcement blaming P'yongyang, and the North's official denial of the charges. Moscow reports only P'yongyang's denial.
November 1983	<b>Moscow deploys 10 TU-16 Badgers and two TU-95 Bears at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam,</b> the first Soviet deployment of bombers outside the Warsaw Pact area since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
January 1984	<b>Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang makes an official visit to Washington.</b>
February 1984	<b>Moscow begins deployment of two of its three aircraft carriers to the Western Pacific. In March a Soviet aircraft carrier task force supports its first joint amphibious exercise with Vietnam.</b>
April 1984	P'yongyang media carry Kim Il-song's TASS interview, the clearest precursor of Kim's trip a month later.
April 1984	<b>President Reagan travels to China.</b>
April 1984	<b>Moscow announces its boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics.</b>
May 1984	Kim Il-song travels to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, his first trip to Moscow in 23 years.

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**June 1984**

P'yongyang announces its boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics on the final day for applications, citing concern over its athletes' safety. North Korea does not refer directly to the Soviet boycott.

**August 1984**

North Korean Premier Kang Song-san visits China. Soon after his return North Korea promulgates its joint venture law--patterned after China's foreign investment regulations.

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**August 1984**

P'yongyang reports a meeting between the Soviet Ambassador in North Korea and Kim Chong-il--who rarely meets foreigners. The meeting may be an oblique acknowledgement of Kim's status as designated successor to Kim Il-song.

**November 1984**

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa, accompanied by military representatives, visits North Korea to conclude a border treaty. Both North Korean and Soviet media report his meetings with Kim Il-song on the 20th and with Kim Chong-il on the 23d.

**30 November 1984**

P'yongyang and Beijing announce Kim Il-song's unofficial visit to China on 26-28 November. Differences in the two sides' media treatment reflect a strain in ties.

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**January 1985**

North Korea and China sign a new aid agreement. Chinese media report P'yongyang's thanks for economic assistance, but North Korean media fail to report the agreement.

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April 1985

North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam visits Moscow. P'yongyang publicizes a joint communique attesting to "consensus on all problems discussed at the talks," a break with its longstanding practice of not issuing joint communiques. The communique may be evidence of an effort to strengthen ties with the Soviets.

April 1985

**South Korean diplomats visit China for the first time to attend an international conference.**



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May 1985

Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang visits North Korea. Neither side claims, as was customary in the past, that their standard "unanimity of views" extends to foreign affairs.

June 1985

Kim Il-song indirectly criticizes Chinese policy by saying that, despite its attempts to bolster its economy through increased contacts with the outside world, North Korea would "never" introduce foreign capital and thus risk becoming a "subjugated" economy.

July 1985


**General Secretary Gorbachev revives the "zone of peace" and "Asian security" concept**, first initiated by Brezhnev in 1969, during Prime Minister Gandhi's visit. Both ideas aim to exclude US influence from Asia.

August 1985

The 40th anniversary of Korean liberation from Japanese rule reveals a new focus on Soviet-North Korean security ties. China does not send a delegation.

December 1985

North Korea accedes to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in return for Soviet agreement to help construct a nuclear power plant.



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January 1986                      **Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visits North Korea. P'yongyang endorses the Soviet proposal for Asian collective security and gives stronger support for the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan--thus broadening the gap with China.**



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January 1986                      **North-South talks are halted as P'yongyang protests the announcement of the US-South Korean joint exercise Team Spirit 1986.**

June 1986                         **A delegation of Korean People's Army political officers visits Moscow. The visit is reciprocated by General Lizechev in December.**

June-July 1986                   **North Korea calls for military tripartite talks--including the two Koreas and the United States--to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula.**

July 1986                         **Moscow and P'yongyang exchange air and naval contingents during the 25th anniversary of their friendship treaty, marking the first official visit by North Korean warships to a foreign port.**

September 1986                   **China sends a team to the Seoul Asian Games on the first direct flight from China to South Korea.**

October 1986                      **Chinese President Li Xiannian visits North Korea. Chinese media portrayals of the trip are warmer than P'yongyang media accounts.**

October 1986                      **The first joint North Korea-Soviet naval exercise marks a growing defense relationship.**

October 1986                      **President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev meet at Reykjavik. P'yongyang supports the Soviet position at the talks.**

October 1986                      **Visiting US Defense Secretary Weinberger receives a warm welcome from China. The reception underscores Beijing's willingness to widen its defense relationship with Washington.**



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- October 1986                      Kim Il-song visits Moscow. North Korean media exude lavish praise for the results of the talks.
- November 1986                    **The United States announces its deployment of Lance missiles in South Korea.** The decision is criticized by P'yongyang and Moscow as another act of US aggression leading to nuclear war.
- December 1986                    KCNA reports that Soviet General Lizichev heads a delegation to P'yongyang for talks on expanding North Korean-Soviet military cooperation.
- December 1986                    Kim Il-song calls for high level political and military talks between North and South Korea.
- January 1987                      North Korea sends a representative to a meeting of deputy Foreign Ministers in Moscow--including officials from Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Mongolia. Soviet media shows an interest in both intra-Korean and Asian regional issues by calling for an improvement in Chinese-Soviet ties, and backing the North's new talks proposal.



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



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**SUBJECT: North Korean Media Treatment of Moscow: Clue to Future Ties?**


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- 1 - Director, DCI/DDCI/Executive Staff (7E 12)
- 1 - NIO/EA (7E 62)
- 1 - C/PPS/DO (3D 01)
- 1 - C/EA/RR (5E 18)
- 1 - OGI/FSIC/PI (2G 28)
- 1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch (4G 43)
- 1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch (4G 31)
- 1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch (4G 43)
- 1 - OEA/NEA Division (4G 43)
- 1 - OEA/China Division (4g 32)
- 1 - OEA/SEA Division (4F 24)
- 1 - D/OEA (4F 18)
- 1 - C/Production/OEA (4G 48)
- 1 - FBIS Analysis Group (1014 Key Bldg.)
- 1 - DDI (7E 47)
- 1 - Senior Review Panel (5G 00)
- 1 - Office of Legislative Liaison (7B 14)
- 1 - PDB Staff (7F 30)
- 5 - CPAS/IMC/CG (7G 07)

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- 1 - CPAS/ILS (7F 50)
- 1 - C/PES (7F 24)
- 1 - NIC/AG (7E 47)
- 1 - DDO/EA Division (5D 00)
- 1 - DDO/EA, [Redacted]
- 1 - DDO/EA, [Redacted]
- 1 - DDO/EA, [Redacted]
- 1 - DDI, [Redacted]
- 1 - DDI, [Redacted]
- 1 - DDI, [Redacted]

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DDI/OEA/NA/Korea, [Redacted]

26 February 1987

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