

PI 21

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



Director of Congressional Affairs

6 May 1987

NOTE FOR: The Acting Director

FROM: Dave Gries *DL*

SUBJECT: MFR for Last Stokes/Hyde Meeting

Attached is my MFR for the meeting.

Attachment

6 May 1987
OCA 87-1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Meeting of 6 May Between A/DCI and Reps. Stokes
and Hyde

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Stokes commented that all other matters between the Committee and the Agency appeared up to date.


The A/DCI provided a copy of our letter objecting to public testimony by Agency employees. Stokes and Hyde listened sympathetically. Stokes asked whether the A/DCI meant to protect senior officials such as George and Clarridge. After learning that he did, Stokes indicated understanding, but did not tip his hand on what he would do about it.

The A/DCI also handed over a copy of his letter to Senators Boren and Cohen regarding GAO's interest in auditing the Agency and a possible SSCI response of setting up its own independent auditing capability. Stokes read the letter and listened without comment.



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The A/DCI also noted the personnel reduction coming out of HPSCI mark up. He said the 1/3 cut in requested CIA slots might have an impact on our effort to improve security, since many of those positions were for security personnel. Stokes said that the Committee did not want to cut into security requirements provided they were justified. He would take a close look at it during conference.



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
The A/DCI drew their attention to recent analytical items about the possibility of hostilities between India and China.

The A/DCI next discussed the verification issue and the position he had laid out to the SSCI and the policy community that the Administration was oversimplifying the verification issue somewhat.




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Tom Latimer and Tom Smeeton also attended the meeting for the Committee. I was also present.



STAT

David D. Gries
Director of Congressional Affairs

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NOTE: #1 (on page 2): D/OCA wrote MFR on [redacted]
#2 : [redacted] has called Tom this date (13 May 87) to offer to furnish the Estimate. Tom is to get back with her. The ball is in Tom's court.

STAT

Page Denied

6 May 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Reps. Stokes and Hyde (6May87) [redacted]

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The following subjects were discussed:

1. We reviewed recent correspondence and agreed that everything was up to date. I again explained why I was holding off on a response to their 4 March letter on counterterrorism reprogramming. [redacted]

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2. I raised the question of the appearance in public session of DO officers and gave them a copy of the letter to Chairman Hamilton. Stokes seemed amenable but asked if that would include Clair George and Dewey Clarridge. When I said yes, his enthusiasm noticeably faded. [redacted]

25X1

3. I brought them up to date on action on the Hill on GAO investigations in CIA and shared with them my letter to Chairman Boren. I read their reaction as still supportive. [redacted]

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4. I raised two budget issues -- cutting the reserve and a cut in our request for additional personnel. I don't think we will get much on either issue. [redacted]

25X1

5. [redacted]

25X1

6. [redacted]

7. I reviewed our concerns about India and China. [redacted]

25X1

8. I briefly described our view of monitoring an INF agreement. [redacted]

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RF

Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

cc: D/OCA

~~SECRET~~

Cl By Signer
NEXT CARD

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1 - A/DCI

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Para 1 - COMPT

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Para 4 - COMPT & DDA

Para 5 - DDA

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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

OCA
Arms4 May 1987
OCA 87-1829

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director

FROM: David D. Gries *DDG*
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: Your Meeting on 6 May with Representatives
Stokes and Hyde

Your regular meeting with Representatives Stokes (D., OH) and Hyde (R., IL) of HPSCI is set for 6 May at 0900 in H 405, The Capitol. Their principal staffers, Tom Latimer and Tom Smeeton, will accompany them; I will be with you.

Suggested agenda topics include:

- Agency objection to the appearance of officers other than the DCI or DDCI, as public witnesses at the Iran/Contra hearings. See the attached letter for talking points.
- GAO. You could update them on the SSCI's efforts to resist GAO audits of the Agency and be sure they are still on board. Attached is your recent letter to Boren and Cohen, which I suggest you furnish to Stokes and Hyde (Sven has no objection). Since it was Stokes who obtained Gray's agreement not to act on his GAO request until we had a chance to brief him, you could tell him that the briefing is scheduled this week. See item from Weekly Report.
- Counterterrorism reprogramming requests. You could remind Stokes that we are deliberately delaying our response to the Committee's 4 March letter on counterterrorism reprogramming. You determined that our response should await the confirmation of the new Director, since it is imperative that the new Director be comfortable with the policy.
- Personnel policies. As you know, the Committee staff, and at least some Members, remain skeptical of the sweeping nature of the proposed changes. You might wish to update Stokes and Hyde on the exploratory nature of our studies.
- Facility visits. The four new Members (Wilson, Kennelly, Lungren, and Shuster) are scheduled to tour [redacted] We welcome--and encourage--such visits here and abroad and wish more Members would participate.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- Public hearings on HR 1013 (Stokes/Boland Bill to mandate 48 hour notice of Findings) are scheduled to resume on 3 or 4 June. The Administration's witness is yet to be determined, but in view of the above principal, you might be tapped. You should be prepared to respond on this subject if they raise it; there is nothing to gain in raising it yourself. Draft testimony is attached.

- Cut of the Reserve by 60%. HPSCI accepted Kastenmeier's amendment cutting the Reserve. You could again stress the importance of the Reserve to the Agency and to any administration. We understand Stokes supported Kastenmeier and Hyde opposed him.

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- D/OCA:DDGries:mdo (4 May 1987)

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

4 May 1987

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman
Select Committee to Investigate Covert
Arms Transactions with Iran
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Press reports continue to circulate that the House and Senate Select Committees on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition may ask employees of the Central Intelligence Agency's clandestine services to testify under oath in public hearings. While I and other Agency officials in discussions with your staff have already outlined the serious problems this would pose for us, I believe this issue is so critical that I want to make our great concern and the reasons for objecting to public testimony absolutely clear. I also want to apprise the Committee that I have consulted with National Security Adviser Carlucci, and he has informed me that this is a matter of importance to the President.

Let me emphasize at the outset that any Agency employee is available to the Select Committees to testify under oath in a closed session. As you know, CIA personnel have already given sworn depositions to Committee staff. The Agency is fully prepared to work with the Committees to produce expeditiously for public release a declassified version of any such testimony. Indeed, I am prepared to commit all necessary resources to ensure that testimony taken in executive session is sanitized and declassified for public use within 24 hours. Accordingly, the issue is not whether information from Agency employees can be put before the public, but whether it is necessary or appropriate for CIA clandestine services employees to appear in open Committee proceedings.

First, there is the issue of precedent. As far as I can determine, no active duty member of the CIA clandestine service has ever testified under oath in a public hearing before the Congress. Although the question of public testimony was considered during the Church and Pike Committee hearings of the 1970s, both those Committees accepted the Agency's argument against public exposure of its employees other than the Director. Both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees have also respected this principle through the years.


It is also important to keep in mind that virtually any staff employee the Committee may wish to call as a witness must travel or live abroad to carry out his or her duties. Public exposure could eliminate the possibility of future service abroad because of personal and operational security problems and reluctance of foreign governments to allow known Agency employees to be stationed in their countries. Although it is true that the names of some of these employees may have appeared in the media, this does not necessarily confirm affiliation with the Agency. On the other hand, public testimony before Congress would confirm official CIA affiliation, and when linked with photographs appearing in the media, would confirm identity as well. I appreciate plans apparently under consideration by Committee staff to prohibit television and still photography of Agency employees, but I question whether these plans are workable or seemly for an Agency official.

Apart from the public disclosure of the identities of our personnel, we are deeply concerned about the kinds of information our witnesses may be asked to furnish in open session. Even with detailed advance preparation and negotiations with staff, there is no way to ensure that a Member will not press for an answer that would require the revelation of highly sensitive information. In short, there would be no way to control the course of an interrogation being played out in public. In this regard, there are rules and safeguards built into the Resolutions establishing the Committees themselves (especially on the Senate side) that require Congressional compliance with detailed procedures in connection with any demand for open session disclosure of classified identities and/or information.

Finally, the appearance of clandestine service employees in public hearings would risk serious consequences for our relationships overseas and our ability to conduct clandestine operations.

For all these reasons, I urge your careful consideration of this issue. I know that the Congress shares with the Executive Branch the goal of making U.S. intelligence as strong as possible. We also share the belief that U.S. intelligence should operate under vigorous Congressional scrutiny. At the same time, an effective secret intelligence agency must remain secret. I ask the Committees to join us in keeping it that way and request an opportunity to discuss this matter further before any final decision is made to call as a witness any member of the Agency's clandestine service. A copy of this letter is also being provided to Ranking Minority Member Cheney.

Sincerely,



Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

10 APR 1987

OCA 87-1246

The Honorable David L. Boren, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing in response to your letter of 26 March on the need for effective oversight of covert action programs. We are prepared to work with the Committee on a mutually agreeable approach to achieve your objective, recognizing that care must be taken to ensure the confidentiality of these very sensitive activities is protected from compromise.

We believe your suggestion on the creation of a special audit and investigations unit, integral to the Committee staff, is a particularly promising approach. Our experience with selected special investigations undertaken by the oversight committees has generally been positive. Such a unit would provide a credible independent arm for Committee review of covert action programs, and would have the added advantage of working at the exclusive direction of the Committee which would ensure the appropriate security safeguards for these sensitive activities.

I suggest our staffs jointly examine such an approach in more depth and develop appropriate recommendations and guidelines for our consideration. Carroll Hauver, our Inspector General, and Dan Childs, our Comptroller, are prepared to work with your staff on this matter.

A copy of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Cohen.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

OCA 87-1665
24 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director

FROM: Dave Gries [redacted]

SUBJECT: Weekly Report

HPSCI Markup: HPSCI finished its markup. We took slightly less than a 4% cut. [redacted]

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Arms Control: The SSCI staff is raising with the Chairman and Vice Chairman the possibility of sequential referral of all arms control legislation. The objective is to make the SSCI a more active player, allowing the Committee to provide "thoughtful advice" and to consider fully the intelligence implications of such legislation. If the Senate leadership agrees, the SSCI will be asking for more support from us in the future. [redacted]

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Status of Planned Hearings on Stokes/Boland (H.R. 1013): HPSCI informs us that no plans exist to have any further public hearings on Stokes/Boland--the bill which would set a 48-hour reporting limit on covert action Findings--until the first week of June. CIA will probably be asked to supply a witness. [redacted]

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More on GAO: The staff of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee has completed drafting legislation that would require GAO auditing of the Agency. Prior to finalizing the draft the staffers plan to hold consultations with SSCI and with us. We are working in concert with SSCI to block harmful provisions. Committee staffers say that impetus for the bill comes from Senator Glenn, not from staff. Senator Glenn has told us the opposite. [redacted]

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3 April 1987

OCA 87-1292

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director

FROM: Dave Gries

SUBJECT: Weekly Report

Confirmation Hearing: The FBI informed us that the White House murder board for Webster is set for Monday afternoon in the Ward Room. There will also be a walk through on the Hill on Tuesday at 2 p.m. Whether a murder board will be held over the weekend remains to be decided. We continue to supply information as required. The interrogatory on Iran is apparently approaching completion, and we expect to be furnished with a copy on Monday. We are told that Specter has his prosecutorial hat on again.

House Hearing on HR 1013 (Stokes/Boland Bill): The Legislation Subcommittee of HPSCI held a public hearing on the Stokes/Boland Bill on Wednesday, 1 April. Witnesses included former DCIs Colby and Turner and former DDI Cline. All of them opposed the Bill's key feature which would require the President to report all Findings in writing to the Congress within 48 hours of signature. Majority Leader Wright strongly supported the Bill, and Minority Leader Michel opposed it--pointing out that the effort to notify key Members could in itself provide a tip off that something was in the works.

GAO Again: We have drafted responses to two recent GAO probes. On the House side, we wrote the GAO Associate Director repeating our traditional position. In addition, we have learned that both Stokes and Wilson have contacted Gray and asked to put a hold on his efforts regarding GAO until CIA has an opportunity to brief him [redacted]. On the Senate side, we spoke to Glenn, who is chairman of the pertinent Government Affairs Subcommittee, and arranged to meet with his staff director regarding Glenn's sponsorship of legislation forcing us under the GAO umbrella. Concurrently, we have drafted a letter to Boren and Cohen for your signature that describes steps that SSCI could take to strengthen its capabilities to perform audits.

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STATEMENT OF DAVID GRIES
DIRECTOR OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee. The CIA supports the Administration's opposition to H.R. 1013. The Agency believes the present system is working well and that additional legislative remedies are not necessary.

Let me first briefly describe the current system. As you know, the Agency has an informal agreement with your committee and the SSCI to provide notification of Presidential findings within 48 hours of the Agency receiving a signed copy of the finding.

--The committee has received advance word of every Presidential finding but for the two involving the attempted rescue of our hostages in Iran in 1979-1980



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In addition, your committee and the SSCI are furnished with the full text of each Presidential finding and an advisory that further explains the scope of the finding. The Agency also answers numerous questions submitted for the record regarding covert actions and conducts an annual review of covert action programs for your committee and the SSCI. Finally, the Agency has a written agreement with the SSCI that provides for notification of certain activities implementing an already approved covert action. The HPSCI is, of course, notified of any activity that requires notification of the SSCI.

H.R. 1013 would attempt to formalize the process by requiring that: 1) Presidential Findings be in writing; 2) copies of all findings be provided to the HPSCI, SSCI, Vice-President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the DCI; and deferral of notice of significant intelligence activities (covert actions) be limited to 48 hours after a finding is signed. Let me address each point separately.

CIA agrees that as a matter of policy Presidential findings should be reduced to writing, and as a practical matter it has been our experience that findings are reduced to writing. I know of no exceptions.

--Nonetheless, we join the Administration in opposing a provision that would prevent the President from taking immediate action in a crisis unless and until his decision was in writing.

However, in such a situation where it is necessary to make a decision quickly to save life, we would certainly support the establishment of a system whereby any oral finding made by the President is reduced to writing within 24 hours.

With respect to dissemination of copies of findings, the current practice is to provide State, Defense, HPSCI, and SSCI with the full text of the finding, albeit not the actual signed copy of the finding.

--H.R. 1013 would require that the President make the signed copy available. It is not apparent to us what additional benefits would be gained by requiring the dissemination of signed copies of all findings.

Furthermore, since directing the President to provide copies of findings to other executive branch officials also raises concerns with respect to erosion of executive prerogatives we, therefore, also must defer to the White House on this provision.

Finally, the requirement that notice of Presidential findings be deferred no later than 48 hours after the finding is signed is the most troublesome provision in the proposed bill. As I have stated, our current practice is to provide notification of a Presidential finding prior to its implementation and within 48 hours of our receiving the signed copy of the finding. In most instances, the requirement in H.R. 1013 that notice be provided within 48 hours of signing as opposed to within 48 hours of our receiving the signed copy would be acceptable.

--However, there might be a situation someday where the President may deem it necessary or appropriate to delay notification for more than 48 hours.

--Moreover, the rigid 48-hour requirement in the bill poses a number of practical problems for us; for example, in instances when the President signs a finding while travelling outside Washington, the 48-hour notification requirement of H.R. 1013 would force the Agency to notify the committees of a finding which the Agency did not have in its physical possession.

We would be very reluctant to do this, given the circumstances that the wording of findings sometimes change right before the time of the signing. We have always considered it prudent to

make a determination ourselves on whether the wording of the finding has been changed in order to ensure that the Congress receives a complete and accurate text.

In summary, rather than restrict the authority of the President to delay notification and place a requirement on the Agency which would be difficult if not impossible to meet if the President signs a finding while travelling, I would urge the Committee to work with the Agency and White House to establish general standards under which decisions to delay notice will be made. These standards must reflect the principle that notification cannot be delayed except in rare instances and for only a very short period of time without placing in jeopardy the relationship of trust which we are trying to establish with the committee.

Let me also suggest that a procedure should be instituted within the Executive Branch which would require periodic review on the record of findings for which a decision to delay notice has been made. The purpose of the review would be to determine whether the circumstances that required a delay in notice to the oversight committees are still present. I also recommend that in those very rare situations requiring that knowledge of a covert activity be kept to an absolute minimum because

disclosure will result in loss of life, we should strive to make greater use of the limited notification procedure provided in section 501 of the Oversight Act. This is a more satisfactory option than delaying notification.

This concludes my statement.

FROM: [Redacted] Office of Congressional Affairs		EXTENSION	NO. OCA 87-1877	STAT STAT
			DATE 4 May 1987	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. D/OCA				We have just learned that HPSCI has hired a new lawyer to look into our personnel policies and practices.
2.				
3. EXDIR				This has been coordinated with [Redacted] OCA; [Redacted] D/Comptroller; and [Redacted] O/Personnel.
4.				
5. ADCI				
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7.				
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7 May 1987

FYI - Mr. Gries briefed Mr. Gates orally on this; he did not give him the memo.

~~SECRET~~

4 May 1987
OCA 87-1877

NOTE FOR: The Acting Director

VIA: Dave Gries

FROM:

25X1

SUBJECT: Addendum to Your Agenda for Your Meeting
with Representatives Stokes and Hyde

When you meet with HPSCI Chairman Louis Stokes (D., OH) and Ranking Republican Henry Hyde (R., IL) on 6 May at 0900, you may want to sound them out on language the Committee has included in its version of the Authorization Bill that directs that a three-member Commission on Intelligence Personnel Systems be established to conduct a comprehensive review and analysis of all personnel management and compensation systems affecting the Intelligence Community. The Commission would be composed of three persons from outside Government--one appointed by the President, one by House Speaker Wright, and one by Senate Majority Leader Byrd. They would have nine months to complete their report.

You may want to express your concern that such a Commission is premature in view of the fact that the Agency is already embarked on consultations with DIA and NSA as we progress on our own internal personnel study and identify areas of concern that we believe are generic within the Community. We believe that we are moving in a careful and consistent fashion to develop a wise personnel strategy that will identify our needs and create innovative steps to meet them. We have been consulting regularly with Committee staff as well, and you expect to be returning to the Committee with a report on our findings, to seek their views, and to consult on any legislation that may be needed.

For your information, we have been told that the SSCI finds the HPSCI suggestion "pernicious," and you need to gauge whether the Committee Members (or only staff) are really committed to derailing our personnel plans.

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Note that §102(b)(1) of the legislation directs DoD to exclude DIA and DMA non-headquarters personnel from the reductions directed in the 1986 ReD Reorganization Act. It would also seem to exclude the headquarters personnel of these two agencies from those mandated reductions, but that is not entirely clear from the way the language has been crafted -- suggest give us an opinion on this.

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The legislation also incorporates the HPSCI's annual language (§ 104) barring the use of NFIP funds and personnel for the Nicaraguan Assistance effort in FY 1988, unless specifically authorized by this or subsequent legislation; the final chapter on that issue will be written later this summer when the Administration formally submits its request for continued aid to the Contras.

Section 105 is real "legalese" - clearly an effort to retroactively close the books on last year's battle with the HAC over the \$125 million issue and appropriations for "unauthorized" projects, but there must be an easier way!!

The "Commission on Intelligence Personnel Systems", which I mentioned in a previous note, makes its appearance in Title VI of the legislation at page 15. The Commission will consist of 3 people from outside Government -- one appointed by the President (who will be the Chairperson), one by the Speaker of the House (Rep. Wright), and one by the Majority Leader of the Senate (Sen. Byrd). The bill provides for an Executive Director and Commission staff, and authorizes the detail of staff to the Commission from the Intelligence Community. It will be funded with \$500K from the IC Staff budget for FY 88, and its charter is to

"conduct a comprehensive review and comparative analysis of all personnel management and compensation systems affecting civilian personnel of agencies and other entities of the intelligence community with a view to determining the adequacy of existing personnel systems and any changes that should be made in such systems."

The bill requires a report no later than 9 months from the date of its enactment, setting forth the Commission's findings, conclusions, and any recommendations (including legislation).

1 **TITLE VI—STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE**

2 **PERSONNEL SYSTEMS**

3 **COMMISSION ON INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEMS**

4 **SEC. 601. (a) ESTABLISHMENT; PURPOSE.**—There is
5 hereby established a commission to be known as the Commis-
6 sion on Intelligence Personnel Systems. The Commission
7 shall conduct a comprehensive review and comparative anal-
8 ysis of all personnel management and compensation systems
9 affecting civilian personnel of agencies and other entities of
10 the intelligence community with a view to determining the
11 adequacy of existing personnel systems and any changes that
12 should be made in such systems.

13 **(b) MEMBERS.**—(1) The Commission shall consist of
14 three members. The President, the Speaker of the House of
15 Representatives (after consultation with the minority leader
16 of the House), and the majority leader of the Senate (after
17 consultation with the minority leader of the Senate) shall
18 each appoint one member. The member appointed by the
19 President shall be the chairman of the Commission.

20 (2) Members of the Commission shall be appointed from
21 among persons outside the Government who by reason of
22 training, background, education, and experience in intelli-
23 gence matters and personnel systems are highly qualified to
24 study the matters described in subsection (a).

1 **(3) Members of the Commission shall be paid at the**
2 **daily equivalent of the rate of basic pay payable for level IV**
3 **of the Executive Schedule for each day (including traveltime)**
4 **that they are engaged in the business of the Commission.**

5 **(4) A member of the Commission shall not be considered**
6 **to be a Federal employee except for purposes of—**

7 **(A) chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, re-**
8 **lating to compensation for work-related injuries; and**

9 **(B) chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code,**
10 **relating to tort claims.**

11 **(c) STAFF.—(1) The Commission may (without regard**
12 **to section 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code) appoint an**
13 **executive director, who shall be paid at a rate not to exceed**
14 **the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive**
15 **Schedule.**

16 **(2) The Commission may appoint such additional staff as**
17 **it considers appropriate. Such personnel shall be paid at a**
18 **rate not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for grade**
19 **GS-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5,**
20 **United States Code.**

21 **(3) The executive director and staff of the Commission**
22 **may be appointed without regard to the provisions of title 5,**
23 **United States Code, governing appointments in the executive**
24 **branch and may be paid without regard to the provisions of**

1 chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title
2 relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.

3 (4) The Commission may procure temporary and inter-
4 mittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United
5 States Code.

6 (d) SUPPORT.—Upon request of the Commission, the
7 Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Intelli-
8 gence Community Staff, and the heads of the elements of the
9 intelligence community may detail personnel under their ju-
10 risdiction to the Commission to assist the Commission in car-
11 rying out its duties under this section and may provide to the
12 Commission such administrative support services as the
13 Commission may require.

14 (e) FUNDING.—Of the amount available to the Intelli-
15 gence Community Staff for fiscal year 1988 under section
16 201, \$500,000 shall be available for the Commission.

17 (f) REPORT.—Not later than nine months after the date
18 of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to
19 the President and to Congress a report setting forth its find-
20 ings and conclusions and such recommendation (including
21 recommendations for legislation) as the Commission considers
22 appropriate.

○

13 Legislative Liaison

RECEIPT NO. H4



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Commission on Intel Personnel Systems

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SECTION

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David Gries, D/OCA/CIA, Rm 7B24

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77-1822

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10. Constituent Inquiries Officer		
11.		
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SUSPENSE

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Name/Date

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H 1706

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

March 31, 1988

mir during my trip to the Soviet Union in October 1985 and his son Alexander resides in the Philadelphia area.

Vladimir and his wife, Mariya, have been trying to emigrate for some 17 years, but have been refused because of Vladimir's supposed access to Soviet national secrets. His alleged exposure to secrets stems from his work 17 years ago as head of the Moscow Television Research Institute. Despite the fact that his knowledge of Soviet television technology is 17 years old, that such knowledge was only arguably tied to any military matter, and that others who worked with him on the same projects have been allowed to emigrate, he has been listed as ineligible to emigrate. Clearly, the Soviet position on this case is untenable, and it suggests that the other denials are equally supportable.

Last Friday, Vladimir's son Alexander initiated a 17-day hunger strike on behalf of his parents. The 17 days are symbolic of the 17 years of refusal that his parents have endured. The deprivation that Alexander is now inflicting on himself symbolizes the 17 years of deprivation of freedom that his parents have suffered—including periods of exile and imprisonment. When Vladimir learned of his son's plans, he too started a 17-day fast. Alexander is carrying out his hunger strike by the fountains on the east side of the Capitol, and I heartily encourage my colleagues to show their support by visiting with him.

Mr. Speaker, General Secretary Gorbachev may have moved forward a few steps with some of his recent actions. It remains to be seen just how far he will go. What is clear, however, is that the distance he must ultimately travel to dispel all doubts and demonstrate true change is far, far indeed.

Mrs. SCHROEDER, I join my distinguished colleagues today in calling on the Soviet Union to put substance into their Glasnost policy. I am especially concerned with the continued refusal by the U.S.S.R. to grant an exit visa to Ida Nudel.

For 15 years Ms. Nudel has been seeking an exit visa so that she may join her sister, Ilana Fridman, in Israel. She has assisted other refuseniks and their families. For her efforts, she has been denied an exit visa repeatedly, treated violently, arrested, tried and sentenced to exile in Siberia, where she lived for 4 years. While there, she was beaten and then housed in a barrack lacking electricity, water, and heat at a time when temperatures dropped to 40 degrees below zero.

When Ms. Nudel returned to Moscow, she was not allowed to live in her home. It is often difficult for refuseniks to find a place to stay, so it took her several months to find a place in Bendery, Moldavia.

I am very concerned about the conditions under which Ms. Nudel is living now. Recent reports indicate she has been harassed in her efforts to obtain medical care. Her sister has told us that people are afraid to be her friend and that she is very lonely.

I hope that the Soviet Union will take the humanitarian route and give Ms. Nudel an exit visa soon so that she may be reunited with her family.

Mr. LENT. Mr. Speaker, the American public has recently become aware of a new trend in Soviet policy known as Glasnost or the democratization of Soviet society. Initiated by the Soviet Union's General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Glasnost has been widely hailed as a

demonstration of Soviet commitment to human rights and freedom.

In truth, Glasnost could prove the most significant threat yet to human rights and freedoms in the Soviet Union. I am concerned that Gorbachev's call for openness may lull us into a false sense of complacency regarding the need for continued action on behalf of the Soviet Jews. I understand that the March figure for Soviet emigration of Jews was the highest monthly figure in 5 years. That is encouraging. However, the 400 visas given out in March are only the tip of the iceberg. We cannot forget that there are hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews still desperately seeking to emigrate.

In addition, we must not forget the persecution and vicious anti-Semitism which prevades Soviet society. Indeed, even now—during this so-called democratization—Hebrew teachers in the U.S.S.R. are routinely arrested, harassed and sent to prison, as are the many prisoners-of-conscience who vigorously protest human rights violations in that country. There are also the refuseniks who are relentlessly persecuted and whose only crime is their sincere desire to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

We must not relax our efforts to secure human rights and freedom for the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews wishig to leave the Soviet Union. As long as these individuals are living under such oppression and persecution, Glasnost is nothing but an empty promise.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous matter on the subject of my special order today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ERDREICH). Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Maryland?

There was no objection.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE: ENHANCING THE WORLD'S COMMON SECURITY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. BROWN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speaker, over the past 2 months, in a series of special order speeches, I have addressed various aspects of the Nation's space program. On February 26, I provided a detailed analysis of how the Nation's overall space effort has become increasingly controlled by the military, and how it is being diverted toward the goal of developing instruments for space warfare. Today, I will carry my discussion one step further, by exploring security-enhancing alternatives to an arms race in space.

As a starting point, I would like to focus quickly on the concept of national security. Doing so seems only fitting in any discussion of programs aimed at contributing to America's security interests.

Fundamentally, we all have a sense of what national security is. The term implies protection of the Nation from external threats while maintaining the health, integrity and economic well-being of our society. Justifiably, the term could be applied to any number of programs aimed at ensuring the continued vigor and prosperity of America. Practically speaking, however, the term "national security" is generally used in a much more limited fashion.

In its most common usage, national security is the catchall phrase used to defend the need for new weapons systems. A quick search through the annals of this political institution would show the term "national security" affixed to more weapons systems than to any other program or activity. Weapons systems such as the Minute man, Pershing, and MX missiles; the B-1, B-52, and Stealth bombers; the Polaris, Poseidon, and Trident submarines; these—and many, many more—have been advanced by the Pentagon and then advocated by politicians as being "essential" in order to maintain the national security of the United States.

Throughout the period of developing and deploying these weapons, however, little attention has been given to whether our investments are actually making us feel more secure. While many argue that our nuclear arsenal has, indeed, brought security benefits and others argue that it is the Soviet Union's defense buildup that has prevented us from meeting our security objectives, I think most of us realize that the past 40 years of pursuing national security has left us less secure at each new turn of the United States-Soviet arms race.

Despite the hundreds of billions of dollars invested in defense programs year after year, national security remains an illusive goal; indeed, it has become an increasingly unreachable goal as new weapons—once deployed by both superpowers—have simply spawned new insecurities. Increasingly accurate land-based nuclear missiles with multiple warheads, cruise missiles small enough to be carried on any surface vessel, strategic bombers increasingly invisible to radar detection—these developments, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, are not allowing any of us to sleep better at night.

Although people are reluctant to admit it—given the enormous investments we have made in building our nuclear arsenal—we live today in a world which has made traditional notions of security obsolete, in which the continued development and refinement of our nuclear arsenal is simply irrational. Whereas the weapons of yesteryear had limited capabilities and limited implications when used, today, the entire firepower of World War II can be unleashed by a single nuclear bomb. That firepower can be delivered to essentially any spot on the globe in

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a matter of minutes. And there are enough nuclear weapons in the world to recreate the explosive power of more than 6,000 World War II's.

These weapons of global scale, deliverable in a brutally short timeframe, have forced us into an era in which we simply cannot continue to think according to the conventional terms of national security. Those terms have suggested that a single nation's security can be maintained independent of the security of other nations. We must now think in terms of common security. For we live in a time when U.S. security is inextricably linked to the security of nations around the globe. If world war III comes, regardless of where it starts and who starts it, it could well determine the fate of all 159 nations on this planet.

All nations thus share the same desire to prevent such a war. All nations face a common threat to their continued survival. This is an unprecedented reality that must be reflected in our security planning.

And it's not simply the nuclear threat that is melding the security of all nations into one. The possibility of environmental crises of global dimensions also has a grasp on the world's collective destiny. A warming up of the atmosphere due to the continued burning of fossil fuels, depletion of the ozone layer as a result of fluorocarbon interactions, changes in the climate due to population stresses on the environment—these and other environmental threats are of real and immediate concern. Within the next 50 to 100 years—a minuscule time period in terms of human history—environmental crises could have devastating impacts on the security of the United States, and the security of nations around the world. Here again, security must be seen in global, and not simply national, terms.

With this said, let me now turn to the space program, which I am convinced could play a vital role in helping the world move away from its outdated, nationalistic notions of security, and toward the fundamental requirements of common security.

At the present time, the Nation's space program, unfortunately, is being carried by the currents of thought that have dominated U.S. "security" planning over the past 40 years. Preparation for space warfare has become one of the top "national security" priorities of this administration. The development of antisatellite [ASAT] weapons and the strategic defense initiative [SDI] are the means to that end. Yet, the putative benefits of such developments are likely to be just as evanescent as have been the avowed benefits of so many weapons programs paid for by the American public in the past. As explained in my February 26 special order address, preparing for space warfare will simply bring greater and greater insecurity, at higher and higher costs.

Our space program could take a different path, however. It could forge a path that truly did enhance our security, and also provided security dividends for people living far beyond our Nation's borders. Such a path is what I would like to explore today.

In my view, there are three distinct and necessary areas of space activity that should be pursued to enhance global security. One would be aimed at global peacekeeping, through the development of an international satellite-based arms control verification and crisis management system. A second would be aimed at global resource analysis and management, through the creation of an array of space observatories designed to monitor environmental change on the planet and study the Earth as a unified system. And a third would be aimed at breaking new ground in the United States-Soviet relationship through international cooperative efforts in space of an unprecedented nature, including a manned mission to the planet Mars.

Let me elaborate on these three proposals, starting with the use of space activities for peacekeeping purposes.

The role of space technologies in contributing to enhanced security arrangements has been clear since the first nuclear detection satellite was placed in orbit by the United States on October 17, 1963. Seven days later, the United States signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union and Britain, with the knowledge that it had just launched into space the means of ensuring compliance with the treaty. This development, in many ways, was foreshadowed by President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal made nearly a decade earlier.

It was in 1955 that Eisenhower, speaking at a Geneva Disarmament Convention, proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union allow aerial photography of each other's nation so as to help reduce the possibility of nuclear war stemming from either miscalculation or misguided fears about the other's military capabilities. Eisenhower offered use of the U-2 reconnaissance plane as a means of helping create the record of this information, but Soviet Premier Khrushchev rejected the proposal as a disguised plan to spy on the Soviet Union.

Overtime, however, both nations mounted extensive satellite photoreconnaissance systems that lead, de facto, to a partial realization of Eisenhower's "open skies" initiative. While Eisenhower had proposed that the United Nations be the coordinating agency for the analysis of information about each other's military capabilities and facilities, both nations instead developed agencies of their own to conduct such activities.

Over the past 25 years, photoreconnaissance from space has advanced to an incredible degree. The first spy satellites were not very precise, failing to

meet the quality of images taken from the U-2 spy plane. Indeed, it took a number of years and numerous satellites to reach the capability of the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, which stopped in 1960 with the shooting down of Gary Powers.

The KH [Keyhole]-8 satellite, first launched in August 1966, reportedly had a resolution of 6 inches, sufficient to detect objects as small as a paperback book from 145 miles in space. With this capability in place, President Johnson in 1966 approached Soviet officials about negotiating limits on strategic nuclear weapons. The SALT I talks began 2 years later. By the time those talks concluded in 1972, the United States had launched its KH-9 satellite, which added further capabilities for monitoring compliance with the SALT I and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaties.

In contrast to the KH-8 satellite, designed to provide imagery at very high resolutions, the KH-9, also called Big Bird, was designed for taking area surveillance images of larger areas with a resolution measured in feet, not inches. In 1976, the United States launched the KH-11 satellite, which combined both close-look and area surveillance on a single satellite, and also introduced digital imagery technology—an entirely new method of photoreconnaissance and interpretation. Rather than involving the ejection of film canisters by the satellite, and their subsequent capture in the atmosphere by aircraft, the KH-11 collects images electronically and transmits them directly to the ground via a communications relay satellite. And it does this in near real time, providing images of events virtually while they occur. The KH-11 technology represented a revolutionary advance in photoreconnaissance from space.

The newest addition to the U.S. spy satellite inventory will be the KH-12, which some say will render even the KH-11 obsolete. According to press accounts, the KH-12, scheduled for one of the first space shuttle launches in 1988, will have a resolution of less than 4 inches. This might be sufficient to determine whether a person sitting in Red Square was reading the newspaper Pravda or Izestia. The KH-12 will also be able to see in the dark using thermal infrared sensors.

Future photoreconnaissance satellites will possess even better capabilities. For instance, sensors are being developed that would collect simultaneous images in as many as 200 or more contiguous spectral bands along the electromagnetic spectrum. A multi-spectral scanner of this form, enormously more sophisticated than any in use today, would represent an incredible breakthrough in the identification and characterization of Earth objects from space, since every substance has slightly different radiation characteristics.

Applications for such sensors will be enormous. For example, sensors of this sort might enable determinations of the precise metals—whether titanium, aluminum, or steel—out of which Soviet weapons are built. Such information would provide insight into the performance of those weapons. The sensors might also enable the characterization of gaseous emissions from Soviet factories to determine whether they are involved in chemical weapons production.

Also under development for future reconnaissance satellites are radar sensors that could take images at night and through cloud cover. Radar imaging satellites will also be able to provide subsurface information, since radar transmissions can penetrate a certain distance into soils and water. And while these and other advances in sensor development are underway, great breakthroughs in computer enhancement and manipulation techniques can be expected, which will enable the extraction of even more information from collected images.

What I have provided here is simply a cursory look at the evolving capabilities of some of the Nation's photoreconnaissance satellite systems, based on accounts taken from books available to the public, the *New York Times* and magazines such as *IEEE Spectrum*. The full details of these satellites remain highly classified. Indeed, even of the office that designs, builds, and operates these satellites is officially classified, although anyone can read about the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO] in various unclassified articles, reports and books.

One can also read about Soviet photoreconnaissance satellites in unclassified literature. What becomes apparent from reviewing both the United States and Soviet spy satellite networks is that these highly secret spacecraft have had a major stabilizing effect on the superpower relationship. They have helped reduce surprises and eliminate exaggerated, worst-case fears. They have made arms control agreements possible and have created a situation where surprise attacks resulting from the mobilization of conventional forces would be impossible. In sum, these satellites have helped keep the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Satellites such as these could help keep the peace between many more nations if they were not under the exclusive control of the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is this realization that gave rise to initial proposals in the late 1970's for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, which would carry the existing bipolar, United States-Soviet open skies arrangement to its next logical step, an era of global open skies.

In 1978, the French Government proposed the creation of an international system of surveillance satellites to monitor arms control agreements and help safeguard against military

crises. The proposal was quickly rejected by both the United States and the Soviet Union, with United States officials claiming such a system would be unworkable and too costly. But that rejection made at a time when the superpowers maintained a clear monopoly on high-resolution remote sensing satellites, and that monopoly no longer exists.

In February 1986, the French launched their SPOT satellite, with a 10-meter resolution, and they have plans for four more civilian remote sensing satellites. The Japanese, Canadians, Indians, and the European Space Agency also are in the process of developing earth observation satellites. The news media has a growing interest in high resolution photos from space as well, and may launch a remote sensing satellite of their own in the not too distant future. What this means is that, just as Soviet opposition to Eisenhower's open skies proposal was overcome by the passage of time so too will the superpowers' rejection of an international open skies era be overtaken by events.

An international satellite-based verification system is, de facto, coming into being. Within a decade, most the pieces for such a system will be in place. A multinational array of satellites capable of providing high resolution images will be in orbit within the next 10 to 15 years. Ground receiving stations for these satellites will be located around the globe. The technology for image processing will also be widely available. The only missing element will be the organizational framework for utilizing the information for peacekeeping purposes, and this is where the United States should assume a leadership role.

The United States should recognize that the era of United States-Soviet control over remote sensing from space has ended. Moreover, it should realize that this is a constructive development in terms of global security. A global information network, providing near real time high resolution images of the entire planet to anyone interested in such information, could help create the foundation for new ways of preventing conflict. It could help preclude wars brought on by misunderstanding or miscalculation. The information gathered by such a system could provide the basis for monitoring border disputes, cease-fire agreements, peacekeeping arrangements, and demilitarized zones. It could provide the conditions for new international legal protections for the security of all nations. Quite simply, it would enhance the world's common security.

To help facilitate a global peacekeeping system such as this, a number of actions by the United States are necessary. The United States should stop pretending that its system for taking high resolution images from space is something that nobody knows about; and instead, become an aggressive

international promoter of remote sensing as a means of helping enhance global security and international stability. It could do this in a variety of ways.

First, by relaxing existing regulations on the allowable resolution levels for civilian-launched remote sensing satellites. This limit, presently at 10 meters, will be bypassed anyway by other countries in the near future. Second, by initiating discussions within the Government and with other nations on how best to set up an international agency responsible for verifying arms control agreements and managing military conflicts. And third, by lowering the veil of secrecy that has been draped for far too long over the National Reconnaissance Office and its operations.

The original circumstances that lead to establishing such a tight security blanket around our space photoreconnaissance systems are simply no longer valid. A transparency revolution has been well underway for years, making objects and actions on the face of the Earth increasingly observable to anyone interested. Yet, those in control of the Nation's space reconnaissance program seem eternally locked into an ancient era, an era when the public couldn't go to their corner bookstores or local libraries to pick up a dozen books with information about photoreconnaissance and the NRO. The stealth and secrecy attached to their efforts has reached almost comical proportions.

For more than 20 years, it has been widely known that the United States operates reconnaissance satellites. Yet, it wasn't until 1978 when President Carter made the first public admission of this fact. Today, more than a decade after the first flight of the KH-11, United States officials still refuse to acknowledge the existence of the satellite, even though since 1977 the Soviet Union has owned a KH-11 operator's manual—complete with information about the satellite's characteristics, capabilities and limitations. The manual was purchased for \$3,000 from a former CIA officer.

The NRO has filled warehouses with images of the planet from space, yet access to these images is tightly constrained to only those intelligence officers with a "need to know." Yet, this "need to know" restriction is artificially constraining access to what, to a considerable degree, should be a public resource. The American public has as much "need to know" about military, economic and agricultural developments around the world—as revealed in high resolution remote sensing images—as does anyone within the intelligence communities. Not only do they have a "need to know," they have a right to know. They are the ones who have spent tens of billions of dollars on this information-gathering system.

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The American public should be allowed to learn of the powerful peacekeeping activities of the NRO. They should have the opportunity to incorporate into their understanding of the world real images of the Soviet Union, in the place of the speculative conceptions presently governing the public's view of that country and its people. The images archived by the NRO also would have substantial economic and historical value if made available to the public and to industry for analysis. Those images are loaded with information of commercial value. And while all the details of the NRO's activities—and everything with their archives—certainly need not be revealed, wider knowledge of them would help rebuild support for the arms control process and help lead to an international appreciation for the peacekeeping contributions of remote sensing satellites.

One can be sure that those who have helped maintain secrecy and control over intelligence gathering satellites during the past two decades—both in the United States and the Soviet Union—will be reluctant to forfeit that control now. A clear demonstration of that reluctance was recently seen when the Pentagon voiced strong objections to proposed regulations that would increase the media's access to remotely sensed data. But it should be emphasized once again that the monopoly which once existed over these technologies, exists no more.

Stansfield Turner, former Director of the CIA, predicts that, "it will not be long before we reach the point where all satellite photography will be so good that the differences between various models—from different countries . . . will be insignificant." Turner, who participated in the United States decision to reject the 1978 French open skies proposal, now feels the decision was a mistake. He thinks the United States should move promptly to help establish such a system.

So, too, does another former high-ranking CIA official, Ray Cline, who has written recently that an international satellite monitoring system would be highly beneficial for United States and global security, as well as for helping provide information for the economic advancement of the developing world.

As time goes on, the case for an international network of peacekeeping satellites will only get stronger. Technical, political and market forces are all pushing in the direction of opening up the remote sensing field. Faced with these conditions, it is in the best interests of the United States—a Nation premised on the free flow of information—to step forward now and provide leadership in creating a global "open skies" system. A 1981 United Nations study of the French proposal estimated the cost to be \$2.5 billion (1980 dollars) over a 10-year period for the launch and operation of a three-satellite system. While this might

seem expensive, it would represent a drop in the bucket compared to what the two superpowers already spend on intelligence-gathering satellites in the name of national security. A modest evolution from this system would give the capability for essentially continuous coverage of every spot on the face of the globe.

Let me now turn from the topic of peacekeeping from space, to the topic of environmental management from space.

As I mentioned earlier, the world's communal destiny is not simply threatened by the potential outbreak of nuclear war, it is also threatened by the possibility of environmental crises of global and dimensions.

As the world's population has pressed beyond 5 billion, on its way to 6 billion by the year 2000, there are growing indications that human activities are creating major and potentially hazardous changes on the Earth, oceans and atmosphere. These changes could reach catastrophic proportions within the next century. Evidence of such change can be seen in all directions.

For example, we already know that acid rain caused by the combustion of fossil fuels in automobiles and power plants is having a devastating impact on the forests of central Europe. Studies have shown that more than one-third of the trees of West Germany have suffered damage from airborne pollutants. According to some scientists, vast regions of European forestland will become wasteland within the next few decades as a result of these pollutants.

Fossil fuel combustion also is releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere on a scale likely to cause dramatic shifts in the Earth's climate. Measurements taken over the past few decades have shown a steady, annual increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. If this trend continues, some scientists predict a warming of the Earth by 3 degrees to 8 degrees Fahrenheit over the next 50 years. This could lead to a melting of the polar ice caps and the subsequent flooding of coastal regions around the globe.

Recent studies of the upper atmosphere over Antarctica indicate that the Earth's ozone layer is being depleted on a seasonal basis. Whether this is the consequence of using fluorocarbons in the atmosphere, as many scientists have predicted, is not known.

Nor is it known whether population pressures in Africa—which have led to the desertification of vast regions—may be having a direct, and adverse impact on the climatic conditions of that continent, although theories support this view. While a link between population growth and climate change has been discounted by scientists in the past, a recent study of the question lead a Canadian meteorologist, Kenneth Hare, to conclude: "We seem to have arrived at a critical moment in the history of mankind's relation to

climate. For the first time we may be on the threshold of man-induced climate change." If this is true, the impacts could be momentous, affecting the Earth's ecosystems in a fashion that we simply cannot presently predict.

Our inability to forecast the implications of human-induced global change stems from our vast ignorance of how in fact we are disturbing our surroundings. Yet, knowledge about such issues could be absolutely vital for our security and our survival in the 21st century. Increasingly, this fact is being recognized by scientists throughout the United States and the world, scientists who are now calling for an international study of the Earth through the use of a network of permanent satellite observatories in space, as well as through ground-based instrumentation around the globe. Satellites provide a unique ability to study and monitor the Earth as never before.

Scientists at the National Science Foundation, National Academy of Sciences, and NASA have endorsed a study of the Earth from space, a study which goes by a variety of names, including the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program, Global Change, and Global Geosciences. A report issued recently by the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences refers to such a study as a mission to planet Earth, and outlines the project as including five to six platforms in geostationary orbit and two in low-Earth polar orbits for continuous observations of the entire Earth.

Through the use of space-based sensors of a variety of kinds, scientists could conduct a simultaneous study of the Earth's climate, the oceans, the biosphere, the dynamics of the continents, and the geochemical cycles of all the major nutrients—in short, a study of the entire planet as an integrated whole. Such a study would require cooperation among scientists from every part of the world, and would no doubt be one of the largest cooperative endeavors in the history of science. The benefits from such an effort could be enormous. As stated in one NASA document endorsing the global change research effort, "If pursued with resolve and commitment, this research program will bring us rewards of knowledge as dramatic, and as relevant to humankind, as any in scientific history."

Such a prediction seems entirely warranted. The information emerging from such a study would enable the world's decisionmakers to get a solid grasp on how humans are disturbing their lifesupport system: planet Earth. Such information might enable us to predict with confidence environmental problems in advance, allowing the formulation of policies to head off or blunt impending catastrophes. A project that provided such opportunities would, without question, be a security-enhancing endeavor for the

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entire world. It would provide security against threats that are certain to loom larger and larger in the future unless we act soon to confront them in an international, multidisciplinary and large-scale fashion. Now is the time to start such a study, while we still have time to respond.

The building blocks for a global change project are certainly available. NASA has operated Earth observing satellites since the early 1960's. An international network of weather monitoring satellites are in place. A joint United States-French ocean observation satellite will be launched in 1990, and other ocean observation spacecraft will soon be operated by the Japanese and the European Space Agency. Satellites that measure the Earth's radiation budget and the dynamics of the upper atmosphere will also be flying soon. And there are other satellites under development that will provide data essential for modeling interactions among all the Earth's many components. As these programs progress, sophisticated computer systems and software will be needed to assimilate the data. International agreements will be required in order to manage the flow of information and the interaction of scientists. And a substantial investment will be needed in order to launch and operate the sort of Earth observation platforms that will be critical to the success of the program over an extended period.

By the turn of the century, the global change project could involve a large-scale infrastructure in space comprised of multisensor platforms in both low-earth and geostationary orbit. These platforms could house not only the sensors for monitoring environmental characteristics of the planet, they could also contain sensors for the international satellite-based verification system outlined above. The space shuttle could routinely dock with these platforms in order to repair or replace aging sensors, or to mount new, more sophisticated devices. A multinational network of sensors clustered on a number of these space platforms would be the most sensible and cost-effective means of proceeding with Earth observations from space. In order to achieve such a system, U.S. leadership will be invaluable.

The United States should strongly urge the international community to adopt the Global Change Program, and it should match this aggressive stance with substantial funding commitments which, in and of themselves, make a statement that the United States is eager to work with nations around the world in developing, through the use of space-based sensors, models of environmental change on the planet so as to help avert human-induced environmental catastrophes in the next century.

This leads to the final topic I would like to discuss today, which is the security-enhancing role of a broad and am-

bitious agenda of international cooperation in space, including high-profile United States-Soviet space cooperation.

International cooperation in the planning and execution of activities in space is certainly nothing new. Over the past 30 years, the United States has signed more than 1,000 agreements with more than 100 countries for international space activities. These cooperative efforts have ranged from sharing data from space experiments, to the cooperative development of satellites, to the hooking-up of manned spacecraft in orbit, as occurred in 1975 with the Apollo-Soyuz handshake in space involving American astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts.

Cooperative space projects such as these, however, hardly compare to the ones that will be available in the future. This is because a number of developments are working together to create opportunities for space cooperation on a much broader and more ambitious scale than ever before.

The most obvious of these developments is the rapid maturity of space programs around the world. Whereas 30 years ago the United States and the Soviet Union were the only major players in space, today impressive space programs are taking form worldwide. For example, China, India, Japan and the European Space Agency have all developed the ability to launch satellites. Canada, France and West Germany have developed substantial aerospace industries. England is forming its own space agency. Brazil is developing its own remote-sensing satellite. All told, more than 125 nations are involved in space exploration in some fashion. As the number and sophistication of these space programs has increased, cross-fertilization among them has also grown. This development will only accelerate as the world's many space programs set ever-more ambitious goals.

A second factor contributing to greater space cooperation is the increased cost of major space projects. Advances in space technology have led to the development of increasingly complex space systems, which are heavier, have higher power requirements, and produce data at enormous rates. These factors all contribute to growing costs. By sharing the costs of such projects, each participating nation carries a smaller economic burden while maintaining access to the data of interest. For example, the U.S. space station, spacelab, Hubble Space Telescope, and Infrared Astronomy Satellite have all involved international cooperation in terms of funding, planning and hardware development. Last year's mission to Halley's Comet, involving collaboration between the Soviet Union, United States, European Space Agency and Japan was a prime example of cost sharing in an endeavor that might have seemed

prohibitively expensive if pursued by any single nation alone.

A third major development in international space cooperation has been growing openness in the Soviet space program. Up until very recently, the entire Soviet space program was shrouded in extreme secrecy, which made space cooperation with the Soviets enormously difficult. However, the policy of "glasnost," or openness, which is being pursued throughout Soviet society under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, has extended to the space program as well. Last summer, the Soviet Union established for the first time a separate agency for the operation of civilian space activities. Previously, civilian and military space programs were tightly covered by the same security veil. With this new agency—called Glavcosmos—in place, the Soviet Union is assuming an aggressive stance in promoting its civilian space program, seeking customers for its space launch vehicles, partners for space science missions, and passengers for its space station. And given the ambitious space plans of the Soviet Union, space scientists around the world have become increasingly interested in working with the Soviets.

Finally, the advance of technology is increasing opportunities for space cooperation. Developments around the world in areas such as space propulsion, power sources, advanced materials, artificial intelligence and robotics are leading to a future in which space travel will become routine, and space science and exploration will advance beyond many of our wildest dreams. As stated in "Pioneering the Space Frontier," the May 1986 report to the President from the National Commission on Space, "space technology has freed humankind to move outward from Earth as a species destined to expand to other worlds." As this expansion into the solar system occurs, people from around the globe will be interested in participating, and will be technically capable of doing so.

With these developments all underway, it should be incumbent of the United States, as the world's most advanced space-faring Nation, to help lead the world in the development of an agenda for international space activities to take us into the 21st century. Two of the top items on that agenda should be the two I have already explored, an international satellite-based verification system and the global change program. A third priority should be an ambitious effort aimed at the exploration of Mars.

Over the past year, leading scientists from around the Nation have endorsed a Mars exploration program as a top priority. This summer, the third in a series of "Case for Mars" conferences will be held in Boulder, CO, with sponsorship coming from NASA, the American Astronomical Society and the Planetary Society. At the present time, the Soviet Union is the prime

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motor in charting out the exploration of Mars, with two unmanned spacecraft scheduled to explore the red planet over the next 6 years. The Soviet Union has proposed a joint United States-Soviet mission to obtain and return sample material from Mars, but NASA, without a similar project underway, has been forced to decline the offer. However, momentum for a United States-Soviet Mars sample return mission is building, as suggested by the recent endorsement of such an effort by Dr. Lew Allen, Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the Nation's premier laboratory for the unmanned exploration of the solar system.

Exploration of Mars was also the central thrust of a new United States-Soviet Union space cooperation agreement negotiated in October 1986, and awaiting enactment at a superpower summit. Out of 16 agreed cooperative projects that comprise the new agreement, the first 4 in the list involve coordination of United States and Soviet Mars missions. These developments are all leading in the direction of an eventual joint United States-Soviet manned mission to Mars.

A manned Mars mission is certainly feasible, according to the National Commission on Space. Indeed, some scientists say that the technical basis for a manned Mars trip is stronger than was the technical basis for President John F. Kennedy's 1961 decision to land a man on the Moon.

Not only is it feasible, a manned trip to Mars seems highly probable. The Soviets have announced their interest in such a trip. Their long-duration space flights and development of a massive launch vehicle are important components of such a plan. American scientists have shown a similar interest in a journey to Mars, which stands out as the most alluring next challenge for manned space flight. Perhaps the most important question is whether such a venture will be done in cooperation or competition between the superpowers.

Realistically, a manned trip to Mars only makes sense if done in a cooperative fashion involving not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but also countries around the world. An international manned Mars effort—led by the two superpowers—would be the most challenging and exciting space mission ever pursued.

The cost of a manned trip to Mars has been estimated at \$40 billion, a price that, if shared by a number of nations, would cost the United States much less than was spent to go to the Moon.

And while some observers would question the value of such an expenditure, in my view, the benefits are compelling. Such a project would put some badly needed direction back into the U.S. Space Program. It would do this by giving high priority to a series of increasingly demanding projects that would serve as the technological step-

ping stones toward Mars. Moreover, such a mission could help lead to a fundamental reshaping of superpower relations.

Recall, if you will, the moment when *Apollo 11* landed on the Moon in 1969. Nearly everyone on the planet within range of a television was watching. Imagine how much more symbolic it would have been if it had not resulted from a lengthy United States-Soviet space race, but rather if it had been the crowning accomplishment of a collaborative effort involving some of the best scientific and engineering minds in the world. A manned trip to Mars could be just such an effort.

And while such a project, in and of itself, could never eliminate the serious and difficult political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, it could play an enormously valuable role in helping the superpowers see their relationship in new terms. It could do this by helping demonstrate the unassailable, yet constantly ignored fact, that the superpowers have no choice but to coexist on spaceship Earth.

The President of the United States should announce that a manned mission to Mars is a fundamental priority for our space program, and that such a mission will be pursued in collaboration with as many nations as are interested. The formal inauguration of such a project could be made in 1992, which has been designated as the international space year. At the time of launching the effort, the United States could initiate work on a Mars sample return mission to be matched with a companion Soviet effort. By 1992, the Soviet Union will have sent two additional spacecraft to Mars, and the United States will have launched its Mars Observer. These developments would provide the foundation for marshaling the energies, resources and advanced technologies of many nations in a peaceful enterprise in space of an unprecedented scale. The international space year could not be celebrated in a more triumphant manner.

Mr. Speaker, this essentially concludes my discussion today. What I have tried to do is identify three areas of space activity that, in combination, could serve as an alternative to spending a larger and larger share of our space budget on developing space-based and space-directed weapons. The administration's strategic defense initiative and antisatellite weapons programs are justified in terms of national security, but, as I have argued here and elsewhere, such weapons, once deployed by both superpowers, would simply bring new insecurities, and at a cost far beyond that of the projects I have proposed. What I have outlined are space endeavors that seek to break from the antiquated conceptions that now govern our security planning. Those outmoded ways of thinking, characterized by the constant pursuit of weapons as a means toward enhanc-

ing security, could well turn space into yet another battleground for the United States-Soviet arms race. We can do better than that.

Space is the common heritage of all the nations of the world. As such, it should be utilized and explored in a manner that adds to the world's common security. As John Foster Dulles once said, "As we reach beyond the planet, we should move as truly united nations." Opportunities for doing so await our attention. The time to focus on them is now.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

As a final note, I would like to have printed in the RECORD a partial bibliography on reconnaissance satellites and the National Reconnaissance Office. Since I mentioned that the material used in my statement was all available from bookstores and libraries, I thought it might be useful to list the titles of those resources.

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The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ERDREICH). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. KYL] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. KYL addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GAYDOS] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. GAYDOS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. LUNGREN] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. LUNGREN addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. LaFALCE] is recognized for 10 minutes.

[Mr. LaFALCE addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. PARRIS] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. PARRIS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. MORRISON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably absent earlier today when the House considered overriding the President's veto of H.R. 2, the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Act. Had I been present, I would have voted in favor of passage notwithstanding the President's objections.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MACK] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. MACK addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. McCANDLESS] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. McCANDLESS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. ROTH addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

STEPS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD CHAIRED BY FORMER SENATOR JOHN TOWER—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 100-58)

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ERDREICH) laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Rules, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and ordered to be printed:

(For message, see proceedings of the Senate of today, Tuesday, March 31, 1987.)

SUBMISSION OF AN AMENDMENT TO THE RULES OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE FOR THE 100TH CONGRESS

(Mr. ST GERMAIN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ST GERMAIN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to rule XI, clause 2(a), the rules of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs for the 100th Congress were printed in the RECORD on February 5, 1987. The following is an amendment to those rules:

In rule 15, at the end of the description of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage, add the following:

The Subcommittee shall not schedule a hearing on any commemorative medal legislation unless the legislation is cosponsored by at least 218 Members of the House.

In considering legislation authorizing Congressional gold medals, the Subcommittee shall apply the following standards:

(1) The recipient shall be a natural person;

(2) The recipient shall have performed an achievement that has an impact on American history and culture that is likely to be recognized as a major achievement in the recipient's field long after the achievement;

(3) The recipient shall not have received a medal previously for the same or substantially the same achievement;

(4) The recipient shall be living or, if deceased, shall have been deceased for not less than 5 years and not more than 25 years; and

(5) The achievements were performed in the recipient's field of endeavor, and represent either a lifetime of continuous superior

achievements or a single achievement so significant that the recipient is recognized and acclaimed by others in the same field, as evidence by the recipient having received the highest honors in the field.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. ANNUNZIO (at the request of Mr. FOLEY), through April 30, on account of illness.

Mr. DANIEL (at the request of Mr. FOLEY), for the balance of the week, on account of illness.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GALLO) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. ROGERS, for 60 minutes, on April 7.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. MACK, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. McCANDLESS, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. McCANDLESS, for 60 minutes, on April 1.

Mr. McCANDLESS, for 60 minutes, on April 2.

Mr. ROTH, for 60 minutes, on April 1.

Mr. ROTH, for 60 minutes, on April 2.

Mr. ROTH, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. MOLINARI, for 60 minutes, on April 1.

Mrs. BENTLEY, for 60 minutes, on April 7.

Mrs. BENTLEY, for 30 minutes, on April 2.

Mr. HASTERT, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. MOLINARI, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SHAW, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. ERDREICH) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. PANETTA, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. CONYERS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. LaFALCE, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. ESPY, for 15 minutes, on April 20.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. LEWIS of Georgia) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, for 5 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GALLO) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. CONTE.

Mr. GILMAN in two instances.

Mr. SCHAEFER.

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