

## ROUTING SLIP

TO:

|          |            | ACTION | INFO | DATE | INITIAL |
|----------|------------|--------|------|------|---------|
| 1        | DCI        |        | X    |      |         |
| 2        | DDCI       |        | X    |      |         |
| 3        | EXDIR      |        |      |      |         |
| 4        | D/ICS      |        |      |      |         |
| 5        | DDI        |        | X    |      |         |
| 6        | DDA        |        |      |      |         |
| 7        | DDO        |        |      |      |         |
| 8        | DDS&T      |        |      |      |         |
| 9        | Chm/NIC    |        | X    |      |         |
| 10       | GC         |        |      |      |         |
| 11       | IG         |        |      |      |         |
| 12       | Compt      |        |      |      |         |
| 13       | D/OCA      |        |      |      |         |
| 14       | D/PAO      |        |      |      |         |
| 15       | D/PERS     |        |      |      |         |
| 16       | D/Ex Staff |        |      |      |         |
| 17       | C/ACIS     |        | X    |      |         |
| 18       | D/SOVA/DI  |        | X    |      |         |
| 19       | NIO/USSR   |        | X    |      |         |
| 20       | D/OSWR/DI  |        | X    |      |         |
| 21       |            |        |      |      |         |
| 22       |            |        |      |      |         |
| SUSPENSE |            | _____  |      |      |         |
|          |            | Date   |      |      |         |

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary  
19 Feb '88

Date

3637 (10-81)



United States Department of State


Washington, D.C. 20520

Feb 18, 1988

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| Executive Registry |
| 88-0666X           |

Dear Bill,

Here is a copy of a memo I sent to Shultz yesterday. It incorporates comments on an earlier draft I showed



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I trust you will find it supports your views.

Warm regards,

Ed Romney



C-119-12



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 17, 1988

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/ART - E. Rowny (B)

SUBJECT: Key START Issues

The President has told us to "go for the gold" and seek a good, verifiable, START treaty by the Moscow summit, but to walk away from a bad treaty. Therefore, it is essential that we identify the critical issues before you begin the ministerial round. In my view, the following issues are critical to our national security:

START/SDI linkage. We must get from the Soviets an explicit repudiation of their position that violations of any D&S Agreement or the ABM Treaty, based on their unilateral interpretation, would constitute grounds for suspension of START reductions. We cannot sign a START agreement under ambiguous terms which give standing to the Soviet claim that they have been granted a right to bail out of START if we test under the broad interpretation. Failure to close this issue invites certain Congressional strangling of SDI. A START agreement at this cost would undermine our national security.

Verification. No one disputes that the START verification regime must be an order of magnitude more extensive than that for INF. It is simply inherent in an agreement which reduces 50% as compared to one which reduces to zero. Specific elements of such a highly complex regime must be cleared up as a matter of highest priority. This will be difficult because it cuts both ways. In my judgment, the minimum essential features are:

- An extensive array of PPM sites, continuously monitoring ballistic missile production, storage and repair, to include tagging to reduce uncertainties about non-deployed systems. We must have more than a token presence.
- A broad right to inspect suspect-sites beyond declared facilities (only on U.S. & Soviet territory), with a limited right to protect sensitive installations and programs. Both the broad and limited rights are politically imperative.

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DECL: OADR

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Mobile ICBMs. The arguments for permitting mobiles in the interest of stability and for banning them in the interest of verification are both well-understood and compelling. I and others have testified that our support for INF depended, in the final analysis, on adequate verification of mobile systems, which was clinched by our global zero outcome and by the production/flight test ban. There appears to be a consensus that our rail-mobiles should be protected and that we would be willing to give up road-mobiles if the Soviets did the same. In any case, we are a long way from an acceptable verification scheme for mobile ICBMs.

Accordingly, I recommend that we hold firm in Moscow to our position on banning mobiles while we simultaneously: 1) press the Soviets to tell us how they would verify mobile ICBMs, and 2) work out our own verification scheme which will meet our security needs and satisfy the Congress.

ALCM accountability. We must protect our conventional cruise missile programs as the primary objective. If this is assured, we can reduce the 1500 km range to 1000 km in exchange for a concession of equal value. We should stick to the discounting rule for now, while we consider adopting alternative proposals such as the "as equipped rule."

SLCM limitations and verification. We cannot accept any limitations on conventional SLCMs, as the Soviets have recently proposed. Nor can we tolerate verification measures which would confirm the presence of nuclear weapons aboard a U.S. submarine or surface ship. To do so would immediately compromise our "neither-confirm-nor-deny" policy and wreak havoc with our allies. We should listen to Soviet explanations of their "concepts". However, it is evident that the Soviets have no credible verification scheme.

Non-transfer/circumvention clause. This clause is a Soviet vehicle for wedge-driving. We cannot accept any restrictions on the UK Trident program, nor can we bow to any implication that maintaining our alliances or deterrent fabric would constitute a violation of a U.S.-Soviet START treaty. The current squabble over FRG P-1A testing exemplifies the risks of including such a clause. There is no place in a START treaty for a NT/NC clause.

The following issues, while not critical to our security, would be extremely valuable in their own right and useful in marketing a START treaty to conservative elements in Congress:

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Heavy ICBM flight-testing and modernization ban. Such a ban is needed because a 50% reduction in SS-18s still leaves a ratio of 1.5 to 1, possibly greater, against our silos. Kissinger, Nixon, Dole, and others have drawn attention to this publicly. We can quash their objections by banning modernization and flight testing. It prevents Soviet accuracy and throwweight enhancements which could more than compensate for their loss of SS-18 warheads. It would also result in a decay of the residual force and would, in time, reduce their destabilizing first-strike threat.

Throwweight. A cosmetic throwweight limitation will not suffice. We need a direct, objective, monitorable limitation to close off the breakout potential of large Soviet missiles.

ICBM Sublimit. By retaining this barrier, we are better able to maneuver the Soviets into increasing the proportion of SLBMs and air-breathers in their force posture. This will benefit stability. If we don't nail it down, the Soviets will be free to creep back into an ICBM-dominant structure which supports the preemptive strategy they profess to be moving away from.

cc: Ambassador Kampelman  
Ambassador Nitze

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