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
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INDICATORS FOR MONITORING  
THE NICARAGUAN INSURGENCY:  
A USER'S GUIDE

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
This User's Guide was prepared by analysts in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis and the Office of Global Issues. Any questions or comments may be directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA,



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INTRODUCTION

The system of indicators described in this User's Guide has been designed to assist those with an interest in the military situation in Nicaragua. The system of indicators is not intended to give a net assessment of the war, nor to predict who will win and how soon. Instead, it defines general levels of weakness and strength in those areas that historically have been important to successful insurgencies and the stability of Marxist-Leninist regimes. Viewed over time, the indicators illustrate trends, but they should not be viewed in isolation because growing strength on one side may be offset by corresponding strength on the other side.

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The system consists of two matrices, one arraying nine military and eight political indicators for assessing the capabilities of the anti-Sandinista insurgents and a second arraying ten military and nine political indicators for assessing the Sandinista side of the equation. This guide includes backup material on each of the indicators, laying out the analytical process our analysts go through each month in filling out the matrix. The backup material consists of a sheet on each indicator that includes:

- A list of key measures used to assess insurgent or regime performance with regard to that indicator.
- A description of what level of activity one would expect to find if insurgent or regime performance against that indicator were deficient, weak, moderate, substantial, or strong. In essence, we have established a scale for each indicator and then defined levels of activity at various points along that scale.

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The factors and descriptions reflect the present situation in Nicaragua, but are based on analysis of a variety of historical insurgencies. In each case, the end points describing deficient or strong capabilities were set first, and then levels of weak, moderate, and substantial performance were defined at mid points along this spectrum. The system was designed by a panel of political, military, and economic analysts who follow Nicaragua on a daily basis.

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**The Anti-Sandinista Insurgency  
Key Indicators**

Legend      ○ Deficient      ● Substantial  
                  ◐ Weak            ● Strong  
                  ◑ Moderate

High }  
 Med } Level of confidence  
 Low } in judgment

		1986												1987		
		Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb			
1	Presence in country	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
2	Geographic extent of operations	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
3	Command, control, and complexity of operations	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
4	Intelligence and security	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
5	Military initiative	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
6	Combat proficiency	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	Med
7	Troop morale and discipline	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	Low
8	Availability of weapons/ammunition/equipment	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
9	Logistic support	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
<b>Political Capabilities</b>																
10	Leadership quality and charisma	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
11	Cohesion and unity	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
12	Appeal of movement inside Nicaragua	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	Med
13	Development and expression of political program	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
14	Cooperation of rural population	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	Med
15	Urban support	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
16	Cooperation by Central American states	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High
17	Foreign support and recognition	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	High



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**The Sandinista Regime**  
**Key Indicators**

Legend      ○ Deficient      ⊕ Substantial  
                  ⊖ Weak              ○ Strong  
                  ⊕ Moderate

High } Level of confidence  
 Med } in judgment  
 Low }

	Military Capabilities	1986												1987		
		Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb			
1	Command and control	⊖	⊖	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	High
2	Strategy and tactics	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	High
3	Intelligence and security	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	High
4	Military aggressiveness	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	Med
5	Mobility/Presence in countryside	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	High
6	Combat effectiveness	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	Med
7	Recruitment and retention	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	High
8	Availability of weapons and equipment	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	High
9	Logistic support	⊖	⊖	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	High
10	Ability to assimilate equipment and operate without foreign advisors	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	Med
<b>Political Capabilities</b>																
11	Directorate unity and cohesion	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	Med
12	Civilian/military relations	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	Med
13	Internal security	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	High
14	Political institutions	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	Med
15	Ability to mobilize mass support	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	Low
16	Control of political opposition	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	High
17	Ability to defuse religious/ethnic discontent	⊖	⊖	⊖	⊖	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	Med
18	Ability to deflect dissatisfaction with economic performance	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	Med
19	Foreign political/diplomatic support	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	Med



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #1

Presence in Country

**DESCRIPTION:** Number of troops maintained inside Nicaragua. Creation of safehavens inside Nicaragua.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

**DEFICIENT:** Vast majority of rebels are outside Nicaragua. Little ability to operate inside except for cross-border raids. No safehavens.

**WEAK:** Half of rebel combatants operate inside Nicaragua for several months to a year at a time, but still totally dependent on external bases. No safehavens in Nicaragua.

**MODERATE:** More than half of combatants operate inside Nicaragua for several months to a year at a time. Some transitory safehavens in Nicaragua. Substantial dependence on bases in Honduras for food, medical care, and resupply.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Majority of combatants always inside Nicaragua. Rebel headquarters moves into Nicaragua. Some permanent safehavens established inside. Depots and caches of supplies established inside.

**STRONG:** Vast majority of rebels operate permanently inside Nicaragua. Rebel headquarters and most logistics based inside. Most camps in Honduras abandoned. Rebel family members move back to Nicaragua.



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
INSURGENCY INDICATOR #2

Geographic Extent of Operations

**DESCRIPTION:** Ability to operate in the various regions of Nicaragua.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

- DEFICIENT:** Rebels generally operate in proximity to borders.
- WEAK:** Operate only in a few isolated areas at a time. Other fronts are sporadic or dormant more than 90 percent of the time. Not able to enter urban or heavily defended areas.
- MODERATE:** Can operate in most rural regions simultaneously most of the time. Operations in urban or heavily defended areas are rare.
- SUBSTANTIAL:** Can operate in all rural areas most of the time with occasional forays into urban and heavily defended areas.
- STRONG:** Operate in all five regions of Nicaragua simultaneously. Operate in urban areas as well as rural.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #3

Command, Control, and Complexity of Operations

**DESCRIPTION:** Ability to plan and execute operations effectively. Strategic Command maintains control over troops in the field. Flexibility and appropriateness of tactics. Quality and effectiveness of military leaders. Ability to coordinate multi-unit and combined-arms operations.


**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**  
**DEFICIENT:** Field commanders operate independently. Little or no ability to coordinate multi-unit operations. Poor communications. Tactical inflexibility and use of inappropriate tactics. No clear objectives set or met.

**WEAK:** Field Commanders occasionally use flexibility and appropriate small-unit tactics but have difficulty coordinating actions. Plans are communicated, but some commanders fail to carry out orders or to work together. Few multi-unit operations take place. Initial objectives rarely met because of weak leadership.

**MODERATE:** Field commanders consistently show flexibility and use appropriate tactics but sometimes have difficulty coordinating actions. Plans and objectives are communicated, but not always achieved due to uneven leadership.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Commanders, staffs and troop units exhibit good teamwork and frequently achieve objectives. Appropriate tactics and flexibility are used. Only the most difficult multi-unit operations prove too much for the leadership to handle.

**STRONG:** Leadership performs well and has confidence of the troops. Successful at planning and executing complex multi-unit operations. Troops in field exhibit tactical flexibility and respond swiftly to changes in plan. Objectives are clearly set and communicated. All elements of the force work together.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #4

Intelligence and Security Capabilities

**DESCRIPTION:** Ability to obtain, evaluate, and act on information about strength, disposition, and plans of enemy forces. Counterintelligence and communications security limit the effectiveness of government intelligence operations.

- DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**
- DEFICIENT:** Government agents have penetrated many levels. Consistent use of unsecure communications. Plans and operations nearly always tipped off. Enemy strength, disposition, and plans not known or considered. Almost totally reliant on foreign generated intelligence.
  - WEAK:** Some penetrations by government agents. Frequent use of unsecure communications. Some information on enemy available but only occasionally acted on. Little effort to obtain own intelligence.
  - MODERATE:** Efforts made to ensure secure communications but with occasional lapses. Efforts made to identify and isolate enemy penetrations. Most enemy units located, and intelligence regularly considered in planning.
  - SUBSTANTIAL:** Secure communications used but some vulnerable to enemy. Many enemy penetrations identified and isolated. Nearly all enemy units located and some plans known. Own collection networks developed and information usually acted upon.
  - STRONG:** Enemy penetrations identified and isolated. Communications secure. All major government forces known and located. Knowledge of enemy plans. Intelligence used in planning operations and largely gathered through own networks.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #5

Military Initiative

**DESCRIPTION:** Rebels ability to initiate clashes by their own action or efforts to expand area of operations. Freedom of movement. Ability and willingness to attack defended targets and carry out symbolic, spectacular operations. Ability to obtain favorable casualty ratio over government.


**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**  
**DEFICIENT:** Most clashes initiated by government. Rebels always on the run or in hiding. Hit only soft targets such as undefended economic installations and civilians. Casualty ratio favors government.

**WEAK:** Rebels limited to moving only at night or in bad weather. Initiate clashes infrequently and rely mostly on road ambushes, mining, and attacks on soft targets. Casualty ratio about even with government.

**MODERATE:** Rebels and government initiate action about equally. Rebels dominate at night and in bad weather, government during daylight. Occasional symbolic attacks on defended targets. Casualty rates higher for government troops than for rebels. Rebels able to infiltrate borders and move from region to region.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Rebels initiate most clashes. Government response limited to sweep operations by a few mobile units with Air Force support. Rebels able to challenge government daylight air superiority. Casualty ratio favors rebels by at least 2:1. Rebels frequently target defended military installations with hit-and-run attacks.

**STRONG:** Government forces pinned to defending fixed targets. Rebels strike anywhere at anytime. Rebels able to move in strength during daylight. Casualty ratio favors guerrillas substantially. Ability to stand up to large government units and overrun isolated ones.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #6

Combat Proficiency

**DESCRIPTION:**

Individual soldiers' effectiveness in combat. Knowledge of basic military skills (patrolling, map reading, security, weapons maintenance and operation). Maintain fire discipline, minimize civilian casualties. Effectiveness of training. Ability to operate and maintain complex weapons

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

**DEFICIENT:**

Combatants lack basic skills, waste ammunition, allow weapons to deteriorate, cause civilian casualties. Frequently subject to ambush. Unable to remain in field because of poor physical condition and unsanitary habits. Frequently flee combat and abandon weapons, wounded.

**WEAK:**

Majority of combatants lack basic skills or perform poorly under fire. Only a few elite units can be trusted to stay in the field or perform difficult missions. Field maintenance of crew-served weapons is poor and little cross-training available. Inadequate target acquisition causes friendly and civilian casualties.

**MODERATE:**

Majority of combatants utilize basic military skills, and many are trained to operate complex weapons. Soldiers perform well in combat but are frequently victims of ambush. Fire discipline is practiced most of the time, but civilian casualties sometimes result.

**SUBSTANTIAL:**

Nearly all combatants trained in basic military skills and practice them most of the time. A few elite specialized units trained to perform highly complex missions. Troops react well under fire, including enemy ambushes.

**STRONG:**

Vast majority of combatants experienced with good application of basic military skills. Maintain fire discipline. Soldiers operate and maintain complex weapons and are cross-trained to perform others' tasks. Civilian casualties minimal. Rebels rarely abandon weapons and usually remove all their casualties.

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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #7

Troop Morale and Discipline

**DESCRIPTION:** Commitment to rebel cause. Willingness to follow orders and respect authority. Insurgent confidence vis-a-vis government forces. Willingness to take risks. Confidence in medical evacuation/treatment of wounded. Confidence in ultimate victory.


**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**  
**DEFICIENT:** Most troops avoid combat, reluctant to take risks. Frequent mutinies and acts of rebellion against own officers. Frequent human rights abuses. High desertion rate. Acceptance of government amnesty. Troops have little or no hope of victory. Believe government soldiers superior.

**WEAK:** Only a few elite units act with confidence. Many others flee from combat, abandon weapons and wounded. Occasional mutinies and acts of rebellion. Many unwilling to take risks. Desertions and dropouts continue to erode strength. Confidence in victory highly dependent on foreign support, little confidence in own efforts.

**MODERATE:** Majority of troops willing to enter combat with a few instances of individual heroism. Desertion/dropout rate does not exceed recruitment. Mutinies rare. Loyalty to cause as well as individual leaders. Monitor own human rights abuses.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Troops willing to fight and take risks most of the time. Believe they are superior man-to-man although enemy may have better support Weapons. Follow orders and respect authority most of the time.

**STRONG:** High esprit. Confidence in ultimate success. Acts of individual heroism are frequent. Orders routinely followed. Very low desertion/dropout rate. Confidence in superiority over government units even against Air Force. Human rights abuses rare, handled by internal judicial system. High confidence in medical system.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #8

Availability of Weapons, Ammunition, and Equipment

**DESCRIPTION:** Reliable and consistent external supply. Appropriate weapons and equipment for type of warfare/threat. Ability to acquire, produce, and modify arms/equipment on their own. Ability to capture weapons/supplies from enemy. Sufficient stores available in Central America.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**  
**DEFICIENT:** Insurgents lack external support. Frequent shortages of ammunition, other supplies. Little or no ability to produce or acquire on their own. Lose more weapons than they capture. Inappropriate weapons for type of conflict.

**WEAK:** External benefactors unreliable. Periodic shortages. Relatively little ability to obtain sufficient stores through capture. Some weapons inappropriate, hard to maintain. Forced to seek many different types of ammunition.

**MODERATE:** External benefactors provide most needs, but with frequent delays. Types of weapons mostly appropriate but still require multiple types of ammunition. Capture more weapons/supplies than they lose, but not enough to depend on. Stores on hand adequate most of the time.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** External benefactors provide what is needed, but long-term reliability in question. All appropriate types of weapons acquired but some not in sufficient quantities. Stocks of most weapons in Central America sufficient with ability to supplement from capture. Some effort made to seek multiple sources or produce items on their own.

**STRONG:** External benefactors provide whatever is needed, reliable over long term. Weapons mix appropriate for threat/type of conflict. Significant ability to obtain weapons/supplies through capture or their own effort. Multiple benefactors. Sufficient quantities stockpiled in Central America.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #9

Logistic Support Capabilities

**DESCRIPTION:** Ability to live off the land, acquire food, etc., inside Nicaragua. Effectiveness of logistics management system. Availability of adequate overland, maritime and airborne delivery systems. Development of non-combatant support personnel. Setting up depots, caches, inside Nicaragua. Security of external logistics bases, lack of restrictions by foreign powers.


**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:** **DEFICIENT:** Little or no ability to live off the land. Little emphasis on logistics management. Delivery systems inadequate to support combat operations beyond border area. No caches or bases inside Nicaragua. Foreign powers severely restrict use of outside bases.

**WEAK:** Rebels able to obtain food inside the country but reliant on outside deliveries for all other support. Delivery systems unreliable, overly dependent on one means. No caches or depots inside. Most units unable to sustain combat operations inside for more than a few months at a time. Foreign powers frequently restrict use of external bases.

**MODERATE:** Some rebel units able to live off land and remain inside for a year or more. Delivery systems experience frequent delays and occasional shortfalls. Emphasis on logistics management and development of civilian support structure. Multiple means of delivery available. Minimal foreign interference in operations of external bases.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Rebels begin to develop civilian support structure inside Nicaragua. Caches and depots set up in some remote areas. Less dependence on one delivery system. Supplies delivered when needed but not always in sufficient quantity.

**STRONG:** Significant support from local population. Bases, depots, and caches maintained inside Nicaragua. Well developed logistics system with trained personnel. Multiple and reliable delivery systems.



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
INSURGENCY INDICATOR #10

Insurgent Leadership Quality/Charisma

**DESCRIPTION:** Measures the presence of strong leaders within the movement, their ability to provide effective leadership, the level of their popular appeal both within the movement and among ordinary Nicaraguans, and their international image.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

- DEFICIENT:** Little or no name recognition outside the movement. Military perceived as making all important decisions.
- WEAK:** Well-known within the movement and perceived to have some say in decisionmaking process.
- MODERATE:** Perceived as providing leadership within the movement. Significant name recognition in Nicaragua. Modest international visibility.
- SUBSTANTIAL:** Well-known in domestic and international circles. Influential in military decisionmaking. Known to command strong loyalties of insurgent rank and file.
- STRONG:** Leader(s) perceived as fully representing the movement on military and political matters. Recognized as having full authority to speak for movement in meetings with foreign governments and as commanding strong loyalties within the movement.



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INSURGENT INDICATOR #11

Cohesion and Unity

**DESCRIPTION:** Shared commitment and unified strategy. Speak with one voice. Absence of backstabbing. All factions represented, overcoming political, ethnic, and social differences. Factions share supplies, conduct joint operations.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**  
**DEFICIENT:** Factions break away from movement, cut separate deals. Always at each others throats. No unified political/military structure. No coordination of military actions. Rival rebel units fight each other.

**WEAK:** Most factions join weak and quarrelsome political structure, but some refuse to cooperate. Forces rarely cooperate in field and refuse to share supplies. Ethnic and political differences dominate discussion. Criticism by outside factions damages credibility.

**MODERATE:** All factions united in loose political structure, but retain own agendas. Some cooperation in the field, but factions continue to operate separately. Movement able to agree only on the broadest of goals.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Single unified military/political structure in which all factions have a voice. Troops in field and some lower-echelon leaders occasionally fail to cooperate. Some friction over leadership positions and perceived domination by one faction.

**STRONG:** All factions agree to common goal. Belong to unified political/military structure. Coordination of military actions routine. No discrimination in sharing of supplies, intelligence.



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INSURGENT INDICATOR #12

Appeal of Movement Inside Nicaragua

DESCRIPTION

Rebels shed association with Somoza regime. Human rights image improves. Effectiveness in highlighting government abuses of Church, economy, political rights. Appeal to nationalism, persuade people they are homegrown.

DEFINITION OF LEVELS:

- DEFICIENT: Rebels perceived as bringing return of Somoza regime. Human rights abuses perceived to be rampant. Rebels unable to benefit from Sandinista shortcomings and dependence on Cuba and Soviet Bloc. Insurgents widely perceived as foreign mercenaries.
- WEAK: Rebels tainted by mercenary image and association with Somoza regime, but benefit somewhat from Sandinista shortcomings. Human rights abuses continue to be a problem. Most Nicaraguans lack confidence in rebels ability to win.
- MODERATE: Rebels perceived as possible alternative to Sandinistas, but population remains apathetic toward both the insurgents and the regime. Both insurgents and regime perceived equally as violators of human rights and heavily influenced by foreign powers.
- SUBSTANTIAL: Rebels benefit from Sandinistas' negative image, and population begins to identify with them. Human rights, nationalist and political image improve, but majority not confident rebels will topple the regime.
- STRONG: Rebels perceived as democratic, nationalist, respectful of human rights, and a viable alternative to the regime. Benefit fully from negative perceptions of Sandinistas.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #13

Development and Expression of Political Program

**DESCRIPTION:** Extent to which rebels develop comprehensive political program with wide appeal inside Nicaragua. Development of means to disseminate their message to the people. Set up working political institutions in exile. Recruit and train political cadres and attempt to establish own political administration over areas inside Nicaragua in which they operate.


**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**  
**DEFICIENT:** No coherent political program and little attention given to non-military matters. Lack of political cadres, radio, and printing presses to disseminate message. No attempts to proselytize the population. No political institutions inside or outside the country.

**WEAK:** Political program developed but poorly articulated. Lack means of dissemination inside the country. Propaganda limited to external radio broadcasts. Little attention to development of political cadres. Most political activity limited to exile community.

**MODERATE:** Comprehensive political program announced. Some attempt made to articulate it inside Nicaragua, but development of political cadre and grass-roots organizations lags. Functioning political institutions in exile.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Clearly stated political program that appeals to economic and social needs. Attempts made to form government in exile and begin extending administration to occupied areas. Extensive external propaganda apparatus. Movement focuses attention on internal political cadres and dissemination of its message to the people.

**STRONG:** Well-developed political program that addresses both post-war political organization and the specific needs and aspirations of the people. Extensive propaganda and grass-roots dissemination network that has both external broadcasts and internal political cadres working to advance the movement. Establishment of shadow government in exile and in occupied areas of the country.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #14

Cooperation of Rural Population

DESCRIPTION

Extent to which peasants provide shelter, food, and intelligence to rebels. Willingness to be recruited as combatants or temporary support personnel. Confidence in rebels' ability to provide them physical security. Response to rebels' civic action programs. Willingness to engage in sabotage and other visible antiregime activities.

DEFINITION OF LEVELS:

**DEFICIENT:** Population provides little support to rebels and informs government troops of their presence. Rebels unable to recruit enough new combatants to replace losses. Peasants fearful of any association with guerrillas.

**WEAK:** Population mostly apathetic. Does not cooperate with government, but distrusts insurgents and fears regime reprisals. Some provide food and temporary shelter. Population has little knowledge of rebel civic action.

**MODERATE:** Much of rural population supports rebels with food, shelter, and information, but unwilling to take more visible action against the government such as sabotage because not confident that rebels can protect them. Sufficient new recruits join rebels to replace their losses.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Majority of population passively supports rebels, and some are willing to carry out sabotage and other visible acts. Those with long association with the guerrillas are more trustful than those in areas where the rebels have not maintained a consistent presence. Population accepts rebel civic action.

**STRONG:** Population strongly supports rebels. Provides food, shelter, intelligence, and enough new recruits to allow continuing growth of the force. Temporary support personnel relieve rebels of many logistics duties. Population confident of own security in siding with rebels, and participates in rebel administration and civic action programs.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #15

Urban Support

**DESCRIPTION:** Extent to which urban dwellers provide recruits, intelligence, shelter, and other support to insurgents. Operation of front groups to disseminate rebels' message, provide personnel for demonstrations. Willingness to engage in active, visible antiregime acts such as sabotage, bombings, graffiti. Extent of ties with private sector businessmen, Church, labor unions, and opposition political parties. Degree of confidence in rebels' ability to assure secrecy and otherwise shield their supporters from regime security services.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

**DEFICIENT:** Little of no urban support for insurgents. Other opposition groups inside Nicaragua publicly disavow the rebels. Population not willing to take any visible action against regime.

**WEAK:** Some urban dwellers provide passive support to rebels, but most remain apathetic or hostile. Internal opposition groups meet clandestinely with rebels outside Nicaragua, but little or no cooperation results in the country. Only a few willing to oppose the regime actively.

**Moderate:** Many urban dwellers provide clandestine support to the rebels, and some join their ranks. Front groups and legal parties sponsor strikes and demonstrations in coordination with the rebels. Graffiti, posters, and pamphlets supporting the rebels occasionally appear in the cities.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Majority of population clandestinely supports rebels. Sabotage, strikes, demonstrations, and other acts of defiance become routine. Attacks on military and security personnel by armed civilians begin. Internal opposition groups clandestinely support insurgents and agree to front some of their activity.

**STRONG:** Urban population openly supports rebels, provides food, shelter, information, and recruits. Willing to carry out acts of sabotage. Internal political parties and other groups agitate for insurgents and disseminate their message.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #16

Cooperation by Central American States

**DESCRIPTION:** Degree to which neighboring governments allow rebels to conduct political activities in their own territory. Governments provide clandestine training. Tolerate insurgent military activity in their territory. Permit use of their territory for supply operations and propaganda generation.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

- DEFICIENT:** Neighbors deny use of their territory for all rebel activity. Agree to cooperate with Sandinistas in policing borders.
- WEAK:** Neighboring countries allow insurgent political organizations to operate there. No military activity permitted.
- MODERATE:** Neighbors allow full range of insurgent political activity. Some also permit clandestine military activity with restrictions.
- SUBSTANTIAL:** All neighbors allow open political activity and some clandestine military activity. Some provide training and other assistance and allow insurgent bases on their territory.
- STRONG:** All neighboring countries allow use of their territory for all rebel activities, including launching attacks into Nicaragua. Openly provide military and political training.



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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #17

Foreign Support and Recognition

**DESCRIPTION:** Recognition by foreign governments of rebel organizations. Willingness to meet with leaders publicly. Rebels have positive image abroad, are considered appealing alternative to the Sandinistas. Treatment in international organizations. Ability to raise funds abroad, gain assistance of foreign political parties and other non-governing organizations.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**  
**DEFICIENT:** Foreign governments condemn rebels and actively oppose them. Refuse to meet their leaders. Forced to close offices abroad. Unable to raise funds or other support from foreign political parties or other organizations. Rebels perceived as right-wing military organization trying to bring back Somoza regime.

**WEAK:** Foreign governments unwilling to meet rebels and offer no open or private sympathy for their cause. Rebels perceived as losers. Some minor support from right-wing political parties.

**MODERATE:** West European and Latin American governments willing to meet privately with rebel political leaders. Rebels allowed to open offices, raise funds, conduct political activity. Insurgency perceived as having legitimate grievances against the Sandinistas.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Rebels have wide and open access to foreign leaders. Rebels widely perceived in a positive way with a favorable human rights image. Political parties and other non-government groups provide funds and other assistance.

**STRONG:** Many foreign governments (especially in Europe, Latin America) recognize state of belligerency. Granted observer status in international organizations. Rebels recognized as desirable alternative to Sandinistas.



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REGIME INDICATOR #1

Command and Control

**DESCRIPTION:** Ability to plan and execute complex or multi-unit operations. Quality and effectiveness of military leaders. Cooperation between combat units, higher headquarters, different services. Ability to coordinate combined arms operations.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

- DEFICIENT:** Operations frequently fail due to lack of planning and poorly stated objectives. Local commanders fail to cooperate and operate independently. Orders frequently fail to reach intended units and central authority has little idea what troops are doing. Rampant rivalries between services prevent coordination.
- WEAK:** Operations often fail due to poor communications and weak leadership. Multi-unit, combined arms, and joint-service operations nearly always prove difficult.
- MODERATE:** Plans and objectives are communicated, but not always achieved due to uneven leadership. Individual units perform well but have difficulty coordinating actions with other units. Combined arms operations generally are effective, but interservice differences hinder some efforts.
- SUBSTANTIAL:** Commanders, staffs, and troop units exhibit good teamwork and frequently achieve objectives. Only the most difficult multi-unit operations prove too much to handle.
- STRONG:** Plan and execute complex operations effectively. Objectives set and clearly communicated. Leadership performs well at all major functions and has confidence of troops. All services work together to achieve objectives.

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REGIME INDICATOR #2

Strategy and Tactics

**DESCRIPTION:** Armed forces have clear-cut objectives. Use small unit tactics, patrolling, and deemphasize armor/multibattalion sweeps. Degree of garrison mentality. Pay attention to interdiction/infiltration and foreign sanctuaries. Appropriate use of firepower to minimize civilian casualties. Build up militia and other local defense forces.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

**DEFICIENT:** No clear-cut objectives. Sole emphasis on military dimension, excessive use of firepower without regard for civilian casualties. Most troops defend fixed targets. No effort to stem infiltration or threaten foreign sanctuaries. Little or no attention to developing militia or civilian defense forces.

**WEAK:** Dependence on multibattalion sweep operations, use of heavy armor and artillery with insufficient regard for damage to civilian property/casualties. Little success in blocking rebel movement in countryside.

**MODERATE:** Military objectives far more developed than political. Only elite units employ small-unit tactics and aggressive patrolling. Some effort to limit civilian casualties. Effort to strengthen militias and civilian defense forces. Some success at interdicting infiltration.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Clear objectives but with overly optimistic timetable. Some attempt to emphasize political as well as military steps. Heavy use of small-unit tactics and patrolling, but limited to daylight hours. Use firepower well, but occasionally cause civilian casualties. Militia restricted to defending fixed targets.

**STRONG:** Clear-cut objectives and appropriate timetable. Emphasis on political as well as military dimension of counterinsurgency. Heavy use of small-unit tactics, patrolling during guerrilla war stage. Large units and firepower to confront main enemy units. Effective use of militia and other local forces. Fire discipline minimizes civilian casualties.



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REGIME INDICATOR #3

Intelligence and Security

**DESCRIPTION:** Ability to obtain, evaluate, and act on information about strength, disposition, and plans of enemy forces. Effectiveness of counterintelligence and communications security.

- DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**
- DEFICIENT:** Military forces penetrated by rebel agents at many levels; unable to formulate plans without leaks. Continuous use of unsecure communications. Unable to determine size or location of enemy forces and objectives. Intelligence not considered in planning own operations.
  - WEAK:** Some information on rebel forces available, but rarely acted upon in timely manner. Some penetrations by rebel forces of government military/security services. Unsecure communications used frequently.
  - MODERATE:** Efforts made to identify and track rebel units, and penetrate rebel ranks to learn plans and objectives. Intelligence considered in making own plans, even if not always adequate. Secure communications available but occasional lapses occur.
  - SUBSTANTIAL:** Most major forces identified and tracked, but many plans and objectives not recognized. Voluminous collection of rebel communications but exploitation and dissemination lags. Secure communications but subject to codebreaking.
  - STRONG:** All major rebel forces identified and located. Prior knowledge of rebel plans and objectives. Information disseminated in timely fashion and acted upon. Enemy penetrations identified and isolated; communications secure from enemy exploitations.



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REGIME INDICATOR #4

Military Aggressiveness

**DESCRIPTION:** Forces react aggressively to rebel sighting and seek contact. Willingness to remain out of garrison for long periods.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**


**DEFICIENT:** Vast majority of clashes initiated by rebels. Many government garrisons threatened with being overrun. Unwillingness to risk elite forces or sophisticated equipment like helicopters.

**WEAK:** Government forces tied to defense of fixed targets with only occasional multi-unit sweeps. Troops generally unwilling to seek contact on the ground, but call for artillery fire and air support to engage rebels. Troops generally unwilling to remain out of garrison for long, or to threaten rebel sanctuaries.

**MODERATE:** Government forces initiate about half the clashes. Dominate the countryside during daylight. Forces willing to seek contact when assured air/fire support.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Government forces initiate most clashes. Willing to patrol and conduct night ambushes. Elite units able to remain in field for extended periods.

**STRONG:** Vast majority of clashes initiated by government troops. Some units remain in the field for several weeks or months. Willing to engage rebels in all weather and terrain, even when not assured of fire support. Willing to cross borders to attack rebel bases.



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REGIME INDICATOR #5

Mobility/Presence in Countryside

**DESCRIPTION:** Sufficient mobility to challenge rebel control in the countryside. Ability to confront rebels on several fronts simultaneously. Government maintains presence in rural areas.

- DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**
- DEFICIENT:** Government presence reduced to large urban areas and permanent garrisons. Rely almost exclusively on air resupply and lack control over roads.
  - WEAK:** Lack of helicopters, trucks, and good roads limit government forces to operating on foot in many remote areas. Unable to fight on more than one front simultaneously. Effectively cede control of some areas to rebels.
  - MODERATE:** Road movement possible to nearly all areas during daylight when escorted. Some company-size units can be airlifted. Government maintains control of countryside during day. Can carry out simultaneous operations on two fronts.
  - SUBSTANTIAL:** Government forces can move anywhere during daylight and good weather. Able to maintain permanent presence in all areas most of the time.
  - STRONG:** Government forces able to move anywhere in country when rebels appear, and to fight simultaneously on several fronts. Government maintains permanent presence in all departments, municipalities, and other administrative jurisdictions.



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REGIME INDICATOR #6

Combat Effectiveness

**DESCRIPTION:** Effectiveness of individual soldiers in combat. Knowledge of basic military skills. Ability to defend symbolic military and economic targets. Small-unit cohesion. Composure under fire.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**  
**DEFICIENT:** Soldiers inadequately trained in basic military skills, waste ammunition, allow weapons and equipment to deteriorate. Unable to remain in field long because of poor physical condition and unsanitary habits. Frequently flee combat and abandon weapons or surrender when rebels besiege them.

**WEAK:** Majority of combatants poorly trained and lacking basic military skills. Only a few elite units can be trusted to perform well. High casualties due to inexperience and frequency of ambushes. Many wounded die before receiving medical treatment.

**MODERATE:** Most soldiers perform well in combat but frequently are victims of ambushes. Efforts are made to recover all weapons and casualties. Soldiers remain vigilant in protecting most important targets. Majority trained in basic military skills before being subject to combat.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Most combatants experienced and well-trained. Troops react well under fire, including enemy ambushes.

**STRONG:** Vast majority of soldiers experienced with good application of basic military skills. Evacuate casualties for treatment. New recruits cross-trained to perform multiple tasks. Troops successfully defend important targets even against superior numbers.



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REGIME INDICATOR #7

Recruitment and Retention

**DESCRIPTION:** Government's ability to enlist and retain sufficient military manpower. Control desertion/dropout rates. Willingness of soldiers to reenlist. Commitment to revolution. Willingness to submit to the draft. Troop morale.

**DEFINITION:** **DEFICIENT:** Military strength continually falling due to draft evasion, low retention and high desertions. Troop morale very low, sabotage of equipment. Vast majority of soldiers not motivated to fight for Sandinista cause.

**OF LEVELS:**

**WEAK:** Serious morale problems due to high casualties, poor pay, poor medical treatment, bad food. Draft evasion and high desertion rate force regime to expand the draft to maintain force levels.

**MODERATE:** Force able to obtain enough recruits and conscripts to offset casualties and desertions. Some instances of insubordination and court martial, but morale not detrimental to overall effectiveness. Some soldiers highly motivated to fight for the revolution.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Sufficient recruits and conscripts available to increase strength of government forces when needed. Desertion rate low and troop morale relatively good.

**STRONG:** Government able to recruit and retain sufficient personnel to reduce reliance on forced conscription. Few draft evaders. Soldiers committed to Sandinista cause. High morale and esprit in most units.



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REGIME INDICATOR #8

Availability of Weapons/Ammunition & Equipment

**DESCRIPTION:** Reliability of foreign assistance. Appropriate mix of weapons for type of threat. Ability to produce and modify own equipment. Sufficient stores available in Nicaragua.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

- DEFICIENT:** Government lacks sufficient external support. Unable to produce or modify equipment on their own. Inappropriate weapons for type of conflict.
- WEAK:** External benefactors provide equipment, but demand payment and threaten to withhold spare parts. Many weapons inappropriate, and some needed to counter a specific threat are lacking.
- MODERATE:** External supporters fill most needs, but with frequent delays. Weapons mix mostly right, but some difficult to maintain and others of little use. Stores on hand mostly adequate but some spot shortages noted.
- SUBSTANTIAL:** External supporters provide equipment when requested but long-term reliability in question. All appropriate weapons types acquired but some in insufficient quantities. Stocks on hand adequate for most contingencies.
- STRONG:** External supporters provide all that is needed and are reliable over long term. Weapons mix appropriate for threat. Sufficient quantities stored in Nicaragua. Multiple sources of weapons.



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REGIME INDICATOR #9

Logistic Support

**DESCRIPTION** Adequate planning and management of supply distribution. Presence of bases or depots in forward areas, and good road network. Sufficient trucks, helicopters, and support personnel.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

**DEFICIENT:** Inadequate planning results in frequent shortages at end of month. Troops unable to stay in remote areas because of lack of bases, poor road network, insufficient transport. Little or no effort to build new bases, roads.

**WEAK:** Supply system breaks down frequently due to bad weather, rebel interdiction of roads, and shortages of helicopters or fuel contamination. Troops in the field miss meals and sometimes are forced to break off action due to lack of supplies.

**MODERATE:** New support bases and roads under construction in remote areas. Sufficient trucks and helicopters acquired, but personnel shortages and weather occasionally delay deliveries. Planning and logistics management adequate for most routine operations, but emergencies and unexpected developments cause problems.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Good road network and forward bases in most areas. Supply system performs adequately with few delays.

**STRONG:** Sufficient roads, forward bases, and landing strips constructed to support operations anywhere in country. Sufficient transportation assets; drivers and other personnel always available. Good planning and management allow large-scale operations supported by prepositioned supplies.



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
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REGIME INDICATOR #10

Ability to Assimilate Equipment and Operate  
without Foreign Advisers

**DESCRIPTION:** Sufficient technical skills and education to operate and maintain complex weapons. Foreign personnel able to depart after training. Lack of tensions and friction between Nicaraguans and foreign advisers. Foreign managerial and tactical advice appropriate for Nicaraguan situation.

- DEFINITION:  
OF LEVELS:**
- DEFICIENT:** Foreign personnel perform some combat duties. Foreign advisers offer inadequate and totally inappropriate advice and training. Frequent friction between Nicaraguans and foreign personnel.
  - WEAK:** Government troops unable to assimilate some complex equipment (radars, medical services, etc.). Foreign advisers present at most field commands, causing friction and bruised relations.
  - MODERATE:** Government troops operate and maintain most equipment while receiving training on the rest. Some reliance on foreign support personnel. Advisers offer appropriate and relevant advice most of the time. Some friction with foreigners, but not enough to threaten operational efficiency.
  - SUBSTANTIAL:** Government troops well-trained by foreign advisers and gradually able to operate and maintain all equipment. Relations with foreign advisers generally good despite a few instances of friction. Foreign advisers limited to national staffs and training facilities.
  - STRONG:** Government troops able to operate and maintain all equipment without significant foreign assistance. Foreign trainers and advisers offer appropriate assistance. Strong relations and mutual trust between soldiers and foreign advisers.



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REGIME INDICATOR #11

Directorate Unity and Cohesion

**DESCRIPTION:** Ability of Sandinista National Directorate to maintain cohesion.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

**DEFICIENT:** Open and violent rifts among Directorate members. Key individuals/units are openly identified as supporters of a faction or Directorate member.

**WEAK:** Significant differences are unresolved and open feuding begins. Unilateral decisions are made and factions appeal to the party, military, and public for support.

**MODERATE:** Personal rivalries and policy differences fairly intense, but compromise is reached for the good of the revolution. Public awareness of factional differences grows. Power plays to undercut some leaders occur.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Tactical differences and minor personal rivalries present, but problems resolved without lasting rancor.

**STRONG:** Broad consensus on all major strategic and tactical issues for consolidating the revolution and countering the insurgency.



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REGIME INDICATOR #12

Civilian-Military Relations

**DESCRIPTION:** Extent of unity and agreement between the Directorate and the military over objectives and counterinsurgency. Extent of cooperation between Interior and Defense ministries.

**DEFINITION:** **DEFICIENT:** Military considers itself the only true defender of the revolution. Splits with political leadership over objectives and strategy. Coup plotting. Ministry of Interior and regular troops openly and violently at odds.

**OF LEVELS:** **WEAK:** Military undertakes some operations in defiance of regime policy. Armed forces and Ministry of Interior attempt to usurp each other's role, occasionally with violent consequences.

**MODERATE:** Military begins to question overall strategy and chafe at restrictions on some types of operations. Growing lack of cooperation between Ministry of Interior and armed forces.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Agreement on objectives and strategy but some tactical differences. Military leaders clearly under civilian authority. Some friction between Ministry of Interior and Army personnel in the field.

**STRONG:** Broad agreement on objectives and tactics for prosecuting the war. Role of Ministry of Interior and armed forces well defined. Spirit of teamwork and cooperation predominates.



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REGIME INDICATOR #13

Internal Security

**DESCRIPTION:** Ability to control growth of opposition groups. Ability to prevent formation of internal front supporting guerrillas. Effectiveness of block committees and informant networks. Success in preventing distribution of opposition propaganda, political messages.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

**DEFICIENT:** Security services unable to limit growth and activities of opposition groups and rebel internal support networks. Uncontrolled dissemination of opposition propaganda. Security service personnel flee or defect to rebels.

**WEAK:** Security services unable to prevent opposition groups from uniting and planning joint activities. Unable to prevent formation of urban internal front supporting rebels. Frequent appearance of leaflets and graffiti in cities.

**MODERATE:** Security services unable to control some opposition groups, especially in the countryside. Must devote considerable resources to ferret out rebel supporters in the cities. Block committees and informant networks break down in rural areas. Government unable to jam radio broadcasts or prevent appearance of leaflets, posters, and graffiti in some areas.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Opposition groups largely divided and under control. Formation of internal fronts in urban areas prevented, but some function in rural areas. Vast majority of population intimidated and unwilling to associate with rebels. All internal information flow controlled, but some external broadcasts reach population.

**STRONG:** Able to penetrate, divide, and manipulate opposition groups. Successfully detect and neutralize insurgent supporters. Population intimidated and afraid to oppose the regime actively. Complete control over information dissemination.



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REGIME INDICATOR #14

Political Institutions

**DESCRIPTION:** Ability of the Sandinista leadership to create, maintain, and strengthen legitimate political and government institutions, such as the party, party-affiliated organizations, and local and national legislative and administrative bodies. Ability of party leaders to control cadre and government officials.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**

**DEFICIENT:** Party lacks coherent vertical structure. No clear-cut lines of authority or policy and ideological guidance. Party lacks control over both national and local government institutions and officials. State and government mechanisms non-existent or perceived as lacking legitimacy.

**WEAK:** Party deeply divided into factions reflecting national leadership rivalries and irreconcilable policy differences. Party apparatus begins to break down in both urban and rural area. Increasingly vocal demands to reform or reorganize government structures.

**MODERATE:** Party apparatus functioning effectively in urban areas, but deficient in some rural areas. Some manifestations of policy differences between the party and government officials.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Party cells functioning at nearly all levels of society. Leadership provides guidance which sometimes is misunderstood or not followed by lower-level party and government officials.

**STRONG:** Party cells effectively operate at every level of Nicaragua's political, military, social, and economic life. Leadership provides clear ideological and policy guidance, which is adhered to by lower-level officials. Lines of authority clear. Functioning state and government mechanisms are widely recognized as legitimate.



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


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REGIME INDICATOR #15

Ability to Mobilize Mass Support

DESCRIPTION	Membership and participation in mass organizations such as labor unions and women's groups. Willingness to participate in parades, rallies, and voluntary work programs. Election turnouts. Voluntary enlistments in military and security services.
DEFINITION OF LEVELS:	<p><b>DEFICIENT:</b> Mass organizations cease to function. Little or no participation in rallies and work programs. Lack of volunteers for military service forces, increased dependence on draft. Extremely low voter turnout or defeat of Sandinista candidates.</p> <p><b>WEAK:</b> Membership and participation in mass organizations decline. Considerable coercion needed to assure attendance at rallies and work programs. Voter turnout declines and massive fraud necessary to assure victory of Sandinista candidates.</p> <p><b>MODERATE:</b> Apathetic participation in mass organizations to ensure access to goods and services. Only party faithful regularly attend rallies and work programs. Voluntary enlistments in military require considerable inducements.</p> <p><b>SUBSTANTIAL:</b> Mass organizations remain strong in the cities but some apathy evident in countryside. Most people participate in rallies and work programs.</p> <p><b>STRONG:</b> Virtually complete participation in mass organizations. Heavy turnout for rallies and work programs. Massive election turnout and overwhelming support for Sandinista candidates. High enlistment reduces dependence on the draft.</p>



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REGIME INDICATOR #16

Control of Political Opposition

**DESCRIPTION:** Ability to divide opposition groups and entice them to cooperate with the regime. Ability to limit effectiveness and political space of opposition. Ability to defeat electoral challenges.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**  
**DEFICIENT:** Opposition parties united and organize large, widespread demonstrations, strikes, and other overt antiregime action. Strong grassroots organization enables them to challenge Sandinistas in fair election and win some positions.

**WEAK:** Opposition coalition gaining strength and becoming more vocal. Grassroots organizations increasingly competitive with Sandinista party in attracting new supporters. Expanding political space strongly defended by international community and invulnerable to all but massive crackdown.

**MODERATE:** Opposition groups cooperate within a formal coalition. Individual groups internally cohesive. Grassroots organizations spread with aid of internal newsletters. Small but stable political space assured by high degree of international attention.

**SUBSTANTIAL:** Opposition weak and divided and individual parties and groups carry out independent antiregime agendas. Weak grassroots organization with little ability to disseminate message outside urban areas. Political space exists only at the whim of the regime. Little international recognition.

**STRONG:** Opposition parties, unions, and other groups completely coopted throughout the country.



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REGIME INDICATOR #17

Ability to Defuse Religious and Ethnic Discontent

DESCRIPTION:

Inability of opposition religious and ethnic leaders to rally their supporters to actively resist regime policies. Extent of acceptance by religious and ethnic groups of Sandinista ideological indoctrination.

DEFINITION OF LEVELS:

DEFICIENT:

Religious and ethnic leaders declare the regime illegitimate and rally their supporters to oppose the Sandinistas with violence. Actively link with political and armed resistance.

WEAK:

Church hierarchy counsels civil disobedience and justifies armed resistance. Church leaders take an active role in opposition political activity. Church plays clandestine role in forging internal front support for the insurgents. Ethnic groups openly oppose the regime and many join the insurgents.

MODERATE:

Church hierarchy is united in its determination to resist certain regime policies such as the draft and Marxist textbooks. Ethnic leaders demand autonomy and an end to government interference in their affairs.

SUBSTANTIAL:

Some high-level clergy and ethnic leaders criticize Sandinista policies, but most ethnic and religious groups remain apolitical.

STRONG:

Sandinistas coopt religious and ethnic groups to support the regime. Sandinistas are able to carry out their programs without resistance from these groups.



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REGIME INDICATOR #18

Ability to Deflect Public Dissatisfaction  
with Regime's Economic Performance

**DESCRIPTION:** Extent of public dissatisfaction with regime's ability to deliver food, health, education, employment, and other services. Ability to avoid public blame for economic deterioration.

- DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**
- DEFICIENT:** Extreme dissatisfaction results in frequent, widespread, organized violence against regime authority, which the rebels are able to exploit.
  - WEAK:** Intense dissatisfaction results in frequent, widespread, organized violence against regime authority which the rebels are able to exploit.
  - MODERATE:** Considerable public disgruntlement leads to occasional, organized, non-violent demonstrations in urban areas. A few spontaneous acts of violence occur.
  - SUBSTANTIAL:** Population expresses frequent verbal dissatisfaction, with a few isolated small demonstrations.
  - STRONG:** Little or no public dissatisfaction with regime performance. Public does not blame Sandinistas for economic shortcomings.



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REGIME INDICATOR #19

Foreign Political/Diplomatic Support

**DESCRIPTION**                    Extent of foreign diplomatic support. Ability to attract foreign economic aid. Willingness of foreign leaders to meet with Sandinista officials. Increasing tolerance within the region and ability to avoid blame for Contadora stalemate.

**DEFINITION OF LEVELS:**


**DEFICIENT:**                    Western and Latin American economic aid cut off. Soviet Bloc and Cuba cut back aid and pressure regime to negotiate with opposition. Some Western and Latin countries openly support the rebels.

**WEAK:**                            Major Third World governments pressure Sandinistas to negotiate with opposition. Most non-Soviet Bloc aid cut off. Contadora countries end mediation efforts and blame Nicaragua for failure.

**MODERATE:**                    Moderate Third World governments distance themselves from Sandinistas, but remain opposed to the insurgency. West Europeans become more critical and continue to reduce aid. Nicaraguan influence in international organizations declines. Nicaragua perceived as an obstacle in regional negotiations.

**SUBSTANTIAL:**                   Sandinistas continue to enjoy strong support from Third World and Soviet Bloc. Some Western leaders critical and cut contacts. Some government aid reduced but internationalists remain highly supportive. Sandinistas generally able to deflect criticism in regional negotiations.

**STRONG:**                        Sandinistas enjoy widespread international support. Obtain sufficient foreign economic support from West and Soviet Bloc. Successfully portray themselves as aggrieved party and shift blame to United States.



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