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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE	
15 April 1988	
China: Tensions in Tibet Continue	2
Summary	
The upsurge of nationalism, especially among younger Tibetans, suggests that sporadic violence against Chinese in Tibet will continue. Tibetan exiles have sought to capitalize on recent unrest to win	
international sympathy and support for their cause, and may even be encouraging the violence. Beijing is likely to respond with a two-track approach. On the one hand, the authorities will crack down on dissidents and impose restrictions on the activities of monasteries. But Chinese	
leaders probably will also continue their liberal religious and minority policies toward Tibet to deflect international criticism and ultimately pacify the population. In our view, any prospect of defusing these tensions over the short term lies in a negotiated agreement between the Dalai Lama and	
Beijing, but such a settlement seems no nearer now than when unofficial talks between the two sides began in the late 1970s.	2
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis. Information available as of 15 April 1988 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief Political Assessments Branch	2
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The Depths of Tibetan	Discontent
remain fervently national	rest in Tibet since last fall graphically illustrates that Tibetans alistic and hostile toward the Chinese. The hostility is reinforced
	ominance of the bureaucracy, the modern sectors of the ducation despite the fact that the Chinese make up only 5 on.
Although Tibeten	representation in the government and the point, has steadily
increased since 1980, ma Beijing. This includes the Buddhist hierarchy but c	representation in the government and the party has steadily lany Tibetans view those in official positions as coopted by e Panchen Lama-second only to the Dalai Lama in the Tibetan considered by many Tibetans to be a Chinese puppet. We
	saw his trip to Tibet in Januarywhich coincided with other cify the populationas a thinly disguised attempt to legitimize
Chinese actions in the p	province. As a consequence, his call during the visit for greater
autonomy in Tibet and h increased Tibetan resent	his admission that police had fired on rioters in October only
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·
	e to resent the restrictions placed on monks and the destruction eries during the Cultural Revolution. In a meeting with US State
	December, Chinese officials acknowledged that Beijing has
established a limit of rou	ughly 10,000 monks for Tibet. Beijing claims limitations are
	ough manpower to develop the region economically, and to keep
	clining. To circumvent these quotas, many young Tibetans have ome "unofficial" monks, financially supported by their own
families rather than the	monasteries, further fueling resentment. In addition, although
	cent of the funds for the restoration of temples and monasteries
been reopened.	ultural Revolution, only 234 out of some 2700 reportedly have
• • •	
Tibetan Opposition Acti	biviev.
indian Opposition Act	ivity
	According to a contact of the
IIC Embaccy in Politing +	the Dalai Lama's security office had sent a few monks from India onasteries in Lhasa last fall to encourage anti-Chinese activities.
to each of the major mo We do not know whethe	er the Dalai Lama was aware of this. His security office has
to each of the major mo We do not know whethe acted in the past withou	er the Dalai Lama was aware of this. His security office has ut his knowledgein January 1987, it sent four or five Tibetans
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A Profile of the March Violence

Rioting broke out in Lhasa on the morning of 5 March during the closing ceremony of the Great Prayer Festival, a holiday in which Tibetan monks traditionally reaffirm their authority over the secular government. The day before, Beijing admitted that a Tibetan dissident had died in prison last fall, and agitators may have suspected it would take little to spark mob violence in the large crowd. According to Western press and State reporting, several monks began shouting slogans in support of the Dalai Lama and calling for independence. They were joined by about 2,000 pilgrims from a crowd reportedly as large as 25,000. Monks pelted police with rocks from the rooftops of the Jokhang Temple, and, according to Chinese press reports, destroyed vehicles and attacked a police station and office of the state-run Buddhist Association. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd and stormed the temple, arresting over 200 monks. Sporadic violence continued throughout that day and into the next. Although the Chinese press acknowledges only five deaths, unconfirmed press reports suggest as many as 16 monks may have died.

Lhasa authorities believe a majority of the populace supported the rioters and responded in force. Chinese police set up roadblocks around the city and carried out several sweeps of Lhasa's downtown and major monasteries, arresting perhaps 100 more Tibetans. To prevent further outbreaks of violence on the 10 March anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising, authorities used Army troops dressed in police uniforms as reinforcements.

US Consulate sources in Lhasa report that the situation after the rioting was worse than even news reports indicated:

Although tensions remain high, foreigners in Lhasa report normalcy is slowly returning and some tourists have been allowed to visit temples and monasteries. Unconfirmed reports from the Western press state many monks remain in hospitals and, as they recover, are being sent to prison.

The Dalai Lama and Tibetan exile leaders have clearly sought to capitalize on the unrest to attract international, including US Congressional attention, to the Tibetans' plight. Tibetans staged demonstrations in Washington, India, and several European capitals after the disturbances last October and again after the unrest in early March. In addition, they have fed a mix of fact and fiction to sympathetic Western political figures and journalists to turn public opinion against the Chinese and generate pressure on Beijing to make concessions (see appendix A).

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
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ha	Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama and Beijing have resumed their on-again, off-again alogue, The Dalai Lama's elder brother, Gyalo Thondup, is made at least two trips to China since the unrest last October. According to the US possulate in Hong Kong, another new unofficial channel may be opening though T.C.
	u, a Chinese Communist in the colony.
fiv	we believe the re-point peace plan the Dalai Lama publicly floated last fall is a ploy to garner
int be th	ternational support for the Tibetan cause and put Beijing on the defensive. It may also in response to Tibetan exiles' perceptions that Beijing has hardened its stance since e first official negotiations in 1982. The plan seems deliberately ambiguous on the key sue of Tibetan independence (see appendix B).
gr tw in in	We cannot rule out that the exiles believe they can force Beijing to grant dependence. But we think it more likely that they are seeking to prod Beijing into anting real autonomy in exchange for nominal Chinese sovereignty. Neither of the vo official negotiating teams sent by the Dalai Lama in 1982 and 1984 demanded dependence. They sought instead expansion of the Tibet Autonomous Region to clude Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Qinghai, and Yunnan Provinces, and asked for an itonomous status similar to what Beijing has offered Taiwan.
Ti Be in in ha	Tibetan exile leaders, however, may be at odds over how far to push the dependence issue. Some of the Dalai Lama's advisers apparently sympathize with betans who favor total independence and oppose any negotiated settlement with eijing. According to a contact of the US Embassy in Beijing, the Dalai Lama's cabinet is creasingly dominated by "fanatics" who will settle for no less than complete dependence. In addition, the Tibetan Youth Congress, an exile group based in India, as periodically called on India to recognize that its own foreign policy interests demand in independent Tibet. One TYC member told a State officer last fall that "it might become necessary" to resume an armed struggle against the Chinese.
В	eijing's Quandary
to po th	Beijing has few, if any, satisfactory options for defusing tensions over the short in. Beijing has repeatedly offered to recognize the Dalai Lama as a religious leader and appoint him as a vice chairman of China's National People's Congress—a government osition, it said, requiring residence in Beijing. Recently, the Panchen Lama suggested the Dalai Lama could live in Tibet if he would return from exile. The Dalai Lama redictably has rejected the offer, probably believing—quite rightly—he would be scredited by his followers if he accepted—just as the Panchen Lama has compromised

alternative to continuing these policies if for no other reason than to show the outside

and other ethnic minorities	asonable effort to accommodate the interests of the Tibetans . They probably also hope these policies and the economic loyalty of the Tibetan population to the Dalai Lama.
violence. They have alread	e expect the Chinese to increase repression to deter further ly arrested several hundred monks, according to press mpose even tighter restrictions on the operations of Buddhist
The Future: More Negotia	ations, More Violence
a negotiated agreement be Dalai Lama, Beijing's rule o settlement, however, is unl to live in Tibet and has ins negotiations. Meanwhile, E	ccess at defusing tensions in Tibet in the short term lies with tween the Dalai Lama and Beijing. Without the support of the ver Tibet will not appear legitimate to the Tibetans. Such a ikely to be soon. The Dalai Lama has refused Beijing's offer isted that his five-point plan must form a basis for Beijing fears the Dalai Lama's visit to Europe this spring will upport and is preparing a propaganda campaign to counter
the international communit the gap between their posi	o continue overtures to the Dalai Lama, again partly to show y that it is willing to reach an accommodation. But because tions is so wide, the two are unlikely to reach a compromise. grant anything approaching real autonomy to Tibet because:
	y, which still regards the area as strategically vital and e Soviet or Indian influence, would firmly oppose the move.
to seek full indepen	r such an agreement would encourage not only the Tibetans dence but other minorities located in equally sensitive g China's border with the Soviet Union to make similiar
	architects of the liberal minorities policy, feel vulnerable ic issues and are not about to give their critics an opening by on Tibet.
monks, further sporadic ou police presence and increa uneasy calm, several Tibet	e upsurge of Tibetan nationalism, especially among young atbreaks of violence seem inevitable. Although the heavy used surveillance over the monasteries have restored an ans have vowed to resume protests once the tourist season according to state reporting. Chinese officials, meanwhile,



	Appendix A	
The War of Distorted I	Facts	
statistics supporting the the remoteness of the problem is further com	the Tibetan exiles have published historic claims. Given the lack of independence region, the gathering of objective data plicated because the two sides often use frames without providing any definition	ent observers in Tibet, and is nearly impossible. The se different boundaries for
However, China's 1982 3.82 million ethnic Tibe believe is fairly accurat	Tibetan exiles claim there are 6 millio census—performed under UN auspices tans. In 1986, Chinese figures claim 4 e. Tibetan exiles are estimated to be c million appear grossly inflated.	shows that China had million Tibetans, which we
allege that 1 million Ch there are only about 70 perhaps another 60,000 to officials from the Ch and 200,000 Han to Tib a large Chinese presen because Chinese are un	so demand an end to Han Chinese mig inese now live in the province. Accord 0,000 to 80,000 Chinese civilians in Tibe troops, most stationed near the Sino- linese Academy of Social Sciences, Bei et during the 1960s and 1970s. Partly ce in Tibetan cities contributes to Sino nwilling to endure the hardships of life ettlers to leave by 1981, which has cause rofessionals.	ding to State reporting, et, and we estimate Indian border. According jing sent between 150,000 out of the realization that Tibetan tension and partly in Tibet, Beijing allowed at
Tibetans have died und ethnic Tibetans in Chin 1960-61 there was a s 1.3 million. Given the in 1959, the border wa some 275,000 seems q	o substantiate Tibetan exiles' accusation ler Chinese rule. According to Chinese a decreased from 2,775,622 in 1953 to erious famine in most of China, and the fighting and emigration relating to the rof 1962, and the famine, a decrease in uite possible. But the claim that 1 millimprisonment, and widescale famine," s	statistics, the number of 2,501,174 in 1964, but in e national population fell by Dalai Lama's flight to India n Tibetan population of lion Tibetans died because
dumping ground for nu	to confirm or deny the charge that Beiji uclear waste. We have no information velopment of small and medium-scale on.	on nuclear facilities in Tibet
have some truth. Chin buildings, and hotels; i	e accusations that the Chinese are destant and the chinese	ower plants, office d education; and brought in

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traditions in the face of an ever-changing and modernizing world.

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		Appendix B		
Negotiations B	etween Beijing and t	the Dalai Ľama		
20-year hiatus, visit Tibet. The demands for an Chinese rule. E Tibet and nearb	when China agreed to move followed the D independent Tibet if ouring 1979 and 1980 y provinces. Three o	o allow a delegation Dalai Lama's announ he were convinced the Dalai Lama sen of the missions cont	ama opened in 1978 after a n of Tibetan exiles in India to cement that he would give up Tibetans were happy under t four "fact finding" missions ained members of the Dalai exile communities outside In	to
Beijing. They n Department, as	net with the Panchen well as with other Ch nbassy reporting, the	Lama and the Directions of the Direction of the Lambert of the Lam	official negotiating teams to stor of the United Front Work cerned with minority policies hree conditions for the Dalai	
	tan Autonomous Regi groups in Sichuan, Q		ed to include the Tibetan	
	should be offered so ly made to Taiwan.	mething similar to	the nine-point proposal	
	ould accept Chinese so to a zone of peace.	overeignty, but the	area should be demilitarized a	and
predictably obje scale down the ambiguous pos	ected to the others. T ir demands, but only	The United Front dir offered in return to with his status. Beij	liscuss the first condition, but rector asked the Tibetans to give the Dalai Lama an jing later publicized the visit, e third.	
again tabled th of 1,000 Tibeta Tibet. This tim	eir three demands and ns during the anticrim e, according to State	d raised new conce ne campaign in 1983 reporting, the Chine	am visited Beijing. The Tibeta rns, including the alleged arre 3 and the Han migration into ese outlined a five-point polic their position. The Chinese	st

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- The Dalai Lama must have confidence in China's political stability and its minorities policies.
- The Dalai Lama should forget about the events of 1959 and be "frank and sincere" in discussing Tibet's future.
- China would welcome the Dalai Lama's return to contribute to national unification and modernization.
- If the Dalai Lama returned to China, the Communist Party would recommend that he be elected a vice-chairman of the National People's Congress, and "it is suggested that he not go and live in Tibet" 1
- When the Dalai Lama returned, he would issue a statement to the press.

	The Chinese also	hinted	that a	visit	to Tibet	by the	Dalai	Lama	would	be	inappropriate.
I								17			•

Beijing refused to allow another Tibetan fact-finding mission to visit Tibet in 1985. Although unofficial contacts between the two have continued, primarily through the Dalai Lama's elder brother Gyalo Thondup, we believe the Dalai Lama probably hopes to force Bejing back to the negotiating table officially. A representative of the Dalai Lama told State officers in 1985 that the Dalai Lama refused to let the issue of his own return eclipse the more important matter of the future of Tibet, and rejected Beijing's five conditions for his return. To pressure Beijing, the Dalai Lama tabled his own five point peace plan during his visit to Washington last September. It calls for:

- Transformation of Tibet into a zone of peace.
- Abandonment of China's population transfer policy, which threatens the existence of the Tibetans as a people.
- Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms.
- Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear waste.

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Chinese press has been tougher on this point, implicitly stating the the Dalai Lama
would not return to live in Tibet, and Chinese officials recently explained to a State
Department officer that the Dalai Lama's residence in Beijing is indeed implied in this
point. Speaking at a 4 April press conference, however, the Panchen Lama stated that
the Dalai Lama could in fact reside in Tibet.

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	ommencement of lations between t			iture status of Tibet a es.	and of
				e, and the Dalai Lama e officials have told S	
				withdrawal of Chinese	
and the s	tatus of Tibet as	a nonnuclear a	rea.		·
Du	ring his visit to I	Beijing last Octo	ber, Gyalo Tho	ndup received a lette	r from
Deng Xiao Beiiing.	oping to deliver t The letter was re	to the Dalai Lam markably concili	ia, according to	a contact of the US Deng reaffirmed a 1	Embassy in
that all is	sues were negot	iable except Tib	etan independe	nce. Deng also apol	ogized for
the lack of	of progress in ne	gotiations.			
Th	ondup returned t	o Beijing in late	December wit	h the Dalai Lama's re	sponse, but
told a Sta	y no agreement of the officer that no	was reached. A o progress had l	n official of the been made on	United Front Work of any outstanding issue	lepartment e and that
there wer	e no future form	al or informal co	ontacts.		
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Appendix C

Chronology of Selected Events Relating to Tibet

1950s	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
7 Oct 50	The Chinese Army enters eastern Tibet (Kham).
19 Dec 50	The Dalai Lama flees to the Indian Border.
23 May 51	17-point agreement between representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese signed in Beijing. Tibetan exiles contend the agreement was not legal.
17 Aug 51	The Dalai Lama returns to Lhasa.
9 Sep 51	The Chinese Army peacefully enters Lhasa.
53	Tibetans in Kham begin guerrilla warfare campaign against the Chinese.
9 Mar 55	Establishment of Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region.
55-56	Khampa tribesmen rebel against Chinese forces in eastern Tibet (Kham).
10 Mar 59	Mass anti-Chinese uprising breaks out in Lhasa.
17 Mar 59	Dalai Lama flees after Chinese shell Norbulingha.
23 Mar 59	Chinese declare martial law in Tibet.
1960s-70s	
62	Sino-Indian border war.
Mar 64	Panchen Lama arrested.
66-76	Cultural Revolution; temples, monasteries burned; Buddhists persecuted.
late 79	Dalai Lama sends first fact-finding delegation, led by an older brother, to Tibet.

1980s

22 May-1 Jun 80 CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Vice

Premier Wan Li visit Lhasa; admit mistakes made

during Cultural Revolution.

Jul-Aug 80 Visit of a five-member fact-finding delegation

sent by Dalai Lama cut short when large crowds gather in Lhasa; third fact-finding delegation, led by Dalai Lama's sister, visits Qinghai Province and Tibet. Another brother of the Dalai Lama visits

Tibet with his family.

Apr 82 Agricultural communes in Tibet disbanded.

May 82 Dalai Lama sends first official negotiating team to

Beijing.

19-31 Aug 84 Secretariat member Hu Qili and Vice Premier Tian

Jiyun visit Tibet; announce new economic

policies.

Oct 84 Dalai Lama sends second negotiating team to

Beijing.

Jun-Aug 85 Delegation from the Dalai Lama refused entry to

Tibet.

Jan 86 Traditional Tibetan Great Prayer Festival revived;

had been banned since the Cultural Revolution.

1987

Jun Beijing refuses Dalai Lama's brother Thublen

Norbu to visit China.

18 Jun US House of Representatives approves

amendment on human rights violations in Tibet.

1 Sep Chinese Embassy in Washington protests Dalai

Lama's upcoming US visit.

19-29 Sep The Dalai Lama visits United States.

21 Sep Dalai Lama proposes a "Five-Point Peace Plan" on

the question of the status of Tibet at the House of Representatives Human Rights Subcommittee.

The Chinese Embassy in Washington criticizes some members of the US Congress for interfering in China's internal affairs and for permitting the Dalai Lama to preach "independence for Tibet" before the House group.

22 Sep

Eight US Congressmen send a letter to Premier Zhao Ziyang in support of the Dalai Lama's plan.

24-25 Sep

Two or three Tibetans executed in Lhasa,

according to press reports.

27 Sep

26 people, including 21 monks from the Drepung Monastery, demonstrate in Lhasa for less than an hour and are arrested by police.

29 Sep

200 Tibetan exiles protest in New Delhi.

30 Sep

Two representatives of US Congress call a press conference to protest the execution and imprisonment of Tibetans in China, and release the text of the letter to Zhao.

Late Sep-Early Oct

NBC broadcasts from China; televises prior interview with Dalai Lama.

1 Oct

Monks from the Sera and Drepung Monasteries demonstrate around the Johkang Temple in downtown Lhasa; call for the release of the 21 arrested monks; crowd swells to more than 1,000. There are also unconfirmed press reports of demonstrations in other cities.

Chinese Embassy in Washington delivers demarche to State Department, warning that the United States is becoming the center for Tibetan independence activities.

2 Oct

Lhasa placed under curfew.

3 Oct

300 Tibetans demonstrate in New Delhi; several hundred protest in Bern, Switzerland.

The Dalai Lama appeals from India to human rights groups to persuade the Chinese Government to stop executions and imprisonment of Tibetans.

4 Oct The Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thondup, arrives in Beijing. 5 Oct Spokesman of China's International Liaison Department holds news briefing on China's position on Tibet, charging that the support of some foreigners for Tibetan independence is a serious interference in China's internal affairs. US State Department spokesman reiterates United States Government position that Tibet is a part of China. Protests reported in Xigaze. The Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies based in India writes a letter to Zhao Ziyang protesting the arrests of Tibetans in Lhasa. 6 Oct Dalai Lama's spokesman says hundreds of Tibetans have been arrested following the 1 October riot, says rally staged on 1 Oct to disrupt celebrations marking China's 38th National Day and because of recent executions and anger at the official propaganda campaign launched against the Dalai Lama. US Senate passes amendment 98-0 on human rights violations in Tibet. Chinese Embassy in Washington expresses extreme indignation over the amendment. About 90 monks arrested and later released. 7 Oct Dalai Lama holds a press conference from his home in India. Calls for continued peaceful demonstrations, and affirms he will continue to send delegations to China for consultations. In New Delhi, police remove eight Tibetans from Chinese Embassy on hunger strike. 50 protest in Ottawa.

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making political statements.

China calls on India to prevent Dalai Lama from

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8 Oct

9 Oct	A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials delivers a strongly worded demarch to the US Ambassador to China.
10 Oct	150 people protest outside the Chinese Embassy in Paris calling for Tibetan independence.
12 Oct	350 Tibetans demonstrate in New Delhi; want to deliver a letter to the Chinese Embassy calling for an internationally supervised plebiscite to settle Tibet's future.
13 Oct	The Dalai Lama gives interview in India; denies protests planned but says his US trip may have played a factor in the unrest.
14 Oct	European Parliament adopts resolution on Tibet. NPC Vice Chairman Huang Hua cancelled plans to visit the Parliament in response.
	Individual travel by foreigners to Tibet banned.
	US Congressional hearing on human rights violations in Tibet.
15 Oct	1,200 Tibetans protest in New Delhi.
28 Oct	13 Tibetan protesters—including nine of the 21 monks arrested after the 27 September demonstrations—released from jail.
mid-Nov	80 monks arrested after demonstrating against Chinese security presence at Ganden Monastery in Lhasa.
16 Nov	500 Tibetans demonstrate in New Delhi.
3 Dec	US House-Senate conference committe adopts nonbinding amendment on Chinese human rights violations in Tibet.
10 Dec	Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhu Qichen demarches US Ambassador to China on US Congressional amendment.
	700 Tibetans demonstrate in New Delhi.

19 Dec	Several Tibetan nuns demonstrate near Jokhang Temple in Lhasa; they call for Tibetan independence and are arrested.
1988	
11 Jan	The Panchen Lama arrives on month-long inspection tour of Tibet.
21 Jan	Bejing releases 59 Tibetans detained since last fall.
19 Feb	Chinese press carries statement by Panchen Lama admitting Chinese police fired on demonstrators during October riots.
25 Feb	Traditional Tibetan prayer festival begins, continues through 6 March.
1 Mar	China's official news service acknowledges 12 political prisoners are being held in Tibet.
4 Mar	Beijing confirms that a Tibetan dissident died in prison last fall.
5 Mar	Rioting breaks out during religious festival when several monks begin shouting slogans in support of the Dalai Lama. As many as 2,000 people may have participated in the riot. Hundreds arrested.
7 Mar	Dalai Lama issues press statement stating that Tibetans "cannot be deceived by cosmetic changes." 500 Tibetan exiles demonstrate in New Delhi.
8 Mar	Chinese Foriegn Minister Wu Xueqian meets with US Secretary of State. Tibet is discussed.
9 Mar	The Panchen Lama and Tibetan government leader Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme denounce March unrest and call for punishment of rioters.
10 Mar	Tibetan National Dayanniversary of 1959 Tibetan uprising; 500 Tibetan exiles demonstrate in New Delhi.
20 Mar	Date set by Chinese authorities by which all participants in 5 March riot must surrender.

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30 Mar	The Panchen Lama confirms that four people died in the 5 March rioting, and later increases the toll to five. Previously, Beijing acknowledged only one death.
4 Apr	The Panchen Lama says the Dalai Lama would be allowed to reside in Tibet; the Dalai Lama calls on Beijing to consider his five-point peace proposal.
	The Dalai Lama arrives in London for a 10-day stay.

Subject: China: Tension in Tibet Continue

Distribution:

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