

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS  
ARE ATTACHED:

(Please do not remove)

PAO 0404 88

PAO 0414 88

SUBJECT:

Perroot's Retirement

STAT/PAO/WMB

PAO 88-0414

**Distribution:**

Orig. - DCI

- STAT 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - D/PAO
- STAT 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - PAO Registry
- 1 - PAO Ames
- 1 - MED (Subject)
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - DCI Security

13 December 1988

STAT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: William M. Baker  
Director, Public Affairs Office

SUBJECT: Arrangements for Address of General Leonard Perroots' Retirement Dinner

1. You are scheduled to address Air Force Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots' retirement dinner at the Army Navy Country Club on 2400 South 18th Street, Arlington, Virginia. Phone: 521-6800. Black-tie is the dress for the evening. I will accompany you and stay throughout the event. Bob Gates is also attending the dinner.

2. Arrangements: You are asked to be at the Army Navy Country Club at approximately 7:15 p.m. where you will be met by the Superintendent of the US Naval Academy, Rear Admiral Ronald Marryott, and Executive Assistant to General Perroots Lieutenant Colonel Ben Romero who will escort you to the reception in the ballroom. A receiving line is not planned. Dinner seating in the ballroom will be at 7:45 p.m. and you will be seated with the following:

- Lieutenant General and Mrs. Leonard Perroots (Mary)  
The Honorable William H. Webster (you will be seated between Mrs. Perroots and Mrs. Negus)
- Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Negus (Barbara)  
General Robert "Bob" and Mrs. Herres (Shirley) Executive Director, DIA  
Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Rear Admiral and Mrs. Ronald Marryott (Carol Ann) Superintendent of the US Naval Academy

(See tabs for biographies and head table diagram.)

After the invocation and introduction of the members of the head table, dinner will be served at 8:00 p.m. At 9:15 p.m. a 10-15 minute slide show and roast of General Perroots will be given. Mr. Negus will introduce you at 9:30 p.m. and you are scheduled for 15 minutes of remarks. At the end of your speech you will step forward in front of the US flag and ask General Perroots to join you. I will read the citation for presentation of the National



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P-309-11


Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal (NIDSM) to General Perroots -- the highest Intelligence Community Award given. Colonel Romero will give you the medal to clip onto General Perroots' lapel and I will hand you the certificate for you to present to him. An in-house photographer will take photographs of the presentation. Following the Intelligence Award ceremony, Mr. Negus will introduce the next presenters. Deputy Director for External Relations for DIA, Denis Clift, and Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence of DIA, Major General Frank Horton, will present General Perroots with a sword for his years of service and a shadow box with a US flag and General Perroots' three star flag. General Perroots will give closing remarks. Adjournment is at 10:15 p.m. (See tab for agenda.)

A podium and microphone will be available at the end of the head table. DCI security will tape your remarks for the Agency's historical records.

Audience: Approximately 160 senior civilian and military officers from the Intelligence Community will attend including representatives from DIA and State Department. Commandant of the Defense Intelligence College, Rear Admiral Howard Roop; Director of the Intelligence Community Staff Lieutenant General Edward Heinz; and Brigadier General Grover Jackson from NSA will be in the audience. Neither the media nor foreign nationals will be present.

Background: Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots assumed his present duties as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency on October 1, 1985. As Director of DIA, he was instrumental in guiding military intelligence during the TWA Flight 847 hijacking, the Achille Lauro incident, and during the US counterterrorist operations against Libya. (See tab for complete biography.)

STAT

  
William M. Baker



## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BIOGRAPHY

### LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEONARD H. PERROOTS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots was appointed the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency on October 1, 1985.

General Perroots was born April 24, 1933, in Morgantown, West Virginia, where he graduated from Saint Francis High School in 1950. He received a Bachelor of Science Degree in History from West Virginia University in 1955 and a Master's Degree in International Affairs from George Washington University, Washington, D.C., in 1975. The General completed Squadron Officer School at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in 1960; Strategic Intelligence School in 1961; and the National War College at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., in 1975; all as a distinguished graduate.



He received his commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at West Virginia University and entered active duty in May 1955 as a squadron intelligence officer for the 95th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. General Perroots was then assigned to the 59th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron at Goose Air Base, Labrador. In February 1959, he transferred to the Combined Services Support Program at Stead Air Force Base, Nevada, and attended Squadron Officer School, from August until December 1960.

General Perroots returned to Stead Air Force Base where he was selected as Chief of the Combined Services Support Program. From May 1962 to May 1965, he was assigned to Headquarters Alaskan Air Command at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, as Chief of the Operations Intelligence and Training Division, Office of the Director of Intelligence.

In May 1965, General Perroots transferred to Air Force headquarters as Chief of the Current Intelligence and Briefing Branch, Directorate of Estimates, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. In June 1969, he was assigned as Chief of the Combat Analysis Division, Directorate of Targets, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at Headquarters 7th Air Force, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam.

After returning to the United States in August 1970, he was again assigned to the Air Staff as Chief of the Operational Intelligence Division. During this period, General Perroots' tour of duty was interrupted by special projects directed by the Air Force Chief of Staff and Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of Linebacker II bombing operations in Southeast Asia and fact-

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finding requirements associated with the Middle East war. His Air Staff duties included briefing the White House staff, congressional committees, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Air Force, and Air Force Chief of Staff. In September 1975, General Perroots was assigned to the Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, as the Director of Operational Intelligence and in February 1978 became Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. In September 1980, he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany. In May 1985, General Perroots became the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at Headquarters Air Force and the Commander of the Air Force Intelligence Service. He assumed his present duties in October 1985.

General Perroots' military decorations and awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Bronze Star Medal, Air Force Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with one Oak Leaf Cluster, and Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm.

General Perroots was promoted to Lieutenant General on October 1, 1985.

General Perroots is married to the former Mary Slavensky of Morgantown, West Virginia. They have five children: Sharon, Leonard Jr., Steven, Barbara, and John.

**PERSONAL FACT SHEET — LIEUTENANT GENERAL  
LEONARD H. PERROOTS**

**A. Personal Data**

Born: April 24, 1933, Morgantown, West Virginia.

Wife: Mary Slavensky.

Children: Sharon, Leonard Jr., Steven, Barbara, and John.

Hometown: Morgantown, West Virginia.

**B. Education**

Graduated: West Virginia University with a Bachelor of Science Degree, 1955; George Washington University, Washington, D.C. with a Master's Degree in International Affairs, 1975; Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1960; Strategic Intelligence School, 1961; National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 1975.

**C. Service**

May 1955 — Mar 1958 Individual training officer and later intelligence officer, 95th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

Mar 1958 — Feb 1959 Intelligence officer, 59th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, Goose Air Base, Labrador.

Feb 1959 — May 1962 Intelligence officer and later Chief of the Combined Services Support Group, 3635th Flying Training Group, Stead Air Force Base, Nevada.

May 1962 — May 1965 Chief of the Operations Intelligence and Training Division, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters Alaskan Air Command, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska.

May 1965 — Jun 1969 Chief of the Current Intelligence and Briefing Branch, Directorate of Estimates, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington, D.C.

Jun 1969 — Aug 1970 Chief of the Combat Analysis Division, Directorate of Targets, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters 7th Air Force, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam.

Aug 1970 — Aug 1971 Chief of the Operations Effects Branch, Current Intelligence Group, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington, D.C.

- Aug 1970 — Aug 1971 Chief of the Operations Effects Branch, Current Intelligence Group, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington, D.C.
- Aug 1971 — Jun 1973 Chief of the Eastern Operations Effects Branch Operational Intelligence Division, 7600th Air Intelligence Group, Air Force Intelligence Service, Washington, D.C.
- Jun 1973 — Aug 1974 Deputy Chief of the Operations Intelligence Division and later Chief of the Aerospace Intelligence Division, Directorate of Operational Intelligence, 7600th Air Intelligence Group, Air Force Intelligence Service, Washington, D.C.
- Aug 1974 — Sep 1975 Student at the National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
- Sep 1975 — Feb 1978 Director of Operational Intelligence, and later Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.
- Feb 1978 — Sep 1980 Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.
- Sep 1980 — Jan 1981 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Force in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
- Jan 1981 — May 1985 Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
- May 1985 — Oct 1985 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Force, and Commander, Air Force Intelligence Service, Washington, D.C.
- Oct 1985 — Present Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.

#### **D. Decorations and Service Awards**

Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit with two Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters

Bronze Star Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster

Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster

National Defense Service Medal

Vietnam Service Medal with four Bronze Service Stars

Air Force Long Overseas Tour Ribbon

Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Device

Republic of Vietnam, Campaign Medal

**E. Effective Dates of Promotion**

<b>Grade</b>	<b>Dates</b>
Second Lieutenant	January 31, 1955
First Lieutenant	November 16, 1956
Captain	October 15, 1961
Major	March 20, 1967
Lieutenant Colonel	August 1, 1971
Colonel	November 1, 1975
Brigadier General	August 1, 1981
Major General	September 1, 1984
Lieutenant General	October 1, 1985

Current as of October 1985





# BIOGRAPHY

## GENERAL ROBERT T. HERRES

General Robert T. Herres was appointed as the first Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, on February 6, 1987. In this position, he serves as the Nation's second highest ranking military officer.

General Herres was born December 1, 1932, in Denver where he attended East High School. He was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1954, and holds master's degrees in Electrical Engineering and Public Administration from the Air Force Institute of Technology and the George Washington University. He is also a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. General Herres was awarded an honorary Doctor of Engineering degree from the Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology.

General Herres began his flying career in fighter-interceptors, was graduated from the Aerospace Research Pilot School, served as chief of the Flight Crew Division with the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program, and later moved into bomber and aerial refueling aircraft operations in the Strategic Air Command. General Herres has also performed duties as an intelligence analyst, in system development and acquisition, and in Command and Control System Management; has commanded a B-52 bomb wing, an air refueling wing, the Air Force Communications Command and Strategic Air Command's Eighth Air Force. As Commander of the Air Force Communications Command, he was responsible for the development, installation and worldwide operation of all Air Force communications, ground radars and air traffic control services. As Commander of Eighth Air Force, General Herres commanded a significant portion of our nation's nuclear deterrent--to include B-52s, FB-111s, aerial refueling tanker aircraft, and Minuteman and Titan missiles. He subsequently served as Director for Command, Control and Communications Systems in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Prior to his appointment as Vice Chairman, General Herres served as Commander in Chief of the bi-national North American Aerospace Defense Command and as the first Commander in Chief of the United States Space Command. In these capacities, he was responsible for the aerospace defense of North America, and for ensuring that military space systems adequately support national command authorities and U. S. forces worldwide.

General Herres is a command pilot, and is qualified for the senior missile, air traffic controller and space badges.

His military decorations and awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with one oak leaf cluster, Air Force Distinguished Service Medal and Legion of Merit.

General Herres is married to the former Shirley Jean Sneckner of San Antonio, Texas. They have three children: Julie, Michael and Jennifer.

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## REAR ADMIRAL RONALD F. MARRYOTT, USN

### Superintendent United States Naval Academy

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Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott, the 52nd Superintendent of the United States Naval Academy, was born on February 18, 1934, in Eddystone, Pennsylvania, and raised in Prospect Park, Pennsylvania.

Admiral Marryott studied for a year at the Wyoming Seminary in Kingston, Pennsylvania, before entering the Naval Academy in 1953. After graduation from the academy in 1957, he began Navy flight training.

Designated a naval aviator in 1959, Admiral Marryott flew P-2V Neptune anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol aircraft with Patrol Squadron Five, deploying to the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. While assigned to Patrol Squadron

Five, he also served as Project Mercury Recovery Officer for the first three manned space flights, with responsibility for airborne search and recovery operations.

In 1964, as a lieutenant, he joined the faculty at the Naval Academy and taught courses in Naval History, History of the U.S. Foreign Policy, U.S. Government and Politics and International Relations. After this assignment, he flew P-3 Orion aircraft with Patrol Squadron Forty-Six at Naval Air Station Moffett Field, California. Then he reported in 1969 to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, D.C., as Special Support Plans Officer in the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-60).

In 1972, Admiral Marryott became the executive officer and then commanding officer of Patrol Squadron Nine. Immediately following this first command tour, he served briefly as the special assistant to the commanding officer of Moffett Field.

Returning to Washington in 1974, Admiral Marryott was assigned as the Primary Security Assistance and Sales Officer for the Far East Region, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State. In 1976, he became the executive secretary to the Chief of Naval Operations for Joint Chiefs of Staff Matters (OP-06C).

In September 1979, he took command of Naval Air Station Moffett Field. After selection for rear admiral in February 1981, he reported in August 1981 as Commander, Iceland Defense Force, with headquarters at Keflavik, Iceland.

Subsequent flag assignments in Washington included duty as the Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-60) on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and an assignment as Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06B) in Washington, D.C. He became the 42nd President of the Naval War College in August 1985, and served in that role until reporting to the Naval Academy as Superintendent in August 1986.

Admiral Marryott's formal education includes a master's degree from the American University in Washington and a baccalaureate degree from the Naval Academy. He is also a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, and the National War College in Washington, D.C.

He wears the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Air Medal, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, the Vietnam Service Medal and various campaign medals.

Rear Admiral Marryott is married to the former Carol Ann Westendorf of Elmhurst, New York. They have three sons, Ronald Jr., Robert and Thomas.



**GORDON NEGUS  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**


Mr. Gordon Negus, the Executive Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has been involved in progressively responsible assignments supporting national security and defense policy since 1958. The early years of his career were spent at Rome Air Development Center, progressing from a project engineer to Chief of the Applied Research Section, Directorate of Communications. In 1967, Mr. Negus came to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and for nearly 20 years his contributions have influenced the Agency's success in national level substantive, operational, and management intelligence issues. A DIA executive since 1974, Mr. Negus' most noteworthy early accomplishments included the development and implementation of management policies and practices for performing scientific and technical intelligence through a combined DIA-Service arrangement and the successful oversight of Service technical sensor data processing operations. In 1975, Mr. Negus was assigned to the position of Defense Intelligence Officer for Strategic Forces and Strategic Arms Limitations. As one of a small group of senior intelligence experts, Mr. Negus performed as the Director's personal staff representative throughout the DoD and Intelligence Community on all matters concerning Soviet strategic forces, weapons systems characteristics, and strategic doctrine in support of arms control negotiations. In 1980, Mr. Negus was selected to be the Assistant Deputy Director for Research. Charged with the responsibility of managing the Agency's major intelligence production operations, Mr. Negus was instrumental in greatly enhancing the quality of intelligence available to senior policymakers and military planners for world-wide military capabilities assessments. In November 1982, Mr. Negus became a member of the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service. In early 1985, Mr. Negus was appointed Vice Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence responsible for the administrative, substantive, and operational direction for all research, estimative, and scientific and technical intelligence produced by DIA. In June 1986, Mr. Negus assumed his current position as the Agency's Executive Director, the senior civilian in the Agency and one of the three members of the command element. In this position he is responsible not only for daily Agency operations, but also for long-term planning and strategic resource management.

Mr. Negus holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics from Lemoyne College in Syracuse, New York (1957) and a Masters of Science degree in Physics from Syracuse University (1961). Additionally, he successfully completed the resident curriculum of the National War College in 1973.

Mr. Negus has received a number of performance awards during his career to include the Presidential Rank of Distinguished Executive in 1985. He is also a member of the CINCSAC Scientific Advisory Group.

Mr. Negus is married to the former Barbara Stephano and they have six children. They reside in Falls Church, VA.

Head Table Seating for General Perroots' Dinner



ATTACHMENT 1

**Program**

1900 Cocktails  
1945 Invocation  
Opening remarks and introduction of special guests  
2000 Dinner  
2100 Break  
2115 Special Program  
2130 Introduction of Guest Speaker  
Judge William H. Webster  
2145 Presentation by Major General Horton, III,  
USAF and Mr. Denis Clift Representing the DIA  
Leadership  
2200 Remarks by Lieutenant General Perroots, USAF  
2215 Adjourn

**Menu**

Fruit Cup  
Salad  
Filet Mignon or Filet of Sole  
Broccoli  
Baked Potato  
Rolls  
Coffee or Tea  
Chocolate Mousse

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**SUBJECT:** (Optional) Remarks at the Retirement Dinner for Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots  
14 December 1988

**FROM:** William M. Baker  
Director, Public Affairs

**EXTENSION**  
27676

**NO.**  
PAO 88-0404

**DATE**  
7 December 1988

**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE	
RECEIVED	FORWARDED

**OFFICER'S INITIALS**

**COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1.	ER	08 DEC 1988		
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7 December 1988

JUDGE:

You are scheduled to give the principal speech at a retirement banquet for Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, Director of DIA, on 14 December 1988. Your remarks will follow dinner and a brief slide show and "roast" of General Perroots.

In preparing your remarks, we talked to a number of people who could provide us both with personal insights on General Perroots and with information on his contributions to intelligence. These individuals included Lt. Col. Romero, Executive Assistant to General Perroots; Admiral Roop, Commandant of the Defense Intelligence College; Lt. Gen. Heinz, Director of the Intelligence Community Staff; and Major General Horton, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and currently DIA's Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence.

Your proposed remarks are centered around the thesis that General Perroots "has made a lasting contribution to intelligence -- strengthening the quality of our product, the capabilities of our intelligence officers, and the integrity of our profession. With these accomplishments, he has helped to make intelligence a more vital and valued part of our nation's defense and national security policy."

After you discuss General Perroots's contributions to intelligence and to our national security, you discuss what may be General Perroots's greatest talent -- "his great ability to communicate his vision, his enthusiasm, his energy, and his commitment to others."

You close with a few observations on General Perroots's retirement plans. Your proposed remarks are attached.

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Attachments:  
as stated

*you may wish  
to add your  
take of you, Lenny  
and acronyms.*



Bill Baker

PAO 88-0404

**Distribution:**

- Orig - DCI
- STAT 1 - [redacted]
- STAT 1 - [redacted]
- STAT 1 - D/PAO
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - ER
- 1 - PAO Registry
- STAT 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - PAO Ames
- 1 - Westbrook (Chrono)

STAT

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STAT



Bill Baker

Attachments:  
as stated



P-309-11



PROPOSED REMARKS  
BY  
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AT THE RETIREMENT DINNER FOR  
LT. GEN. LEONARD H. PERROOTS  
DECEMBER 14, 1988  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

GOOD EVENING. I AM DELIGHTED TO SAY A FEW WORDS AT THIS DINNER TO HONOR MY COLLEAGUE AND FRIEND, LENNY PERROOTS.

THE PROGRAM WE'VE JUST SEEN HAS MADE ONE THING PRETTY CLEAR -- WHEREVER LENNY IS, THERE IS A LOT GOING ON. HE HAS TAKEN CARE OF PROJECTS AND PEOPLE. AND WHEN HE IS IN CHARGE, THOSE AROUND HIM WILL TELL YOU THEY HAVE A GOOD PLACE TO WORK. THAT IS BECAUSE LENNY MAKES SURE THAT THOSE WHO WORK FOR HIM HAVE THE INFORMATION THEY NEED TO GET THE JOB DONE AND THE TRAINING THEY NEED TO DO THE JOB BETTER. AND IF THEY DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY NEED TO DO THE JOB BETTER, LENNY CAN TELL THEM THAT TOO. LENNY HAS NEVER BEEN ACCUSED OF LACKING FOR WORDS. BUT TONIGHT OUR WORDS ARE FOR LENNY RATHER THAN FROM HIM.

WHEN LENNY RETIRES ON THE LAST DAY OF THIS YEAR, HE WILL RETIRE FROM THE HIGHEST POSITION IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. IN

HIS 33 YEARS OF DISTINGUISHED SERVICE TO THE AIR FORCE, TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND TO THE COUNTRY, LENNY HAS MADE A LASTING CONTRIBUTION TO INTELLIGENCE. HE HAS STRENGTHENED THE QUALITY OF OUR PRODUCT, THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND THE INTEGRITY OF OUR PROFESSION. WITH THESE ACCOMPLISHMENTS, HE HAS MADE INTELLIGENCE A MORE VITAL AND VALUED PART OF OUR NATION'S DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.

AS DIRECTOR OF D.I.A., LENNY HAS SET THE HIGHEST STANDARDS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS. AND HE HAS NOT BEEN SHY IN COMMUNICATING THIS TO THE TROOPS. "IF YOUR INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ARE LOUSY," HE TOLD A CLASS OF NEW DEFENSE ATTACHES THIS PAST SPRING, "SENDING A MOUNTAIN OF THEM IS NOT GOING TO HELP. LIKewise, I ASSURE YOU, THAT IF YOU SEND FEWER REPORTS, BUT OF BETTER QUALITY, NO ONE WILL COMPLAIN, ESPECIALLY NOT ME."<sup>1</sup>

THE INTELLIGENCE THAT LENNY DEMANDED ALSO HAD TO BE FREE OF PERSONAL OR POLITICAL BIAS. LENNY AND I SHARE THE OPINION THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR ANALYSIS DEPENDS UPON THE OBJECTIVITY OF OUR PRODUCT. EARLY THIS YEAR, LENNY TOLD A GROUP OF DEFENSE ATTACHES, "YOU HAVE TO KEEP THE GUY WHO NEEDS THE INTELLIGENCE AWAY FROM THE GUY WHO IS COLLECTING IT."<sup>2</sup> AND HE HAS TOLD HIS ANALYSTS TO KEEP A SIMILAR DISTANCE FROM POLICY CONCERNS IN DEVELOPING THEIR JUDGMENTS.

LENNY'S WILLINGNESS TO STAND BEHIND THE ANALYSIS OF D.I.A. AND OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS EARNED HIM OUR ADMIRATION AND RESPECT. HE HAS RESISTED PRESSURES TO CHANGE HIS COUNSEL, AND HE HAS BOTH DEFENDED AND INSISTED UPON THE ANALYTICAL INTEGRITY OF HIS ORGANIZATION.

SHORTLY AFTER HE WAS APPOINTED DIRECTOR, LENNY WAS CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING D.I.A.'S WORK ON

THE P.O.W.-M.I.A. ISSUE. HE INVESTIGATED THOSE CHARGES AND TOOK ACTIONS WHICH NOT ONLY STRENGTHENED CONFIDENCE IN D.I.A., THEY HELPED MAKE THE P.O.W. ISSUE A PRIORITY CONCERN FOR THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.<sup>3</sup>

UNDER LENNY'S LEADERSHIP, D.I.A. HAS WON HIGH MARKS, NOT ONLY FOR THE QUALITY AND INTEGRITY OF ITS INTELLIGENCE, BUT FOR ITS ABILITY TO MEET THE INTELLIGENCE NEEDS OF ITS CONSUMERS --- FROM THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS, TO THE JOINT CHIEFS, TO OUR ALLIES.

PROVIDING AND ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS AROUND THE WORLD HAS BEEN ONE OF HIS TOP PRIORITIES, AND HE HAS DONE MUCH TO ELIMINATE GAPS, REDUNDANCY, AND INCOMPATIBILITY IN THE COMMUNICATION OF INTELLIGENCE BOTH BETWEEN SERVICES AND FROM THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS TO THE TACTICAL COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD.<sup>4</sup> IN 1986, THE DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RECEIVED THE JOINT MERITORIOUS UNIT AWARD FOR THE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IT PROVIDED -- ESPECIALLY TO OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS -- DURING THE LIBYAN AIR RAID, THE ACHILLE LAURO INCIDENT, AND THE HIJACKING OF T.W.A. FLIGHT 847.<sup>5</sup>

I CANNOT DISCUSS LENNY'S COMMITMENT TO MEETING THE INTELLIGENCE NEEDS OF OUR CONSUMERS WITHOUT MENTIONING THAT HE MAY WELL HAVE BRIEFED MORE FOREIGN HEADS OF STATE AND CHIEFS OF DEFENSE THAN ANY OTHER LIVING AMERICAN. AT THE REQUEST OF SECRETARIES WEINBERGER AND CARLUCCI, LENNY HAS SPOKEN WITH FOREIGN HEADS OF STATE, BRIEFED MINISTERS OF DEFENSE, AND ADDRESSED FOREIGN PARLIAMENTS ON U.S. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS. IN FACT, HE RETURNED FROM A FINAL AND VERY SUCCESSFUL BRIEFING TOUR ONLY LAST WEEK.

MAINTAINING HIGH STANDARDS IN THE COMMUNITY'S INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT LENNY'S WORK TO

CREATE BETTER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. HE HAS RECRUITED MANY GOOD PEOPLE FOR D.I.A., AND HE HAS CREATED OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRAINING AND ADVANCEMENT THAT PERSUADE THEM TO STAY.

I KNOW THAT HE IS ESPECIALLY PROUD OF HIS WORK WITH THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE. AND THIS IS AN EXCITING, DYNAMIC TIME FOR THE COLLEGE. IT IS ATTRACTING AND SERVING MORE STUDENTS THAN EVER BEFORE -- STUDENTS NOT ONLY FROM THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, BUT FROM ALL PARTS OF THE ARMED SERVICES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.<sup>6</sup> THANKS TO LENNY'S EFFORTS, THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE HAS EXPANDED ITS FACULTY, BROADENED ITS CURRICULUM, AND BECOME A CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND LEARNING IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD.

LENNY'S EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE HAVE BENEFITTED THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS. UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP, THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS PLAYED A

STRONG, RESPECTED ROLE IN PRODUCING NATIONAL ESTIMATES --  
MANAGING MANY ESTIMATES AND CONTRIBUTING SIGNIFICANT EXPERTISE  
TO OTHERS.

I ALSO THINK WE HAVE SEEN PEOPLE GET ALONG BETTER IN THE  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DURING LENNY'S TENURE AS DIRECTOR OF  
D.I.A. MORE ANALYSTS IN DIFFERENT AGENCIES ARE WORKING WITH  
EACH OTHER, RATHER THAN AGAINST EACH OTHER. CLEARLY, WE HAVE  
SOME DISTANCE TO TRAVEL IN COORDINATING OUR COLLECTION EFFORTS  
AND PRODUCING COMPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS. BUT, WE HAVE MADE SOME  
REAL PROGRESS, AND I THINK LENNY DESERVES A GOOD PART OF THE  
CREDIT.

THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT LENNY AND D.I.A. HAVE NOT STOOD  
THEIR GROUND WHEN THEY HAVE HELD A STRONG, OPPOSING VIEW.  
THIS, TOO, HAS STRENGTHENED OUR ANALYSIS FOR, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE  
CURBED THE ALL-OUT CONTEST, WE STILL HAVE COMPETITIVE VIEWS  
WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.



UNDER LENNY'S LEADERSHIP, D.I.A. IS PROVIDING MORE AND BETTER SUPPORT THAN EVER TO OUR NATION'S DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY. INTELLIGENCE IS NOW A REGULAR, VALUED INPUT AT EVERY STAGE OF THE WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT PROCESS -- FROM THE DEFINITION OF A NEED, THROUGH THE DESIGN OF A PARTICULAR WEAPON SYSTEM, TO ITS EVENTUAL RETIREMENT AND REPLACEMENT.

ARMS CONTROL IS ANOTHER, VERY IMPORTANT AREA OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY WHERE INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN INDISPENSABLE. IN EARLY NOVEMBER, I AWARDED A UNIT CITATION TO D.I.A.'S STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS BRANCH FOR ITS SUPERIOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OUR STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS.<sup>7</sup> AND THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH TRAINING THE U.S. INSPECTORS AND ESCORTS FOR THE INF TREATY -- A TASK THAT INVOLVED PREPARING FOR AND TRAINING THE FIRST CLASS OF INSPECTORS WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE TREATY SIGNING.<sup>8</sup>

THE LATE GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR ONCE RECOUNTED A CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH A HARD-BITTEN AND HIGHLY DECORATED SERGEANT MAJOR WHEN HE WAS CONDUCTING AN ARMY STUDY ON LEADERSHIP. GENERAL TAYLOR ASKED THE SERGEANT MAJOR IF HE COULD GIVE HIM A BRIEF DEFINITION OF LEADERSHIP. THE OLD SOLDIER REPLIED, "LEADERSHIP IS WHEN YOUR LEADER TELLS YOU HE IS GOING TO TAKE YOU TO HELL AND BACK AND YOU FIND YOURSELF LOOKING FORWARD TO THE TRIP."<sup>9</sup>

THE TOUGHEST JOB OF ANY LEADER IS TO INSPIRE AND MOTIVATE HIS PEOPLE. AND I THINK THIS MAY BE LENNY'S GREATEST TALENT -- HIS GREAT ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE HIS VISION, HIS ENTHUSIASM, HIS ENERGY, AND HIS COMMITMENT TO OTHERS. HE KNOWS THAT NO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION CAN SUCCEED WITHOUT RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS PEOPLE. AND HIS DEDICATION AND LOYALTY TO HIS PEOPLE HAS BEEN RETURNED TO HIM MANY TIMES OVER.

LENNY, THROUGH YOUR MANY ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND THROUGH THE DEDICATION AND SERVICE YOU HAVE INSPIRED IN OTHERS, YOU HAVE DONE MUCH FOR THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSION AND FOR YOUR COUNTRY.

ALTHOUGH SOME OF US DOUBT THAT YOU WILL REALLY RETIRE FROM INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC SERVICE, YOUR ACTUAL RETIREMENT PLANS MAY BE THE BEST-KEPT SECRET IN WASHINGTON. WHATEVER YOU MAY CHOOSE TO DO, YOU HAVE OUR BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS AND OUR GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATION FOR YOUR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE TO OUR PROFESSION.

#### FOOTNOTES

1 General Perroots talked of quality in intelligence when he spoke to a class of graduating defense attaches on 1 April 1988. A copy of the relevant passage of his speech is attached.

2 General Perroots's remarks on the need for objectivity were drawn from his address to the Latin American Attache Conference on 19 January 1988. A copy of the relevant passage of the speech is attached.

3 Press clippings on the POW-MIA issue are attached, as are General Perroots's remarks on the subject to the Air Force Worldwide Inspection Conference on 7 October 1987.

4 General Perroots discussed his efforts to improve support to operational commanders in an article he wrote for Signal magazine entitled "New Approaches to C<sup>3</sup> Interoperability in the Intelligence Community." A copy of the article is attached.

5 A copy of the unit citation to DIA, awarded on 31 October 1986, is attached.

6 Enrollments at the Defense Intelligence College have increased from 2,685 in 1984 to 7,509 in 1988. A chart showing this increase is attached.

7 At the Intelligence Community awards ceremony on 4 November 1988, the DCI awarded a unit citation to DIA's Strategic Negotiations Branch. A copy of the citation is attached.

8 According to [redacted] the DCI's Special Assistant for INF, the INF treaty was signed on 7 December 1987 and the Defense Intelligence College's first class for INF inspectors began on 16 February 1988.

9 The DCI quoted General Taylor on leadership when he dedicated the statue to General Donovan on 16 October 1988.

STAT

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REMARKS BY LT. GENERAL LEONARD H. PERROOTS

DEFENSE ATTACHE GRADUATION/ CLASS 88U2

1 APRIL 1988

GOOD MORNING, AND MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL OF YOU ON COMPLETING THIS COURSE. IT IS ALWAYS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO COME HERE AND ADDRESS OUR NEW ATTACHES. YOU ARE THE "FRONTLINE" IN THE INTELLIGENCE BUSINESS -- A CRITICAL COMPONENT IN THIS COUNTRY'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING PROCESS. LAST YEAR, THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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NOW I KNOW THAT THERE IS A PERCEPTION THAT  
BEAN COUNTING IS HELD IN HIGH ESTEEM HERE IN  
WASHINGTON. I HAVE TO ADMIT THERE IS SOME  
TRUTH TO THAT. BUT LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT IF  
YOUR IIRS ARE LOUSY, SENDING A MOUNTAIN OF  
THEM IS NOT GOING TO HELP. LIKEWISE, I ASSURE  
YOU, THAT IF YOU SEND FEWER IIRS, BUT OF  
BETTER QUALITY, NO ONE WILL COMPLAIN,  
ESPECIALLY NOT ME. ONE WELL-THOUGHT-OUT IIR  
IS WORTH A HUNDRED BITS AND PIECES OF  
INFORMATION.

QUALITY, NOT QUANTITY, WILL BE THE MEASURE OF

**UNCLASSIFIED**

REMARKS BY LT. GENERAL LEONARD H. PERROOTS  
TO LATIN AMERICAN ATTACHE CONFERENCE

DATE: 19 JANUARY 1988

GREETINGS FROM WASHINGTON, WHERE THE CLIMATE  
IS DECIDEDLY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT YOU ARE  
ENJOYING HERE, THOUGH THIS IS NOTHING  
COMPARED TO THE HEAT I'VE BEEN GETTING ON  
CAPITOL HILL LATELY.

IT IS MY GREAT PLEASURE TO BE ABLE TO JOIN  
YOU FOR YOUR CONFERENCE. IT IS A TRIP LONG  
OVERDUE, AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED. THE WORK

## UNCLASSIFIED

IS STEADILY IMPROVING AND THE DISAGREEMENTS  
HAVE BECOME MORE AND MORE INFREQUENT.

A FEW LAST WORDS OF ADVICE: MANY OF YOU ARE  
NOW MOVING IN VERY HIGH CIRCLES AND THAT  
RARIFIED ATMOSPHERE MIGHT GO TO SOME HEADS.  
MAKE SURE YOU KEEP THINGS IN PERSPECTIVE.  
RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO SELL OUT TO THE  
PROCESS. JUST BECAUSE YOU ARE BEING WINED AND  
DINED BY CONGRESSMAN X OR SECRETARY Y, THERE  
IS NO REASON TO SKEW YOUR FINDINGS TO MEET  
THEIR POLITICAL NEEDS. YOU HAVE TO KEEP THE  
GUY WHO NEEDS THE INTELLIGENCE AWAY FROM THE  
GUY WHO IS COLLECTING IT.



The Associated Press, June 23, 1986

**HEADLINE:** Panel Investigates Claim That a Videotape Shows U.S. POWs in Laos

**BYLINE:** By DONALD M. ROTHBERG, Associated Press Writer

**DATELINE:** WASHINGTON

**KEYWORD:** POW Videotape

**BODY:**

The Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, delving into a mystery that dates to the end of the Vietnam War, is trying to untangle reports that a videotape exists showing American prisoners of war still held in Laos.

The tape is being offered to the U.S. government for \$4.2 million.

Involved in the episode are a retired Army major and a retired sergeant who are suing President Reagan and other top government officials in an effort to force them to pursue the matter; a man recently released from a Singapore prison who claims to have the tape; and a North Carolina congressman who is championing their cause.

The suit is pending in U.S. District Court in Fayetteville, N.C.

Maj. Mark A. Smith and Sgt. Melvin C. McIntire told the Senate committee at a hearing last January that for two years they collected information on American POWs from a network of agents in Southeast Asia and turned it over to Army Intelligence, which passed it on to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Smith said that this winter he saw "evidence" which, he said, "proves beyond any doubt that in excess of 30 Americans and other nationalities are being held as prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. This evidence cannot be described in detail but can generally be described as current and specific." Smith didn't discuss in open session what he had. But sources, who insisted on anonymity, said he was referring to a videotape which was described in some detail in an affidavit filed in connection with the suit against Reagan.

The committee, chaired by Sen. Frank H. Murkowski, R-Alaska, has asked Smith and McIntire to return for a hearing Wednesday to question them in more detail.

Since the end of the Vietnam war and the release of prisoners held in North Vietnam, the U.S. government has received hundreds of reports that Americans were still being held prisoner. Many of these reports included alleged sightings of Americans in Laos.

Government officials, while saying they do not rule out the possibility, have testified that they have never received proof that Americans still are held in Southeast Asia.

So far, even government officials who express skepticism about Smith's report refuse to rule out the possibility that it is accurate. The committee appears to be reserving judgment.

Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the panel on Feb. 27 that he was aware of Smith's contention that there was a videotape.

The Associated Press, June 23, 1986

"Now, I'm not suggesting, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, that there is no film," said Perroots, "and I hope, as I think he is attempting to do now, Mr. Smith is pursuing this, trying to find that film." Rep. Bill Hendon, R-N.C., delivered to Vice President George Bush a letter dated Feb. 28, addressed to Reagan and signed by Mark L. Waple, Smith's lawyer.

The letter said "those who are in control of the Americans in captivity" had agreed to allow three members of Congress to view the film.

"After these three representatives have had the opportunity to view the film and are satisfied with the validity of the contents, they will be required to pay the sum of 4.2 million dollars in cash and take receipt of the original of the film and other evidence of live Americans and other allied POWs still being held in Southeast Asia," Waple wrote.

The letter also stated that "those in control of this evidence also require that Major Smith and the three congressional representatives mentioned above be provided a U.S. commercial airliner with the authorization and capability to depart from Los Angeles International Airport and to fly to a destination in Southeast Asia to be determined at a later date by those in control of the film.

"One of the pilots of the airliner must be selected by Major Mark Smith and the remainder of the crew may be selected by the United States government as long as they are under deep civilian cover." Steve Hart, a Bush spokesman, said the letter was referred to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The three members of Congress named in the letter were Hendon, Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz., and Rep. Robert C. Smith, R-N.H. Robert Maynes, a spokesman for DeConcini, said the trip never took place.

The person in control of the tape was identified as "John Obassy." In an affidavit given in connection with Smith's lawsuit, "Obassy" said, "My fictitious name is John Obassy. I presently reside in Southeast Asia. My experience in Southeast Asia as an entrepreneur and government contractor goes back to approximately 1967 and has continued through the present." "Obassy" said he had access to border and central regions of Laos where the communists had not consolidated control.

"I traveled throughout Laos because I had many Laotian friends who asked me for assistance to help and supply food and medical aid for non-military uses," he said. To finance his activities, "Obassy" said he "entered the business of buying precious metals and stones from the free Lao at very low prices which enabled me to resell for commercial prices." He said Laotians showed him "sites or camps which had male Caucasian and Asian prisoners - some were in chains - who were heavily guarded by Vietnamese. They were also guarded by other nationalities.

"I estimated that approximately 90 of the prisoners were Caucasian and that 40 to 50 of this number were North Americans." He said the first time he saw such a group was in 1978 and that the last time was in October of 1985 "when I saw a work detail comprised of 39 men which I very strongly believe to be Americans. ... I was told by the free Lao that they were Americans." Smith wrote a memorandum in which he described meeting "Obassy" in Cyprus in last January and being taken to a building where he was shown a four-hour videotape of men, handcuffed and chained, being marched down a road.

The Associated Press, June 23, 1986

"The prisoners were described \_ as I saw them \_ as American and Korean," wrote Smith.

He said "Obassy" was in the film and he saw him "give medical attention to the Americans and the Koreans. ... I saw him look in their mouth, give shots and give medicine." Smith said the prisoners were being used to pan for gold.

He added that "The film shows the Americans and the Koreans working with one leg chain on. They were chained together. They were being used to dig the pits. The film showed them doing the work digging the pits. After that I saw the same views of the gold panning by the other prisoners who were not American." "Obassy's" real name is Robin Gregson, a British national, according to a Defense Department document. It was disclosed in Insight magazine on April 28 and again at a committee hearing.

Until recently, Gregson was in jail in Singapore on a fraud charge.

Lt. Col. Paul Mather, assigned to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, testified before the committee that three or four years ago, Gregson was convicted in Thailand on charges stemming from "planting drugs on some tourists and then having them arrested and then taking payoffs." Mather said that "as far as I know" Gregson did not go to prison on that charge.

A Veterans' Affairs Committee staff member said the panel was informed that Gregson was free on bail from the current charge in Singapore.

After Gregson's name was mentioned at a committee hearing, Hendon wrote to Murkowski and said, "Your identifying this critical witness is the most reprehensible action that I have ever witnessed in my five and one-half year effort to help return U.S. military personnel from communist prisons in Southeast Asia." Hendon wrote that "had you asked me, I could have told you that divulging this man's identity would jeopardize not only Obassy's life, but the lives of the U.S. prisoners of war that I am convinced he has access to.

"Your actions not only jeopardize all these individuals lives, but make my task of securing the entire videotape infinitely more difficult, if not impossible." When asked about the matter, Hendon refused to discuss the tape.

In a letter to Hendon on May 8, Murkowski denied that Gregson's identity had been divulged by the Senate committee. "Mr. Gregson's identity was revealed some time ago, in an internationally available publication," as well as elsewhere, the Alaska Republican wrote.

LEVEL 1 - 4 OF 5 STORIES

The Associated Press

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June 22, 1986, Sunday, BC cycle

The Associated Press, September 30, 1986

The materials in the AP file were compiled by The Associated Press. These materials may not be republished without the express written consent of The Associated Press.

September 30, 1986, Tuesday, AM cycle

SECTION: Washington Dateline

LENGTH: 706 words

HEADLINE: Task Force Reports 'Strong Possibility' Americans Still in SE Asia

BYLINE: By NORMAN BLACK, AP Military Writer

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

KEYWORD: POW Report

BODY:

A task force, reporting to the Pentagon, says it found no hard evidence but believes there is a "strong possibility" that American servicemen from the Vietnam War are still being held as prisoners in Southeast Asia.

"The Prisoner -of- War -Missing-in-Action center should be clear that its largest analytical question is whether Americans remain alive in Southeast Asia against their will," states the report by the group.

"No one knows the answer to the question for sure. Based upon the body of information, there is a strong possibility of prisoners still being held." The findings of the task force were released Tuesday by Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, the Air Force general who heads the Defense Intelligence Agency. Perroots created the task force last spring to gain an independent assessment of his agency's work on the POW -MIA issue.

Perroots, during a Pentagon briefing, said he could not adopt the panel's conclusion that there was a "strong possibility" of live American prisoners in Southeast Asia. At one point, he expressed concern that reports on the task force's work might raise false hopes among the families of missing Americans.

The task force, he noted, used the "key words 'information' rather than 'evidence,' 'possibility' rather than 'fact.'" "I do not know" if there are live American prisoners, Perroots added.

"My concern is that those comments may be misinterpreted, to suggest that possibly we have something new and that perhaps this will raise the expectations of the families. I have to look these families in the face ... and I have no credible evidence - strong, compelling evidence - or I submit to you it would go to the president tomorrow." The report by the task force, which was headed by one of Perroots' predecessors, retired Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe Jr., has been classified and was not released to reporters. Perroots sought to summarize its findings, however, and read selected portions.

According to Perroots, the panel found "there was no evidence of a 'cover-up' by anyone in DIA or anywhere in the U.S. government" in terms of the handling of POW information.

The Associated Press, September 30, 1986

The task force, which included several former and current officials with the DIA and Central Intelligence Agency, also offered a host of recommendations to improve the procedures by which POW reports are investigated, Perroots said.

Virtually all of those have been accepted, including proposals to increase the number of personnel working to analyze "live-sighting reports." The general said there are currently 91 such live-sighting reports whose status cannot be resolved. The most recent involve 12 reports received between 1982 and 1985. There have been no new reports this year, he added.

Virtually all of the reports investigated by the DIA come from Southeast Asian refugees, making the process very difficult, Perroots said.

Referring to the live-sighting reports, Perroots added: "In toto, you may establish that that is strong possibility; someone else may establish that it's just a possibility. It's a question of a call." Tighe, in a television interview Monday night, said he personally believed that American POWs would probably be found as soon as the United States extended diplomatic recognition to Vietnam.

"I think it's over-simplification of the problem, obviously," Perroots said when asked about that statement.

Perroots said Tuesday that reporters were "quibbling in terms of language" by suggesting there was a great difference between administration policy and the Tighe group's conclusions.

The Reagan administration's oft-stated policy is to assume that since there is no conclusive proof to the contrary, there might be some live Americans in Southeast Asia. Under that policy, the DIA continues to investigate all "live-sighting reports" received from Southeast Asia.

"I am going on the assumption that there may be Americans still alive in Southeast Asia, Perroots concluded.

"I am totally dedicated as director of the DIA to pursue all available avenues of collection and analysis on this issue of such importance to the nation. We share the pain and sorrow felt by many American families and we must take care to avoid giving false hope to those who have placed their trust in us."

LEVEL 1 - 3 OF 5 STORIES

The Associated Press

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June 23, 1986, Monday, PM cycle

SECTION: Washington Dateline

LENGTH: 1378 words

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OCT 5 - 1987 3

INTEGRATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
AND SECURITY REVIEW (OASD-PA)  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

REMARKS BY LT. GENERAL LEONARD H. PERROOTS  
TO AIR FORCE 1987 WORLDWIDE INSPECTION CONFERENCE  
7 OCTOBER 1987

GOOD EVENING. IT IS MY PLEASURE TO BE ABLE TO  
SPEAK TO YOU ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR WORLDWIDE  
INSPECTION CONFERENCE. I MUST SAY THAT I APPLAUD  
THE EMPHASIS THAT YOU ARE GIVING THIS YEAR TO THE  
PROJECT WARRIOR THEME AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE  
ROLE PLAYED BY ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS YOURS AND  
MINE IN SUPPORTING OUR FRONT-LINE FIGHTERS.

THIS EVENING I WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND ON THE THEME  
OF COMMITMENT TO OUR FIGHTING FORCES, AND SHIFT  
THE FOCUS SLIGHTLY TO OUR COMMITMENT TO ENSURING  
THAT THEIR SERVICE WILL NEVER BE FORGOTTEN. THE

IS AS IT SHOULD BE. IT SIGNALS TO VIETNAM AND LAOS THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE TO OUR PEOPLE, AND IT REASSURES THOSE IN UNIFORM THAT IN FUTURE CONFLICTS THEY WILL NEVER BE FORGOTTEN.

AS SECRETARY WEINBERGER SAID RECENTLY, "ALL OF US IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REMAIN STEADFAST IN OUR SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO RESOLUTION OF THE POW/MIA ISSUE. THE PRESIDENT HAS REPEATEDLY DECLARED HIS DETERMINATION TO OBTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR AMERICANS MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. FOR BOTH PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL REASONS WE EMBRACE THE PRESIDENT'S GOAL AS OUR OWN."

WHEN I BECAME DIRECTOR OF DIA, I WAS CONFRONTED

WITH CRITICISM THAT DIA WAS RUNNING INADEQUATE  
POW/MIA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND SUPPRESSING  
POW/MIA EVIDENCE. I ORDERED AN INTERNAL REVIEW,  
AND FLATLY ESTABLISHED THAT SUCH CHARGES OF  
SUPPRESSION WERE FALSE. BUT BASED ON MY REVIEW I  
FELT WE COULD AND SHOULD DO MORE. I DOUBLED OUR  
POW/MIA STAFF TO 39. THIS SPECIAL GROUP INCLUDES  
SOME OF THE LEADING SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANALYSTS AND  
LINGUISTS IN THE COUNTRY, MOST OF WHOM ARE  
VETERANS WITH WIDE EXPERIENCE IN INDOCHINA AND  
SUBSTANTIVE POW/MIA BACKGROUNDS.

TO FURTHER ALLAY PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS,  
FORMER DIA DIRECTOR RETIRED AIR FORCE LT. GENERAL  
EUGENE TIGHE WAS ASKED TO ASSEMBLE A GROUP OF  
EXPERTS, INCLUDING TWO FORMER POWS, TO EXAMINE DIA



FILES FOR EVIDENCE OF A COVER-UP. THEY FOCUSED ON LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS TO DETERMINE THE QUALITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE.

THE TIGHE REPORT DETERMINED THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A DIA COVER -UP. BUT THE GROUP DID CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY U.S. PRISONERS ARE STILL BEING HELD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE GROUP DID NOT SUPPLY ANY EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE ITS CONCLUSION.

AS THE GROUP NOTED, "NO ONE KNOWS THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION FOR SURE." ALTHOUGH IT IS HARD TO ARGUE WITH THAT PREMISE, AND I KNOW MANY AMERICANS SHARE GEN. TIGHE'S BELIEF, WE HAVE YET TO FIND THE HARD EVIDENCE WHICH WILL PROVE THAT POWS CONTINUE

( TO BE HELD. THAT SAID, AND I WILL MAKE THIS POINT AGAIN AND AGAIN, WE ARE PROCEEDING IN OUR WORK ASSUMING THAT SOME AMERICANS MAY STILL BE THERE. WE CANNOT RULE OUT THAT POSSIBILITY.

WE WILL KEEP LOOKING FOR THAT EVIDENCE. ALTHOUGH I CANNOT GO INTO GREAT DETAIL IN DESCRIBING OUR EFFORTS, I CAN TELL YOU THAT DIA IS PART OF A LARGER, INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, WHICH ( INCLUDES CIA, NSA, AND THE NATIONAL COLLECTION ORGANIZATIONS. THIS COMMITTEE OVERSEES THE ACTIVE COLLECTION EFFORTS FOCUSED ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE, WHICH INCLUDE A WIDE VARIETY OF METHODS --BOTH HUMAN AND TECHNICAL.

SHOULD EVIDENCE EMERGE THAT ONE OR MORE AMERICANS

( GOVERNMENT WILL EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO ACCOUNT FOR THEM AND SECURE THEIR RETURN.

ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING AMERICANS IS AND WILL REMAIN A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE DIA. WE FEEL A SPECIAL COMMITMENT AND DEEP GRATITUDE TO THOSE AMERICANS WHO SERVED OUR COUNTRY AT A DIFFICULT TIME, AND WE MUST, THROUGH OUR PERSISTENT EFFORTS, LET THOSE WHO FOLLOW KNOW THAT THEY WILL NEVER BE ABANDONED REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SAID, "THEY WERE OUR LOVED ONES AND OUR FELLOW AMERICANS, AND THEY WERE, I AM CERTAIN TIME WILL TELL, PART OF A NOBLE CAUSE AND HISTORY'S HEROES. "

AND AS A VIETNAM VETERAN, I TELL YOU IN ALL SINCERITY TONIGHT, THAT MEMORIES OF THOSE SOLDIERS, THOSE SAILORS, AND ESPECIALLY THOSE AIRMEN, WHO SO NOBLY SACRIFICED THEIR LIVES IN VIETNAM WALK WITH ME EACH AND EVERY DAY. I EXPECT THAT THEY WILL BE MY CONSTANT COMPANIONS UNTIL THE UNCERTAINTY OF THEIR FATE IS PUT TO REST. I AM COMMITTED, AS IS ALL OF DIA, TO LEAVING NO STONE UNTURNED IN THIS QUEST. YOU HAVE MY PROMISE ON THAT.

THANK YOU, AND GOOD NIGHT.

**SECURITY/ESPIONAGE**

FYI

DAM

SIGNAL

SEPTEMBER 1988

Pg. 31

# New Approaches to C<sup>3</sup> Interoperability in the Intelligence Community

By LTGen. Leonard H. Perroots, USAF

**T**he issue of communicating and coordinating intelligence from the highest levels of government to the tactical commanders in the field—and vice versa—is at least as old as the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. To apprise the Greek leadership of the defeat of the Persians, Pheidippides, the fastest runner in the Greek Army, had to run 26 miles from the plains of Marathon to Athens. Unfortunately, upon completing his mission, Pheidippides dropped dead.

Putting timely, useful intelligence in the hands of a myriad of consumers where and when they need it is the *raison d'être* of military intelligence. The failure to provide that link at a critical moment may mean the difference between success and failure in a future operation.

As the chief of intelligence at U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE), I often found myself frustrated by

being unable to rapidly exchange crucial information with my service counterparts in Europe and with the NATO Allies. In many cases, those involved had no reliable dedicated secure lines of communications even with Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), let alone Fifth and Seventh Corps. We virtually had no capability for transferring computer data, and we exchanged imagery by courier. Communication with the Allies was even worse. These problems made it clear that each NATO corps commander would be supported by a fragmented, different intelligence data basis that would make integrated maneuver targeting and execution almost impossible. In Europe we began implementing many initiatives designed to improve the situation, but the momentum of change must be sustained if intelligence is to be an effective force multiplier.

## Movement Toward Interoperability

When I became director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1985, I was determined to make enhanced intelligence support to operational commanders around the globe a top priority. That year was a watershed for command, control and communications (C<sup>3</sup>) interoperability. Up to that point, each of the services, as well as each of the Allies, had been scrambling to take advantage of the technological miracles being spawned by the communications and computer industries. Attempts to impose some discipline on this buying binge netted few results. Suddenly, the United States and its Allies found themselves with new and better equipment, but with no better ability to share information with each other. Uneasily, we realized

SUPPLEMENT: MONDAY, 19 SEPTEMBER 1988

**NEW APPROACHES . . . CONTINUED**

that, despite incredible technological breakthroughs, the problems plaguing the United States and its Allies from World War I to the Iran hostage rescue mission and Grenada contingency remained unresolved.

In 1985 Congress threatened to withhold all funds for communications' equipment until meaningful progress was made in improving interoperability problems. It mandated that the Department of Defense (DOD) directive on DOD policy toward ensuring interoperability be updated—it had not been revised since 1967—and that bureaucratic problems stymieing interoperability be resolved. To that end, programs such as the Intelligence Communications Architecture (INCA) program and organizations such as the Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency (JTC<sup>3</sup>A) took on added responsibilities and importance.

After three years, some C<sup>3</sup> interoperability problems in the intelligence arena remain unresolved. But things are moving in the right direction, and we are proud of the progress that we have made. An old adage says that an ounce of application is worth a ton of abstraction. Likewise, tangible results in resolving even some interoperability problems are as important as the over-arching plans and architectures we have worked so hard to put in place.

Much of the progress is a result of the close working relationship that DIA has established with DOD Under Secretary Robert B. Costello and his acquisition organization: people in J-6; and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) Dr. Gordon Smith, who appreciates the magnitude of the problems faced by military intelligence. Not long ago, during a visit to the defense intelligence analysis center, Dr. Smith underscored the fundamental point that intelligence information is becoming intertwined with command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) information as never before.

In fact, the intelligence and communications communities are working more closely than ever before. The need to coordinate defensive, targeting and strike activities on land, at sea and in the air demands that C<sup>2</sup> functions be coordinated closely with supporting intelligence functions. All U.S. forces must be able to see the same picture of the battlefield constantly updated each second, and increasingly they are able to achieve that through the rapid processing and exchange of information now made possible by state-of-the-art communications and computer technologies.

The Air Force has coined a term that neatly sums up the new attitude in DIA: "intelligence application." This is the culmination of the intelligence process—the application of intelligence by users whose needs drive the process—and it is derived from the user mission. It adds an active dimension to the classic intelligence cycle function for dissemination. Application involves the cooperative interactions between the intelligence producers and the end users.

**Communications Practices**

The Theater Intelligence Architecture Program (TIAP) is one vehicle for providing the enhanced intelligence support and the cooperative interaction between intelligence producers and users. Through a coordinated effort between DIA and the operational commands, it is now possible to identify theater intelli-

gence shortfalls and to validate solutions for the national budgetary process. By providing key documents and by regionally managing intelligence information, DIA is providing a mechanism for the commands to capitalize on available technologies in all disciplines to satisfy their military missions.

Communications compose one piece of the high technology mosaic that TIAP is attempting to piece together. Admittedly, some of the communications problems experienced during past operations could have been alleviated with adequate planning time. Nevertheless, the problem of communications is a fundamental one, particularly at the tactical level. The long-term search for solutions is being pursued by the DIA-managed INCA project, established by congressional mandate to improve the timely flow of intelligence to tactical commanders. INCA, targeted on the 1990s time frame, addresses not only communications hardware shortfalls but also procedural, policy and organizational issues affecting the intelligence process and the flow of intelligence to tactical users. Although its focus is long-term, the INCA project office already has identified requirements in many areas of mutual support and interoperability, and it is sponsoring several projects aimed at facilitating alternative communications capabilities for the tactical user.

**Data Transfer**

At the tactical level, distinctions between communications, data exchange and various other C<sup>3</sup> subsystems have become somewhat blurred. The fusion of these systems to coordinate information at varying levels of detail from thousands of miles away in space requires sophistication and synchronization. To this end, INCA works in league with all of the DIA programs designed to improve the flow of information to the tactical commander.

One top DIA initiative is the improvement of data management. As new data collection and processing systems come on line, voluminous amounts of data increasingly overload intelligence analysts. The same applies to the tactical commander. DIA has initiated several efforts to improve the quality of its finished intelligence and the speed with which it disseminates that information to the unified and specified commands. The DOD Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) master plan is a massive effort to centralize the life cycle management of more than 50 separate DOD computer types and to provide standard system architectures, common software, maintenance and training. The network is expanding to the unified and specified commands and their components to improve interoperability between national and tactical automated data processing (ADP) systems. In another effort, INCA and DODIIS are working to connect DODIIS information sources to tactical units using the Defense Data Network (DDN) as a communications carrier.

Transferring digital data in the tactical environment has been a formidable challenge to the intelligence community. Over the years, many functional intelligence communities developed at the national level, with each providing separate supporting data bases and individual data element definitions and acceptable value sets. Data elements standards are fundamental in data exchange to achieve timely exchange and integration of data from these different systems.

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**NEW APPROACHES . . . CONTINUED**

DIA is attempting to achieve that with the Military Intelligence Integrated Data System (MIIDS). MIIDS is the overall DOD-wide architecture for interoperable data bases supporting operational intelligence requirements at the strategic, operational and tactical echelons. The integrated data base (IDB) is the core data base within the MIIDS architecture.

DIA has the DOD lead in developing intelligence data bases for all members of the DOD intelligence community. DIA sets production standards, monitors delegated production, publishes data base documents and validates data needs for the operational commands. MIIDS already has begun to improve significantly the usefulness and availability of information through the integrated data base to operational units by sharing and distributing intelligence among and between the national, theater and tactical echelons. Because the data base integrates and relates military intelligence such as units, facilities, equipment and locations, analysts can apply the data within the context of the intelligence problems posed by operational users. This way, the currency of the data also will be improved because the new data base design supports a more mobile and dynamic viewpoint of military intelligence. In the long term, this architecture conceivably will permit a near real time exchange of intelligence.

The MIIDS architecture envisions an IDB subset hosted at a tactical intelligence center as part of the Joint Tactical Fusion Program (JTFF). In peacetime, the data base is updated by national and theater intelligence production organizations. In wartime, this data subset will be a starter set of data that will be updated, if communications are available, through national theater assets or local tactical collection assets for more detailed or dynamic data. If communications are cut, the baseline IDB data will be updated through tactical collection assets using IDB as a frame of reference for data on enemy units, facilities, locations and equipment.

A test bed that I brought over to Europe in 1983, the Limited Operational Capability-Europe (LOCE) project, has been a success story. As the U.S. contribution to the Battlefield Information Collection Exploitation System (BICES) effort, this system consists of a correlation center at Ramstein Air Base, West Germany, several sensor interface modules and 60 work stations throughout the Allied forces central regions. LOCE currently is providing near real time electronic and imagery intelligence. For the first time, multinational corps in the northern army groups rapidly can exchange intelligence with each other as well as with the U.S. corps of the central army group.

Other initiatives are underway to expand LOCE to include NATO forces in the northern and southern regions, to incorporate naval forces in the data base, to add NATO nations and to establish a joint U.S./West German correlation center at Ahrweiler, West Germany. The interface of LOCE to existing and planned U.S., NATO and other European national systems will provide for the first time an intelligence network that significantly increases timeliness and accuracy of intelligence provided to NATO staffs and operational forces. Combined with improvements in national tactical C<sup>2</sup> systems throughout the European Theater, the LOCE network, in tandem with the BICES effort in

Europe, will help commanders locate, engage, disrupt and destroy the enemy.

DIA is devoting considerable resources and effort to the emerging BICES program. As part of the Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) concept, BICES is creating a NATO capability to receive, process and correlate multinational data rapidly and to provide commanders at all echelons with timely intelligence on enemy dispositions and activities. DIA is the executive agent for BICES and is working closely with the United States European Command (USEUCOM) and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to build a NATO-wide intelligence network that will fuse processing and information exchange capabilities in support of U.S. and Allied forces. Here too, INCA actively is engaged in support to Allied Command Europe (ACE) in developing the ACE INCA.

**Intelligence Support**

Many of the crisis intelligence support problems encountered during past operations could have been alleviated by providing national level support directly to the unified and specified commanders. To meet intelligence needs during crises, DIA has created a national military intelligence support team (NMIST). When requested by the commander in chief (CINC), NMIST rapidly deploys a team to support the operational commander with critical, tailored, all-source intelligence. This intelligence is passed from DIA via ultra high frequency (UHF) military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) and includes secure voice, text and imagery. Because NMIST is designed to work in response to crisis requirements of the joint task force commander, the flow pattern generates from the bottom up with the commander determining intelligence needs and priorities. The system's flexibility allows NMIST responses to change with the commander's priorities.

DIA has used this capability in several situations and found that commanders need and want more of it. Responding to these requests, NMIST is expanding and improving its capability to apply the National Security Agency (NSA) Scalable Transportable Intelligence Communications System (STICS) to exchange imagery information with remote units.

Worldwide interoperability under all conflict conditions is the ultimate goal for communications and intelligence alike, but it is a goal that will be nearly impossible to reach because one problem is that interoperability cannot be achieved in isolation. It is influenced at all times by such variables as changes in planning, policy, doctrine, force structure, hardware and the erratic budgetary process. We must develop ways to share special compartmented intelligence among tactical units and regional and national centers using existing data networks. We must fill the need for communications systems capable of surviving and enduring in all threat environments including electronic warfare and otherwise disturbed electromagnetic environments. To ensure coordinated, integrated warfare, we need enhanced and more rapid electronic exploitation systems, as well as interoperable communications and automated processing capabilities among our joint and combined forces. Collection managers, analysts and users need more adaptable and secure data exchange systems to connect them at all

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**NEW APPROACHES . . . CONTINUED**

levels. Particularly, rapid wide band communications from sensors to analysts and users are needed.

Although MIIDS IDB is bringing data element standardization closer, processing standards for data, communications and sensor technology must be addressed on an international basis to improve capabilities for multinational interoperability. Standardization techniques made possible by digital signal processing offer improved communications capabilities in all types of threat environments while maintaining interoperability.

**Security Levels**

Differences in security levels remain a sticky problem. Intelligence people traditionally are leery of talking to anyone without clearances—even operators. Because intelligence and C<sup>2</sup> work at different levels of security, effective interoperability is impeded significantly. Until now, interfacing between intelligence and C<sup>2</sup> has taken many forms: one-way communications for data; two separate centers with doors that lock; and human intervention and data sanitization. More innovative and common sense thinking is needed on the security issue if interoperability is going to be more than an overworked buzzword. For example, during an all-out war, intelligence becomes much more perishable and should be passed system low rather than system high to facilitate rapid, multinational handling. My analysis shows that more than 90 percent of intelligence necessary to prosecute a war can be passed system low.

The philosophy that the end user cannot interpret intelligence data without an intervening intelligence officer also needs to be challenged. Creative thinking is needed to design appropriate closed loop systems that will allow end users access to the intelligence data tailored to their needs.

**Interoperability Hindrances**

Problems caused by having different sets of equipment, communications standards and protocols and software stem from a "not invented here" attitude along with a lack of leadership commitment to do more than pay lip service to interoperability. The joint responsibility of the services is to keep the goal of interoperability in mind. It needs to be part of a checklist for system approval. And, interoperability itself needs to be better defined so we will know when, how and where it is achieved. Old traditions cannot be allowed to interfere with the pursuit of interoperability.

DIA currently has a number of new initiatives underway that address segments of the interoperability issue, notably efforts dealing with the national imagery transmission format, geographic information system standardization and MIIDS/IDB interoperability. However, no overall plan exists to ensure interoperability of current and future unified and specified command and DIA intelligence systems. DIA now is formulating a program to address this problem. The agency, in conjunction with the unified and specified commands, the services and DIA functional managers, will identify those areas lacking in either interoperability or appropriate standards. This survey will include fielded and under development hardware, software and data bases. Once problem areas are identified,

DIA will coordinate courses of action and milestones.

Geographic information system standardization is one such area. Now that technology has reached a point where precision map, imagery and digital information can be manipulated to support operational planning with unique computer derived graphic products. DIA and the commands have common interests and requirements applying to digital geographic information processing and management. Without clearly defined coordination processes, parallel development may prevent any single user from passing information to a consumer. DIA has an established organization with the technical and analytical aptitude necessary for developing and exploiting these systems, and the agency must serve as a key player in coordinating the development, production, manipulation and exchange of geographic information.

The goal of the national imagery transmission format is to create a file format that would be used to transmit imagery and associated data in secondary imagery dissemination networks. Since its inception, the scope of the project has been expanded to include standard error and detection and correction, crypto and communications protocols. To date, DIA has developed a proposed national imagery transmission format (NITF) and currently is consolidating responses to the definition document. The DOD approved imagery dissemination definitions that DIA established now are awaiting validation. In the future, DIA will take the lead in NITF implementation, assisting the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in identifying the cost of retrofitting existing secondary imagery dissemination systems with NITF, coordinating theater communications with INCA and pressing for DOD crypto and modem standardization.

The recent successes of past operations illustrate that we are resolving many of the problems in communicating between intelligence and operations. Two years ago, DIA was awarded the joint meritorious unit award for the intelligence support it provided during the Libyan air raid and the TWA flight #847 and *Achille Lauro* hijackings. These operations attest to the improvements in multidiscipline intelligence integration, as well as in the operations intelligence interface.

Today, DIA is working more closely with industry and OSD to make interoperability a top consideration in the design phase of C<sup>3</sup>I programs. Black boxes and jury-rigged systems to achieve interoperability are the least effective, and sometimes most expensive, solutions to this problem. It is imperative that this problem be corrected in the early stages of the game.

Things are moving in the right direction. Intelligence is at the forefront of the drive toward better interoperability and toward providing the services and Allies with the up-to-the-minute data integral to the complex electronic battlefield of today. Had he had the systems we have today, Pheidippides might have lived to be a great general. But then again, we would not have the Boston Marathon.

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*LTGen. Leonard H. Perroots, USAF, is Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and is a member of the AFCEA Washington, D.C., Chapter.*





## Citation

*to accompany the award of the  
Joint Meritorious Unit Award  
to the*


## Defense Intelligence Agency

*The Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service, from 1 June 1985 to 1 June 1986. The Agency provided unparalleled intelligence support encompassing the broadest range of intelligence analysis, technical services, photographic processing, and reconnaissance imagery to meet the real-time requirements of national decision makers. Responding directly to immediate requirements, the Agency provided vital intelligence to policy makers during the tense periods of the TWA Flight 847 hijacking incident, to on-site operational units during the Achille Lauro hijacking, to the White House staff during the Philippine crisis, and to Naval and Air Force component commanders during the Libyan counterterrorist operations. Never faltering in its commitment, the Agency provided the critical information demanded by the tactical commanders, without which success could not have been achieved, and national objectives would not have been realized. The distinctive accomplishments of the personnel assigned to the United States Defense Intelligence Agency reflect great credit upon themselves and the Department of Defense.*

*Given under my hand this 31st day of October, 1986.*

*Secretary of Defense.*

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Prepared by DIC-A/Nov 88

**DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY****is hereby awarded the****NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MERITORIOUS UNIT CITATION**

The Strategic Negotiations Branch, International Negotiations Support Division, Directorate for External Relations, Defense Intelligence Agency, is hereby awarded the National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation in recognition of its sustained superior defense intelligence support to the strategic arms control negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period 1 March 1987 - 15 April 1988. During this period, the Strategic Negotiations Branch has provided outstanding support to four strategic arms control negotiating forums: Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and the Defense and Space Negotiations (D&S), under the overall negotiations on the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks; and the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). In each of these negotiations, the Strategic Negotiations Branch responded with exemplary professionalism and dedication to the extraordinary professional and personnel demands of representing the Defense Intelligence Agency in coordinating and presenting Intelligence Community.