

OCA FILE

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MEMORANDUM TO: The Director
The Deputy Director
The Executive Director

FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: OCA Goals and Strategies for 1988

1. This memorandum summarizes actions taken from January through June to implement the goals and strategies for 1988 outlined by the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) on 7 January 1988.

Promote the "Four C's"
Implement the New Guidelines for Contacts with Congress

2. In January 1988, OCA published, with DCI approval, its "Guidelines for Contact with Congress." This 12-page document explains the "Four C's" (candor, corrections, completeness, consistency). It also discusses for Agency briefers their obligations in briefing the Congress and the limitations on what they may say without specific approval from the Director of Congressional Affairs or from more senior officers. The document addresses such concerns as Congressional access to Inspector General reports, protection of third agency material, sources and methods, protection given liaison relationships, and unevaluated intelligence information. These guidelines were sent to the Directorates and independent offices for broad distribution throughout the Agency. In addition to these basic guidelines, OCA on 22 January published for use by its own liaison officers an additional 33-page document consisting of detailed questions and answers to enable our officers who deal with Congress on a full-time basis to cope with more specific and troublesome issues.

3. The Director of Congressional Affairs, the heads of the Office's three main components, and several of our other officers address a large number of Agency management conferences; Chiefs of Station conferences in Washington and elsewhere; and training courses ranging from the New Analyst

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Course, the Mid-Career course, the Advanced Intelligence Seminar, to the CIA and the Congress elective offered to our SIS-level officers. We find that these opportunities to describe and underscore the "Four C's" and our guidelines for contact with Congress provide valuable opportunities to draw attention to these goals by officers who actually do our Congressional briefings and by managers who can pass the word within their components. Experience has shown that oral discussions of these issues register with participants even better than circulating the written version. In all cases, OCA officers attempt to work with first-time Congressional briefers to ensure they are aware of our guidelines.

Improve Responses to Congressional Inquiries

4. OCA is working with the principal Agency components to eliminate impediments to our providing prompt and complete responses to Congressional questions. We have tried to focus both on limiting the numbers and scope of Congressional questions and on getting our own house in order to ensure a quick and appropriate response to legitimate questions. During the first six months of 1988 we received far more numerous and time consuming questions on the INF issue than on any other single topic. The CIA and the Intelligence Community enjoyed modest success in focusing and limiting the questions, but they distinguished themselves in responding promptly to the still astonishing number of questions that remained. Chairman Boren on several occasions praised the Intelligence Community for its timeliness and thoroughness in responding to these questions, which enabled the Committee to produce its own report on INF monitoring capabilities for submission to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

5. The most troublesome area in responding to Congressional inquiries remains the tendency of the Oversight Committees, particularly the Senate Intelligence Committee, to ask open-ended questions of the Operations Directorate. During the first half of 1988, these tended to focus on Central American issues, especially Nicaragua and narcotics. Although we have turned aside numerous questions and limited the scope of others, those remaining demand a great deal of manpower and time from already overburdened components.

6. OCA has discussed with the Deputy Director for Operations and his staff organizational changes and other measures that should speed our written responses to the Congress. The Deputy Director for Operations recently established a position of Special Assistant in his office to oversee directorate actions related to Congressional inquiries. OCA will cooperate with this officer to see that we are as responsive to Congress as possible while at the same time protecting the Operations Directorate's sources, methods, and other legitimate concerns.

Reduce Number of Briefings of Congressional Staffers

7. This objective is intended primarily to limit the number of briefings we provide to the staff of non-oversight committees and to the personal staff of Members. This goal was made necessary by the dramatic increase (41%) in the number of staff briefings from 1986 to 1987.

8. During the first half of 1988 we have succeeded in this endeavor in the limited sense that we have halted the increase in the number of staff briefings. We have failed in the sense that the number of staff briefings remains at a constant level higher than we would like. Overall, during the first six months of 1988, the numbers of staff briefings, occasions when testimony was given before Congressional committees and subcommittees, and briefings of individual Members stayed at 1987 levels. We have been seeking as part of this objective to increase the number of joint briefings to the Oversight Committee staffs to protect the time of senior Agency managers. We have made some progress in this area, but must consider carefully whether to push harder because the joint sessions also have the unintended effect of assisting the Committee staffs to cross-examine us still more closely than when each is left to its own devices.

9. There was one important difference in the level of our Congressional activity between 1987 and 1988. The number of presentations by the DCI or DDCI before our four Oversight Committees dropped by 70 percent from 35 in the first six months of 1987 to 10 in the corresponding period this year. For the most part, I believe this is a positive development reflecting the fact that much of the politics and passion have been removed from the Agency's relationship with Congress. On the other hand, this represents a diminished level of exposure that we should monitor lest the Oversight Committees feel we are ignoring them.

Discourage Trend Toward Micromanagement

10. During 1988, the trend toward micromanagement has continued both in terms of Committee requests for briefings on covert action programs and in terms of how overall Agency resources should be allocated. The increase in micromanagement was made certain by the political debates growing out of the Iran-Contra affair and over the wisdom of the Administration's Central America programs. In each case, the Congress for political reasons had to demonstrate that it was taking a firmer hand with the Intelligence Community. The trend has been reinforced by Congressional awareness of real or imagined weaknesses in the Agency's management of three different covert action programs.

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11. In terms of concrete and generally negative developments, the most significant change in 1988 has been the establishment of the Senate Intelligence Committee's Audit Team, which has undertaken a fairly intrusive look into the operations and files of an overseas station and has acquired access to documents in the Washington area previously not provided routinely to the Committee. The micromanagement stimulated by the activities of the Senate Audit Team will only increase once the House follows through with its plan to establish a parallel unit. On the analytic side, a single but somewhat worrisome development occurred with Senator Bradley's insistence on reviewing the raw reporting that went into our judgments on the [redacted] matter. Although I believe the Committee's interest in this type of undertaking is not likely to be sustained, it does represent an opening wedge toward micromanagement of the analytic process that is cause for concern.

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12. On the positive side, we have turned back a number of Congressional initiatives that would have resulted in still greater micromanagement of the Agency. We have succeeded in holding GAO at bay (partly by cooperating with the new Senate Audit Team) despite increasing efforts by GAO's inspectors to look at Agency programs and facilities and continued efforts by some Members of the Congress to have the organization look into CIA activities. Similarly, we have reached agreement with the Senate on a substitute for a "Statutory Inspector General," the effect of which will be to forestall a substantially greater reporting responsibility to the Congress. We have also succeeded in sharply limiting the scope of some new reporting requirements included in next year's Authorization Bill and have provided effective protection from these provisions for some of our most sensitive proprietaries. Finally, the Agency has been generally successful in holding back non-oversight Members and staffers who would like to get into the micromanagement business. [redacted]

Increase Coverage of Congressional Delegations and Staff Delegations Traveling Abroad

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13. We have pressed both Intelligence Committees to increase the numbers of officers from OCA or the Operations Directorate area divisions accompanying Congressional delegations abroad. We have in a limited number of cases sent Agency officers with Congressional groups, and this invariably has served to minimize problems that otherwise arise. Officers from Headquarters who deal regularly with Congress typically know the rules better, enabling them to provide help in reining in overbearing Congressional visitors and bolstering the confidence of some Chiefs of Station who receive few visitors and might otherwise be too reticent.

14. Despite the obvious benefits of these escorts, we are not destined to increase the numbers significantly, especially on the House side. Both the Staff Director and the Chief Counsel of the Committee believe that staffers feel inhibited when officers from Headquarters accompany them abroad. Although not articulated, it is also clear that they believe they can elicit more from our officers abroad if the latter do not have the benefit of the presence of officers from Headquarters to clarify the rules. We do somewhat more traveling with groups from the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has a more positive view of Agency escorts.

Encourage Improved Security in Congress

15. Officers from Congressional Affairs and several other Agency components have worked actively during 1988 to prompt both the House and Senate to improve their security programs. We have met with the Senate Security Officer, the Capitol Police, the Sergeants at Arms of both Houses, the Capitol Architect, and the staffs of both House and Senate Intelligence Committees in pursuit of this goal. We have cleaned up records of those holding Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) accesses, audited the physical security of several areas in the House and Senate where highly classified information is stored, provided educational briefings to several Members and--perhaps most important--urged all interlocutors to establish a centralized, technical security office in the Capitol.

16. I believe there is reason for cautious optimism concerning Capitol Hill security. The House Sergeant at Arms has decided to establish an independent technical security group and is negotiating with the House leadership to win their support. On the Senate side, Senator Hollings is attempting to provide funds in the Legislative Appropriations Bill to finance a Senate technical security group. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Boren has registered his concern with the quality of security protection afforded classified intelligence by the other committees of the Congress and has indicated that in the new Congress he will press the leadership to consider a centralized storage facility. These are signs of a heightened consciousness on the security issue that we have not often seen in the past.



John L. Helgeson

D/OCA/JLH:wcsr [redacted] (20 Sep 88)

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