

DDT-26



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

13 March 1986

NOTE TO: The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Secretary of State

Mr. Secretary -

Here is the paper you requested outlining what we think you will encounter during your trip to France, Italy, Greece and Turkey next week. I am also including papers on the Polish situation and the Church in Eastern Europe that may be helpful as you prepare for your audience with the Pope.

Bob.

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment:
As Stated

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Washington, D.C. 20505


BACKGROUND FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ' WEST EUROPEAN TRIP

Summary

The West European countries you visit next week all place a high priority on ensuring amicable exchanges, but individual leaders in each capital will see your presence as a unique opportunity to press for US concessions -- particularly on trade and aid issues. As distracted as the French will be in the aftermath of the election, we do not rule out a strong demarche by Mitterrand aimed at US objections to recent EC tariff and quota revisions affecting Spain and Portugal. In Italy, Prime Minister Craxi will probably press for your help in gaining Rome G-5 membership, while Foreign Minister Andreotti may grumble about US policies on trade and the Middle East. Greece's Papandreu, hoping that you will invite him to the US, will be on his best behavior but is unlikely to promise much on contentious issues like the US bases. The Turks, for their part, may urge your personal intervention in the DECA negotiations.



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This memorandum was prepared by the Western Europe Division. Comments and questions are welcomed and should be addressed to [redacted] Chief, Western Europe Division, Office of European Analysis, [redacted]

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France

French officials who meet with you will be preoccupied with domestic politics in the aftermath of the National Assembly election on 16 March.

--Assuming the conservatives win the election, French officials, including President Mitterrand, will be distracted by the confusion surrounding the transition to a government of "cohabitation."

--Opposition leaders will still be jockeying for position, and we strongly doubt that the details of a new government will have been settled by the time you arrive. If the situation is clearer than we anticipate, you may be asked to meet with opposition leaders, such as Jacques Chirac, in addition to -- or instead of -- your scheduled sessions with former President Giscard and Foreign Minister Dumas

--The last thing French leaders want at this stage is new troubles with the US, and they probably will try to avoid surprising you with any significant new departures in French policy. [REDACTED]

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In your most important meeting, Mitterrand will try to demonstrate his firm grip on the French foreign policy rudder since he will want to carve out foreign affairs as his preserve during the cohabitation period.

--We believe Mitterrand will underscore the continuity in French foreign policy under cohabitation and stress the importance to France of close Franco-American ties. [REDACTED]

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On specific foreign policy issues, Mitterrand is likely to hew to familiar French themes.

--He will join in decrying international terrorism-- especially in light of the recent kidnapping of four more French citizens in Lebanon--but in our view will continue to balk at proposals for significantly enhanced international cooperation to combat terrorism. The French do not want to expose

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[redacted]

themselves to criticism in a multilateral forum for their traditional policies of granting asylum liberally and resisting extradition requests from other countries.

--Similarly, Mitterrand will be eager to condemn Libya but is unlikely to agree to any more concrete French actions in support of US sanctions.

--If pressed on the Libyan issue, he will probably argue that France is doing its part in the struggle against Qadhafi by frustrating his designs on Chad.

--Mitterrand is relieved that Duvalier's presence in France did not become a campaign issue, but he will probably stress that Paris expects continued US help in finding Duvalier a permanent home. [redacted]

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The one issue that we think could become a serious bone of contention during your visit is the trade conflict with the European Community over tariff and quota revisions in Spain and Portugal caused by EC accession.

--Should the US announce retaliatory measures before your visit, Mitterrand will almost certainly register strong French objections. Any other French officials you meet will doubtless echo these protests.

--We believe that Mitterrand's response will be tempered, however, by his preoccupation with domestic politics and the overall favorable climate of Franco-American international economic relations. His reaction, therefore, is unlikely to go beyond a stern warning that US actions not only justify EC retaliation but may also jeopardize the new GATT round. [redacted]

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Mitterrand may well take the opportunity to applaud recent advances in international monetary cooperation.

--He has long pressed for more stable exchange rates and is likely to reiterate his support for the notion of an international monetary conference.

--He may ask that you to clarify US thinking on stabilizing exchange rates and offer the recent French Treasury proposal on target zones as a starting point.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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--Mitterrand is also likely to applaud the recent wave of interest rate cuts. He may also try to assure you that he will be calling the shots for France at the Tokyo Summit in May, although preparations for the Economic Summit could be the first test of strength between Mitterrand and a new center-right government.

[redacted]

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Italy

Your visit to Rome could find Italian leaders on the verge of a government shakeup.

--Prime Minister Craxi's cabinet, which has been in office for a record-setting two and a half years, appears to be running out of steam.

--Craxi and Christian Democratic Party leader De Mita have been considering several options -- including a major cabinet shuffle and early elections -- but now seem to be leaning toward minor cabinet changes.

[redacted]

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Regardless of the situation within the governing coalition, your interlocutors are likely to press you on a number of issues.

--Craxi, President Cossiga, and Defense Minister Spadolini, while expressing support for US efforts to combat terrorism, are likely to emphasize that situations like the confrontation at Sigonella between US and Italian forces during the Abu-Abbas affair must not be repeated. They will call for more advance consultations to avoid similar incidents in the future.

--Craxi and Spadolini probably will also stress that the US must alert Rome about its intentions in the Gulf of Sidra far enough in advance for Italy to adjust its forces.

--Craxi is apparently convinced that the US can persuade the UK and West Germany to support Italy's membership in the G-5, and he is likely to press you for such efforts. He may bring up the Tokyo Summit and state his support for the French proposal on exchange rate target zones.

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In our view, your most contentious session may be with Foreign Minister Andreotti.

--An outspoken critic of many US policies in the Middle East, Andreotti probably will argue that Washington must prod Tel Aviv to be more flexible. He may also complain that the evidence linking Qadhafi to the Rome massacre is weak and argue that the US maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra will not dissuade Qadhafi.

[REDACTED]

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--Andreotti might respond to US criticism of Italian trade practices by threatening to enforce an agreement to keep bilateral military trade balanced -- annual US military exports to Italy have so far heavily outweighed Italian sales to the United States. [REDACTED]

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Greece

Prime Minister Papandreou probably views your visit as a major opportunity to convince Washington of the sincerity of his commitment to steer bilateral relations into "calmer waters"-- a consistent theme since his reelection last June. We believe his interest in better relations with the United States derives largely from Greece's need for foreign assistance to cope with its economic problems and Papandreou's need to preserve his political credibility with centrists and the Greek military. In addition, he probably has several more specific goals:

--We believe securing an invitation to visit the US is at the top of his agenda. This would strengthen his position with the Greek military and political moderates and put him on equal footing with Turkish Prime Minister Ozal who visited the US last May.

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--He may also urge speedy delivery of the F-16s. Papandreou needs these to blunt opposition charges that his policies have weakened security ties with the US. We assume he also calculates that the longer delivery of the F-16s is delayed the greater leverage Washington has on key questions such as the renewal of US bases.

--He probably sees a successful visit by you as an important step in creating the impression that Greece is a good credit risk, offers profitable investment opportunities, and is a safe place for tourists. [REDACTED]

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Papandreou will also want to avoid making commitments that would decrease his bargaining power later or limit his ability to pursue other important policy goals.

--US bases. We believe Papandreou will not want to be totally negative, but it is unlikely that he will make a more definite commitment to you at his time. There are indications, however, that he and his advisors are beginning to think less in terms of eliminating the bases and more in terms of what concessions they can wring from the US in return for renewal.

--NATO. Papandreou is unlikely to make any commitment to deepen or extend Greek participation in NATO exercises.

--Cooperation against terrorism. While the Greek government has taken some measures--upgrading security at the Athens airport, participating in counter-terrorist programs, and monitoring its large Arab population more closely--Papandreou will want to avoid public commitments that could affect Greece's standing with either moderate or radical Middle Eastern countries. He will avoid endorsement of sanctions against Libya. [REDACTED]

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Although Papandreou is unlikely to be strident or argumentative in conversations with you, we would not be surprised by negative statements or posturing before or after your departure. If he comes under pressure from

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domestic critics, he is quite capable of taking positions that run counter to points he may have made privately with you.

--If the left criticizes him for colluding with you, for example, he may revert to a more negative public posture on the US bases and cooperation with NATO. 25X6

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Turkey

Prime Minister Ozal and other Turkish officials are likely to view your visit as a prime opportunity to press for trade concessions and other economic benefits from the US, defend Turkey's policies in the Middle East, and impress upon you the importance of Turkey's contributions to Western security. Given the role the Turks would like you to play in championing their interests, we believe your Turkish hosts will not use high pressure tactics but will rely on their diplomatic skills in trying to win a positive response from you. [REDACTED]

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Foremost among Turkish goals during your visit will be:

--To derive additional benefits for Turkey in return for renewal of the US-Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). In particular, they want expanded access to the US market for Turkish products, especially textiles and steel. They may also urge you to intervene personally in the DECA negotiations.

--To secure your help in obtaining other economic and trade benefits from the United States. They might, for example, ask you to intervene to secure forgiveness of debts on Foreign Military Sales and to lobby for increased economic and military assistance, or even increased private investment.

--To solicit your understanding and support for Turkish policies in the Middle East and the importance of Turkey's ability to play the role of an "honest

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broker" between the West and the Muslim world, stressing Turkey's geographically exposed position and the military threat from Syria. They may emphasize Turkey's interest in promoting an equitable and non-destabilizing settlement of the Iran-Iraq war. Ozal will just have returned from Baghdad before meeting you and may wish to discuss new moves to settle the conflict.

--To counter what you are likely to hear from the Greeks concerning Turkey's alleged responsibility for the impasse in disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus.

--To probe for signs of US willingness to tolerate a change in the Cyprus situation, perhaps by hinting that Greek Cypriot intransigence is paving the way for international recognition of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." [REDACTED]

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--To minimize possible points of contention with the US and to stress mutual interests. We therefore conclude that the Turks, even when pressing for concessions, will advance their views in a low-key and non-confrontational manner. [REDACTED]

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Background Paper on Poland

Poland seems little closer to consensual stability than it was when shipyard workers went on strike in August 1980 or when martial law was declared in December 1981. Demonstrations have become more infrequent and fewer people attend them, but the issues that gave rise to the birth of Solidarity have not been resolved and could, under the right combination of circumstances, provoke another crisis. [redacted]

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The authorities have become more adept at maintaining order. The Polish legal structure has been strengthened to give the regime more options in handling dissent. The universities -- a traditional source of trouble -- have been brought under tighter control. The expansion of the Church's power has been slowed. Jaruzelski has strengthened his grip on the party by removing some of his critics. [redacted]

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Jaruzelski has had some foreign policy successes with visits to India, Yugoslavia, the United Nations, and France. A visit to Italy may be in the offing, and Gorbachev seems to have accepted him. The unwillingness, meanwhile, of the Poles to move toward a genuine national reconciliation has kept US-Polish relations at a very low level. [redacted]

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Economy

The modest recovery of the Polish economy from the depths of 1980-82 has slowed, and there are no indications that the Poles can expect significant outside help from either the Soviets or the West. The Poles may join the IMF this spring, but that clearly will not be enough to turn the economy around. Warsaw's Western creditors -- immersed in debt rescheduling negotiations with the Poles -- show no enthusiasm for extending significant new credits. Poland continues to receive more favorable economic treatment from the Soviets -- in the form of trade credits -- than any other East European country. These credits are slated to end next year. The Poles continue to request additional help but the current panacea being touted by Moscow -- increased emphasis on CEMA integration, especially in science and technology -- is not likely to bring near-term results for Poland. [redacted]

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Domestically, the economic reform that once was touted as a solution to Poland's problems is dead in the water, partly because of conservative bureaucrats but also because reform would require austerity measures that would not be

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[redacted]

accepted by workers. Although there are spot shortages, especially of coal this winter, supplies of food and other goods seem generally to have improved over 1981-82; the most sensitive issues gripping workers are prices and wages. Many factory managers have managed to dampen complaints about price hikes by agreeing to wage increases that exceed national targets. The perpetual grumbling in the factories has thus far not resulted in any significant strikes, but we cannot be certain how long Polish workers will quietly accept a virtually stagnating standard of living. [redacted]

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The Opposition

Although currently pessimistic about its prospects, the opposition remains a potent force. It represents a large cadre of people with political experience in organizing workers. It has an extensive underground press that circulates information throughout the country. It conducts a number of social and cultural events -- in conjunction with the Church -- that the regime cannot control. The older generation of the opposition -- the establishment so to speak -- seems disposed to wait for better times. But there is an ill-defined group of younger people who apparently are more willing to turn to violence to achieve their aims. This group, with occasional backing from the general population, would like Cardinal Glemp and the Church to be more aggressive in their dealings with the regime. [redacted]

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The Church

The authorities continue to be cautious when dealing with the Church. A number of issues under discussion remain unresolved: the amount of paper the state will give the Church to publish its censored but independent newspapers, legislation giving the Church a legal status, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and Church control over outspoken, anti-regime priests. Another key issue is whether the regime will allow the Church to operate a fund to aid private agriculture. The authorities have been delaying approval for this fund for several years believing such a program would further entrench the Church in the Polish countryside. Over the past several weeks there have been optimistic assessments from the Church that the government is ready to go ahead. Such optimism has arisen before only to be dashed. The Church's future building plans -- which call for more than the one thousand buildings currently under construction -- are being discussed with the regime, which would clearly like to severely cut back on this aspect of the Church's activities. The regime rarely misses an opportunity to draw the population's attention to the Church's use of scarce building materials. [redacted]

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The Party

In the population's eyes, the party remains a discredited organization from which the more liberal, openminded members fled (or were purged). Although Jaruzelski gave up the Premiership in November 1985 to concentrate on party work, it is unlikely that he can turn it into a more dynamic organization with new or workable ideas for achieving reconciliation with the Poles. Jaruzelski is now in the midst of preparations for the party congress in June from which he will probably emerge with a top leadership and a party apparatus that more closely reflects his own personnel choices. [REDACTED]

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Polish-Soviet Relations

Gorbachev seems more pleased today with Jaruzelski's performance than he was last April when the leaders first met. At that time Gorbachev pushed Jaruzelski to take a tougher stand toward the opposition and Church, a course the Polish leader has followed partly as a result of the Soviet pressure and partly because he saw that his less harsh approaches to normalization were not working. His ascetic style fits in well with Gorbachev's attacks on alcoholism and corruption. Gorbachev's attitude seemed evident in the positive treatment Jaruzelski has received during the ongoing Soviet party congress. Jaruzelski, at the congress, was clearly seeking to curry favor with the Soviet leader. [REDACTED]

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Polish-US Relations

The unwillingness of the Poles to move toward a genuine national reconciliation has hampered, from the US point of view, an improvement in relations. Despite several amnesties, the number of political prisoners (now estimated at about 250) is again inching upwards. The authorities continue to harass known opposition leaders, including Walesa, and are following a hostile policy toward intellectuals. The regime is dragging its feet on a number of Church/State issues and, in general, is not inclined to seek the active cooperation of those who are critical of official policies. [REDACTED]

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For their part, the Poles want a higher level of contacts with the US as a sign of legitimacy, but they insist that the US make the first public gesture as it would seem to vindicate Warsaw's claim to being the aggrieved party. The Poles continue to demand that the US stop interfering in their internal affairs through Radio Free Europe or via comments by US Administration officials and occasionally repeat their demand for monetary compensation (now set at \$15 billion) for damages caused by US sanctions. We are not convinced the Poles make this last demand seriously, but it is on the table. [REDACTED]

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

Catholicism in Eastern Europe

Except in Albania, where all religious practice has been eliminated, the Roman Catholic Church has survived the establishment of Marxist societies in Eastern Europe. In recent years, and particularly since the appointment of a Polish Pope, there have even been signs of a revival of Catholicism in the region. While no country seems close to developing the same level of religious intensity that exists in Poland--where crucifixes hang in some state schools--East European and Soviet authorities are worried about the attraction of religion, particularly among the youth.

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The Vatican is pleased with this trend, but it recognizes that much more needs to be done to secure genuine religious rights in Eastern Europe. There is a shortage of priests and churches, and most of the regimes insist on participating in the selection of new clerics. The Pope has been pressing hard to correct these inequities and would like to visit several East European countries in addition to another planned trip to Poland in 1987.

[Redacted]

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Catholicism and the East European Marxist states are likely to maintain an uneasy coexistence. The governments need stable societies in order to prosper, and the Church needs state support to function; neither wants to create conditions that would prompt Soviet intervention. Whatever the outcome, the practice of religion has demonstrated the limitations of state power in Eastern Europe for over 40 years and the yearnings of the people for a spiritual life to fill the vacuum created by Marxist atheism.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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This memorandum was prepared by the East European Division. Comments and questions are welcome and should be addressed to [Redacted] Chief, East European Division, EURA on [Redacted]

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The Pope continues to keep well-informed on events in Poland through a constant stream of visits to Rome by both clerics and lay people. Nevertheless, it seems clear that he recognizes Cardinal Glemp as the man who has to fight the battles with the Polish authorities and leaves most of the tactical decisions to him. The Pope has, on occasion, favored a tougher response by the Church to regime policies, but these are expressed as opinions and not order to Glemp. [redacted]

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By some accounts, the Pope is at a loss on what to do about Poland. He appears to favor constructive engagement with the Jaruzelski regime, but is unwilling to extend diplomatic relations until the regime goes ahead with legislation giving the Church a legal status in the country. The Pope does not appear to believe that there will be any near-term change by the Jaruzelski regime toward more liberal policies. In the meantime, he has strongly supported the Church's efforts to expand its activities into various social-cultural activities to substitute for discredited state institutions. The Pope endorsed the Church's effort to create an internationally financed fund to aid private agriculture and, on balance, believes that US sanctions have lost much of their efficiency. [redacted]

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Uppermost in the Pope's mind is his desire to return to Poland in June 1987 for a Eucharistic Congress. As with his previous trip in 1983, the Pope undoubtedly sees such a visit as an opportunity to give comfort and hope to his people. He also hopes to impress on Jaruzelski the need to go further in seeking reconciliation with the Polish people. [redacted]

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The Polish authorities have reportedly already given their approval for the visit although negotiations remain on some details. The Pope would clearly like to visit Gdansk and other reported Solidarity strongholds, but the authorities are adamantly opposed, fearing that a visit would stir up the workers. [redacted]

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As a forerunner to his visit in 1987, the Pope reportedly is prepared to receive Jaruzelski in Rome in the near future. In recent weeks Jaruzelski has been angling for an invitation to Rome to further increase his international legitimacy. The stumbling block apparently is the unwillingness of Italian Prime Minister Craxi to receive him. The prospects of such a visit remain unclear since the Italians stipulated that three prominent political prisoners be released and the Polish regime responded by only reducing marginally the sentences of two. [redacted]

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The Czechoslovak regime's tight controls over the activities of the Catholic Church are a matter of continuing concern to the Vatican and have contributed to very contentious relations between Rome and Prague. The government's restrictive policy reflects its concern that the Church could become a haven for

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anti-regime activity similar to neighboring Poland. Government control of the Catholic Church includes state licensing and payment of priests and required state approval of ordinations.

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[redacted]

The Czechoslovak Catholic Church, which claims 11 million followers out of a population of 15 million, has experienced a revival of popular support in recent years. The most recent manifestation occurred at the town of Velehrad in July 1985 when over 100,000 attended the 1100th anniversary of the burial nearby of St. Methodius, who is credited with bringing Christianity to the Slavs. The generally young crowd that attended loudly objected to attempts by government representatives to focus the celebration on secular terms. Vatican State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Cardinal Casaroli was received enthusiastically and expressed the desire that the Pope would be able to visit Czechoslovakia.

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Ten of the 13 Czechoslovak bishoprics and two archbishoprics are currently vacant. The Vatican refuses to accept candidates from among the approximately 500 priests in the pro-government "Pacem in Terris" organization, and the government will not consider candidates from among the remaining 2600 priests in Czechoslovakia. Cardinal Casaroli's consultations with government leaders last summer after the Velehrad celebrations produced no solutions.

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The Vatican's greatest concern for the future of the Czechoslovak church is finding a successor for Cardinal Tomasek who is 86 and ailing. Tomasek has been a fairly cautious leader of the Catholic Church, although even his limited outspokenness has led the government to isolate and criticize him. Government nominees to succeed Tomasek -- Bishop Feranec being the most likely -- would be pro-government "Pacem in Terris" supporters that would present the Vatican with the same problem it has experienced with the Czechoslovak bishoprics.

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The Vatican's relations with Hungary are comparatively good. Religious practice is not rigorously interfered with and the Catholic Church has its own newspaper, although it is subject to the same sort of ill-defined censorship as all Hungarian publications. The Hungarian Catholic Church claims 6 million adherents out of a total population of 10.7 million.

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At times the Vatican appears uneasy with the relatively cozy church-state relationship in Hungary. The Primate of Hungary, Cardinal Laszlo Lekai, has paid for the regime's goodwill with acts of political cooperation that include participation in the official peace movement, public defense of Hungary's human rights record, and support for most of the regime's foreign and domestic policies. This has apparently led to concern in Rome that the government has coopted the Church hierarchy and that Cardinal

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Lekai was not being assertive enough in advancing the interests of the Church. [redacted] 25X1

Some of the Hungarian faithful agree and a minority have formed the so-called Base Communities of Catholics, who object to following both the dictates of the Church hierarchy and some of the regime's policies. In particular, the Communities' advocacy of conscientious objection to military service has strained the church-state relationship. The regime has tried to defuse the situation by quietly allowing Catholic conscientious objectors to perform alternate civilian service, and the Vatican, which does not want a confrontation that might undermine the progress made by the Hungarian Church, has enjoined the dissidents to obey their ecclesiastical superiors. [redacted] 25X1

The Pope received East German leader Honecker during the latter's official visit to Italy in April 1985, but the visit has not led to improvements in church-state relations. According to US Embassy sources, the Pope has been urging Cardinal Meisner to modify the German Church's traditional policy of keeping the government at arm's length. John Paul wants the German Church to adopt, at least in some degree the Protestant Church's policy of political engagement. There is little evidence that Meisner has moved in this direction. The Catholic Church in East Germany is a small minority -- 1.5 million in a population of almost 17 million. [redacted] 25X1

The rise in recent years of public concern in East Germany over "peace" issues has strained traditional Catholic detachment. In January 1983, after journalistic criticism of their stance from abroad and reportedly after Papal urging, the East German bishops issued a pastoral letter on world peace that challenged several regime positions. Days later, Pope John Paul II announced that the leading East German bishop, Meisner, would be made a cardinal. The pastoral letter was not followed, however, by any noticeable change in relations between the church and the regime, and, [redacted] the traditional arm's-length posture still has strong appeal in the East German Catholic hierarchy. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

The position of the Roman Catholic Church in Romania is surprisingly good, in view of the Ceausescu regime's extremely restrictive policy toward religion in general, its brutally repressive approach toward fundamentalist Protestant believers, and the close identification of the Catholic Church with the country's beleaguered Hungarian and German minorities. The Vatican desk officer for Romania told U.S. diplomats last year that in many ways the Catholic Church encountered less pressure from the Ceausescu regime than it did elsewhere in Eastern Europe. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]

The Vatican nevertheless has a number of concerns. Chief among them is the plight of the Uniate, or Greek Catholic Church (which practices the Eastern rite but communes with Rome), officially suppressed and annexed to the Orthodox Church in 1948. The Uniate Church, centered in Transylvania, has about 1.6 million adherents (almost entirely ethnic Romanian) and was the second most influential Church in the country prior to its dissolution. It continues to function underground with a network of secretly ordained priests and claims some 500,000 to 700,000 adherents. The Pope celebrated a mass for one of the Uniate Church's underground bishops upon learning of his death last year, thereby conveying his continuing interest in the fate of the Uniates. [redacted] 25X1

Other major Vatican concerns are the regime's refusal since 1949 to recognize four of the Catholic Church's six dioceses and the lack of an official statute regularizing the Catholic Church's status. Negotiations for a statute have been going on between Bucharest and the Vatican for several years. Agreement seemed near in 1978, but the regime has been dragging its feet since then, possibly in reaction to the election of Pope John Paul II and his association with the rise of Solidarity in Poland. [redacted] 25X1

A final issue of concern is the regime's discrimination against the country's sizable (nearly two million) Hungarian minority, the majority of whom are Roman Catholic. These concerns reached a high point in 1984 because of the alleged beating death of an ethnic Hungarian Roman Catholic priest at the hands of the security authorities. The issue has never been resolved conclusively. [redacted] 25X1

Yugoslavia is the only East European country that has 25X1 diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and the Pope as recently as last December expressed an interest in paying it a visit. But bilateral relations remain cool, and the prospects for an improvement, or a papal visit, look dim for the near future. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] the Yugoslav Government in February invited the Pope to visit this year but deliberately couched the invitation in terms the pontiff could not accept. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

The main sticking point to better Belgrade-Vatican ties, and a papal visit, is deep-seated friction between church and state in Croatia, one of Yugoslavia's six constituent republics. As in Poland, the Communist Croatian authorities fear the Croatian Church for its longstanding role as a defender of Croat nationhood. They attack it for its collaboration during World War II with the fascist regime installed by the Nazis. Croatia's ideologically alienated youth nonetheless flock to church to church events in record numbers. Church-state relations are much

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better in the less doctrinaire liberal northerly Republic of Slovenia. Catholics make up nearly one-third of the country's 23 million people, the others being mainly Orthodox or Muslim. [redacted]

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Pope John Paul is worried about the survival of the Church in Bulgaria where less than one percent of the population is Roman Catholic. The training of new priests is a major problem for the Church, since there is no seminary in Bulgaria. Although the government claims that it would allow some priests to go to Rome to study, the number of new vocations is low and most priests are elderly. Sofia and the Vatican have not been able to agree on the appointment of a new bishop to Plovdiv. The Bulgarian government rejected the Vatican's nomination in 1984.

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In recent years--especially since the charges of Bulgarian complicity in the assassination attempt--the Bulgarian government has actively sought to project a facade of better relations with the Vatican. Before the Antonov trial began last May, the regime sent a delegation to Rome in connection with the anniversary of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Reportedly, the head of the delegation sought the Pope's intervention on behalf of the Bulgarian defendants. [redacted]

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The Vatican has made no public comment on the assassination trial in Rome, [redacted]

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[redacted] The Pope does not want the incident to add to the Church's already weakened standing in Bulgaria. [redacted] the Pope last May instructed Vatican officials and the staff of the official Vatican daily to refrain from making public references to the Pope's position on the trial. [redacted]

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Before World War II, ten percent of the Albanian population was Roman Catholic, with roots back to the first missionary campaigns of the Apostles. Hundreds of clergymen were jailed, or executed in the first decade after the war. The Catholic Church seemed to suffer the most, apparently because of its foreign links, and was forced to break with the Vatican. In 1967 organized religion was outlawed altogether and Albania proclaimed the establishment of "the world's first atheistic state." [redacted]

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The Pope on a number of occasions during the past few years has publicly criticized Albanian religious persecution. In return, Tirane censors all references to the Pope from Italian TV programs, which are rebroadcast otherwise untouched to the domestic audience. Prospects for improved conditions for the country's Catholic minority are slim under the regime of Ramiz Alia that came to power almost a year ago. [redacted]

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