



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

~~Secret~~

25X1

**MASTER FILE COPY**  
**DO NOT GIVE OUT**  
**OR MARK ON**

# Assessed Manpower of Warsaw Pact Forces in the NATO Guidelines Area, 1985

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

~~Secret~~

NI IIM 86-10005  
March 1986


Copy 462

9 1

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**  
**Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions**

**DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>NOFORN-</b>	<b>Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals</b>
<b>NOCONTRACT-</b>	<b>Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants</b>
<b>PROPIN-</b>	<b>Caution—Proprietary Information Involved</b>
<b>ORCON-</b>	<b>Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator</b>
<b>REL . . .-</b>	<b>This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to . . .</b>



**STAT**

SECRET

25X1

NI IIM 86-10005

**ASSESSED MANPOWER OF  
WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE  
NATO GUIDELINES AREA, 1985**

Information available as of 1 January 1985 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, approved for publication on 7 March 1986 by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

SECRET



SECRET

25X1

## PREFACE

This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum assesses Warsaw Pact ground and air force manpower in Central Europe (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia). It was produced in support of the US effort to negotiate a mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) agreement and to establish the US position on the size of the Pact forces in the reduction area. The figures in the Memorandum represent the estimated numerical strength, as of 1 January 1985, of all Warsaw Pact personnel that the United States currently defines as military servicemen subject to MBFR negotiation: that is, "all active-duty uniformed military servicemen, except naval personnel, in the area of reduction." The rounded figures depict the US estimate of the number of military personnel assigned to the rosters of Pact units in Central Europe at the beginning of 1985 and are not intended to represent the number of personnel authorized or available for duty on one particular day.

Because of a lack of evidence on manning in nondivisional—especially rear services—units, we have always been less confident in the estimate of soldiers assigned to nondivisional units than in the estimate of those assigned to divisions. During 1985, however, the US Intelligence Community completed a comprehensive reexamination of Soviet nondivisional manning. The results of this study improved our understanding of Warsaw Pact rear services organization in peacetime and increased our relative confidence in the nondivisional portion of the estimate. In the Statement of Estimative Confidence, the uncertainty associated with these point estimates has been explained along with relative confidence between divisional and nondivisional estimates.

This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. It was drafted [redacted] the Central Intelligence Agency and [redacted] [redacted] the Defense Intelligence Agency and was coordinated with the intelligence components of the Departments of State and Defense and with the Central Intelligence Agency.

25X1  
25X1

*This information is Secret* [redacted]

25X1

iii

SECRET



SECRET

25X1

## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
PREFACE .....	iii
DEFINITION OF ROUNDING RULES.....	1
SUMMARY OF CHANGES SINCE THE 1983 ASSESSMENT...	2
TABLE I: SUMMARY.....	4
TABLE II: SUMMARY OF WARSAW PACT MANNING TOTALS BY FORCE CATEGORY .....	5
STATEMENT OF ESTIMATIVE CONFIDENCE .....	7
TABLE III: ESTIMATIVE CONFIDENCE.....	9
TABLE IV: SOVIET FORCES, NATO GUIDELINES AREA....	10
A. Summary of Soviet Forces .....	10
B. Soviet Ground Forces.....	10
C. Soviet Air Forces.....	18
TABLE V: EAST GERMAN FORCES.....	23
A. Summary of East German Forces .....	23
B. East German Ground Forces.....	23
C. East German Air/Air Defense Forces.....	26
TABLE VI: POLISH FORCES .....	28
A. Summary of Polish Forces .....	28
B. Polish Ground Forces.....	28
C. Polish Air Forces.....	32
D. Polish Air Defense Forces.....	34
TABLE VII: CZECHOSLOVAK FORCES.....	38
A. Summary of Czechoslovak Forces.....	38
B. Czechoslovak Ground Forces.....	38
C. Czechoslovak Air Forces .....	42
D. Czechoslovak Air Defense Forces .....	44
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	47

v

SECRET

**Page Denied**



SECRET

25X1

## DEFINITION OF ROUNDING RULES

With the exception of maneuver division assessments, all printed line item figures, subtotals, and totals in this Memorandum have been subjected to the following rounding rules:

Estimated figures in range	Rounded to nearest
1 through 49	5
50 through 249	25
250 through 999	50
1,000 through 4,999	100
5,000 through 9,999	250
10,000 and greater	500

Although printed subtotals are rounded, totals have been derived from nonrounded subtotals (not shown).

25X1

1  
SECRET

SECRET

25X1

### Summary of Changes Since the 1984 Assessment

This Memorandum presents our estimate of Warsaw Pact manpower in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) as of 1 January 1985. A comparison of this assessment with our previous one of 1 January 1984<sup>1</sup> shows a net decrease of 39,000 servicemen. The figures indicate a decrease of about 14,500 in the estimate for Pact ground forces and about 24,000 in that for Pact air and air defense forces. This decrease essentially represents a refinement of previous estimates and does not necessarily reflect an actual withdrawal or decrease of servicemen since the 1984 estimate. Significant changes in the figures since 1984 are summarized as follows:

- **Soviet Forces**

- *Divisional.* Evidence continues to reinforce recent assessments of divisional undermanning. However, the formation of an army-level SS-21 brigade from the divisional SS-21 battalions of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), contributed in part to the decrease in this year's divisional estimate. The result has been an assessment of divisional strengths for 1985 that is 1,500 less than the 1984 assessment.
- *Nondivisional.* A detailed review of nondivisional units, especially rear services, resulted in significant changes from the 1984 assessment. The pattern of reduced manning levels identified in divisions has been shown to apply in varying degrees to nondivisional units. Most technical units are manned in peacetime at relatively high percentages of war authorization, while the less technical rear service units are manned, in some instance, at cadre strength. Furthermore, numerous rear service units that have been identified as a part of the intended wartime structure are assessed for the first time as part of the peacetime forces. Of particular note are the increase in strength resulting from a reevaluation of the number and types of medical units assessed at front and army level (+3,050), the replacement of maintenance/ordnance units with maintenance bases at front and army level (+550), and the addition of traffic control units at front and army level (+700). The reassessment of aggregate groupings, such as garrison support, clubs, exchanges, and commissaries, accounted for most of the decrease

<sup>1</sup> NI IIM 85-10004, *Assessed Manpower of Warsaw Pact Forces in the NATO Guidelines Area*, 1984, April 1985.

Note: This Summary is Secret

25X1

2

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

in other rear services (-6,900). Significant decreases, also, were noted in material support brigades (-1,800) and depots (-3,025). The reassessment of tank training units (+1,000), the addition of a material support brigade in NGF (+1,400), and the addition of three Scaleboard SSM brigades (+2,900) accounted for significant increases in manning. Overall, there was a decrease of 7,000 in service support and 5,000 in combat support from the 1984 assessment.

- *Air Forces*. Soviet Air Forces manning decreased by some 11,000 men from the 1984 assessment. The previous estimate was based on the supposition that Soviet Air Forces units in the NGA were manned at or very near intended wartime levels. Recent evidence, however, shows that the assigned manpower for Soviet Air Forces is substantially below wartime levels. A significant part of the reduction in this estimate derives from information that shows the air technical battalions, which maintain airfields, manned at about 50 percent of intended wartime levels.
- *Non-Soviet Forces*. In non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) ground forces, incremental changes in individual line items accounted for most of the changes in the forces assessment. However, the more significant changes are noted below:
  - *East German*. In East German National Forces the introduction of new equipment in divisions and the reassessment of construction units resulted in an overall decrease of 1,000 personnel.
  - *Polish*. In Poland a major reassessment resulted in an increase of 2,250 for schools, while the Ministry of National Defense figure was assessed as being lower (-1,450). Two new combat support units were added at front level: an artillery brigade (+400) and a security and service unit (+850). A reassessment that helicopters are not organic to divisions in peacetime resulted in a decrease of 1,000 in the combat strength estimate. Overall, the Polish ground forces estimate increased by 1,000.
  - *Czechoslovakia*. Czechoslovak National Forces had an overall decrease (-1,000). This was the result of a decrease in our estimate of combat and combat support manning, coupled with a slight increase in the estimate of service support manning.
  - *NSWP Air/Air Defense Forces*. The bulk of the decrease (-13,000) resulted from the assessment that the assigned manning is not at intended wartime levels in peacetime. This lower estimate derives primarily from the supposition that NSWP air/air defense units reflect peacetime manning practices similar to those found in Soviet Air Forces. Thus, our manpower estimates for NSWP units are essentially the same as those for comparable Soviet Air Forces units.

SECRET

25X1

Table 1

## SUMMARY

A. WARSAW PACT MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA,  
DIVIDED BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES

(All East European national air defense personnel are counted as air manpower, and all Pact helicopter personnel in units assigned to or in support of ground forces are counted as ground manpower.)

	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Maneuver (Divisions)</u>	<u>Air/Air Defense</u>	<u>Total<sup>a</sup></u>
Soviet	465,000	(269,500)	47,500	512,500
East Germany	121,500	(61,000)	35,500	157,000
Poland	233,500	(98,000)	83,500	317,000
Czechoslovakia	146,500	(66,000)	52,500	199,000
Total Warsaw Pact <sup>b</sup>	967,000	(494,500)	219,000	1,185,500

B. CHANGES IN THE US ESTIMATE OF NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF  
WARSAW PACT MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA

(This table presents the numerical differences between this estimate and the CIA/DIA estimate compiled in 1984—see IIM 85-10004.)<sup>c</sup>

	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Air/Air Defense</u>	<u>Total<sup>a</sup></u>
Soviet	-13,500	-11,000	-24,500
East Germany	-1,000	-2,500	-3,500
Poland	+1,000	-8,000	-7,000
Czechoslovakia	-1,000	-2,500	-4,000
Total Warsaw Pact <sup>a b</sup>	-14,500	-24,000	-39,000

<sup>a</sup> Because of rounding rules, totals may not add across.

<sup>b</sup> Because of rounding rules, totals may not add down.

<sup>c</sup> See section entitled "Summary of Changes Since the 1984 Assessment" of this IIM for an explanation of the major changes.

SECRET

25X1

TABLE II  
SUMMARY OF WARSAW PACT MANNING TOTALS  
BY FORCE CATEGORY <sup>a</sup>

	Combat	Percentage of Force <sup>b</sup>	Combat Support	Percentage of Force <sup>b</sup>	Service Support	Percentage of Force <sup>b</sup>	Total <sup>c</sup>
<b>Soviet Ground Forces</b>							
GSFG	211,000	60.1	76,500	21.8	63,500	18.1	351,500
NGF	19,500	49.1	12,000	30.8	8,000	20.1	39,500
CGF	54,500	73.3	10,000	13.6	9,750	13.1	74,000
Subtotal <sup>d</sup>	285,000		98,500		81,500		465,000
<b>National Ground Forces</b>							
East Germany	61,500	50.5	20,000	16.3	40,500	33.2	121,500
Poland	98,000	41.9	42,000	17.9	94,000	40.2	233,500
Czechoslovakia	67,000	45.7	26,500	18.2	53,000	36.1	146,500
Subtotal <sup>d</sup>	226,500		88,000		187,000		502,000
Total Warsaw Pact Ground Forces <sup>d</sup>	511,500		187,000		268,500		967,000
<b>Soviet Air Forces</b>							
GSFG	9,500	31.1	9,250	30.2	12,000	38.7	30,500
NGF	4,000	32.6	3,500	29.1	4,700	38.3	12,000
CGF	1,600	33.4	1,500	30.7	1,700	35.9	4,800
Subtotal <sup>d</sup>	15,000		14,500		18,500		47,500
<b>National Air and Air Defense Forces</b>							
East German Air and							
Air Defense Forces	9,000	25.2	11,500	32.5	15,000	42.3	35,500
Polish Air Forces	5,000	13.2	4,500	12.1	28,000	74.7	37,500
Polish Air Defense Forces	15,000	33.2	16,500	35.7	14,500	31.1	46,000
Czechoslovak Air Forces	4,400	17.4	4,000	15.7	17,000	66.9	25,500
Czechoslovak Air Defense Forces	9,500	35.2	10,000	37.1	7,500	27.7	27,000
Subtotal <sup>d</sup>	43,000		46,500		82,000		171,500
Total Warsaw Pact Air and Air Defense Forces <sup>d</sup>	58,000		61,000		100,000		219,000
Total Manpower of Warsaw Pact Forces in the NATO Guidelines Area <sup>d</sup>	569,500		247,500		368,500		1,185,500

<sup>a</sup> Unit categories—combat, combat support, and service support—have been applied using NATO guidelines.<sup>b</sup> Percentages of the force have been derived from nonrounded subtotals (not shown).<sup>c</sup> Because of rounding rules, totals may not add across.<sup>d</sup> Because of rounding rules, totals may not add down.



**Page Denied**

SECRET

25X1

**Recent Changes in Confidence.** The 1 January 1985 estimate generally reflects an overall increase in confidence resulting primarily from a reexamination of service support manning practices and organization. The improvement is most evident in that portion of the Soviet Ground Forces estimate where the ranged estimate narrowed by 30 percent. In contrast, the point estimate only declined by less than 3 percent. This change translates into a decrease in our statistical uncertainty from about  $\pm 10$  percent of the estimate in 1984 to  $\pm 6$  percent in 1985.

Our relative confidence by force category is clarified as follows:

- **Combat Units.** We have high confidence that the available evidence allowed us to develop an accurate assessment of the assigned peacetime strengths of Soviet combat units, especially of maneuver divisions. The evidential base encompassed both structural and subunit specific manning data as well as instances of second source corroboration.
- **Combat Support Units.** We have moderate confidence that the evidence allowed development of an accurate assessment of the assigned strengths of Soviet combat support units. Our ability to develop structural profiles of combat support units varied from high, with the structurally distinct artillery, SAM, tactical SSM, and helicopter units; to moderate, with units such as engineer, signal, and electronics. Manning evidence focused on the structurally distinct units, requiring the application of generalized manning concepts to the others.
- **Service Support Units.** In the 1984 assessment, we had low confidence that the evidence allowed us to develop an accurate assessment of the assigned strengths of Soviet service support units. Our confidence in this portion of the estimate for 1985, while still lower relative to the combat and combat support portions of the estimate, has improved. The reexamination of nondivisional units produced a significant increase in our understanding of the peacetime organization and manning practices of service support units. The continued refinement of the rear services study conducted in 1985 should further increase our relative confidence in this portion of the estimate.



SECRET

25X1

**Table III**  
**ESTIMATIVE CONFIDENCE**

	Ranged Estimate <sup>a</sup>	Minimum Estimate <sup>a</sup>
<b>Soviet</b>		
Ground Forces	431,000-500,000	418,000
(Divisions)	(254,000-285,500)	(247,000)
Air Forces	42,500-52,500	41,000
<b>East Germany</b>		
Ground Forces	113,500-132,500	109,500
(Divisions)	(57,500-64,500)	(56,500)
Air/Air Defense Forces	31,000-40,000	30,000
<b>Poland</b>		
Ground Forces	205,500-262,500	194,000
(Divisions)	(88,500-108,000)	(84,500)
Air/Air Defense Forces	72,500-94,500	71,000
<b>Czechoslovakia</b>		
Ground Forces	124,500-172,000	114,500
(Divisions)	(60,000-78,000)	(56,500)
Air/Air Defense Forces	45,500-59,500	45,000

<sup>a</sup> Numbers rounded according to rounding rules.

**Page Denied**

Next 35 Page(s) In Document Denied



SECRET

25X1

## GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAA—antiaircraft artillery	Maint—maintenance
Acft—aircraft	MBFR—mutual and balanced force reduction
Acq—acquisition	MD—military district
AD—air defense	Med—medical
Admin—administrative	Misc—miscellaneous
AF—air force	MND—Ministry of National Defense
Afld—airfield	MP—military police
Ammo—ammunition	Msl—missile
Arty—artillery	
	NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Bde—brigade	NCO—noncommissioned officer
Bmb—bomber	NGA—NATO Guidelines Area
Bn—battalion	NGF—Northern Group of Forces
	No—northern
C—Combat Unit	
CGF—Central Group of Forces	Off—Officer
Chem—chemical	
Cmd—command	POL—petrol (gasoline), oil, and lubricants
Co—company	PRTB—mobile technical repair base
COMINT—communications intelligence	(from the Russian <i>podvizhnaya remontnaya</i>
Comms—communications	<i>tekhnicheskaya baza</i> )
Const—construction	
CS—Combat Support Unit	QM—quartermaster
DF—Direction Finding	Recce—reconnaissance
Def—defense	R&D—research and development
Det—detachment	Rgt—regiment
Div—division	RR—railroad
ECM—electronic countermeasures	SA—shock army
Engr—engineer	SAA—strategic air army
	SAM—surface-to-air missile
Ftr—fighter	Sig—signals
	SIGINT—signals intelligence
G—guards	Spt—support
GA—guards army	Sqdn—squadron
GCI—ground-controlled intercept	SS—Service Support Unit
Gnd—ground	SSM—surface-to-surface missile
GSFG—Group of Soviet Forces, Germany	
GTA—guards tank army	Tac—tactical
	TAF—tactical air force
Hel—helicopter	Tech—technical
Hq—headquarters	Tgt—target
	Tng—training
Ind—independent	Trans—transport, transportation
Insp—inspector	
Intel—intelligence	VGK—Supreme High Command (from the
	Russian <i>Verkhovnoye Glavnokomandovaniye</i> )

*This Glossary is Unclassified.*

47  
SECRET



**Page Denied**

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied

**Secret**

---

**Secret**