


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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Intelligence Community Staff  
Washington, D.C. 20505



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ICS 0811-88  
6 April 1988



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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM:

[Redacted]  
Community Counterintelligence and Security  
Countermeasures Office

SUBJECT: DIA Requests for Review of DCID 1/7 Policies and Conditions  
of Applicability

REFERENCES:

- A. Memo fr EXDIR/DIA to DD/CIA dtd 22 Feb 88
- B. Memo fr ADCI to EXDIR/DIA dtd 6 Mar 88
- C. DCID 1/7 dtd 27 Feb 87

1. References A and B are attached for basic background to provide at least implied reason for a meeting scheduled between representatives of DIA and CIA on Friday, 8 April at 1030 hours in Room 1015, Ames Building. Recipients have been requested to attend for discussion of the subjects addressed in reference A. [Redacted]

2. The issues to be discussed are only outlined in the references, and it will be necessary to examine them in more detail at the meeting. The undersigned, acting for CCISCMO in hosting this meeting, will not attempt to define issues in this memorandum and defers to CIA and DIA representatives respectively. I also want to avoid the risk of misstating positions of either agency. Our first order of business will be to agree on just that--what the issues are in plain language, understandable to generalists and specialists alike. Where definitions are required as a basis to understand what follows, they too will be stated in clear layman's language. [Redacted]

3. All parties are asked to enter the meeting with a cooperative, open spirit and a willingness to meet each other at a point where mutually acceptable solutions can be agreed upon. We have ourselves to blame for permitting lack of earlier agreements to escalate the matters to the lofty levels which will now focus on our deliberations. Coincidentally, the



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SUBJECT: DIA Request for Review of DCID 1/7 Policies and Conditions of  
Applicability

Information Handling Committee is nearing completion of the revision of DCID 1/16, which contains at least one similar condition generating contention among Community members. If the DCI is forced to settle that issue himself, it will affect at least part of what we will be discussing in our meeting(s). All should recognize that one meeting is unlikely to resolve differences, but we are all obliged to move rapidly to reach realistic agreements that will satisfy operational needs and simultaneously provide the proper protection for intelligence sources and methods.

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Attachments:

a/s

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SUBJECT: DIA Request for Review of DCID 1/7 Policies and Conditions of Applicability

CCISCMO/ICS [redacted]

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- 1 - EXO/OS
- 1 - A&CSB/ISG/P&TS/OS
- 6 - [redacted]
- 1 - ICS Registry
- 1 - CCISCMO chrono
- 1 - CM chrono
- 1 - DCID 1/7 file
- 1 - [redacted]

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

ICS 0790-88

6 March 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gordon Negus, Executive Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Security Policies Governing the Dissemination of  
Intelligence Information

REFERENCES: A. Your memo, 22 February 1988 (U-4392/OS-4)

B. DCI Directive 1/7, "Security Controls on the  
Dissemination of Intelligence Information,  
27 February 1987

1. The concepts and rationale expressed in your 22 February memorandum clearly exhibit the limitations and inhibitions placed on certain DIA operating procedures by strict application of the rules imposed in DCID 1/7. When I approved the revised DCID in February 1987 as Acting Director of Central Intelligence, I understood that there were contentious issues surrounding the NOCONTRACT, as well as other, controls. I realized that the principal objections involved the dissemination caveats as applied to contractors supporting DoD/DIA efforts. I approved the DCID with the understanding that CIA and DIA officers would work together to attempt to resolve the issues, with or without further revision of the DCID. The fact is that CIA and DIA have not continued efforts at negotiating the issues.


2. Your memorandum contains three requests. The first one asks for my support in a joint effort to review existing policy with the objective of establishing new policy to protect sensitive intelligence while permitting Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs) to make determinations for release of information as exceptions to the rules. I am disappointed that CIA and DIA have not carried on negotiations over these issues as I directed and expected. I am charging the Community Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Office (CCISCMO) of the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) with responsibility to organize and coordinate meetings between CIA and DIA to discuss and work the issues involved.

SUBJECT: Security Policies Governing the Dissemination of  
Intelligence Information

3. The second request asks me to temporarily authorize the SOIC/DIA to permit release of controlled intelligence in DIA data bases where sources cannot be determined. I withhold that permission pending a recommendation from the Director/ICS after he receives a status report following the meetings between CIA and DIA on the overall problem area surrounding the subject. I am requiring such a report and recommendation within 60 days. Should revision of the DCID become necessary, CCISCMO will manage the necessary administrative staffing and Community coordination.

4. With respect to your third request (that DIA be relieved of the requirement for government personnel to be present with SAFE contractors when access to controlled information is possible), this will be a topic for the CIA-DIA negotiators to review since the SAFE program is a joint effort managed by the two agencies. The common element in each of these requests is that particular interests of CIA are involved.

5. Be assured that I am sympathetic to the problems surfaced and the restrictions placed on DIA and, in fact, the entire Community. We share the commitment to the proper dissemination and use of sensitive intelligence information in consonance with our solemn responsibility to protect the sources and methods from which it is produced.

  
Robert M. Gates  
Acting Director

SUBJECT: Security Policies Governing the Dissemination of  
Intelligence Information

CCISCMO [redacted] (3 March 1988)

Distribution of ICS 0790-88:

- Original - [redacted]
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- 1 - CCISCMO subject (DCID 1/7)
- 1 - CCISCMO chrono
- 1 - [redacted]

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
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## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-1251



U-4392/OS-4

22 FEB 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Security Policies Governing the Dissemination of Intelligence Information

Reference: DCI Directive 1/7, "Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information," 27 February 1987.

1. The Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on contractors to develop large all-source data bases, sophisticated telecommunication systems, and state of the art ADP storage, data integration, retrieval, and computational capabilities. Strict compliance, however, with DCID 1/7 severely limits the development, maintenance, and use of these sophisticated systems, and Allied access to this critical data as well.
2. DCID 1/7 requires the consent of the "originator" for release of all material carrying the ORCON, NOCONTRACT, NOFORN, or PROPIN caveat. In large DoD intelligence data systems, the data bases have historically carried the caveats of the data being entered, even though there is no reference to source nor audit to a source on the data being entered. Subsequent effort, therefore, to identify the source of each data item to pursue "release authorization" has proven not only impractical, but also impossible in many circumstances. In June 1986, therefore, DIA proposed a specific change to the DCID 1/7 which recognized (1) the role of appropriately cleared contractors working under authorized government contract; (2) the fact that no source reference was made; and (3) would permit release of all-source data base information to those specific contractors. During discussions of that proposal, your staff raised the additional issue of DIA releasing data base information caveated NOFORN. To date, my staff has been unable to reach accord with your staff on these significant policy issues.
3. In addition to the difficulty in releasing automated data base information where there is no source attribution, there are also clear cases where contractor release is sought for data that does, in fact, clearly identify the source. In late 1985 this Agency sought authorization to release automated message traffic to contractors involved in the joint DIA/CIA SAFE program. In January 1986, the DCI Security Committee agreed to this access, but with the stipulation that government personnel be present at all times. This guidance has proven to be wasteful and impractical due to personnel constraints. DoD/DIA does not have sufficient resources to support major systems development or enhancement initiatives without reliance on contractors who possess the required security clearances.

4. In summary, strict compliance with the provisions of DCID 1/7 severely limits use of available technology to improve intelligence support to operational forces. I would appreciate your support in a joint effort to review the existing policy with the objective of establishing a new policy that adequately protects sensitive intelligence sources while authorizing Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs) to make controlled and auditable release of NOFORN, NOCONTRACT, ORCON, and PROPIN intelligence information where sources are unidentified and unidentifiable. In the interim, request authority as the SOIC for DIA, to grant release of caveated intelligence in DIA data bases where the originator cannot be determined. Secondly, standard and practical procedures must be established for authorizing system development contractor access to source identified intelligence data where operationally required. In this regard, specifically request that DIA be relieved from the requirement that government personnel be present when SAFE contractors have access to NOCONTRACT and ORCON information.



GORDON NEGUS  
Executive Director