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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Congressional Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20505

Telephone: 482-6136

12 March 1987

HPSCI
WH

TO: Mr. William L. Ball, III
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

Dear Mr. Ball:

The enclosed unclassified paper was prepared in response to a question from Representative Dick Cheney (R., WY) during a recent Committee hearing on Nicaragua.

I thought you might find it interesting.

15/

[Redacted]
Deputy Director for House Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

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**SUBJECT: Training of Foreign Subversives in Nicaragua;
Presence in Nicaragua of Foreign Advisors to Assist
in the Training of Foreign Subversives.**

The following information was provided by a former Operations Officer in the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DIM) who deserted in April 1986.

Training of Foreign Subversives in Nicaragua

1. Three organizations within the Sandinista regime work together in a program of training revolutionaries from other countries in Nicaragua: The Directorate of International Relations (DRI) of the Sandinista National Liberation Front Party; the F-3 Section of the Directorate General of State Security (DGSE) of the Ministry of Interior; and the Military Intelligence Directorate (DIM) of the Sandinista Popular Army.

2. The DRI is the key organization involved in bringing both political and military trainees to Nicaragua. It determines how many individuals from which groups are to be trained; this depends on availability of training space and instructors. Individuals who train in Nicaragua are from revolutionary groups in Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador. (Comment: Source was not aware of any Guatemalan insurgents trained in Nicaragua.) Once the DRI has determined how many individuals can be handled, it informs the respective revolutionary groups, whose responsibility it is to select the political and military trainees. Once the trainees have arrived in Nicaragua, the DRI and the DGSE are the primary liaison organizations for military trainees. Both the DRI and DGSE are in contact with the trainees before they are put in contact with Military Counterintelligence (CIM) and the Seventh Section of the DIM.

3. The CIM handles physical security for the trainees after they are assigned to a training facility. Each trainee is given false identification and assigned a pseudonym by a CIM officer, who picks up and holds the documentation used by the trainees during their travel. The DIM plans the training agenda, and, if the arriving trainees cross into Nicaragua by land, places a reception team on the border to receive them. The DIM and the DGSE jointly provide the weapons and armament to be used by the trainees. Weapons and equipment are adapted to meet the needs of specific activities for which the revolutionaries are being trained. The F-3 section of the DGSE does the alterations.

Training Facilities in Nicaragua for Foreign Revolutionaries

1. Trainees are usually sent to Montelimar, which can accommodate up to 2,000 personnel. Occasionally trainees are assigned to one of a number of Special Assignment Training Centers (CEPEDE). Trainees who are en route to Cuba are usually lodged in villas, houses or apartments in the Las Colinas area of Managua.

BREAKDOWN OF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TRAINING OF FOREIGN SUBVERSIVES
IN NICARAGUA

FSLN - Party organization
Directorate of Internatational Relations
(DRI)

Responsible for: Determining the number of foreign subversives that can be trained in political and military activities.

Acting along with the DGSE as primary liaison for military trainees once they are in Nicaragua.

Ministry of Interior
Directorate General of State Security
(DGSE)

Responsible for: Acting along with the DGSE as primary liaison for military trainees one they are in Nicaragua.

Altering weapons and equipment to meet the needs of the trainees (F-3).

Providing weapons and equipment to be used by the trainees, jointly with DIM.

Sandinista Popular Army
Military Intelligence Directorate
(DIM)

Responsible for: Planning the training agenda.

Meeting the trainees at the border if they arrive by land.

Providing weapons and armament to be used by the trainees, jointly with DGSE.

Sandinista Popular Army
Military Counterintelligence
(CIM)

Responsible for: Providing physical security and false documentation for the trainees after they are assigned to a training facility.

2. For specific terrorism training, trainees receive two months of basic training in a camp located near Managua. They then receive advanced training in a variety of activities, including guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare training, which takes up to six months to complete, is conducted in a northern region. The guerrilla warfare course includes, among other things, training in the use of a variety of weapons and the use of explosives. One of the long-range goals of this program is to form a Libyan-sponsored International Revolutionary Army which would provide protection for all member groups. The DRI, through the Sandinista National Center for Solidarity with People (CNSP), is in contact with counterpart groups in Cuba, Vietnam and Iran to set up such an organization. (Comment: Source also indicated that a group of 20 Nicaraguan intelligence officers was scheduled to go to Libya in August 1986 for training, possibly in connection with this program, but he does not know whether the travel took place.)

Foreign Advisors in Nicaragua

1. As of early 1986 there were about 30 Cuban advisors and instructors assigned to the DIM. There were four or five Cuban instructors on the General Staff at Montelimar. One taught marksmanship and physical education, one specialized in marksmanship, and a third taught diving, parachuting and karate. In 1982, most Sandinista trainees were not favorably disposed toward the Cuban instructors. This dislike stemmed from the Cubans' harsh criticism and disparaging personal remarks both in and out of class. Gradually, however, the Cuban instructors earned their students' respect because of their knowledge and unselfish contribution to the Sandinista Revolutionary cause.

2. In early 1985 there were five Vietnamese instructors at the CEPEDE in Montelimar. They taught courses in reconnaissance, personal camouflage, silent and hidden advance, enemy search, military engineering, ambushes/jungle combat, and karate. The Vietnamese instructors were popular and, more importantly, respected for their expertise in guerrilla warfare tactics.