



Director of
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Soviet Civil Defense: Objectives, Pace, and Effectiveness

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Memorandum to Holders

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NI IIM 86-10004JX

February 1986

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
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
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NI IIM 86-10004JX

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF
NI IIM 77-029J

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE:
OBJECTIVES, PACE,
AND EFFECTIVENESS

Information available as of 15 December 1985 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, which was approved for publication on 31 December 1985.



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PREFACE

The 1977 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet civil defense planning remains in many respects the major comprehensive study on the subject.¹ However, important sections of that paper have been superseded by the 1981 Memorandum to Holders and a 1983 IIM, and analyses undertaken by the intelligence agencies individually have shed light on additional aspects of the program.²

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This document incorporates Intelligence Community findings since 1981 and new data on sheltering, evacuation, and effectiveness. Although not as comprehensive in scope as the 1977 IIM, it addresses those issues that we believe to be central to an evaluation of the program's short-term effectiveness. We do not attempt to assess Soviet prospects for medium- or long-term recovery after a nuclear attack because of the uncertainties surrounding the climatic and biological effects of a massive nuclear exchange. In addition, in-depth analyses would be highly scenario dependent. We have, however, identified those areas known to us that we believe would have an impact on the Soviets' capability for continuing operations in the period shortly after a nuclear attack.

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This Memorandum to Holders was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs. It was drafted by the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Contributions to various portions of the study were also made by elements of the US Air Force, the National Security Agency, The Joint Data Systems Support Center, Defense Communications Agency, provided extensive computer support for the measures-of-effectiveness study, while statistical support for the evacuation and shelter studies was provided by CIA's Analytic Support Group. This Memorandum was coordinated by the NIO/SP's Interagency Working Group on Civil Defense.

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¹ See *Soviet Civil Defense: Objectives, Pace, and Effectiveness*, NI IIM 77-029J (TS Codeword), December 1977, or NI IIM 77-029 (S NF), December 1977.

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² See Memorandum to Holders of *Soviet Civil Defense: Objectives, Pace, and Effectiveness*, NI IIM 81-10001J (TS Codeword), January 1981, or NI IIM 81-10001D (S NF), July 1981; and *Soviet Wartime Management: The Role of Civil Defense in Leadership Continuity*, NI IIM 83-10005JX (TS Codeword), December 1983.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Civil defense is an integral part of the Soviets' strategic posture. The Soviets see their civil defense program as providing them with an advantage over the United States, but during a crisis period their judgments about their freedom of action and recourse to hostilities would be based on many military, political, and other factors beyond just a significant civil defense asymmetry. They probably have many uncertainties about their capability to implement their civil defense plans, as well as about the impact of longer term nuclear effects. Nonetheless, continued investment in civil defense over a 35-year period has resulted in a program that—in the Soviets' view—is perceived as credible and is a contributing element of their strategic posture. According to an alternative view, there is no indication that the Soviets believe their civil defense program makes any but a marginal contribution to the USSR's overall strength relative to that of the United States, or that it could produce a satisfactory outcome in such a war.³

[Redacted]

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Although current civil defense capabilities are not uniformly comprehensive, the Soviets to date have achieved a level of competence that permits them to focus selectively on weaknesses in the system. A period of maintenance and stable growth appears to have succeeded the intensive development of the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, and there have been no discernible changes of emphasis in the program over the past several years. Spending on the four elements of the program for which we can estimate costs remains steady at about 470 million rubles per year, or \$4.5 billion if duplicated in the United States. (These figures should be viewed as minimum estimates only, inasmuch as many aspects of the program are not included.)

[Redacted]

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The Soviets have made considerable progress in almost all areas of civil defense over the last 15 years. In particular, they have made great strides in their efforts to implement plans for the protection of the leadership and essential workers during wartime. Recent analysis suggests that, in addition to an extensive command post network outside of urban areas, the Soviets have a more extensive urban command post network than we previously suspected. In Moscow, where the need for leadership protection is the greatest, the Soviets over the last 35 years

³ The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. [Redacted]

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have constructed an enormous system of urban deep underground complexes, interconnected by public and special subway lines [Redacted]

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[Redacted] as well as deep underground complexes [Redacted] Deep underground facilities

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connected to public subways have also been identified in several other major cities. There are indications, moreover, that the Soviets' capacity for underground production may be greater than we have estimated in the past—although the extent of such efforts remains unclear. [Redacted]

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We have identified other areas, however, that the Soviets apparently perceive as needing improvement. They experimented with a major reorganization of civil defense in the late 1970s and early 1980s. On the basis of statements made by Marshal Ogarkov, as Chief of the General Staff in the early 1980s, we judge that the move was partly intended to address problems in coordinating military, economic, and civil defense mobilization requirements. We do not know the outcome of the reorganization attempt. [Redacted]

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The ultimate effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense program is highly scenario dependent. Our analysis shows that, if in the course of an ongoing crisis or conflict, the Soviets mobilize early enough to implement fully their civil defense plans and deliver a first strike against the United States, the program could greatly minimize the casualties attributable to prompt nuclear effects among all segments of the population. Immediate casualties could range from at least 162 million with little or no civil defense to at least 30 million with full sheltering and evacuation. Although civil defense could protect some key economic assets, the Soviets almost certainly believe it cannot prevent major damage to their economy. [Redacted]

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CHAPTER I OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATION, AND DIRECTION OF ACTIVITY

1. The history of Soviet efforts to provide civil defense against weapons of mass destruction is uneven. Drawing on their experience in World War II, Soviet leaders laid the groundwork for some elements of the current civil defense program as early as the late 1940s. Although selected measures were implemented during the 1950s, the need for a program of nationwide protection came under heavy debate, reflected in open literature of the period. The debates culminated in the promulgation of the 1961 Civil Defense Statute (see annex A), which provided guidance for the development of a new national civil defense organization. It took most of the decade of the 1960s, however, to develop a comprehensive program that could begin to address the myriad problems connected with a nationwide civil defense effort. This period of germination resulted in a spurt of activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite probable fluctuations in the focus and intensity of effort since then, civil defense continues to occupy an important place in Soviet strategic doctrine and military strategy.

and we have been frustrated in our efforts to understand the current dynamics of the program. Although we believe external influences are present, the recent trends we have been able to identify appear to be internally driven.

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Objectives

4. Civil defense is an integral part of the Soviets' strategic posture. It is one of several strategic defensive programs which, in combination, are designed generally to limit damage to the Soviet homeland and to protect key strategic and economic assets. Although Soviet leaders have stated that nuclear war is a catastrophe that must be avoided if possible, they regard it as a continuing possibility and have rejected mutual vulnerability as a desirable or permanent basis for the US-Soviet strategic relationship. This perception has reinforced Soviet interest in the development of active and passive defenses.

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2. A basic theme underlying this report is the maturity of the civil defense effort; we are interested not only in the current objectives and status of the program, but also in its prospective evolution after roughly 35 years of experience. Research since 1981 strongly suggests that—fluctuations in the fortunes of the civil defense program notwithstanding—the Soviets' concerns with defending key components of their civilian infrastructure surfaced earlier and were taken more seriously than recognized until recently. Although many influences will be brought to bear on the future direction of the program, this long-term effort provides the Soviets with the experience to assess the program's strengths and weaknesses, in turn providing guidance for future activities.

5. Soviet civil defense is designed primarily to support Soviet military doctrine and strategy, although the progress has humanitarian elements. The Soviets seek superior capabilities to fight and win a war with the United States and to be in a stronger postwar position than their adversaries. Civil defense is intended to contribute to the maintenance of a functioning logistic base for operations by combat forces, to limit human and material losses, and to attempt to ensure that the essential political and socioeconomic basis for Soviet society is preserved in the postattack period. This broad mandate involves civil defense in almost all aspects of defense of the rear of the country.

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6. Although our understanding of the scope of the civil defense program has improved over time, our determination of specific program objectives has remained fairly consistent. Civil defense appears specifically aimed at:

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3. A second theme of interest during the preparation of this study was the likely operational response to the current strategic environment. Recent US defense initiatives undoubtedly have affected Soviet strategic planning in many areas; an indication of the sensitivity of civil defense to such external developments would have provided insights into the program's place and priority. There is a significant timelag in reporting on the programmatic aspects of civil defense, however,

- Protecting the population (the leadership, essential workforce, and general public, in that order of priority).
- Maintaining continuity of economic activity in wartime.
- Liquidating the consequences of an enemy attack.

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**Table I-1
Objectives and Tasks
of Soviet Civil Defense**

Objectives	Tasks
Protect the population	Protect the leadership
	Urban command posts
	Exurban relocation sites
	Redundant communications systems
	Protect the essential work force
	Shelters at essential worksites
	Dispersal plans
	Relocation plans
	Protect the general population
	Shelters (urban and rural, blast and fallout)
Evacuation plans	
Individual protective gear	
Maintain continuity of economic activity in wartime	Coordinate civil defense and economic mobilization plans
	Protect essential economic personnel
	Urban and exurban command posts for the economic leadership
	Sheltering, dispersal, and relocation of essential workers
	Ensure stable supply of raw materials and utility inputs
	Buried utility lines
	Redundant sources of supply
	Strategic reserves
	Protect individual pieces of machinery and equipment (limited implementation)
	Hasty hardening
	Rapid shutdown
	Prevention of secondary damage
	Protect entire installations
Geographic dispersal (limited implementation)	
Underground production facilities	
Relocation	
Enhance prospects for postattack recovery	Maintain military civil defense units
	Organize civilian civil defense formations
	Maintain medical reserves
	Maintain food reserves
	Provide training in rescue and recovery operations

These goals accord with official Soviet statements. The civil defense program also is responsible for ensuring continuity of the wartime management structure, a mission that supports each of the goals noted above.

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7. Although declared priorities seem to reflect actual policy, implementation of measures to achieve them has not always followed suit. Table I-1 combines classified and unclassified information on the priority objectives and tasks of civil defense. Progress in the economic sphere appears particularly uneven.

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8. The breadth of the civil defense program and the tasks assigned to it support our belief that it is an ongoing and dynamic effort. The enduring and cumulative nature of some aspects of the program, such as blast shelter construction, does not obviate the need for continued effort in others, such as training, evacuation planning, and supply maintenance. Moreover, population growth, technological advances, and military developments require a program that is both expansive and responsive to changes in the strategic environment. Although the Soviets have made considerable progress in almost all aspects of the program over the past decade, the requirement for continued improvement will remain in the years to come.

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Organization and Manning

9. Since the close of World War II, the civil defense program has undergone several reorganizations. These were generated by the difficulty of creating a nationwide program intended both to prepare the national infrastructure for war support and to limit damage to all nonmilitary segments of society. The reorganizations in 1961 and 1971 consolidated civil defense under national control, initially under the Council of Ministers and later under the Ministry of Defense. The program was organized on a territorial-industrial basis, operating under a system of dual-subordination to the administrative and economic hierarchies.

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increasing integration of civil defense into the military, a trend we believe is continuing. This trend manifested itself in another major reorganization attempt, dating from the mid-to-late 1970s, that involved subordinating civil defense to the military commissariats. We do not know the outcome of that effort, which was still under debate in late 1982. Regardless of the hierarchical framework, the military is increasingly present in civil defense planning and operations, apparently exerting greater control in many respects than the party apparatchiks, who,

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however, maintain their overall supervisory and advisory role.

Territorial-Administrative Structure

10. Civil defense staffs exist at each echelon of the Soviet administrative structure. Headed by General of the Army A. T. Altunin, a deputy minister of defense, the national-level USSR Civil Defense Staff provides technical guidance and direction to subordinate elements in the same way that other Ministry of Defense (MOD) staff elements direct the branches of the armed forces. This similarity is reflected in the Staff's organizational structure, which includes political, personnel, foreign assistance, and combat training components. Additional directorates carry out specialized civil defense functions. There are at least 26 active-duty general officers on the Headquarters Staff, a probable indication of its importance.

11. At the republic level, the civilian chairmen of the republic councils of ministers serve as the chiefs of civil defense. Functional responsibility for civil defense is delegated to military chiefs of staff, who hold the rank of general officer, and their staff organizations. The republic civil defense staffs (composed of both military and civilian personnel) are structured along the same lines as USSR Civil Defense.

12. At lower levels, the civilian chairmen of the executive committees (*ispolkom*) serve as the chiefs of civil defense for their organizations. Active-duty military officers head the civil defense staffs at the oblast level and in some cities, while lesser staffs are more frequently headed by reserve or retired military officers. The staffs operate with the same authority as departments of regional and local governments. Oblast staffs are correspondingly smaller than those at the republic level, but are organized similarly. In some cases they are merged with the city civil defense staff.

13. Large cities with several urban rayons pose particular problems for the execution of wartime plans. Although the existing local-level organizations are adequate for peacetime functions, they probably are not structured to handle operational problems associated with controlling evacuation and poststrike rescue and repair. For this purpose, the Soviets have developed intermediate command structures, the operational axes, which would exist as operative echelons only in wartime.¹ The axes are formed along the routes

¹ Since 1969, we have found no references to operational axes in open literature, suggesting their existence may have become classified. Collateral information continues to provide evidence that they remain part of Soviet plans.

used for dispersal, evacuation, and movement of rescue and repair units. The chief of the oblast civil defense staff would appoint the operational axis commander, who would control road and rail networks, hosting areas, and urban and rural rayon civil defense personnel within his jurisdiction.

Economic-Functional Structure

14. Civil defense also is organized at all levels of the economy, in accordance with the objectives of ensuring continuity of economic activity in wartime and protecting the workforce. In a procedure similar to that followed at territorial levels in the administrative structure, the chiefs of the ministries and of subordinate organizations down to the installation level are designated the chiefs of civil defense. Each is assisted by a chief of staff and a staff organization bearing the day-to-day responsibility for implementation of the program. Full-time staffs exist at management organizations and key enterprises; at some installations, civil defense may be administered on a part-time basis by a single employee.

15. The staffs attached to ministries responsible for economic and other societal functions are of particular importance. The wartime responsibilities of many of these ministries were initially specified in the 1961 Civil Defense Statute. These subsequently have been modified, but there is evidence that current responsibilities accord generally with those set forth in the original convention. Other service ministries and associated organizations not specifically cited in the statute, such as the Ministry of Power and Electrification, also have responsibilities related to civil defense.

16. Also present at all management levels in the national economy are First and Second Departments, variously responsible for integrating plans for conversion to wartime operations with the necessary civil defense measures.² Each ministry's designated department plans for the implementation of wartime operations and production requirements in a nuclear environment, deciding on such measures as developing redundant production facilities or ordering rapid shutdown of sensitive machinery. Although we do not have much information on the relationship between the two organizations, the designated departments and civil defense staffs below the ministerial level probably cooperate closely to ensure implementation of ministerial directives. Civil defense planning in the economic-functional hierarchy, therefore, is a technical re-

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sponsibility, centered on ensuring that specific wartime economic objectives are met. Plans also are coordinated with the territorial civil defense staffs, which maintain operational responsibility for civil defense planning [redacted]

The Military and Civil Defense

17. As a component of the MOD headed by a deputy minister of defense, the civil defense program enjoys a status within the military similar to that of other nonforce branches such as Rear Services. The General Staff is responsible for coordinating civil defense activities with the rest of the armed forces and also is closely concerned with civil defense mobiliza-

tion plans through the Organization and Mobilization Main Directorate. [redacted]

18. The 16 military districts (MDs) in the Soviet Union are the territorial extension of the Ministry of Defense and would constitute the key management echelon below the national level in wartime. Over time they have been given increased authority and responsibilities over most military assets related to wartime operations, including civil defense. In the 1960s, the role of the military districts' "sections for civil defense," headed by an "assistant to the commander," had been restricted to control of the military civil defense units; in 1971 and 1972 the 16 Soviet military districts also received operational control over

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the territorial and economic-functional civil defense staffs in their areas. [redacted]

[redacted] this was a controversial move engineered by the military in defiance of a Central Committee decision to delay a final resolution on the overall structure of civil defense until the end of 1972. The action was in line with a Ministry of Defense proposal recommending organizational changes because of disputes with the then-autonomous national civil defense staff over command relationships, access to transportation resources in the event of war, and military suggestions for changes in civil defense policy. The determination of the Ministry of Defense to resolve these disputes in its favor was one factor leading to the reorganization that subordinated civil defense to the MOD, the replacement of the deputies of the chief of Civil Defense by officers from the military districts in early 1972, and finally to the replacement of the chief of Civil Defense himself by Altunin in July 1972. [redacted]

defense organizations, particularly with regard to the functioning of the "local defense" elements of the garrisons. These measures reflected growing awareness on the part of Soviet planners that implementation of civil defense plans in a crisis could adversely affect deployment of military units from garrison areas and achievement of increased levels of readiness of the armed forces. Soviet planners also came to appreciate the assistance civil defense formations could give armed forces units in coping with a nuclear attack on garrison areas, particularly in the initial stages of conflict. [redacted]

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19. As a consequence of the expansion of the military district commanders' authority, by 1973 the former "sections" had been upgraded to "directorates" and the "assistants" to "deputy military district commanders." The directorate for civil defense of the military district has probably become the main link between the national staff and the territorial staffs at the republic, oblast, and lower governmental levels. The boundaries of 13 of the 15 Soviet republics coincide with MD boundaries. In these republics the territorial civil defense staffs probably are subordinate to the military district deputy commander for civil defense. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic contain more than one military district, however. As late as 1972, the RSFSR civil defense staff administered subordinate territorial staffs through intermediate organizations called "operational zones." There is evidence that subsequently, in connection with the expansion of their authority, the military district commanders in these two large republics took control of the operational zones. It is unclear what the current relationship is between the military districts within the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR and the territorial civil defense staffs. [redacted]

22. The military commissariats (*voynkomati*) are defined by the Soviets as organs of local military administration and are without equivalent in the United States. They bear responsibility for both military mobilization and personnel matters, overlapping many of the concerns of the civil defense staffs. Commissariat duties include conducting partial or general mobilization, planning the wartime allocation of civilian equipment and transport, and supervising registration of national economic resources for military use. They also supervise preinduction military training and indoctrination, issue callups for military service and reserve training, and maintain records on reservists and deferments. [redacted]

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23. The commissariat structure parallels the traditional territorial-administrative organization of civil defense in many respects [redacted] The commissariats are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, and are responsible to the General Staff through the Organization and Mobilization Main Directorate. Within the military chain of command, the MD commander exercises authority over the commissariats through the Organization and Mobilization Department of the MD staff. For administrative purposes, however, the commissariats are organized hierarchically according to territorial-administrative subdivisions. At the city and rayon level they have the status of an executive committee department. This facilitates peacetime cooperation with the civilian sector and enables the commissariats to serve as the conduit between the armed forces structure and the govern-

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20. After the military districts assumed responsibility for civil defense operations in wartime, a number of improvements were made in civil defense planning and training. Innovations were introduced into the oblast-level civil defense structure, and efforts were made to integrate civil defense readiness stages with those of the armed forces. New garrison regulations specified responsibilities of garrison commanders and their staffs for improving coordination with civil

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civil defense organization. Overall policy guidance on civil defense matters originates with the Defense Council. The CPSU's influence extends to the civil defense hierarchy through the first secretaries of the party's territorial committees and through other party organizations. Within the civil defense structure, the party organization follows the pattern established by the MOD's Main Political Administration for other components of the armed forces. There are deputies for political affairs at each level of the civil defense structure. Also, all military personnel in the civil defense organization who are party members must be affiliated with party organizations.

some units existed in the early 1960s. The earliest evidence of units we have currently identified dates from 1966. Most of the others we know of were established by the early 1970s; we know of no units created since 1976.

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41. Unclassified writings periodically refer to party involvement in civil defense matters at various enterprises, but there is no classified information recently available to supplement this knowledge. We are particularly interested in the party's reaction to the proposed reorganization of civil defense, since further integration of civil defense into the military structure could diminish the party's influence considerably. It is possible, although there is no information to that effect, that the party was somehow involved in prolonging the debate over the reorganization.

45. Most of the units we know of are situated near cities with populations of 300,000 or more. Their locations outside the likely zones of prompt nuclear destruction would allow them to begin rescue and recovery operations as soon as radiation levels permitted.

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Operating Elements of Civil Defense

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42. The operating elements of the Soviet civil defense program—organizations that will actually carry out postattack recovery operations—may be divided into two general categories: military civil defense units and civilian civil defense formations.

[Redacted]

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43. The Soviets have established independent military units dedicated exclusively to supporting the civil defense program in both peacetime and wartime. These units are subordinate to the commander of each military district. In peacetime, the cadre-strength units train civilians in civil defense procedures as well as reservists assigned to the units. They also assist in rescue and recovery operations following natural disasters and accidents at industrial installations. During a preattack period the units would help evacuate urban areas and construct expedient shelters for evacuees. In the postattack period their mission would include reestablishing communications, reconnoitering and marking contaminated zones, decontamination, restoring transportation routes, and cooperating with the civilian civil defense units in effecting emergency rescue and repair.

47. [Redacted]

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The units maintain sufficient equipment to outfit the reservists.

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44. The 1961 Civil Defense Statute provides our first reference to the existence of these units, although we do not know if they had already been in operation before then.

48. The size of the units varies considerably, and there does not appear to be a set organizational structure. Each unit has personnel trained in various specialties, but the number varies per unit. Therefore, specialists that may be organized into a section- or platoon-size group in one unit may constitute a company-size group in another. Also, some units combine personnel trained in different skills in one group.


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Because of this we could not compile a representative organizational chart. We were, however, able to identify specialties common to most units. They are: chemical, communications, demolition, engineering, firefighting, food service and supply, maintenance, medical, reconnaissance, and transportation.


leadership; according to unclassified sources, Altunin approved regulations tightening training standards for civilian formations in September 1984.

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
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49. Specialized training schools are located with nine units. the students, instructors, and equipment at these schools would be used during emergencies.



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Manning

50. Civilian civil defense formations also exist. Trained and organized in peacetime, these formations have the following missions:

54. The 1961 statute stipulated three categories of civil defense personnel:

- To prepare in the period before an attack for the protection of workers and other segments of the population.
- To implement measures to lessen damage to plants and equipment.
- To conduct emergency rescue and repair work following an attack.

— Active-duty military personnel and civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense assigned to territorial civil defense staffs, command posts, civil defense troop units, communications centers, chemical laboratories, and educational institutions.

— Civilian employees of councils of ministers or of executive committees of local soviets (oblast, city, and rayon) who may supplement MOD personnel in staffing the territorial or local civil defense organizations, or who, at lower levels, may constitute the entire civil defense staff.

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51. Soviet texts identify two types of civilian formations: territorial and installation. The territorial formations are directly subordinate to the territorial staffs and are drawn from workers of services such as utilities, construction trusts, medical facilities, transportation groups, and firefighting organizations. Installation formations are intended for pre- and post-attack operations at their own enterprises, although the territorial authorities are empowered to allocate them as necessary during postattack recovery. Rescue, medical, and firefighting groups are the most common type of installation formations, although squads for purposes such as reconnaissance, decontamination, and evacuation assistance also have been reported. These groups receive special training and frequently participate in integrated exercises and competitions.

— Civilian employees of ministerial and territorial organizations who serve as full-time civil defense personnel for individual installations.



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55. The professional qualifications of command and staff personnel responsible for civil defense are as important as their numbers. Of the approximately 75 general officers in the civil defense structure, the

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majority have had significant command and staff experience at military district or equivalent levels. Their educational backgrounds demonstrate that these civil defense generals are on a par with their peers in other elements of the armed forces in terms of advanced military education. Civil defense assignments do not appear to have diminished career advancement for general and field-grade officers.

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52. Using guidelines issued by General Altunin in 1976, we originally calculated the total number of participants in these formations to be about 16 million people. More recently, we reassessed that number to be over 25 million. A great many of these participate only perfunctorily, however. The quality of these groups varies considerably because much of the population appears not to take civil defense training seriously. This apparently is an active concern of the

56. Veterans of World War II no longer predominate among the active-duty officers and reserve officers in civil defense staff positions. An increasing

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were promulgated by the USSR Civil Defense Chief. These changes have encouraged reserve officers and retirees to accept civil defense positions. [redacted]

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Direction and Level of Activity

57. Civil defense in the USSR is a well-established, ongoing effort. The debates that plagued the program in the 1950s and 1960s appear largely resolved; the issues we have identified as causing concern to the leadership involve the program's effectiveness rather than its basic existence. The potentially disruptive issues of the 1980s—budget constraints, nuclear winter, and arms control—appear to have had little impact on the authorities' commitment to carry out the basic objectives of the plan. [redacted]

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58. The Soviets have achieved a level of competence that permits them to focus selectively on weaknesses in the system. A period of maintenance and stable growth appears to have succeeded the intensive development that characterized the period from the late 1960s through the mid-1970s. Although many problems remain to be resolved, we believe the Soviets have surpassed the minimum level of achievement necessary to impart confidence in the program's viability [redacted]

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Attitudes

59. Although we do not have direct information on leadership views on civil defense, all available evidence suggests that, internally, the program is taken seriously. Despite the prevalence of statements to Western officials that play down the extent and significance of the program, domestic literature continuously emphasizes the importance of general preparedness and of training activity. Possibly as a propaganda ploy to heighten the average citizen's interest and participation in the program, Soviet statements over the last few years have stressed that the aggressive nature of recent US defense and foreign policy initiatives has heightened the need for continued vigilance in civil defense preparedness. [redacted]

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number of active-duty personnel are graduates of the civil defense academy, other military schools, and the civil defense advanced officers courses. The quality of the field-grade officers is indicated by the number of active-duty colonels at national and republic levels who are promoted to general officer rank. Senior, full-time positions at lower levels of the territorial civil defense structure and at individual installations continue to be staffed by reserve officers and officer retirees. In 1979 modifications in administrative law covering dual-compensation pay scales and pensions

60. [redacted] the leadership and other essential personnel such as doctors and heads of civil defense programs at key installations do take the program seriously. Continued investment and activity in an era of budget constraints support this view. The average Soviet citizen apparently continues to be apathetic toward the program, paying little attention to civil defense lectures and regarding exercises as more of an opportunity for socializing than for training. Although this reduces the benefits of training and

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could diminish the effectiveness of the civilian civil defense formations, we believe it has very little impact on the rest of the program. The majority of Soviet citizens probably would obey orders under most crisis scenarios. Moreover, the general disinterest of Soviet citizenry in civil defense does not indicate a lack of purpose on the part of the leadership.

coordinating civil defense and military requirements, and probably were a factor behind the 1971 reorganization. Since then the Soviets have used these exercises to practice greater military control over civil defense in wartime. The exercises provided the military districts with experience in controlling and coordinating civil defense operations, and allowed the Soviets to test the joint command of civil defense and military commissariat staffs. Our limited data base on these exercises prevents us from drawing conclusions about the frequency with which they occur. There is no evidence that their occurrence is sensitive to internal or external political-military developments.

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Training and Exercises

61. Classroom training and practical exercises are carried out in accordance with three-year training plans established by the USSR Civil Defense Staff. Civil defense training is compulsory and Soviet citizens routinely receive instruction beginning in their student years and continuing through retirement. Training can take the form of lectures, courses, or exercises and is given in schools, in the military, and at places of work. The subjects covered include use of gas masks, first aid, and the effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

65. military civil defense units are required to conduct field training exercises twice a year. We judge that most units adhere to this schedule. The reporting indicates a wide variation in the frequency of exercises conducted at economic installations, however, with some installations conducting exercises once a year and others going over seven years or more without them. Scientific institutes in particular appear to abuse this regulation. Moreover, evacuation exercises frequently are conducted in a desultory manner and usually involve only a small percentage of an installation's personnel.

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62. Retired military officers usually conduct the classroom training at schools and at places of work. Special training is provided for key managers and leadership personnel by officials from the civil defense and military commissariat staffs. The military commissariats appear to be heavily involved in training medical personnel in civil defense.

Costs

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the instructors at most workplaces and at higher educational institutions frequently appear disinterested in the subject, and observance of regulations on attendance and proficiency often is lax. Training for students in the schools and through DOSAAF, the youth organization, appears to be somewhat better. The instructors for medical personnel and key managers also are usually knowledgeable and apparently take their responsibilities seriously.

66. We are unable to estimate the total cost of civil defense preparations in the USSR. We have assessed the annual cost of four elements of the program: pay and allowances for about 150,000 full-time personnel, the operation of 59 military civil defense units, construction and maintenance of facilities for these units, and urban blast shelter construction (see table I-4). The cost of these elements in 1984 amounted to about 470 million rubles, the equivalent of about 7 percent of the estimated cost for Soviet strategic defensive forces, or less than 1 percent of the estimated total defense budget. If duplicated in the United States, these four elements would have cost about \$4.5 billion in 1984, with about 77 percent representing manpower costs. (These estimates should be considered very rough approximations because of uncertainties in both the quantitative data on civil defense programs and price estimates.)

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63. Practical exercises are an important part of the civil defense program, and are conducted at all levels, from General Staff exercises involving both military and civilian cadres in complex integrated exercises to simple alerts or drills practiced at one installation. Although exercises can involve personnel from several installations or even several territorial civil defense staffs in conjunction with individual installations, we have no information on major integrated exercises—such as those involving the entire population of a city or all civil defense staffs within a military district.

67. We emphasize that the cost estimates above constitute only part of the total expense of civil defense. Additional costs would be incurred from activities such as:

64. Information on civil defense efforts as part of General Staff-related exercises is incomplete. In the 1960s these exercises revealed serious problems in

- Training and exercises.
- Supply and equipment maintenance.

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Table I-4
Partial Cost of Soviet
Civil Defense, 1984

	Billion 1970 Rubles	Billion 1984 Dollars
Total	0.47	4.53
Manpower—military and civilian	0.20	3.51
Military units		
Operation	0.10	0.31
Construction and maintenance	0.01	0.07
Annual blast shelter construction	0.16	0.65

- Construction of other underground facilities such as underground hospitals, special subway facilities, and underground factories.
- Production and installation of communications equipment.
- Research and development.

The \$4.5 billion figure—a substantial investment by itself—should be viewed as a minimum and not as a total cost estimate.

Pace

68. It is difficult to measure the pace of the program. Few areas are quantifiable, and current reporting is limited. Some areas showed an increase in activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but the emphasis appears to have leveled off since the mid-1970s. We judge that the enduring and cumulative nature of many aspects of the program has allowed the Soviets to increase their civil defense capability while maintaining a steady pace of effort. The areas we have examined include:

- **Shelter Construction**— a marked increase in activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which leveled off in the middle of the decade. New construction appears to be keeping pace with or slightly exceeding population growth.
- **Military Civil Defense Units**—The first units probably were created in the early 1960s, with the majority established in the late 1960s and early 1970s. We have no evidence that any units have been established since 1976. Construction

and other activity at existing units continue, however.

— **Training for the General Public**— unclassified literature indicate a continued and steady emphasis on training for the public—at schools, in the military, and at places of work. Training topics remain generally constant.

— **Command Post Construction**—We do not know the extent to which the Soviets have completed their requirements for urban and exurban command posts. Most command posts for which we have evidence were constructed before the mid-to-late 1970s,

The Soviets are likely to construct new command posts as additional requirements are generated.

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
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

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Responses to the Strategic Environment

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71. The deterioration in US-Soviet relations between 1980 and 1984 and US defense initiatives during that period heightened the general level of anti-US rhetoric in the official Soviet media. Among the specific dangers cited were (a) aggressive and hostile US intentions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, (b) reduction of warning times due to Pershing II deployments, and (c) the generally destabilizing nature of all new US nuclear weapons programs, particularly the Pershing IIs, MX, and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs).

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CHAPTER II PROTECTION OF THE LEADERSHIP

1. A primary objective of the Soviet civil defense program is the protection and support of the leadership in wartime. The Soviets' confidence in their capability to conduct nuclear war is probably critically dependent on their assessment of the survivability and continuing effectiveness of their leadership during and following a nuclear attack. To this end, the Soviets have been making preparations to facilitate the transition from peacetime to wartime and to enhance their leadership's potential for effective performance in a nuclear conflict. Their plans include establishing:

- A well-defined wartime management organization.
- A clearly designated chain of authority and leadership responsibilities.
- Facilities and procedures to give leadership cadres and organizations a high probability of surviving a large-scale nuclear attack.
- Survivable, reliable communications networks.
- Exercises and training programs for key personnel and organizations at all levels of the wartime management structure.

2. In 1983 the Intelligence Community published an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum entitled *Soviet Wartime Management: The Role of Civil Defense in Leadership Continuity*, which examined in detail preparations for continuing leadership operations under the various contingencies of nuclear war. This chapter presents some of the findings of that study that have the greatest bearing on the scope and responsibilities of the civil defense program. We also present new findings on Soviet efforts to ensure the survivability of the wartime management system.

Wartime Management Structure

Organizational Concepts

3. During the past 20 years, the Soviets have instituted organizational changes that are consistent with their view that the entire Soviet state must be pre-

pared to function in a nuclear environment. Conceptually, the requirements for change were recognized in the 1950s and early 1960s; however, progress toward satisfying those requirements was hindered by resource limitations, bureaucratic resistance to change, and the continuing need to match or offset US technological advances. The history of organizational initiatives since that time suggests that Soviet leaders concluded that the wartime management system should meet several criteria. It must be:

- Established in peacetime.
- Integrated with the organizations responsible for defending against nuclear attack.
- Capable of supporting the conduct of military operations at any level or phase of hostilities.
- Capable of a quick transition to wartime conditions without requiring significant modifications of its peacetime organization.
- Responsible to centralized direction, yet have the capability for decentralized operations if nuclear destruction should make it necessary.

Peacetime Organizations and Functions

4. The party-state apparatus that manages the Soviet Union in peacetime consists of three interrelated hierarchies: the party apparatus, the government administration, and the ministerial system, with subordinate entities throughout the country. As a whole, they provide an integrated management structure that imposes centralized direction over all elements of the military, economic, and social life of the nation.

5. Some of the characteristics of this apparatus and its management practices are widely perceived as hindering the peacetime performance of the Soviet Union. These same characteristics and practices, however, would greatly facilitate the management of the nation under the catastrophic circumstances of nuclear war. The party structure, for example, provides for a high degree of redundancy in management personnel. Typical party career patterns potentially broaden the


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
pool of management expertise available to replace losses in a nuclear war, while the peacetime authority of territorial-level party leaders lays the groundwork for decentralized management if necessary

6. Parallels can be drawn with the administrative and ministerial hierarchies. All of the organizations subordinate to national-level ministries have a role in wartime management of the government and the economy, including postattack recovery. Even those ministries found only at the republic level and at the lowest end of the peacetime priority scale have responsibilities that will assume considerable importance in a nuclear war. For example, extensive preparations for decontamination involve facilities and services provided through the republic ministries responsible for housing and municipal affairs. Like the party structure, the ministerial and administrative systems—though highly centralized—could shift to more decentralized operations through subordinate organizations.



7. The Soviets attach great importance to the need to effect a rapid transition from peace to war with minimal disruption. In wartime the peacetime managerial system would provide a unified command structure extending from the central leadership to the armed forces, to all territorial and administrative levels of the USSR, and to the national economy. The peacetime structure also has organizations that have special responsibilities for facilitating the transition to wartime. They include: the Defense Council; the military district staffs; the second directorates and departments in ministerial and territorial components that coordinate civil defense and economic mobilization; the military commissariats; and the civil defense organization.

Wartime Leadership



9. Our latest analysis considers the economic leadership and a greater number of civil defense personnel

to be integral parts of the wartime management structure. We judge this structure to be composed of the following groups:

- The National Command Authority (NCA) and other national-level leaders who would direct the military, political, and economic activities of the nation.
- The leaders of the 16 military districts, who would have the key role in wartime territorial administration, in management of recovery operations, and in providing continuing support of military operations following a large-scale nuclear attack.
- The leaders of the 15 Soviet republics, who would be responsible for supporting the war effort and maintaining the integrity of the multinational Soviet state. The Soviet republics would not be in the chain of command from the National Command Authority to key territorial organizations.
- The leaders of oblasts, the basic territorial elements, who would be responsible under military district supervision for directing rescue and recovery operations and for military support tasks.
- The leaders in cities, in rural areas, and at individual installations, who would operate under oblast control.
- The civil defense territorial staff organizations, which constitute a professionally staffed command infrastructure to help the wartime leadership carry out its assigned responsibilities

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10. We estimate that approximately 179,000 officials make up the key leadership of those organizations with important wartime responsibilities (see table II-1). This estimate does not capture all echelons involved in wartime management. We do not count the rural rayon leadership, because of lack of data on staffing procedures. Also omitted are the key leaders at essential economic installations, in part because there is no consensus in the Intelligence Community as to which Soviet enterprises should be considered key installations. Together, they could constitute an additional several thousand to several tens of thousands. Our estimate also excludes the large peacetime support staffs serving these key Soviet leaders.

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Size of the Soviet Wartime Leadership

National	17,000 ^a
Military districts	1,000 ^b
Republics	13,500
Key regional organizations	6,500
Oblasts	10,000
Cities	
Population 25,000 or above	32,000
Population below 25,000	20,500
Urban rayons	18,500
Subtotal	119,000
Civil defense personnel	60,000
Total	179,000^c

^a This figure includes only the key leaders of national-level party, government, and economic organizations and does not encompass the vast managerial and staff support network supporting these leaders.

^b This figure includes an estimated 800 officers in civil defense components plus senior command personnel.

^c This figure includes the top civilian/military national leadership and military officers from the Ministry of Defense, the military districts, and civil defense staffs. It excludes all other military officers, rural rayon leaders, and managers of key installations.

earliest postwar relocation sites for which we have evidence were constructed for key national-level military and civilian organizations in the late 1950s and early 1960s

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13. We now believe each territorial and ministerial component of the wartime management structure from the national level down to selected individual enterprises would operate both urban and exurban command posts or relocation facilities. The functions of the component determine the number of its primary and alternate command posts, their size, and the degree of protection offered against nuclear effects, as well as the communications equipment, transport, and other support provided. At the highest levels of the national leadership and throughout the armed forces, mobile command posts and related communications facilities also are used, although they are not usually available to subordinate territorial-administrative and ministerial organizations. The present war management structure relies primarily on fixed command posts and will probably continue to do so; we doubt the Soviets would be able to carry out their wartime management plans using only mobile command posts.

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Urban Facilities25X1
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11. In developing the nationwide system for war management, the Soviets have stressed the need for a unified command, control, and communications network. Civilian wartime facilities and procedures have been patterned after those of the armed forces to ensure compatibility of the two systems. One aspect of this pattern is the network of command posts provided for the leadership of all organizations in the war management structure.

12. Although discussions of nuclear effects did not appear in Soviet literature until well into the 1950s, Soviet leaders apparently were fully aware of the danger and had initiated a nuclear protection program for the leadership by the late 1940s. Early efforts were concentrated in urban areas; in some cities, this was closely tied to the development and expansion of subway systems. Advances in nuclear weapons technologies and in Soviet war-fighting doctrine in the mid-1950s diverted the mainstream of attention to the development of exurban relocation sites, although the Soviets continued to invest in urban facilities. The

This network consists variously of hardened structures at or near the residences of some senior leaders, multistory detached bunkers connected to important government buildings, other detached or basement shelters, underground communications centers, and—in some cities—connections to public or special dedicated subway lines. These facilities serve to:

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- Provide management cadres with protection and command and control capabilities in the event of an attack with minimum warning.
- Enhance the leadership's ability to disperse rapidly to exurban sites, with a high degree of physical security and minimum risk of observation.

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— Provide protection and command and control facilities for operational elements of management organizations that would remain in urban areas during and after an attack. These elements would be required to direct essential activity, report damage estimates, and conduct poststrike recovery operations. [redacted]

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15. Although urban command posts exist for most leadership entities, [redacted]

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[redacted] Initial research has focused on subway-related facilities in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev [redacted] Our information confirms that there is a clear relationship between the subways, protective facilities for leadership in urban areas, and civil defense authorities. Operation of facilities associated with the subways is the responsibility of the second department and civil defense staff of each subway administration. The subway administrations coordinate their plans with USSR Civil Defense, territorial civil defense staffs, and the organizations that would use the special facilities. [redacted]

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17. Protective facilities connected to the subways are of two basic types: regular bunkers—some of which are very deep multilevel structures—for leadership and communications elements, and protective facilities off the public subway lines, which would be used for essential workers, wartime economic reserves, and possibly some leadership elements. Both types of facilities can be built at the time the subway lines are constructed or can be added later. We are not sure how the shelter facilities are configured vis-a-vis the public lines (see figure II-1). They reportedly can be accessed by doors in the tunnel walls. In subway stations, these doors are covered by decorative grills concealing access ramps that can be extended across the tracks for entrance or exit [redacted] These facilities either may have been dug discretely or may be sections of a separate tunnel that runs parallel to those for the public subway lines. [redacted]

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16. The extensive and largely successful use of the Moscow subway for civil defense during World War II probably encouraged the Soviets to integrate the subways into planning for the postwar era. The advantages of depth and secrecy inherent in subway construction techniques proved to be of special utility to plans for leadership protection. [redacted]

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
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20. Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev are unique among Soviet cities, with far more extensive requirements for protected leadership command and control facilities than most other major cities. It is difficult to extrapolate evidence on the urban command post networks across the USSR; there are only six other cities with currently operating subway systems, although systems in another 18 cities are under construction or planned. These cities are all key nodes in the wartime management system, with each city representing a major concentration of military and industrial targets. To varying degrees, the Soviets would rely on many, if not all, of these subways to help provide leadership continuity. There are over 300 additional cities the Soviets probably believe to be at risk, however, with less sophisticated capabilities for leadership protection. We do not yet have a basis for assessing the degree of protection afforded the leadership in these areas [redacted]

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19. The operational utility of the subway-related facilities is enhanced by their connection to the underground transportation network, which would increase the leadership's flexibility during a crisis and conceal their activities from hostile observation and the Soviet population. Table II-3 depicts how the subways and their special facilities probably would be used by the leadership during the different levels of readiness that govern the transition from peace to war. ([redacted])

[redacted] The subways' use for rapid and covert relocation of the leadership appears to be of particular importance in Moscow, probably because of the city's concentration of high-level leadership. We have several reports of special dedicated subway lines connecting government buildings in downtown Moscow with exurban leadership facilities. [redacted]

21. Construction activity at identified facilities indicates that the Soviets are continuing to expand and improve the urban war management network. Despite the primary role of exurban command posts and communications facilities, it is apparent that the urban network figures prominently in Soviet plans for managing a nuclear conflict. Far from providing only a worst case or reserve capability for leadership continuity, the network provides the leadership—at least in the major cities—with the potential for continuing operations in those cities during a nuclear war. [redacted]

Exurban Facilities

22. The Soviets would try to relocate most of their leadership to exurban sites in the event of war. We currently estimate that over 1,000 facilities exist, with about 275 serving key elements of the Soviet wartime leadership of particular significance to the United

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States in the context of nuclear war [redacted]
These elements include leaders at national, military district, republic, and oblast levels (the 56 most important oblasts) whose major wartime responsibilities involve supporting strategic and theater military operations, maintaining internal political control, managing war-related production and services, and effecting poststrike reconstitution of essential communications, transportation services, electric power, and industrial production.¹ [redacted]

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24. Although we do not know the extent of the Soviets' plans for protecting the leadership, the nearly 40-year history of the program, the number of identified and reported facilities, and their association with the broad spectrum of leadership suggest basic requirements for leadership protection probably have been met. New command posts [redacted] [redacted] are being constructed, however, and existing sites are undergoing expansion or upgrade. Although we believe the Soviets probably have come close to meeting their basic site requirements, improvements in Soviet

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¹ Military service headquarters, main command posts, and theater command, control, and communications facilities are not included.

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Table II-3
Postulated Subway Activities at Various Soviet Readiness Stages

Readiness Levels	Subway Operations
Normal Peacetime	
Constant combat readiness	City civil defense staff prepared to direct the operations of subway system in wartime. Trains on normal schedule primarily moving passenger traffic. Subway-connected command posts and communications centers staffed by duty personnel only.
Threatening Period	
Increased combat readiness	Normal operations continue. Subway personnel and civil defense staffs test emergency equipment, prepare shelters, and position supplies. Subway authorities' urban command and communications centers fully manned. Liaison established with each subway division's command post and with the Military Transportation Services (VOSO) of the relevant military district. Subway exurban relocation facilities partially staffed and readied for operation.
Threat-of-war readiness	All subway-connected shelters and special facilities fully readied. Subway probably used to facilitate relocation of leadership to exurban command posts. Hours of public service probably reduced to accommodate special movements of personnel and freight.
Full combat readiness	Subways possibly used in movement of essential personnel commuting from exurban areas to cities. Subway use strictly controlled.
Transattack period	Personnel to be sheltered in subways or subway-related facilities allowed to enter. Admission to subway surface entrances halted upon receipt of "air alert" signal. Blast closures isolating subway station platforms from surface entrances and track tunnels activated on signal to "close protective structures." Train operations halted and all underground protective structures throughout the subsurface system remain "buttoned up" until "all clear" is sounded.
Postattack period	Reconnaissance of subway systems undertaken to determine extent of damage to stations, track tunnels, and rolling stock. Plans to restore service implemented. Subways used, to degree possible, for movement of rescue and recovery workers and equipment.

[Redacted]

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construction techniques and communications equipment, as well as the need to offset US strategic advances, indicate that the program, though mature, should be viewed as ongoing. [Redacted]

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25. We classify Soviet relocation sites as either single- or dual-purpose. Single-purpose facilities are those that are intended to support wartime command functions only. They have military characteristics and are manned continuously in peacetime at levels that would facilitate a rapid transition to a wartime posture. The characteristics of the facilities vary according to command level and function. [Redacted] IIM, we have recategorized them as f [Redacted]

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
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28. We have designated exurban command and control facilities with peacetime functions different from their wartime roles as dual-purpose. The concept is not new; since the early 1960s, Soviet civil defense

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planning has called for the use of dual-purpose facilities in providing for wartime medical services, urban evacuation, dispersal of key personnel, and relocation of industry. The idea is to reduce the economic burden of prescribed civil defense preparations by using existing facilities and by planning new construction to serve a beneficial peacetime function. Although the single-purpose facilities are extremely important to the wartime management structure, dual-purpose facilities are now more numerous and are used by all levels of Soviet leadership

29. Construction of dual-purpose relocation sites began in the 1960s. Some sites use aboveground facilities only; others have both aboveground facilities and underground protective structures, either detached bunkers or basement shelters. All have been significantly upgraded from their original peacetime configuration.

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
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
their peacetime function. Relocation facilities also can be found at other sites, such as educational institutions and research institutes in rural areas. Selection of facilities is limited by the guidelines established by USSR Civil Defense, which consider:

- Proximity of likely targets.
- Hardness of underground and surface structures.
- Availability of communications.
- Accessibility to transportation.


30. We categorize dual-purpose facilities according to their peacetime roles. The most numerous types are those that have rest, recreation, or health services as

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
- Redundancy of power sources.
- Availability of water 

Survivability of Fixed Sites

31. There does not appear to be a positive correlation between the degree of protection at dual-purpose relocation facilities and the functions or level of organization they are intended to serve. However, there does appear to be some correlation between the periods of construction and the nature of the hardened structures provided.

33. The effectiveness of the Soviets' wartime management structure ultimately will depend on the vulnerability of their leadership facilities to a US nuclear attack. The Soviets have undertaken a number of measures to improve the survivability of their facilities, including hardening; proliferation and dispersal of installations; concealment and deception; and deployment of active defenses near some sites. 


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34. *Physical Vulnerability.* Vulnerability estimates of the urban and exurban deep underground facilities are currently under review. There are probably differences between the urban and exurban versions, as well as among different urban facilities.

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Mobile Command Posts



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

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exists between USSR Civil Defense and elements of the Ministry of Defense concerned with the development and testing of nuclear weapons. [redacted]

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[redacted] suggests that guidelines for the design and location of exurban command posts appear to have been altered in response to changes in Soviet perceptions about nuclear weapons effects, the potential size of a nuclear attack, and probable targets in the USSR. Nevertheless, no patterns have been observed with regard to the location of these facilities, probably because of the latitude often given to organizations in planning. For reasons of convenience, security, and economy, ministries have preferred to meet their relocation requirements by using rest, recreation, or other facilities already under their control. [redacted]

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37. **Location.** The distance of relocation facilities from probable target areas has been a key factor in the USSR Civil Defense guidelines. Close cooperation

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41. **Active Defense.** The Soviets will employ active defenses to attempt to protect leadership sites, particularly in the Moscow area, which has the most modern and densely deployed air defenses in the USSR. In addition, ballistic missile defenses around Moscow currently are being expanded and upgraded within the limits of the ABM Treaty. Construction of new leadership sites is continuing within the Moscow defenses, despite the plethora of targets in the area. This suggests a degree of confidence in the layered defenses currently deployed. [redacted]

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[redacted]

43. Ballistic missile defenses deployed under ABM Treaty limits could be easily overcome by a large-scale US ballistic missile attack on Moscow. Nevertheless, if the Soviets were able to execute an effective, well-coordinated first strike on US ICBMs, the number of highly accurate warheads available to attack leadership facilities would be reduced. Under these circumstances the Soviets' ABM and air defenses could assume greater importance in protecting the national-level leadership [redacted]

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Costs

44. We are unable to provide a reliable estimate of the total cost of the Soviet wartime management program. In the previous IIM on Soviet wartime management, we estimated that the cost of construction and equipment for all exurban leadership facilities—if duplicated in the United States—would fall between 28 billion and 56 billion in 1981 dollars. This estimate, however, was based on the calculation that there were between 800 and 1,600 relocation facilities of certain types throughout the USSR. It did not consider, moreover, the deep underground complexes in exurban areas [redacted]

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45. Reanalysis of the number and types of facilities thought to exist has shown that some of the judgments underlying our 1981 estimates were incorrect. This same analysis has revealed gaps in our data base, preventing us from precisely recalculating the total number of facilities (which probably number over 1,000) and their costs. [redacted]

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in the wartime management structure. Under the 1961 Civil Defense Statute (see annex A) the "organization of a warning and communications system" was defined as a "main task," with primary responsibility given to the MOC assisted by the MOD. Working together, these ministries developed redundant networks, supporting facilities, and operational procedures that were aimed at providing the national leadership with continuity of control over all activities in the Soviet homeland following a nuclear attack.

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Ministry of Communications

47. The 1961 Civil Defense Statute directed the USSR MOC to:

- "Develop measures . . . that ensure the dependable functioning of the means of communication, warning, and radiobroadcasting of the country in peacetime during the special period."
- "Provide Civil Defense in peacetime and during the special period with communications; during the special period organize centralized use of all state and departmental means of communications."
- "Provide the organization of warning and communications services in republics, krais, oblasts, towns, and rayons, and effect the management and supervision of their activities."

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48. To implement these directives, the USSR Minister of Communications, in his role as Chief of Civil Defense of MOC and principal communications officer of the Soviet Government, followed the standard civil defense management pattern by creating second departments (to integrate the wartime functions of the ministry with civil defense plans) and civil defense staffs at the all-union and territorial levels of the ministerial structure. Similar actions were taken in the republic ministries of communications. At oblast levels and below, departments and sections of communications would provide the manpower and equipment for

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
There are both pricing and methodological uncertainties in the costing of Soviet facilities and equipment. Therefore, these estimates should be regarded as rough approximations.

Communications Support

46. Communications support is the joint responsibility of the Ministry of Communications (MOC) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD). These responsibilities have evolved over the past 20 years along with changes

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

the communications services of the territorial civil defense staffs.

49. Concern for the survivability and dependability of communications in wartime resulted in the adoption of several corrective measures beginning in the early 1960s, and improvements continue to be made. Some of these measures grew out of a broader program in the MOC to expand, improve, and automate its common-user service.



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Most important, the MOC developed plans for 16 automated regional communications control centers. The 16 communications regions served by these centers probably were intended to provide military district commanders with the capability to manage communications systems in their area on a decentralized basis if necessary after a nuclear attack. Although wartime considerations were presumably not the sole motivation for adopting this regional arrangement, they probably were a major factor in the decision.



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52. The MOC would play an important role in advising civil defense officials and the population of emergency alerts, including impending attacks. The MOC components at all levels would use the full range of communications available, which have already been tested, to relay warning information received from higher echelons or from territorial civil defense organizations. The communications means would include the local telephone systems, radio stations, and wire transmissions.



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53. Poststrike restoration of communications services constitutes an important function of the civil defense elements of the MOC at all levels. For the most part, the civil defense elements of oblast and lower-level MOC organizations are responsible for repairing damage to secondary networks. Personnel would be drawn from the appropriate departments and would use standard-issue MOC equipment in their emergency repair work. Similar patterns would be followed by those regional communications organizations under the MOC that are responsible for intercity networks.



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Ministry of Defense

54. The 1961 statute that subordinated USSR Civil Defense to the Council of Ministers called on the MOD to assist in the implementation of civil defense measures. Among the items MOD was to provide for in its budget were military personnel assigned to civil defense communications centers. The MOD provided assistance directly to USSR Civil Defense in Moscow, but assistance from the Ministry of Defense to republic and local civil defense staffs was channeled through the military districts.

This military involvement in civil defense would facilitate the later incorporation of civil defense into the MOD.

Ministry of Power and Electrification. Soviet law requires that these communications systems conform to the regulations and technical standards established by the Ministry of Communications. In wartime the MOC would assume control of these ministerial communications systems.

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Problems

59. The Soviets may believe that deep underground structures such as those near Moscow and the numerous national-level relocation facilities will assure the survivability of some of the top leadership—a priority objective of their wartime management plans. Nonetheless, their confidence in the effectiveness of their overall wartime management structure is almost certainly tempered by the belief that the leadership would be high on the list of US targeting priorities in a nuclear conflict.

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60. Moreover, survivability of the wartime management structure itself is only the first step to accomplishing the leadership's objectives. The ability of the wartime management structure to try to ensure the continued existence of the Soviet system and recovery of the economic infrastructure depends on its ability to implement several highly complex measures under conditions of extreme stress. Management must be able to activate dispersal and evacuation plans in a timely manner without interfering with military mobilization or force deployment, and without inhibiting the continued functioning of the logistic base supporting military operations. If nuclear strikes occur, they then must direct damage-limitation, rescue, and repair activities to restore priority operations while coping with degradation of their own management and communications network.

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Other Ministries

58. In addition, there are communications systems designed to meet the special needs of the Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of Maritime Fleet, and the

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CHAPTER III

PROTECTION OF THE URBAN POPULATION

1. Soviet writings recognize that many highly populated regions would be attacked in a large-scale nuclear strike because of their economic and military importance. Protecting the population from weapons of mass destruction is a key element of the civil defense program, encompassing an array of measures designed to contend with both the short- and long-term effects of these weapons. The measures include:

- Early warning of the population against the danger of enemy attack.
- Dispersal of essential personnel from labor and service enterprises in large cities into outlying areas and evacuation of nonessential personnel from cities to rural areas.
- Providing individual means of protection for the population.
- Construction of blast and fallout shelters for essential personnel and some of the general population remaining in the cities after evacuation, and equipping fallout shelters in dispersal and evacuation areas.
- Protection of water and food supplies and the creation of reserve supplies of food, water, medical goods, and other essential items in dispersal and evacuation areas.
- Organization of radiation and chemical/biological weapons monitoring stations, reconnaissance, and laboratory control.
- Mandatory general training of the population on methods of protection from weapons of mass destruction.
- Preparation and equipping of civil defense formations.
- Implementation of medical preparations and antiepidemic measures.
- Preparation and execution of rescue operations in centers of destruction.

2. This chapter presents the findings of recent studies on three major elements of the program:

sheltering, evacuation, and medical support. Unless specifically noted, the discussion in this chapter refers to the urban population as a whole, including both essential and nonessential personnel. (Chapters II and IV examine specific measures to protect the leadership and key workers, respectively.)

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The Urban Shelter Program

3. Although sheltering is the keystone of most major European civil defense programs, factors such as population size, construction costs, and expected collateral damage have caused the Soviets to look to alternate methods—such as evacuation—for protecting the majority of their population. Nonetheless, the ongoing blast shelter construction program is a vital component of plans for protecting essential personnel and some of the general population. Though limited in scope, this program is intended to:

- Facilitate continuing operations in cities up to the moment of an attack.
- Provide protection for part of the population that cannot be evacuated.
- Provide protection for a small, though significant, portion of the population if warning times are reduced.

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Blast Shelters

4. The history of shelter construction in the Soviet Union mirrors the history of civil defense as a whole, with shifts in emphasis closely following changes in military doctrine and strategy. Urban shelters first were constructed during the 1920s and 1930s as part of the local air defense system against attack by manned bombers. Suspended after the war, construction of air raid shelters resumed by 1949 and continued into the 1950s. We cannot pinpoint the year the Soviets began to harden these shelters to withstand nuclear effects, but believe the effort was under way before the debate of the mid-1950s over the effectiveness of a nationwide shelter program. Despite the fact that selected sheltering measures apparently were given some chance of success (suggested by continued command post construction and the incorporation of civil


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
defense features in new subway construction), the debate culminated in the curtailment of general shelter construction in the early 1960s.

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5. The program revived after 1968, with the publication of a decree requiring shelters to be included in all new construction. Although the regulation was not uniformly enforced, particularly at residential buildings, construction rates increased rapidly through the early 1970s, leveling off in the middle of the decade. During this period, construction plans and techniques were standardized across the USSR.

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6. **Types of Blast Shelters.** Soviet regulations classify blast shelters according to strength, capacity, structure, availability of filters and ventilation equipment, and time frame for construction:



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
8. **Shelter Guidelines.**

changes occurred in shelter guidelines in the mid-to-late 1970s. An important aspect of those changes was the reduction in projected shelter stay-times to two or three days. This stay-time has been substantiated by reporting on instructions received during training and on ventilation capabilities. It also was no longer required that food supplies be kept in shelters; instead, shelters would be stocked in the "special period" preceding an attack.

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We believe, however, that most shelters for essential personnel maintain food supplies.

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
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lution and filtration equipment used. Under certain conditions, for example, the standard may be as high as 2.5 square meters per person. [redacted]

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10. Soviet planned occupancy factors for the available space are based on midsummer climatic conditions. Soviet civil defense publications cite 0.5 square meter as the minimum space allocation per person. However, some of these publications [redacted] indicate that this figure may vary with region, season of the year, the effective shelter temperature, or the performance of the venti-

11. **Fallout Shelters.** Radiation or fallout shelters are classified by the Soviets into groups according to the time of construction and degree of attenuation of radiation. They can be permanent structures built during peacetime, temporary structures hastily built from local materials under threat of an attack, basements and cellars adapted as fallout shelters under threat of attack, or existing buildings used without modification. [redacted]

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
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time, is more economical, and reduces the effect of such problems as the storage of construction materials and weather or hydrological conditions. Soviet sources cite the following structures as suitable for adaptation as fallout shelters: basements, root cellars, other cellars, housing, mines and mineworks, subway sections, and other underground excavations. They state that basements or cellars in wooden houses can be upgraded to have PFs approaching 100, while those in stone houses can be raised to 800-1,000. They also state that root cellars can be upgraded from a PF of 40 to 1,000. In addition, there is an extensive body of Soviet literature [redacted] that confirms the existence of Soviet plans for the rapid construction of expedient fallout shelters. [redacted]

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12. The degree of attenuation of radiation is the extent to which a protective structure reduces the dose of radiation over time. The Soviets assess the attenuation of radiation in a one-story wooden house as a protective factor (PF) of two, in an open trench as three, in a production building or basement of a wooden home as seven, in a stone house as 10, and in a covered trench or basement of a stone home as 40 to 100. These figures differ somewhat from US assessments of the PFs for similar buildings [redacted]

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13. [redacted] indicate a preference for adapting structures as fallout shelters rather than constructing new ones. Adaptation takes less

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26. We estimate the Soviets will have about 33,000 shelters in 1994, which could protect approximately 23 million people. This is 11.5 percent of the projected 1994 urban population, an increase of about 5 million people. Breaking these figures down by city size, we find that the largest cities will be able to shelter slightly less of their population (15.8 percent vice 16.9 percent), while the smallest cities' capabilities will increase slightly (10.9 percent vice 8.4 percent). Overall, however, we see no significant change in the Soviets' position a decade hence.

their contribution to wartime economic activity are examined in chapters II and IV, respectively.

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Subways

27. Since World War II, when the Moscow subway was used for sheltering the population and housed protected command posts for the leadership, Soviet authorities have looked upon subways as much more than a public transportation system. The advent of nuclear weapons and new delivery systems reinforced the realization that subways can play a key role in the defense of large urban centers in modern war.

30. **Background.** There are nine operational subway systems in the USSR; another 10 are under construction, and eight more are planned (see figure III-2).² By 1990 subways will be in operation or under construction in most Soviet cities with 1 million or more inhabitants. The cities with or scheduled for subways are important administrative, economic, and population centers. All but one are oblast (or equivalent) or republic capitals, and 14 of the 16 military district headquarters cities are included. They also represent 14 of the 15 largest population centers.

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31. Soviet subways are designed with both peacetime and wartime functions in mind. The role of subways in urban transport remains an important consideration. This, together with prevailing geological conditions, patterns of urban growth, and cost constraints, determines the size of individual systems and the type of construction used in their tunnels and stations. As with most major construction projects in the USSR and Eastern Europe since the 1960s, however, subway construction plans are reviewed by civil defense authorities to determine how they can be adapted to the civil defense needs—which vary considerably—of the metropolitan area concerned. This dual-purpose aspect of subway development is characteristic of many areas of civil defense planning.

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The Soviets consider civil defense requirements early in the subways' design, modifying and expanding their inherent civil defense capabilities. The storage and protective capabilities of special facilities constructed adjacent to, and connected to, the public system, as well as the protected transportation capability, would contribute significantly to the continued functioning of cities in wartime. The wartime functions of the subways would probably include:

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- Protection of the leadership through special shelters, command posts, and evacuation routes.
- Protection of the essential work force in special shelters.
- To a lesser extent, providing protection for a limited portion of the general population.
- Aiding continuity of economic activity through connections to essential installations and the storage of equipment and essential reserves.
- Aiding postattack recovery through inherent transportation capabilities.

32. **Civil Defense Role.** For civil defense purposes, the post-World War II subway network consists of two components: the public system, used daily by the general population for transportation, and classified special facilities, maintained solely for use in the event of war. Both elements are designed to withstand weapons of mass destruction. The public system reportedly is divided into zones, which in wartime would be supported by ventilation and power units housed in deep underground structures. Deep subway station platforms and adjacent track tunnels are equipped to be sealed against nuclear effects.

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The classified special facilities are underground hardened structures, accessible from both stations and tunnels and served by independent life support systems. The facilities probably serve as command posts, communications centers, secure storage

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
29. This section discusses the subways' role in protecting all segments of the population. Their extensive place in preparations for leadership continuity and

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Figure III-2
Soviet Cities With Subway Systems
Operational, Under Construction, or Planned



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areas for emergency medical and food supplies, alternate production facilities, and supplemental personnel shelter space. The deepest could be hardened against pressure as high as 38,000 kilopascals (5,600 psi) from a 1-megaton weapon. There are also spur lines and possibly dedicated subway lines serving some of these facilities. Reporting indicates that civil defense features of both the public and classified facilities are tested regularly.

33. We believe the classified special facilities of the subways are solely for leaders and other essential personnel. Subway-connected bunkers, spur lines, and probably dedicated subway lines in Moscow would be used to shelter and covertly evacuate the leadership. Other special shelters off the track tunnels would also be used by essential workers.

34. Information on the public system's civil defense role and the extent to which it would serve the general

public is contradictory. Theoretically, the subways could be used to provide first-stage transportation for evacuating personnel as well as significant shelter capacity for the population. However, the complications involved in the subways' multidimensional wartime role have led to different judgments on the public system's civil defense mission. The consensus view holds that subway stations and some major tunnel segments would be used for sheltering the population. This same analysis discounts the general use of subways for evacuation. An alternative view is that neither the station platforms nor the tunnels would be used to shelter nonessential personnel. In this view, the subways would instead be kept open for transportation as:

- An additional means of evacuation.
- A means of protected daily preattack commuting for dispersed essential workers.

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used, however, this latter figure represents a maximum that is unlikely to be approached, since not all sections of the subways would be suitable for shelter

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36. **Problems.** Use of the subways for civil defense is not without problems. As in the case of so many other elements of Soviet plans for coping with nuclear war, sufficient warning is the key. Although we know subway systems are well adapted for rapid conversion to full readiness [redacted] the Soviets' ability to execute the range of civil defense activities involving the subways would vary directly with warning time available. [redacted]

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37. The effectiveness of the subways' civil defense capabilities is uncertain. [redacted]

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[redacted] command posts and shelters connected to the subways probably contain life support systems comparable to other protective facilities for essential personnel. However, analysis of Soviet construction techniques suggests that some of these facilities probably are less survivable than many dedicated hardened civilian command posts. Ventilation capabilities are another major concern. Deep underground life support centers that provide ventilation and power to the civil defense zones of the public system are known to exist in Moscow and Leningrad and probably are present in other cities. Even if they are not attacked directly, however, their usefulness would depend on the integrity of their surface air inlets and exhausts and the location of any subway damage. Long-range plans for improving the subways include installing highly efficient tunnel ventilation systems, but we cannot estimate their impact on shelter capabilities. [redacted]

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— A means of protected movement for postattack rescue and repair teams and dispersed essential workers.³ [redacted]

35. Although we cannot confirm the extent to which the public systems would be used for shelter, we have estimated the potential shelter capacity of the currently operating systems. Assuming an occupancy factor of 1 square meter per person and counting only those portions more than 8 meters deep, we estimate the operating underground stations could shelter roughly 570,000 people, or 2.3 percent of the population in the nine cities concerned. If both operating tunnels and stations were used, they could shelter approximately 3.6 million people, or 14.5 percent of the population in those cities.⁴ Even if tunnels were

³ The holder of this view is the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. [redacted]

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38. A similar concern is the ability of the system itself to withstand the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Resistance to blast would depend on the location of the explosions as well as other factors such as yield and height of burst. [redacted] have reported that hermetic seals have failed in tests, and would not be effective against residual radiation. While most shelter air filters provide some protection against chemical and bacteriological contamination, [redacted] reporting available conflicts on the availability of these filters for subway ventilation. [redacted]

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39. **Implications.** The construction of a subway and a related network of hardened underground structures in some major Soviet urban centers might, in some scenarios, improve the chances for the leadership, essential work force, and perhaps some of the general population, to survive a nuclear attack. In

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
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
addition, significant portions of the subways' underground track system would probably survive intact into the postattack period, while damaged sections probably could be repaired. The restoration of even limited service on some lines would greatly facilitate movement of repair and rescue teams, allowing them to bypass or circumvent contaminated or destroyed areas. The capability for protected movement could be a vital consideration should the conflict extend beyond the major nuclear strikes, as the Soviets expect. Thus, those very cities whose continued activity and rapid recovery would be most vital to the USSR possess in their subway systems a potentially significant tool to facilitate that process. Continued emphasis on the construction and renovation of subways and related hardened command, control, and communications facilities in key urban areas demonstrates that the Soviets perceive the potential benefits subway systems offer in a nuclear conflict.

Urban Evacuation

40. Integral to civil defense planning for nuclear war since the 1950s, evacuation was formalized as a basic tenet of the program in the 1961 Civil Defense Statute. The Soviets apparently plan to evacuate the nonworking population and nonessential workers from likely target areas, including cities of military or economic importance, border zones, and other areas surrounding key military and economic installations.



Evacuation Estimate



42. [redacted] we developed a classification rule that could be applied to

all Soviet cities to estimate which would evacuate in wartime. Population has proved repeatedly to be the most significant factor in our estimate.

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43. Since 1981, our estimate of the number of cities to evacuate has ranged from a minimum of 279 to a maximum of 420 because of continued refinements in our methodology and improved information on the number of cities evacuating. We currently estimate as many as 331 cities might be evacuated in wartime. This is about one-third of the 942 cities with populations greater than 25,000.

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44. Not all of the population would be evacuated from cities at risk. Some key workers and probably some leadership personnel would remain behind to continue essential operations, relying on shelters for protection in the event of an attack. Our latest estimate of the number of people the Soviets plan to evacuate assumes that all available shelter capacity will be used, and that all who cannot be sheltered would be evacuated. Given the variation according to population size in individual cities' shelter capacities, we judge that the proportion of the population to be evacuated from each city also varies: 83.1 percent of cities with more than 1 million people, 90.7 percent of those with between 100,000 and 1 million people, and 91.6 percent of cities with between 25,000 and 100,000 people. The net result would be the evacuation of some 92 million people, or 88 percent of the population of the 331 cities. This is, in fact, 61 percent of the population in all Soviet cities with more than 25,000 people.

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Problems

45. The mass evacuation of 331 urban areas would be an enormous and complex task, with many obstacles to successfully evacuating the population as well as to supporting them in the host areas. Widespread reporting on the existence of evacuation plans at a broad variety of installations, continued evidence of evacuation exercises at installations and on a larger scale, and undiminished emphasis on evacuation in unclassified writings indicate that the Soviets remain serious in their intention to evacuate the general population. There is no consensus within the Intelligence Community on the extent to which these plans can be carried out, however. Their degree of success will depend on many interdependent factors, including:

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- The amount of strategic warning in the absence of a US preemptive attack.

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


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— Adequate transportation.

— Weather conditions.

— The cooperation of the population.



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children to camps in summer. The Soviet press [Redacted] reported that a large-scale removal of children, students, and undesirables took place in Moscow before the 1980 Olympic Games. In that period, [Redacted] more than 2,000 buses amassed in Moscow during one morning, about half of which were observed leaving the city in convoys [Redacted]

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47. The possibility that the United States might view evacuation as an indicator of an imminent Soviet nuclear strike could influence the timing and extent of the USSR's decision to evacuate. Given the permanence of evacuation in Soviet plans, however, we believe the Soviets would still try to implement evacuation plans in wartime. Although we believe the Soviets recognize that mass evacuation could trigger a US preemptive strike, they might try to avoid this dilemma by (1) piecemeal or gradual evacuation; (2) covert evacuation to the extent possible; (3) propaganda to dissuade US leaders from such a course. [Redacted]

It is estimated that those buses alone had the capability to remove at least 90,000 people from Moscow on that morning. We have no evidence that the event was related to civil defense testing, but we expect that the Soviets fully realized its applicability to civil defense planning. Of note was the use of main evacuation routes. [Redacted]

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51. *Weather Conditions.* [Redacted]

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48. *Transportation.* [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Severe winter weather conditions in much of the Soviet Union suggest, however, that during a large part of the year evacuation would be difficult, requiring extended leadtimes to complete. [Redacted]

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52. *Cooperation of the Population.* Central to any successful evacuation would be the cooperation of the people involved. Panic and refusal to cooperate are frequently cited as leading reasons why mass evacuation would not be successful in the United States. In fact, there reportedly have been incidents during which Soviet citizens, believing nuclear war imminent, panicked and produced considerable chaos. Furthermore, [Redacted] many Soviet citizens are extremely skeptical about the chances for successful evacuation of major cities. There are, however, several factors that we believe would minimize (though not necessarily eliminate) these problems under the classic wartime scenarios that presume strategic warning. These include:

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- A tradition of obedience to authority, particularly in wartime.
- Provisions for militia and other security groups to ensure orderly evacuation.
- Repeated instruction and drill on civil defense measures, including occasional evacuation exercises.
- Continued propaganda that the Soviet Government has undertaken adequate civil defense preparations and that evacuation is feasible.

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The Soviets are not known to practice evacuation on a large scale, presumably because such exercises are unacceptably disruptive, both socially and economically, and are likely to cause panic. [Redacted]

50. We recognize that the Soviets have the capability to move large numbers of civilians rapidly. For example, they annually conduct mass transport of [Redacted]

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quences" of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons are:

- Mobilization plans for medical personnel and facilities.
- Special civil defense training for all medical personnel.
- Provision for emergency medical supplies and transportation.
- Preparation for sanitation and epidemic management teams to control disease.
- Plans for medical evacuation of casualties from urban areas to relocated hospitals.
- Construction of underground medical facilities.
- Shelter for medical personnel.

Peacetime Preparations

57. *Organization and Manning.* The Civil Defense Medical Service is one of several services under the USSR Civil Defense Staff. In peacetime the Medical Service consists primarily of staff personnel responsible for coordinating the civil defense efforts of the Ministries of Health and Medical Industry. All administrative levels of the Ministry of Health and probably the Ministry of Medical Industry have Second Departments responsible for integrating plans for conversion to wartime operations, formulating doctrine, and conducting civil defense medical exercises. Soviet medical facilities also have Second Departments, headed by physicians responsible for planning and coordinating civil defense training and mobilization.

58. Upon mobilization, the medical assets of the Ministry of Health would become part of the Civil Defense Medical Service. The wartime structure of the Civil Defense Medical Service would be based on the organization and personnel of the Public Health Departments and medical facilities at each administrative level, under a system of dual subordination. During wartime the director of the local Public Health Department would become the head of the Civil Defense Medical Service for the areas concerned and a member of the local civil defense staff.

59. Because medical personnel and stocks are limited, the armed forces and civil defense compete for many of the same resources. The Soviets, therefore, face the problem of balancing the medical manpower, training, and transportation requirements of the Civil Defense Medical Service with those at the Central

Hosting

54. We have not attempted a detailed study of Soviet plans for hosting evacuees. We believe the Soviets would face significant problems in feeding and caring for an evacuated population, particularly for an extended period of time.

Future


55. We anticipate that evacuation will remain the keystone of Soviet plans for protecting the urban population. There is no evidence in unclassified writings to suggest increased emphasis on sheltering nationwide, although, as mentioned earlier, there may have been some change of policy in Moscow. Continued growth of the urban population will increase the burden on both shelter and evacuation capabilities; if the Soviets' concepts for mass evacuation do not change, we estimate their plans would involve at least 90-95 million people from 331 cities in 1994.

Civil Defense Medical Planning

56. In a nuclear war, the number of surviving injured is likely to equal or exceed the number of those killed immediately. Tens of millions of casualties could require medical treatment in the postattack period. According to Soviet unclassified writings, a stated objective of the civil defense program is to provide sufficient medical resources for the protection of the population and for treatment of the massive number of civilian casualties expected. Among the measures designed to aid in "eliminating the medical conse-

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Military Medical Directorate, which controls active-duty and reserve military medical personnel. We believe the military commissariats play a key role in allocating personnel and transportation to both organizations.

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60. In peacetime, medical personnel generally are either inducted into the armed forces upon graduation or are issued reserve military service booklets. Each booklet, issued by the military commissariats, contains a military specialty code, the reporting location for mobilization, and other service-related information. Military medical personnel are issued similar booklets upon completion of active duty. Although reserve retirement age varies according to rank, sex, and length of service, military commissariats generally carry male medical reservists on military reserve rosters until age 55, when they are assigned permanently to civil defense reserves. Female medical reservists usually are assigned to civil defense reserves at age 50.

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61. We do not know how the Soviets plan to allocate personnel between the armed forces and civil defense. Although the primary mission of the military medical service is to support the military, unclassified civil defense medical texts discuss the use of military medical resources for civilian application in the immediate postattack period. Military civil defense regiments also have limited medical treatment capabilities and could treat some civilian casualties in wartime.

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62. We estimate that the total number of medical personnel available to both the Soviet armed forces and civil defense in wartime would be about 4.0 million. There are approximately 1.1 million doctors in the USSR; there are also about 2.9 million paramedical personnel, including feldshers (physician's assistants), nurses, midwives, laboratory technicians, medical orderlies, and other assistants.⁵

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63. **Training and Exercises.** Civil defense medical training is extended in varying degrees to most segments of the population. Almost all Soviet medical personnel receive extensive military and civil defense instruction at medical training institutes. The combined military and civil defense training that accompanies the four-year program at the State Medical Institute of Alma-Ata is typical. Civil defense training at the institute is mandatory for both males and

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⁵ It should be noted that doctors in the USSR do not receive training comparable to that for Western physicians and in many cases are on a par with Western paramedical personnel.

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females, and the courses include combined instruction in basic military and civil defense topics. Among the civil defense topics taught are the treatment of nuclear, biological, and chemical casualties and the use of protective clothing. In some cases traditional military instruction is emphasized for men, while training for women focuses on civil defense. Postgraduate civil defense training is usually provided by military commissariats and civil defense staffs; in addition, civil defense medical training is given at urban medical facilities.

64. The general population also receives civil defense medical training at workplaces and schools and during military service. This training usually includes basic first aid, such as treatment for burns, artificial respiration, splinting of broken bones, and treatment for shock. Training for the general population also covers preventive measures to reduce casualties after a nuclear strike—for example, how to use protective masks, radiological and chemical measuring devices, and procedures for decontamination.

65. The extent of training through exercises appears to be uneven. some medical facilities do in fact hold semiannual or annual exercises for paramedical teams.

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a Civil Defense Medical Service first aid detachment (OPM) and instruction on general civil defense topics. Some medical facilities, however, do not engage in field training exercises. This could result in severe problems when carrying out relocation plans in wartime. Also, we have no information that the Soviets have conducted comprehensive, integrated exercises to test the entire civil defense medical network or major portions of it, although small-scale civil defense medical exercises occur throughout the USSR. In the absence of such large-scale, comprehensive exercises, it is difficult to see how the Soviets can accurately estimate the reliability of the system.

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66. **Transportation.** The military and civil defense compete for transport as well as for medical personnel. During mobilization, the Soviets plan to draw transportation assets from the civilian economy to meet the needs of the armed forces and civil defense; allocations of transport would be made through the military commissariats.

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[Redacted] We believe, however, that the military would have priority in wartime and that peacetime plans are likely to be altered as necessary. [Redacted]

there are special civil defense medical reserve supply depots for wartime use. [Redacted]

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67. We estimate that the USSR has approximately 681,000 buses; some 86,000 were built in 1982 alone. Although some of these buses would be used to support the military, many probably would be available for civil defense. Modification kits for converting buses to ambulances have been available since at least 1977, but we are uncertain as to the numbers and locations of these kits. The conversion process, reportedly requiring four to six hours, involves the addition of litters and medical equipment and the painting of windows. Once converted, a bus can accommodate 10 to 20 stretchers. Military commissariats also maintain rosters of civilian ambulances to be mobilized in wartime. Soviet unclassified sources mention the use of special ambulance trains and water transport to evacuate casualties. [Redacted]

70. Although the Soviets maintain medical stockpiles, we do not know how long these supplies could meet nationwide requirements under conditions of nuclear war. Even during peacetime the Soviets experience periodic shortages of medical supplies in certain areas, and stockpiles in other areas are not inspected and rotated. Also, Soviet medicines generally are of a lesser quality than those commonly found in the West. [Redacted]

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71. *Underground Medical Facilities.* Medical personnel are a key resource for postattack recovery; protecting them in wartime would be a priority of civil defense. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] medical facilities with personnel shelters. These shelters are probably designed primarily to protect medical personnel when warning time is inadequate to allow for relocation or evacuation of the medical facility. Where shelter space is limited, medical personnel probably would have priority over patients. [Redacted]

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68. *Medical Reserves.* The Soviets maintain stockpiles of medical equipment and supplies for civil defense. These range from simple first aid kits stored in personnel shelters to wartime pharmaceutical stocks kept in medical depots. Most of the first aid kits are A-12 medical kits that contain basic supplies, antibiotics, painkillers, bandages, and stretchers. Such kits are carried by the OPMs. Many shelters are stocked with first aid kits, but not all are equipped with medical stocks. In the late 1970s the Soviets apparently changed shelter guidelines and deleted the requirement for medical kits. Those now in shelters may have been there before the change in criteria or may be part of the equipment that an installation's medical team would carry when it joins its designated OPM. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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69. Medical treatment facilities are required to maintain a two- to three-day supply of medical stocks for emergency use only; we believe this requirement refers to peacetime levels of supply. The stocks are generally stored in hospital basements and are required to be rotated periodically. Warehouses and pharmacies also are required to maintain emergency stocks for treatment of chemical and biological casualties as well as other essential wartime medicines; they probably have wartime plans to provide medical supplies to relocated hospitals. [Redacted]

73. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Other underground medical facilities are designed as storage depots for wartime medical reserves. In addition, [Redacted] reserve hospitals, equipped with medical supplies and underground facilities, are maintained by cadre staffs solely for wartime use by the Civil Defense Medical Service [Redacted]

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74. Although our evidence indicates that a large number of urban hospitals plan to relocate or evacuate in wartime, the urban underground medical facilities are probably designed to provide limited medical support for the leadership, essential work force, and other personnel who must remain in these areas during wartime. These facilities also serve as shelters for medical personnel who may not be able to evacuate or relocate in wartime. Exurban facilities are designed to treat casualties who would be evacuated from Soviet cities and to afford additional protection against radio-

active fallout.

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Wartime Operations

75. *Treatment and Evacuation of Casualties.* The Civil Defense Medical Service has developed an elaborate plan for medical operations in the event of a nuclear attack. [redacted] unclassified civil defense literature disclose that the plan is based on two stages of treatment and evacuation. [redacted]

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76. In the first stage, OPMs would deploy to ex-urban areas after mobilization and establish medical treatment facilities. An OPM is designed to handle about 300 casualties a day. Soviet civil defense plans call for urban hospitals to provide cadres for OPMs, each with approximately 150 personnel, of which 25 would be doctors. Large hospitals would provide cadres sufficient for two OPMs, while smaller hospitals and polyclinics would provide cadres for one. Soviet planning also calls for the OPMs to be augmented by teams of paramedical personnel from factories, institutes, and similar enterprises.

77. The OPMs would be deployed in uncontaminated areas as close as possible to target areas; they would be heavily dependent on radiological reconnaissance to avoid areas that were severely contaminated or in the path of fallout. They in turn would deploy and direct the operation of the medical teams, each consisting of approximately 24 paramedics—students, workers, and members of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies. These teams would deploy to severely damaged areas, where they would receive casualties from civil defense rescue detachments and give first aid; then they would transport the seriously injured to the OPMs, which would give more extensive medical care.

78. In the second stage, casualties requiring specialized care would be transported from the OPMs to hospital bases formed from the more specialized hospitals and medical research and training institutes, which would have relocated to exurban areas. These bases, with specialized surgical sections for treating severe injuries, would be directly subordinate to oblast or kray civil defense medical services. Soviet unclassified sources assert that these bases could be as far as 10 to 12 hours' travel time from OPMs.

79. A hospital base would include six to eight hospital-collection points. Each hospital-collection point would include a main hospital, casualty-collection points, and hospitals that specialize in various categories of injury. Collection points that are nearest the target areas also would have a special sorting and evacuation hospital.

80. Although the OPMs probably would give rudimentary first aid to large numbers of casualties, the Soviets face significant uncertainties about the provision of more specialized medical care in the postattack period. Delays in transporting casualties from the OPMs to hospital bases would almost certainly result

in many fatalities. Moreover, the collection points at hospital bases are likely to be overwhelmed with casualties during the medical evacuation. Shortages of trained personnel, medical supplies, or equipment in hastily established hospital bases would cause additional problems.

81. *Sanitary-Epidemiological Operations.* Sanitary-epidemiological units (sanepids) also would play a key role in Soviet civil defense medical operations. Sanepids are controlled in peacetime by the Ministry of Public Health. Their peacetime responsibilities are: inoculating and vaccinating the general public; insect and rodent control; water, dairy, and meat monitoring; and industrial and community hygiene. They usually are equipped with mobile laboratory and inspection equipment and are normally headed by a physician.

82. [redacted] the sanepids' missions in wartime are to:

- Support OPMs and base hospitals in exurban areas and provide preventive health care.
- Be responsible for mass immunizations of the populace to curb infectious diseases that could result from radiation-induced suppression of the body's immune system.
- Provide uncontaminated water for OPM and hospital base operations.
- Supervise the disposal of corpses and human waste to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

83. Sanepids from large urban areas would specialize.

[redacted]

84. The Soviets face significant uncertainties about the ability of these teams to carry out their assigned wartime tasks. For example, during the Sverdlovsk anthrax epidemic of 1979, sanepids ultimately were able to control the spread of disease, but the level of effort reportedly was quite large for the size of the outbreak. That sanepids would have such large resources available to them in the postattack period is unlikely. Similarly, sanepids have been only partially

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successful in controlling epidemics in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of large-scale nuclear strikes, sanepids probably would be of limited effectiveness in coping with infectious diseases. [redacted]

85. Relocation and Evacuation of Medical Facilities.

[redacted]

support for the population during the postattack period. They probably believe that these preparations enhance their prospects for reducing fatalities should nuclear war occur. Nevertheless, the Soviets face significant uncertainties about the ability of the Civil Defense Medical Service to perform its wartime mission. These uncertainties center on the:

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- Amount of warning time available for mobilization of the Civil Defense Medical Service.

[redacted]

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86. Soviet medical facilities appear to be accorded a relatively high priority in evacuation and relocation operations. Unclassified Soviet civil defense medical manuals assert that relocated medical facilities would assist in the dispersal or relocation of the essential work force and the evacuation of the general population. Given adequate warning time, civil defense medical facilities probably would relocate after the leadership had moved to exurban command posts, but before the dispersal, evacuation, or relocation of the other segments of the population. [redacted]

- Shortages of appropriate medical supplies and equipment—despite stockpiling—to treat the massive number of casualties expected.

- Shortages of medical personnel despite the emphasis on civil defense training for large numbers of medical and paramedical personnel.

- Problems with sanepid operations in peacetime that bring into question the ability of the sanepids to accomplish their wartime mission.

- Uneven implementation of stated civil defense training goals and the consequent ability of medical personnel to perform their wartime roles.

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87. A major problem for the Soviets is providing sufficient building space in which relocated medical facilities could operate. [redacted]

- Ability of medical units to reenter targeted cities after a nuclear attack to permit the timely treatment and evacuation of personnel remaining in the cities.

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[redacted]

Although there appears to be a potential for conflict between military and civil defense requirements in time of war, the subordination of civil defense staffs to military commissariats in some areas may have helped to eliminate conflicting assignments of medical personnel and civilian transportation assets. [redacted]

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Outlook

88. The available evidence indicates that the Soviets have taken some measures to provide medical


89. The Soviets will continue their efforts to prepare for providing medical support to the population in the trans- and post-attack period. The unprecedented number of casualties that would result from a general nuclear war would nonetheless present major problems for the medical infrastructure. [redacted]

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CHAPTER IV PROTECTION OF THE ECONOMY


1. Ensuring continuity of essential economic activity is a major objective of the Soviet civil defense program. The measures envisioned by the Soviets are designed to support military operations, sustain the population, and aid postattack recovery. Efforts to achieve these goals fall short of stated Soviet intentions, however, because of the sheer complexity of maintaining a viable national economic base in a nuclear environment. 


2. Like other aspects of the civil defense program, some of the Soviets' plans for protecting the economy can be traced to experiences of World War II. Under the relatively limited destructive capability of conventional warfare, for example, they found that:

- The ability to continue military-related production in wartime could have a major impact on the conduct and outcome of a prolonged conflict.
- Relocation of major industry was feasible, both in terms of physical relocation and continued supply and operations.
- Underground production facilities could offer significant protection to key manufacturing processes.
- Possession of a knowledgeable and skilled work force was essential to recovery and to the maintenance of a country's status as a major international power.

Nevertheless, increased understanding of the effects of nuclear weapons, together with the fact that disruption of the enemy state's logistic base would be one of the primary tasks in a future war, complicated the Soviets' ability to apply these lessons to the nuclear age. 



3. We have little information on early post-World War II plans for economic protection. Although attention quickly refocused on preparations for leadership survival and continuity and some shelter construction resumed, we do not know to what extent the Soviets maintained or resumed plans for defending the indus-

trial base. Restoration of the relocated industries to the western USSR consumed considerable resources and effort, as did reconstruction in cities subject to German attack. Soviet capabilities for economic protection probably did not progress significantly during this period and may have been allowed to lapse for a time; some of the World War II underground production facilities reportedly were abandoned, although new construction also occurred. The organization of civil defense on a local or point defense basis may have inhibited the formulation of a comprehensive plan for protecting the economy from nuclear attack. At some point in the 1950s, however, the requirement for such a plan was apparently recognized, with the foundations of the program laid out in the 1961 Civil Defense Statute. 

4. The creation of civil defense staffs at all levels of the economic hierarchy facilitated the development of a combination of procedures to protect various economic installations and assets. These procedures are coordinated with the Second Departments and Directorates to ensure compatibility with economic mobilization plans for conversion to wartime requirements. The choice of procedures to be implemented is determined by the nature of economic activity and the civil defense category (installations of special importance, and first or second categories) to which an enterprise has been assigned. 

5. The array of measures discussed in Soviet literature for protecting the range of economic assets can be broken down into four categories:

- Protecting economic personnel.
- Ensuring a stable supply of raw materials and utility inputs.
- Protecting machinery and equipment.
- Implementing large-scale measures to limit damage to entire installations.

Our review of the evidence, 

suggests that the emphasis the Soviets have placed on each of these areas varies. The Soviets do not believe

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massive damage to the economy is avoidable, and peacetime economic considerations have interfered with the implementation of some parts of their program. Nonetheless, the tenacity with which the Soviets have pursued their wartime economic objectives and the nature and focus of those preparations we have been able to detect suggest that progress in this area is as serious, if not as tractable, as that in other areas of civil defense [redacted]

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Protection of Essential Personnel

6. The Soviets' plans for ensuring continuity of economic activity in wartime depend heavily on their ability to mobilize and protect essential personnel. Although we cannot confidently assess the composition or size of this group, preparations for its continued functioning are extensive and well developed. The group consists of both leaders and workers at a variety of economic installations—factories, institutes, service organizations, and administrative enterprises. [redacted]

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Economic Leadership

7. Economic managers compose a vital segment of the essential leadership. Such leaders at all levels—from national ministries to key installations—are provided with both urban and exurban command posts from which they can direct operations in all phases of a conflict. [redacted]

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8. The sophistication of facilities and communications provided for the economic leadership varies, depending on the level of leadership involved. [redacted]

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[redacted] We believe that the economic leadership would try to relocate before an attack [redacted]

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[redacted] It is apparent that the leaders of some ministries have more than one alternate command post available, so that with limited warning time they could transfer operations to a close-in site, proceeding to a more distant site if additional warning time were available. Ministerial entities also have access to the command post facilities of subordinate installations, further complicating our determination of the location and survivability of these elements. [redacted]

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Essential Work Force

9. Soviet writings distinguish between two major programs—evacuation and dispersal—for removing the population from likely target areas. Soviet plans

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[redacted] can be better understood, however, if viewed in the context of a three-tiered system of evacuation, relocation, and dispersal, which takes into account the purpose of moving the workers as well as the pattern of movement involved. [redacted]

10. Evacuation plans would be implemented for nonessential personnel—either workers at installations that would suspend operations if an attack were believed imminent, or workers not required at enterprises continuing basic operations. Soviet writings indicate that these workers would be resettled in the more distant areas of the exurban zone but generally within the oblast or equivalent administrative entity. [redacted]

[redacted] at least in the initial phases—most evacuees would be hosted 20 to 100 kilometers from their home cities. It is possible that some of these workers would be reassigned to other enterprises that are continuing operations during or after an attack, but we do not have extensive evidence of such plans. [redacted]

11. Relocation, although normally subsumed under the general term "evacuation," pertains to those workers who will transfer their work operations from the city to the exurban area. They would be resettled near existing or newly established facilities. Soviet manuals do not cite guidelines for relocating workers; however, [redacted] the majority would resettle 20 to 100 kilometers away. [redacted]

12. Dispersal plans exist for workers who would continue operations within the city. Designated installations would continue operations around the clock, with on-duty shifts afforded protection in shelters at

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
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the work sites and off-duty shifts dispersed to areas close to the city but outside the range of direct nuclear effects. Rotation of these shifts would continue as long as possible. To facilitate commuting, the dispersed work force is to be no more than four to five hours' round trip travel time from their work sites and no further than 5 km from railroad stations or highways.



Protection of Raw Materials and Utility Inputs

14. The leadership and essential workers receive priority in shelter construction and allocation. Soviet plans call for sufficient shelter capacity for one work shift at essential economic installations. A 1977 study




revealed that the Soviets could provide shelter, based on a minimum occupancy factor of 1 square meter per person, for at least one-quarter of the work force at these installations. Since not all personnel are considered essential to an installation's operation, the evidence suggests that the Soviets are adhering to the stated guidelines.



17. Soviet writings discuss the need to ensure the continued supply of inputs for the production process—namely strategic raw materials¹ and utility services. We have only limited information on these measures, however. We know that the Soviets have stockpiles of materiel in hardened urban facilities and

¹ Strategic raw materials are those raw materials that are critical to the functioning of the defense industries or of the overall Soviet economy. Such materials are probably stored in a refined state—for example, cobalt metal rather than cobalt ore. Particularly significant are those that must be imported.



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exurban storage areas—estimates of the quantity of selected raw materials stockpiled at installations range from one month's supply to (in a few instances) one year's. Equipment reserves may also exist in some cities in special subway-related facilities. Although our knowledge is limited, stockpiling has been a major precept of economic planning since the 1950s, and sizable protected reserves could exist. [redacted]

18. Soviet efforts to ensure a continued supply of utility inputs are concentrated along two lines: diversifying utility sources and burying utility lines. [redacted]

[redacted]

20. Despite extensive review in Soviet literature and numerous Western studies demonstrating that such measures can offer some protection against collateral damage, there are only a few reports on plans to protect individual equipment [redacted] may our findings lead us to believe these measures do not figure importantly in Soviet plans. [redacted]

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Macroprotection of Installations

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21. Measures to protect entire installations offer greater potential for the survival of wartime production capacity than the measures discussed above. [redacted] unclassified writings indicate that the Soviets have reviewed several options for protecting economic enterprises, including relocation, geographic dispersal in peacetime, and permanent hardening of facilities. Analysis of the application of these measures suggests that they have not proved equally practicable. [redacted]

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22. Economic relocation receives relatively little attention in Soviet civil defense manuals. We have compiled a data base on roughly 170 facilities [redacted]

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[redacted] Given the extensive and successful relocation of major industries to the Urals in World War II, we judge that the Soviets are serious in their intention to carry out their plans at these 170 installations. As indicated earlier, the list includes enterprises such as hospitals, institutes, and service organizations, all of which would be important to postattack recovery. Despite the difficulty of moving heavy equipment, however, our data base also includes over 40 industrial plants, many of which could produce war-related materiel [redacted]

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Micromeasures for Machinery and Equipment

19. The Soviets propose a variety of measures to protect machinery and equipment left in place. The work forces at many installations are divided into civil defense formations, some of which are trained to secure plant equipment. [redacted]

- **Rapid Shutdown of Equipment.** Many machines are more vulnerable during operation. Some production processes involve combustibles that could ignite during an attack. Disconnecting machinery from power sources also offers a measure of protection against electromagnetic pulse effects.
- **Hasty Hardening.** Methods to be employed include scattering wood chips, metal chips, or other production byproducts around equipment; erecting protective metal shields around sensitive machinery; and using sandbags to protect both equipment and buildings.
- **Limiting Secondary Damage.** Civilian units would be tasked with removing flammable material from production areas and burying combustibles or toxic substances. [redacted]

23. There is some question as to the feasibility of widespread industrial relocation under the typical scenario of a future East-West conflict. [redacted]

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[redacted] Soviet plans call for relocation and resumption of operations at new sites in one week. Although we believe this time frame is ambitious, it is still conceivable that plants could be moved, if not fully reestablished, within that period of time. If relocation occurred during or after military mobilization, however, competing demands on limited transportation assets could hinder this effort further. The experience gained in World War II and the priority likely to be accorded

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to these industries increases the likelihood of successfully implementing these plans. We have no evidence, however, of factories carrying out practical training in relocation procedures, which could expedite activity in the event of war. [Redacted]

24. The Soviets also have to consider that industrial relocation, like evacuation of the population, could be viewed as a strong indicator of a decision to escalate to strategic nuclear conflict, possibly triggering a preemptive strike by US nuclear forces. Since relocation requires a minimum of one week by the most optimistic standards, implementation of this measure could be self-defeating. The Soviets' actions would depend greatly on their assessment of our ability to detect their preparations and the political resolve of US leaders. The actual existence of these plans suggests that the Soviets may not perceive this as a serious problem, particularly if a prolonged conventional phase were to precede major nuclear strikes. [Redacted]

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25. Although geographic dispersal of facilities in peacetime is discussed widely in Soviet civil defense publications, it does not appear to have been implemented to a significant degree. On the contrary, new plants have been built adjacent to existing ones, while existing facilities have been expanded. Several factors probably have inhibited geographic dispersal:

- Expansion of existing production facilities is generally less expensive and faster than building new complexes.
- Some industries require highly skilled design and production engineers who are generally available only in established urban engineering centers.
- The existing transportation network is centered around major cities. [Redacted]

26. The relatively few cases of dispersal probably also can be attributed to peacetime considerations rather than civil defense. Some industries have been dispersed because of overcrowding in major urban areas, leaving no space for expansion; others because of a desire to bring production facilities closer to the source of raw materials. For example, plants manufacturing munitions are located at over 80 sites, each near the source of material supply. Similarly, fabrication and machining of projectile bodies is widely distributed among metalworking plants in the USSR. [Redacted]

27. The third method proposed in Soviet civil defense manuals for protection of industry is the application of permanent hardening techniques to industrial construction. These engineering measures involve spe-

cial construction materials and methods to harden aboveground structures, as well as construction of underground facilities suitable for manufacturing purposes. Our supporting evidence suggests the Soviets have turned to underground production facilities to protect some war-support and recovery-related industries. [Redacted]

28. Our understanding of the priority and scope of Soviet plans for underground production is limited by the longevity of the program (which obscures both the intent and extent of Soviet activities) [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The Soviets placed some defense industry underground during World War II and may have continued to use these facilities after the war. [Redacted] study,² reflecting information from World War II to 1953, lists reports of 71 production facilities, most of which could not then be confirmed by independent sources. The facilities reported included nearly every known variety of underground construction, including improved caves, galleries cut in rock, installations in shaft mines, multistoried underground buildings, bunkers or earth-covered buildings, and cellar and basement shops. The industries exploiting these facilities ran the gamut of defense production, from aircraft manufacturers to chemical plants. [Redacted]

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29. The repatriation of POWs sharply curtailed the amount of information available on Soviet activity after 1953. Some facilities were abandoned, and we do not know the extent to which new construction occurred. [Redacted]

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Nonetheless, [Redacted] several factors probably encouraged the Soviets to seriously examine the option of underground production:

- The threat of nuclear attack in the event of a major war.
- The example of German underground industrial construction during World War II and the experience of German technicians who were available to the USSR.
- Probable familiarity with the Swedish program for placing vital industry underground.

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- The presence of geologic formations suitable for such construction and accessible to existing transportation facilities.
- Increased safety for many production processes inherent in underground facilities.

The construction of underground plants in Eastern Bloc countries during the 1950s also suggests the Soviets were active in that period. [redacted]

30. Although we suspect that cost considerations prevented the Soviets from undertaking a massive effort to move industry underground, there is tentative

evidence to suggest that interest in underground facilities continued in the 1960s. In 1961 Marshal Sokolovskiy stated in his book *Military Strategy* that:

Ensuring the viability of industry, especially heavy and military industry, is a most important aspect of the preparation of industry for war. . . . The most important industrial enterprises should preferably be located underground in premises prepared beforehand for this purpose.³

³ From a 1971 Stanford Research Institute edition of the Sokolovskiy-edited book. [redacted]

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Outlook

35. Soviet efforts to protect the economy appear selective rather than comprehensive and focus on key elements of the economic infrastructure essential to war support and recovery. The Soviets have made considerable progress in preparations for protecting key workers and economic managers, and have had some success in developing protective measures for the following major industries: defense, machine building, chemicals, metals, energy, transportation, construction, and communications. They have been unable to implement all of the measures recommended by civil defense advocates, however, and appear to accept the fact that large-scale damage to the economy is unavoidable in nuclear war. [redacted]

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36. The Soviets have experienced difficulties in preparing the peacetime economy for the transition to a wartime footing, despite the extensive organizational mechanisms to facilitate the process. In this regard, the previously noted statements by former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Ogarkov plainly assert that mobilization plans for the military, the economy,

and civil defense are inadequately coordinated. The magnitude of the task confronting the bureaucracy—which experiences difficulties in peacetime planning—suggests these problems will not be resolved easily. [redacted]

37. As with other aspects of civil defense, the effectiveness of Soviet plans for protecting the economy will depend on the time available to implement those measures not already in place, as well as on the ability of the United States to detect and compensate for them. Previous analyses have concluded that the Soviets would not attempt to implement preattack measures such as evacuation or relocation unless convinced of a high probability of nuclear attack. The Soviets probably would wish to avoid economic disruption as well as the possibility of triggering a US preemptive strike. Nonetheless, the Soviets might try to carry out some measures covertly or incrementally to ease the strain of mass evacuation. Some aspects of evacuation also could be carried out covertly, to buy additional time. Successful implementation of these plans could provide some protection for key assets and would contribute to Soviet capabilities for protracted conflict and postattack recovery. [redacted]

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
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

struction of underground installations appear to offer the best chance of providing significant protection.

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
Damage to the Economy

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33. The Soviets' writings indicate a recognition that they cannot prevent large-scale damage to their economy in a nuclear war.



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Conclusions

39. The level of damage the Soviets would sustain in a nuclear war would depend greatly on the extent to which civil defense measures could be implemented. Full implementation of civil defense preparations would greatly reduce population losses and could prevent damage to a limited number of economic assets. Our earlier judgment—that the most critical decision to be made by Soviet leaders in terms of saving their population is whether to evacuate—was reconfirmed by the latest study. Statements by the Soviets about the reduction in strategic warning times caused by the modernization of US forces, therefore, may reflect serious concerns about the Soviets' ability to provide civil defense for the country as a whole.




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37. Of the civil defense measures designed to limit damage to economic installations, relocation and con-



40. The Soviets would probably sustain higher levels of damage in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Not only will US forces undergo modernization, but we expect our target intelligence base to expand over the coming years. Combined with the problems posed by an increasing population, these factors indicate that Soviet civil defense will require continued attention and investment in the next decade if the Soviets are to maintain the gains already achieved.



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CHAPTER VI

TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

1. Over a 10-year period of worsening economic trends and cooling East-West relations, the Soviets have maintained a consistent level of effort in those aspects of civil defense reviewed for this document. This contributes to our judgment that civil defense holds a relatively constant priority in Soviet planning and is viewed as a significant part of plans for homeland defense. The Soviets apparently recognize there is a margin of diminishing returns for each ruble invested in the program, and probably have chosen what they perceive to be an economically realistic level of effort that still provides key peacetime and wartime benefits. These include:

- Significant wartime protection for many key elements of their political, social, and economic structure.
- An improved mobilization posture—both civilian and economic—should war occur.
- A means of propagandizing Soviet citizens about the nature of the threat from the West.
- A legitimizing tool, demonstrating the government's concern for the citizenry.

2. Although the Soviets have not publicly cited their civil defense capabilities as adding to their deterrence posture, we judge that the program weighs significantly in their perception of the strategic balance. Soviet military writings explicitly recognize the program's contribution to both war-fighting and war-survival capabilities. The Soviets' traditional emphasis on layered defenses, their continued investment in and internal emphasis on civil defense, and their efforts to reinforce Western perceptions that civil defense is of limited value indicate their recognition that civil defense is part of the defensive equation. To the extent that civil defense plans are carried out successfully in wartime, they would be a factor in the correlation of forces during and after a conflict.

3. Soviet leaders, however, cannot be certain of the degree of protection civil defense would afford, at present or in the early 1990s. Our analysis of the evidence suggests the Soviets are not likely to be any more confident now than we assessed them to be in

1981 that they can carry out the full range of civil defense measures planned for the population and the economy. Moreover, although we have not detected any change in emphasis on the civil defense program in the aftermath of Soviet scientific speculation about the likelihood of a nuclear winter resulting from a major nuclear exchange, it must compound the uncertainties about prospects for postattack recovery raised by factors such as radioactive contamination, ultraviolet burning, and shortage of basic needs such as food.

4. We do not expect to see a major shift in the Soviets' emphasis on the program—either increased or decreased—barring a dramatic change in one of the superpowers' strategic capabilities and doctrine. The Soviets probably will maintain a fairly constant rate of investment in civil defense to consolidate the gains already attained, with attention to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of existing assets. We expect the Soviets to:

- Continue blast shelter construction at roughly current rates, with emphasis on shelters for essential personnel.
- Improve maintenance of existing shelters.
- Incorporate civil defense features into new subway construction.
- Construct additional but relatively limited numbers of new command posts as new requirements are generated.
- Continue to upgrade existing command post facilities and equipment.
- Maintain constant levels of military civil defense unit activity.
- Take additional steps to integrate civil defense into the military, including increasing cooperation with the military commissariats if the reorganization did not occur.
- Aim for improvements in rural civil defense capabilities.
- Try to redress the problems noted by Marshal Ogarkov in coordinating all aspects of mobilization planning.

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The Soviets also will continue to pay attention to such programs as medical preparedness and economic protection,

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[Redacted] but would expect additional changes when General Altunin eventually is replaced as its chief.

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7. Soviet civil defense also has implications for US war planning insofar as it helps increase wartime production. The Intelligence Community has not yet examined Soviet plans for economic mobilization and wartime production in depth, but measures such as relocating industries and constructing underground production facilities would have an impact on military production levels. The Soviets probably believe that additional stockpiles of military materiel could have an impact on the trans- and post-attack phases of a strategic conflict.

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8. A final politicomilitary implication and a little-explored problem from the intelligence point of view are the terms on which a potential nuclear war would be concluded. We cannot confidently forecast the factors that would determine the ultimate "victor" in a nuclear conflict, or the social, economic, or military position of the superpowers in a postattack world. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that those capabilities and assets Soviet civil defense is aimed at supporting and protecting would be foremost among the factors determining the political realities of a postnuclear era.

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
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ANNEX A
TEXT OF 1961 CIVIL DEFENSE STATUTE

Statute

Regarding the Civil Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Tasks of the Civil Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**Confirmed by resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU
and Council of Ministers of the USSR of 13 July 1961 No. 639-275**

1. The civil defense of the Union of SSRs is a system of national defensive measures undertaken in advance in peacetime with the aim of protecting the population and the national economy from missile-nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, and also for carrying out rescue and urgent emergency-reconstruction work at centers of devastation during the "Special Period."

The "Special Period" in the country is proclaimed by decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In the event of a sudden attack by the enemy, the civil defense plans are brought into effect immediately by decision of the Chiefs of Civil Defense of the Union Republics.

2. The main tasks of civil defense are:

- Universal compulsory training of the population of the country in methods of defense against missile-nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, and action for the elimination of the effects of the enemy attack;
- Carrying out measures for increasing the stability of work of industrial, power, transport, and communications enterprises during the "Special Period";
- Carrying out rescue and urgent emergency reconstruction work in centers of devastation and assisting the affected population;
- Carrying out measures to ensure the protection of animals, plants, provisions, unprocessed foods, water, and forage from bacteriological, radioactive, and chemical contamination, and also measures for eliminating the effects of contamination;

- Organization of a warning and communications system;
- Working out plans for the evacuation from large towns of organizations and institutions that are not essential for existence of these towns, and for the evacuation of the population incapable of work and children during the "Special Period," as well as carrying out other measures to ensure protection of the population;
- Creation and training of civil defense forces in towns, villages, and installations of the national economy.

3. The scope and time limits for carrying out civil defense measures in towns and other centers of population are determined by the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics in accordance with their administrative-political, economic, and defensive significance. For this purpose large administrative centers and large industrial cities are divided into cities of the Special, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd groups for civil defense, and the most important installations of the national economy into installations of special importance and the 1st and 2nd category.

The placing of cities into the above-mentioned groups is carried out by the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the recommendation of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics in coordination with the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR, and the State Planning Committee of the USSR.

The placing of installations of the national economy in categories is done by the Councils of Ministers



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of Union Republics, ministries and departments of the USSR in coordination with the Staff of the Civil Defense of the USSR.

Organizational Structure and Management of Civil Defense

4. General direction of the civil defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is exercised by the Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR, under whom there is a staff of civil defense of the Union of SSRs.

The most important questions concerning civil defense are studied by the Defense Council (*Soviet Oborony*) of the USSR.

The Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR is responsible for:

- Ensuring constant readiness of the forces and means of civil defense of the USSR for operations in the event of an enemy attack;
- Organization of control of civil defense;
- Organization of execution of combat training of the personnel of staffs, engineer-antichemical units, services, nonmilitary formations and institutions of civil defense, and also the rendering of assistance in the organization and execution of universal compulsory training of the population;
- Working out plans for the civil defense of the USSR and guiding scientific research work concerning questions of civil defense;
- Circulation of information regarding civil defense experience and the publication of directives, guides, instructions, the classified journal *Civil Defense of the USSR*, programs, and teaching aids.

The orders of the Chief of Civil Defense on questions of civil defense must be obeyed by all chiefs of civil defense, ministries, departments, councils of national economy, and organizations.

5. The direction of civil defense in the union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, towns, and rayons is executed by the appropriate chiefs of civil defense.

The chiefs of civil defense of union and autonomous republics are the chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the republics. The chiefs of civil defense of krays, oblasts, towns, and town and village rayons

are the chairmen of the executive committees of the Councils of Workers' Deputies.

The chairmen of the councils of national economy of economic administrative rayons are the deputies of the appropriate chiefs of civil defense for industry.

The chiefs of civil defense of enterprises, organizations, establishments, educational institutions, and railroad branches and stations are their managers; in workers settlements, village councils, as well as in kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises it is the chairmen of the executive committees of settlement and village councils, the chairmen of kolkhozes, the directors of sovkhozes, and of other agricultural enterprises.

The Councils of Ministers of Union and Autonomous Republics, the management personnel of ministries, departments, councils of national economy, and organizations, the executive committees of the Councils of Workers' Deputies and the chiefs of civil defense are responsible for carrying out measures for civil defense and for the constant readiness of the forces and means of civil defense for operations.

Civil defense staffs are formed under the chiefs of civil defense.

In addition to the authorized complement, workers from Party, soviet, Komsomol and other public organizations are enlisted for work in the staffs of civil defense by decisions of Party and soviet organs, without being released from their basic work.

6. The chiefs of civil defense of republics, krays, oblasts, towns, and rayons execute the management of civil defense directly through their civil defense staffs and services.

7. The chiefs of civil defense staffs are the deputies of the corresponding chiefs of civil defense. The chiefs of staff of civil defense of autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, towns, and town and village rayons are members of limited meetings (*suzhennoye zasedaniye*) of Councils of Ministers of ASSRs and of executive committees of Councils of Workers' Deputies.

8. For preparing and conducting work for the elimination of the effects of enemy attacks, civil defense services are created by decisions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Councils of Ministers of Union and Autonomous Republics, limited meetings of executive committees of Councils of Workers' Deputies and of managers of installations.

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The management of the civil defense services is executed by the managers of the corresponding ministries, departments, organizations, institutions, and enterprises on the basis of which these services are set up.

The missions and activities of the civil defense services are defined in the statutes pertaining to services.

The chiefs of civil defense of all grades, the chiefs of services, the directors of ministries, departments, councils of the national economy, and other organizations plan and organize preparation for civil defense in peacetime and work out plans for civil defense for the "Special Period."

Preparatory measures for the fulfillment of the plans of civil defense for the "Special Period" may be put into effect by preliminary orders of the chief of civil defense of the USSR.

The plans for civil defense are to be confirmed by the following:

- union republics, by the Councils of Ministers of Union Republics;
- autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, towns, and rayons, by limited meetings of the Councils of Ministers of Autonomous Republics and corresponding executive committees of Councils of Workers' Deputies;
- of ministries, departments, councils of the national economy and other organizations, and also installations of the national economy, by their managers in collaboration with the corresponding staffs of civil defense.

The plans of civil defense services are confirmed by the corresponding chiefs of civil defense.

9. The civil defense forces for the execution of the task of eliminating the effects of enemy attacks consist of military civil defense units (regular units and units formed for wartime), and also of the nonmilitary formations and institutions of civil defense.

The total number of servicemen in civil defense in peacetime and wartime is determined by the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The organizational structure and authorized number of personnel of civil defense staffs, command posts, engineer-antichemical units, communications centers, chemical laboratories, and educational institutions partially staffed with servicemen, and also by

workers and employees and supported by the budget of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, are determined by the chief of civil defense of the USSR within the limits of the total number for civil defense as determined by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and partially staffed with workers and employees supported by local republic budgets or departmental estimates, determined by the Councils of Ministers of union republics, the management personnel of executive committees, ministries, departments, and councils of the national economy.

10. The nonmilitary formations of civil defense are created and equipped by the management personnel of ministries, departments, councils of the national economy and organizations on the base of enterprises, establishments, educational institutions, sovkhozes, and kolkhozes.

USSR citizens who are not liable for military service by mobilization or who have draft exemptions are enlisted for compulsory service in nonmilitary formations and institutions of civil defense: women from 16 to 55 and men from 16 to 60 years of age.

Those exempted from service in nonmilitary formations and institutions of civil defense are: disabled workers and servicemen of the 1st and 2nd categories, pregnant women and women having children under 8 years of age (women with secondary and higher medical education with children up to 2 years of age).

11. For excellent fulfillment of measures of civil defense, citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics receive incentive on a general basis and, in addition, are awarded the chest insignia "Distinguished Worker of Civil Defense of the USSR" ("*Otlichnik grazhdanskoy oborony SSSR*").

12. The training of officer cadres for civil defense is undertaken in the educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. The training of supervisory personnel for civil defense is carried out at republic, kray, oblast, town, and departmental courses for civil defense, organized by decisions of the Councils of Ministers of Union Republics, executive committees of Councils of Workers' Deputies, ministries, departments, and councils of the national economy in coordination with the chief of civil defense of the USSR, and also at training centers (schools) of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with Army, Aviation, and Navy of the USSR.

The training of persons who carry out supervisory duties in civil defense without release from their basic

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work is conducted during free time, and also by means of musters involving release from production (not more than 12 days per annum) without loss of wages or average daily pay at their place of employment and with the payment of out-of-town per diem.

The training of personnel of nonmilitarized formations and civil defense institutions is carried out during free time and at short musters (totaling not more than 5 days per annum) with release from production and without loss of wages or average pay at their place of employment and with the payment of out-of-town traveling allowances.

The training of personnel attached to military civil defense units to be formed in wartime is carried out by summoning them to training musters in accordance with the law regarding universal military service.

In order to prepare staffs, units, services, and nonmilitary formations for operations, union republic, kray, oblast, town, rayon, and installation civil defense exercises, in which the population is also called to take part, are carried out.

Party-Political Work

13. The direction of Party-political work in institutions and nonmilitary formations of civil defense is carried out by the Central Committees of Communist Parties of union republics, kray committees, oblast committees, town committees and rayon committees of the Party, and in military civil defense units—by the political organs of the Soviet Army.

The main task of Party-political work in civil defense is to ensure successful fulfillment of all civil defense plans and measures both in peace and wartime.

14. Party organs and Party organizations are responsible for checking that civil defense measures are fulfilled by ministries, departments, soviet, and economic organs, establishments, and educational institutions.

Special Responsibilities of Ministries, Departments, and Organizations in Regard to Civil Defense

15. The Ministry of Defense of the USSR:

- (a) Assists the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics, councils of the national economy, ministries, and departments of the USSR

and public organizations in the carrying out of civil defense measures (in the center through the Ministry of Defense of the USSR; in the union and autonomous republics and locally—through military districts and commanders of garrisons);

- (b) Carries out mobilization work and accomplishes the disposition of staffs and engineer-antichemical units of civil defense in the "Special Period";
- (c) Conducts scientific-research, experimental-design, and testing work in the interests of creating new means and methods for protecting the population, for reducing possible losses and devastation, and to carry out rescue work;
- (d) Keeps the chiefs of civil defense of the Union of SSR's republics, krays, oblasts, and towns informed about the fulfillment of measures connected with bringing civil defense to combat readiness;
- (e) Summons the civil defense staffs to joint training exercises carried out with the Soviet Army;
- (f) Works out together with the State Planning Committee of the USSR the basic data for carrying out measures to reduce possible devastation and losses from weapons of mass destruction.

16. The Ministry of Communications of the USSR:

- (a) Develops and puts into effect measures that ensure the dependable functioning of the means of communication, warning, and radio-broadcasting of the country in peacetime and during the "Special Period";
- (b) Provides civil defense in peacetime and during the "Special Period" with communications, and during the "Special Period" organizes centralized use of all State and departmental means of communication;
- (c) Provides the organization of warning and communication services in republics, krays, oblasts, towns and rayons, and effects the management and supervision of their activities.

17. The Ministry of Health of the USSR:

- (a) Works out and puts into effect civil defense measures for the medical care of the popula-

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tion of the country under conditions of the use by the enemy of missile-nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons; and creates reserves of medical supplies and medicines;

- (b) Gives practical assistance to the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR in the work of organizing, training, and equipping of the mass nonmilitary formations of civil defense medical services; and to ministries and departments—it gives practical assistance in the training of medical personnel for civil defense from among persons studying the humanities at higher educational institutions and supervises the execution of this work;
- (c) Establishes a union medical service and checks on the organization and readiness of republic, kray, oblast, town, and rayon medical services;
- (d) Works out, together with interested ministries and departments, the norms and methods for carrying out examination of foodstuffs, raw materials, and water for contamination by toxic, radioactive and bacteriological substances in order to determine their suitability for consumption; it also prepares proposals regarding methods of decontamination.

18. The Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR:

- (a) Provides general direction of the measures carried out in the country for the protection of agricultural animals and plants and also products of plant-growing, animal husbandry, and sources of water supply in sovkhozes and kolkhozes from weapons of mass destruction;
- (b) Creates a union civil defense service for the protection of animals and plants and supervises the organization and constant readiness of such services in republics, krays, oblasts, towns, and rayons;
- (c) Creates reserves of biological preparations and the necessary materials for supplying the services, and determines the order of use of materials and biological preparations during the "Special Period";

NOTE: The directions (instructions) of the Ministry of Communications of the USSR regarding measures for ensuring dependable functioning of the means of communication, of the Ministry of Health of the USSR for ensuring the medical protection of the

population, and of the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR regarding the protection of animals and plants during the "Special Period" are compulsory for all ministries, departments, councils of the national economy and organizations.

19. The Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Maritime Fleet, the ministries and directorates of the river fleet and of water resources of union republics, and also ministries, departments, and councils of the national economy possessing railway and water transport:

- (a) Work out and put into effect measures ensuring the reliability of the working of transport and its installations during the "Special Period"; carry out transportation for civil defense in accordance with confirmed plans;
- (b) Ensure the carrying out of measures for giving warning of the danger of enemy attack to directorates, branches, and installations, steamship lines and railway, river and maritime transport services, military units and passengers; and likewise for the protection of people, provisions, unprocessed foods, forage, and sources of water supply from effects of weapons of mass destruction, and for medical processing of people and the decontamination of rolling stock, river transport, installations, and port structures.

The Ministry of Transportation forms a civil defense medical service for railway transport and creates reserves of medical, sanitary-technical, and sanitary-economic goods.

20. The State Procurement Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR:

- (a) Draws up plans for and organizes the dispersal of stocks of grain products in the country;
- (b) Provides general management of the carrying out in the country of measures for protecting State resources and reserves of grain and its processed products from weapons of mass destruction;
- (c) Works out means and methods for the decontamination, degassing, and disinfection of grain and its processed products and decides on the utilization or destruction of grain products which resist decontamination.

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21. The Chief Directorate of State Material Reserves of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Union of Consumer Cooperatives and the Ministries of Trade work out and organize the fulfillment of measures for the protection of foodstuffs, forage, and sources of water supply at their subordinate enterprises, bases, and depots against weapons of mass destruction; they carry out the dispersed storage of State reserves of foodstuffs and forage.

The Union of Consumer Cooperatives and the Ministries of Trade work out and effect civil defense measures to provide food supplies, drinking water, and articles of basic necessity to the evacuated and affected population, and also to the population brought in for the work of eliminating the effects of enemy attacks.

22. The Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education of the USSR, the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Vocational-Technical Education, the ministries of education of union republics, and other ministries and councils of the national economy which have educational institutions, organize in their subordinate educational institutions instruction of the students and pupils in matters of civil defense, and work out and publish training aids in accordance with the program of study.

23. The Ministry of Culture of the USSR:

- (a) Organizes the dissemination of information to the population regarding matters of defense against weapons of mass destruction;
- (b) Organizes and puts into effect measures for the protection of unique museum valuables that are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry.

24. The State Committee for Broadcasting and Television of the Council of Ministers of the USSR:

- Organizes over the radio and television the dissemination of information among the population regarding matters of protection against weapons of mass destruction;
- Organizes in conjunction with the Ministry of Communications of the USSR and the staff of civil defense of the USSR the preparation of means for broadcasting special civil defense programs and signals.

25. The Ministry for the Construction of Electric Power Stations, the ministries (directorates) of construction of union republics and the construction

directorates of councils of national economy organize the preparation and carrying out of engineer-rescue and emergency-reconstruction work at centers of devastation, and draw up manuals, instructions, and training aids on these questions.

The Ministry for the Construction of Electric Power Stations works out the basic data for the protection of the population and valuable materials in zones of possible inundation resulting from the destruction of hydroelectric stations.

26. The State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Coordination of Scientific-Research Work, the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Automation and Machine-building, the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Radio-electronics, the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Electronic Technology, and the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Aviation Technology ensure that the technical requirements of civil defense are incorporated in the design of new equipment and instruments.

27. The State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Chemistry works out in the interest of civil defense new means of antichemical defense and improves existing ones.

28. The Chief Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet of the Council of Ministers of the USSR:

- Ensures constant readiness of air transport for operations under conditions where weapons of mass destruction are used by the enemy;
- Provides transport facilities and aerial reconnaissance of centers of devastation in accordance with the confirmed plans for the civil defense.

29. The Chief Directorate of the Gas Industry of the Council of Ministers of the USSR ensures that the gas supply system works reliably in wartime and provides for emergency-reconstruction work on damaged gas-mains; it gives technical assistance to ministries, departments, and councils of the national economy in carrying out such work on oil pipelines and branches off of the gas-mains.

30. The Chief Directorate of the Hydrometeorological Service of the Council of Ministers of the USSR provides the civil defense staffs with information regarding radioactive contamination of the air, water, and ground, and also with data regarding the meteorological

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logical situation necessary for the direction of the work of civil defense.

31. Ministries, directorates, and divisions of the communal economy of union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, and town executive committees of Councils of Workers' Deputies:

- Work out and put into effect measures for the protection of water and town water supply structures from contamination by toxic and radioactive substances and bacteriological agents, to increase the reliability of operation of the town water supply, power, and other networks and structures of the communal economy, and carry out urgent emergency-reconstruction work;
- Work out measures for providing shelters for the population and organize their execution, and ensure that the municipal utility enterprise, structures, and equipment are prepared and utilized for the sanitary-processing of the population and for the decontamination of the terrain, structures, transport, and clothing;
- Organize corresponding republic, kray, oblast, and town services for water supply, for refugees, and shelters, gas supply, sanitary processing of the population and contamination of clothing, terrain, and structures, direct these services, and ensure their constant readiness.

32. The Ministries of Automobile Transport and Highways of union republics, and the chief directorates of automobile transport and highways of the Councils of Ministers of Union Republics:

- Ensure motor vehicle transport in accordance with the confirmed civil defense plans, organize and implement measures for the protection of passengers and for the decontamination of motor vehicle transport and freight;
- Work out and put into effect measures for adapting available construction and road equipment for civil defense purposes, for improving and increasing the carrying capacity of evacuation routes, and for the reconstruction of roads and road structures.

33. The Ministries of Internal Affairs of Union Republics work out and put into effect, with the introduction of the "Special Period," measures for the preservation of order and security, for the extinguishing of conflagrations; and for keeping track of losses

among the population; they also take part in the annihilation of enemy landings and diversionary groups.

34. The All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy of the USSR (DOSAAF USSR):

- Carries out universal compulsory training of the population in methods of protection against modern means of mass destruction, making extensive use for this purpose of the press, radio, television, movies, cultural, educational, and other institutions;
- Trains public instructors, common-supervisory and technical personnel for the nonmilitary formations and institutions of civil defense;
- Works out and publishes training programs, training and visual aids, and literature, and also orders films and slides from the ministries of culture on the subject of training the population.

35. The Union of Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent of the USSR:

- Carries out training of the population regarding giving first aid to casualties and caring for the sick;
- Organizes and carries out training of the personnel of the mass nonmilitary medical civil defense formations;
- Trains reserve nurses for civil defense purposes, and in conjunction with health organizations, also arranges for blood donors from among the population;
- Provides town and rayon sanitary teams with standard items.

36. Ministries, departments, councils of the national economy, and scientific institutions define and carry out scientific-research work concerning civil defense matters in coordination with, and on the instructions of, the staff of civil defense of the USSR.

Scientific-research and experimental-design work in civil defense subjects is carried out at the expense of the national budget based on the estimates of appropriate institutions.

The coordination of scientific-research work carried out by scientific-research institutes of ministries and departments concerning civil defense subjects,

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and supervision over the fulfillment of this work is effected by the staff of civil defense of the USSR.

Materiel-Technical Support and Financing of Civil Defense

37. The Councils of Ministers of Union Republics, ministries, and departments of the USSR plan the financing of civil defense measures annually, taking into account the necessary economy.

The Ministry of Finance of the USSR, in conjunction with the staff of civil defense of the USSR, examines the financial plans and prepares decisions regarding expenditures for civil defense measures.

38. The staff of civil defense of the USSR and its directly subordinate training establishments, institutions and sub-units, engineer-antichemical units, and special military sub-units, as well as the military personnel of all staffs, command posts, courses (training centers) and civil defense chemical laboratories are maintained on the union budget based on estimates of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR; they are provided with all types of materiel-technical support by the allocating organs of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.

39. The civil defense staffs and command posts of union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, towns, and rayons; chemical laboratories, and courses (training centers) of civil defense are maintained on the appropriate republic or local budgets.

40. The materiel-technical supply of special stores and military equipment to civil defense in union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, towns, rayons, ministries, departments, councils of the national economy, and organizations is effected through the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, with payment of the cost of the materiel allocated, while other types of stores and materiel resources are provided by Councils of Ministers of Union and Autonomous Republics, executive committees of local Councils of Workers' Deputies, ministries, departments, councils of the national economy, and organizations.

Funds for civil defense special stores and military equipment are allotted to the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in the established way and are distributed to the staffs of civil defense of the USSR at the request of union republics, ministries, and departments of the USSR.

The tasks of closing contracts with the factory-suppliers and the realization of funds for all types of

stores are given to the supply and collection organizations of the union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, towns, ministries, and departments of the USSR, councils of the national economy, and organizations.

41. The financing of civil defense measures, including the training and equipping of non-military formations and the training of the population, is effected in the following manner:

- In union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, towns, and other populated places—against republic or local budgets;
- At enterprises and in organizations which are on a self-supporting basis—from the funds available for general plant, administrative-management, and running expenses, and the distribution costs of these enterprises and organizations;
- In ministries, departments, councils of the national economy, and subordinate budgetary institutions and organizations—against the union or republic budgets.

42. Expenditures connected with the activation of civil defense plans are provided for in the estimates of directorates and divisions of executive committees of Councils of Workers' Deputies, installations, ministries, departments and councils of the national economy.

43. Military personnel of civil defense are on active military duty as cadres of the Soviet Army and in regard to length of service, pay, and materiel support enjoy all rights and privileges in accordance with the statutes and norms that are in effect in the Soviet Army.

44. Personnel of the civil defense militarized guard are provided with foodstuffs and clothing by the allocating organs of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, with the payment of their cost by republic or local budgets, depending on the subordination of the installation being guarded.

45. The complements of staffs, command posts, educational institutions and chemical laboratories of civil defense, as well as the estimates of their administrative-supply expenditures need not be recorded by financial organs. Expenditures for the maintenance of civil defense staffs and of their subordinate sub-units are provided for in separate estimates, disbursements from which can be made on the authority of the chiefs

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of the appropriate civil defense staffs and educational institutions.

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