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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BONN 04808

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO, GE  
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD: MEETINGS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL  
AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY

IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE CHANCELLOR AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, CODEL BYRD FEBRUARY 9 EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE INF TREATY AND HEARD GERMAN CONCERNS REGARDING FOLLOW-ON STEPS. SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BYRD, JOINED BY SENATORS PELL, NUNN, BOREN, AND WARNER APPLAUDED ALLIANCE COHESION WHICH HAD YIELDED "A VICTORY ON INF" AND URGED THE NATO PARTNERS TO DEMONSTRATE THE SAME COLLECTIVE UNITY IN FACING THE POST-INF DECISIONS. THE CODEL PREDICTED THE INF TREATY WOULD BE RATIFIED. CHANCELLOR KOHL AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER OUTLINED THE GERMAN CASE FOR INCORPORATING SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES INTO NATO'S ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING STRATEGY, NOT SEQUENTIALLY BUT IN TANDEM WITH THE OTHER TALKS. THEY MADE CLEAR THAT THEY OPPOSED A THIRD ZERO, SUPPORTING INSTEAD REDUCTIONS TO LOWER EQUAL LEVELS. ON MODERNIZATION, KOHL AND GENSCHER PUSHED THE GERMAN PREFERENCE FOR A GO-SLOW APPROACH, URGING THAT THE ALLIANCE DEFER SPECIFIC DECISIONS ON MONTEBELLO FOLLOW-UP, PENDING DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATO SECURITY CONCEPT WHICH FACTORED IN GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS. THE CHANCELLOR ALSO SHARED HIS STRONGLY-FELT VIEWS ON THE FRG'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. AND HIS ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET LEADER GORBACHEV AND THE VULNERABILITY OF SOME WARSAW PACT MEMBERS TO WESTERN IDEAS AND VALUES. THE FOREIGN OFFICE HOSTED A LUNCHEON FOR THE CODEL. OTHER PROGRAM EVENTS INCLUDED A PRESS CONFERENCE AND A MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER WOERNER (THESE WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL). THE AMBASSADOR AND EMBOFF VARGAS ACCOMPANIED THE CODEL TO THE MEETINGS WITH KOHL AND GENSCHER AND THE LUNCHEON. END SUMMARY.

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MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

3. SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BYRD EXPLAINED TO GENSCHER THAT HIS BIPARTISAN DELEGATION WANTED TO REASSURE OUR EUROPEAN NATO ALLIES THAT THE SENATE VIEWED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE AS FIRM AS EVER. ALLIANCE COHESION AND STEADFASTNESS HAD ENABLED THE NATO PARTNERS TO WIN A VICTORY ON INF; THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE TREATY WOULD BE APPROVED BY THE U.S. SENATE. THE KEY QUESTION NOW EVOLVED AROUND WHAT NATO ALLIES COLLECTIVELY WERE PREPARED TO DO IN THE WAY OF NEXT STEPS.

4. ON NEXT STEPS, GENSCHER SAID A CONTINUING PRIMARY CONCERN WAS THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY, WHICH WOULD BE A PROBLEM SO LONG AS NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS REMAINED IN LIMBO. THE FRG BELIEVED THAT A BALANCED CSCE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, ADDRESSING THE MAIN ISSUES IN THE THREE BASKETS (HUMAN RIGHTS, SECURITY, COOPERATION, INCREASED VISITOR EXCHANGES), SHOULD BE FINALIZED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO AS TO PERMIT THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEW CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS. ANY FURTHER DELAY IN STARTING THESE TALKS WOULD ONLY DELAY ACHIEVEMENT OF REDUCTIONS IN THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCE. ON A RELATED NOTE, GENSCHER SAID HE HAD REMINDED GORBACHEV IN THE PAST THAT THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE REMAINED AN OBSTACLE TO EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION.

5. ON SNF AND MODERNIZATION, GENSCHER REPEATED FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS. THE JUNE 1987 REYKJAVIK NAC STATEMENT ALLOWED FOR NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS IN U.S. AND SOVIET SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND, GIVEN THE SPECIAL DANGER THESE WEAPONS POSED FOR GERMANS, THE FRG SUPPORTED THE INCORPORATION OF THESE LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILES OF SHORTER RANGE IN NATO'S ARMS CONTROL CONCEPT AND OVERALL STRATEGY, HE SAID. GENSCHER REJECTED A SEQUENTIAL APPROACH CONCERNING THE PRIORITIES FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, SAYING THERE CAN BE NO SEQUENCE; THAT DECISIONS ON NEGOTIATING TIMETABLES FLOW FROM A VARIETY OF FACTORS. WHILE HE BELIEVED THAT SNF TALKS SHOULD OCCUR IN TANDEM WITH OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, GENSCHER SAID HE WANTED TO BE CLEAR ON HIS AND THE FRG STANCE ON SNF. HE DID NOT ADVOCATE NOR SUPPORT A THIRD ZERO ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. INSTEAD HE BACKED

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TALKS AIMED AT REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LEVELS. COMING BACK TO THIS POINT LATER IN THE DISCUSSIONS, GENSCHER FULLY RECOGNIZED AND ACCEPTED THE POINT THAT "WE DO REQUIRE THE ELEMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE" NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.

6. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONING ON MODERNIZATION BY SENATOR NUNN, GENSCHER SAID NATO NEEDED TO DEVELOP A POST-INF SECURITY CONCEPT, ADDRESSING GOALS OF ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS, BEFORE SPECIFIC MODERNIZATION DECISIONS COULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT SAY WHAT SHOULD BE DONE NOW WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMS SUCH AS LANCE WITHOUT HAVING FIRST REACHED AGREEMENT ON WHAT SHAPE THE OVERALL SECURITY FRAMEWORK WOULD TAKE. LANCE WAS ONLY A TINY SEGMENT OF THE PICTURE AND COULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN ISOLATION. FURTHER, GIVEN ITS LIFE-SPAN, IT DID NOT REQUIRE A

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MODERNIZATION DECISION NOW. THE FRG THINKING ON A SECURITY CONCEPT FOR NATO DID NOT CLASH WITH MONTEBELLO, BUT RATHER SOUGHT TO SETTLE THE REMAINING ISSUES (THE P1B QUESTION HAVING BEEN RESOLVED BY THE INF TREATY) OF MONTEBELLO. THE QUESTION OF ARTILLERY MODERNIZATION WAS ALREADY COMPLETED (SIC), BUT OTHER MODERNIZATION ISSUES WOULD COME UP, INCLUDING LANCE AND MUNITIONS. NATO WOULD HAVE TO DEBATE THE NUMBERS AND TYPES. (COMMENT: GENSCHER PROVIDED NO COMMENTARY TO BACK UP HIS ASSERTION ON COMPLETION OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY MODERNIZATION. END COMMENT.)

7. ON START, GENSCHER SAID AN IDEAL TIMETABLE FOR CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT, INCLUDING 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WOULD BE DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR. IF IT WERE NOT POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE A "GOOD AGREEMENT" DURING THIS TIMEFRAME, HOWEVER, THE U.S. SHOULD OPT TO WAIT UNTIL A MORE PROPITIOUS TIME.

8. AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED, SENATOR BYRD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A UNITED STANCE BY THE ALLIANCE IN ADVANCING COMMON SECURITY GOALS. HE AFFIRMED THAT THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO NATO WAS UNWAVERING.

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CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL  
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9. IN A RELAXED, 90-MINUTE MEETING, THE CHANCELLOR RESPONDED TO CODEL BYRD QUESTIONS ON FRG PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. KOHL ALSO ASSESSED DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SHARED PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE FRG'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

10. KOHL BEGAN BY NOTING HIS STANDING INVITATION TO A SMALL GROUP OF U.S. SENATORS TO VISIT THE FRG AROUND THE MAY-TIMEFRAME. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO AFFORD BOTH THE SENATORS AND HIGH-LEVEL FRG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ON A WIDE-RANGE OF ISSUES AFFECTING U.S. AND GERMAN RELATIONS. THERE WOULD BE A CULTURAL PURPOSE AS WELL, WITH THE AMERICANS HAVING THE CHANCE TO MEET AND CHAT WITH THE MAN ON THE STREET, DOING SOME SIGHTSEEING AND TAKING IN SOME CULTURAL EVENTS. A SIMILAR INVITATION WOULD BE ISSUED TO A GROUP OF U.S. CONGRESSMEN TO VISIT ON ANOTHER OCCASION.

11. SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT THE SENATORS WERE AWARE OF THE CHANCELLOR'S INVITATION. THERE WAS A NATURAL AFFINITY BETWEEN GERMANS AND AMERICANS, WHICH GAVE RISE TO THESE TRANSATLANTIC EXCHANGES. HE DESCRIBED THE BIPARTISAN NATURE OF HIS DELEGATION AND BEGAN THE SUBSTANTIVE PORTION OF THE PROGRAM BY ASKING THE CHANCELLOR TO COMMENT ON GERMAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S./FRG RELATIONS AND THE "DYNAMIC" SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

12. KOHL REPLIED THAT FRG RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. CONSTITUTED "THE ESSENTIAL ISSUE FOR US." PEACE AND PROSPERITY HAD REIGNED IN EUROPE SINCE 1945 PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF THE U.S. PROTECTIVE UMBRELLA. NOT SINCE THE SIMILAR (IN LENGTH) PERIOD 1870-1914 HAD EUROPE KNOWN SUSTAINED TRANQUILITY. GERMANS, ESPECIALLY THE 30-35 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WHO RETAINED MEMORIES OF THE WAR, REMEMBERED WELL THE EXTENDED-HAND OF THE MARSHALL PLAN WHICH IGNITED THIS NEW ERA OF PEACE AND GROWTH. KOHL KNEW PERSONALLY THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN AID TO A SHATTERED, DEFEATED GERMANY. AT THE CLOSE OF THE WAR,  
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HE WAS A 15-YEAR OLD SOLDIER, MEMBER OF AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNIT. HIS UNIT WAS WITHOUT SUPPLIES AND STARVING. THE AMERICANS WERE KIND AND PROVIDED FOOD. GERMANS OF HIS GENERATION WHO ARE LIVING COULD AFFIRM THAT AMERICANS DID NOT LOOT NOR DISMANTLE WHAT REMAINED OF GERMAN INDUSTRY. KOHL SAID THAT AS CHANCELLOR HE HAS BASED HIS POLICIES ON THE "IRREVERSIBLE LINKS" BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE WEST, FORGED IN LARGE MEASURE BY THE U.S./FRG RELATIONSHIP.

13. REGARDING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, KOHL SAID GERMANS VIEWED GORBACHEV AS AN IMAGINATIVE LEADER SEEKING TO REVERSE INEFFECTUAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES OF THE PAST, HOPING TO BRING ABOUT AN INCREASED LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY, PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMY. IN KOHL'S VIEW, IT WAS TOO EARLY TO DECLARE GORBACHEV A MAN OF PEACE. THE WEST SHOULD RESERVE JUDGMENT FOR THE NEXT 3-5 YEARS, AWAITING SOVIET ACTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN, EMIGRATION, AND POST-INF ARMS CONTROL. THE NATO ALLIANCE SHOULD MAKE GOOD USE OF THIS TIME, DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING SECURITY POLICIES WHICH ENABLED IT TO TALK TO THE SOVIETS ON THE BASIS OF STRENGTH.

14. KOHL TERMED SOME WARSAW PACT MEMBERS AS UNRELIABLE PARTNERS FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE "GIFTED AND TALENTED" CZECHS WERE UNHAPPY WITH THEIR REGIME AND YEARNED FOR A GREATER MEASURE OF FREEDOM. SO DID THE POLES, WHO "WILL SURVIVE" COMMUNISM ("THEY HAVE SURVIVED EVERYTHING ELSE"). WHILE HE COULD NOT KNOCK DOWN THE BERLIN WALL, KOHL SAID HE WOULD SEEK TO EXPAND INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO "OPEN THE WINDOW INTO THE GDR." OVER 1.5 MILLION YOUNG EAST GERMANS HAVE VISITED THE WEST AND HE WILL SEEK TO INCREASE THAT NUMBER, ENABLING THEM TO COMPARE THEIR LIFE STYLES WITH THOSE OF FREE SOCIETIES.

15. TURNING TO ARMS CONTROL THEMES, KOHL URGED THAT THE SENATE RATIFY THE INF TREATY, REFRAINING FROM ATTACHING AMENDMENTS THAT WOULD CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE TREATY. FAILURE TO RATIFY WOULD SPELL DISASTER FOR EUROPE. KOHL RECOUNTED THE BITTER CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING DEPLOYMENT OF P-II'S AND GLCM'S IN THE FRG IN 1983. OVER 300,000 GERMANS HAD CONVERGED AROUND THE CHANCELLERY TO PROTEST HIS DECISION TO IMPLEMENT THE PAINFUL HALF OF THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION. GERMANS ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE U.S.-SOVIET TREATY WHICH WOULD TAKE THESE SYSTEMS OUT. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY SENATOR WARNER, KOHL SAID THAT THE U.S. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRG THROUGHOUT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WERE EXCELLENT, THANKS IN GREAT PART TO THE EFFORTS OF THE U.S. AMBASSADORS HERE (FIRST ARTHUR BURNS; NOW, RICHARD BURT) AND THE U.S. NEGOTIATORS, WHO SAW TO IT THAT THE FRG GOVERNMENT WAS CONSULTED CONTINUOUSLY. THE SCG MECHANISM HAD EQUALLY SERVED AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION IN THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. (LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, RESPONDING TO A POINT ON THE DANGERS OF A THIRD ZERO, THE CHANCELLOR REFERRED TO THE HEATED DOMESTIC DEBATE ON THE SECOND INF ZERO, WHICH RAGED IN THE FRG DURING THE PERIOD APRIL-JUNE 1987. KOHL, ASKING THAT THIS REMARK NOT BE DISCLOSED, SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SUPPORTED THE SECOND ZERO, ON SRINF; THAT ZERO LRINF AND REDUCED EQUAL CEILINGS ON SRINF HAD CONSTITUTED HIS PREFERRED FORMULA. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE U.S. HAD SIGNALLED ITS PREFERENCE

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FOR DOUBLE ZERO AND HE WAS OBLIGED TO REVERSE HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IN FAVOR OF DOUBLE ZERO. HIS DECISION HAD DISMAYED HIS FELLOW CONSERVATIVES, CAUSING HIM SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY.)

16. LOOKING BEYOND INF, KOHL SAID NATO SHOULD FACTOR IN GERMAN SENSITIVITIES ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN OUTLINING AN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO INCLUDE SNF TALKS WITHIN ITS OVERALL CONCEPT, HE SAID. KOHL HASTENED TO ADD THAT HE DID NOT FAVOR A THIRD ZERO AND THAT THE FRG POSITION REMAINED ONE OF FAVORING NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LOWER LEVELS. HE SAID HE PLANNED TO RUN FOR RE-ELECTION IN 1990 AND HIS OPPOSITION TO A THIRD ZERO AND DE-NUCLEARIZATION WOULD CONSTITUTE STRONG CAMPAIGN THEMES.

17. ON NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION, KOHL REPEATED FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS ON THE NEED FOR NATO TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY CONCEPT BEFORE DEFINING A TIMETABLE FOR SPECIFIC

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DECISIONS ON MODERNIZATION. THERE WAS NO RUSH TO DECIDE ON A LANCE FOLLOW-ON, HE SAID, AS THE PRESENT SYSTEM WAS GOOD THROUGH THE FIRST PART OF THE 1990'S.

18. OTHER POINTS ON ARMS CONTROL BY KOHL:

-- IN NEGOTIATIONS ON MISSILES IN THE 0-500 KM RANGE, THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE PRESSED TO SCALE BACK THEIR SCUD FORCE; EVEN IF THEY HALVED IT, THEY WOULD STILL HAVE MORE THAN WHAT THE WEST HAS.

-- SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ENTERTAIN ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION PROPOSALS IN NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS WILL PROVE TO BE THE REAL TEST IN ASSESSING SERIOUS SOVIET INTENT IN ARMS CONTROL.

-- A START AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY IF CONCLUDED THIS SUMMER, WOULD PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT BOOST TO GORBACHEV INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION.

19. REPLYING TO QUESTIONS BY SENATOR PELL ON THE FRANCO-GERMAN BRIGADE, KOHL SAID ITS CREATION HAD BEEN HIS IDEA. THERE WAS BOTH SYMBOLISM AND PRACTICALITY BEHIND IT. UP TO NOW, NO ONE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT SUCH A NOTION WAS POSSIBLE IN THIS CENTURY. BUT NOW IT WAS REALITY. THE BRIGADE WOULD HAVE AN INTEGRATED LEADERSHIP AND, FOR NOW, NATIONAL COMBAT AND SUPPORT UNITS. HE EXPECTED IT TO BE OPERATIONAL IN A YEAR'S TIME AND WOULD SUCCEED IN BRINGING FRANCE INTO THE FORWARD DEFENSE REGIONS AND EAST OF THE RHINE. IT WAS A CONVENIENT WAY TO BRING FRANCE CLOSER TO NATO, ALTHOUGH THIS TOPIC WAS NEVER BROACHED IN FRENCH-GERMAN TALKS. KOHL SAID HE EXPECTED INCREASED MOMENTUM AND PROGRESS IN BRIGADE ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

20. SENATOR BYRD THANKED THE CHANCELLOR FOR HIS TIME, SAYING HE LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING HIM ON FEB. 18, AT 1100 HOURS, ALONG WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SENATE IN WASHINGTON. ON A POSSIBLE START TREATY, THE SENATE MAJORITY LEADER SAID HE WOULD BE CONCERNED IF ONE CAME TO THE SENATE BY THE SUMMER. IT WOULD BE TOO SOON AND GIVEN THE COMPLEX, CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, THE SENATE WOULD WANT TO CAREFULLY REVIEW IT BEFORE GIVING ITS ADVICE AND

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CONSENT. THE SENATE WOULD RESIST BEING SWEEP ALONG BY  
A PRO-ARMS CONTROL ATMOSPHERE.

21. CODEL BYRD DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THIS  
REPORT BEFORE DEPARTING BONN.

BURT

END OF MESSAGE

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