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Sult Sen Proxmire  
Sen Bumpers

OCA-1734  
31 May 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of Draft SDI Paper

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On 31 May I passed the attached comments on a draft SDI report to Ron Tammen of Senator Proxmire's Office and Bruce MacDonald of Senator Bumpers' Office. The final paragraph was deleted. The discussion was held in SH 219. They agreed to take the suggested language.

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Senate Division

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(31 May 1988)

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27 MAY 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted] 25X1  
 Office of Congressional Affairs

FROM: [redacted] 25X1  
 Director of Scientific and Weapons Research

SUBJECT: Classification Review of the 1988 Senate Staff  
 Report on the US SDI: Star Wars at the Crossroads [redacted] 25X1

1. We have reviewed the draft Senate staff report on the SDI that was provided to us for classification review via the SDIO. We believe there are a number of items in the draft that are classified. There are also statements and references to CIA that we believe are incorrect or do not accurately reflect information that was provided to the authors in a classified briefing last January. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

3. In the second paragraph on page 85, the second sentence should be [redacted] corrected as follows: '... a CIA briefing in which the analysts expressed the view that the Soviets are probably unwilling and unable at present to mount an effort equivalent to the US SDI program.' [redacted] 25X1

4. The last sentence of the first paragraph on page 100 is unclassified but should be revised as follows: 'Such an estimate includes Soviet expenditures for air defense against bombers and cruise missiles and for anti-satellite applications, as well as strategic defenses against ballistic missiles.' [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

SECRET [redacted]

**SUBJECT: Classification Review of the 1988 Senate Staff Report on the US  
SDI: Star Wars at the Crossroads** [redacted]

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5. In the last paragraph on page 100, [redacted] it may be more realistic to state that some CIA analysts made the statements quoted in the following sentences. Also, we suggest that the second sentence in this paragraph be replaced with the classified and correct statement that: 'These analysts believe that there is no Soviet SDI now, in the sense that the US SDI is considered to be a research program directed toward the development of a comprehensive, multi-tiered ballistic missile defense involving space-based weapons for boost-phase intercept.' [redacted]

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6. We suggest adding a [redacted] statement as follows: 'The Soviets have an extensive effort in strategic missile defense and they have been pursuing research for many years on some of the technologies that are being investigated in the US SDI. But because of major Soviet deficiencies in many key technologies, we do not believe the Soviets are capable at present of mounting an effort of their own that is truly comparable to the US SDI. In contrast to the US, the Soviets appear to be concentrating on exploring conventional and advanced technologies appropriate for ground-based, terminal defenses against ballistic missile reentry vehicles.' [redacted]

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7. We also call your attention to the likelihood of classified data in the draft from the DIA's System Threat Assessment Report (STAR)--we believe this draft must be reviewed by DIA for proper classification. Chapter 10 is of particular concern. [redacted]

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8. Finally, I must add a cautionary note about the potential damage that reports such as these could cause, even at the unclassified level. They provide the Soviets with accurate, up-to-date and authoritative information on the status, scope, achievements, problems, plans and projections for an important US strategic program. [redacted]

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19 May 1988

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Comments on Senate Staff Study: Star Wars at the Crossroads  
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The latest Senate staff report--and the third in a series--on the Strategic Defense Initiative for Senators Johnston, Bumpers and Proxmire contains information from a classified briefing that was provided by the undersigned and [redacted] on 22 January. A memorandum for the record of that briefing is provided in Attachment 1. The pages in the draft report which make reference to the briefing and its content are included here in Attachment 2. [redacted]

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We believe that some of these statements and conclusions attributed to us do not accurately reflect the full or qualified statements that we made in our classified briefing. Most importantly,

-- we stated that it was our view that it is unlikely that the Soviets have--or are capable of mounting yet--a true counterpart to the US Strategic Defense Initiative, in the sense that the SDI is a research program oriented toward the development of a comprehensive, multi-tiered, strategic ballistic missile defense system which involves the use of space-based elements for boost-phase intercepts. [redacted]

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The staff report tends to suggest that we said that the Soviets never will pursue an SDI-like effort (never say never) or that it was flat-out impossible for them to ever have an equivalent to the SDI. The staff report also fails to spell out the assumption that was made about the nature and character of the US SDI program, i.e., that we believe the SDI is thought of generally as including and depending on a space-based, boost-phase BMD effort. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Although the Senate staff study draft uses the term, we did not use 'basic research' in relation to Soviet military NIR--scientific research work. Soviet military research has a military purpose and is a form of technology development. We made no judgements with respect to the availability dates (IOC), if the Soviets were to pursue development of system elements comparable to those of a first-term US SDS. [redacted]

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[redacted]


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[redacted]

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With respect to those system concepts which are more comparable to US second-generation options, we stated that




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This staff report, like the two that preceded it, is intended to be published at the unclassified level and distributed publicly. We are not at liberty to approve the publication of our statements at the unclassified level. Our views and agency positions were provided in a secret-level briefing and, though we may believe that some of these observations or conclusions could be released at the unclassified level in an anonymous personal-view context, approval at higher levels must be obtained for release of such judgements as CIA positions at either the classified or the unclassified level.



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Senior Analysts,  
Strategic Defense Center  
Defensive Systems Division

Attachments: a/s

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