

FR 2988X-00

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

7-21-88

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)

Initials Date  
22 JUL 1988

1. ER

2. DDI

3. DCI rec'd 22 July

4.

5.

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

DCI  
EXEC  
PEG

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

DDI

7E44 HQ

STAT

5041-102  
U.S. Government Printing Office: 1987-181-246

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (REV. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA

Orig + file held to DDI 880810

STAT

Office of East Asian Analysis  
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Executive Registry

88-2988X

21 July, 1988

*DCI & DDCI*

NOTE TO: DDI

THROUGH: D/OEA *FI*

SUBJECT: Arms for Philippine NPA

Attached is the information you requested on the possibility that the NPA has an arms transfer relationship with the Sandinistas, as alleged in the Washington Times this morning.



*Drew*

STAT



*5 DDCI 22 JUL 1988*



STAT

~~SECRET~~

25X1



25X1

21 July 1988

**TALKING POINTS FOR THE DDI**

The Philippines Communist Insurgents:  
Relations with Managua

**The 21 July Washington Times' article is generally accurate in describing the relationship between the Communist Party of the Philippines and Nicaragua, but exaggerates prospects for Sandinista military assistance to the CPP.**

--The CPP has cast a broad net in its search for foreign patrons willing to provide arms and other assistance and has sent representatives to Nicaragua several times since the early 1980s, [redacted]

25X1

- [redacted] suggests that the CPP is primarily interested in Nicaraguan medical and propaganda assistance. [redacted] shows, for example, that the CPP, for unknown reasons, failed to follow up Sandinista offers in late 1985 for military training and other unspecified military aid. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**The CPP established party-to-party relations with the Sandinistas earlier this year, and senior CPP officials who visited Managua to formalize party-to-party ties expressed serious reservations about the Nicaraguan revolution** [redacted]

25X1

25X1

--The insurgents described their Nicaraguan counterparts as ideologically shallow and unnecessarily exploiting the population.

- [redacted] it was unstructured and inconsistent, and apparently convinced CPP leaders not to send additional cadre to Managua for similar courses.

25X1

--Nevertheless, we expect the CPP to maintain a representative in Managua primarily to establish contact with other leftist Latin American groups. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Several factors, including resource constraints in most potential Latin American donors and the distance between the Philippines and Latin America, makes it unlikely that the CPP would receive a clandestine shipment of arms directly from the region except perhaps from Havana, with which the CPP also recently established party-to-party ties.**

~~SECRET~~

25X1

SECRET

25X1

--During their meeting with CPP leaders earlier this year, the Cubans apparently raised insurgent hopes for an arms transfer by suggesting that further discussions be held in North Korea; P'yongyang reportedly agreed last year to provide the CPP arms but so far has yet to deliver any as a result of the insurgents' inability to resolve logistic and security problems.

--The CPP's only military relationship in Latin America is with Salvadoran rebels, who reportedly promised the CPP explosives and clandestine radio training earlier this year but no arms.

25X1

SECRET

25X1

# Filipino Managua as arms source

By Marc Lemer  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

MANILA — Communist rebels in the Philippines have strengthened contacts with Nicaragua's Marxist Sandinista regime in an effort to secure arms for the insurgents' 19-year-old battle with the Manila government.

Diplomatic and military sources said members of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) visited Managua earlier this year to renew contacts established in early 1986, when a 60-day cease-fire allowed the rebels to travel here and abroad.

"Arms are a major effort of the CPP," said a senior military officer. "They can't take off on the next stage of their mission without a major sup-

plier of arms.

The Philippine Constabulary, the country's internal security force, last month seized two fishing vessels that, according to captured rebel documents, were to be used to smuggle arms.

The constabulary alerted local commanders to be on the lookout for Soviet-made SA-7, surface-to-air missiles after unconfirmed reports surfaced that several were in the hands of the 25,000-member New People's Army, the armed wing of the CPP.

The missiles would give the CPP army an effective means to counter the Philippine air force's fleet of nearly 100 helicopters, the most potent weapon in the armed forces.

see ARMS, page A10

counterinsurgency campaign.

"... his honor" said a foreign official. "down a helicopter would be a big step for the rebels, and it would have a terrible effect on morale in the air force."

The communist rebels traditionally depend for arms on ambushes and raids on government troops and isolated police and military detachments. Government statistics show the military lost 746 firearms to rebels in the first half of the year, but soldiers recovered a like number in encounters and from captured rebels.

China and the Soviet Union have pledged to Manila officials they will not support the Philippine insurgents, and foreign envoys agreed that the communist superpowers can make greater inroads here through diplomatic initiatives than by supplying arms to the rebels.

As a result, the rebels increasingly turn to the Eastern bloc and to Latin American nations, such as Nicaragua, who share with the Philippines a Spanish Catholic heritage.

"We are actually very much concerned with what we believe is the current effort of the CPP-NPA to bring in large quantities of military hardware..." Gen. Renato de Villa, armed forces chief of staff, said in an interview. "It is not illogical to expect them to enhance their capability in the country by direct procurement of weapons."

Several years ago, the military seized a smuggled shipment of AK-47 assault rifles in Isabela Province in the north.

One Western diplomat said the recent contacts with Nicaragua were most likely limited to pledges of solidarity. "But they are looking everywhere for anything they can get, including the international arms market," he said.

Suspicion over the Nicaragua connection has been corroborated by journeys to Managua by low-ranking party members, traveling under assumed names, and by activists on the legal left. Some of those contacts took place earlier this year, according to diplomatic and military sources.

Nicaragua's role here also came under renewed scrutiny last month, when Minister Raul Manglapus invited Managua to send a representative to a Manila conference on newly restored democracies, a move strongly criticized by U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Platt and which caused several West German foundations to cut off their support for the meeting.

"The inclusion of Nicaragua was an insult," said an Asian diplomat who asked for anonymity. "It shows some misunderstandings [by Manila] about democracy. Everyone was speaking Spanish. Mr. Manglapus should be more sensitive about his relations with his Asian neighbors."

Military suspicions also have been raised about the role of foreigners, particularly Europeans, following the arrest earlier this summer of a West German minister and a leftist Swedish youth leader on charges of aiding the insurgents in nearby Quezon province.