

Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis

STAT

11 December 1989

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Dick,



If you haven't seen them already, the attached two cables from San Salvador are probably worth your reading.



STAT

John K. Allen, Jr.
Director

African and Latin American Analysis

Attachment

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
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FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

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INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4182

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS SAN SALVADOR 15833

USIA FOR AR, P/G

STATE FOR ARA/CEN, ARA/P, PA

E.O. 12356 N/A

BODY

TAGS: OPRC, SCOM, PGOV, PREL, US, ES

SUBJECT: THE AMERICAN MEDIA VIS-A-VIS EL SALVADOR

REF: A. HOWARD/DANCE, JACOBS/HOWARD TELCOMS OF 12/7/89,

- B. SAN SALVADOR 15596 (C)

- BACKGROUND

1. EVEN BEFORE THE CURRENT FMLN OFFENSIVE BEGAN ON NOVEMBER 11, EL SALVADOR AS A POLICY ISSUE OCCUPIED A UNIQUE POSITION IN THE AMERICAN PSYCHE. THOSE WHO SUPPORT U.S POLICY AND THE EFFORTS OF THE GOES TO BUILD A WORKING AND VIABLE DEMOCRACY, WHILE NUMEROUS ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN A BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL CONSENSUS, ARE RESTRAINED AND CAUTIOUS. THE PROBLEMS THAT STILL PLAGUE EL SALVADOR, AND THE MEMORY OF THE HORRORS THAT

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AFFLICTED THIS SMALL COUNTRY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DECADE, SERVE TO LIMIT ENTHUSIASM. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THOSE WHO OPPOSE THIS POLICY HAVE THE VEHEMENCE AND THE INTELLECTUAL CERTITUDE OF THE "TRUE BELIEVER." FOR THESE PEOPLE, SALVADOR IS NOT A POLITICAL PROBLEM, OR EVEN A SPECIFIC PARCEL OF POOR AND OVER-CROWDED REAL ESTATE; IT IS A MORALITY PLAY. ITS VILLAINS -- TOTAL AND UNREDEEMABLE -- ARE THE OLIGARCHY, THE MILITARY, AND THE CALLOUS AMERICAN BUREAUCRATS WHO SUPPORT THEM. ITS HEROES -- PURE AND UNBURDENED BY POLITICAL SELF-INTEREST -- ARE THE POOR AND NOBLE CAMPESINOS, IDEALISTIC CHURCH ACTIVISTS, OPPRESSED LABOR LEADERS, AND BRAVE FOREIGNERS WHO LABOR ON BEHALF OF THE DOWNTRODDEN. IT IS ONLY IN THE PAST YEAR THAT A SERIES OF BRUTAL ASSASSINATIONS -- OF MAYORS, POLITICANS, AND CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUALS -- HAS FINALLY STRIPPED THE FMLN OF ITS MYTHIC ROBIN HOOD IMAGE.

- (A) COVERAIE

2. THE COVERAGE OF THE WAR, PARTICULARLY BY THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC MEDIA WITH ITS DEMAND FOR GOOD "VISUALS," HAS INTENSIFIED THIS DISTORTION. THE WRITTEN MEDIA, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH PERMANENT SAN SALVADOR-BASED SPANISH SPEAKING REPRESENTATIVES, I.E, THE WASHINGTON POST, NEW YORK TIMES, MIAMI HERALD, NEWSWEEK, ETC., HAVE GENERALLY REPORTED THE WAR ACCURATELY, AND HAVE AT LEAST MADE AN HONEST ATTEMPT AT OBJECTIVITY.

3. THE MOST DISTORTED IMAGES HAVE COME FROM THE TELEVISION NETWORKS, WITH CNN THE MOST CONSPICUOUS (AND THE ONLY ONE WE ARE ABLE TO REGULARLY MONITOR) OFFENDER. THEIR COVERAGE, AS TYPICAL OF THE MEDIUM, TENDS TO REDUCE THE REALITY TO BLACK OR WHITE SIMPLICITY, WHILE LEAVING ALL THE GRAY AREAS ASIDE. THE VISUAL IMPACT OF COMBAT FOOTAGE AND IMPOVERISHED CAMPESINOS ALSO FOSTERS A LEBANON-LIKE IMAGE, WITHOUT COUNTERBALANCING IMAGES OF A THRIVING MIDDLE CLASS AND THE RAPID URBAN DEVELOPMENT THAT ILLUSTRATES THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SALVADORAN STORY.

- OUR REALITY

4. WHAT WE SEE HERE IN EL SALVADOR IS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, ELECTED WITH OVER 53 OF THE VOTE IN AN ELECTION JUDGED "FAIR AND FREE," THAT HAD JOINED WITH THE FMLN IN A PROCESS OF DIALOG (AND IN WHICH EACH SIDE HAD ASSURED THAT IT WOULD NOT UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW) TO ARRIVE AT A PEACEFUL -- BUT CONSTITUTIONALLY LEGITIMATE -- SOLUTION TO A BLOODY TEN-YEAR OLD INSURGENCY,

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STRUGGLING TO CONTAIN AN ARMED INCURSION INTO ITS CAPITAL CITY, AS WELL AS INTO SMALLER INTERIOR POPULATION CENTERS.

5. WE SEE AN FMLN, BLATANTLY SUPPLIED WITH SOVIET DESIGNED WEAPONS PROVIDED BY CUBA VIA NICARAGUA (AND IN VIOLATION OF SEVERAL CENTRAL AMERICAN AGREEMENTS), BRINGING BETWEEN TWO AND THREE THOUSAND HEAVILY ARMED COMBATANTS INTO SAN SALVADOR. WE SEE A SELF-PROCLAIMED MARXIST-LENINIST GROUP ATTACKING THE RESIDENCES OF PRESIDENT CRISTIANI -- ATTEMPTING TO MURDER HIM, HIS WIFE, AND CHILDREN, VIOLATING ITS OWN PROMISE BY WITHDRAWING FROM THE DIALOG PROCESS, USING HIGH-POWERED WEAPONS IN A DENSE URBAN ENVIRONMENT -- WITH ONE OF ITS FIRST VICTIMS A 26 YEAR OLD AMERICAN SCHOOL TEACHER, AND THEN PURPOSELY PLACING ITS COMBATANTS BEHIND A SHIELD OF UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 SAN SALVADOR 15833

USIA FOR AR, P/G
STATE FOR ARA/CEN, ARA/P, PA

E.O. 12356 N/A

TAGS: OPRC, SCOM, PGOV, PREL, US, ES

SUBJECT: THE AMERICAN MEDIA VIS-A-VIS EL SALVADOR

INNOCENT CIVILIANS, AND ALL THE WHILE BABBLING ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS.

6. MILITARILY, WE SEE A SALVADORAN MILITARY (ESAF) THAT HAS FOUGHT WELL, BUT HAS FAILED UNTIL RECENTLY TO GO STRONGLY ON THE OFFENSIVE. THE FMLN HAS NOT OVERRUN OR BADLY DAMAGED A SINGLE, RPT SINGLE, ESAF INSTALLATION, AND HAS SUFFERED CASUALTIES AT A RATIO OF 3:1. WE SEE A SALVADORAN AIR FORCE (FAES) THAT HAS GENERALLY RESTRAINED ITS USE OF AERIAL FIREPOWER AND THAT HAS NOT -- SO FAR -- LOST A SINGLE AIRCRAFT TO THE SOVIET SA-7'S INTRODUCED BY NICARAGUA (BUT HAS LOST THREE AIRCRAFT TO CONVENTIONAL GROUNDFIRE).

7. WE NOW SEE VIA RECENT INFORMATION, AN FMLN THAT PLANNED THIS AS ITS (SECOND) FINAL OFFENSIVE, AND BASED THIS EXPECTATION ON A POPULAR UPRISING THAT DID NOT HAPPEN. WE SEE AN FMLN THAT HAS TAKEN SERIOUS CASUALTIES, AND IS TRYING TO REPLACE TRHESE LOSSES BY KIDNAPPING CHILDREN AND OTHER CIVILIANS, THAT HAS NOT ONLY USED OR LOST AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS, BUT IN ITS PUSH FOR A FINAL VICTORY HAS UNMASKED A CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED NETWORK OF SO-CALLED POPULAR AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, SAFEHOUSES, ETC.

- THE DISTORTION

8. THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA, AND A CASUAL READING OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS, PRESENTS AN IMAGE OF EL SALVADOR AS

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LEBANON, THAT IS, OF A NATIONESO FRACTURED AND VIOLENT THAT, AT BEST, THERE IS A MORAL EQUIVALENCY BETWEEN THE FMLN AND THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOES IS NOT PORTRAYED AS DEFENDING ITSELF AND ITS POPULATION FROM ATTACK; IT IS PORTRAYED INSTEAD AS THE UNPROVOKED INITIATORS OF REPRESSIVE, VICIOUS ASSAULTS ON ITS CITIZENS. IT IS NOT RESPONDING TO (PERHAPS IMAGINED OR EXAGGERATED BUT NEVERTHELESS FRIGHTENING) REPORTS OF "INTERNACIONALISTAS" FIGHTING WITH AND SUPPORTING THE FMLN, BUT RATHER LAUNCHING A DIABOLICAL ASSAULT ON CHURCH AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS. AT TIMES, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO KNOW FROM THE MEDIA COVERAGE THAT THE FMLN IS EVEN A PARTY TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. IMAGES OF REFUGEES, DAMAGED BUILDINGS, DEAD SOLDIERS, ETC. ARE OFFERED AS THOUGH THEY EXIST INDEPENDENT OF THE GUERRILLA'S ATTACK ON POPULATION CENTERS.

9. IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT SOME OF THE BLAME FOR THESE DISTORTIONS RESTS WITH THE GOES ITSELF. ITS OWN INFORMATION EFFORTS WERE LATE IN STARTING, HEAVY HANDED, AND FREQUENTLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. ITS OWN SUSPICIONS AND DISTRUST OF THE INTERNATIONAL, AND EVEN ITS OWN, PRESS HAVE MADE RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA PRICKLY. ITS REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD ARE FREQUENTLY OUTGUNNED AND OUTMANNED BY THE OPPOSITION. PRESIDENT CRISTIANI SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED, AND PERHAPS WILL INCLUDE, REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES IN HIS DECISION MAKING APPARATUS. THE DECISION TO FUNNEL ALL INFORMATION THROUGH A "NATIONAL INFORMATION CENTER" WAS ILL-ADVISED AT BEST, AND GAVE A FREE PLAY TO THE FMLN'S EFFECTIVE "RADIO VENCEREMOS," AS WELL AS TO THE EXAGGERATION AND DISTORTION OF RUMOR AND GOSSIP THAT HAACAUSED CONSIDERABLE DISCOMFORT, AT TIMES APPROACHING PANIC, AMONG THE GENERAL POPULACE.

(B) THE POST, THE AGENCY, AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS

10. THE OBVIOUS ANTIDOTE TO THE ABOVE IS INFORMATION. USIS HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE REST OF THE MISSION, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY WITH AMBASSADOR WALKER, TO BRIEF THE PRESS ALMOST DAILY. SOMETIMES THIS HAS BEEN IN OPEN PRESS CONFERENCES, OTHER TIMES ON BACKGROUND, AND ALMOST CONSTANT ONE-ON-ONES WITH JOURNALISTS IN PERSON OR ON THE TELEPHONE. WE ARE USING THE MATERIAL PROVIDED BY WASHINGTON, I.E., WIRELESS FILE, WORLDNET, STATE DEPARTMET BRIEFINGS, AS WELL ASHBUR OWN SELF-GENERATED PRODUCTS. WE ARE ALSO WORKING WITH OUR SALVADORAN COUNTERPARTS; CLOSELY WITH THE MILITARY SPOKESMAN (COPREFA), LESS SUCCESSFULLY WITH MAURICIO SANDOVAL, THE CIVILIAN NATIONAL SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION. A SALVADORAN OFFICER, CAPT. SALVADOR GIRALT, WHO RETURNED LAST WEEK AFTER PARTICIPATING IN THE AGENCY'S IV MRP "AMERICAN BROADCAST MEDIA," HAS JUST BEEN ASSIGNED (AT

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EMBASSY SUGGESTION) TO COPREFA AND IS NOW ITS DEPUTY SPOKESMAN. HE WILL FILL A VITAL NEED AS THE ONLY GOES INFORMATION OFFICIAL, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY, ABLE TO BRIEF THE PRESS IN ENGLISH.

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 SAN SALVADOR 15833

USIA FOR AR, P/G
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TAGS: OPRC, SCOM, PGOV, PREL, US, ES

SUBJECT: THE AMERICAN MEDIA VIS-A-VIS EL SALVADOR

11. THE AGENCY HAS PROVIDED GOOD SUPPORT. WE CAN USE WF ARTICLES, OFFICIAL TEXTS, WORLDNETS, ETC. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SALVADORAN PUBLIC, THE ESAF, AND EVEN THE FMLN, NOT DOUBT AMERICAN CONSTANCY AND OUR COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF DEMOCRACY.

12. IT WOULD BE OF ENORMOUS IMPORT IF THE DEPARTMENT AND/OR USIA CAN INTEREST SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AS FREEDOM HOUSE AND THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE IN PREPARING REPORTS AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION.

13. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE GOES HAD PROFESSIONAL HELP IN SETTING-UP A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFICIENT PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM. ONE POSSIBILITY WE SUGGEST, WITHOUT HAVING VETTED IT WITH THE GOES ITSELF, WOULD BE FOR A FLUENT SPANISH SPEAKING RETIRED AGENCY OFFICER TO COME TO SAN SALVADOR TO WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT AS AN ADVISOR. THIS IS A SUGGESTION; WE DO NOT KNOW HOW THIS WOULD BE FUNDED, WE DO KNOW THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A REAL DISTANCE BETWEEN THIS ADVISOR AND THE EMBASSY ITSELF.

- (C) THE BOOMERANG EFFECT

14. THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON POST, THE MIAMI HERALD, AND THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ARE FOR SALE IN EL SALVADOR THE DAY AFTER PUBLICATION, AS ARE THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINES. CNN IS BROADCAST VIA TWO PRIVATE "CABLE" (ACTUALLY UHF BROADCAST DISTRIBUTION) COMPANIES, AND LOCAL TELEVISION CHANNEL 12 WAS, AND HAS RESUMED, BROADCASTING A SPANISH SUBTITLED HALF-HOUR OF THE CBS NIGHTLY NEWS WITH DAN RATHER.

15. THE EFFECT OF THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN, AS WE SEE IT, TWOFOLD. FIRST, WHEN THE GOES CLUMSILY BLANKED OUT CNN, AS WELL AS TEMPORARILY CENSORING THE LOCAL NEWSCASTS ON TELEVISION AND RADIO, THE FEELING AMONG THE LOCAL POPULATION, AND PARTICULARLY THE UPPER CLASSES, WAS THAT "THE SITUATION MUST BE WORSE THAN WE ARE BEING

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TOLD, OR WHY ELSE WOULD THE GOVERNMENT BE CUTTING OFF THIS OUTSIDE NEWS?"

16. SECOND, FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ACCESS TO OUTSIDE MEDIA, THERE IS A FEELING THAT THE "WHOLE WORLD IS AGAINST US", AND PARTICULARLY THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. THIS HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SOMETIMES UNPRODUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOES AND THE PRESS, BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN. WE, THAT IS THE MISSION AND PARTICULARLY USIS, THE CONSULAR SECTION, AND AMBASSADOR WALKER, SPEND TIME WE DO NOT HAVE GETTING JOURNALISTS RELEASED BY MILITARY UNITS, INTERVENING WITH THE SECURITY FORCES, ETC. BEYOND THE ILL WILL GENERATED AND THE TIME LOST, THESE IRRITATIONS AND HARASSMENTS TEND TO SHIFT MANY OF THE JOURNALISTS' FOCUS FROM THE ACTIONS OF THE FMLN AND ITS MILITARY OFFENSIVE, TOWARDS ISOLATED, CLUMSILY HANDLED INCIDENTS OF HARASSMENTS THAT INEVITABLY EVOKE DARK REMINDERS OF EARLY-80'S SALVADOR. THESE INCIDENTS OF HARASSMENT OR WORSE SHOULD NOT GO UNREPORTED OR UNREDRESSED, BUT IN MOST CASES THERE IS FAR MORE SMOKE THAN FIRE. IT IS OUR CHALLENGE, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY THE CHALLENGE OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT, TO KEEP THE FOCUS ON THE MAIN STORY:

- I.E., AN ELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY FIGHTING
- TO BEAT OFF AN ASSAULT DESIGNED TO TOPPLE IT BY
- MARXIST GUERRILLAS. JACOBS

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END OF MESSAGE

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
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RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
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CONTROLS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SAN SALVADOR 15831

CITE: (U) 0361

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 829 0361 90.

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) EL SALVADOR (ES).

SUBJ: IIR 6 829 0361 90/LESSONS LEARNED FROM RECENT

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FMLN OFFENSIVE (PART 2) - WHAT REALLY HAPPENED, AND WHAT DOES IT MEAN?/(111)(U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED U N C L A S S I F I E D.

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE -

DOI: (U) 891111-30.

REQS: (U) D-AH5-1100-14; K-DC4-00064.

SOURCES: (U) MEMBER USDAO SAN SALVADOR.

SUMMARY: (U) THIS REPORT IS THE SECOND IN A SERIES OF "LESSONS LEARNED" FROM THE RECENT FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) OFFENSIVE.

TEXT: 1. (U) INTRODUCTORY RO COMMENT. THE FIRST REPORT IN THIS SERIES (CITE IIR 6 829 0328) WAS AN EARLY LOOK AT LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE RECENT FMLN OFFENSIVE. THIS REPORT CONTAINS MORE OF THE SAME, WITH MORE ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY NOT YET FULLY DEVELOPED WHEN THE CITED IIR WAS WRITTEN. BECAUSE ALL THE INFORMATION WAS GIVEN DIRECTLY TO RO, OR OBTAINED THROUGH OBSERVATIONS OF RO, THE SOURCE IS GIVEN AS "MEMBER DAO". WHERE IT IS USEFUL TO QUOTE OR IDENTIFY THE DIRECT SOURCE OF INFORMATION, THIS IS DONE IN THE TEXT. RO CONCLUSIONS OR OPINIONS, AS OPPOSED TO INFORMATION COLLECTED BY RO, ARE SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED THROUGHOUT THE REPORT. THE BASIC ISSUES THE REPORT ADDRESSES ARE--

--WHAT WERE THE FMLN'S GOALS?

--TO WHAT EXTENT WERE THE GOALS ACCOMPLISHED?

--WHAT ARE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE FMLN NOW?

--HOW CAN THE GOES/ESAF TEAM COUNTER THOSE CAPABILITIES?

--WHAT DID THE OFFENSIVE MEAN TO THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF THE WAR?

PROBABLY FALL INTO 3 CATEGORIES - THE OBVIOUS ONES THAT CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FMLN BATTLEFIELD MANEUVER; THE "ADVERTISED" ONES THAT ARE TAKEN FROM FMLN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, PRISONER AND DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION, AND INFORMATION PASSED TO CIVILIANS IN CONFLICTIVE AREAS; AND THE HIDDEN AGENDA KNOWN ONLY TO THE FMLN HIGH COMMAND AND ITS SPONSORS. THE OBVIOUS GOALS, ACCORDING

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TO RO'S SOURCES, INCLUDE--

--INFLECT A SERIES OF MILITARY DEFEATS AGAINST PURE MILITARY TARGETS, SUCH AS THE 1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE (1ST BDE) HEADQUARTERS, THE SALVADORAN AIR FORCE (FAES) BASE AT ILOPANGO, THE 3RD BDE HEADQUARTERS, ETC.

--SCORE PSYCHOLOGICAL OR "SYMBOLIC" VICTORIES, SUCH AS WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY SEIZING ENTIRE NEIGHBORHOODS AND HIGH VALUE ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL TARGETS.

--DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FMLN REMAINS A STRONG MILITARY FORCE, A FORCE TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

THE ADVERTISED GOALS INCLUDED--

--SPARK A POPULAR INSURRECTION

--FORCE THE GOES TO RETURN TO THE DIALOGUE ON TERMS MORE FAVORABLE TO THE FMLN, SINCE THE FMLN WOULD HAVE A STRONGER POSITION

--DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FMLN IS STILL A VIABLE FIGHTING FORCE

THE HIDDEN AGENDA IS NOT KNOWN. OTHER SOURCES AND ANALYSIS OF FMLN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS MAY REVEAL OTHER OBJECTIVES, BUT THESE BROAD STROKES, IN RO'S OPINION, REPRESENT THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES.

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

3. (U) TO WHAT EXTENT WERE GOALS ACCOMPLISHED? THE FMLN FAILED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS PURELY MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF DEFEATING ESAF AND CUSEP FORCES. ALTHOUGH GUERRILLAS TOOK GROUND AND INFLECTED CASUALTIES, THEY FAILED TO INFLECT ANY MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT DEFEATS OR SEIZE ANY KEY MILITARY TARGETS. MORALE IN MOST ESAF UNITS IN COMBAT ROSE DESPITE HEAVY CASUALTIES, AND THE FMLN SUSTAINED FRIGHTFUL LOSSES IN TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT. THE FMLN ACHIEVED PARTIAL SUCCESS IN ITS GOALS TO SCORE PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORIES. GUERRILLAS SEIZED AND HELD SEVERAL AREAS OF TERRAIN WHICH GOT THEM MAJOR LEAGUE ATTENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA. AS GUERRILLAS WERE DRIVEN FROM THE AREAS BY COORDINATED ESAF COUNTERATTACKS, PART OF THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUND WAS LOST. MUCH OF IT WAS REGAINED, HOWEVER, BY 2 SMALL UNIT ACTIONS WHICH RECEIVED WIDE-SPREAD PUBLICITY - THE SEIZURE OF THE SHERATON HOTEL AND THE OCCUPATION OF SEVERAL PRIVATE HOMES IN THE SAN SALVADOR SUBURB OF ESCALON. EVIDENCE THAT THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORIES WERE SCORED CAN BE SUMMED UP THROUGH SEVERAL SOURCES--

--"THAT INCIDENT IN ESACLON JUST GOES TO SHOW YOU HOW A

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HANDFUL OF GUERRILLAS CAN TERRORIZE AN ENTIRE AREA."
(SOURCE IS U.S. FIELD GRADE OFFICER)

--A MAJOR ARTICLE IN THE NOVEMBER 27, 1989 "US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT" CALLED THE OFFENSIVE A "MISFIRE", IN WHICH THE FMLN "GAMBLED BIG...AND SEEMINGLY LOST." THE ARTICLE ALSO STATED THAT THE GUERRILLAS "MISCALCULATED" IF THEY THOUGHT THE OFFENSIVE WOULD "UNDERMINE THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT ALFREDO CRISTIANI AND EXPLODE IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S FACE." THE ARTICLE CONCLUDED THAT "IF, AS THE REBELS SAID, THEIR AIM WAS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION, THEN THE STRATEGY BACKFIRED." ONE WEEK LATER (DECEMBER 4, 1989 ISSUE), THE SAME MAGAZINE FEATURED AN ARTICLE WHICH CALLED EL SALVADOR "BUSH'S CENTRAL AMERICAN ALBATROSS", STATED THAT THE CURRENT ROUND OF FIGHTING "LEFT CRISTIANI WEAKER," AND FURTHER STATED THAT THE U.S. "MAY BE FORCED...TO PRESSURE ARENA TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GUERRILLAS." THE ARTICLE RAISED AN UGLY SPECTER THAT IT WAS PRACTICALLY FORBIDDEN TO DISCUSS IN MANY WASHINGTON CIRCLES A YEAR AGO BY SPECULATING, "THE BEST THE U.S. MAY BE ABLE TO HOPE FOR IS A MILITARY STALEMATE."

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--ON 891130, MOST FAMILY MEMBERS OF U.S. MISSION PERSONNEL IN EL SALVADOR WERE REMOVED FROM THE COUNTRY IN WHAT WAS TERMED "VOLUNTARY EVACUATION".

~~TWO INCIDENTS WHICH HAD NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
WHATEVER INELICTED WHAT MAY ULTIMATELY BE PERCEIVED AS A
SMASHING FMLN MORAL VICTORY. A WEEK AFTER THE "BATTLE OF
SAN SALVADOR" WAS WON BY THE ESAF. THE POPULAR
INSURRECTION FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. WHAT FEW CIVILIAN
NONCOMBATANTS HELPED GUERRILLAS DID SO, IN MOST CASES,
AT GUNPOINT. POPULAR SUPPORT, IN FACT, PROBABLY
DECREASED, ACCORDING TO MANY WORKING CLASS SOURCES.
SOME OF RO'S SOURCES STATE (AND RO CONCURS) THAT THE TOP
FMLN LEADERSHIP COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE BELIEVED THE
SUPPORT BASE EXISTED TO SPARK AN INSURRECTION. THE
EVIDENCE OF FAILURE, AT ANY RATE, IS ABSOLUTELY
CONCLUSIVE. THE FMLN REMAINS A VIABLE FIGHTING FORCE.
THAT FORCE IS NOT, HOWEVER, CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE
ESAF, EXPANDING THROUGH A MASS OF "ENLISTMENTS" VIA THE
POPULAR INSURRECTION, OR SUSTAINING ITSELF IN HEAVY
COMBAT FOR MORE THAN A FEW DAYS. THE FORCE REMAINS
VIABLE AFTER THIS OFFENSIVE, IN RO'S OPINION, ONLY
BECAUSE THE ESAF (FOR WHATEVER REASON) PASSED UP THE
CHANCE TO CRUSH IT ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE JURY IS
STILL OUT AS TO WHETHER THE FMLN HAS A STRONGER
BARGAINING POSITION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. PART OF
THAT QUESTION WILL BE ANSWERED BY OBSERVING GOES
RESOLVE. PART OF IT WILL BE ANSWERED BY OBSERVING U.S.
(THAT IS, EL SALVADOR'S MAJOR ALLY'S) RESOLVE. IF THE
U.S. APPLIES PRESSURE TO FORCE THE GOES TO RETURN TO THE~~

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DIALOGUE PROCESS OFFERING ANY CONCESSIONS TO THE FMLN NOT PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED (OR AGAINST THE GOES' DESIRE), RO WOULD JUDGE THE FMLN PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY OVER THE U.S. A 100 PERCENT SUCCESS.

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

4. (U) WHAT ARE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE FMLN NOW? SOURCES' OPINIONS VARY, BUT SOME CREDIBLE, EXPERIENCED "EL SALVADOR WATCHERS" BELIEVE THE FMLN HAS TAKEN SUCH A MILITARY BEATING, AND SUSTAINED SO MANY CASUALTIES AND MATERIAL LOSSES, THAT IT WILL BE OUT OF MAJOR ACTION FOR THE NEAR TERM. SOME OF THESE SOURCES DO NOT BELIEVE THE FMLN HAS MAJOR "RESERVES" TO COMMIT TO ANOTHER LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE. RO CONCURS THAT THE FMLN HAS (AGAIN) BEEN THRASHED, BUT WARNS AGAINST COUNTING THEM OUT MILITARILY FOR 2 REASONS. FIRST, THE HIGH COMMAND AND SOME TOUGH FIELD COMMANDERS ARE STILL ALIVE. HISTORICALLY, CAPABLE INSURGENT LEADERS WIN OR DIE. UNTIL THE TOP LEADERSHIP IS KILLED, THE TOP LEADERS WILL KEEP TRYING TO WIN. SECOND, THE FMLN HAS REPEATEDLY SHOWED ITS WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT WITH CHILD WARRIORS. AS LONG AS THE TOP LEADERSHIP LIVES, IT CAN FIND AN ALMOST INEXHAUSTABLE SUPPLY OF YOUNG KIDNAP VICTIMS TO FILL ITS DEPLETED RANKS. RO FIRMLY (MORE FIRMLY THAN EVER, AFTER THIS OFFENSIVE) BELIEVES THAT ESAF TACTICAL UNITS ARE CAPABLE OF OUTFIGHTING THE FMLN TACTICAL UNITS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE FMLN MILITARY CAPABILITIES CAN BE WRITTEN OFF. FMLN CURRENT POLITICAL CAPABILITIES ARE NOT QUANTIFIABLE, AT THIS STAGE OF THE POST-OFFENSIVE PERIOD, IN RO'S OPINION. IT IS SIMPLY TOO SOON TO TELL HOW MUCH POLITICAL CLOUT THE PARTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY HAS GIVEN THE FMLN LEADERSHIP, AS OPPOSED TO HOW MUCH THE FMLN MAY HAVE BEEN WEAKENED POLITICALLY BY THE MILITARY BEATING IT TOOK.

5. (U) WHAT ARE THE CURRENT FMLN CAPABILITIES? IN BROAD TERMS, RO BELIEVES THE FMLN HAS THE CAPABILITY TO GO BACK ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE, PERSUADE THE GOES TO RETURN TO THE DIALOGUE TABLE, THEN USE THE DIALOGUE PROCESS (ONCE AGAIN) TO REARM, RECRUIT, RETRAIN, AND REST. THE FMLN CAN CONTINUE GUERRILLA ACTIONS AS IT HAS DONE IN THE PAST. BY MASSING ITS SURVIVING FIGHTERS (ASSUMING SUFFICIENT ARMS AND AMMUNITION REMAINING) THE FMLN COULD LAUNCH A SECOND ROUND OF ATTACKS, EITHER IN THE CAPITAL OR THE FIELD. RO DOES NOT BELIEVE THE FMLN CAN DUPLICATE ITS PREVIOUS ALL-OUT EFFORT WITHOUT REINFORCEMENTS NOT YET SEEN IN ITS ORDER OF BATTLE.

6. (U) HOW CAN THE GOES/ESAF COUNTER THESE CAPABILITIES? A NUMBER OF SOURCES BELIEVE THE ESAF MUST "GO ON THE OFFENSIVE" NOW TO EXPLOIT THE SUCCESS IT HAD IN PREVENTING FMLN MILITARY VICTORIES. AT LEAST ONE MILITARY LEADER ADVOCATED "GOING AFTER THE LEADERSHIP",

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WHICH WAS INTERPRETED AS "ATTACKING COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS". RO HAS HAD A STEADY STREAM OF ESAF SOURCES STATING FOR A YEAR AND A HALF THAT THE WAY TO WIN THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE WAR IS TO DESTROY THE FMLN LEADERSHIP. JUNIOR OFFICERS ARE MORE SPECIFIC. THEY SIMPLY SAY THAT THE TOP LEADERS MUST BE KILLED. ESAF SOURCES (FIELD SOLDIERS) ARE INEVITABLY EXCITED AND ENCOURAGED BY THE DEATHS OF FMLN PLATOON-LEVEL LEADERS. THOSE ARE IMPORTANT LOSSES, BUT RANDOMLY KILLING PLATOON COMMANDERS WILL NOT REDUCE THE FMLN'S LEADERSHIP CAPABILITY. TO CRIPPLE THE FMLN, IT'S NECESSARY TO KILL ENOUGH OF THE TOP LEADERS (JOAQUIN ((VILLALOBOS)) HAS TO GO, FOR INSTANCE), TO DERAIL THE VERY AGILE, VERSATILE LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATION THAT HAS ADAPTED SO WELL TO CHANGING FORTUNES AND CIRCUMSTANCES THROUGHOUT THE WAR. THE MOST EXPERIENCED, DEDICATED FIELD LEADERS WHO KEEP THE FIGHTERS GOING (AND KEEP THE RECRUITING AND TRAINING PROJECTS ALIVE) HAVE TO DIE, AS WELL. AT THE ESAF BATTALION LEVEL DOWN, RO SEES THE WILL TO GO INTO THE MOST CONFLICTIVE ZONES, HUNT THE FMLN DOWN, AND CLOSE WITH THE ENEMY REPEATEDLY. AT THE HIGHER LEVELS OF DECISIONMAKING, RO HAS HEARD A LOT OF CONVERSATION ABOUT "GOING AFTER THE LEADERS", BUT HAS NOT YET SEEN A DEDICATED EFFORT TO REALLY GET THEM. ON THE CONTRARY, THE ONLY TIME RO HAS EVER SEEN A TOP FMLN LEADER, SUCH AS VILLALOBOS, THE LEADER HAS BEEN TALKING PUBLICLY WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOES. IF THE RECENT OFFENSIVE HAS TAUGHT ANYTHING, IT HAS REINFORCED THE LESSON THAT THE KEY TO PUTTING DOWN AN INSURGENCY IS TO PUT DOWN THE LEADERSHIP. THE FMLN HAS, RO BELIEVES, 2 OTHER KEY VULNERABILITIES, BOTH OF WHICH RELATE TO SUPPLIES. A FULL-COURT PRESS TO CUT THE LOGISTICS FLOW TO FMLN FIGHTERS COULD RESULT IN A MAJOR BODY BLOW TO THE ORGANIZATION. RO HAS SEEN DOZENS OF ATTEMPTS AND HEARD

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

HOURS OF CONVERSATION ABOUT STOPPING THE LOGISTICS. RO CAN COUNT THE SUCCESSFUL INTERDICTIONS OF THE PAST 18 MONTHS, HOWEVER, ON THE FINGERS OF 1 HAND--

--THE MAJOR SEIZURE OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION IN SAN SALVADOR (GOOD POLICE WORK)

--THE SEIZURE OF A TRUCK LOAD OF WEAPONS IN HONDURAS (GOOD WORK IN HONDURAS)

--THE SEIZURE OF ANTI-AIR WEAPONS FROM A PLANE WHICH CRASHED IN USULUTAN (LUCKY ACCIDENT)

--THE SEIZURE OF 750 POUNDS OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES IN THE SOUTHERN ANGELA MONTANO 891031 (GOOD PATROL ACTION, BUT LUCKY BREAK HITTING THAT TARGET)

THESE FEW SUCCESSES, WHILE SPECTACULAR IN TERMS OF

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VOLUME OR POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT POLITICALLY, WILL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE FMLN'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN ITSELF OVER THE LONG HAUL. THE OTHER VULNERABILITY IS THE RECRUITING PIPELINE OF DEDICATED FIGHTERS. THE FMLN CAN KIDNAP AN ENDLESS SUPPLY OF 10-YEAR-OLDS, SOME OF WHOM WILL FIGHT AND SOME OF WHOM WILL FLEE. ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE WILL SURVIVE TO BECOME TOP-LINE GUERRILLAS. A HARD CAMPAIGN TO ENCOURAGE MORE DESERTIONS MIGHT WEAKEN THE OVERALL FIGHTING STRENGTH OF THE FMLN. THE BEST WEAPON IN THE ARSENAL FOR THE FIGHT, HOWEVER, IS TO CRUSH THE TOP/FIELD LEADERSHIP, THEREBY WEAKENING OVERALL GUERRILLA MORALE, THUS AFFECTING RECRUITING AND RETENTION. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE EQUATION, THE GOES MUST IDENTIFY THE PERCEIVED NEEDS AND DESIRES OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND DEMONSTRATE OBVIOUS DEDICATION TO AND PROGRESS TOWARD FULFILLING THOSE NEEDS. THE USG PERCEIVES THOSE DESIRES TO BE DEMOCRACY AND BASIC "HUMAN RIGHTS". THE DESIRES MAY BE MUCH MORE BASIC THAN THAT AT THIS POINT IN THE WAR, SINCE THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IS FAIRLY WELL ALONG (WHETHER IT IS A REAL DESIRE OF THE POPULATION AT LARGE, RO FRANKLY DOES NOT KNOW); AND MOST "HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS" ARE COMMITTED BY THE FMLN. MOST WORKING CLASS PEOPLE WHO TALK TO RO WANT TO SEE THE FMLN GUERRILLAS KILLED TO THE LAST RIFLEMAN AND TO HAVE THE FREEDOM TO WORK IN PEACE. WHATEVER THE NEEDS, DESIRES, OR PROJECTS THE GOES NEEDS TO ADDRESS, IT CAN NOT MAKE MUCH MORE PROGRESS UNLESS THE FMLN CAN BE MADE TO STOP FIGHTING. "COUNTERING THE GUERRILLA CAPABILITIES", THEN, EXAMINED FROM ANY ANGLE, APPEARS TO START AT THE

CEASES TO BE A FACTOR IN THE COUNTRY'S PROGRESS. IN THE MILITARY ARENA, THIS BOILS DOWN TO 1 THING - GET OUT OF THE DEFENSIVE MIND-SET AND ATTACK THE FMLN MILITARY TARGETS UNTIL THE WILL TO FIGHT IS DEFEATED.

7. (U) WHAT DID THE OFFENSIVE MEAN TO THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF THE WAR? AS OF 891204, NOBODY KNOWS. RO BELIEVES 2 SCENARIOS ARE POSSIBLE--

~~SAME "SQUARE 1"--CRUSH THE FMLN TO THE POINT AT WHICH IT CEASES TO BE A FACTOR IN THE COUNTRY'S PROGRESS. IN THE MILITARY ARENA, THIS BOILS DOWN TO 1 THING - GET OUT OF THE DEFENSIVE MIND-SET AND ATTACK THE FMLN MILITARY TARGETS UNTIL THE WILL TO FIGHT IS DEFEATED.~~

~~7. (U) WHAT DID THE OFFENSIVE MEAN TO THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF THE WAR? AS OF 891204, NOBODY KNOWS. RO BELIEVES 2 SCENARIOS ARE POSSIBLE--~~

--SCENARIO 1

--THE GOES/ESAF/POPULATION AT LARGE REALIZES THE OFFENSIVE ENDED IN AN FMLN DEFEAT.

--THE GOES/ESAF TEAM DECIDES TO GO ON THE ATTACK AFTER THE HARD FMLN TARGETS AND DESTROY THEM.

--THE USG CONTINUES TO PROVIDE MATERIAL AND MORAL SUPPORT (ESPECIALLY THE LATTER), AND TO PRESSURE OTHER INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS TO CURTAIL SUPPORT TO THE FMLN.

--FACED WITH DEMORALIZING LEADERSHIP LOSSES, IMPLACABLE

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SUPPORT FROM A POWERFUL GOES ALLY, AND SHRINKING SUPPORT FROM ABROAD, THE FMLN RETURNS TO THE DIALOGUE PROCESS WEAKENED, WILLING TO "GIVE" ON KEY ISSUES.

--THE GOOD GUYS WIN, AND THE USG HAS A FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

--SCENARIO 2

--THE GOES/ESAF DECLARE A VICTORY IN THE FMLN OFFENSIVE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 *****/
AND HUNKER DOWN IN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE.

--THE FMLN, FACED WITH ONLY THE TYPE OF STEADY PRESSURE WHICH THE FIELD FIGHTERS HAVE LEARNED TO LIVE WITH, RESTS, REARMS, RECRUITS, AND RETRAINS.

--THE USG, UNABLE TO POINT TO A STRATEGIC VICTORY IN THE OFFENSIVE AND UNABLE TO SUSTAIN FULL SUPPORT FOR A GOES/ESAF WHICH HAS BEEN "SHAKEN" BY THE UNEXPECTED STRENGTH OF THE FMLN, REDUCES AID, ESPECIALLY MORAL SUPPORT.

--VIEWING "WEAKENING U.S. RESOLVE", THE FMLN AND EXTERNAL SUPPORTERS PROLONG THE STEADY MILITARY BATTLE, THUS GAINING MORE POLITICAL STRENGTH.

--THE FMLN LEADERSHIP, AT SOME FUTURE DATE, APPLIES ANOTHER HEAVY DOSE OF PUBLICITY - GAINING COMBAT ACTION.

--THE USG, TIRED OF DRAGGING OUT THE PROCESS FOR NO APPARENT GAIN, PRESSURES THE GOES TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE FMLN ON THE REBELS' TERMS.

--THE BAD GUYS WIN, AND THE USG SUFFERS A MAJOR (AND EXPENSIVE) FOREIGN POLICY DEFEAT IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF THESE 2 SCENARIOS, THERE MAY BE AN ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES, BUT THIS OFFENSIVE IS PROBABLY THE TURNING POINT IN THE WAR. THE GOES/ESAF HAS AN OPPORTUNITY THAT MAY NOT COME AROUND AGAIN. THE FMLN HAS, IN FACT, BEEN BEATEN MILITARILY IN THIS OFFENSIVE, BUT THAT MAY BE IRRELEVANT. AS ONE MODERATELY HIGH-RANKING CIVILIAN OFFICER TOLD RO 891202, "YOU CAN'T SEPARATE THE MILITARY ASPECT FROM THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT." THOSE ARE THE KEY WORDS IN THIS REPORT. THE ESAF MILITARY VICTORY MEANS NOTHING IF THE FMLN PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY GIVES THEM THE UPPER HAND. WHAT DOES THE OFFENSIVE MEAN TO THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR? IT'S THE TURNING POINT, AND IT COULD GO EITHER WAY.

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COMMENTS: (FIELD COMMENTS) -- 1. (U) THE FINAL CONCLUSIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE RO'S ALONE, ALTHOUGH THE SOURCES QUOTED HAVE OBVIOUSLY EXPRESSED POSSIBILITIES AND CONCLUSIONS ON WHICH RO HAS REFLECTED AND FROM WHICH RO HAS DRAWN. REAL ANALYSTS MAY DEVELOP OTHER EQUALLY VALID CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGEST OTHER CREDIBLE EVENTUALITIES, EVEN IF THEY HAVE ACCESS TO EXACTLY THE SAME EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION AS RO.

2. (U) THE ESAF "DEFENSIVE MIND-SET" REFERRED TO IN THIS REPORT REFERS TO THE ESAF INSTITUTION AS A WHOLE AND SOME OF THE TOP OFFICERS. AT THE BATTALION LEVEL DOWN, RO NORMALLY SEES AN AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE IN OFFICERS AND TROOPS ALIKE WHICH IS NOT REFLECTED ALL THE WAY UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. OF THE 2 MOST AGGRESSIVE HIGH-RANKING FIELD COMMANDERS RO KNOWS, 3RD BDE'S COLONEL MAURICIO ERNESTO ((VARGAS)) AND DM-7'S COLONEL ROBERTO MAURICIO ((STABEN)), THE FORMER HAS MAINTAINED AN AGGRESSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN PLAN SINCE TAKING COMMAND, AND INCLUDED AN AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT PLAN IN THE RECENT BATTLE OF SAN MIGUEL. THE LATTER IS EXILED TO A NON-CONFLICTIVE AREA OF THE COUNTRY WHERE HIS SUPERIOR TALENTS AS A BATTLEFIELD LEADER ARE DOING HIS COUNTRY NO GOOD. SOME SOURCES, INCLUDING A HIGH-RANKING U.S. MILITARY OFFICER WHO HAS PARTICIPATED IN AND FOLLOWED THE EL SALVADOR WAR FOR SEVERAL YEARS, BLAMES THE "DEFENSIVE MIND-SET" PARTIALLY ON THE U.S. THE ENTIRE U.S. AID AND ADVISORY EFFORT, IN THIS OFFICER'S OPINION, HAS STRESSED AVOIDING RISK-TAKING AT THE EXPENSE OF GOING AFTER THE ENEMY. EVERY TREND THAT RO HAS SEEN IN 18 MONTHS OF WORKING WITH THE ISSUES IN EL SALVADOR SUPPORT THAT OFFICER'S POINT.

3. (U) FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES, RO CONCLUDES THAT THE BATTLE OF SAN SALVADOR, THE KEY FIGHT IN THE OFFENSIVE, BEGAN 891111 (WITH THE MULTIPLE FMLN ATTACKS AGAINST GOES/ESAF/CUSEP TARGETS) AND ENDED AT 1730 LOCAL, 891130, WITH THE FORCED DEPARTURE OF U.S. MISSION DEPENDENTS FROM COMALAPA AIRPORT.

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 *****/

//IPSP: (U) PG1100//.

//COMSOBJ: (U) 111//.

ADMIN

PROJ: (U)

COLL: (U) AB; ZZ.

INSTR: (U) US NO.

PREP: (U) 6-00302.

ACQ: (U) EL SALVADOR (891111-891130).

DISSEM: (U) FIELD: AMEMBASSY EL SALVADOR.

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