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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

March 3, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR:

- Mr. Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary, Department of State
- Colonel William M. Matz, Jr.
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense
- Mr. William V. Vitale
Executive Secretary, Department of Energy
- Mr. Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
- Mr. H. Lawrence Sandall
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency
- RADM Joseph C. Strasser
Executive Assistant to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Cleared Copy of "Overview of the INF Negotiations"

Attached is the fully cleared Overview of the INF Negotiations including final NSC comments and clearance for your information and future reference. The Acting Director will transmit the Overview to Senator Pell and the SFRC, in response to Senator Pell's January 13 request, by COB March 4, 1988.



William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

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OVERVIEW OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS

An ACDA Staff Paper

March 3, 1987

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OVERVIEW OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper provides a general overview of the negotiations in the INF Negotiating Group in Geneva since the negotiations resumed on March 12, 1985.* It also covers INF negotiating developments in the Ministerial and Summit Meetings since January 1985. As it concentrates on the main issues, its content is selective rather than all-inclusive.

An earlier analysis of the 1981-1983 INF negotiations, when the US INF Delegation was headed by Ambassador Paul Nitze, and which were broken off unilaterally by the Soviets on November 23, 1983, is contained in the "SCG Progress Report on INF" released to the public on December 8, 1983. Here a brief summary of the US and Soviet negotiating positions at the outset in 1981, and as they stood at the resumption of negotiations in March 1985, is provided in the following section on Background.

An unclassified chronology that summarizes major developments in the negotiations is also available (see attached published document: "INF: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Chronology," Issues Brief, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.)

Background

Looking back from the perspective of late 1987 and the conclusion of the INF Treaty, it is clear that the Soviet Union was brought around from its initial unrealistic position of seeking to preserve a longer-range INF (LRINF) missile monopoly to accepting the US "zero option" announced by President Reagan in 1981, in consultation with the Allies and pursuant to the December 1979 "dual track" decision of NATO. Moreover, US persistence and Alliance solidarity were the main reasons for this success.

*The INF Treaty signed on December 8, 1987 uses the terms intermediate-range missiles (IRMs) which are capable of ranges between 1000 and 5500 kilometers, and shorter-range missiles (SRMs) which are capable of ranges between 500 and 1000 km. The terms IRM and SRM are generally equivalent to LRINF (longer-range INF) and SRINF (shorter-range INF), respectively, which is older US terminology. The more general term INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) includes all US and Soviet ground-launched missiles in the 500 to 5500 km. range band.

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The 1979 NATO "dual track" decision was taken in order to maintain the credibility of NATO's strategy of flexible response in light of the large and sustained buildup in Soviet LRINF missile forces. The 1979 NATO Integrated Decision Document called for modernization of LRINF forces, while pursuing parallel US-Soviet negotiations to establish US and Soviet equality in LRINF missile capabilities on a global basis at a lower equal level. NATO agreed from the outset on the need for global limits, US/Soviet equality, no "compensation" for third country forces in any INF agreement, no undermining of NATO's conventional capability, and effective verification.

The main impetus for the NATO "dual track" decision of 1979 was the Soviet deployment beginning in 1977 of the SS-20 -- a highly accurate, 5000 kilometer range ballistic missile equipped with three independently targetable warheads and launched from a mobile transporter. As of mid-January 1985, the Soviet Union had deployed at least 396 SS-20 launchers (with missiles capable of carrying at least 1,188 warheads) at operational bases. Until the end of 1983, the United States had no comparable systems deployed. In the context of rough US-Soviet strategic parity, the SS-20 buildup further exacerbated the threat to our European Allies. It raised concern that the Soviets might come to believe -- however mistakenly -- that US strategic forces could be "decoupled" from the defense of Europe. To maintain credible deterrence, the Alliance moved to redress the INF imbalance through a combination of modernization and negotiation.

US Negotiating Position

The original US negotiating aims announced by President Reagan on November 18, 1981, after Allied consultations, drew on the "zero option," which called for the complete elimination of US and Soviet LRINF missiles on a global basis, while establishing collateral constraints on Soviet shorter-range INF (SRINF) missiles.

The US "zero option" negotiating position on INF was consistent with the NATO 1979 Decision Guidelines. Those guidelines were:

- any limitations on US INF missile systems be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet INF missile systems;
- any agreed limitations be consistent with the principle of equality, both in limits and rights;
- limitations on US and Soviet LRINF missiles should be negotiated bilaterally in a step-by-step approach;
- non-US, Allied systems be excluded from the bilateral negotiation, and the US avoid negotiating Soviet compensation for such systems;

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- the immediate objective of the negotiations be agreed world-wide (global) reductions and limitations on US and Soviet LRINF missile systems; and
- any agreed limitations must be verifiable.

Thereafter, the Reagan Administration INF proposals built on this NATO foundation but went significantly further, in close consultation with the Allies, calling for the global elimination of an entire class of US and Soviet INF systems and the requirement of effective verification. Further clarifying the criteria for an INF agreement, the United States together with the Allies ruled out as unacceptable any outcome on INF that would entail Soviet exportation of the security threat in Europe to other regions, such as the Far East, or result in an adverse impact on NATO's conventional defense and deterrence capability (e.g., aircraft).

In March 1983, the United States, following Allied consultation, proposed an interim agreement on INF that would establish equal global limits on US and Soviet warheads on LRINF missiles on launchers at the lowest mutually acceptable number above zero. This US proposal was in effect an offer to substantially reduce the number of warheads on the planned US LRINF deployments in Europe, provided the Soviet Union reduced the number of warheads on its LRINF missiles to an equal number on a global basis. In tabling this proposal, the United States did not advance a specific warhead level, indicating that it was prepared to consider any level between zero and 572 acceptable to the Soviet side. When the Soviet side refused to advance a number, the US negotiators suggested a series of alternate levels between 50 and 450. However, the Soviet side rejected any US deployments.

In September 1983, President Reagan elaborated on the interim agreement proposal by offering to address stated Soviet concerns on aircraft, geography, and the composition of the NATO LRINF missile force. These proposals, tabled on September 22, were rejected by the Soviet side.

On November 15, 1983, the United States specifically suggested an equal global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads, a number corresponding to the level the Soviet side had suggested for their SS-20 deployments in the Western USSR. The Soviet side also rejected this proposal.

Soviet Negotiating Position

The Soviet negotiating position at the INF negotiations evolved through several variations between 1981 and 1983. However, every Soviet proposal during that period had as its ultimate objective the Soviet retention of a substantial SS-20 missile force in

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Europe, but no US LRINF missile deployments for NATO. The initial Soviet position called for limiting "medium-range" (1000-5500 km) missiles and aircraft of the Soviet Union and "NATO" in Europe or stationed in the waters adjoining it, to combined aggregates on each side of 300 systems. This proposal would have: precluded US LRINF missile deployments; included the capability of the independent British and French nuclear forces in a bilateral US-USSR agreement; and significantly impaired US conventional capability in Europe through the virtual elimination of US dual-capable aircraft in Europe.

The Soviet side subsequently proposed a missile launcher subceiling tied explicitly to the level of British and French missiles (162 by Soviet count) and expressed a willingness to treat warheads as a unit of account in addition to launchers. However, neither of these proposals changed the unacceptable outcomes of the basic Soviet proposal.

In August 1983, General Secretary Andropov announced Soviet willingness to "liquidate" missiles in Europe made excess by Soviet proposals. But, it became clear that only one missile associated with each excess launcher actually would be liquidated. Hence, the US rejected this approach. Under the Soviet proposal, nothing would bar the Soviet Union from continued production and stockpiling of new missiles in unlimited numbers for potential deployment in the European theater. Nor would it prevent the further buildup of SS-20s on launchers outside of Europe where they could threaten our Asian allies and friends while also remaining within range of much of NATO.

In an October 1983 interview, General Secretary Andropov suggested some positive movement on the geographic and aircraft issues. He also offered Soviet reductions to approximately 140 SS-20 missile launchers with 420 warheads in Europe, but continued to tie these reductions to limits on new deployments of British and French independent nuclear forces (currently associated, by Soviet count, with approximately 420 warheads) in order to preclude any US LRINF missile deployments.

The Soviet Union originally attempted to justify its retention of an LRINF monopoly in all of its proposals by asserting that an INF "balance" already existed. To make this point, they equated NATO aircraft with the SS-20. But this argument was undercut by the Soviets continuing SS-20 deployments -- over 100 with 300 warheads were deployed during the course of the talks. Increasingly, the Soviets tried to rationalize the unequal outcome they were seeking by a contrived claim for "compensation" for British and French forces, a position consistently rejected by the United States and its NATO allies.

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Soviet Unilateral Walkout from Negotiations

As the November 1983 date for initial deliveries of US LRINF missiles to European deployment sites approached, the Soviet Union campaigned to block the US deployment by seeking to intimidate the United States and the Allies, and to arouse public opinion against the deployment, particularly in the host countries, while ignoring the threat posed by their missiles to the Allies. The Soviet Union threatened to pull out of the negotiations and to begin a program of so-called "countermeasures" to the US INF deployment. On November 23, 1983, the Soviet delegation unilaterally withdrew from the INF talks. The United States made it known that it regretted the Soviet walkout and that it was prepared to resume negotiations at any time the Soviet side was ready.

Subsequently, the Soviet Union implemented its so-called "countermeasures", which consisted of:

- ending the Soviet declared "moratorium" on new SS-20 base construction in the western USSR;
- stationing SRINF missile systems (SS-12 SCALEBOARDS) in Czechoslovakia and East Germany; and
- patrolling Soviet missile submarines closer to US coasts.

Interim Developments

US and Allied steadfastness and the adherence to the INF deployment schedule in Europe during the intervening period was effective in finally bringing the Soviet Union back to the INF negotiating table. Indications that the Soviet side was ready to return began surfacing about one year after the walkout, in November 1984.

US deployments called for by the 1979 NATO dual-track decision proceeded gradually but steadily from the initial deliveries for deployment in November 1983. Called for were the deployment of 108 Pershing IIs in the FRG and 464 GLCMs in five basing countries by 1988, as indicated in the table below under "planned level". Also indicated in the table below, as of December 31, 1984, is the operational status of US INF missile deployments in Europe. The table shows a total of 102 US LRINF missiles installed in Europe at the end of 1984, most of which were in the FRG and UK, and a small number in Italy. By the end of March 1985 (when INF negotiations had just resumed in Geneva), the total of operational US LRINF missiles in Europe had risen somewhat to 118 with additional missiles operational in the FRG.

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US INF DEPLOYMENTS AND SCHEDULE (Dec. 1984)

	<u>Pershing II</u>		<u>GLCM</u>	
	<u>Operational*</u>	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Operational*</u>	<u>Planned</u>
FRG	54	108	0	96
UK		0	32	160
Italy		0	16	112
Belgium		0	0	48
Netherld		0	0	48
TOTALS	54	108	48	464

*Operational figures are based on deployment schedule as revised through last quarter of 1984. Planned figures denote numbers scheduled for full deployment, as planned, for completion in 1988.

During 1984 and subsequently, British and French nuclear modernization proceeded as planned under their national authorities.

During the year following its walkout from the INF Talks, the USSR started more than 10 new SS-20 bases, the largest number of SS-20 bases begun in any one year since deployment began in 1977. By early January 1985, the number of SS-20 launchers at operational bases had risen to at least 396 (with 1,118 warheads), with additional launchers and missiles that could be made available in a crisis.

Steps Toward Resumption of INF Negotiations

The United States continued throughout 1984 to explore ways to stimulate the arms control dialogue and to resume the nuclear arms control talks. In quickly accepting a June 1984 Soviet proposal for Vienna negotiations on "preventing the militarization of outer space," the United States informed the USSR that it was prepared to meet with the USSR to discuss and define mutually acceptable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons could be resumed, as well as feasible approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on ASAT weapons. The Soviets responded negatively, setting unacceptable preconditions which precluded any talks.

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In his September 1984 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Reagan proposed "umbrella talks" to stimulate discussion on arms control issues. In a subsequent meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and in correspondence with the new Soviet General Secretary Chernenko, President Reagan also urged the Soviet side to resume the arms control dialogue.

As a result of these efforts, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on November 22, 1984 to negotiations in order to reach mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of nuclear offensive and defensive systems. During their meeting in Geneva on January 7-8, 1985, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed that these talks would cover nuclear and space arms. The negotiations on defense and space, START and INF were to be conducted in parallel but separately, by a delegation from each side divided into three groups: one to deal with strategic offensive arms, one for intermediate-range arms, and one to address defense and space issues. The talks were aimed at limiting and reducing nuclear arsenals and strengthening strategic stability. The sides agreed to begin the negotiations on March 12, 1985 in Geneva. President Reagan announced that Ambassador Maynard Glitman would have responsibility for negotiations on INF.

At a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in January 1985 in Geneva, Secretary Shultz stated, with respect to the INF talks, that: While adhering to the principles previously set forth on INF, the US was prepared to build upon the flexibility inherent in the US 1983 proposals and to explore possible new approaches as well, in pursuit of the lowest possible equal global limits.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko repeated familiar elements of the previous, unacceptable Soviet position, including the Soviet contention that US LRINF missiles were "strategic" systems and that the British and French systems must be "taken into account." He also called for a halt to US LRINF deployments in exchange for a cessation of Soviet "countermeasures". He added that the United States and Soviet Union would then proceed to "reductions to agreed levels" on medium-range missiles in Europe. He did not demand withdrawal of already deployed missiles as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations.

NST Negotiations Resume on March 12, 1985

The NST negotiations which began on March 12, 1985 in Geneva were divided into three separate negotiating groups: START; Defense and Space, and INF. The US INF Delegation was headed by Ambassador Glitman; and the Soviet INF Delegation by Ambassador Obukhov. The Special Consultative Group (SCG) in Brussels remained the primary consultation mechanism between the US and its NATO

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allies on matters related to the INF negotiations. The SCG continued its intensive and productive consultations throughout the INF negotiations.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
(March 1985 - December 1987)

II. ROUND I (March 12, 1985 - April 23, 1985)

United States Position

At the beginning of the new talks, the United States underscored the principles and criteria underlying its approach. The US reaffirmed that the draft treaties of 1982, for the global elimination of all LRINF missiles, and of 1983, for an interim agreement based on equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads if the Soviets were unprepared to accept a zero outcome, were still on the table. It also again placed before the Soviets the US September 1983 initiatives which addressed concerns that the Soviet Union had raised and was based on the following:

- First, the United States proposed a new initiative on equal global limits: If the Soviet Union would agree to reductions and limits on a global basis, the United States would consider a commitment not to offset the entire Soviet global missile deployment through US deployments in Europe. The United States would retain the right to deploy missiles elsewhere.
- Second, the United States would be prepared to consider mutually acceptable ways to address the Soviet desire that an agreement should limit aircraft as well as missiles.
- Third, the United States would address the mix of missiles that would result from reductions. In the context of reductions to equal global levels, the United States would be prepared to apportion the reductions in deployments appropriately between Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.

At the resumption of negotiations in March 1985, the US delegation also underlined the importance in any INF agreement of collateral constraints on SRINF missile systems, and the unacceptability of any notion of Soviet compensation for third country systems. The US position was characterized by a willingness to take into account specific Soviet concerns.

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Soviet Position

The Soviet Union's criteria and principles for the resumption of INF talks remained basically unchanged from its position on November 23, 1983, when it unilaterally discontinued the INF negotiations. The Soviet base position sought an outcome that would remove the US INF systems from Europe and preclude further deployments, while preserving a Soviet LRINF monopoly. Moreover, the Soviet Union regressed somewhat from its earlier position by trying to equate the Soviet Union's so-called "countermeasures" with US LRINF missile deployments, a position firmly rejected by the United States.

Soviet proposals during this opening round were predictable. The Soviet side:

- proposed to remove their so-called countermeasures in exchange for elimination of Pershing II and GLCM deployments in Europe. The US firmly rejected this artificial equation between US LRINF missile deployments which were designed to counter the SS-20 buildup and threat to NATO and Soviet forward deployments of SRINF SS-12s to Eastern Europe;
- insisted on complete equivalence with UK and French forces, involving third countries in the negotiations and leaving the Soviets with a substantial LRINF missile force and room to grow, while no US missiles could be deployed. The US continued to reject this demand as well; and
- proposed to reduce and limit "medium-range" aircraft, even including US carrier-based aircraft, and to have the level of US aircraft in Europe dependent on the level of UK and French aircraft. The Soviets were unwilling or unable to elaborate on this proposal, which appeared little changed from the aircraft proposals made by General Secretary Andropov in October 1983.

Soviet Moratorium and Missile Reduction Proposals

In addition, the Soviets put forward three moratoria proposals in the first round.

In addition to a draft moratorium covering all three NST negotiating areas, the Soviets tabled a separate INF bilateral moratorium proposal. General Secretary Gorbachev also announced a unilateral Soviet moratorium covering Soviet LRINF missile deployments in Europe that would continue until November 1985.

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However, the Soviets refused to respond to a number of specific US questions on details of these proposals unless the US first agreed in principle to a moratorium.

-- Soviet Bilateral INF Moratorium Proposal: This proposal, tabled on April 11, 1985, consisted essentially of the following propositions.

- The USSR would "refrain" from deploying additional SS-20, SS-4 and SS-N-5 missiles in or near Europe if the US would halt deployments of the Pershing II and GLCM in Europe.
- Verification would be accomplished by NTM; and
- The moratorium would remain in force until conclusion of an INF reductions agreement.

This proposal was patently unacceptable, since it would have codified a Soviet advantage in LRINF missile warheads of more than 8 to 1 and would have placed no constraints on SS-20 deployments outside Europe (e.g., in Soviet Asia).

-- Missile Reduction Proposal:

Under the Soviet missile reductions proposal, immediately after a moratorium had been established:

- The US would remove all P-IIIs and GLCMs from Europe;
- The Soviets in turn would reverse their "countermeasures," i.e., withdraw all "operational-tactical missiles of enhanced range" (SS-12 SCALEBOARD SRINF missiles) in the GDR and Czechoslovakia and withdraw the additional Soviet submarines patrolling off the US coast since late 1983;
- The Soviets would begin a gradual reduction of their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-N-5 missile forces in or near Europe to a level at which their warheads equalled the number of missiles in the independent UK and French nuclear deterrent forces; and
- All "medium-range" missiles to be reduced would be destroyed.
- The Soviet side also proposed, as a preliminary measure, removal from combat duty of the missiles to be withdrawn, and concentrating them in specially designated zones.

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The US rejected this proposal too, on the grounds that it would permit retention of a substantial Soviet force threatening Europe, while no US LRINF systems would be permitted.

-- Linkage

The Soviet negotiators did not emphasize the linkage issue (i.e., interrelationship of INF to START or Defense and Space negotiating fora) during this round. They indicated, in informal probings, that they would be willing to implement an INF agreement along the lines of their proposal, without awaiting resolution in the START or Defense and Space areas, and would be prepared to implement any mutually acceptable INF agreement.

III. ROUND II (May 30, 1985 - July 16, 1985)

The Soviet position in this round was marked mainly by polemical, hardened and deliberately dilatory tactics. Toward the end of the round, the Soviets began to discuss more germane issues, but without any movement toward agreement. Overall the Soviets continued to insist on total acceptance of their view. The United States did not change its position.

US Position

The US continued its effort to engage the Soviets substantively and constructively on the issues. The US Delegation stressed that it was prepared to consider any reasonable INF outcome provided the result was equal US-Soviet warhead limits on a global basis. However, the Soviet side refused to discuss any alternative other than zero US LRINF missiles in Europe while insisting that SS-20 warhead levels in Europe should be equal to the combined British and French warhead levels. US efforts to open a discussion on SRINF and verification also were rebuffed by the Soviets.

The US side refuted Soviet claims that the US LRINF deployments upset the "balance" in Europe, in view of the overwhelming Soviet advantage in LRINF missiles and the numbers of Soviet aircraft capable of attacking targets on NATO territory. The US side also pointed out that the Soviets based their balance claims on arbitrary criteria inconsistently applied, including inflated figures for the number of bombs ascribed to NATO aircraft and the incorrect equation of bombs on aircraft with warheads on missiles.

The Soviet contingent offer to freeze the level of their LRINF missiles in Asia (see below, under Soviet position, Gorbachev's May 29 offer) implicitly constituted Soviet acknowledgement, for the first time, that their Asian systems were indeed relevant to the INF negotiations.

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Soviet Position

The Soviet negotiating stance hardened during Round Two, based on the previous Soviet insistence in 1982-83 that there be no US LRINF missile deployments, but the USSR should be allowed to retain a large LRINF missile force of its own. The Soviets continued to insist that the US must withdraw its "illegally" deployed cruise and Pershing II missiles from Europe and that limits on Soviet LRINF in any agreement must take British and French nuclear forces into account. The Soviets reiterated their "reduction proposal" but added nothing new to it. The Soviet negotiators:

- stepped up their attack on third country systems, arguing that an INF agreement should establish a balance between the Soviet SS-20 force on one side and the entire UK and French SLBM and land-based missile nuclear forces on the other;
- attacked the US global approach and asserted that the Soviet SS-20 force in the Asian portion of the USSR was intended solely to counter US air and naval forces in the Pacific and Indian oceans and should be left out of the negotiations; and
- charged that US LRINF systems were designed to give the US a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union and were "strategic, first strike" systems, illegal and a circumvention of SALT II.

On May 29, 1985, the new Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev reaffirmed Andropov's October 26, 1983 offer to halt deployments of the SS-20 in the Eastern USSR once an INF agreement covering Europe came into force, provided there were "no significant changes in the strategic situation" in the Asian region. The Soviet negotiators claimed that this was a new step on their part and that the other conditions for such a halt and specific numbers could be made an integral part of an INF agreement. However, the Soviet side declined to specify what the numbers would be or how this proposal would be integrated in a treaty, unless the US expressed interest in the moratorium proposal. (This Soviet offer, though not a major movement, amounted to Soviet acknowledgement that their Asian systems were relevant to the INF negotiations.)

Detailing of Soviet Position on Aircraft

In a plenary statement on July 9, 1985 during Round II, the Soviet side identified the aircraft to be included in their proposal to reduce and limit Soviet and NATO "medium-range"

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aircraft to agreed levels. Backfire, Badger and Blinder aircraft would be included on the Soviet side, while NATO would include US FB-111, F-111, F-16, F-4, A-6, A-7, F/A-18, French Mirage IV and UK Tornado. Under this Soviet proposal, some US dual-capable aircraft would be permitted to remain in Europe depending on the level chosen and on the size of the UK and French forces.

This proposal merely reaffirmed the longstanding Soviet position on aircraft. The Soviet side continued to : (1) seek inclusion of unrelated carrier-based US aircraft which had mainly conventional support missions; (2) include UK and French forces; and (3) demand Soviet equality with a "NATO" aircraft aggregate.

The United States held that limits on INF missiles were the main priority because they represented the main threat. But the United States was prepared to discuss equal limits on specified types of US and Soviet land-based aircraft at a level that would not have an adverse impact on NATO's conventional forces.

IV. ROUND III (September 23, 1985 - November 7, 1985)

Round Three was marked by a number of US and Soviet initiatives, the most important of which were presented late in the round. The US presented major new proposals on November 1 and the round was extended for one week, until November 7, to permit initial discussion of the US initiatives. In anticipation of the planned November Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Geneva, the climate of the negotiations improved and there were fewer Soviet polemics.

The most important change was the Soviet indication, for the first time, that it was prepared to accept some limited US LRINF deployments in Europe, albeit for a brief period, according to their proposal, before reductions to zero. This helped pave the way for progress on INF at the Summit.

Soviet Position

During Round III, the Soviets presented essentially four separate proposals covering INF, all of which are described in greater detail below. In brief, these were:

- A proposal to include US LRINF in the Soviet START proposal;
- A second called for the elimination of US LRINF missiles but Soviet retention of SS-20's equal to UK and French forces as part of an overall arms control agreement;

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- The third would do the same as the second, but as part of a separate INF agreement; and
- The last, presented on October 14, would permit up to 120 US GLCMs in Europe for a period of time, but tie the permitted SS-20 number also to the level of UK and French forces.

While the October 14, 1985 proposal would have allowed some US LRINF deployments in Europe for a limited time, the Soviets made clear that their ultimate goal remained unchanged: no US LRINF missile deployments in Europe, but a Soviet right to retain a "flexible equivalent" in LRINF missiles to the combined UK and French independent nuclear deterrent forces. Although the Soviets also proposed to freeze their substantial SS-20 force in Asia, they alone would have been free to determine when and if the "strategic situation" in that region warranted an increase in SS-20s. There was no certainty that any Soviet SS-20s would have been eliminated under any of the "new" Soviet proposals.

US Position

The US continued to respond to Soviet queries and to probe parameters of the "new" Soviet proposals. While the Soviet October 14 proposal continued to have major drawbacks, it did contain some movement toward the US position, which the US delegation sought to explore. On October 31, 1985, President Reagan announced that the United States would be tabling a new arms control proposal in Geneva which would address INF and build on "positive elements" of the Soviet positions of late September 1985.

The US proposal tabled in Geneva on November 1 contained a number of new initiatives on INF which are detailed below. In particular, the US proposals offered a flexible approach toward establishing equal warhead levels in Europe and in determining the mix between P-IIIs and GLCMs. For the first time, the United States was prepared to agree to an equal European subceiling in the global limit, with proportional Soviet reductions in Asia and equal global missile warhead totals. These proposals had been presented initially to the Soviets during Secretary Shultz's visit to Moscow in October 1985 in preparation for the November 20-21, 1985 Summit meeting in Geneva between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.

The Soviet Initiatives

On September 30, the Soviets presented a counter proposal to the US position of March 1985. Some further new elements in the Soviet position were enumerated publicly by General Secretary Gorbachev during his trip to Paris that same week. In addition,

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Soviet negotiators made a further informal proposal on October 14, parts of which were later incorporated into the official Soviet position.

-- Soviet Counterproposal of September 30, 1985

The Soviet "strategic" counterproposal of September 30, 1985 covered a wide range of NST issues. A number of elements had an indirect bearing on INF. These included:

- o a freeze on existing nuclear weapons with a limit on their modernization;
- o 50% reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles capable of reaching the territory of the other side;
- o a ban on cruise missiles over the 600 km range;
- o a halt in US and Soviet LRINF deployments followed by the "deepest possible" reductions; and
- o no deployment of nuclear arms in states where none exist, and no increases or replacements with new weapons in states where they are already deployed.

The Soviet delegation later explained, however, that the Soviet position remained zero US INF systems, with sufficient SS-20's to balance what the Soviets alleged were 178 UK/French missiles with 530 warheads. Under this proposal, SS-20's in the European USSR would be reduced from 243 to about 178 missiles with 534 warheads. With this proposal, the Soviets accepted the principle of some reductions, but the level was fundamentally conditioned by Soviet incorporation of the numbers of British and French nuclear weapons.

-- Gorbachev's Paris Proposals

During a visit to Paris in October 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev said that an INF agreement separate from START and Defense and Space was possible, and offered separate negotiations with the British and the French. Gorbachev thus implied that British and French nuclear forces could be excluded from US-Soviet bilateral INF negotiations. This break with longstanding Soviet demands had yet to be formalized in Geneva, but it was a portent of how Soviet policy was evolving.

Gorbachev asserted further that some SS-20's had been removed from "combat alert status" so as to reduce to the level of 243 launchers in Europe claimed for June 1984, and their facilities would be dismantled during the next two months. He also claimed that SS-4's were being phased out.

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-- Soviet October 10 INF Offer

On October 10, 1985, the Soviets backtracked to their previous position by again proposing reduction of US LRINF missiles in Europe to zero, while offering equivalent reductions in SS-20 warheads to match, and vary with, the independent nuclear deterrent forces of the UK and France. The Soviets also formally indicated they would eliminate their aging force of SS-4s.

-- Soviet October 14 Informal Variant

On October 14, the Soviets proposed that the US freeze the level of its LRINF missile deployments as of December 1, 1985. In return the Soviets would continue their declared moratorium. Subsequently, over an 18 month period, the US would reduce to a level of 100-120 GLCMs. The effect of this proposal was to require that all US P-IIs be eliminated from the outset. The Soviets would then reduce their warheads on LRINF missiles in Europe to the level of US GLCM warheads plus UK and French systems.

The Soviets also indicated that they would freeze Soviet LRINF missiles in Soviet Asia if the US strategic "potential" there remained unchanged. They made only a glancing reference to aircraft in a follow-on stage. (Thereafter, aircraft no longer figured as an element in the Soviet approach to an INF agreement.)

This proposal was an explicit Soviet statement of its willingness to accept some level of US LRINF missile deployments, at least for a time, and it appeared to moderate the earlier Soviet demand that GLCMs be banned. The declared freeze on further SS-20 deployments in Asia, while repeating a long-standing Soviet position, responded to the Western position that Soviet systems could not be simply transferred from Europe to threaten US Allies in Asia. However, the proposal did not provide for US-Soviet equality, but continued to insist on Soviet compensation for British and French warheads.

US Initiatives

-- US November 1 Proposals

On November 1, the US in an effort to pave common ground made new proposals which contained the following key elements on INF:

- o The previous US negotiating positions remained on the table. The US preferred outcome remained a US/Soviet zero/solution, involving the ultimate total elimination of the entire class of US and Soviet LRINF missiles.

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As an interim step toward this goal, the US proposed the following approach:

- The US would be prepared to cap its LRINF missile launcher deployments in Europe at the number deployed on December 31, 1985 (140 P-II and GLCM launchers), in return for Soviet agreement to reduce SS-20 missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same number.
- The US would retain freedom to mix the types deployed, i.e., for the US, both the P-II and GLCM. The mix would be a subject for discussion but the number of Soviet SS-20 warheads in (or within range of) Europe would be no higher than 420. The number of US GLCM and P-II warheads would depend on the launcher mix; a mix could be chosen that would give the US and USSR an equal number of 420 warheads in Europe, or in return for fewer deployed P-II's, the US would be entitled to as many as 450 warheads in Europe. In this regard, the US would retain the right to relocate from Europe US LRINF missiles permitted under the agreement. The US also would retain the freedom to convert Pershing II missiles removed from Europe under the terms of the agreement to Pershing IB SRINF missiles.
- Under this approach, the USSR would be required to reduce the number of SS-20 launchers in the Eastern portion of the USSR (i.e. outside the range of NATO Europe) in the same proportion as such launcher reductions within range of NATO Europe.
- The end result would be that both sides would be limited to an equal global LRINF missile warhead number.
- Appropriate constraints also would be applied to US and Soviet SRINF missiles.
- The US was prepared (in case the Soviets raised the issue) to discuss constraints on comparable LRINF aircraft on both sides, in the context of an agreement that met US objectives.
- The US also continued to stress the importance of effective verification as well as Soviet compliance with existing agreements in regard to reaching an INF and other future agreements.

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V. Geneva Summit (November 19-21, 1985)

The Geneva Summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev took place between Rounds III and IV. It covered a wide range of agenda items, including human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral matters as well as arms control. In light of the new proposals tabled by the US and Soviet Union in Round III of the Geneva negotiations, the concluding Joint Statement of the Geneva Summit contained a mutual commitment to early progress in the negotiations, focusing particularly on "the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the US and USSR appropriately applied." It also called for an "interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces." Finally, the Joint Statement called for agreed effective measures to verify compliance with obligations assumed during negotiation of these agreements.

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VI. ROUND IV (January 16, 1986 - March 4, 1986)

The US INF Delegation returned to the Geneva talks in January prepared to implement the November Summit mandate to press for early progress in those areas where there was common ground. It sought to broaden and deepen areas of apparent convergence in Round III and at the Summit. The round was marked by two major events which gave the negotiations a new impetus: On January 16 the Soviet side proposed the elimination of US and Soviet LRINF missiles in Europe, as part of a plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. On February 24, the United States proposed the phased elimination of all US and Soviet LRINF missiles by 1989, accompanied by detailed verification provisions.

US Position

The US used the opening weeks of the round to restate its position, underline areas of convergence and stress the need for accelerated progress. Throughout the round, the US pressed in vain for additional details on the Soviet January 16 proposal and continued probing for Soviet flexibility on two key issues -- SS-20 reductions in Asia, and constraints on SRINF missile systems. Toward the end of the round, the US put forward a proposal, detailed below, which took account of our Allies' concerns and responded to the January 16 Soviet offer.

Soviet Position

The initial Soviet response to the US February 24 proposal was negative. It characterized the US proposal as a reintroduction of the "unacceptable" zero option. The Soviets also rejected a US offer to extend the round for INF, or to reconvene the next round earlier, to allow more time for discussion and to seek common ground. The Soviet Union rejected the US proposals on verification as "premature". They also failed to mention on-site inspection, although Soviet public utterances on this point had been positive.

During Round IV, the Soviets explicitly refused to join in efforts to bridge or narrow differences arguing that only the Soviet proposal provided a basis for negotiation.

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Soviet Proposals

-- Gorbachev Proposal of January 16, 1986

On January 16, the Soviets tabled in Geneva General Secretary Gorbachev's January 15 proposal for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons over a fifteen year period. This proposal included a call for eliminating US and Soviet LRINF missiles in Europe during a first stage of reductions whose implementation would extend for five to eight years (overlapping with follow-on negotiations and a second stage of reductions). Such elimination was made contingent on British and French agreement not to build up their own independent nuclear deterrent nuclear forces, and on US agreement not to supply "medium-range" or strategic missiles to third countries. There would be no reductions in Asian SS-20s during this first stage.

During the Soviet second stage, that would begin no later than 1990 and whose implementation would last five to seven years, the US and USSR would implement further measures to eliminate "medium-range" nuclear arms and freeze their "tactical" nuclear weapons. (Under the Soviet definition, tactical weapons would include all nuclear capable systems with a range of 1,000 kilometers or below.) After the 50 percent US and Soviet "strategic reductions" were completed, all nuclear powers would eliminate their tactical nuclear weapons.

During the third stage beginning no later than 1995, all remaining nuclear weapons would be eliminated. The Soviets left obscure when in the second or third stages the remaining LRINF missiles, i.e. Soviet SS-20's in Asia, would be eliminated.

Assessment of Gorbachev Proposal

This was the first Soviet proposal that did not provide for a Soviet right to retain a residual SS-20 missile force in Europe as compensation for British and French forces. However, the Soviets indicated that the British and French governments would have to make national commitments not to build up their nuclear forces. Thus, actions by third countries were still a precondition to conclusion of a bilateral US-Soviet agreement. In addition, the Soviet precondition that the US not transfer strategic and "medium-range" missiles to its Allies could have impacted heavily on US programs of cooperation. Moreover, the Soviet proposal included neither: (1) provisions for any reductions in SS-20s in the Asian region, nor (2) restrictions on SRINF missile systems in the first stage. On linkage to other negotiating fora, the relationship between the Soviet January 16 proposal and their acceptance of a separate INF agreement was initially ambiguous.

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However, the Soviets finally stated formally that the INF element of their proposal was not contingent on prior resolution of strategic or defense and space issues.

US Proposals

-- US February 24 Proposal

After thorough USG analysis of the new Soviet proposal, President Reagan authorized the presentation of a new US proposal. This two-part proposal, in keeping with the commitment in the Summit Joint Statement to accelerate progress in the Geneva negotiations, was composed of a reductions scheme and verification measures and was tabled in Geneva on February 24 and 27, 1986.

o Reduction Proposals

To achieve global elimination of US and Soviet LRINF missiles by the end of 1989, the US proposed a concrete plan for the timing and phasing of LRINF reductions down to zero, with a concurrent and proportional Soviet drawdown in Europe and Asia, and alternative approaches to establishing constraints on SRINF missiles.

- By the end of 1987, the US and USSR would limit their LRINF missile deployments in Europe to 140 launchers each, with the Soviet Union making concurrent proportional reductions in Asia. In the context of this first phase, the warhead levels in Europe would be fixed along the lines proposed by the United States in its November 1, 1985 proposal.
- Within the following year, both sides would further reduce the number of LRINF missile launchers remaining in Europe and Asia by an additional 50 percent.
- Finally, both sides would move to the total elimination of this category of weapons by the end of 1989.
- Associated with this plan, there would be a parallel series of global LRINF warhead ceilings under which the US would retain the right to global equality.

Under this plan, Soviet reductions in both Europe and Asia would be proportional, although the US indicated a readiness to consider Soviet counterproposals on phasing of reductions. SRINF limits could be agreed in one of two ways: either equal US and Soviet SRINF missile ceilings at the December 31, 1985 Soviet level (roughly 135), or with a freeze of both side's SRINF missiles at their January 1, 1982 levels (approximately 120 for the USSR and 108 missiles on launchers for the US). This SRINF limit was to be fully implemented by the end of 1987.

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o Verification Measures

As a key element of its February 24, 1986 proposal, the US underscored to the Soviets the need for a comprehensive INF verification regime, as an integral part of an agreement, and introduced the following elements of such a comprehensive regime:

- Provision for the use of, and non-interference with, national technical means (NTM), as well as the requirement for broadcast of engineering measurements on missile flights, a ban on encryption, and a ban on concealment measures that impede verification;
- Specification of areas and facilities where treaty-limited systems would be located and areas where systems would be prohibited except during announced transit;
- Reciprocal exchange of specified data in a Memorandum of Understanding attached to an INF Treaty;
- Reciprocal updating of specified numerical and technical data on limited systems, specified associated facilities and equipment, and related activities;
- Specialized cooperative measures and procedures to assure the dismantlement, destruction or conversion of reduced systems and facilities; and
- On-site inspection/monitoring.

Summary of Soviet Movement on Major Issues

When negotiations resumed in March 1985, the sides were no closer together than they had been when talks broke off in November 1983. However, by the end of Round IV in early March 1986, some areas of convergence between the US and Soviet negotiating positions were appearing. Substantial differences remained on all major issues and a great deal of time and effort would be required to overcome them. Progress was being made, albeit slowly. The following brief summary describes some important movement in the Soviet position:

o US-Soviet Equality: With their January 16, 1986 proposal, the Soviets for the first time offered to reduce their LRINF missiles in Europe to zero, if the US did the same, without demanding compensation for UK/French forces.

o Third Country Forces: The Soviet willingness to accept for the first time reductions to zero in US/Soviet LRINF missiles in Europe without demanding residual Soviet missiles to counterbalance

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British and French forces was a major change in the Soviet position on third country forces. The Soviets did, however, insist that: Britain and France would have to pledge not to build up their own nuclear arms, and the US would have to agree not to supply strategic or "medium-range" missiles to other countries. These conditions too were unacceptable to the US and its Allies.

o Aircraft: After mid-1985, there was no further discussion of INF aircraft as part of an initial agreement. Both sides focused on missiles as the principal priority.

o Linkage: The Soviet position on linkage remained ambiguous. In this period, the Soviet side emphasized its willingness to conclude a separate INF agreement.

o Geographic Limits: Under the new Soviet proposal, Soviet SS-20's in Asia presumably would be covered (in stage two) when the US and USSR agreed to implement further measures to eliminate their "medium-range" nuclear arms.

o SRINF: Under the Soviet comprehensive proposal, SRINF missiles would be frozen in stage one reductions and then eliminated in stage two as part of a multilateral commitment of all nuclear powers to destroy all "tactical" nuclear arms having a range of up to 1000 kilometers. However, the Soviet side was unwilling to engage in discussions of specific SRINF limitations integral to a separate INF agreement.

VII. ROUND V (May 8, 1986 - June 26, 1986)

At the beginning of Round V, Soviet Ambassador Obukhov became the chief START negotiator and was replaced by a long-term member of the INF Negotiating Group, Ambassador Lem Masterkov. During this round, the Soviet side introduced a draft agreement, and used the round to elaborate on it. However, they avoided serious substantive discussions of the main issues.

Soviet Initiatives

-- Soviet May 15 Draft INF Agreement

Early in the round, the Soviets tabled a draft INF agreement on "medium-range" missiles which embodied the INF portion of their January 16 proposal but contained no new elements. The Soviet Draft INF Agreement was sketchy at best and did not include many of the more detailed elements of their 1982 Draft Treaty. They characterized this May 15 draft as a "framework" for an agreement.

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-- Work Groups Proposal

In order to focus attention on their draft agreement, the Soviets formally proposed on May 22 establishment of a Joint Draft Text Working Group to begin work on actual Treaty language, based on their draft. They indicated that questions concerning the Soviet proposal would be dealt with in the working group. The US Delegation noted that it could not accept this proposal unless the US Draft texts and proposals were given equal status. In particular, the United States insisted that a parallel working group should deal with verification issues, concurrently with the group working on the treaty text. The Soviet side rejected this.

US Initiatives

The US delegation emphasized the need for practical negotiations to focus on the major issues dividing the sides and attempted to develop areas of common ground. The Soviets were unwilling to discuss the US proposals of February 24, 1986 insisting instead on discussing their January 16 proposals.

-- Verification Working Group

On June 5, 1986 the US Delegation proposed the creation of a verification working group to work in parallel with the treaty text working group. The Soviets resisted the establishment of two groups countering that the Joint Draft Text Working Group could include a subgroup of experts to address verification issues "if necessary". The Soviets proposed to address verification sequentially, i.e., only after the US had agreed to the provisions relating to reduction and limitation obligations. The Soviets resisted efforts to work out terms of reference for dealing with verification, whatever the forum. The Soviet approach was unacceptable to the US, which continued to insist that verification must be an integral part of any agreement.

Summary of Central Issues During the Round

o Geographical Scope: The US continued to emphasize that only reductions and limitations of SS-20s on a global basis would meet US and Allied security concerns. The Soviets insisted that an INF agreement should deal only with Europe. The Soviets restated their proposal to freeze deployments in Asia after Treaty signature (but refused to discuss freeze levels) and reintroduced their previous offer dating from 1982-83 that instead of not deploying SS-20s west of the Urals (approximately 60° East Longitude) they would not deploy SS-20s west of 80° East Longitude.

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o LRINF Reductions: The Soviets suggested phased reductions to zero over three to five years with equal reductions of 50 percent the first year. The phased approach and first year outcome only superficially resembled the US February 24, 1986 Proposal, and was unacceptable to the US.

o Third Country Systems: The Soviets stressed their view of the need to prevent the build-up of British and French systems. They introduced a draft agreed statement which would require a joint US-USSR understanding that the conclusion of a bilateral US-Soviet INF agreement depend on the condition that the UK and France forego increases of their nuclear forces, and indicated that an INF Treaty would not be ratified by the USSR without such a formal UK/France obligation. The Soviets also included in the draft statement an obligation by the US not to transfer strategic systems to third countries, complementing their draft agreement's provision prohibiting transfer of "medium-range" systems. The US rejected the first point as inconsistent with a bilateral US-Soviet treaty and the second as conflicting with a firmly established US policy on programs of cooperation with our Allies. Thus, even though the Soviets had moved away from openly including British and French systems in a bilateral treaty, they continued to seek limits and other constraints on those forces as a precondition for a US-Soviet treaty.

o SRINF: The Soviets proposed to deal with SRINF missiles outside an INF agreement, either by working out an accord on systems below 1000 km immediately upon conclusion of an INF agreement or by invoking a multilateral forum to work on SRINF systems. The US rejected this as a regressive step in view of the previous Soviet 1982 willingness to deal with SRINF simultaneously with constraints on LRINF systems. The Soviets also reintroduced their offer to remove SCALEBOARD missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia if "medium-range" missiles in Europe were eliminated.

o Verification: The Soviets again did not put forward concrete verification provisions comparable to those tabled by the US and sought to delay discussions of verification until reductions had been agreed, despite Soviet public claims of interest in verification. The United States stressed that verification measures would have to be worked out concurrently with substantive provisions to ensure our ability to verify those provisions. Such verification measures would also have to be an integral part of the treaty.

VIII. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S JULY 25 LETTER

In his letter of July 25, 1986 to General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan again made clear the US preference for the total

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elimination of US and Soviet LRINF missiles on a world-wide basis. He proposed, if elimination were not possible, a return to the November 1985 Summit's focus on an interim agreement that could allow LRINF reductions to begin as soon as possible. This letter was followed by a series of high level discussions between the US Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister on INF and on other arms control issues in August and September.

IX. US-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS MEETINGS (August 11-12, 1986 and September 5-6, 1986)

Between Rounds V and VI, US and Soviet arms control experts met on August 11-12 in Moscow and again on September 5-6 in Washington in support of the Geneva negotiations and to prepare ground for the September 19-20 meeting between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. These talks served to narrow US and Soviet differences on INF issues.

At the Experts Meeting of September 5-6, the Soviets moved away from their January proposal for the early elimination of US and Soviet LRINF missiles back in the direction of an interim approach which would provide for a finite level of US and Soviet systems in Europe prior to complete elimination. The Soviets proposed limiting the total number of warheads on LRINF missiles deployed in Europe to 100 on each side, limiting Soviet LRINF deployments in Asia to an unspecified level and allowing the US to deploy in the continental US (not including Alaska) a number of LRINF missiles equal to the number of Soviet warheads on LRINF missiles deployed in Asia. The Soviets also proposed that the LRINF missile systems permitted in Europe be limited to GLCMs and SS-20s only. They refused to agree to reductions on SS-20s in Asia, or to specify existing levels in Asia, although the Soviets agreed that, in the context of their proposed European limits, they would "limit" the number of warheads on their LRINF missiles deployed in Asia. Additionally, they argued that the SRINF issue could be dealt with after the LRINF question was settled. The Soviets did not raise their past demands for limits on British and French systems or on their modernization.

The US indicated a readiness to accept as an interim agreement a ceiling of 100 LRINF missile warheads in Europe, provided that Soviets also agreed to a limit of 100 warheads or less outside of Europe (a global ceiling of 200 warheads). For such an agreement, the US indicated that it could also accept an approach confining the US to deployment on US territory of a number of warheads equal to the number of Soviet LRINF missile warheads outside of Europe. The US made clear, however, it would not forego its right to deploy LRINF systems in Alaska. Moreover, while the US was prepared to discuss the future mix between P-IIIs and GLCMs, P-IIIs would have to

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be part of any residual force. The US also expressed preference for an interim INF agreement which would remain in effect until superseded by an agreement on further reductions and would not be a "temporary" measure of short duration as the Soviets proposed.

Thus, although the Soviets seemed to be accepting our basic structure for an equal global LRINF missile warhead ceiling with equality in Europe, important disagreements continued to separate the sides regarding SRINF, reductions of Asian SS-20s, the Pershing II-GLCM mix, verification, and the duration of an agreement.

X. ROUND VI (September 18, 1986 - November 12, 1986)

On September 18, the opening day of Round VI, the United States tabled in Geneva a new proposal that incorporated the key elements of the Moscow and Washington experts meetings the previous summer. A week later the Soviets tabled proposals reflecting their suggestions at these experts talks. The positions set forth by both sides reflected a number of areas of convergence and narrowed differences.

During the round, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev held their historic meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland (Oct. 10-12, 1986) while the INF negotiations in Geneva carried on. Their discussions in Reykjavik lent the negotiations a new direction and impetus.

Following Reykjavik, the US tabled in Geneva proposals incorporating the areas of agreement discussed in Reykjavik. The Soviet negotiators also tabled their view on what was achieved at Reykjavik. However, the Soviets again linked an INF agreement to resolution of strategic defense issues.

Pre-Reykjavik Developments (September 18 - October 11, 1986)

-- US Initiatives

At the beginning of the Round the US Delegation made clear that it could accept an interim agreement providing for 100 LRINF missile warheads on each side in Europe, if the Soviets agreed concurrently to reduce to 100 LRINF missile warheads or less in Asia, with a US right to match these deployments on its territory.

-- Soviet Initiatives

On September 25, the Soviets formally proposed an "interim, temporary" INF accord. The Soviets accepted the principle of equality in US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe and globally -- a significant step beyond their longstanding position

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-- but were reluctant to accept the concept of global limits. They abandoned their demands for a freeze on British and French nuclear forces and for restricting long-standing US-Allied programs of cooperation in strategic systems, although they continued to seek to restrict the transfer of "medium-range" systems.

-- Summary of Key Issues

Prior to the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviet side had taken tentative but significant steps of convergence toward key elements in the US position, including movement toward the US-proposed conditions of an interim INF agreement specifying equal LRINF missile warhead ceilings on each side in Europe and global LRINF limits. For example, by the end of Round V in June, the Soviet side had moved away from including British and French systems in a bilateral treaty although it hedged by insisting on third country preconditions for a treaty; and had proposed a phased reduction of LRINF missiles in Europe down to 50 per cent at the end of one year and to zero over three to five years, with some similarity to the US February 24 proposal. Early in Round VI, the Soviet side formally proposed an "interim, temporary" INF accord with finite equal limits of 100 US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe, and for the first time accepted the principle of equality in US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe and globally.

However, key issues remained unresolved prior to the October Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik, including: (1) Soviet refusal to reduce SS-20s in Asia, (2) Soviet unwillingness to deal concurrently with SRINF missiles, and (3) Soviet insistence on eliminating all US P-IIs in Europe as part of any interim accord. The sides also were divided on the issue of duration, with the Soviets seeking a specified duration while the US argued for an agreement that would remain in force until superseded by a subsequent reductions agreement. Moreover, despite a general Soviet commitment to deal with verification, Soviet negotiator did little work on this subject.

XI. THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING IN REYKJAVIK (October 11-12, 1986)

President Reagan agreed to General Secretary Gorbachev's request for a special meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland on October 11-12 to discuss the entire US-Soviet agenda. During two days of intense discussions, significant progress was achieved on INF. This progress helped move the negotiations forward on substantive issues. However, the Soviets relinked INF with Defense and Space and made demands of the United States that would cripple SDI. They thus created an artificial barrier that took some months to clear away.

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On INF, agreement in principle was reached at Reykjavik to allow equal global ceilings of 100 LRINF missile warheads on each side, none of which could be deployed in Europe. The Soviets thus agreed to reduce their total SS-20 force to a level of 100 warheads (i.e., 33 missiles) and to remove all SS-20s from Europe.

The Soviets offered to freeze their SRINF missile systems pending negotiation of reductions, but conditioned this on "freezing" US SRINF at their current level of zero.

The Soviets also agreed in principle to some general verification measures. These included: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; (2) on-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels; and (3) effective monitoring of the remaining INF missile system inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

At Reykjavik, it was also understood that other provisions would have to be added to form the basis for a complete INF agreement. Also at Reykjavik the Soviets did not mention the inclusion of British and French nuclear systems or US aircraft in Europe in an INF agreement, thus conclusively removing these nuclear forces from the negotiating table.

In the end, however, the Soviet Union held all progress on INF hostage to an unjustifiable demand to restrict strategic defense research to laboratories. This demand had no merit in its own right and bore no relation to the INF negotiations, as the Soviets had previously acknowledged. The Soviets almost certainly saw it as a means of bringing public pressure to bear on the United States.

XII. ROUND VI DEVELOPMENTS POST-REYKJAVIK (October 13 - November 12, 1986)

-- US Initiative

On October 23, 1986, the US set forth at the negotiating table in Geneva positions based on our understanding of what had been achieved in Reykjavik in the INF area and we outlined additional elements to be included in an interim INF agreement, with zero US and Soviet LRINF remaining our ultimate objective.

The US Delegation noted the following elements as mutually agreed at Reykjavik:

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- A LRINF missile ceiling of 100 warheads on each side, with none in Europe, and 100 warheads on each side outside of Europe, stationed in Soviet Asia and the United States respectively;
- Equal constraints on US and Soviet SRINF missiles in an INF agreement and early follow-on negotiations on SRINF; and
- Specific verification measures including comprehensive exchanges of data before and after an INF agreement, on-site inspection of reductions to agreed levels, and effective monitoring of remaining missile systems and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

In addition, the US Delegation proposed the following provisions designed to flesh out an INF agreement:

- Phased reductions to agreed levels to be completed by the end of 1991;
- With regard to SRINF missile constraints, the US was prepared to agree to a ceiling on US and Soviet SRINF missile systems of both sides at the current Soviet level on a global basis. This constraint, accompanied by appropriate qualitative constraints, would apply to SRINF missile systems with a range equal to or greater than the Soviet SS-23 but less than or equal to the Soviet SS-12 SCALEBOARD, along with a ban on systems with ranges between that of the SCALEBOARD and the US Pershing II, a LRINF missile. Negotiations on reductions of SRINF missile systems were to begin within six months after an initial INF agreement was reached.
- Any interim INF agreement would have to be of unlimited duration and remain in effect until replaced by a subsequent agreement to eliminate LRINF missiles entirely.

-- Soviet Initiative

The Soviet Union tabled a package proposal based on Reykjavik on November 7 at the Joint NST Plenary Meeting in Geneva. The "medium-range" INF aspects of this package were tabled in the INF Negotiating Group on November 12. The Soviet INF proposals were made up of the following elements:

- "Medium-range" missiles in Europe would be eliminated within a period of up to five years under procedures and terms to be mutually agreed upon.

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- o Missiles with a range of less than 1000 kilometers deployed in Europe would be frozen at the January 1, 1987 level for each side (leaving the US with zero and the Soviets with approximately 135, a sizeable force) with further questions to be resolved in follow-on negotiations.
- o The USSR would reduce its remaining LRINF missiles in Soviet Asia to 100 warheads and would undertake to deploy the remaining missiles in such a way that they could not hit targets on US territory, including in Alaska, based on Soviet range definitions for the SS-20s. The US would have to agree to deploy its remaining 100 LRINF missile warheads in the US, but not including Alaska.
- o Verification would be carried out in the same way as for strategic offensive arms, taking into account the specific characteristics of "medium-range" missiles and the terms for their elimination or reduction.

XIII. INTERIM SESSION OF INTENSIVE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS
(December 2-5, 1986)

As agreed before the end of Round VI, US and Soviet NST Negotiators returned to Geneva December 2-5 for an interim session of intensive limited-composition meetings. The US objective at these meetings was to gain a clearer idea of where the US and USSR agreed and disagreed on key issues in all three negotiating groups. The December session was attended by the three US Negotiators (Ambassadors Kampelman, Glitman and Lehman) and by their Soviet counterparts (Ambassadors Karpov, Masterkov, and Obukhov) and consisted of an intensive schedule of fourteen meetings and informal contracts.

Unfortunately, the Soviet purpose at the meetings apparently was to reinforce a broader Soviet public affairs strategy designed to blame lack of movement on US "intransigence" on SDI and to obtain US agreement to negotiate on the basis of the Soviet November 7 proposals.

On INF the Soviets were not prepared to engage in serious, substantive discussion. Instead they took a polemical line, which they repeated publicly, accusing the US of creating new obstacles in INF inter alia by insisting on the right to build up, rather than freeze, SRINF missiles and by retaining the right to deploy LRINF missiles in Alaska from where they could reach Soviet territory.

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The US pressed the Soviets at these meetings to separate (or "de-link") progress on INF from progress in other areas and to negotiate seriously on a separate INF agreement.

Summary of Basic INF Issues

Despite the slow-down in the December talks, Reykjavik had moved the sides significantly closer on a number of basic INF issues by year's end. A brief summary of areas of convergence and outstanding differences follows:

- o LRINF: There was agreement on the limits of 100 LRINF missile warheads, with zero in Europe and the permitted residuals of 100 on each side to be confined respectively to Soviet Asia and US territory. However, the Soviets insisted on prohibiting deployments in Alaska.
- o Phasing: Agreement existed that the zero in Europe should be reached within five years, that is, by 1991, although the Soviets following Reykjavik refused to specify that Asian reductions would take place in the same time frame and in the same agreement.
- o SRINF: Agreement was reached that there would be constraints on SRINF missiles in an initial INF agreement. However, the Soviets wanted to freeze US SRINF at zero while the US insisted on the right to match Soviet levels. The Soviets also refused to clarify which missiles they would constrain and limited their SRINF offer to Europe only.
- o Verification: The Soviets indicated that they agreed on the basic principles of verification, but were reluctant to discuss details, including details of on-site observation of the elimination of missiles.
- o Linkage: Soviet linkage of progress in INF to an overall solution of problems in START and Defense and Space, especially crippling constraints on SDI, remained a major obstacle, despite some indications that they were prepared to waive linkage.

XIV. ROUND VII (January 15, 1987 to March 6, 1987; Extended to March 26, 1987)

US Initiatives

To build upon the common ground reached at Reykjavik, President Reagan instructed the US Delegation to table a Draft INF Treaty during Round VII. Meanwhile, General Secretary Gorbachev's February 28, 1987 TASS statement signalled Soviet willingness to

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The round was extended three weeks to March 26 to permit fuller discussion of the US Draft. During this period the Soviets agreed to a new working group format, including parallel work on verification. The Soviets asked extensive questions about the US Draft Treaty, but revealed almost nothing about the specifics of their own position and were unprepared to engage in substantive drafting of an INF Treaty.

US Verification Provisions

After lengthy consultations with the Allies, the United States tabled specific verification provisions separately on March 12, 1987:

- Identification of areas and facilities where treaty-limited systems could be located and prohibition against having them elsewhere;
- Reciprocal comprehensive exchanges of specified data on treaty-limited systems, support facilities and equipment;
- Reciprocal updating of this data;
- Specialized procedures for destruction, dismantlement and conversion of long-range INF missile systems, including on-site inspection;
- Short notice on-site inspection and continuous monitoring of facilities declared to the other side in the data exchanges, as well as short notice inspections of suspect sites; and
- Provisions for the use of and non-interference with National Technical Means (NTM), a requirement for broadcast of engineering measurements on flight tests, a ban on encryption and a ban on concealment measures that impede monitoring by NTM.

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- o Soviet longer-range "operational-tactical missiles" (i.e. SCALEBOARD) would be withdrawn to the USSR from their forward deployed location in the GDR and Czechoslovakia once an INF agreement is reached, and;
- o Separate negotiations would be opened "immediately" on other "operational-tactical" missiles (which were not further defined) with a view to their reduction and elimination.

The Soviet offer made at Reykjavik to constrain SRINF missiles at 1987 levels (i.e., a monopoly for the Soviet Union) was not a part of the new proposal. Thus Gorbachev's February 28 proposal also represented a step backward from Reykjavik in that it sought to reverse the US-Soviet Agreement which had existed in the 1981-83 INF negotiations and which, after a year and a half hiatus, had been reaffirmed at Reykjavik, namely that constraints on shorter-range missiles must form an integral part of an initial INF Agreement. Gorbachev's new approach would have opened a path for the Soviet side to undermine the effectiveness of an INF agreement by creating the opportunity to increase their SRINF missiles which, depending on their range and locations, could reach many of the targets covered by Soviet SS-20s.

US Draft Treaty of March 4, 1987

On March 4, 1987, the US tabled its Draft Interim INF Treaty. This draft had been presented in outline form to the Allies on February 6 and reflected the continuing and close US-Allied consultations on INF. While incorporating the INF agreements reached at Reykjavik, it also sought to advance the negotiations, particularly in the area of verification. The Treaty contained specific obligations with respect to the verification of an agreement and foreshadowed additional treaty documents: A Memorandum of Understanding on Data, and Protocols on Inspection and Elimination of Missile Systems. Its essential provisions were:

- o Reduction to 100 LRINF missile warheads globally, with none in Europe, and the remaining 100 to be deployed in Soviet Asia and on US Territory.
- o Constraints on SRINF missile systems with a US right to equality at the present Soviet global level of SRINF missiles, and
- o Specific obligations for a detailed and effective verification regime.

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sign a separate agreement on INF, which President Reagan characterized as removing "a serious obstacle to progress toward INF reductions."

The tabling of the US Draft INF Treaty was a significant milestone. It permitted the two sides to get down to the task of translating the general areas of agreement on INF into the more precise language of treaty commitments based on a US framework.

Soviet Initiative

The Soviets entered the round in January with an agenda that reflected a continuing effort to link INF with other issues. They sought to engage the US in drafting the common text of a framework INF agreement, which, together with similar documents on START and Defense and Space issues, was intended to form the overall package solution sought by the Soviets. During the period before the TASS statement on February 28, the Soviets resisted answering US questions about the Soviet position and attempted to defer discussions of key details until after a framework agreement was achieved. Nonetheless, persistent US probing resulted in further clarification of a number of areas of agreement and disagreement.

Gorbachev's February 28 TASS Statement

In the TASS statement of February 28, 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev announced willingness to sign a separate agreement to eliminate Soviet and American Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe within five years, thus ending Soviet insistence that these missiles be considered part of a comprehensive arms control package.

This was at least the fourth time that the Soviets had "linked" or "delinked" INF from other issues: In March 1985, the Soviets created the original linkage which they dropped formally at the Geneva Summit in November, and then reestablished at Reykjavik. The Gorbachev statement of February delinked INF for the final time. After that the Soviets worked toward a separate INF agreement, as the US had proposed all along.

On the topic of SRINF, Gorbachev also proposed that:

- o SRINF should be taken out of the current negotiations, "opening the way for speedy conclusion of an agreement exclusively on medium-range missiles" -- a step back from his offer at Reykjavik;

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XV. SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN MOSCOW (April 13-16, 1987)

During a three day meeting between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow on April 13-16, 1987, the Soviets elaborated on the SRINF position outline in General Secretary Gorbachev's Prague Speech and his February 28 statement. Specifically, on SRINF, the Soviets:

- o indicated they would accept a reference to SRINF missiles in an initial INF Treaty, but said they still wished to deal with SRINF in a separate negotiation from an initial LRINF agreement;
- o stated that they would withdraw and destroy the Soviet SRINF missile systems stationed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia after an initial INF agreement was reached and proposed that SRINF missiles be reduced to zero in Europe within one year; and
- o indicated that their position in separate SRINF negotiations would be SRINF elimination, at least in Europe, and the goal of reaching agreement on global equality. The Soviets suggested these negotiations would include SS-12s (SCALEBOARDS) and SS-23s, cover the range band between 500 and 1,000 km, and be on a global basis. However the Soviets did not make clear whether they were prepared to recognize the right to US equality during any SRINF negotiations.

An "Expert Group" also met on INF issues during the Moscow visit. It reviewed the status of verification issues which were identified as a priority area for the INF negotiations. The US made clear that resolution of difficult verification issues would be simplified and facilitated if the Soviets would agree to eliminate all the remaining capability for 100 LRINF missile warheads which they insisted on retaining in an initial INF Agreement. While making clear that it would stand by the Reykjavik formula, the US again stated in Moscow, as it had all along in Geneva, that a global zero for LRINF remained its preferred outcome.

The Soviets also repeated an offer made by General Secretary Gorbachev in Prague to include weapon systems with ranges below 500 kilometers as part of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. The United States was skeptical of this proposal because we have avoided linking nuclear and conventional forces in one negotiating forum and because the Soviet proposal could have generated pressure for a "denuclearized" Europe in which Soviet conventional forces would have retained their superiority. The two sides exchanged views on the issue of P-II to P-IB conversion, but there was no narrowing of differences on this issue.

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After the Moscow Meeting, the United States undertook consultations with its Allies on options for resolving the SRINF issue in keeping with NATO's basic approach. These consultations considered how to implement the principle of US-Soviet equality, which was the centerpiece of the US position. The main choices were to move toward NATO deployments of SRINF missile systems, or to press for their complete elimination. (The possibility of deferring the SRINF question for subsequent negotiations was not considered to be in the US or NATO interest.) These consultations took several months of intense discussions both within the alliance and within individual countries. The final decision was reached by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Ministerial which met at Reykjavik in June, where NATO proposed the complete elimination of the SRINF missile systems of the United States and the USSR on a global basis.

XVI. ROUND VIII (April 23, 1987 - December 7, 1987)

Round VIII was the concluding negotiating session. This round can be viewed as having two distinct phases. The first phase was based on the Reykjavik Summit formula of zero LRINF missile systems in Europe with a residual 100 LRINF warheads on each side, deployed in Soviet Asia and on US territory respectively. The second phase came about when the Soviet side accepted the US proposal for zero US-Soviet LRINF globally and zero US-Soviet SRINF globally -- the "double global zero" (DGZ) formula. This US proposal followed intensive consultations with the Allies between April and June and the NAC Ministerial at Reykjavik on June 12. The Soviets formally accepted this proposal in Geneva on July 23 -- after Gorbachev's published interview in an Indonesian newspaper on July 22.

DGZ would require US and Soviet reductions of both LRINF and SRINF missile systems (i.e., all their ground-launched INF missiles with a range between 500 and 5500 km) to zero on a global basis. Hence, the draft treaty/protocol texts prepared before or during the first phase of Round VIII had to be revised to take DGZ into account during phase two of Round VIII. Round VIII became correspondingly intense, punctuated by high-level meetings between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and between Ambassadors Kampelman and Vorontsov, the heads of their respective NST delegations.

Phase One of Round VIII -- Implementing Reykjavik Accord

The Round began in Geneva on April 23. President Reagan called on the Soviets to speed progress in the INF negotiation by

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responding to the US verification proposals. He reiterated that a zero LRINF outcome remained the preferred solution for the US and its allies, and that Soviet agreement to such an outcome would facilitate verification of the treaty provisions. The principal US objective at the start of this round was to obtain Soviet agreement to begin substantive joint drafting of an INF treaty incorporating what had been agreed at Reykjavik and in Round VII.

At the outset of the round, both delegations agreed to leave the closing date of the round open since there were many issues and details to work out. General V.I. Medvedev, a long-time member of the Soviet INF Delegation, replaced Ambassador Lem Masterkov as chief Soviet INF negotiator. On April 27, shortly after the round began, the Soviets tabled their Draft INF Treaty, which was presented in two parts -- a basic treaty with a structure similar to the US March 4 draft, and a lengthy annex with draft agreed statements and common understandings.

Tabling of Soviet Draft INF Treaty (April 27, 1987)

The Soviet Draft Treaty which was tabled April 27 included many of the points in the US Draft. The principal provisions of the Soviet Draft were:

- o LRINF: the Soviet Draft reflected the Reykjavik formula, but retained a 100 warhead ceiling without providing for follow-on LRINF negotiations. It prohibited stationing residual INF missiles within range of the other's territory, i.e., precluding the US from deploying its LRINF in Alaska. It banned new types of LRINF missiles, included reductions and limitations on non-deployed missiles and launchers, and reinstated the offer that Soviet residual warheads in Asia would not be deployed closer to Europe than 80 degrees East longitude.
- o Phasing: The Soviet Draft Treaty proposed reductions in two phases, with 50 percent reductions in a first three-year phase, and reduction of the remainder (to zero LRINF missiles in Europe and 100 residual LRINF warheads outside Europe), in the second, two-year phase. The Soviet position called for US reductions to occur concurrently in the first stage. (See note, infra.)
- o Elimination: the Soviet draft accepted dismantlement and destruction, but not conversion, as methods of elimination. The US approach at this stage of the negotiations (i.e., before the Soviets had agreed to global zero LRINF or to inclusion of

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global zero SRINF in the initial INF agreement) would have permitted conversion within certain limits as a method of elimination. It would have allowed the sides to convert missile components for LRINF systems for use in non-LRINF systems or in non-INF systems of shorter range (i.e., non-strategic systems), subject to agreed verification procedures.

- o SRINF: SRINF was mentioned only in a separate prepared statement, not in the Treaty text itself. In a change from the Gorbachev proposal in Moscow, the Soviet SRINF proposal called for equal global limits, with zero in Europe for both sides. The SS-12 SCALEBOARD and SS-23 were both included, with the range floor set at 500 kilometers and reductions to be achieved within one year. The Soviet SRINF proposal did not exclude third country systems explicitly.
- o FRG Pershing IA's: In a major shift, the Soviet draft Treaty proposed for the first time including US-owned warheads for the West German P-IAs in an INF agreement, a position which had not been raised in the Moscow Ministerial and which was immediately rejected by the United States as inappropriate for inclusion in a bilateral US-Soviet Treaty and incompatible with existing US-Allied programs of cooperation.
- o Definitions: the Soviet draft definition of INF missiles to be limited omitted any distinction between nuclear and conventional, and thus applied to all ground-launched missiles having a range between 500 and 5500 km.
- o Verification: The Soviet draft verification regime generally followed the structure of the US proposal. For example, it included in some form most of the measures proposed by the United States except on-site inspection (OSI) at suspect sites or of baseline data. The Soviet verification approach was less specific than the US proposal in some areas, and in a few places appeared more intrusive (e.g., the Soviet proposal included mandatory OSI of training sites and test ranges, OSI of US military bases in third countries, and inspection of private as well as manufacturing plants owned or under contract to the government). At this stage, the Soviets left many details for an Inspection Protocol, which they did not provide.

Note on Phasing:

Given the Soviet LRINF missile preponderance LRINF in Europe and globally, the US phasing proposal called for early Soviet

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reductions down to the US level in order to achieve US-Soviet equality as soon as possible. In view of the assumption that under an INF agreement 100 LRINF warheads would be permitted both parties, the US also wished to preserve the right to withdraw LRINF missiles from Europe to US territory, rather than destroy those systems, so that global equality could be reached during the reduction process. This meant the first US systems withdrawn would not necessarily be destroyed, though they no longer would be in Europe.

The Soviets sought US agreement to a percentage reductions process, and to begin US reductions in the first phase of the reductions period -- concurrently with Soviet reductions. Thus, equal levels would only be achieved at the end of the reductions period, a situation that would have maintained the global disparity during the reductions process. The Soviets also sought destruction of US systems withdrawn from Europe, arguing that the US otherwise would be engaged in a buildup of LRINF on its territory.

In addition, differences existed on the duration and number of phases, and the overall duration of reductions. The US preferred three years for the overall duration, reductions in two or three phases, and achievement of US-Soviet equality at the end of the first phase. The Soviet position called for a five year period with 50 per cent reductions by both parties in a three-year first phase and reductions to zero in Europe in a two-year second phase, and the requirement that the US eliminate (destroy) at least some missiles from the very beginning of the reductions process.

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Tabling of US Draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data (May 7, 1987)

On May 7, the United States tabled a draft MOU on Data, noting that it was agreed at Reykjavik to include this document as an integral part of the treaty, and that subsequent US-Soviet agreement called for a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data both prior to reductions and thereafter. This MOU provided for an extensive exchange on quantitative and qualitative information about the missile systems subject to the Treaty. It was unprecedented in scope and detail in nuclear arms treaties.

Agreement on a US-Soviet Joint INF Draft Text (June 1, 1987)

On June 1, the US and Soviet delegations agreed on an initial, heavily bracketed Joint Draft Text (JDT) of the treaty articles. While containing the positions of both sides, the structure essentially paralleled that of the US Draft Treaty tabled on March 4. The common language in portions of this initial JDT provided a basis for clarifying and helping to resolve the remaining INF issues. Substantial differences still remained on the following key points:

- o Verification: The Soviets asked questions about the proposed US approach, including on-site inspection, but provided little to explain their own approach.

During this period, in addition to the several treaty articles on verification and the Memorandum of Understanding on Data, the US tabled a Protocol on Destruction, Dismantlement or Conversion. By contrast, the Soviets presented only a single article containing the basic elements of their verification approach and individual paragraphs setting forth other provisions. The Soviet language suggested areas of convergence with the United States, particularly in regard to baseline inspection and inspection of destruction and dismantlement. However, the Soviet position was sketchy, and the Soviet side was unable to explain key elements of its position.

At the same time, the Soviets played a different tune publicly, and claimed that their verification approach was more demanding and intrusive than the US approach because it included the right to inspect any US military base or manufacturing plant anywhere.

A key difference at this stage was over the US preference for distinct quotas for different types of inspections. The Soviet

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side proposed a single quota for all inspections at declared facilities. The US view was that baseline inspection and inspection of the process of elimination should not be restricted by quota, whereas the Soviet position on these issues was undeveloped. In addition, the sides differed radically on inspections of suspect sites. The United States called for mandatory inspections (subject to a quota) of all facilities owned or operated by the parties on their territories or that of basing countries where LRINF missiles might be located. The Soviet Union demanded inspection rights to US military bases in third countries everywhere (not merely in the European INF "basing countries") and to any site in deployment areas in the INF basing countries (whether or not that site was owned or operated by the United States).

- o SRINF: As noted earlier, the United States was carrying out intensive consultations with its Allies about how to respond to Soviet SRINF proposals (see section above on Soviet tabling of draft treaty on April 27). At the drafting level, the Soviet side did accept the concept of an article on SRINF in the Treaty. The US continued to make clear to the Soviets that the belated Soviet effort to include the FRG's Pershing IA SRINF missile systems was unacceptable. The US categorically rejected bringing a longstanding program of cooperation into a bilateral US-Soviet agreement.
- o LRINF: The United States continued to stress that Soviet agreement to eliminate the systems capable of carrying the final 100 LRINF missile warheads on either side would have a major positive impact on the INF negotiations by making the verification requirements simpler, because monitoring INF activity (or the lack thereof) under a treaty banning LRINF missiles would be simpler than monitoring under the provisions of a treaty which allowed each side to retain some missiles.
- o Other Issues: Other differences remaining at this stage included phasing of reductions, conversion as a US method of elimination, basing of missiles within range of the other's territory, new types, and non-circumvention.

US SRINF Proposal

The US consultations with allies on SRINF, begun after the Moscow Ministerial in April, were concluded in June. On June 15, President Reagan announced that the US would support the elimination of US and Soviet shorter-range INF (SRINF) missile systems, provided that elimination was global, bilateral,

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effectively verifiable, an integral part of an INF agreement and included the Soviet SS-12 SCALEBOARD and SS-23 missile systems. On June 16, 1987 the US formally made this new proposal at the INF talks in Geneva.

As noted, prior to tabling its SRINF proposal, the US had carried out intensive consultation with its allies. The results of this consultation were reflected in the concluding communique of the NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland on June 12, 1987, in which our Allies expressed support for the global and effectively verifiable elimination of all US and Soviet SRINF missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometers as an integral part of an INF agreement. The communique also called on the Soviet Union to drop its demand to retain a portion of its SS-20 LRINF missile capability and reiterated the wish to see all INF missiles eliminated in accordance with NATO's long-standing objective. The allies also set certain priorities in other arms control areas, including the establishment of a conventional balance in Europe and the global elimination of chemical weapons.

Phase Two of Round VIII - Double Global Zero

Glitman-Obukhov/Chervov Conversations on DGZ

Prior to July 22, 1987, there were informal discussions in Geneva between Ambassador Glitman and Ambassador Obukhov and subsequently between Ambassador Glitman and General Chervov of the Soviet Ministry of Defense on the possibility of a "double global zero" solution encompassing both LRINF and SRINF missiles. Following consultations with Washington, Ambassador Glitman queried Ambassador Obukhov on June 1 about the possibility of reaching a global zero. Obukhov said he would later so indicate if this result was possible. While visiting Geneva on June 17, General Chervov, during a luncheon attended by Obukhov and others, told Ambassador Glitman that he would be willing, on an informal basis, to carry back to Moscow a proposal under which the Soviet Union would accept global zero for both LRINF and SRINF missile systems if the US side would agree to destroy and not to convert LRINF and SRINF missiles and launchers.

After consulting with Washington, Ambassador Glitman was authorized to provide an informal and unofficial but positive response to the Chervov suggestion. On June 20, Ambassador Glitman informed the Soviet side that if the Soviets proposed elimination of all US and Soviet LRINF and SRINF missile systems, the US would consider destruction or dismantlement of US LRINF and SRINF

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systems, no conversion of missiles or launchers, and no transfer of any existing US missiles or launchers to any third party. There would then be no US or Soviet INF missiles in the 500 to 5,500 km. range. The US viewed a ban on production of such US and Soviet systems as the next logical step.

Gorbachev's Acceptance of Double Global Zero (July 22, 1987)

Negotiations entered a new phase when Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev accepted the goal enunciated by President Reagan in November 1981 for the elimination of the entire class of LRINF missile systems. In a lengthy interview in the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka carried in TASS, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev indicated that the Soviets were willing to agree to a "double global zero" treaty to eliminate longer-range and shorter-range INF missiles, in effect accepting the US position to eliminate US and Soviet LRINF and SRINF missiles globally.

On July 23, Soviet negotiators at the NST negotiation in Geneva confirmed this position. At the same time, the Soviets made clear both in Moscow and Geneva that a number of what they termed "artificial obstacles" to an INF agreement would have to be removed:

- o systems to be eliminated could not be converted (e.g., P-II to P-IB or GLCM to SLCM);
- o warheads would have to be eliminated, including US warheads for FRG Pershing IAs as well as for Pershing IIs and GLCMs;
- o there would be a ban on new types;
- o phased reduction procedures would have to reflect equal percentages for both sides; and
- o verification procedures would have to be modified.

US Position on Gorbachev's Double Global Zero Statement (July 28, 1987)

Responding quickly to the suggestion in Gorbachev's interview, President Reagan announced on July 27 the tabling in Geneva the following day of a proposal for implementing the double global zero outcome. The key elements of the US proposal consisted of:

- o global elimination of US and Soviet LRINF missiles;

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- o global elimination of US and Soviet SRINF missiles;
- o destruction of missiles and launchers which are subject to elimination;
- o no conversion of INF missiles and launchers to other types of weapons systems;
- o no transfer of existing US and Soviet INF missiles and launchers to any third party; and
- o strict and effective verification provisions.

During discussion of its proposal the US again made clear that, with respect to the FRG P-IA missile force, the US would not negotiate about the systems of its allies or bilateral programs of cooperation and would continue the established program of cooperation with the FRG.

Double Global Zero Negotiations:

Soviet acceptance of the double global zero formula on July 22 was a major milestone. Coupled with a ban on production of INF missiles, it meant that the most important issues left to be negotiated were: (1) the implementation of the treaty, e.g., the phasing of reductions; (2) provisions for an effective verification regime, to aid in ensuring compliance with the terms of a treaty; (3) the data base; and (4) methods of elimination of LRINF and SRINF missile systems and their elements. Soviet agreement to the DGZ formula made it possible for the United States to simplify verification provisions in the revised draft treaty proposal that was tabled on September 14, 1987. Agreement on DGZ also further increased the tempo of negotiations, which had already accelerated as the Soviets began to unveil their verification position between June 16 and July 2. It therefore became possible to foresee completion of the treaty before the end of 1987.

US Warheads on West German Pershing IA Missiles

Gorbachev's July 22 announcement accepting DGZ had also proposed elimination of the West German Pershing IA missile force and associated US warheads. The United States rejected this element of the Soviet proposal, making clear that our Allies' forces are not subject to a bilateral US-Soviet treaty.

Chancellor Kohl announced on August 26 that by decision of the FRG government, West Germany would forego modernization and

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dismantle its Pershing missile force, provided a US-Soviet INF agreement based on DGZ was fully implemented.

XVII. SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MINISTERIAL IN WASHINGTON (September 15-17, 1987)

At the conclusion of the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Washington of September 15-17, the United States and USSR announced agreement in principle to conclude a treaty for the global elimination of US and Soviet INF missiles. They agreed the treaty should be ready for signing in the fall, and that the date for a summit to sign the treaty should be set at the next Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow, scheduled for October.

Agreement also was reached on procedures for the elimination of INF missile front sections, specifically, that before US and Soviet INF missiles are eliminated, nuclear warhead devices and guidance elements will be removed from the front sections, while the remainder of the front section structure would then be eliminated under agreed procedures.

It further was agreed, in view of the FRG decision in August to eliminate its P-IA missile force, that once the US program of cooperation with the FRG had ended by decision of the FRG government the US would remove its reentry vehicles (RVs) associated with FRG missiles, and these would be eliminated according to the same procedures as those for eliminating missile front sections in the treaty. The United States made it clear that the US-Soviet bilateral agreement concerning the disposition of US reentry vehicles does not apply to third country forces nor affect existing US programs of cooperation with allies.

XVIII. SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MINISTERIAL IN MOSCOW (October 22-23, 1987)

The Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow on October 22-23 made progress on a series of detailed issues, many related to the specific procedures for implementing the agreement. The following week in Geneva, the Soviets agreed to exchange data under the MOU, and to eliminate all SS-5s; the US agreed to eliminate its P-IAs (none of which was currently deployed).

Agreement was reached on the time frame for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles (IRMs) and their front sections, of shorter-range missiles (SRMs) and their front sections, and of reentry vehicles released from programs of cooperation. It was

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agreed that the period of elimination for IRMs and their front sections would be three years, and that the period of elimination for SRMs and their front sections will be no longer than 18 months (and preferably will be 12 months if technically feasible).

N.B.: With respect to the terminology used in the closing stages of the negotiations, the term IRMs (intermediate-range missiles) referred to all US and Soviet ground-launched missiles with capabilities for ranges between 1000 and 5500 kilometers, and the term SRMs (shorter-range missiles) referred to all US and Soviet ground-launched missiles with capabilities for ranges between 500 and 1000 kilometers. The terms IRM and SRM are generally equivalent to the terms LRINF missile and SRINF missile, respectively, as used by the US previously in the negotiations.

On procedures for missile elimination, it was also agreed that "launch-to-destruct" will be permitted for a limited time and for a limited number of IRMs.

In order to move toward agreement on inspection procedures, the US offered to agree that Soviet aircraft will be used in the USSR and US aircraft in the United States to transport visiting inspection teams, contingent on Soviet agreement on the other aspects of the on-site inspection (OSI) procedures in a manner consistent with US positions.

Consistent with the decision made by the FRG, agreement was reached on an three-year "overall period of elimination," with all US and Soviet IRMs and their RVs to be eliminated fifteen days prior to the end of that period, and for RVs released (by unilateral action of the FRG government) from existing programs of cooperation to be eliminated during the last fifteen days of the three-year period, using agreed procedures.

IX. Negotiating Issues in the Last Stage of Negotiations

Important issues had to be resolved in the last stage of negotiations. These included:

- the disposition of missile front sections and nuclear warhead devices;
- phasing of reductions;
- R & D boosters and launch provisions;
- missile conversion;

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- missile stage similarity;
- continuous portal monitoring; and
- final approach to OSI, with implications for:
 - o suspect-site inspection; and
 - o NTM enhancement.

These issues and their outcomes are briefly discussed below, followed by separate treatment of the final negotiating issues related to the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data. In addition, the Basing Country Agreement and Exchange of Notes issues were addressed in the negotiations in Geneva and were settled in the last stages of those negotiations.

Disposition of Missile Front Sections and Nuclear Warhead Devices:

The US view of elimination of INF missiles was that, for a variety of reasons, the focus should be on the destruction of the missiles and their entire delivery systems. Our concerns included the serious verification difficulties associated with the elimination of nuclear warhead devices.

Following the Washington Ministerial, the Soviet negotiators again argued that US INF warheads must be destroyed. The purpose of the Soviet approach was to justify their position regarding the West German Pershing IA force. The Soviet side declined to resolve this issue until the issue of phasing of reductions had been fully settled. It had been previously agreed that the guidance elements and nuclear warhead devices would be removed from the front sections before missiles were moved to elimination facilities. Then the missiles with their remaining front section structures would be eliminated by agreed procedures (i.e., physically destroyed).

However, the Soviet side raised the issue yet again in Moscow at the October 22-23 Ministerial. There the front section issue was finally resolved on the basis of what had been agreed in Washington in September.

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Phasing of Reductions

In late summer, the US reshaped its proposal on phasing to allow for two or three phases within a three year overall period of elimination, calling for equal levels at the end of the penultimate phase (which could be a longer first phase of a two phase period). Earlier, the US had called for the Soviet Union to reduce to equal levels by the end of the first of three phases. At the Moscow ministerial of October 22-23, the Soviet Union, which until then had called for a five-year overall period of elimination, agreed to three years, but continued to call for reductions by both sides to begin from the time of the treaty entry into force (EIF). The final agreement on phasing of LRINF elimination called for a 29 month first (penultimate) phase, at the end of which US and Soviet equality must be achieved. The US agreed to participate in the process of reductions from the beginning during the first phase.

The United States had consistently preserved its right to control the INF force mix between the two US types of LRINF missile systems, Pershing and GLCM, while the Soviet Union sought to gain US agreement to an outcome featuring emphasis on reductions in Pershings. The final agreement, corresponding with US plans for phasing of reductions established in consultation with basing country Allies, was that the US would carry out the reductions in a manner that ensured we would continue to have Pershing systems until the end of the elimination period.

With respect to phasing of SRINF missile reductions, the US opening position was that elimination should be completed within one year. The Soviet position called for elimination over three years. During the negotiations, the Soviets contended that a one year SRINF elimination period would impose practical problems. The final agreement was to complete SRINF elimination within eighteen months, under the following conditions: that all deployed missiles and all launchers be removed to elimination facilities within three months, and all remaining non-deployed missiles be removed to such facilities within twelve months.

The US initially opposed a Soviet proposal for "launch to destruction" as a method of elimination because flight test data from such launches could be useful for efforts to maintain the reliability of a covert capability. The Soviet Union sought the right to use this method not only for a large part of its LRINF systems, but also for SRINF missiles. It was eventually agreed that up to 100 LRINF missiles (IRMs) could be destroyed by launch within the first six months after the treaty enters into force. The parties agreed to bar any use of telemetry except for broadcast

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of unencrypted telemetry for range safety. The Soviet Union finally agreed to our proposal of a three year overall period of elimination.

The other accepted methods of elimination were detailed by each missile type and further differentiated by parts of the missile (e.g., stages, fuel, rocket nozzles or motors, front sections, canisters, etc.). In general, the other accepted methods of elimination for solid-fuel missiles, stages, and their other components included explosive demolition, burning in place (static firing), and crushing or flattening. The accepted methods of elimination of cruise missiles included cutting the airframe and crushing or flattening structures and launch canisters. There is no limit to how many solid-fuel missile stages a side may burn by static firing, but it was agreed that instrumentation is not permitted in using that means of elimination.

R & D Boosters

The US sought a provision in the Treaty that would make clear that the parties retained their freedom with respect to R & D Booster systems critical to strategic defensive forces, which might otherwise be considered to be treaty-limited intermediate-range or shorter-range systems. At the same time, we sought restrictions on R & D boosters capable of ranges in the treaty-limited range band in order to preclude the maintenance of INF operational capabilities in an R & D guise or at test facilities. It was agreed that neither side would have more than a total of 35 launchers for such boosters at any one time. The Soviet Union accepted the principle that such R & D boosters and launchers would be permitted, along with the further stipulation that the launchers must be limited and the stages must be distinct from those of existing types of missiles limited by the treaty. The Soviets also agreed that such boosters be used only for R & D purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves, and agreed to prior notification procedures for any test-flights of such boosters with a range capability in the treaty limited band.

Missile Conversion

Earlier in the negotiations, the US had proposed conversion as a means of reducing INF missiles. In the context of the 1986 Reykjavik accord, the US wished to preserve the option of converting LRINF missile stages and components to use in SRINF or non-INF systems of lesser range. Once it became apparent from the Glitman-Obukhov/Chervov exchange in June 1987 that the USSR might accept a double global zero solution, this option was

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reconsidered. After the Gorbachev announcement on July 22, 1987 accepting double global zero, the United States decided to forego conversion of its INF systems. Hence, the basic agreement in the negotiations was that conversion of INF systems would be prohibited. The draft treaty thereafter provided for a ban on the future production, and for the physical elimination, of all solid propellant stages of existing INF missiles.

SS-20/SS-25 Missile Stage Similarity and Continuous Portal Monitoring

Before the Soviet Union came to accept the double global zero formula in late July 1987, the assumption that residual INF forces would exist precluded bans on production and flight-testing. Even after DGZ, the five year reductions concept -- if accepted by the United States -- would have required maintaining flight-test programs for operational reliability during the period of reductions. But with convergence late in the negotiations on the shorter, three-year overall period of elimination, it became possible to agree on a total ban on production and flight-testing.

Once there was agreement on double global zero together with a ban on INF missile system production and missile flight-testing, it appeared that the earlier US proposal for perimeter and portal monitoring of production/final assembly facilities of INF systems was no longer essential. However, the Soviet Union stated in October, shortly before the Moscow ministerial meeting, that the SS-20 and SS-25 first stages are "outwardly similar, though not interchangeable," and could not be easily distinguished visually by an inspector.

This posed the problem of how to confirm that SS-25 first stages were not being used to construct SS-20 missiles. In order to help verify the ban on production of SS-20 missiles, the Soviets returned to what was originally a US idea. They proposed that the US have the right to "continuous portal monitoring" of the Soviet SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk, where SS-20 missiles also previously have been assembled. In turn, the US agreed to allow the Soviets continuous monitoring of a US missile production facility, in this case Hercules Plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah where Pershing II stages had been produced and other missile stages are now produced.

Final Decisions on On-Site Inspections (OSI)

Suspect-Site Inspections

In the context of an INF agreement that would have permitted

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the US and USSR each to retain missiles and launchers capable of carrying 100 warheads, the US proposed inspection of any site in either country where such missiles and launchers could be located -- suspect sites. After the Soviet Union agreed to the global double zero proposal, in July 1987, the US reexamined its proposals for suspect-site inspection. Since any verification provisions would be reciprocal, the US weighed the potential risk of permitting Soviet access in the US to sensitive facilities or privately owned property against the potential verification benefits of suspect-site inspection. In that context, the US determined that on balance, overall US interests were served by on-site inspections short of "anywhere, anytime" inspections.

NTM Enhancement

In view of the outward similarity between the first stage of the SS-20 and the SS-25, the US insisted on, and the Soviets agreed to a cooperative measure to enhance national technical means (NTM) of verification. The Soviet Union is obliged on a US short-notice request up to six times a year to open the retractable roofs on the single-bay garages at SS-25 bases and remove SS-25 missiles on launchers from them for a specified length of time, so that they can be monitored by US NTMs to aid in determining whether there are SS-20s at the SS-25 bases.

Elimination Protocol

The US first tabled a draft of the Elimination Protocol (initially known as the Destruction, Dismantlement, or Conversion Protocol) in May 1987. The Soviets responded with their own version in September. The US achieved its objective of establishing the specific and detailed procedures for the elimination of missiles, launchers, support equipment and support structures.

The Elimination Protocol also embodies agreement on the disposition of reentry vehicles (RVs) which by unilateral decision have been released from Programs of Cooperation (i.e. the US-owned RVs on FRG P-IAs).

The US and Soviet sides held discussion among technical experts on methods of destroying solid fuel ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. They agreed that explosive demolition and burning (static firing) would be the main methods of eliminating solid fuel ballistic missiles, and cutting, crushing and flattening the airframes the main methods of eliminating cruise missiles.

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The US insisted that destruction procedures should render treaty-limited items incapable of being restored. The Soviet Union insisted on strict reciprocity in determining what elements would be subject to destruction and what could be salvaged. The elimination procedures meet both these criteria.

Inspection Protocol

The Inspection Protocol sets out the specific procedures for carrying out on-site and continuous inspections. The US tabled a draft Inspection Protocol on September 14, 1987. This draft had been developed in consultation with the basing countries before it was presented to the Soviets because Soviet inspectors would be carrying out inspections on the territories of the basing countries.

The Soviets accepted basic US provisions that: guarantee diplomatic privileges and immunities of inspectors; protect the sovereignty of the basing countries; ensure that inspectors do not unnecessarily interfere with on-going activities at the inspection site; protect against the compromise of sensitive information at the inspection site; prohibit the inspected Party from cancelling inspections in progress; and permit the inspecting Party to bring its own equipment to the site. At US insistence, the Inspection Protocol includes precise details about how inspections will be conducted, thus minimizing arguments after entry into force about the rights of the inspecting and inspected parties.

With respect to short-notice inspections, an essential US objective was to preserve an element of surprise in the conduct of inspections by minimizing the amount of time between notification of the site to be inspected and arrival at the site to a matter of a few hours. At first, the Soviets resisted the basic concept of short-notice, rejecting arguments that the element of surprise was essential to verification. They countered that the main consideration should be to provide adequate time after notification for transportation, site preparation, etc. However, the US insisted that the ability to carry out inspections on short notice was essential to the effectiveness and credibility of the inspection regime. The Soviets finally accepted the US concept.

The Inspection Protocol specifies procedures that govern the conduct of inspections at the inspection site. The central assumption underlying US-proposed procedures was that the inspectors' objective should be to help verify that there are not more missiles, missile stages, or launchers at the inspection site than the number declared by the inspected Party. To assist in accomplishing this objective, the US proposed that inspectors have the right to inspect any structure or container at the inspection

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site where a missile, missile stage, or launcher could be hidden. In contrast, the initial Soviet assumption was that the inspectors' objective should simply be to count the numbers of missiles and launchers that the inspected Party shows them. The Soviets eventually agreed that the sides would have the right to inspect all structures and objects within the inspection site boundary that are capable of containing a missile, missile stage or launcher of the inspected party that is subject to the Treaty.

The Inspection Protocol covers continuous monitoring at missile final assembly or production facilities (for the US, designated parts of the Hercules plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah, and for the Soviets, the SS-20/25 final assembly plant at Votkinsk). The US objective was to obtain a monitoring system that would help to ensure that SS-20s could not exit at the monitored installation. The sides agreed: to station thirty inspectors at each facility; to permit the application of non-destructive imaging to every missile canister exiting the facilities; and to permit opening the end of eight missile canisters which met agreed size limits per year to measure the stages inside.

Memorandum of Understanding on Data

At Reykjavik in October 1986, the US and U.S.S.R. agreed in principle that a comprehensive exchange of data would be a central and integral element of an INF verification regime. The US initially tabled a draft format for Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data in May 1987. However, the Soviet Union declined to begin the necessary work of negotiating the MOU structure and deferred the formation of a working group for several months.

The Soviets essentially agreed to the basic structure and data categories of the MOU as proposed by the US. This included: (1) definitions of MOU terms supplementing those in the Treaty; (2) a quantitative statement of the overall aggregates of deployed and non-deployed IRMs and SRMs and their launchers; (3) a disaggregated list of the specific locations at which deployed and non-deployed IRMs and SRMs, and their launchers, agreed support structures, and equipment were to be found (e.g., missile operating bases, deployment areas and missile support facilities) and the designated elimination facilities during the three-year reductions period; (4) technical data on IRMs and SRMs and their launchers; and (5) photos of items subject to elimination and site diagrams of the locations subject to inspection.

The Soviets delayed tabling the specific MOU data. Agreement was reached in October that the "as of" date for the MOU would be 1 November, 1987. Data was then exchanged in several steps. The

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Soviets provided MOU data in four installments on 26 October, 18 and 21 November, and again on 2 December.

The MOU data will be updated by a further exchange of data after the Treaty enters into force. All of the data will be subject to verification by each side with the help of baseline inspections within 90 days after the Treaty enters into force.

Basing Country Agreements and Exchange of Notes

The United States consulted fully and regularly with its Allies on all aspects of the INF Treaty. Since we were prepared to agree to permit Soviet inspections of facilities in the five Allied basing countries, i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, one important element of those consultations involved setting the conditions for such inspections. At the same time, we and the Allies agreed that we should avoid any direct negotiations between the basing countries and the USSR on any matters pertaining to a strictly bilateral US-Soviet agreement. While preserving this fundamental principle of the INF Treaty as a solely bilateral agreement, we developed two supporting documents which enabled the US to give the Soviets access to sovereign basing countries and defined the conditions of such access while preserving the sovereignty of the basing countries concerned.

Parallel with and distinct from the INF Treaty, we negotiated the Basing Country Agreement between the United States and the Allied basing countries, enabling the US to guarantee that the Treaty provisions related to inspections at facilities which are located in those countries could be carried out under terms consistent with the Treaty. This agreement was signed by Secretary of State Shultz and the Foreign Ministers of the basing countries at Brussels on December 11, 1987.

The diplomatic notes exchanged between the Soviet Union and each basing country express the willingness of each basing country to permit the Soviet Union to carry out inspections on their territories, and the commitment of the Soviet Union to behave during the inspections in a manner consistent with its obligations under the Treaty regarding the conduct of inspections. The United States has exchanged identical notes with the those basing countries in the Warsaw Pact where Soviet systems and facilities subject to the Treaty are located, namely, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The text of the notes is identical in each of these cases and was worked out in Geneva between the United States and Soviet delegations working on the INF Treaty itself.

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