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STATEMENT OF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BEFORE THE

U. S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

AT HEARINGS ON

U. S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM

MARCH 1965

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THE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**I. BACKGROUND**

• The personnel security program at the Central Intelligence Agency has developed over many years and represents the cumulative thinking and judgments of many individuals. The personnel security policies and procedures are designed to prevent the penetration of the Agency. A strong and viable personnel security program is not totally dependent upon the Agency's Office of Security standing alone. It is vital to involve and have coordination and cooperation with other elements of the Agency, particularly the Offices of Personnel and Medical Services, which share major responsibilities in the screening area.

• Personnel security demands allocation of more than half of the Office of Security's resources. These officers are dedicated to the areas of prescreening, investigation, adjudication, polygraph, security awareness, security troubleshooting, and reinvestigation/repolygraph. The personnel security function is supported by a network of strategically located field offices, and in-house polygraph capability, and a small counterintelligence unit.

• In a sense, the Office of Security is a watchdog for the Director of Central Intelligence. The watchdog in this case ensures that the activities of the Agency are carried out in a manner that protects personnel, sources of information, methods of operations and protects classified intelligence information. In all of this there is no function more important than personnel security, which might properly be defined as the program that seeks to ensure that the Agency always employs and is associated with people who can be trusted with the Nation's top secrets.

**II. PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS/AUTHORITIES**

• The Agency's investigative and adjudicative authorities are set out in the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949. These authorities were expanded upon in Executive Orders 10450 and 12036, various Agency regulations and Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/14.

• Agency regulations state in part that it is imperative that Agency personnel be persons "who are of excellent character, and of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, discretion, and trustworthiness." That was lifted out of 10450, and the

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Agency's standards are high because CIA's mission is vital to national security and much is expected of those who carry it out. The Agency necessarily insists on standards of integrity, personal responsibility, trustworthiness and loyalty well beyond what most other employers demand.

### III. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL SCREENING

The Agency's Office of Personnel recruiters fill the Agency's personnel needs by utilizing direct newspaper advertising or contacts with appropriate sources in universities, military bases, private industry, vocational/technical institutions, or the referrals of current and former employees. These recruiters are scattered throughout the United States.

Once the applicant is located and identified, initial interviews are arranged with the recruiter. The most promising candidates are asked to submit resumes and, in most cases, the recruiter arranges for a professional applicant test battery to be administered. The recruiter will then send to Headquarters his interview report, along with his recommendation.

A key step in the process involves the use of expeditors who are experienced professional security officers assigned to the Office of Personnel. The expeditors painstakingly review the Personal History Statement submitted by the applicant, concentrating on entries that tend to signal trouble--the items most likely to be falsified by the candidate. The expeditors then attempt to contact all the applicants put into processing in order to identify and eliminate those individuals who have made admissions which soundly establish their unsuitability for Agency employment or who will do so in a telephone interview--normally about ten percent of the candidates.

### IV. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES SCREENING

All applicants are required to complete medical processing prior to entry on duty. This processing consists of a medical evaluation, psychiatric screening, and in some cases psychological assessments. The medical evaluation which consists of accepted and usual medical testing techniques, is appraised by a medical doctor who determines whether the applicant is physically qualified for employment.

Psychiatric screening begins with the receipt and review of the applicant's report of medical history. Should pertinent psychiatric information be noted, the report is forwarded for special evaluation. Depending upon the nature and extent of the information, the Office of Medical Services may request additional information from the physician of the applicant.

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\* During the applicant's Headquarters processing, he or she will complete a psychiatric history questionnaire. This is carefully screened by a psychometrist. Depending on the nature of the information developed, or existing recommendations in the file, the psychometrist may refer the applicant for psychiatric interview. A report of the interview will be prepared, reviewed and analyzed by professional staff members and an appropriate recommendation for disposition will be forwarded through command channels.

\* Psychological assessments may be requested by operating officials and are mandatory in a number of cases. The assessments are not for medical screening, but are used to match the skills of the applicant with his projected assignment. They may contain significant information as to the suitability and flexibility of the candidate.

#### V. THE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION

\* Security processing includes the scheduling and conduct of a full field investigation. The investigation is designed to establish the applicant's bona fides and determine that he or she is of excellent character, of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness. Appropriate National Agency Checks are always conducted, and the field investigation covers the most recent 15 years of the applicant's life, or back to age 17, whichever is shorter.

\* All education, employments, and neighborhoods are covered; teachers, fellow students, supervisors, co-workers, and neighbors are interviewed to the extent possible. In addition, a minimum of five character references, including peers, are interviewed. Police checks are conducted on all areas where the applicant has lived, worked or attended school, and credit reputation is established through interviews and/or credit reporting agencies. Suitability and security factors explored by the investigator include family background, reputation and loyalty of spouse and close relatives, as well as the applicant's health, habits, associates, morals, loyalty, financial standing, abilities, personality, character traits, and foreign travels.

\* In summary, the background investigation explores every legitimate facet of an applicant's life. The field inquiry by the Office of Security is one of the most comprehensive in Government today. It is closed only when all information, favorable or unfavorable, is confirmed, consolidated and sufficient to permit an equitable decision--fair to the individual and fair to the Agency.

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**VI. THE POLYGRAPH PROGRAM**

• The CIA polygraph program is closely controlled and managed by the Office of Security, following strict guidelines established by the Director of Central Intelligence. Polygraph examiners are generally selected from the ranks of professional security officers who have had on-the-job experience. All examiners are volunteers and are carefully selected for their maturity, emotional stability, evenhandedness and dedication. They receive their three-month formal training at the CIA Polygraph School and then must complete a nine-month probationary period under the close scrutiny of experienced Agency examiners.

• Polygraph testing has played a crucial role in the Central Intelligence Agency's security program for the past 35 years. During this time, the CIA has developed incontrovertible evidence of the value of this vital procedure.

• The CIA's experience with polygraph involves over 128,000 cases and close to a million separate polygraph charts. The value of the polygraph, indeed its indispensability, is clearly reflected in the high number of security disapproval decisions taken by the Director of Security based on information developed during the polygraph examination.

• In the polygraph interview, only those basic questions necessary to satisfy legitimate security concerns are asked. No unrelated information is solicited along the way. Over and above the initial training and probationary period, a strict quality control program is designed to ensure that the highest technical standards are met by examiners, whether at the apprentice or senior examiner level.

**VII. THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS**

• The basic security responsibility for collating all of the essential data on an applicant rests with the appraiser who ensures that the investigation is complete, and that all appropriate issues are covered in the course of the polygraph interview. This Personnel Security Officer summarizes all the essential elements of the case, and makes an appropriate recommendation in terms of approval, security disqualification, or referral to the Office of Personnel's Applicant Review Panel on suitability grounds.

• The adjudicative phase of security processing is delicate and critical for all concerned. Subjectivity in the process must be reduced to an absolute minimum. Each case is analyzed by an appraiser who has the freedom to vote his or her

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conscience in making an appropriate recommendation--with no pressure from above. In all cases the total person is considered in order to present a balanced picture which covers both the favorable aspects of an applicant's background as well as problem areas.

- It is a system of checks and balances. Each case is reviewed by a number of senior experienced Security Officers where there is serious derogatory information and a negative recommendation is being made. The final decision is made by the Director of Security who must weigh the evidence, keeping in mind national security above all other considerations. Statistically, over twelve percent of the applicants put into processing are disapproved on strictly security grounds.

#### VII. THE APPLICANT REVIEW PANEL

- A truly effective personnel screening program involves a team effort by the Offices of Personnel, Medical Services, and Security. This collegial approach to the screening of candidates for employment is best reflected in the work of the Applicant Review Panel, which was established in 1953 to appraise all significant suitability information available through the Agency screening procedures. Data is shared among the Applicant Review Panel members, and is subjected to systematic adjudication before a decision affecting employment is made.

- Adverse suitability information coming within the purview of the Applicant Review Panel may be illustrated as follows: emotional instability and immaturity, personality idiosyncrasies, limited mental capacity including scholarship deficiencies, physical impairment, limitations precluding adaptability and flexibility, poor employment record, financial irresponsibility, including spending habits, excessive alcohol use, and marital difficulties.

- A representative of any one of the three offices may refer a case to the Applicant Review Panel based on suitability information developed during the course of the screening process. It may be data of such a nature that standing alone it does not justify an applicant's rejection, but when related with data existing in other offices, it may acquire greater significance. The Applicant Review Panel is chaired by the Office of Personnel representative and the Panel makes recommendations to the Director of Personnel, who makes the decision to accept or reject the applicant's employment with the Agency. Approximately five percent of the applicants put into processing are disapproved by the Applicant Review Panel because of suitability factors.

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**IX. THE REINVESTIGATION/REPOLYGRAPH PROGRAM**

• In making personnel security decisions, the premise is followed that the past is the precursor of the future. Behavior that is characteristic of a person's background tends to be repeated in the future. In hiring and clearing people, the emphasis is on learning as much as possible about their past. The emphasis on the total person--expensive and time-consuming though it is--pays dividends.

• People do change with time. The applicant hired today will be a significantly different person--physiologically and psychologically--ten years from now. If the "whole person concept" is the key to the initial clearance effort, then the "dynamic person concept" is equally important in the personnel security concerns held about on-duty personnel. A strong personnel security program has to be an on-going effort.

• In view of the sensitive intelligence and counterintelligence mission of the Agency and in support of the statutory responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods, the Agency has historically and traditionally maintained a program for the periodic review of security cases, as required by DCID 1/14. At the present time there is a review of the status of new employees within the three-year probationary period, and this normally involves both a reinvestigation and a repolygraph. There is also the regular reinvestigation program that follows thereafter on a cycle of every five years.

**X. CONCLUSION**

• It is the position of the Office of Security that, by and large, the Central Intelligence Agency is composed of very dedicated, hardworking, and capable employees. The screening offices have served jointly as an effective machine in bringing on board individuals of high caliber and diverse backgrounds who possess an extremely wide variety of education, skill, and experience. At the same time, the machine screens out those persons who do not meet Agency security and suitability standards.



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EDWIN C. MOORE

BACKGROUND ON THE CASE

Edwin G. Moore, II, was a CIA staff employee from 1952 to 1963 when he was terminated by the DCI after being convicted of arson. He was reinstated in 1967, following acquittal from this charge. He retired in 1973 on medical disability. His career had been marked by marginal work performance, chronic work frustrations and a general reputation of being miscast in an intelligence agency.

In December 1976, Moore threw a package containing classified CIA documents and ransom payment instructions for \$200,000 over a fence into a Soviet residence compound. The Soviet watchman was afraid that the package was a bomb and turned it over to a police officer. A subsequent search of Moore's house turned up ten boxes of CIA classified documents dating back to the late 1950s.

In May 1977, Moore was convicted on two counts of espionage and three counts of unlawful possession of classified Government documents. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He was paroled in 1979.

LESSONS OF CASE/CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- The Moore case pointed out the need for greater emphasis on the reinvestigation/repolygraph programs and the need to dedicate more resources to such efforts. Following the Moore disclosures, the Agency applied additional resources and took steps to implement reinvestigations and repolygraphs of staff personnel at roughly five-year intervals.

- The Moore case illustrated a need for meaningful indoctrination and security awareness programs. Again the Agency responded by directing additional resources toward the problem. A new mandatory security indoctrination program was developed and presented to all employees. In addition, the initial security briefing for new employees was revised and expanded.

- The Moore case demonstrated that first-line supervisors must assume a large responsibility for recognizing and dealing with employee suitability issues before they become security problems. In the Agency, steps were taken through approved training mechanisms to educate the Agency's supervisors about these important duties and responsibilities.

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• The Moore case showed that there was a need to generate a greater awareness of the Personnel Evaluation Board (PEB); an interoffice panel consisting of officers from the Offices of Personnel, Security and Medical Services who meet with management representatives to discuss problems of employee suitability. Special efforts were introduced after Moore to publicize the role of PEB and to encourage greater use of the instrumentality. As a result of these efforts, the use and effectiveness of the PEB have increased significantly.

• The Moore case surfaced the need for periodic unannounced spot checks of briefcases and packages to lessen the possibility of unauthorized removal from Agency buildings of classified materials. A special educational program alerted all employees to their physical security responsibilities.

• The Moore case delivered up a more forceful approach in the handling of the Agency's personnel security cases.

• The Moore case reaffirmed that formal compartmentation and need-to-know are viable principles for use in the Agency's security program. This message was transmitted throughout the Agency.

• The Moore case showed that there is close interrelationship between security and suitability issues; a disgruntled employee has the potential for causing serious security difficulties regardless of the basis for his bitterness. After the Moore case, this point was made with unusual vigor throughout the chain of command and with those involved with clearance adjudications.

• The Moore case showed that Agency management had to place greater reliance on the screening arms of the Agency, particularly the Office of Medical Services which was quite accurate in its psychological assessment of Mr. Moore. The Office of Medical Services now plays a stronger role in the screening of applicants.

• The analysis of the Moore case concluded that a vigorous repolygraph program offers the best chance of uncovering an individual who is deliberately violating the security trust expected of employees. The Agency's repolygraph program was significantly strengthened as a result of the Moore case review.

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\* The Moore case led to the conclusion that the cornerstone of a sound security program is faith and trust in the individual employee. The quality of employees should be uppermost in the selection process. Personnel security standards must not be bent.

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## CHRISTOPHER BOYCE

BACKGROUND ON THE CASE

Christopher John Boyce worked for TRW, Inc., in El Segundo, California, from 1974 to 1976 as a document control clerk, courier and communicator. He had access to Agency classified and compartmented documents regarding technical intelligence collection systems, and to cryptological systems. During Boyce's employment at TRW, he periodically removed, copied and returned hundreds of documents. He photographed other documents and devices in the document control and communications center where he worked. Boyce gave this information to an accomplice, Andrew Caulton Lee, who sold it to the Soviets for about \$76,000.

In January 1977, the Mexican police arrested Lee outside the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He was found to have microfilm of Top Secret documents in his possession. Boyce and Lee were convicted of conspiracy, espionage, and theft. Boyce was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment, and Lee to life imprisonment.

LESSONS OF THE CASE/CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- The Boyce case illustrated a need to initiate a program of selective polygraph use in private industry on key contractor personnel having access to sensitive codeword documents. In the Agency an authorization was obtained for a pilot effort which later led to a formal approval to establish an industrial polygraph program.

- The Boyce case showed that investigative coverage in industrial cases should be as extensive as in staff cases and should focus on peer connections in addition to family associations. This message was transmitted to all Agency field office investigative personnel.

- The Boyce case determined that the application of personnel security standards in the appraisal of industrial cases had to be upgraded to the level of adjudication used in Agency staff employee cases. After Boyce, steps were immediately taken to tighten the screening process in contractor cases.

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BOYCE

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• The Boyce case surfaced a need for a program of periodic, unannounced, comprehensive security audits of industrial contractor facilities. Resources were obtained to establish an Industrial Security Branch with the responsibility of conducting these security inspections.

• The Boyce case brought home again the close relationship between security and suitability issues in the realm of personnel security. The personality and character flaws of Christopher Boyce were the key to his treasonable behavior in private industry. In the wake of the case, the Agency moved to a greater emphasis upon suitability issues in the industrial cases. In addition, a new Industrial Review Panel was created at that time to address suitability problems in industry.

• Though essentially a personnel security failure, the Boyce case also led to various physical security reform measures, especially having to do with document controls and personnel access controls.

• The Boyce case pointed to the need to improve the line of communication between the Agency and the industrial security officer counterparts. Arrangements, therefore, were made to hold regularly scheduled Industrial Security Seminars to educate contractor security officers on Agency security requirements, and to provide a forum for appropriate dialogue on matters of mutual interest.

• The Boyce case again showed the correlation between effective line supervision and effective security. It also illustrated the importance of involvement by all supervisors in the policies and practices of the Organization's security program.

• The Boyce case delivered insights on necessary security reforms for communications and registry operations, especially the "two-man" rule whenever handling especially sensitive information is involved.

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## WILLIAM KAMPILES

BACKGROUND ON THE CASE

William Peter Kampiles was a CIA staff employee from March until October 1977. In approximately August 1977, he removed a Top Secret/compartmented manual pertaining to a sensitive technical collection project. He removed it from the office where he was assigned, walked out of the Agency Headquarters Building and took it to his apartment. Kampiles resigned in October 1977 after receiving a warning letter the previous month for poor performance. He subsequently took the manual to Athens, Greece, where he sold it to a Soviet Embassy official for \$3,000. Kampiles was arrested by the FBI in August 1978 and confessed to the theft and sale of the manual to the Soviets. On 22 December 1978, he was sentenced to 40 years in prison.

LESSONS OF CASE/CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The Kampiles case illustrated the value of assigning career security officers to line components where they can monitor operational activity closely and spot possible personnel security problems early. Following the Kampiles case, a major drive was launched to place security careerists "in residence" in all the major components of the Agency. This drive is now finished and deemed successful.

The Kampiles case showed the need for security awareness programs to be aimed at individual employees and at supervisors. After the case broke, a new group was established in the Office of Security for this purpose with additional personnel dedicated exclusively to security indoctrination and security education activity.

The Kampiles case determined that there was a need to conduct a comprehensive review of new Agency employees early on and certainly before the end of a three-year "probationary period." Subsequent to the case, procedures were established to provide such screening by the Offices of Personnel, Security and Medical Services, along with a performance/suitability assessment by the supervisory chain of command. The review conducted by the Office of Security includes both a reinvestigation update and a polygraph reinterview.

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**KAMPFILES**

As a CIA staff employee from approximately August 1977, he received manual pertaining to a project. He removed it from the office and took it home. He talked out of the Agency and took it to his apartment. Kampfiles received a warning letter the next day. He subsequently took the manual to a Soviet Embassy. He was arrested by the FBI in August 1977 and sale of the manual to the Soviet Union. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison.

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It was determined that there was a comprehensive review of new Agency personnel before the end of a period. Subsequent to the establishment of the Office of Personnel, Security and Suitability, a performance/suitability review chain of command. The Office of Security includes both a polygraph reinterview.

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The Kampfiles case led to a conclusion that physical security programming needed to be strengthened. Measures were taken to improve compound perimeter security by upgrading the fences, outdoor lights, alarms, guard consoles, and badge controls. Steps were also taken to upgrade the overall security access system.

The Kampfiles case highlighted concerns over document controls. New emphasis was given to strict accountability for Top Secret and other highly sensitive documents. Disseminations of sensitive intelligence reports were curtailed in strict conformity with the "need-to-know" principle.

The Kampfiles case brought attention to registry operations, policies and procedures. Following a full review of this matter, steps were taken to establish a separate career service for registry officers and information control specialists. Tighter controls were established on the flow of documents and a program for periodic audits of controlled documents was established.

The Kampfiles case illustrated the importance of psychological assessment as a prelude to appointment to sensitive positions. If the individual's self-image and the nature of his assignment are widely discrepant, serious maladjustment may ensue. The Agency has reacted to this possibility by significantly increasing its reliance upon psychological testing prior to employment.