



American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
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Telex: 671-1239

June 23, 1988

Dr. Robert Gates
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of my letter to President Reagan in which I urge that he seek full military funding for the Nicaraguan resistance. In my view, we are at a critical, historical turning point where the Administration could still undo the tactical mistakes that began in August, 1987.

Also, in case you missed it, I am enclosing a copy of the president's excellent statement of May 24, 1988 in which he was explicit about the fact that the Sandinistas had violated both the Arias plan and the March, 1988 truce agreement.

Congratulations on your continuing forthright public testimony concerning Soviet international actions. If you have a copy of the full text, I would appreciate having one so that I might cite it in my writing.

I thought you might like to see several of my recent articles:

"The Afghan Trap", National Review, April 1, 1988.
"The Four 'Detentes'", National Review, June 24, 1988.
With Alan Keyes, "Afghanistan - victory or blunder" (to be published shortly).

Also enclosed, is an announcement of our forthcoming meeting with Mr. Savimbi to which you are most cordially invited.

It would be my pleasure to invite you to lunch here at AEI, and I shall telephone to see if we can meet in the near future.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Constantine".

Constantine C. Menges, Ph.D.
Resident Scholar

CCM/spm
Enc.

P-311-10R
A circular stamp with the text "DCI EXEC" and a date "JUN 23 1988".

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

28 June 1988

Executive Secretariat --

The Deputy Director has seen
the attached but has made
no comment. Do you wish to
record???

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File*



THE FUTURE OF ANGOLA

Speaker

Dr. Jonas Savimbi
President, National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

Panelists

Representative Dan Burton (R-Ind.)
Ranking Minority Member, House Foreign Affairs' Africa Subcommittee

***Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)**
Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Alan L. Keyes, Ph.D.
AEI Resident Scholar;
Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Constantine C. Menges, Ph.D.
AEI Resident Scholar;
Former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Wednesday, June 29, 1988

11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

American Enterprise Institute
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Twelfth Floor Board Room

R.S.V.P.: 202/862-5829

In early May 1988, representatives of the United States, South Africa, Cuba, and the Communist government of Angola met in London for "exploratory talks" about a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. Later that month senior Angola and South Africa officials met in Congo (Brazzaville) for further direct talks on the details of a regional diplomatic settlement in southern Africa. The issue came up for discussion again at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, held in Moscow from May 31 to June 2, with the announcement that a final settlement was expected by late September 1988.

The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research will sponsor a talk by Dr. Jonas Savimbi, president of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, focusing on the implications of the current negotiations for Angola's future. He will be joined by a distinguished panel of public officials and foreign policy experts who have devoted special attention to Angola.

*invited

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 24, 1988

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Two months have passed since the Congress limited United States assistance to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance to food, shelter, clothing, and medicine. The Congress stopped U.S. military assistance to the Resistance, while the Soviet Bloc continued its military assistance to the Communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Some thought that U.S. forbearance would bring democracy and peace to Nicaragua through negotiations between the Resistance and the Sandinista regime, but it has not.

Tomorrow, as I leave on the first leg of my trip to Moscow, the Resistance and the Sandinistas are scheduled to meet again. The Sandinistas will again have the opportunity to carry out the promises they have made -- beginning a decade ago with promises to the Organization of American States -- of establishment of freedom and democracy in Nicaragua. We do not need more pieces of paper bearing empty Sandinista promises and Sandinista signatures -- we need deeds, not more words.

During the sixty-day truce established under the Sapoa Agreement signed March 23, the Sandinistas have continued, and indeed intensified, their repression of the Nicaraguan people. They have not carried out their commitments under the Guatemala Accord of August 7, 1987, or under the Sapoa Agreement. The Sandinistas have gone so far as to make it impossible to arrange through neutral parties to deliver food and medicine to Resistance members inside Nicaragua.

The men and women of the Agency for International Development who have worked long and hard to ensure that the members of the Resistance have the basic necessities of life deserve the thanks of our Nation. The work of A.I.D. keeps the chance for democracy alive in Nicaragua.

The United States continues to support those fighting for freedom and democracy in Nicaragua. The Freedom Fighters of the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance deserve the continued support of the United States.

If the current stalemate in the peace process persists and the Sandinistas continue their policies of repression, then we will call upon the Congress to reconsider its February 3 decision to curtail assistance to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters.

#

June 13, 1988

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing you as a citizen and as an individual who was one of your foreign policy advisors during the 1980 campaign and then was honored to serve in your administration for five years (1981-86) including three years as one of your special assistants for national security affairs.

On April 12, 1988, I was one of several foreign policy experts with whom you met for about an hour for a discussion of SDI and the freedom fighters. It was very good to see you again and have the opportunity for such a cordial and candid dialogue.

The ending of negotiations in Nicaragua provides you with the opportunity to assure that the aggressive and repressive Sandinista regime will finally be brought to implementing the three commitments made to the OAS in 1979: genuine democracy with fair and free elections for the national government; a non-aligned foreign policy; and, a mixed economy. You can help the Nicaraguan people accomplish this by immediately going to the Congress and seeking a yes or no vote on full military aid for the Nicaraguan resistance.

The Sandinistas have violated the terms of the still existing and valid 1979 OAS negotiated political settlement and that along with their 1979 initiation of aggression using armed subversion provides the legitimate basis for helping the unarmed and armed Nicaraguan democratic resistance to attain real democracy in Nicaragua. You may recall that Speaker James Wright unilaterally abrogated and terminated his August 5, 1987 agreement with you and instead endorsed what you correctly called the "fatally flawed" Arias plan of August 7, 1987.

The Sandinistas violated the Arias plan and it has expired. The Sandinistas violated the truce agreement of March 23, 1988 and it has expired. The Sandinistas have shown during these past ten months that they are determined to continue their aggression against neighbors, their alliance with Castro's Cuba and the Soviet bloc and their internal communist dictatorship. (Even the Washington Post editorial of June 12, 1988 agrees that the Sandinistas have violated these agreements!)


Page Two

Speaker Wright promised Minority Leader Michel that if you sought a vote on military aid to the armed Nicaraguan resistance he would assure this within ten days. On June 1, 1988, a bipartisan group of congressmen and senators led by Rep. Jack Kemp and Sen. David Boren wrote you to request that you seek full military and other aid for the Nicaraguan resistance.

Mr. President, I urge you to heed their suggestion. Based on my many years of work on this issue, I believe that the days between now and the July 4, 1988 congressional recess may be the best chance to rescue democracy in Nicaragua and indeed all of Central America from the mistakes made by the Carter administration in 1978-80 and by the majority of congressional democrats who rejected your previous requests (1984, 1985, 1987-88).

I also believe that if you act now and mobilize the full power of your office, there will be at least 48 sensible democrats who with the solid group of 170 House Republicans will vote against communist dictatorship and for freedom in Nicaragua. As both the late democratic Senator Henry Jackson and you have often said the communist objective --much more likely to be attained if the Nicaraguan resistance continues to be denied military aid by the congressional democrats-- is a communist Central America, Panama and a communist Mexico on our southern border. This can still be prevented, and your action now can be the turning point to success for our friends and for freedom.

With respect,



Constantine C Menges, Ph.D.
Resident Scholar

CCM/spm

CONSTANTINE C. MENGES

THE AFGHAN TRAP

ON FEBRUARY 8, Mikhail Gorbachev made a dramatic announcement: If the U.S. cut off aid to the Afghan resistance by March 15, Soviet troop withdrawal could begin on May 15 and be completed within ten months. He indicated that this pullout could be "front-end loaded," as Secretary of State Shultz had proposed, and that it would proceed regardless of whether there was agreement on an interim Afghan government to succeed the Communist regime.

U.S. media immediately concluded that "peace is at hand." The possibility of "a good settlement" is nearing, claimed the *Washington Post* the day after Gorbachev's announcement. Two days later, a *New York Times* editorial hailed the pledge as "an extraordinary statement" that indicates that, "from all appearances, Moscow has made the painful decision to lose a war."

Perhaps. But the euphoria of the press ought to be tempered by the hard lessons of history. In 1978, after 25 years of active Soviet subversion, the Communist Party of Afghanistan seized power in a bloody military coup. Within a year, the new regime had executed tens of thousands, imprisoned many more, and tried to destroy religion and all other independent institutions. Out of 15 million Afghans, more than one million have died since the war began, and nearly five million more—one-third of the total population—have fled to Pakistan and Iran, trading the abject misery of Soviet domination for the squalor of life in refugee camps.

Moscow has invested billions of rubles in a long-term program to build

an infrastructure of Communist control in Kabul. Does Gorbachev's offer really signal an abrupt about-face? Or is it more likely that the Soviet proposal is part of an effort to win by diplomatic cunning what the Red Army has failed to achieve by military force?

To avoid that possibility, President Reagan has all along insisted that aid to the resistance continue until all Soviet troops have been withdrawn and an independent government is in place. He reiterated his commitment just before the 1987 Summit and again in his 1988 State of the Union message.

ASTONISHINGLY, a faction within the State Department appears to have been following a different policy altogether. These career officials are working for a settlement based on the 1985 Geneva draft treaty, which would require a Western aid cutoff as soon as a troop withdrawal begins. Given the Soviets' history of announcing mere troop rotations in Afghanistan as troop withdrawals, that policy is a formula for Soviet victory.

Information about the State Department's independent strategy first became public in May 1986, when a key supporter of the Afghan resistance, Senator Gordon Humphrey (R., N.H.), was questioning a senior State Department official. The official admitted that Shultz knew about the change of policy, but would not say whether President Reagan knew. On February 11, 1988, the *New York Times* published a report headlined "Reagan Didn't Know of Afghan Deal," and quoted "White House and State Department officials" as confirming that "an American commitment in 1985 to end military aid to the Afghan guerrillas at the beginning of a Soviet troop withdrawal was made without the knowledge or approval of President Reagan." This recent report is disturbingly consistent with testimony last year and

with the pattern of State Department actions on other foreign-policy issues.

Reports from Capitol Hill suggest Shultz may have actually closed the deal during a recent trip to Moscow. "Our sources say the deal was made," says Don Morrissey, Legislative Director to Congressman Bill McCollum (R., Fla.), a longtime supporter of the Afghan resistance. "It includes a front-end cutoff of aid with a front-loaded withdrawal of troops. None of the Afghan alliance leaders are party to the agreement and there are no plans to make them." McCollum is circulating a letter (dated February 24) among House colleagues calling on Reagan to reject a settlement that: fails to recognize the Afghan Mujahedin alliance; demands a cutoff of U.S. aid before Soviet troops are withdrawn; permits the Soviets to continue aiding their puppets in Kabul; or fails to assure the repatriation of refugees and the return of "tens of thousands" of Afghan children forcibly removed from their parents for "education" in the Soviet Union. A similar letter from Senator Humphrey has been signed by 28 of his Senate colleagues. On February 29, by a bipartisan vote of 77 to 0, the Senate passed a resolution calling for continued aid to the resistance until all Soviet troops are out and a "political solution in Kabul acceptable to the resistance" exists.

If State Department officials are allowed to have their way, there is a good chance the U.S. will accept a defective political settlement, allowing the Kremlin to eventually consolidate its power in Afghanistan. After all, the Soviet Union and its allies have frequently used political settlements as part of a strategy for eventual Communist victory. In 1986, an official Defense Department report concluded that in at least four peace agreements the Communist side committed "significant violations, including military ones . . . immediately after the agree-

Mr. Menges, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1983 to 1986. His forthcoming book, Inside the National Security Council, will be published by Simon and Schuster this June.

ments went into effect, suggesting that the Communists were planning the infringements even as they were negotiating." Among the examples in this report: The terms of the 1962 "settlement" on Laos required North Vietnam to remove its ten thousand troops through designated checkpoints in the shortest time possible, but "only forty left the country through International Control Commission checkpoints." In 1973, the Paris Accords required North Vietnam to withdraw all its forces from Cambodia and Laos and refrain from introducing any additional forces into South Vietnam. In fact, "North Vietnam never observed the cease-fire and troop-withdrawal requirements. Within three months . . . Hanoi had already illegally infiltrated some thirty thousand additional troops."

To these disturbing instances, we should add the conclusion reached by President Reagan in four annual reports on Soviet non-compliance with arms-control agreements. The 1984 report concluded that "over a 25-year span the Soviets had violated a substantial number of arms-control commitments." And in 1985, Reagan said about these vital agreements, "There is a pattern of Soviet non-compliance."

Since the United States has made no effective response to repeated treaty violations, Gorbachev might reasonably expect to be able to use the offer of Soviet troop withdrawal—spaced over nine months with no certain way for the U.S. to monitor actual troop levels—as a lever to terminate U.S. aid. Then there would be many ways for the Kremlin to keep Afghanistan within the Soviet orbit.

Some observers have suggested that the Soviets plan to annex (de facto) northern Afghanistan, leaving a nominally free rump state in the south. The Soviets have taken considerable pains to integrate mineral-rich northern Afghanistan into their own southern "socialist republics," exchanging Party cadres, building joint water projects, and emphasizing ethnic ties between Afghan tribes and their Soviet cousins immediately to the north. An already divided Afghanistan would then be susceptible to further manipulation, perhaps by reviving long-simmering "Pushtunistan" separatist sentiments.

But even without annexing the north, the proposed settlement offers the Soviet Union ample opportunities to maintain control over Afghanistan. For

example, it might try to divide and demoralize the Afghan Mujahedin, as the different resistance groups begin to discuss the composition of the new government and methods of Soviet withdrawal. Held together principally by hatred of Soviet occupation, the resistance alliance would be very vulnerable to Communist destabilization in such a new political context. Three groups within the alliance seek a secular government such as a constitutional monarchy or a Western-style parliament, but the four "fundamentalist" groups demand an Islamic state. The Soviets may have proposed a role for the former king, Zahir Shah (deposed by a left-wing coup in 1973), in order to aggravate these differences.

As in 1980, when the Soviets tried to mask their domination of Afghanistan with a cosmetic "broad front" government, they may try to control the "new" government through ostensibly non-Communist Afghans who are clandestine Communist allies. Moscow will probably attempt to maintain control over the premiership, the army, the secret police, and the ministries of education and communication.

U.S. wavering would weaken Pakistan's support for the resistance. (Pakistan is essential both as sanctuary for Afghan guerrillas and their refugee families and as a conduit for getting aid to the fighting forces within Afghanistan.) Publicly, Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq sensibly refuses to

have anything to do with Moscow's puppet, Najibullah. But recent reports are that the State Department has begun to pressure Zia to go along with its settlement.

Divisions between resistance groups might also be exacerbated as some leaders reject the emerging settlement as a Soviet trap while others embrace it as a vehicle to power. The spectacle of freedom-fighters warring among themselves would sharply undermine Western—and Pakistani—support for them. Meanwhile, the UN-created verification system, like other verification groups in the past, will probably overlook Soviet violations while vigilantly monitoring and limiting movement from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

The Soviets can calculate that infighting within the resistance, a U.S. cutoff, and unobstructed Soviet violations would dramatically weaken the resistance. Then, in late 1988, with the U.S. preoccupied with presidential politics, Soviet troops and secret police could be secretly reinfilitrated in order to cut the resistance down further.

SOVIET VICTORY in Afghanistan is a real possibility. It can still be avoided if President Reagan makes sure his Administration adheres to his own policy. How? By clearly reaffirming that policy in public statements and regularly using meetings of the full National Security Council to ensure his control. In addition, the United States should be willing to *increase* military aid to the resistance unless the Soviets agree to withdraw their forces and permit a truly independent government in Afghanistan. On their side, the resistance leaders can declare that unless the Soviet Union withdraws soon and permits an independent, non-Communist government, they will not grant amnesty to members of the Afghan Communist government, and the future Afghan government will be anti-Soviet rather than non-aligned. They can also let Moscow know they will seek billions in reparations for the suffering they have endured in almost ten years of war.

Unless this defective settlement is prevented, there is a grave probability of a Communist Afghanistan, the dismemberment of Pakistan, Soviet gains in Iran, and pro-Soviet radicals taking power in some of the Persian Gulf oil states. □



THE FOUR 'DETENTES' / CONSTANTINE C. MENGES

THAT OLD SUMMIT MAGIC

THERE'S AN irresistible charm about Summitry. By the time this issue goes to press, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev will have performed the sacred rites of that old Summit magic: hands will be shaken, glasses clinked; the sun will shine a little brighter, hearts rest a little easier, because in faraway Moscow two men who hold the fate of the world in their all-too-human hands will have signed a communiqué or perhaps some new agreements. The substance of such agreements seems hardly to matter. In this style of diplomacy, it is the "new spirit of peace," not the details, that counts.

Those who are not connoisseurs of the arms-control process may be surprised to learn that the current flirtation with Moscow is the fifth in a long line of sequels. Nowadays, the term *détente* is usually reserved for the prolonged period of "eased tension" inaugurated by Richard Nixon and continued during the Ford and Carter Administrations. But a careful look at the history of Soviet-American relations since World War II shows that *détente* is not an isolated phenomenon, but a recurring temptation: in at least three other periods, Washington attempted friendly relations with the Kremlin. Each period was marked by Summit meetings, arms-control accords, and high expectations of a new era of cooperation. (See chart, pp. 38-39.) Each was ended by an act of Soviet aggression. And, when the dust settled, each period of *détente* left the West in a relatively worse position. By contrast, the interludes between *détentes*—periods of more normal relations with the

Soviets—seem to produce consistently better foreign-policy results.

The first period of *détente* (1943-48) began with the 1943 Teheran Summit, at which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met to plan the postwar international order. Stalin's presence indicated that Western leaders expected the wartime alliance to blossom into a cordial peacetime relationship. "Never before have major allies been more clearly united not only in their war aims but in their peace aims," Roosevelt announced to Congress two years later, upon his return from Yalta.

Détente continued into the Truman era with the Summit at Potsdam. Under Truman, the U.S. slashed its military forces from 12 million during the war to under two million in 1946. The Truman Administration also proposed giving up America's nuclear monopoly by placing all atomic weapons under international control (the Soviets rejected the plan).

For their part, the Soviets retained some four million men under arms and launched a crash program to build their own A-bomb. With Stalin's help, Communists took power in Eastern Europe and launched guerrilla wars in Greece, China, and Vietnam. The fellow feeling was disappearing by the spring of 1947, when Truman promised to aid governments resisting Soviet subversion and promulgated the Marshall Plan. *Détente* I came to a crashing close in 1948 as a result of the Soviets' double whammy: the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February and the Berlin blockade in July.

Stalin's death ushered in the second period of *détente* (1953-56). President Eisenhower called for improved relations with Moscow, and the long-stalled Korean truce talks resumed; an armistice was signed in July 1953. The following February, a Big Four (France, Britain, U.S., USSR) foreign ministers' meeting formally initiated *Détente* II, which continued through the Geneva

Summit of July 1955. It ended in November 1956, when Soviet troops invaded Hungary.

Détente III had the shortest run. It began in May 1959 with the lengthy negotiation among the former Allied powers over the status of West Berlin. Other notable events during this period were the "informal" Eisenhower-Khrushchev Camp David Summit, and the June 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev Summit in Vienna. American hopes for good relations were, again, soon disappointed: in August 1961, the Soviets built the Berlin Wall, and then detonated four H-bombs (breaking a moratorium on atmospheric nuclear testing). In 1962, the Kremlin began secretly placing medium-range ballistic missiles armed with H-bombs in Cuba.

The most recent era of *détente* began in 1972, when Nixon traveled to Moscow to meet with Brezhnev and sign the SALT I and ABM accords. It ended in December 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

HAVE WE GAINED anything from these repeated unilateral attempts at mutual admiration? Well, in 1955, in the midst of *Détente* II, the Kremlin withdrew its occupying troops from Austria and agreed to respect that country's neutrality. An important success, to be sure, especially for the Austrians. But it is disconcerting to find that, after all the hopes we've repeatedly hung on *détente*, Austria's liberation thirty years ago remains the West's sole unambiguous gain.

The arms agreements of the 1970s, usually considered the crown jewel of the *détente* process, haven't benefited the West at all. SALT I, which limited the number of launchers but not the number of hydrogen bombs, failed to slow the Soviet arms buildup. The unratified SALT II treaty, which the U.S. observed until 1986, "limited" the number of H-bombs deployed to about

Mr. Menges is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. From 1983 to 1986 he served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. His new book, inside the National Security Council, will be published by Simon & Schuster in July.

MAJOR U.S.-USSR TALKS

SETBACKS FOR U.S.

ADVANCES FOR U.S.

Détente I

Feb. 1945	U.S., UK, USSR Summit, Yalta	1945	Soviet effort to take northern Iran		
July 1945	U.S., UK, USSR Summit, Potsdam	1945	Stalin re-ignites civil war in Greece; USSR gives military aid to Communists in China, Vietnam		
1946	Foreign ministers' conference	1945	Yugoslavia becomes Communist		
1947	Foreign ministers' conference	1946	Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Poland become Communist	1946	Soviet puppet governments in northern Iran ended
		Oct. 1947	Cominform re-established	1947	Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan proposed
		Feb. 1948	Czechoslovakia becomes Communist		
		June 1948	Berlin blockade	April 1948	OECD formed to administer Marshall Plan

Return to Normal Relations

		Oct. 1949	China becomes Communist	April 1949	NATO established
		Feb. 1950	Soviet-Chinese treaty		
		June 1950	North Korea attacks South Korea	June 1950	UN Security Council votes to oppose North Korean attack
				Oct. 1952	U.S. H-bomb developed
				March 1953	Stalin dies
		Aug. 1953	Soviet H-bomb developed	July 1953	Korea armistice
				Aug. 1953	Iran destabilization fails

Détente II

Feb. 1954	Foreign ministers' conference	July 1954	North Vietnam becomes Communist	April 1955	Austria becomes neutral; USSR out
July 1955	Geneva Summit	May 1955	Warsaw Pact formed	May 1955	West Germany joins NATO
		Nov. 1956	Soviet invasion of Hungary		

Return to Normal Relations

1957	Soviet <i>Sputnik</i>	March 1957	European Economic Community (EEC) begins
1958	Soviet Berlin ultimatums		

Détente III

May-Aug. 1959	Foreign ministers' conference	1959	North Vietnam begins war to conquer South Vietnam
Sept. 1959	Camp David Summit	Nov. 1959	Cuba enters Soviet orbit
May 1960	Paris Summit	1960-1961	Congo destabilization
June 1961	Vienna Summit	Aug. 1961	Berlin Wall erected

Return to Normal Relations

Oct. 1962	U.S. requires Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba
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MAJOR U.S.-USSR TALKS**SETBACKS FOR U.S.****ADVANCES FOR U.S.**

June 1967 Glassboro meeting

Aug. 1968 Soviet bloc invades
Czechoslovakia

July 1963 USSR-China dispute is public
 Aug. 1963 U.S.-USSR accord to ban
 nuclear testing in air
 April 1965 OAS/U.S. force stabilizes
 Dominican Republic
 Jan. 1967 U.S.-USSR accord to keep
 offensive weapons out of space
 Sept. 1968 Albania leaves Soviet bloc
 Aug. 1970 Accord on normalization—
 USSR, West Germany
 Sept. 1971 Accord on Berlin—U.S., UK,
 USSR, France
 Feb. 1972 Nixon Summit in China

Détente IV

May 1972 Moscow Summit

Jan. 1973 Vietnam treaty (violated from the
start by the Communist side)

May 1972 SALT I/ABM accords

June 1973 Washington
SummitOct. 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack on
Israel—Soviets gave support and
had to be deterred from sending
troops to Egypt

Nov. 1973 Cuban troops to help Syria

Dec. 1973 OPEC doubles oil price

April 1974–
1975 USSR tries to make Portugal
Communist

June 1974 Moscow Summit

Nov. 1974 Vladivostok
SummitApril–May
1975 South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos
become Communist

June 1975 Mozambique becomes Communist

Aug. 1975 Helsinki
conference

Nov. 1975 Angola becomes Communist

May 1976 Syrian troops into Lebanon

1977 Ethiopia becomes Communist

April 1978 Afghanistan becomes Communist

Feb. 1979 Iran: Khomeini to power

March 1979 Grenada becomes Communist

Sept. 1978 Camp David Accord—
Israel, Egypt, U.S.June 1979 Vienna Summit
(SALT II)

July 1979 Nicaragua becomes Communist

Dec. 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Return to Normal Relations

Oct. 1981 Sadat assassinated

Dec. 1981 Solidarity repressed in Poland

March 1982 El Salvador elections

April 1983 Reagan proposes SDI

Oct. 1983 Grenada liberated

Nov. 1983 NATO deploys INF

Jan. 1985 Reagan announces support for
freedom-fightersJuly 1985 Congress repeals Clark
AmendmentNov. 1985 Reagan says U.S. will support
UNITA in Angola

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/26 : CIA-RDP90G01353R002000050001-8
13,000 for each side—that is, about six times as many as either Washington or Moscow had deployed on strategic missiles when arms talks began.

THE NUMBER of nuclear warheads on Soviet land- and sea-based strategic missiles increased from 2,445 in 1972 to 8,900 by 1985. The Soviets' conventional-arms buildup, of course, also continued unabated. And the Soviets have repeatedly violated the terms of the accords, from their promise at the 1972 Summit to observe "norms of international conduct" (which the United States understood to mean an end to subversive aggression), to the 1975 Helsinki human-rights guarantees. From these experiences Moscow has learned one very bad lesson: there is no penalty for refusing to abide by agreements. Our passive response to each set of Soviet violations makes it less likely that the next agreements will be observed.

Overall, Moscow has done very well indeed during periods of détente, making its greatest gains during the two longest episodes. During Détente I (between 1943 and 1948) the Soviets engaged in direct or indirect warfare against Western allies in at least a dozen different countries. In 1944, Stalin told Communist guerrillas in Greece and Yugoslavia to prepare to seize power at war's end, and Radio Moscow began urging Poles to rebel against the Nazis in order to aid the approaching Red Army (which he then ordered to halt for two months while the Nazis exterminated the Polish resistance fighters). In late 1945, Stalin began military aid to Communists in China and Vietnam, and tried to annex northern Iran; only Truman's threat to launch a nuclear strike halted the latter scheme. By 1947, Communists, aided by Soviet occupation troops and making use of secret police and fraudulent elections, had seized control of most of Eastern Europe. North Korea had joined the Soviet bloc, and the Chinese Communists were well on the way to victory (attained in 1949). The Soviets made gains during the shorter periods of détente as well, notably in acquiring Cuba and North Vietnam as client-states.

The years of Détente IV were again a period of sustained growth for Soviet influence and a veritable bull market for Communist terrorism. During

the 1970s the Soviets gained ten new client-states in Asia, Africa, and Central America: South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Grenada, and Nicaragua. Following established patterns, most of these new Communist regimes then turned to subverting their neighbors. The Sandinistas gave military support to guerrillas in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras; Grenada aided subversives in neighboring Caribbean democracies; and Ethiopia provided material support to guerrillas in the Sudan and Somalia.

Compare this glowing record to what the Soviets were able to achieve during periods of normal relations. Following the collapse of Détente I, the U.S. led in establishing the Organization of American States (1948) and NATO (1949), among other regional security organizations. In 1950, America urged the UN to respond militarily to North Korea's invasion of South Korea. And America fostered democratic, pro-Western governments in Japan and West Germany.

After Détente II, the West repulsed Khrushchev's attempts to absorb Berlin, and it established the European Economic Community (1957). In the ten years following Détente III, no new pro-Soviet regime took power, and the Soviet-backed Communist insurgency in Vietnam was stalemated (with help from the United States). During the six-year period of normal relations following Détente IV—the Reagan era—the West has gained on several different fronts. Twelve countries (ten of them in Latin America) have made a transition to political democracy. More than 350,000 anti-Communist resistance fighters have taken up arms in six of the ten Soviet client-states established in the Seventies. America, overturning the Brezhnev doctrine, drove an established Communist dictatorship out of Grenada. Communist guerrillas in El

Salvador and Guatemala faced significant setbacks. And all these gains were achieved without a single serious U.S.-Soviet military confrontation.

During each period of détente, the West, desperately clinging to the illusion of friendly relations, has ignored or downplayed hostile Soviet actions. In each instance, Moscow has taken advantage of our rose-colored glasses to help its proxies grab additional territory. Agreements are cheap, when violating them costs nothing. The current effort at détente is likely to prove a reprise of the past. Who are the probable casualties? Resistance fighters in Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan for starters. And then countries, like Pakistan, that are likely to bear the brunt of Soviet-sponsored international terrorism. Vulnerable democratic movements in Central and South America will also suffer, as will blacks in South Africa, who may be forced to endure, as their brethren in Ethiopia and Mozambique have before them, the brutality of Communist rule.

THE POSTWAR record suggests that normal, realistic relations with the Soviet Union best serve our national interests and preserve the international order. What are the hallmarks of a realistic foreign policy? Realism requires that we recognize hostile actions throughout the world and help our friends defeat them, and that we withhold from the Soviet Union all economic preferences and credits, which give it the hard currency it needs to maintain its global empire. Realism allows cooperative efforts such as verifiable bilateral reduction in offensive nuclear and conventional forces. But it cannot rest on the belief that the USSR—which defines itself as our enemy and daily carries out indirect aggression against our allies—has somehow been transformed into a friend.

Since 1945, four attempts at détente have failed, badly. Our fifth fling with détente will end the same way, unless we realize that prudent realism, not wishful thinking, is the best path to peace and freedom. When Moscow ends its hostile international actions, complies with its treaty obligations, and negotiates deep cuts in offensive weapons, then a genuine U.S.-Soviet détente may evolve. Until then, vigilance, not relaxation, must be the watchword. □



June 1988

THE AFGHAN AGREEMENTS: VICTORY OR BLUNDER*

U.S. support for the successful Afghan resistance to Soviet aggression has been an example of effective bipartisan cooperation in foreign policy. Are the recently concluded U.N. accords on Afghanistan a major success or a major blunder by the State Department that could permit the Soviets to prevent victory by the Afghan resistance?

By their reported terms the accords signed in Geneva on April 14 make no provision for a ceasefire in the war or for a transition government leading to a genuinely independent and neutral Afghanistan. In effect, they require only that the Pakistanis immediately cease aiding the Afghan resistance and that the Soviets withdraw their combat forces by February 1989. Though hailed as a great event, the accords do not represent an instantaneous happening. They set up a process, with the end of Pakistan's support for the resistance at the start, and the promised end of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan at the finish. In between lies a ten month period during which the success of Afghanistan's struggle for freedom could well be decided.

If the Soviets have accepted defeat, abandoned their

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historical objective of gaining access to the Persian Gulf, and decided to permit a genuinely independent, non-communist government in Afghanistan, the Geneva agreement could be a positive step. If they merely intend to weaken the resistance by coercing Pakistan into terminating aid, dismantling their training camps and ending its cooperation, the agreement gives them the chance to do so.

The Soviets have insisted on their right to continue military and other support to their clients in Kabul. The United States has likewise declared that it will continue to aid the Afghan resistance if Soviet aid to Kabul does not end. Nothing in the U.N. agreement prohibits Soviet resupply of the Kabul regime in any type or quantity, but the accord would cripple the Western supply effort to the mujaheddin since it precludes continued use of Pakistani territory as a staging ground for these efforts. If the supplies cannot go through Pakistan, then most cannot be sent at all.

The Soviet and Afghan secret services are likely to step up their current campaign of sabotage and terror against Pakistan-- begun in 1982, expanded since 1985-- in an effort to force its government to cease aiding the resistance. If Pakistani leaders try to resist these pressures and continue Pakistan's present role, they will face increased unrest at home as their people are wounded and killed by Soviet/Kabul-instigated terror assaults. On June 13, 1988, the Soviet and the Afghan communist leaders met in Moscow and Gorbachev then threatened Pakistan

with "resolute retaliatory steps" unless it halted aid to the resistance.

The Soviets have also begun to take the political offensive by declaring Pakistan in violation of the U.N. accords and warning that the pullout might be slowed or halted as a result. Gorbachev warned in his post-summit news conference on June 1 that Moscow would react to "provocations" from Pakistan and that there would be "far-reaching consequences" if the Geneva accords were "ruined" by continued aid to the mujaheddin. On June 7 Najibullah reiterated this warning, stating that he would ask the Soviets to delay their withdrawal if Pakistan continued to allow weapons shipments to the guerrillas. Najibulla also went to the UN with the Soviet foreign minister in early June to declare that Pakistan was in violation of the Geneva agreement.

State Department officials and many outside observers have predicted the quick collapse of the communist regime in Kabul once Soviet forces have withdrawn. If Soviet withdrawal were to take place over a short time frame--one to two months--these predictions might be credible (it only took days for those forces to invade in 1979). Given ten months, however, the Soviets would have ample opportunity further to strengthen their clients, especially if their "withdrawal" becomes slow or ambiguous.

Much depends on the actual number of Soviets in the country. The Soviets claim that their military forces number 90,000,

while Western sources estimate more than 120,000. It is known that the Soviet bloc has secret police in the country in various guises, giving them the equivalent of an additional 10-15,000 troops. That adds up to a total force of 130,000 to 135,000 troops. Hence in the first period of the agreement the Soviets could withdraw up to 45,000 troops and leave nearly intact the 90,000 they currently acknowledge. Even if the Soviets withdrew their claimed 90,000 troops during the ten month period, as many as 45,000 could be left behind.

This ambiguity over the number of troops highlights the need for effective verification of the withdrawal. Unfortunately, such verification will be difficult, if not impossible. Since the international verification team will have no reliable idea how many Soviets are in Afghanistan at the start, progress in the withdrawal will be difficult to confirm.

Since fighting will continue, movement throughout the country will be dangerous, and any international verification team will have to rely on the Soviets for protection. This will certainly inhibit their ability to make the independent forays necessary for sound judgments. They may end up relying on the Soviets for the bulk of their information about Soviet actions.

This is a recipe for easy deception. Given the length of the Soviet border with Afghanistan, the size of both countries, the length of the withdrawal period, and the ethnic similarities between Afghans and groups in the bordering Soviet republics, a sizeable Soviet presence could be camouflaged without great

difficulty.

With a good sized residual Soviet force to back them up, the defenders of the Kabul regime could certainly prevent a quick victory by the Mujaheddin. During the ten month withdrawal period, the Soviet and Afghan regimes will also probably use all means trying to exacerbate divisions within the resistance alliance and provoke fighting among the parties. Some groups will prefer to attack and harass the Soviets, while others will oppose this.

Also, under the assumption that the Soviets are withdrawing and victory is near, attention within the resistance could shift from defeating the communist regime to deciding who should govern Afghanistan. Might some elements in the resistance be tempted to seek accomodation with the Najibullah regime (or some suitable Soviet-backed replacement) in order to prevent a fundamentalist Islamic government from taking power?. The Soviets will likely focus their political, covert and military strategy on exacerbating and exploiting these and other differences within the resistance.

If events develop in line with this pessimistic scenario, a communist dictatorship linked to the Soviets will still rule Afghanistan next February. Because of the U.N. accords, Gorbachev will be able to tell the world and the Soviet people that Pakistan, the implacable Mujaheddin (and perhaps the United States) are responsible for the continued Soviet presence. By agreeing to withdraw from Afghanistan and

appearing to try in good faith to carry out the withdrawal, the Soviet leaders might be able to reduce discontent in the USSR over their involvement in the war. Facing continued resistance, the Soviets could be well positioned to justify continuing the fight until the mujaheddin have been defeated or significantly cut down. In that case the U.N. accords would end up strengthening the Politburo's ability to justify its war, while weakening the international position of Pakistan, the resistance (and the United States).

What impact might these accords have next September when the U.N. General Assembly considers the annual resolution calling for withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan? The Soviets might argue that the resolution be replaced by a text calling for full implementation of the U.N. agreement, chastising the resistance for slowing or rejecting the accords, and condemning Pakistan for violating the agreement, thus making a full Soviet pullout impossible. Such a U.N. resolution would in this case symbolize the complicated and vulnerable posture into which the Geneva accord might force the United States, Pakistan and the resistance movement.

Although top Soviet officials have repeatedly declared their desire to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan, Soviet actions suggest that their aims have not changed. Abundant evidence suggests that the Soviets may be preparing a de facto annexation of the northern half of Afghanistan. They have concluded a number of direct agreements between Soviet muslim

republics and the Afghan northern provinces in economic and cultural matters, short circuiting the Kabul regime. They have created a new province in northern Afghanistan and named both a Northern Provinces head and a military commander for all forces in the northern half of the country. It is unlikely the Soviets would be taking these steps if they intended to permit a genuinely independent Afghanistan.

The U.N. accords by no means constitute or guarantee victory in the struggle to end the communist dictatorship in Afghanistan. Instead, they complicate the struggle and give the Soviets an excellent weapon with which to defeat the resistance. The 1973 Geneva accord on Vietnam led to Nobel peace prizes, in 1974. But that settlement was systematically violated by North Vietnam. More importantly it created the political conditions that allowed the U.S. Congress sharply to reduce its support for South Vietnam's efforts to defend itself. Together with the massive communist military attacks on the South in early 1975, that U.S. aid reduction resulted in military victory for the communist North. The 1962 Laos accords produced a similar fate. Rather than forming the basis for peace, these defective agreements have been a weapon used by the communists to destroy the morale and political cohesion of their opponents. The Reagan Defense Department issued a report documenting these historical facts in May 1986, but the lessons have been ignored by the Reagan State Department.

Bipartisan supporters of the Afghan resistance, on Capitol

Hill and elsewhere, must resist the temptation to declare a victory. If they fold their tents now, the Soviets will quietly steal victory away. Congress should insist that President Reagan stand by his objective of an independent, non-Communist government in Afghanistan, and it should pass a joint resolution calling upon him to recognize the Afghan Resistance Interim Government as the government of Afghanistan. A special oversight committee should be established to monitor the efforts made by State, Defense and other relevant Departments and agencies to ensure that Soviet withdrawal is effectively verified, and that there is no relaxation of efforts in support of the Afghan resistance until all Soviet troops have in fact been withdrawn and an independent, non-communist government exists in Afghanistan.

DRAFT 5

June 16, 1988

B: AFGHANAC (Tim's diskette)

THE AFGHAN AGREEMENTS: VICTORY OR BLUNDER

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 1988

CONSTANTINE MENGES

The Washington Times

Mexico hanging in the balance

In two close votes the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives has refused to provide aid to the Nicaraguan armed democratic resistance. Nicaragua's communist dictator Daniel Ortega responded to the first negative vote on Feb. 3 by calling for "complete and total defeat" of the resistance.



President Reagan should now submit his request through the regular appropriations process for the full amount of military and other support the resis-

tance needs for the next year (probably about \$150 million) and seek an up-or-down vote before the July 4 congressional recess.

He could win that vote if he and his administration clearly state that some congressional Democrats seem to be trying to lose Nicaragua to communism twice — the first time was in 1979-81 when the Carter

administration did much too little to assure implementation of the Sandinista commitments to the Organization of American States that they would be genuinely democratic.

President Reagan should inform those who vote against his request for full aid that in November 1988 he will go to their congressional districts and tell the public that the defeat of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters risks not only communist victory in Central America but also communist takeover of Mexico in the near future.

[In a speech on Monday, Mr. Reagan indicated that the administra-

tion intends to seek renewed military aid for the Contras.]

The late Democratic Sen. Henry Jackson said in 1982: "Leftist revolts in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala are the preliminary stage for the ultimate assault on Mexico, the true Soviet objective in the Western Hemisphere."

Early in 1984 the Bipartisan Commission, established at Mr. Jackson's suggestion and led by Henry Kissinger, presented its report to President Reagan.

The commission, including a former chairman of the Democratic National Committee and Lane Kirkland, wrote: "As Nicaragua is already doing, additional Marxist-Leninist regimes in Central America could be expected to expand their armed forces, bring in large numbers of Cuban and Soviet advisers, develop sophisticated agencies of internal repression and external subversion."

President Reagan echoed Mr. Jackson's warning in a May 1984 television address designed to persuade Democratic congressmen to provide adequate aid for the friendly countries of Central America: "If we continue to provide too little help," President Reagan said, "our choice will be a communist Central America. ... This ... poses the threat that one hundred million people from Panama to the open border on our south could come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes."

The Sandinista regime became the aggressor in the region in 1979 when it initiated armed subversion against its peaceful neighbors. As President Duarte again documented recently, this aggression continues despite the Arias peace plan.

Aid for the Contras began in 1982 after Mr. Carter. Mr. Reagan and the Central American leaders had tried diplomacy and economic aid as a means of persuading the Sandinistas to become democratic and stop this armed subversion. Consistent with the right of states to defend themselves and their allies, this aid was and is a defensive response to Sandinista aggression.

Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has told Congress that if it cuts off aid to the Contras, the Sandinistas are likely to expand their support to the communist insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala dramatically, with full Cuban and Soviet-bloc backing.

Mr. Weinberger said this activity might include disguising thousands of Sandinista soldiers as guerrillas and infiltrating them into neighboring countries.

For example, at about 100 a day or 3,000 each month, in only about seven months the now-weakened Salvadoran communist guerrillas would have additional forces of 21,000. Since it requires about 10 soldiers to contain one insurgent, this would present the Duarte government the truly impossible task of adding about 210,000 soldiers — a fourfold increase costing about \$2

If Congress persists in abandoning the Contras, some of them may have to leave Nicaragua or else find themselves hunted down by the 140,000-strong Sandinista Armed Forces, which have been supplied with more than \$2 billion in Soviet-bloc weapons (compared with about \$200 million in U.S. funds for the Nicaraguan resistance).

Next, the combination of a sharply increasing communist threat and the demoralization of the pro-democratic groups could likely lead to a communist Central America in two stages.

First would come a process including internal panic, turmoil and polarization — perhaps one or more military coups and the return of the violent right — perhaps followed by Congress' cutting vital U.S. aid to some of the friendly Central American countries. Some congressional Democrats would likely take a "let the dust settle" approach to any breakdown of the recently achieved democratic institutions.

Second, the emboldened communist groups could step up terrorist, military and political action using the usual "broad front" approach to deceive some non-communist elements into helping them take power.

History suggests that a commu-

nist victory in Central America would probably be followed by a sustained and systematic strategy aimed at bringing the pro-Soviet communist parties of Mexico and Panama to power. The communist movement within Mexico, with the support of the Soviet bloc and Cuba, would use the communist countries of Central America as a base area, just as Nicaragua has been used by the Central American communist movements since 1979.

Yet six decades of political stability, 40 years of steady economic growth, and the adaptation to the effects of the 1982 economic crisis all testify to the strengths of the Mexican political system. Mexico is likely to remain stable, changing through evolution, unless the internal and international communist movements decide to attempt a seizure of power.

Constantine Menges

The Washington Times March 9, 1988

However, except for the governing party, only the communist movement in Mexico is organized in every area of life: a political party with tens of thousands of members, millions of voters and a clandestine apparatus; key communist labor unions and communist penetration of some ostensibly government-controlled unions; peasant organizations throughout the country; a wide array of Soviet-supported front groups; and two large communist-controlled coalitions of disaffected poor, which were formed after the onset of the economic crisis in 1982.

To these must be added decades of close Mexican communist cooperation with the Soviet Union, an unusually large Soviet-bloc "diplomatic" presence in Mexico City, and permission for the Palestine Liberation Organization and other terrorist organizations to maintain facilities in Mexico.

A communist strategy for taking power in Mexico would likely employ deception and speed to prevent the U.S. leadership from understanding until too late that a communist seizure of power had taken place.

Once the decision had been taken, undercover communist groups would likely deepen the economic and political crisis by sparking strikes, demonstrations, attacks on tourists and sabotage of oil-production facilities, which could begin a sharp downward economic spiral and deepen the misery of the very poor in a short time.

Or communist cadres within the military might stage a coup to "reform the Revolution of 1910"; this method was used in Ethiopia in 1977 and in Afghanistan in 1978. (Why did Fidel Castro confer a medal on two senior Mexican defense officials in 1987?) Or some elements of the governing party might openly join with communist-controlled fronts in a coalition defined as "the authentic and reformed governing party."

All this could be accompanied by terrorism directed at moderate Mexican leaders by groups claiming to represent various regional or class interests but in fact operating under covert communist control.

These possibilities, combined with the lack of real knowledge about Mexican politics among U.S. leaders and the concerns caused by the new communist states of Central America, could well mean that a communist government could be in power before any consensus could form in the United States about how to help the people of Mexico defend themselves.

Communist victory in Central America and Mexico would be a tragedy for the 100 million people who live there, and it would confront the United States with an enormous threat, which would grow worse year by year.

Fortunately, this catastrophe can be prevented if Congress provides the funds for the Reagan strategy of helping the people of Central America themselves achieve democracy and real peace. Since 1981 the number of democracies has increased from one to four among the five Central American countries. The Sandinistas came to power in 1979 by promising the OAS that they would establish genuine democracy and remain non-aligned. If Congress finally provides sufficient aid to the Nicaraguan resistance, the people of Nicaragua can bring about a genuinely democratic government there.

The Democratic majority in Congress continues to face a historic decision in 1988.

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