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OCA 88-2297
11 July 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: Your Breakfast with Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier (D., WI)

1. On Tuesday, 12 July at 8:00 a.m. you are scheduled to host a breakfast in your Dining Room for Representative Robert Kastenmeier. Also in attendance will be Bob Gates, Dick Kerr, Dick Stolz, and myself.

2. Mr. Kastenmeier was appointed to the House Intelligence Committee in 1985 as the most senior of the group of six Democrats who joined the Committee at that time. He is also the third ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee. He appears to put most of his energy into that Committee, where he chairs a key Subcommittee on civil rights.

3. He is regarded as a leading thinker among House liberals. His ideological liberalism, however, is accompanied by a conservative personal style. He does not enjoy confrontations and actively seeks to avoid them.

4. Mr. Kastenmeier attends most House Intelligence Committee hearings--budget, covert action, and the Tuesday morning briefings (current intelligence updates), finding them generally informative and interesting. He is an active questioner, usually trying to get at the legal or political rationale behind the actions under discussion. In the past he has indicated that he does not read many of the Agency's products, not even the National Intelligence Daily.

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6. Mr. Kastenmeier would welcome your comments on developments in the world's hot spots, including the Iran airliner shutdown, Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan.

7. Our interest is to expose Kastenmeier to senior Agency managers and establish a stronger relationship to prepare for his likely nomination to the Committee chairmanship next January. He would serve a two-year term. In fact, Kastenmeier's selection is not at all certain--Beilenson and former Member McCurdy could also make a strong claim.



John L. Helgerson

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Attachments



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BIOGRAPHY

Name (including party/state:) Rep Robert (Bob) Kastenmeier (D., WI)

University of Wisconsin

District: Wisconsin 2 - Madison; rural areas famous for cheese & Wisconsin dells

First elected: 1958 Up for re-election: 1988 Winning %: 56%

Past service on intelligence committee: Yes: NO: x

Current service on intelligence committee: Yes: x NO:

Term on intelligence committee expires: 1991

Other committee assignments: Judiciary - 3rd Ranking Democrat, chairs Subcmte on Courts and Civil Liberties

Major intelligence/legislative interests: Covert action reporting procedures; quality of analysis; and is sensitive to issues involving individual liberties

STAT

Visits to CIA facilities:

STAT

Last contact with DCI/DDCI: House Intelligence breakfast on 21 April 1988

Recent correspondence:

Wisconsin - 2nd District

2 Robert W. Kastenmeier (D)

Of Sun Prairie — Elected 1958

Born: Jan. 24, 1924, Beaver Dam, Wis.
Education: U. of Wisconsin, LL.B. 1952.
Military Career: Army, 1943-46.
Occupation: Lawyer.
Family: Wife, Dorothy Chambers; three children.
Religion: Unspecified.
Political Career: Democratic nominee for U.S. House, 1956.
Capitol Office: 2328 Rayburn Bldg. 20515; 225-2906.



In Washington: Kastenmeier has not changed much ideologically during his long House career — he is as solid in his commitment to equal rights and civil liberties as he was when he arrived nearly 30 years ago. But his role has changed enormously. Kastenmeier has evolved from a crusader into a technician.

Kastenmeier is as conservative in his personal style as he is liberal in outlook. A dull speaker with a distaste for flamboyance, he is often overshadowed on Judiciary by members who express their views more militantly.

While other Judiciary Committee Democrats have used their senior positions to stake out rhetorical opposition to Reagan priorities, Kastenmeier has said relatively little in public. Instead, during unfavorable times for liberal initiatives, he has busied himself in the complexities of patent law and court administration, using his Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice to push through a wide variety of technical but important pieces of legislation.

Kastenmeier devoted much of the 1970s to working on the intricacies of copyright law, producing the first comprehensive revision in that field in more than 60 years and guiding it through nearly a decade of debate.

Since then, advances in technology have presented Kastenmeier and his subcommittee with a myriad of new copyright and patent issues to delve into. One successful Kastenmeier bill in the 98th Congress gave 10 years of copyright protection to the makers of microchips by categorizing the mask works on the chips as a new type of "writing."

Less successful, so far at least, has been Kastenmeier's bill to make liable for patent infringement anyone who imports, sells or uses products made abroad by a process patented in

the United States. The measure, the result of four years' work by the subcommittee, failed to clear Congress in 1986.

In the 99th Congress, Kastenmeier worked to extend privacy guarantees for telephone conversations to messages transmitted and stored in computers, known as "electronic mail." His legislation attracted a coalition of support ranging from business groups to the American Civil Liberties Union; that helped persuade a reluctant Justice Department to come aboard. The bill was signed by President Reagan in October 1986.

Kastenmeier's subcommittee also handles the federal courts, and he played a major role in changing the bankruptcy court system, which had been left in limbo by a 1982 Supreme Court decision. He fought a plan, pushed by Judiciary Chairman Peter W. Rodino Jr., which would have created a new system of 227 judges with special constitutional standing. Under that standing, the judges would have had life tenure and salaries that could not be reduced by Congress. "If we err," Kastenmeier said, "let us err on the side of caution."

Kastenmeier insisted that the new judge-ships were not needed to handle bankruptcy cases. In the end, Congress agreed. Overall authority over bankruptcy matters was eventually given to federal district court judges, with bankruptcy judges adjuncts to those courts.

In 1986, Kastenmeier's chairmanship forced him to public attention in one of the more extraordinary events to occur in Congress in many years: the impeachment and trial of a federal judge.

U.S. District Judge Harry E. Claiborne of Nevada was serving a two-year sentence for tax evasion but refused to resign and continued to receive his \$78,700 annual salary. Kasten-

Wisconsin 2

South —
Madison

Republicans have most of the land in the 2nd, and Democrats have most of the voters. While the district covers a sizable portion of southern Wisconsin's Republican-voting rural areas, its centerpiece is the traditionally Democratic city of Madison in Dane County.

The 1980 election serves as an example of GOP frustration. Even though Kastenmeier lost every county except Dane, his 3-to-2 edge there was sufficient to lift him to victory.

Madison, the state capital and second largest city in Wisconsin, has its share of industry: meat processor Oscar Mayer, for example, employs more than 2,450 in its Madison plant. But the city's personality is dominated by its white-collar sector — the bureaucrats who work in local and state government, the 2,300 educators and 45,000 students at the University of Wisconsin, and the large number of insurance company home offices, so many that Madison calls itself a Midwestern Hartford.

Madison boasts a tradition of political liberalism. Since 1924, when Robert M. La Follette carried Dane County as the Progressive Party's presidential candidate, Democrats nearly always have won here. Walter F. Mondale won the county by more

than 20,000 votes in 1984, and in 1986, Democratic Senate nominee Ed Garvey took 58 percent of the Dane vote while losing statewide.

Outside the Madison area, agriculture and tourism sustain the district's economy. Dairying is important, and there is some beef production, although many livestock farmers have switched in recent years to raising corn as a cash crop.

In New Glarus (Green County), which was founded by the Swiss, the downtown area has been redone to resemble a village in the mother country. Wisconsin Dells (Columbia County) lures big-city tourists to view the steep ridges and high plateaus along the Wisconsin River.

The majority of farmers and small-town people in the district are conservative, and they chafe at Madison's dominance of district politics. In 1986, GOP House nominee Ann Haney won 9 of the 10 predominantly rural counties in the 2nd. But Kastenmeier's 60 percent tally in Dane County gave him a comfortable overall victory margin.

Population: 523,011. White 509,003 (97%). Black 6,051 (1%). Other 4,986 (1%). Spanish origin 4,233 (1%). 18 and over 363,086 (73%). 65 and over 55,870 (11%). Median age: 29.

meier's panel approved four articles of impeachment and sent them to the full Judiciary Committee, which approved them 35-0.

Once the committee sent the impeachment resolution to the House, Kastenmeier showed his characteristic distaste for the spotlight. Before the House chose the nine managers, or prosecutors, for the Senate's impeachment trial, Kastenmeier said he did not intend to seek his own appointment. "I feel my work is done once we have concluded on the House floor," he said. Kastenmeier nevertheless was selected as one of five Democrats to serve as managers in the Senate trial, which resulted in Claiborne's removal from office.

Kastenmeier's subcommittee also has jurisdiction over some of the most sensitive social issues of the 1980s, but he serves his liberal principles on those subjects by taking as little action as possible. He fights any legislation to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over busing, school prayer or abortion. He has held hearings

on some of these bills at various times in recent years, but he has never come close to scheduling any action on them. "These bills are merely a form of chastisement," he has said while sitting on several of them.

Kastenmeier came to Congress as one of the small cadre of 1950s peace activists. He complained about the anti-communist "witch hunts" of his state's former GOP senator, Joseph R. McCarthy, and said the "military-industrial complex" was out of control. With two former campaign aides, Marcus Raskin and Arthur Waskow, now well-known leftist writers, he set out to produce a manifesto to influence American foreign policy in the 1960s.

They began the Liberal Project and attracted 17 other congressmen who wanted to publish position papers on liberal issues. The 1960 election was not kind to them; 16 of the 18 were defeated. But Kastenmeier continued as head of the redrawn "Liberal Group" and a few

Wisconsin - 2nd District

years later published the Liberal Papers, calling for disarmament, admission of mainland China to the United Nations and an end to the draft. Republicans labeled them "apostles of appeasement" and most Democrats ignored the work. Since then, Kastenmeier has kept a lower profile both inside the House and out. But many of the ideas were accepted eventually.

His timing has been unusual. His opposition to the Vietnam War was so far ahead of public opinion that by the time the anti-war fervor reached its peak, Kastenmeier had been through it already. He was consistent in his support for the anti-war movement, but he was never a national leader in it.

Early in his career, Kastenmeier and his allies in the Liberal Group — Don Edwards and Phillip Burton of California — worked on efforts to democratize House procedure. But here too, Kastenmeier did not play a leading role when the changes were actually made a decade later. By then, he had turned his attention to legal work on Judiciary. He supported the procedural reforms but was not publicly associated with them by most members.

Kastenmeier admits that he and other House liberals have modified the approach of 20 years ago. "We are less pretentious," he has said. "We don't presume to accomplish as much. We, in the context of the House of Representatives, ought to try to be reasonably effective. We feel we ought to be the cutting edge of American liberalism in the body politic, yet there is even a limitation to that."

At Home: It is no longer possible for Kastenmeier to win re-election easily on the mere strength of his opposition to the Vietnam War or his support for the impeachment of President Nixon. He has to take campaigning almost as seriously as he did in the early years of his career. But his seat seems secure for now.

After dropping to 54 percent of the vote in 1980 and losing every county in the district except Dane, home of the University of Wisconsin, he bounced back in his next two elections, taking more than 61 percent. Against a strong candidate in 1986, he slipped back to 56 percent.

Although Kastenmeier never has seemed very comfortable campaigning, he now does the things that endangered Democrats have been doing for years. In 1980 he hired a professional campaign manager for the first time.

The son of an elected minor official from Dodge County, Kastenmeier took only a limited interest in politics until he was nearly 30 years old. Then he became the Democratic chairman of the second-smallest county in the district, and three years later, in 1956, decided

to run for the seat left open by Republican Glenn R. Davis, who ran for the Senate. Kastenmeier lost to GOP nominee Donald E. Tewes by a 55-45 margin. But in 1958, with two of Wisconsin's most popular Democrats — William Proxmire and Gaylord Nelson — running on the statewide ticket, many Republicans in the 2nd stayed home and Kastenmeier won.

Kastenmeier's first three elections were hotly contested affairs that included accusations that the Democrat was sympathetic to communists. In his first successful campaign, in 1958, he was helped by farm discontent with the policies of the Eisenhower administration.

After 1964 redistricting removed Milwaukee's suburban Waukesha County from the district, Kastenmeier's percentages shot up. In 1970, when the old charges were updated to include criticism that Kastenmeier was "soft on radical students," the incumbent won by his highest percentage ever.

Kastenmeier had few problems for a full decade after that. But in 1980, his refusal to back away from any of his liberal views opened him to Republican assault as being out of step with the new fiscal conservatism. Those attacks, made by his challenger, former yo-yo manufacturer James A. Wright, had particular appeal in the farming communities that surround Madison. Only Kastenmeier's strong support in the Madison university community allowed him to survive the 1980 contest, in which Nelson went down to defeat at the statewide level.

In 1982, Republicans nominated a more moderate candidate, tax consultant Jim Johnson, who tried to appeal to Madison and avoided the Reagan-style rhetoric that Wright had used. But the issues were moving back in Kastenmeier's direction. Much of the anti-government feeling of the previous election had subsided, and the issue with the strongest emotional appeal was the nuclear freeze. Wisconsin voted overwhelmingly for the freeze, and Kastenmeier was one of its most vocal supporters.

The GOP did not give Kastenmeier much trouble in 1984, but two years later found an attractive challenger in Ann Haney, a moderate Republican who served in the Cabinet of former GOP Gov. Lee Sherman Dreyfus. Haney, a vivacious campaigner, tried to win support in Dane County by challenging Kastenmeier's effectiveness more than his ideology. She argued that Kastenmeier should have spent less time on copyright and patent law and more time on matters important to the 2nd District, such as agriculture.

But if Kastenmeier's style and legislative interests did not stir enthusiasm at home,

Robert W. Kastenmeier, D-Wis.

Haney still had difficulty overcoming the loyal following he had built during almost three decades in the House. She was further ham-

pered shortly before the election when an illness in her family forced her off the campaign trail for more than a week.

Committees

Judiciary (3rd of 21 Democrats)
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice (chairman); Civil and Constitutional Rights.

Select Intelligence (4th of 11 Democrats)
Legislation; Program and Budget Authorization.

Elections

1986 General

| | | |
|---------------------------|---------|-------|
| Robert W. Kastenmeier (D) | 106,919 | (56%) |
| Ann J. Haney (R) | 85,156 | (44%) |

1984 General

| | | |
|---------------------------|---------|-------|
| Robert W. Kastenmeier (D) | 159,987 | (64%) |
| Albert E. Wiley Jr. (R) | 91,345 | (36%) |

Previous Winning Percentages: 1982 (61%) 1980 (54%)
 1978 (58%) 1976 (66%) 1974 (65%) 1972 (68%)
 1970 (69%) 1968 (60%) 1966 (58%) 1964 (64%)
 1962 (53%) 1960 (53%) 1958 (52%)

District Vote For President

| 1984 | | 1980 | | 1976 | |
|------|---------------|------|---------------|------|---------------|
| D | 127,626 (50%) | D | 124,236 (47%) | D | 124,106 (51%) |
| R | 124,014 (49%) | R | 106,003 (40%) | R | 109,405 (45%) |
| | | I | 25,513 (10%) | | |

Key Votes

| | |
|--|---|
| Produce MX missiles (1985) | N |
| Cut federal subsidy for water projects (1985) | Y |
| Weaken gun control laws (1986) | N |
| Cut back public housing construction (1986) | N |
| Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986) | N |
| Impose textile import limits over Reagan veto (1986) | Y |
| Block chemical weapons production (1986) | Y |
| Impose South African sanctions over Reagan veto (1986) | Y |

Campaign Finance

| | Receipts | Receipts from PACs | | Expenditures |
|-----------------|-----------|--------------------|--|--------------|
| 1986 | | | | |
| Kastenmeier (D) | \$348,293 | \$106,730 (31%) | | \$385,947 |
| Haney (R) | \$272,390 | \$74,318 (27%) | | \$271,077 |
| 1984 | | | | |
| Kastenmeier (D) | \$218,356 | \$71,912 (33%) | | \$208,040 |
| Wiley (R) | \$96,072 | \$17,925 (19%) | | \$96,156 |

Voting Studies

| Year | Presidential Support | | Party Unity | | Conservative Coalition | |
|------|----------------------|----|-------------|----|------------------------|----|
| | S | O | S | O | S | O |
| 1986 | 16 | 81 | 92 | 5 | 4 | 92 |
| 1985 | 16 | 84 | 91 | 4 | 5 | 93 |
| 1984 | 25 | 73 | 90 | 6 | 8 | 92 |
| 1983 | 11 | 82 | 90 | 6 | 8 | 91 |
| 1982 | 26 | 74 | 89 | 10 | 12 | 88 |
| 1981 | 22 | 75 | 89 | 11 | 5 | 95 |

S = Support O = Opposition

† Not eligible for all recorded votes.


Interest Group Ratings

| Year | ADA | ACU | AFL-CIO | CCUS |
|------|-----|-----|---------|------|
| 1986 | 100 | 0 | 86 | 17 |
| 1985 | 100 | 5 | 94 | 24 |
| 1984 | 95 | 0 | 77 | 25 |
| 1983 | 95 | 9 | 100 | 20 |
| 1982 | 90 | 0 | 100 | 20 |
| 1981 | 95 | 7 | 80 | 5 |

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IRANIAN REACTION TO
AIRLINER SHOOTDOWN



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Talking Points for the DCI

Iranian Reaction to the Airliner Shootdown


8 July 1988

Iran: Reaction to the Shootdown

Iranian officials worldwide are trying to portray the incident as proof that the US presence in the Gulf is the cause of instability there. 


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-- Iran has officially asked the UN Security Council to condemn the US and to call for the withdrawal of US forces from the Gulf. Iranian officials realize that the Council is unlikely to condemn the US, but probably calculate they will gain from renewed debate over the US role in the Gulf.

-- Tehran is also using the incident to rekindle popular support for the war against Iraq. 

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We believe that the emotions generated by the shootdown and the Iranian perception that the US action was part of a Washington-led effort to undermine the Islamic Republic make it almost certain Tehran will eventually seek to retaliate for the US action. A US offer to compensate the victims of the shootdown is not likely to change Tehran's view that US goals and actions in the region threaten vital Iranian interests.

-- Iran is unlikely to retaliate immediately because it will want to avoid jeopardizing the propaganda gains it hopes to realize from the US action. Rafsanjani appeared to reflect this stance in a speech on Tuesday in which he suggested that hasty retaliation could be counter-productive. 

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In considering its options for responding, we believe Tehran would favor striking at US interests through terrorism or laying mines in the Gulf, over direct military confrontation, in order to minimize the chances of massive US retaliation.

-- Iran is likely to use surrogate groups like Hizballah to carry out terrorism in order to maintain the appearance of plausible deniability.

Since the accidental downing on Sunday, we have noted a number of warnings of a possible attack on US interests. 


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Naval Operations

Iran probably will confine itself to routine naval operations in the near term to avoid taking attention away from the airliner tragedy.

- No unusual naval activity has been noted since 3 July.
- The risk of unplanned confrontations may be greater now, however, because Iran cannot maintain complete control over its speedboats at sea, and Iranian sailors are more likely to view nearby US forces--particularly aircraft--as threats and try to shoot first. 25X1

The Ground War

Baghdad has firmly established its superiority over a troubled Iran and is likely to continue pressing Tehran with more air and ground attacks. Tehran appears to be hunkering down for a long--and possibly painful--period of reorganization and preparation for its next attempt to recapture the initiative.

- Iraq will continue to launch ground attacks of various sizes to try to regain lost territory, damage Iranian morale, and wear down Iranian forces. A major Iraqi offensive against Iran's last significant salient in the Halabja area in the north is likely this summer. 25X1

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8 July 1988

TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

PANAMA

Political Developments

The Panamanian regime withdrew its members from the Board of Directors of the Canal Commission this week, charging that Washington has turned management of the Canal into a weapon of economic coercion.

- The regime declared that US withholding of Canal payments violates the 1977 Canal Treaties and that US obstruction of Panama's participation in the Canal's administration compelled the regime's decision. Specifically, Panama objects to Washington's unilateral decision to move the site of the meeting and US refusal to recognize the new Panamanian board member.
- The regime criticized Washington's refusal to include on the meeting's agenda the "illegal retention" of monies owed to Panama, and the obstruction of the Panamanian delegation's technical staff from traveling to the US.
- Acting Foreign Minister Ritter stated that Panama would not recognize decisions made by the commission in Panama's absence.
- Panama indicated that it does not want to renegotiate the treaties and would push for their enforcement in international forums. [REDACTED]

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Panama's withdrawal from the commission is probably the beginning of a campaign to counter US pressures by making the administration of the waterway a major political issue.

- The regime will try to avoid actions that would reduce Canal earnings or give Washington a pretext to break the treaties.
- Nonetheless, Panama probably calculates that a propaganda campaign in such organizations as the UN and the World Court that raises questions about Washington's commitment to honor the treaties would deal a significant setback to US policy objectives.


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
Economic Developments

Panama continues to take steps to lower its government payroll, raise taxes, and search for foreign financial support, but the regime's financial problems remain critical.

- Panama received the fourth and final \$4.9 million installment of the \$19.6 million Libyan loan last Tuesday; additional assistance from Tripoli is unlikely unless Noriega agrees to significant political concessions, such as giving Qadhafi a freer hand to use Panama as a base for terrorist activities.
- The regime is trying to sell or mortgage government assets to Taiwanese and Spanish investors to raise cash, and is even considering putting up its interest in the Trans-Panama oil pipeline as collateral to obtain short-term loans.
- Regime officials are groping for solutions to Panama's economic problems. They reportedly believe that the most immediate solution to Panama's economic problems could result from Colombians, specifically the Medellin drug cartel, buying Panamanian assets. 


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Military Developments

We have no indications of flight activity between Cuba and Panama 

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- Although the majority of Nicaraguan military aircraft are of Soviet origin, both the Sandinista Air Force and the Panamanian Air Force have CASA-212 short-range transports, as well as two or three other utility or transport aircraft.
- Apart from placing the Panama Defense forces on a higher state of readiness over the fourth of July weekend, the regime has conducted no unusual military activities during the past two weeks. 

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NICARAGUA

ALA/MCD

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8 July 1988

TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

Nicaragua: The Current Situation

The bulk of rebel forces--some 10,000 out of an estimated 15,700-16,700 total--are currently in Honduras. Although the rebels began reinfiltrating fighters into Nicaragua last week, in part to allay Honduran concerns and persuade Tegucigalpa to release rebel arms and munitions it controls, their efforts have been hampered by supply shortages and uncertainty over future US support.

- In late June, some 1,300 combatants reportedly left the Las Vegas salient to return to Nicaragua, and we believe nearly 500 already have crossed the border.
- We do not know the current objectives of these returning fighters, but if hostilities resume they probably will limit their actions to small-scale harassment and sabotage.

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Despite Managua's extension of the cease-fire until the end of July, the sporadic fighting of recent weeks is likely to increase as the insurgents reinfiltrate men from Honduras and the Sandinistas try to block them and deal with rebel units inside Nicaragua.

- Sandinista counterinsurgency battalions are already becoming more active in northern and central Nicaragua. One battalion is moving to join an infantry brigade opposite rebel positions in the Las Vegas salient.

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-- [redacted] On 4 July, according to Sandinista press, five soldiers and seven civilians were killed when two government vehicles apparently were blown up by an anti-tank mine in the area.

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[REDACTED]

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On the diplomatic front, cease-fire negotiations are on hold.


- Despite President Ortega's claim that the Sandinistas are losing patience with the rebels, Managua appears willing to allow the process to drag on. The Sandinistas probably calculate that they are gaining propaganda mileage out of the rebels' refusal to meet, and that shortages of ammunition and other supplies will make the rebels more likely to sign a final accord on Managua's terms.
- Rebel leaders, after rejecting recent Sandinista offers to resume negotiations, now are publicly expressing optimism following a personal invitation from President Ortega to meet in Managua on 28 July. The rebels are insisting that Ortega head future government delegations and that talks be held outside Nicaragua. They told US officials they plan to wait until after the 7 August summit of Central American presidents before meeting again with the regime. [REDACTED]

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At home, the Sandinistas are proceeding with minimal political reforms designed to foster an image of increasing democratization without jeopardizing their hold on power.

- President Ortega submitted a draft electoral law to the National Assembly last week, a major step toward holding local elections.
- The electoral reforms do not meet major rebel demands to limit reelection and, if enacted as currently drafted, would bar political parties from receiving foreign donations.
- The regime may delay discussions of the legislation to entice rebel political leaders to return home to negotiate changes in the law.
- Meanwhile, although the internal opposition has been largely inactive since labor leaders ended a hunger strike in early May, representatives from 14 opposition parties plan to meet with Costa Rican President Arias on Tuesday [7/12] to press him to intensify international pressure on the regime. [REDACTED]

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


8 July 1988

TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI


Progress of the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Although the Soviets have not evacuated any major garrisons since June 23, they have continued preparations for the withdrawal of their forces from northeastern and western Afghanistan.



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While the Soviets have been making preparations for the withdrawal of units in northeastern and western Afghanistan, there seems to have been a decrease in their withdrawal activity along the main withdrawal route between Pol-e Khomri and Kholm. There are also indications that the withdrawal of some Soviet personnel in western Afghanistan may be delayed.



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Doubts about the competence of regime forces may lead the Soviets to consider delaying the withdrawal of some technical personnel and perhaps advisors from the west. If significant numbers of troops are delayed, it will be difficult for the Soviets to have half of their troops out of Afghanistan by August 15 as the Geneva accords require.

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We now estimate that close to 25,000 Soviet troops have permanently left their garrisons in Afghanistan. Of these, we estimate 15,000 have returned to the USSR, and the rest are either enroute to the border or have consolidated with their parent units to be withdrawn later.

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(Most recently, on 7 July, Yuli Vorontsov, a Soviet deputy foreign minister, said publicly that about 23,000 troops had been withdrawn.) Although the Soviet figure could be somewhat inflated, the difference between it and our estimate probably stems from collection limitations.

- Reports of "thinning" out of units, the movement of troops from unidentified units, and the withdrawal of some forces by air are making it increasingly difficult to get an accurate troop count of Soviet forces leaving Afghanistan.

Regime and Insurgent Activity

Although regime forces are maintaining control of Kabul, security within a thirty kilometer radius around the capital continues to deteriorate, according to a variety of reports:

- Insurgents are strengthening their forces in the southern and western sections of Kabul province and in Lowgar province, seizing additional district centers and capturing small regime outposts. Afghan army defections appear to be rising.
- Soviet and regime forces reportedly are conducting raids in cities near Kabul that the insurgents had temporarily occupied. US embassy sources claim these attacks are reprisals against civilians.

Insurgent bombings and rocket attacks the last couple of days in Kabul are the most intense ever experienced

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- The stepped up attacks probably reflect insurgent efforts to show UN negotiator Cordovez--who arrived in Kabul this week--that his plan for a ceasefire and coalition government have little chance of succeeding.

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Withdrawal Update, 7 July 1988



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